THE CALCULUS OF ACCOMMODATION:
CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, AND OTHER CLASHES
BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE STATE

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Abstract: This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether, and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should be exempted from the dictates of civil law. The “political maelstrom” over the Obama administration’s sterilization and contraceptive coverage mandate is just one of many clashes between religion and the state. Religious groups and individuals have also sought religious exemptions to the duty to assist with abortions or facilitate same-sex marriages. In all these contexts, religious objectors claim a special right of entitlement to follow their religious tenets, in the face of equally compelling claims that religious accommodations threaten access and may impose significant costs on others. Legislators and other policymakers have struggled with how to advance two compelling, and at times conflicting, values—access and religious liberty. This Article examines, and responds to, a number of “sticking points” voiced by legislators about a qualified exemption for religious objectors that would permit them to step aside from facilitating same-sex marriages so long as no hardship will result. These concerns bear an uncanny resemblance to reasons why some believe the Obama administration should not yield further on the coverage mandate. This Article maintains that religious accommodations qualified by hardship to others can transform what could be a zero-sum proposition into one in which access and religious freedom can both be affirmed.

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INTRODUCTION

2012 has witnessed a “political maelstrom” over the Obama administration’s regulations to implement the new health care reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). These regulations require nearly all employers and health insurers to cover sterilization procedures and contraceptives, including newer emergency contraceptives like ella which sometimes act after fertilization to prevent pregnancy. Even before the regulations become final, a hue and cry arose from the faith community because mandated coverage places the bulk of religious employers “in the untenable position of having to choose between violating the law and violating their conscience[s]”—specifically, their religious belief that life begins at con-

3 On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, upheld the ACA’s individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power, while striking down a portion of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as exceeding Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
5 See infra notes 137–156 (discussing the mechanisms of action for ella and Plan B).
ception and should not be destroyed. Although the regulations exempt churches, their cramped definition of religious employer provides no refuge for religiously affiliated universities, hospitals, and social services agencies like Catholic Charities, the “arm of compassion” of the Catholic Church. As one group that supported the ACA, the Catholic Health Association, explained: “The impact of being told we do not fit the new definition of a religious employer and therefore cannot operate our ministries following our consciences has jolted us. . . . From President Thomas Jefferson to President Barack Obama, we have been promised a respect for appropriate religious freedom.”

These claims of a special right to be exempted from the dictates of civil law were met by equally vigorous claims that “all women, regardless of their employer, should be able to access the birth control coverage benefit.” In promulgating the regulations, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) relied on an Institute of Medicine study showing that “women have unique health care needs and burdens,” including the need for

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7 See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2012) (stating that, as a Catholic programming television station, Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN) “does not believe that contraception, sterilization, or abortion are properly understood to constitute medicine,” and that “these procedures involve gravely immoral practices, including the intentional destruction of innocent human life”). EWTN argued that “[h]aving to pay a fine to the taxing authorities for the privilege of practicing one’s religion or controlling one’s own speech is un-American, unprecedented, and flagrantly unconstitutional,” and asserted that “the Mandate can be interpreted as nothing other than a deliberate attack by the Defendants on the religious beliefs of EWTN and millions of other Americans.”

8 See Greg Johnson, Obama’s ‘Fig-Leaf’ Compromise on Contraception Won’t Mollify Conservatives, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 2012, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012-feb/12/obamas-fig-leaf-compromise-on-contraception-wont. Under the regulations, an organization is an exempt “religious employer” only when it primarily employs and serves those who share its faith, seeks to inculcate its religious values, and meets Internal Revenue Service tests for a faith-based body. See HHSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 4. Religious groups have litigated, and lost, claims that state-level contraceptive coverage mandates too narrowly define exempt religious organizations. See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 95 (Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y. 2006).


contraceptive services. Women’s rights groups, such as the National Women’s Law Center, cheered the Obama administration for establishing “a major milestone in protecting women’s health.” Others decried the inclusion of even a limited exemption for religious organizations and encouraged HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius to hold the line against broader exemptions.

These competing claims about whether and when to accommodate religious objectors arise because religious objectors are not, as a matter of federal constitutional right, shielded against the burdens of

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11 Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727–28 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54) (citing Inst. of Med., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 16 (2011)). Based on the Institute of Medicine study, HHS and DOL concluded that “[t]he contraceptive coverage requirement is . . . designed to serve the compelling public health and gender equity goals described.” Id. at 8729.


generally applicable laws.\textsuperscript{15} Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court specifically noted in the 1990 case, \textit{Employment Division v. Smith}, religious groups and individuals must look to the political process for these accommodations.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Importantly, laws that are not neutral may also be struck down in accordance with \textit{Smith}. See 494 U.S. at 890. A recent case from Washington, \textit{Stormans Inc. v. Selecky}, illustrates how contextual the analysis of neutrality is. See 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007), vacated, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). In \textit{Stormans}, a group of pharmacists filed suit to preliminarily enjoin state rules lacking a conscience exemption. Id. The rules required them to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, which violated their religious convictions. Id. The federal district court granted this injunction, finding the rules to be neither neutral nor generally applicable given evidence that “strongly suggests that the overriding objective of the [rule] was, to the degree possible, to eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of dispensing medication.” Id. at 1259.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that, from the “thin” evidentiary record, the rules were neutral and generally applicable because the “object of the rules was to ensure safe and timely patient access to lawful and lawfully prescribed medications . . . [and to] eliminate all objections that do not ensure patient health, safety, and access to medication.” 586 F.3d at 1131–32, 1142. The court emphasized that the rules did not single out drugs to which pharmacists might have a religious objection. See id. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case. Id. at 1126.

On remand, the district court conducted a twelve-day bench trial, developing a fifty-four page record of factual findings, and concluded that the rules were neither neutral nor generally applicable. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2012). With respect to neutrality, the court found that the rules “are riddled with exemptions” that undermine their secular purpose, “but contain no such exemptions for identical religiously-motivated conduct.” Id. at 1190. Further, the state failed to explain why the refuse-and-refer policy for secular exemptions would create prohibitive difficulties for religious exemptions. Id. Lastly, the court found that “[t]he rules are not generally applicable because the State does not enforce them against all pharmacies, or even to all pharmacies with religious objections to dispensing [emergency contraception].” Id. at 1199. The court, applying strict scrutiny per \textit{Smith}, concluded that the rules were unconstitutional. Id. at 1201.

\textsuperscript{16} See 494 U.S. at 890 (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or organization’s exercise of religious liberty). The \textit{Smith} Court emphasized:

\begin{quote}
[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
The controversy over the coverage mandate precipitated just such a political process, with the Obama administration making a series of

must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.

Id.

In January 2012, the Supreme Court, in *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC*, held that the ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, applies to an employee who works in a church-affiliated entity (for example, in a church school), based on an overall assessment of the role of the employee, which derives partially from the church’s own understanding of that role. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–07 (2012). Shortly after the decision, a number of commentators grappled with the impact of *Hosanna-Tabor* on Smith’s broader holding that religious groups and individuals must look to the political process for protection. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, *What Comes After Hosanna-Tabor*, First Things (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2012/01/what-comes-after-hosanna-tabor (comparing Smith’s reasoning that “a blanket rule that religious claims nearly always trigger exemptions to generally applicable laws would in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,” with *Hosanna-Tabor*, which said “in effect, that when it comes to the right to govern themselves in the choice of their clergy, ministers, leaders, and others whose functions and duties are distinctly religious, churches and other religious organizations are indeed a law unto themselves”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: *Hosanna-Tabor* and the First Amendment, Engage, 168, 168–70 (Mar. 2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120322_EsbeckEngage13.1.pdf (making a similar comparison).

The White House has indicated that it does not believe there are “any constitutional rights issues” presented by the coverage mandate. See Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112 [hereinafter January Press Briefing]. Amid this political process, thirty separate suits have been filed by religious employers to date, arguing that the contraceptive mandate, as applied to objecting religious employers, violates the First Amendment and RFRA. See, e.g., *supra* note 7 (discussing the suit brought by EWTN). These suits, which began with the EWTN suit, reached a crescendo on May 21, 2012, when “43 Catholic educational, charitable and other entities filed a dozen lawsuits in federal court . . . charging that the [coverage mandate] violates their religious freedom.” Julie Roviner, Catholic Groups Sue Obama Administration over Birth Control Rule, NPR (May 21, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/21/153218446/catholic-groups-sue-obama-administration-over-birth-control-rule; see HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (listing lawsuits); see also *supra* notes 6–7 and accompanying text (noting the religious backlash against the mandate). The University of Notre Dame, as discussed later in this Article, was among the forty-three institutions. See *infra* notes 322, 326–327 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuits).

Also among the forty-three institutions was Wheaton College, an evangelical institution. For some, Wheaton’s inclusion shows that “[t]his is not a fight over contraception. Evangelicals, in fact, don’t agree with Catholics on their opposition to contraception and birth control.” Instead, the “issue is about religious freedom.” Napp Nazworth, Wheaton College, Catholic University Jointly Sue over Birth Control Mandate, Christian Post (July 18, 2012, 4:01 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/wheaton-college-catholic-university-jointly-sue-over-birth-control-mandate-78491/#OQD2M1kdBlgGwqL99 (quoting John Garvey, president of Catholic University of America).
attempts to quell the rancor over the coverage mandate. First, it promised to work with religious groups to address their concerns before the deadline for implementation in subsequent plan years. Speaking for the White House, Domestic Policy Director Cecilia Munoz reiterated the administration’s commitment “to both respecting religious beliefs and increasing access to important preventive services.” The administration extended the deadline for compliance by one year, a concession dismissed by critics as “kicking the can down the road.”

These suits are now working their way through the courts with varying success. For example, in Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice on standing and ripeness grounds. No. 4:12CV3035, 2012 WL 2913402, at *20, 24 (D. Neb. July 17, 2012). The following day, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a case without prejudice brought by Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic liberal arts college, on similar grounds. See Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, No. CIV.A. 11-1989 JEB, 2012 WL 2914417, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he Court agrees that Belmont’s injury is too speculative to confer standing and that the case is also not ripe for decision.”). In August 2012, the same court dismissed Wheaton College’s suit, concluding that in light of “concrete steps” by the Obama administration “to address Wheaton’s concerns, including their commitment not to enforce the challenged regulations against Wheaton while accommodations are being negotiated, Wheaton has not alleged a concrete and imminent injury [necessary for] judicial review.” Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1169, 2012 WL 3637162, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012).

By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted a preliminary injunction in a suit brought by a private, for-profit company, Hercules Industries, Inc., whose formal policies are based on Catholic principles. Newland v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1123-JLK, 2012 WL 3069154, at *1–2 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012). The court compared the possible harms threatening the plaintiff, the government, and the public and concluded that “[o]n balance, the threatened harm to Plaintiffs, impingement of their right to freely exercise their religious beliefs, and the concomitant public interest in that right strongly favor the entry of injunctive relief.” Id. at *5. The court, however, specifically limited the scope of its order so as not to enjoin the enforcement of the coverage mandate against other parties. Id. at *9.


See Memorandum from the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. on Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 2 (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/02102012/20120210-Preventive-Services-Bulletin.pdf (delaying enforcement “until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013” for “non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by non-profit organizations whose plans have not covered contraceptive services for religious reasons at any point from . . . February 10, 2012[,] onward,” but requiring the plan to notify employees). HHS issued guidance on August 15, 2012, which clarifies that the safe harbor is avail-
The Obama administration then proffered its much-maligned “accommodation” for religious employers. The President explained:

[I]f a woman’s employer is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objection to providing contraceptive services as part of their health plan, the insurance company—not the hospital, not the charity—will be required to reach out and offer the woman contraceptive care free of charge without co-pays, without hassle.

This suggestion, too, was met with derision from critics. In a statement issued after the President’s announcement, more than five hundred scholars, university presidents, religious leaders, and others—including Catholic Cardinal Timothy Dolan, archbishop of New York and president of the U.S. Council of Bishops—labeled the accommodation “unacceptable,” hiding a “grave violation” of religious liberty behind a “cheap accounting trick.”

[hereinafter CAMPUS NOTES] (discussing the possible exemptions to the extension).

148 Johnson, supra note 8 (quoting the Catholic Archbishop of Miami, Thomas Wenski).


23 See Richard Wolf, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/02/source-obama-to-change-birth-control-rule/1 (noting that “White House officials took pains to avoid the word ‘compromise,’ [because] under the accommodation, no woman who wants access to contraceptives should be denied”).

Other critics have also labeled the accommodation a "shell game." See Wolf, supra note 23 (quoting law professor Robert Destro of Catholic University).

Religious objections have come not only from Catholics, but also from representatives of numerous Muslim, mainline Christian, and evangelical Christian universities. See generally id. (including as signatories the leaders of Arizona Christian University, Biola University, Dordt College, East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist University, Oklahoma
At each step, the Obama administration has responded that its position strikes “the appropriate balance between religious beliefs and the need to provide preventive services to American women.”25 White House Chief of Staff Jacob Lew maintained that this final accommodation “set[s] out [the administration’s] policy . . . . We are going to finalize it in the final rules [because] we think that’s the right approach.”26

Baptist University, Oklahoma Christian University, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Union University, and Zaytuna College, among other religious institutions of higher education).


Among the perverse incentives created by the ACA are that:

The ACA . . . deter[s] low- and moderate-income taxpayers from accepting jobs with employers that offer “affordable” health insurance; . . . discourage[s] many low- and moderate-income taxpayers from attempting to increase their household incomes; . . . dissuade[s] employers from hiring low- and moderate-income taxpayers and . . . encourage[s] employers to reduce the salaries paid to some low- and moderate-income employees; . . . prompt[s] employers to shift some low- and moderate-income employees from full-time to part-time positions; . . . [and] induce[s] employers to stop offering ‘affordable’ health insurance to at least some low- and moderate-income employees . . . .

See Gamage, supra, at *2–3.

26 See Obama Chief of Staff: No More Compromise, Contraceptive Rule Is Done Deal, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/12/obama-chief-staff-no-more-compromise-contraceptive-rule-is-done-deal. The Obama administration finalized the regulations on February 15, 2012. See Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728. Since the Obama administration signaled its unwillingness to compromise further, the U.S. Department of Justice has asked the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to dismiss a suit challenging the coverage mandate because “the administration is working on an amendment to address the religious objections.” Brian Bowling, Feds Ask Judge to Dismiss ‘Morning-After’ Lawsuit, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (May 1, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://triblive.com/home/1292708-74/college-lawsuit-drugs-says-amendment-geneva-administration-coverage-department-federal (reporting the government’s additional argument that the plaintiff “cannot satisfy the imminence requirement for standing”); see Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 2–5, 6, Geneva College v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2012).
At least one later poll suggests that a majority of the American people in fact believe that exemptions for religious employers are warranted.\(^27\)

These claims for exemption from the coverage mandate are far from the only claims for accommodation being made by religious groups today.\(^28\) Since 2009, two major medical centers have “revers[ed] a long-standing policy exempting employees who refuse[d to assist with abortions] based on religious or moral objections.”\(^29\) In each case, nurses alleged that they were threatened with firing or professional discipline for resisting participation in or training for abortions. In both cases, the nurses sued, asserting both constitutional and statutory rights\(^30\) to not assist in abortion procedures in violation of their moral

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\(^{27}\) In a March 2012 poll, 57% of Americans responded that religiously affiliated employers, such as hospitals or universities, should be allowed to opt out of mandated coverage for birth control. See Jim Rutenberg & Marjorie Connelly, *Obama’s Rating Falls as Poll Reflects Volatility*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2012, at A1. Of those responding, 61% of men supported an opt-out, compared to 53% of women. See id. Among all respondents, 37% believed the debate to be over religious freedom, whereas 51% thought it centered on “women’s health and their rights.” N.Y. Times & CBS News, 2012 Poll 22 (Mar. 7–11, 2012), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/324884/new-york-times-cbs-poll.pdf. A poll commissioned by Planned Parenthood in 2012 found that “[o]nly 39% of voters support an exemption for Catholic hospitals and universities from providing the benefit, while 57% are opposed to one.” See Tom Jensen, *Our Polling on the Birth Control Issue*, Pub. Pol’y Polling (Feb. 10, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/02/our-polling-on-the-birth-control-issue.html.


\(^{29}\) Rob Stein, *N.J. Nurses Sue over Abortion Policy*, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 2011, at A2 (discussing a lawsuit against the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ)).

\(^{30}\) Federal conscience protections contemporaneous with the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 decision in *Roe v. Wade* provide that:

No entity which receives [certain grants, contracts, loans or loan guarantees], may—

(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or

(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to [such] personnel,

because he performed or assisted . . . a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, [or] refused to perform or assist [one] . . . [due to] his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006) (popularly known as the “Church Amendment”); see also *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973) (holding that a woman’s decision to have an abortion is protected by her right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution). Twenty states similarly provide conscientious objectors with an absolute exemption from participating in sterilizations and abortions. See
or religious convictions. Those suits reached very different outcomes.32


Two years earlier, in *Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital*, an operating room nurse brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against her employer, claiming that she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week abortion, in violation of the Church Amendment. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6, *Cenzon-DeCarlo* v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-03120), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2010), available at http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/Cenzon-DeCarloPIbrief.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum for Preliminary Injunction]. The plaintiff, Cathy Cenzon-DeCarlo, alleged that although the hospital had staffed around her religious objection to assisting with abortions for years, on May 24, 2009, her superior threatened not only to terminate her if she did not help with an abortion, but also to report her to the nursing board for “patient abandonment.” See id.

32 *Danquah* was fully resolved by a settlement on the record memorializing the parties’ agreement that, except when the mother’s life is at risk and there are no other non-objecting staff members available to assist, nurses with conscientious objections will not have to assist with abortions. See Danquah Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 5–6. In such rare cases, “the only involvement of the objecting plaintiffs would be to care for the patient until such time as a non-objecting person can get there to take over the care.” Id. at 6. Judge Jose Linares retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure compliance with the agreement. Id. at 5. By contrast, the federal district court hearing the *Cenzon-DeCarlo* case dismissed the suit, concluding that the Church Amendment did not confer a private right of action. See *Cenzon-DeCarlo*, 2010 WL 109485 at *4. The decision was affirmed by the
While the clashes over contraception and abortion play out on the national stage, parallel claims for religious accommodations have been advanced in several states that have considered, and in some cases enacted, same-sex marriage legislation. Religious objectors to same-sex marriage have asked for a way to both honor their religious convictions and comply with the law. Specifically, they have asked to step aside from celebrating, facilitating, or recognizing same-sex marriages when doing so would violate their religious beliefs.

In a May 2012 statement to ABC News, the first of its kind by a sitting president, President Obama supported the rights of same-sex couples to get married. At the same time, President Obama said that the state should respect religious liberty: “[I]t’s important to recognize that folks who feel very strongly that marriage should be defined narrowly as between a man and a woman, many of them are not coming at it


The New Jersey statute cited in Danquah’s complaint, which states that “[n]o person shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or sterilization,” provides an unqualified exemption for objectors to those procedures. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:65A-1. Concerns that unqualified exemptions impose hardships on those seeking procedures or services are not unfounded. As Part IV of this Article explains, exemptions qualified by hardship are necessary to equitably balance both access and religious liberty. See infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Health Care Procedures, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 41, 41 n.5 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, Limits of Conscience] (arguing that exemptions for pharmacies from the duty to stock emergency contraceptives pose a much greater threat to patient access than exemptions for individual pharmacists, and offering instead that state legislatures should prefer individual exemptions over institutional ones provided that the individual exemptions are qualified by hardship to patients).

33 See infra app. A (collecting state statutory provisions relating to same-sex marriage).


from a mean-spirited perspective. They’re coming at it because they care about families.”

Like President Obama, many state legislators have struggled with reconciling two compelling, and at times conflicting, values in the same piece of legislation—marriage equality and religious liberty. They perceive difficult tradeoffs, such as how to protect religious liberty without offending the dignity of same-sex couples or condoning anti-gay animus, among other concerns. The real-world points of resistance that state lawmakers articulate echo the concerns voiced about exemptions to the new coverage mandate.

This Article summarizes a number of sticking points voiced to me by legislators about a hardship exemption that I, and others, have tried to secure in state same-sex marriage laws, together with some responses that may be offered. Assuming that spoken concerns reflect real ones, as I believe they do, it is worthwhile to examine points of resistance to religious liberty protections in same-sex marriage laws as a way of testing the strength of claims for exemptions on other questions over which the public remains deeply divided.

Part I explores the threshold question troubling many legislators: if the political will is there to recognize same-sex marriage, why should

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36 Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting President Obama).

This Article also draws on a model religious liberty provision that two groups of legal scholars have crafted and advocated for in jurisdictions considering same-sex marriage legislation. See infra app. B. One group of scholars consists of myself, Thomas C. Berg of the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Carl H. Esbeck of the University of Missouri School of Law, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. of Valparaiso University School of Law, Richard W. Garnett of the University of Notre Dame Law School, and Marc D. Stern, member of the New York State Bar for Legal Advocacy. This group takes no position for or against same-sex marriage, but argues that robust religious liberty protections should be included in any legislation. The second group, led by Douglas Laycock of the University of Virginia School of Law, consists of Professor Laycock, Marc D. Stern, and Michael Perry of Emory University School of Law, all of whom explicitly endorse same-sex marriage. In May 2012, Bruce Ledewitz of Duquesne University School of Law joined the second group.
the legislature accommodate anyone? 38 This Part offers a simple response: exemptions serve the interests of same-sex marriage supporters—in addition to being the right thing to do and maximizing individual liberty. 39 This Part contends that without accommodations, public attitudes about same-sex marriage are likely to harden, delaying marriage equality. It charts how a winner-takes-all approach to same-sex marriage—offering exemptions only to the clergy, who do not need them because of the First Amendment—has failed to garner sufficient support to become law. By contrast, bills providing meaningful protections for religious objectors have succeeded, suggesting that religious exemptions take a powerful argument away from same-sex marriage opponents. Part I then explores how an inflexible approach to requests for religious accommodations to the coverage mandate may likewise backfire if not tempered.

The Article then turns to a host of practical considerations raised by religious liberty accommodations. Part II asks, as District of Columbia councilmember Phil Mendelson did, “how . . . policy maker[s] can know . . . that a religious objector] is really acting on fundamental religious belief [rather than] prejudice?” 40 Section A argues that although sincerity issues do arise, the significant personal cost of objecting gives objectors little incentive to make insincere claims. Further, courts have shown the institutional competence to separate sincere from insincere claims in a range of contexts, from military conscientious objections to suits by prisoners. Section B then considers a related concern in the health care context—that exemptions legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas. This Section recaps the argument made by family planning advocates that emergency contraceptives like Plan B act only to prevent fertilization—and never after. This Section reviews emerging evidence about ella’s mechanisms of action that shows that ella’s enhanced effectiveness in preventing pregnancy stems in part from post-fertilization effects. More fundamentally, Section B argues that if claims of faith receive protection only when the rest of society

38 See infra notes 46–109 and accompanying text.
39 See infra note 46 (discussing the goods served by having the personal liberty to live out one’s sexual identity and one’s religious identity).
agrees with the objector’s belief, then almost nothing would remain of religious freedom.

Part III then explores how broad any legislative accommodation should be. This Part examines whether religious objectors should be protected only when they are noncommercial actors or when directly performing a morally freighted service, like solemnizing a marriage or terminating a pregnancy. It argues that appropriately crafted exemptions can avoid the real concern driving efforts to cabin an exemption’s scope—dislocation to the individuals seeking the contested service.

Part IV assesses a claim made by White House press secretary Jay Carney that the coverage mandate “does not direct an individual to do anything,” and so there can be no real threat to religious liberty. The Part first documents the steep penalties that religious objectors face in both the health care and same-sex marriage contexts without specific protections. It then takes the claim at face value, concluding that if the changing legal landscape really does not direct objectors to do anything, then religious accommodations cost nothing to grant but can allay significant fears at a time of great social change.

Part V explores the notion that no one should have to bear the cost of another’s religious objection, a claim now made in fights over both the coverage mandate and same-sex marriage. This Part first explains that appropriately crafted exemptions can vindicate both values at stake: access and religious liberty. It then acknowledges that qualified exemptions—that is, accommodations that allow religious objectors to avoid civil dictates only when a hardship will not result for those seeking a service—impose some costs on both sides, but also turn down the temperature on heated social debates.

Part VI then explores the question of hardship in the especially difficult context of insurance benefits, both for same-sex spouses and for deeply divisive services like contraception. This Part argues that failing to include religious accommodations in benefit mandates often leads to greater hardships—namely, the choice to discontinue objectionable coverage rather than violate a religious belief. Religious objectors have resorted to this “nuclear option” on multiple occasions when an exemption was not forthcoming, and they may continue to do so. Outside the health care context, religious objectors can take the nuclear option at no real cost. Even after the ACA, the nuclear option re-

41 See infra notes 164–207 and accompanying text.
42 January Press Briefing, supra note 17; see infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text.
mains available to institutions that object to the coverage mandate—
notwithstanding the steep penalties the ACA imposes on larger em-
ployers that drop health care coverage for their employees. Indeed,
many employers that drop coverage are likely to come out ahead finan-
cially. This Part then asks a question almost entirely overlooked in the
controversy over the coverage mandate: what happens to the individual
who morally objects to contraceptives and sterilization—what do they
do after the ACA? For them, the penalties are likely to be draconian,
imposing a significant encroachment on religious liberty.

Part VII tackles the idea that accommodations for religious objec-
tors should not be allowed because of harm to the dignity of others. It
argues that legislators frequently must address two dignitary harms, not
one—for example, the harm to lesbian and gay couples who are turned
aside and the harm to religious believers who are told that their beliefs
are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public sphere. Although the
competing claims about dignitary losses cannot resolve the question of
whether to give accommodations, they can and should guide the struc-
ture of accommodations to cabin the possibility of dignitary harm.

Finally, the Article concludes that in the end, no matter how
thoughtful an exemption or a claim for exemptions may be, to realisti-
cally obtain religious liberty protection in the legislative or regulatory
process requires proponents to understand how exemptions look to
decisionmakers on the ground.

I. FIRST STICKING POINT: WHY ACCOMMODATE ANYONE?

Like the Obama administration’s evolving efforts to vindicate two
competing values—access and religious freedom—state legislators have
had to confront the obvious question: if the political will is there to
recognize same-sex marriage, why should the state accommodate any-
one? The short answer is this: self-interest.

Before describing why religious liberty guarantees are in the inter-
est of both sides, in both debates, I should note that this focus on prag-
matic considerations is not intended to detract from principled argu-
ments favoring exemptions. The same fundamental values of personal
liberty that support an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her
essential identity, including sexual identity and same-sex relationships,
also support an individual’s right to live according to his or her religious

45 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text.
convictions.\textsuperscript{46} Not all observers agree with such principled arguments, however.\textsuperscript{47} For such people, a practical argument may have an appeal, even when more normative claims do not. So let’s talk practicality.

A. Religious Accommodations Are a Pathway to Same-Sex Marriage

In the absence of accommodations, public attitudes toward same-sex relationships are likely to become more divided, not less, as Professor Douglas Laycock has noted:

To impose legal penalties or civil liabilities on a wedding planner who refuses to do a same-sex wedding, or on a religious counseling agency that refuses to provide marriage counseling to same-sex couples, will simply ensure that conservative religious opinion on this issue can repeatedly be aroused to fever pitch. Every such case will be in the news repeatedly, and every such story will further inflame the opponents of same-sex mar-

\textsuperscript{46} Professor Chai Feldblum argues that the “identity liberty” same-sex couples have in marriage and the “belief liberty” objectors have in their religion both constitute core values and deserve protection, but these values directly conflict when civil rights laws force one to accommodate the other. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 123, 157. Professor Feldblum concludes that the conduct demanded by civil rights laws “can burden an individual’s belief liberty interest,” but “[a]cknowledging [the burden’s impact] does \textit{not} necessarily mean that [civil rights] laws will be invalidated or that exemptions . . . will always be granted to individuals holding such beliefs.” \textit{Id.}; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 206, 219–20, 230–32 (2010) (critiquing Professor Feldblum’s argument). Many other scholars also offer principled arguments. See generally Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 236 (2010) (arguing that religious objections to same-sex marriage do not necessitate additional statutory protections because those objections predate the debate over same-sex marriage); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 260 (2010) (discussing four reasons to maintain religious liberty accommodations for those opposed to same-sex marriage); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010) (distinguishing between freedom of clergy and claims of “religiously motivated individuals,” and concluding that although some religious freedoms are sufficiently protected under the U.S. Constitution, others receive less protection, and thus same-sex marriage opponents would be wise to find common ground to secure robust exemptions now rather than wait); Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 307 (2010) (advocating qualified religious exemptions as a solution to preserving religious liberty without diminishing the equality of same-sex couples); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. \\ & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010) (arguing that government employees with religious objections should be granted exemptions).

riage. Refusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will politically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex marriage. It will ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and deeply divisive.\footnote{See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, \textit{in Shannon Gilreath, The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liberation} 260, 260–61 (2011) (predicting that “[t]he number of people who assert their right to conscientious objection will be small in the beginning, and it will gradually decline to insignificance if deprived of the chance to rally around a series of martyrs”).}

By creating religious martyrs, the likely outcome is to delay social acceptance of gay marriage, not to hasten it.

In the United States, our over-decade-long experience with attempts to secure legislation recognizing same-sex marriage suggests that religious accommodations likely have helped same-sex marriage advocates secure long-sought victories. To date, seven jurisdictions have enacted, and retained, laws recognizing same-sex marriage: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington.\footnote{See \textit{infra} app. A. Maine’s same-sex marriage law, which contained a clergy-only exemption, was repealed in a “people’s referendum,” and a similar measure passed the New Hampshire legislature only to be vetoed by Governor John Lynch. \textit{See generally} Robin Fretwell Wilson, \textit{Charting the Success of Same-Sex Marriage Legislation} (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at \url{http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/132} (summarizing the history of same-sex marriage legislation in every state to consider it to date). The New Hampshire legislature amended the bill to include more expansive exemptions and Governor Lynch subsequently signed it into law. \textit{See id.}}

protections were enacted such a short time later suggests that exemptions mattered to the ultimate success of those bills.51 A number of observers drew precisely this conclusion.

51 The two exceptions to this pattern are Connecticut and Maine. In 2007, Connecticut considered, and failed to pass, proposed same-sex marriage legislation containing protec-
After Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New York’s same-sex marriage law in the summer of 2011, the *New York Times* observed that the religious exemptions “proved to be the most microscopically examined and debated—and the most pivotal—in the battle over same-sex marriage. Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill legalizing same-sex marriage provided more expansive protections for religious organizations and helped pull the legislation over the finish line . . .”

Similarly, in Maryland, religious liberty exemptions shifted the question for some legislators from *whether* to embrace marriage equality to *how* to balance that good with religious liberty.


In Maine, legislation containing a clergy-only exemption attained overwhelming support before being repealed in a popular referendum. See generally Wilson, *supra* note 49 (discussing same-sex marriage in Maine). That bill passed in 2009 by votes of 89–57 and 21–13 in the lower and upper chambers, respectively. See *id*.

Although it is impossible, after the fact, to say definitively that more expansive exemptions proved decisive in the success of these same-sex marriage laws, the number of narrowly defeated bills that later succeeded when revised to include more expansive exemptions is suggestive. Also suggestive is Maine’s experience: even where a same-sex marriage bill passed both chambers of the legislature by substantial majorities, the new law containing protection only for the clergy was narrowly rejected by voters. See *id*.

It remains to be seen whether new legislation in Maryland and Washington, containing more expansive exemptions, will satisfy voters in a referendum. In these states, opponents have collected sufficient signatures to force a November 2012 referendum on the legislation. See Berg, *supra* note 50; Myers, *supra* note 50. See generally Wilson, *supra* note 49 (summarizing recent developments in same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland and Washington).


These successful attempts to recognize same-sex marriage resulted from a delicate process in which legislators reached a set of compromises about how best to balance marriage equality with other goods in society. This should surprise no one. Competing interests are often balanced in a pluralistic, democratic society. In the civil rights era, exemptions for religious objectors and others served as the pathway to social change, not an obstacle to it.\textsuperscript{54}

What sparked those compromises? Religious organizations do much good in society but frequently need the space to do so in accordance with their convictions.\textsuperscript{55} In the same-sex marriage context, with-\ldots

\textsuperscript{54} Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce, contains a provision known as the “Mrs. Murphy exemption,” which exempts dwellings with four or fewer families, if one of them is the owner’s. See 42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(2) (2006). The fictional Mrs. Murphy, an Irish widow engaged in renting rooms in her home, emerged during congressional debate over Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when lawmakers expressed concern about restricting an individual’s right of commercial association without interfering with his or her deep personal convictions. See Marie A. Failinger, \textit{Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords}, 29 \textit{Cap. U. L. Rev.} 385, 383–87 (2001). Many proponents of the exemption feared Title II would not pass without this accommodation, because public empathy for homeowners who are forced to let rooms to support their families would deter lawmakers from enacting an unqualified law. See Peter Evans Kane, \textit{The Senate Debate on the 1964 Civil Rights Act} 50 (Aug. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University), available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI6806320. Like Title II, Title VIII exempts owner-occupied dwellings with no more than four families, as well as religious organizations operating noncommercial dwellings—accommodations that Senator Walter Mondale at the time labeled as “politically necessary.” 114 \textit{Cong. Rec.} 2495 (1968).

\textsuperscript{55} See Byron R. Johnson, \textit{Ctr. for Research on Religion & Urban Civil Soc’y, Objective Hope: Assessing the Effectiveness of Faith-Based Organizations: A Review of the Literature} 7 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ctrcs_objective_hope.pdf (noting that “[b]y some estimates, [Faith-Based Organizations] provide $20 billion of privately contributed funds to social service delivery for over 70 million Americans annually”); Avis C. Vidal, \textit{Urban Inst., Faith-Based Organizations in Community Development} (2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/faithbased.pdf (noting, in a foreword by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development general deputy assistant secretary Lawrence L. Thompson, that “recently, there has been greater recognition and value given to the contributions of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in providing social services,” and that “[h]istorically, FBOs have been particularly prominent in providing food, clothing, and shelter to people in need”); \textit{White House Office of Faith-Based & Cmty. Initiatives, Guidance to Faith-Based and Community Organizations on Partnering with the Federal Government} 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.ethicsinstitute.com/pdf/Faith%20Based%20Federal%20Grants.pdf (“Faith-based and community groups are the unsung heroes in helping Americans in need. Their compassionate care and neighborly love turn lives around and provide hope where it has been missing. These groups do not provide care because they have to, but because they want to.”).
out such protections, groups and individuals that hew to their religious beliefs about marriage would be at risk of losing government contracts and benefits and would also be subject to lawsuits from private citizens. These risks are not speculative. The City of San Francisco withdrew $3.5 million in social services contracts from the Salvation Army when it refused, for religious reasons, to provide benefits to its employees’ same-sex partners.\textsuperscript{56} In New Jersey, the state’s Division of Civil Rights of the Office of the Attorney General found that a Methodist nonprofit association violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination when it denied the requests of two same-sex couples to use the group’s boardwalk pavilion for their commitment ceremonies.\textsuperscript{57} Separately, local tax authorities stripped the group of its exemption from ad valorem property taxes on the boardwalk pavilion and billed the group close to $20,000 in “rollback” taxes, although it ultimately paid less.\textsuperscript{58} More recently, a Vermont bed-and-breakfast settled a suit seeking “symbolic and punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief” brought by a lesbian couple, joined by the Vermont Human Rights Commission.\textsuperscript{59} The cou-


\textsuperscript{57} See N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, Finding of Probable Cause, Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at \url{http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf}. The administrative law judge who heard the case determined that the association “was renting space at the Pavilion for weddings, an activity largely detached from associational expression or speech,” had rented “wedding space to heterosexual couples irrespective of their [religious] tradition,” and had never “inquire[d] into religious beliefs or practice because it did not sponsor, or otherwise control, these weddings,” and thus that the association had violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination when it refused to permit the couple’s civil union ceremony. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09, 2012 WL 169302, at *4–5 (N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012). The federal courts refused to intervene when the association filed suit. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 07-3802-JAP, 2007 WL 3349787, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss on abstention grounds), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 2009).

\textsuperscript{58} See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NPR (June 16, 2008), \url{http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486340}; see also Judy Peet, Gay Unions Dispute Could Cost Group: State Pulls Association’s Tax-Exempt Status, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 18, 2007, at 19 (indicating that taxes on the pavilion would be roughly $11,000 as a result of the property’s loss of exemption under New Jersey’s Green Acres Program, which requires that the property “be available equally to all persons”). Under the Green Acres Program, the tax exemption requires that covered property “is open to all on an equal basis and that a tax exemption . . . would be in the public interest.” See Letter from Lisa Jackson, Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to Scott Hoffman, Adm’r, Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n (Sept. 15, 2007) (on file with author).

ple filed suit after an employee indicated in an e-mail that the inn does not "host gay receptions" due to the innkeepers’ “personal feelings,”\(^6^0\) although it remains disputed whether the employee’s statement did, in fact, represent the inn’s policy.\(^6^1\) Nonetheless, the inn agreed to pay a $10,000 civil penalty, place another $20,000 in a charitable trust, and no longer host weddings or receptions for any member of the public.\(^6^2\)

The jurisdictions that have recognized same-sex marriage legislatively have all acknowledged the impact of same-sex marriage laws on a wide swath of the public that adheres to a traditional (i.e., heterosexual) view of marriage.\(^6^3\) Each law provides religious liberty protections to the clergy\(^6^4\) in addition to guarantees extending beyond those

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\(^6^0\) See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at Exhibit A, Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 CACV (Vt. Super. Ct. May 10, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/wildflower_answer_and_affirmative_defenses_to_plfs_third_amended_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Answer and Affirmative Defenses] (containing a printed copy of the e-mail from the inn’s employee). The couple alleged that the innkeepers had made public statements that they could not offer their services “because it goes against everything that we as Catholics believe in.” Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6.

\(^6^1\) Compare Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6 (alleging that the owners of the inn reaffirmed that hosting same-sex weddings contradicted their religious beliefs), with Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 60, at 4 (denying this assertion as inaccurate, and claiming that the employee who denied services did not follow the inn’s policy). Significantly, the employee offered the services of her own private company in the same e-mail, to which the mother of one of the plaintiffs responded that “[they] will have no shortage of good choices.” See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at Exhibit A. As explained in Part V, the possibility of a hardship to the couple should influence society’s willingness to provide an exemption. See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.


\(^6^3\) See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on the laws enacted in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington).

\(^6^4\) Clergy protections appear in each of the laws offering more expansive protections. For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (Supp. 2011). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing the text of enacted legislation and a breakdown of protections in proposed and enacted bills). The idea of “forced officiating” is “a distraction from real situations where religious conscience [may be] at risk.” See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Iowa Governor Chet Culver (July 9, 2009) (on file with author).

Some proposed exemptions that insulate only the clergy and churches from the duty to solemnize same-sex marriages have failed to garner enough support to become law. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
granted by the First Amendment. A core of protections has emerged for religious organizations and individuals who cannot celebrate or facilitate any marriage—including a same-sex marriage, interfaith marriage, or second marriage—when doing so would violate their religious convictions.

Although each law describes the exempt activities in slightly different terms, generally they encompass the provision of "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if . . . related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage." Each jurisdiction insulates religious organizations from civil

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65 See supra notes 14–15 (discussing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, and reviewing the Court’s conclusion that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment regardless of their burden on the exercise of religious liberty).

66 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a (West Supp. 2011) (covering "a religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society"); D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (covering "a religious society, or a nonprofit organization that is operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious society"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (covering "a religious organization, association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society"); see also infra app. A (providing other statutory examples).

67 These religious exemptions encompass "all" marriages, including interfaith marriages, second marriages, and same-sex marriages. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (noting that religious organizations "shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage") (emphasis added); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (noting that religious organizations "shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage") (emphasis added); see also infra app. A (providing other statutory examples). Some faiths oppose interfaith marriage. See Cent. Conference of Am. Rabbis, Reform Judaism and Mixed Marriage (Responsa No. 146), reprinted in American Reform Responsa: Collected Responsa of the Central Conference of American Rabbis 1889–1983, at 445 (Walter Jacob ed., 1983) ("The Central Conference of American Rabbis, recalling its stand adopted in 1909 ‘that mixed marriage is contrary to the Jewish tradition and should be discouraged,’ now declares its opposition to participation by its members in any ceremony which solemnizes a mixed marriage.").

68 See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(1). New Hampshire also requires that "such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of [the objector’s] reli-
suits for refusing to celebrate marriages, and six of the seven explicitly protect such organizations from punishment at the hands of the government. All insulate religious nonprofit organizations, like Catholic Charities or the Salvation Army, from the duty to celebrate or solemnize marriages that violate their religious tenets. Four extend these protections to benevolent religious organizations, like the Knights of Columbus, or to religious groups that sponsor marriage retreats or provide housing for married individuals. In New York, New Hampshire,
and Washington, individual employees of these groups receive protection, too.\textsuperscript{74} Although no state legislature has yet to protect religious objectors in the for-profit sector or in government employment,\textsuperscript{75} the religious liberty protections enacted to date sweep far beyond the church sanctuary, providing accommodations that exceed what most scholars believe would be constitutionally demanded.\textsuperscript{76} Importantly, however, the legislative accommodations in some states were cobbled together quickly during the legislative process, resulting in some drafting problems.\textsuperscript{77}

Contrast these legislative victories with the resounding defeats that have occurred when advocates have adopted an inflexible approach to religious accommodations. Since 2004, legislators in nine states and the District of Columbia have introduced proposed same-sex marriage legislation shorn of protections for anyone other than the clergy and churches.\textsuperscript{78} This legislation has failed in every jurisdiction in which it has been offered.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{74} N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) ("[A]ny employee . . . being managed, directed, or supervised by . . . a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit corporation . . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any such refusal . . . shall not create any civil claim . . ."); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) ("[A]ny individual . . ."); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(4) (West 2005) ("[A]n individual . . ."). These provisions immunize employees of religious organizations from civil suit directly and possibly also from being compelled by their employers to participate in marriage celebrations. Other states do not provide explicit exemptions for individual employees of religious organizations. \textit{See infra} app. A.

\textsuperscript{75} The religious liberty accommodations that I and others have worked to secure, however, would not allow religious individuals in government employment or commerce to serve as roadblocks on the path to marriage; on the contrary, they would only allow these individuals to step aside from facilitating a marriage when doing so would violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, but \textit{only} when substantial hardship for same-sex couples would not result. \textit{See infra} app. B.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{See Smith}, 494 U.S. at 890.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{infra} notes 131–133 and accompanying text (discussing the suggestion to limit the application of the model provision in Appendix B to sincerely held religious beliefs).

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{See generally} Wilson, \textit{supra} note 49 (providing a summary of key provisions in selected states’ same-sex marriage legislation).

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{See generally id.} (reviewing various protections and exemptions considered by state legislators in drafting same-sex marriage bills). This is not to say that all same-sex marriage bills that include more expansive exemptions succeed. For example, Maryland’s proposed legislation in 2011 included a clergy-only exemption. The legislation was amended by the Senate to include more expansive exemptions, only to die in the House because the Senate’s provisions were effectively frozen—no further changes could be made by the House in time to be heard by the Senate in that legislative cycle. \textit{See id.}
Such measures have failed at the ballot box, too. In 2009, Maine legislators repeatedly refused to include expansive religious liberty protections in the state’s same-sex marriage law. Instead, the legislature elected to provide only “faux” protections already guaranteed by the Constitution and turned down more expansive religious liberty protections like those advocated for by some scholars. Maine’s same-sex marriage law provided “protection” that was coterminous with constitutional guarantees. It expressly did not “authorize any court or other state or local governmental body . . . to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s tradition as guaranteed by the Maine [or] United States Constitution[s].” An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Laws 150–51 (abrogated by people’s veto). It provided no other protections. See id. Provisions like these offer “faux” protection because “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.” See Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 1.

In response to Question 1: People’s Veto, An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 52.9% of Maine voters responded “Yes” when asked, “Do you want to reject the new law that lets same-sex couples marry and allows individuals and religious groups to refuse to perform these marriages?” compared to 47.1% who responded “No.” See Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations, Maine.gov, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).

Professor Jana Singer argues for winner-takes-all legislation stripped of any religious accommodations. See Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSBlog (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-away-marriage-equality. She suggests that “broad-based exemptions are both constitutionally problematic and politically unwise.” Id. If Professor Singer’s over-accommodation argument were correct, thousands of state and federal statutory accommodations would be invalidated—from military conscientious objection provisions to Native American peyote use, which received statutory exemption in response to Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2010) (discussing the extent of existing religious liberty accommodations).

Dale Carpenter, There’s Always Next Year, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 4, 2009, 1:21 PM), http://www.volokoh.com/2009/11/04/theres-always-next-year (“Some will say that we should have included broader protection for religious liberty in the [Maine] legislature’s [same-sex marriage] bill.”). Professor Carpenter did not attribute the law’s demise to this omission, however: “I don’t get the sense that the supposed erosion of religious liberty was the main Maine issue or that broader protection would have made an electoral differ-
could have been swayed to change their votes by live-and-let-live religious liberty protections, Maine would have same-sex marriage today. Together, these experiences suggest that exemptions take a powerful argument against same-sex marriage away from opponents.

As with the legislative process, religious liberty accommodations can mute a powerful argument used in constitutional amendment fights. Sadly, this did not occur in California with Proposition 8. There, the Yes on 8 campaign... [argued that] religious institutions would be in danger of losing their tax exempt status or being sued if they refused to perform same sex marriages or to allow the use of their properties for that purpose. Religiously affiliated adoption agencies would be sanctioned if they refused to allow same sex couples to adopt and religious parents would be harmed when public schools taught that same sex marriages were as legitimate as heterosexual marriages.

The strength of preference matters, of course. A voter could tend to favor religious liberty over gay rights, but not know how to weigh or evaluate evidence of a religious liberty impact. If a voter’s preference or weighting is not strong enough to change his or her vote or position, then it is irrelevant. Certainly the fact that same-sex marriage opponents in Maine and California invested money in messaging about religious impacts in order to influence the outcome of referenda suggests that they think it mattered. See Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 111, 167 n.292 (2010) (“Opponents of same-sex marriage in Maine [invested in] advertisements claiming that if same-sex marriage became legal, homosexuality would be taught in schools.”); Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum v. Brien: A “Moment” in History, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 27, 48 (2009) (“The first advertisement that opponents of same-sex marriage launched was one that said same-sex marriage threatened to take away the tax-exempt status of California churches.”). The real assay of whether religious liberty concerns move undecided citizens will come in the 2012 referenda on the Maryland and Washington bills containing more expansive religious liberty protection. See supra note 50.

Other factors may explain this legislative track record. For example, Rhode Island’s 2011 same-sex marriage bill contained a clergy-only exemption. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (summarizing the key provisions of Rhode Island’s proposed same-sex marriage legislation). However, given the fact that Rhode Island is the most Catholic state in the nation, the same-sex marriage bill may have failed to garner sufficient support, whatever exemptions were proffered. See Religious Identity: States Differ Widely, Gallup (Aug 7, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/122075/religious-identity-states-differ-widely.aspx (reporting that 53% of Rhode Islanders identify as Roman Catholic). Nonetheless, the pattern strongly correlates with the refusal to embrace more expansive exemptions.

Helene Slessarev-Jamir, Religious Conservatives’ Success in Constructing Gay Marriage as a Threat to Religious Liberties 3 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n 2012 Annual Meeting Paper), avail-
These arguments received traction precisely because no legislation was enacted on the heels of the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in *In re Marriage Cases*. The California legislature missed a crucial opportunity to balance religious liberty concerns with marriage equality, as Connecticut’s legislature did after Connecticut’s supreme court held in *Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health* that laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated same-sex couples’ equal protection rights under Connecticut’s Constitution.

As each of these examples illustrates, religious accommodations need not work against the marriage-equality agenda. As one prominent gay rights leader, Jonathan Rauch, has pointed out, the smart move is to “bend toward accommodation,” not away from it.

B. Religious Accommodations Can Cement Greater Access to Needed Services

Just as an inflexible, winner-takes-all stance may backfire in the same-sex marriage context, it may also backfire with the coverage mandate. This is so not because a legislative victory hangs in the balance—
the ACA has already been enacted, although Congress is now considering a number of bills to limit the coverage mandate— but because religious objectors, when left no choice on other matters, have often chosen to exit the market rather than violate their religious beliefs.

Such exoduses have occurred again and again over the past decade. In 2006, Catholic Charities of Massachusetts shuttered its adoption business after placing children with Boston families for 103 years. In the months preceding the closure, the state’s bishops learned that the organization had placed children for adoption with a handful of gay and lesbian parents—placements that accorded with Massachusetts law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Still, the state’s bishops abruptly discontinued the practice. The bishops then sought “relief from the regulatory requirements,” asking then-Governor

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91 Efforts have begun in Congress to broaden the exemption or eliminate the coverage mandate. Laurie Kellman, GOP Senators Fail to Reverse Birth Control Rule, Bos. Globe (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2012/03/01/gop_senators_fail_to_reverse_birth_control_rule.

92 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that religious organizations may choose to leave the health care market and arguing that “[w]hatever one thinks of the moral questions involved, this controversy . . . is also sure to impose additional pressures on the [ACA]”).


94 See 102 Mass. Code Regs. 1.03(1) (1997) (requiring adoption agencies to obtain a state license and “not discriminate in providing services to children and their families on the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation or disability”) (emphasis added). This requirement dates back to 1989, “when Massachusetts amended its antidiscrimination statute dealing with employment, housing, and government services to include sexual orientation as one of the forbidden grounds of discrimination.” Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 781, 832 n.301 (2007).

95 Catholic Charities originally placed thirteen children with gay or lesbian parents, although it is unclear whether the adopting parents were at the time in same-sex relationships. Compare Wen, supra note 93 (noting that “approximately 13 children had been placed by Catholic Charities in gay households” (emphasis added)), with Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, Catholic News Serv. (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm (indicating that Catholic Charities “had arranged the adoption of 13 children by same-sex couples over the past 20 years” (emphasis added)). After reports surfaced regarding the organization’s placements, the state’s bishops directed Catholic agencies not to place children with gay or lesbian parents. Wen, supra note 93. Eight members of Catholic Charities’ forty-two member board, which had voted unanimously to continue placing children with lesbian and gay parents, then resigned. Patricia Wen, In Break from Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, Bos. Globe, Mar. 3, 2006, at B4.
Mitt Romney for assistance.\textsuperscript{96} Governor Romney initially signaled “openness” to the request, but ultimately said that any exemption would have to come from the legislature or a court.\textsuperscript{97} When relief was not forthcoming, however, Catholic Charities discontinued its adoption services altogether.\textsuperscript{98}

In February 2010, the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington ended its eighty-year-old foster care placement program rather than approve same-sex couples for placement, which presumably would have been required under the District of Columbia’s nondiscrimination laws and its new same-sex marriage law.\textsuperscript{99} Recently, Illinois’s same-sex civil union law ushered in a new requirement that all social service agencies that receive state money, including religiously affiliated ones, “must consider same-sex couples as potential foster-care and adoptive parents.”\textsuperscript{100} The state’s Catholic bishops lobbied against the civil union law, but contended that they and other religious leaders were given the impression that it would not affect state contracts with Catholic Charities and other religious social services.\textsuperscript{101} Finding themselves without an exemption, many groups are shedding their adoption services, closing them, or transferring them outside the church \textit{qua} church to nonprofit organizations.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{98} See Wen, supra note 93; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, \textit{A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption}, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475, 479–83 (2008) (documenting the exit of religious social services providers and other vendors from the market in the absence of an exemption).
\textsuperscript{100} See Laurie Goodstein, Illinois Bishops Drop Program over Bias Rule, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2011, at A16.
\textsuperscript{101} Explaining why the Catholic dioceses did not lobby for a specific exemption, Bishop Thomas J. Paprocki said, “It would have been seen as, ‘We’re going to compromise on the principle as long as we get our exception.’ We didn’t want it to be seen as buying our support.” See id. Notably, Connecticut and Maryland’s same-sex marriage laws exempt social services agencies as long as they receive no government funding. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135b; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
\textsuperscript{102} See Goodstein, supra note 100 (describing the process by which Illinois bishops “followed colleagues in Washington, D.C., and Massachusetts who had jettisoned their adoption services rather than comply with nondiscrimination laws”); William Wan, Catholic Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “Catholic Charities last month transferred its foster-care program—43 children, 35 families
The coverage mandate likewise may hasten such extreme measures. Chicago’s Cardinal Francis George asked in a recent op-ed:

What will happen if the HHS regulations are not rescinded? A Catholic institution, so far as I can see right now, will have one of four choices: 1) secularize itself, breaking its connection to the church, her moral and social teachings and the oversight of its ministry by the local bishop. This is a form of theft. It means the church will not be permitted to have an institutional voice in public life. 2) Pay exorbitant annual fines to avoid paying for insurance policies that cover abortifacient drugs, artificial contraception and sterilization. This is not economically sustainable. 3) Sell the institution to a non-Catholic group or to a local government. 4) Close down.

Cardinal George then noted that the Archdiocese’s directory contained “a complete list of Catholic hospitals and health care institutions in Cook and Lake counties,” and ominously warned that “two Lents from now, unless something changes, that page will be blank.”

Other religious leaders have issued similar warnings. The president of Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic-affiliated institution in North Carolina that has filed suit against HHS, told the Gaston Gazette that “[w]e want to serve our community but we feel cornered. . . . I believe we would go there [and close the college]” rather than comply with the coverage mandate.

Of course, dire predictions may turn out to be nothing more than empty threats. The amount of weight decisionmakers should give to the possibility of an exodus of religious providers will necessarily depend on

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would love to have the separation between church and state we thought we enjoyed just a few months ago, when we were free to run Catholic institutions in conformity with the demands of the Catholic faith, when the government couldn’t tell us which of our ministries are Catholic and which not, when the law protected rather than crushed conscience.

Id.

104 See id.

105 See Amanda Memrick, Belmont Abbey Officials Explain Health Care Lawsuit, GASTON GAZETTE (Gastonia, N.C.), Nov. 20, 2011, at 1B; see also CAMPUS NOTES, supra note 20 (discussing the difficulties faced by Catholic colleges if they are forced to provide contraceptive coverage to students).
the specific context. For example, with health care services, legislators and policymakers wisely would consider a range of factors, including market concentration, the scarcity of other providers, the market share of the possible exiting organizations, the likelihood that the exiting organizations would sell the organization rather than shutter it, the likelihood of a private buyer or the government acquiring the facility in advance of any shutdown, the probable time frame for any transition, and how likely it might be that the objector will choose to accede to civil strictures rather than actually exiting the market. Catholic-affiliated hospitals account for seventeen percent of all hospital admissions nationally, and with many markets served exclusively by a sole, Catholic-affiliated hospital, policymakers may well be loathe to engage in a high-stakes game of chicken.

II. Second Sticking Point: Exemptions Condone Prejudice or Crazy Ideas

In the same-sex marriage context, legislators readily accept that “member[s] of the cloth . . . clearly ha[ve] deeply held fundamental religious beliefs,” but sometimes express deep skepticism about wheth-

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106 With adoption services, legislators considering a religious exemption might consider a variety of factors, such as the impact an exemption (or denial of one) would have on children awaiting adoption and on same-sex couples seeking to adopt. Among other questions, legislators should also ask whether other providers of adoption services would readily serve gay couples seeking to adopt, whether information-forcing rules could direct prospective parents to willing providers, and, if the state rejects religious accommodations, whether objecting agencies would exit the market, and if so, how many children would they have placed and how many of these children would be picked up by other agencies after their exit. See Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83.


109 Of course, under the hardship accommodation described in Part V of this Article, the Catholic hospital that exclusively serves its market is likely to be in a blocking position in some instances, and thus would have to provide the needed service, notwithstanding its religious objection. Importantly, the model provision in Appendix B does not limit the ability of religious organizations to object only when no hardship results, a point over which the groups of scholars I have worked with remains deeply divided. See infra notes 249–258 and accompanying text (describing instances in which a religiously affiliated hospital would occupy a blocking position, warranting qualification of any exemption).
er other objectors are “really acting on fundamental religious belief and doctrine as opposed to just a prejudice . . . . How do I make that distinction with [a wedding] photographer?” A related concern arises in the health care context, where some argue that religious liberty accommodations legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas, such as the notion that emergency contraceptives act as abortifacients.

This Part first takes up the claim that insincere objections will receive protection as a result of religious liberty accommodations. It then examines whether such accommodations validate completely groundless notions.

A. Concerns About Insincere Beliefs

Consider first concerns about sincerity. Whether a claimed belief is sincere or a convenient screen for ignoble acts is an issue common to many, but not all, religious freedom protections. Unlike freedom of speech, freedom of conscience does not protect the insincere. Patently, some individuals may be motivated to make a religious freedom argument in order to receive better work hours, get away with using illegal drugs, or avoid criminal charges. Many claims for protection, however, seek the ability to perform an act that is not only personally burdensome, but meaningless apart from the religious faith that gives the act meaning. So, for example, claims to go without medical care or to adhere to kosher dietary laws burden the claimant sig-

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110 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:54:40 (statement of Councilmember Phil Mendelson).

111 See infra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of ella and Plan B).

112 E.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834–35 (1989) (allowing a religious objection to working on Sundays, even though other members of defendant’s religion did not share this belief); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 429, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (attempting to avoid prosecution for drug use by arguing that marijuana was a sacrament in the defendant’s religion, the “Boo Hoos”); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1189–90 (3d ed. 2006); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25) (on file with author) (“If the claim for an exemption is not to work on Saturday, or to refrain from having a child vaccinated, we can imagine that someone who wishes to spend the day with his family, or to avoid vaccination risks for his child, might announce an insincere objection in conscience.”).

113 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Miss. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265–69 (1990); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 128–30 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Of course, some religious believers assert claims of faith not to avoid health care for themselves, but to avoid some forms of health care for their children. See generally Understanding Family Law § 7.05, at 212–15 (John De Witt et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005). These protections have been criticized on a number of grounds. See James Dwyer,
nificantly, but impose very little cost on others, making it very unlikely that someone would make an insincere claim.\footnote{See, e.g., Doswell v. Smith, 139 F.3d 888, 1998 WL 110161, at *1–2, 5–6 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).}

Other claims for protection encompass acts that may impose a cost on others, but that nonetheless open the claimant up to significant personal costs. Consider the nurse at Mt. Sinai Hospital who alleged that she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week abortion, despite federal and state statutes giving her an unqualified right to refuse.\footnote{See Greenawalt, \textit{supra} note 112, at 25–26 (“One way of minimizing the success of insincere claims is, as I have suggested, to limit an exemption to religious claims, which many people may be more hesitant to make up, given the typical tie of religious convictions to institutional affiliations.”).} She was threatened not only with termination, but with losing her nursing license for “patient abandonment.”\footnote{See supra note 31 (same).}


As others have noted, if an exemption, say from participating in the sale of morning after pills, confers no ordinary advantage on the person who claims that participation would violate his conscience, and if the seeking of an exemption is likely to cause irritation.

of superiors or colleagues that could down the road hurt [one’s] chances for a promotion or informal benefits, a person has no incentive to make an insincere claim.\textsuperscript{119}

Even though many individuals will not be motivated to feign a religious objection, sincerity questions can and do arise in some cases—from prisoners requesting religious accommodations to military conscientious objectors. In each context, courts have generally proven competent to separate the sincere plaintiff from the insincere. In the prison context, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) directs prison officials not to “impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.”\textsuperscript{120} Some prisoners bring lawsuits based on religious claims to harass prison administrators or to gain perks they cannot otherwise secure. For instance, in 2010, an inmate in an Orange County, California jail claimed to celebrate the Seinfeld holiday, Festivus, in order to get double portions of food.\textsuperscript{121} There, prison officials determined that the inmate’s religious claim was not sincere.\textsuperscript{122} Obviously, many other prisoners do bring claims with merit.\textsuperscript{123}

Because both sincere and insincere claims can arise, in the 2005 case \textit{Cutter v. Wilkinson}, the U.S. Supreme Court gave prison officials considerable leeway to test the sincerity of a prisoner’s stated need for accommodation, without which a prisoner-plaintiff cannot take advantage of federal statutory religious accommodations:

\textit{P}rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is central to a prisoner’s religion, the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity. The truth of a belief is not open to question; rather, the question is whether the objector’s beliefs are truly held.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{119} Greenawalt, \textit{supra} note 112, at 25.
\textsuperscript{122} Id.
\textsuperscript{123} See, e.g., Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary judgment against a pro se Rastafarian inmate suing under RLUIPA because prison officials cut the plaintiff’s dreadlocks).
\textsuperscript{124} 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the military has long had a detailed system for evaluating the sincerity of conscientious objections to military service.125

Tests for sincerity parallel the examination of “pretext” that is common to most employment discrimination litigation in the federal courts. Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court in the 1973 case, *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, courts must evaluate whether an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action is a pretext for invidious discrimination.126

Although these contexts differ in important ways, together they underscore that courts have the institutional competence to judge whether a claimed religious objection to same-sex marriage is sincere or merely pretext for animus. This is not to say, however, that deciding the sincerity of a religious belief is an easy task. Sincerity must be determined “without a view as to [the] truth or falsity” of the religious belief being claimed, a point the Supreme Court established in the 1944 decision in *United States v. Ballard*.127 There, the government indicted leaders of a religion called “I Am” for mail fraud after the leaders solicited donations from individuals they promised to cure of diseases. The Court held that a jury could properly decide whether the leaders sincerely believed that they possessed healing abilities, but could not evaluate the religious belief itself.

Moreover, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points out, “[t]here is no measure for sincerity.”128 A number of commentators have suggested guides for evaluating sincerity. For example, Professor Kent Greenawalt notes that when someone “loses her job or is demoted because she actually refuses to perform an act,” this helps to “demonstrate a true claim of conscience.”129 But he observes that “those whose claim for an exemption is granted usually are not put to such a clear test, . . . opening an exemption . . . to those with lukewarm reservations.”130

125 See *Aguayo v. Harvey*, 476 F.3d 971, 973, 979–81 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the U.S. Army’s determination under Army Regulation 600-43 that a claimed conscientious objection was not “sincere and deeply held”).


128 Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1190.

129 Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 26 (discussing moral objections, as opposed to religious objections).

130 Id.
Although it is true that the legislative accommodations described in Appendix B are designed to insulate religious objectors from lawsuits, this does not mean that objecting is cost-free. As noted above, many refusals are met with social opprobrium or stigma from one’s employer, coworkers, or community, even when there are existing protections.\footnote{See supra note 30 (discussing the exemptions available to abortion objectors), supra notes 31–32 (describing attempts to penalize workers claiming exemptions under existing laws).} Neither does it mean that religious objectors get a free pass. Lawsuits may follow even when a legislative accommodation is made. If an exemption is structured like that in Appendix B,\footnote{See Appendix A for statutory accommodations that have been enacted, some of which were cobbled together in last-minute negotiations, as a consequence of which, they have drafting problems. Unlike the model provision in Appendix B, the enacted exemptions are not limited by sincerity. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).} an objector, if sued, may find that his or her beliefs are, in fact, subjected to a searching examination for sincerity. In the end, the difficulty of assessing sincerity remains “one reason for the law to avoid exemptions,” but that reason “must be measured against the positive reasons to grant such exemptions.”\footnote{Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness 110 (2006).}

\section*{B. Concerns About “Crazy” Beliefs}

In the health care context, some worry that religious exemptions will legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas. Two different religious beliefs underpin objections to the coverage mandate: one contends that all sexual intercourse should have the potential for creating life—thus, procedures that sterilize a person and drugs that prevent fertilization are both objectionable.\footnote{Some religious objectors emphasize the concern over contraceptive coverage. See, e.g., Bishop Robert H. Brom, Contraception and Sterilization, Catholic Answers (Aug. 10, 2004), http://www.catholic.com/tracts/contraception-and-sterilization (“[O]ver the course of time the Church has called greater attention to the unitive aspect of marital intercourse, yet it remains true that the procreative aspect of each particular marital act must not be frustrated.”). Many find the objection to contraceptive coverage to be incomprehensible. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Beyond Pelvic Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR11; Guttmacher Inst., Testimony Submitted to the Comm. on Preventive Servs. for Women, Inst. of Med. 16 (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf; Press Release, Majority of Catholics Think Employers Should Be Required to Provide Health Care Plans That Cover Birth Control at No Cost, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://publicreligion.org/newsroom/2012/02/january-tracking-poll-2012. In his column in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof wrote:} The second belief focuses on emergency
contraceptives as covered drugs, with objectors maintaining that emergency contraceptives act after fertilization to destroy a life-in-being.\textsuperscript{135} It is this second belief that gets tagged as unfounded.

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), for example, opposed pharmacy and pharmacist exemptions from the duty to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, saying “provider refusals to dispense emergency contraception based on unsupported beliefs about its primary mechanism of action should not be justified.”\textsuperscript{136} ACOG argued that drugs like Plan B do not act as abortifacients, thus objectors have no medically sound basis for claiming an exemption from filling prescriptions.\textsuperscript{137}

Factually, however, this contention is simply more complicated than ACOG’s blanket assertion suggests. Plan B was approved in 1999,\textsuperscript{138} and its label states that “[i]t works mainly by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possible that Plan B One-Step may also work by . . . preventing attachment (implantation) to the uterus

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\textit{Id.} Indeed, the majority of Americans believe that it is often socially responsible to have sex without procreation. In a survey of 591 adults nationwide, who were asked whether “the birth control pill has made American family life better,” 50\% of those randomly telephoned responded that it had, and 56\% believed that “the birth control pill has made women’s lives better.” See CBS NEWS, POLL: THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL: 50 YEARS LATER 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_Birth_Control_Pill_050710.pdf. Religious believers did not share this view as widely. \textit{Id.} (reporting that 38\% of Catholics and 41\% of white Evangelicals believed the birth control pill had made American family life better).

\textsuperscript{135} Gene Veith, \textit{Church Organizations Must Provide Free Contraception and Abortifacients}, CRAINCH (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.geneveith.com/2012/01/24/church-organizations-must-provide-free-contraception-abortifacient ("Christian organizations that oppose abortion as a matter of religious conviction will be required by law to pay for abortifacients and thus violate their religious convictions.").


\textsuperscript{137} See id.

As late as 2004, Charles Lockwood, a member of the scientific advisory committee to the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) that held hearings about whether to make Plan B available over the counter and now dean of Yale University’s medical school, explained that:

[m]any on the FDA panel perceived that a contracegestive effect [e.g., an effect after fertilization occurs] was possible and we recommended that the package labeling should describe the drug’s potential mechanism of action so that women could make an informed choice about its use and avoid inadvertently violating their own moral or religious beliefs.140

Despite these early concerns about a post-fertilization effect, since Plan B’s initial approval by the FDA, the only way that Plan B has been


140 Charles J. Lockwood, OTC Emergency Contraception: The Right Choice, Contemp. OB/GYN, Jan. 2004, at 15 (discussing the available evidence and positing “that even if 10% of women experience the contracegestive effect of Plan B, its [over-the-counter] availability will prevent far more abortions, performed further along in gestation”). Lockwood cited work showing a contracegestive effect, and noted that by 2002:

There [was] also evidence that the endometrial epithelium in both the peri-ovulatory and luteal phases is disrupted by [Plan B], leading one group of investigators to conclude that its emergency contraceptive effect was mediated by alteration of the endometrial surface and, therefore, receptivity [of the implanting embryo]. Because many of the key regulators of blastocyst attachment and early implantation (such as integrins, cytokines, and glycopeptides) are regulated by steroid hormones, there is also the potential for more subtle biochemical derangements.

Id.; see also G. Ugocsai et al., Scanning Electron Microscopic (SEM) Changes of the Endometrium in Women Taking High Doses of Levonorgestrel as Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 66 CONTRACEPTION 433, 433 (2002) (“[E]mergency methods of contraception. . . . exert their negative effect on fertility by . . . creating unfavorable conditions for the implantation or for the establishment of a pregnancy.” (emphasis added)).

Despite this evidence, in an editorial the New York Times lamented:

Belief that [Plan B] might be an abortifacient stems from speculative language that the [FDA] approved for its original label, which listed a number of physiological processes by which the pill might prevent pregnancy, including preventing fertilized eggs from implanting in the womb. There was no evidence to support that view at the time, and there is none to support it now.

demonstrated to operate is as a contraceptive—meaning that it works to prevent fertilization entirely.\footnote{141} Studies report, for example, that Plan B works to prevent fertilization by: (1) impeding the sperm’s ability to reach the egg and (2) delaying ovulation so there is no egg released to meet the sperm.\footnote{142} Still, while Plan B appears to have no effect after fertilization, the authors of the studies supporting this conclusion acknowledge that post-fertilization effects cannot be definitively ruled out.\footnote{143}

The evidence about newer emergency contraceptives like ella, approved in 2010, is shaping up very differently.\footnote{144} Whereas Plan B is ef-

\footnote{141} See infra note 142.

\footnote{142} Gabriela Noé et al., Contraceptive Efficacy of Emergency with Levonorgestrel Given Before or After Ovulation, 81 CONTRACEPTION 414, 414, 419, 420 (2010) (stating that “[i]t is established that preovulatory administration of LNG [Plan B] interferes with the ovulatory process” and finding from a comparison of the number of expected and actual pregnancies after “unprotected intercourse during fertile cycle days” among women who took LNG-EC [Plan B] on the day of ovulation or immediately thereafter” that the “difference was not statistically significant,” showing that Plan B “is very effective in preventing pregnancy when it is administered before ovulation, but it is ineffective in preventing pregnancy once fertilization has occurred”); James Trussell & Beth Jordan, Editorial, Mechanism of Action of Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 74 CONTRACEPTION 87, 87 (2006) (“Levonorgestrel [Plan B] also interferes with sperm migration and function at all levels of the genital tract.”).

\footnote{143} Although studies of Plan B’s contraceptive mechanism of action are now seen as dispositive, the authors of those studies acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that this question can ever be unequivocally answered, and we therefore cannot conclude that [emergency contraceptives] never prevent pregnancy after fertilization.” Trussell & Jordan, supra note 142, at 87; see also Noé et al., supra note 142, at 414 (conceding that studies of the impact of Plan B on “endometrial receptivity,” a post-fertilization effect, “are not consistent, and current knowledge on cellular and molecular markers of endometrial receptivity in the human is insufficient to resolve this controversy”).

\footnote{144} Some commentators lump Plan B and ella together in their discussions, failing to distinguish between the mechanisms by which the two drugs appear to work. See, e.g., Keith Fournier, Plan B and Ella: Morning After Contraceptives Can Induce Abortion, Catholic Online (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=44730 (discussing Plan B and ella and concluding that they both “may result in the eviction of an embryonic human person”). For those who, like the Catholic Church, maintain that life begins at conception, parsing the exact mechanisms of Plan B and ella is irrelevant to the moral calculus of dispensing them.
fective for up to 72 hours after unprotected sex, ella works up to 120 hours after unprotected sex and is much more effective in preventing pregnancy than Plan B. In one study, ella prevented 85% of expected pregnancies, compared to Plan B’s 69%.147

A number of authorities believe that ella’s enhanced effectiveness stems in part from post-fertilization mechanisms of action, although ella clearly also works to prevent the release of an egg from the ovary, and therefore prevents fertilization itself, as Plan B does.148 A 2011 article in the Annals of Pharmacotherapy concluded that if a woman happens to take ella within five days after unprotected sex—and after the egg has already been fertilized—ella’s “mechanism of action is much more accurately described as contragestive, since only gestation (implantation and growth) of the embryo [fertilized egg] is prevented” during that time frame.149 Indeed, this contragestive effect likely accounts for ella’s “enhanced effectiveness . . . compared with [Plan B].”150

One author posits that with ella, “there is a unique circumstance and time period in which [ella] would have a direct abortifacient effect”—defined in the article to mean “loss of the embryo occurring either at the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage”—“rather than a contraceptive effect.”152 This would occur when “unprotected intercourse occurs within the fertility window (i.e., less than 120 hours (5 days) before ovulation or not more than 24 hours after ovulation) and [ella] is taken after fertilization.”153 Professor Ralph Miech, an assos-
Associate professor emeritus of molecular pharmacology, physiology, and biotechnology at Brown University, believes that ella “blocks the immunotolerance effects of progesterone on the maternal innate immune system . . ., resulting in the immunorejection of an embryo attempting to implant.”

In line with this evidence, ella’s FDA label states under the heading “How does ella work?” that “ella is thought to work . . . primarily by stopping or delaying the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possible that ella may also work by preventing attachment (implantation) to the uterus.” As with Plan B, evidence of ella’s precise mechanisms of action may evolve as new studies accumulate.

The evidence of a contragestive effect, as opposed to a contraceptive one, begs the question of whether a drug that acts after fertilization or implantation should count as an abortifacient—itself a deeply contested matter. But whatever one considers to be an abortifacient, more than half of women in one study—fifty-three percent—said they would not use a birth control method that acts after fertilization.

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154 Id. at 391. As Professor Miech explains, “Inadequate progesterone synthesis results in spontaneous abortions” as a matter of course. Id.; see also Pamela Stratton et al., Endometrial Effects of a Single Early Luteal Dose of the Selective Progesterone Receptor Modulator CDB-2914, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2035, 2039–40 (2010) (“ella caused a significant dose-dependent decrease in endometrial thickness [and] an increase in glandular [progesterone] receptors . . . Either effect . . . may hamper implantation.”). See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State over Contraception, Sterilization and Abortion (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing a more complete discussion of this and other studies demonstrating that ella works not only as a contraceptive but also as a contragestive).

155 Ella Prescribing Information, supra note 146, at *9; see Veith, supra note 135.

156 Popular reporting on ella emphasizes both the findings about ella’s possible mechanisms of action and the uncertainty remaining about those mechanisms. See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 140 (“Research on Ella . . . is less extensive, but the F.D.A., Dr. Blithe, and others say evidence increasingly suggests it does not derail implantation, citing, among other things, several studies in which women became pregnant when taking Ella after ovulating. The studies, focused on Ella’s effectiveness, were not designed to determine if it blocked implantation, but experts still consider them significant.”); Rob Stein, 5-Day-After Contraceptive Wins FDA Approval, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Ella . . . works as a contraceptive by blocking progesterone’s activity, delaying the ovaries from producing an egg. But progesterone is also needed to prepare the womb to accept a fertilized egg and to nurture a developing embryo . . . Ella’s chemical similarity to RU-486 [a controversial abortifacient] raises the possibility that it might do the same thing, perhaps if taken at elevated doses. But no one knows for sure whether the drug would induce an abortion, because the drug has never been tested that way.”).

157 See Wilson, supra note 154.

the same study, forty-four percent of women said they would “stop using” their birth control method if told that “there was even [a] remote possibility” that it acted after fertilization.\textsuperscript{159}

Like ordinary women across multiple cultures,\textsuperscript{160} objectors could seek exemptions not because they positively knew that by filling a prescription they were cutting short a potential life, but because they could not positively know they were not. Ultimately, then, this is a question about who gets to decide in instances of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{161}

Of course, when claims of faith are involved, the requirement that the rest of society agree with the objector’s belief in order for the objector to receive protection would leave almost nothing of religious freedom. As Justice William Douglas noted, writing for the Supreme Court in Ballard, “Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.”\textsuperscript{162} The Court reiterated this principle in its 1981 decision in \textit{Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division}, explaining that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{III. THIRD STICKING POINT: OBJECTORS ARE PROTECTED FROM DOING THE DEED—SOLEMNIZING A MARRIAGE OR PERFORMING AN ABORTION—and THAT IS SUFFICIENT}

Accommodations invariably raise the question about who precisely will receive protection. In both the same-sex marriage context and the health care context, many readily concede that religious objectors should be protected when actually performing a morally freighted service, like presiding over nuptials or ending a pregnancy, but resist protections for others acting in less direct capacities. Put another way, some contend that, on these questions, society should protect only priests and doctors.

\textsuperscript{159} See id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{160} See Wilson, supra note 154 (collecting studies across multiple countries of women’s attitudes toward using birth control methods that may act after fertilization or implantation).
\textsuperscript{161} To be sure that emergency contraception was acting only to prevent fertilization, and not at a later stage (either before or after implantation), would require “historical knowledge of the woman’s menstrual cycles, ultrasound examination, and [certain] hormone surge testing.” Keenan, supra note 143, at 814. Surely, nobody really wants to resolve this uncertainty at the expense of women.
\textsuperscript{162} Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87.
\textsuperscript{163} 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
Consider this claim first as to same-sex marriage. Every draft same-sex marriage bill has unambiguously protected the refusal to solemnize a marriage, notwithstanding the shared intuition that churches and clergy cannot be forced to solemnize marriages in violation of their religious tenets. But legislators responsible for the text of the draft bills have been much more skeptical when it comes to crafting a “compromise that permits continued discrimination outside of solemnizing a marriage in a church sanctuary.” In a clever column, Professor John Corvino captures the tension over protecting more than solemnization:

[T]he gay-rights debate concerning religious accommodation is not about worship. No serious person argues that the government should force religions to perform gay weddings (or ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions) against their will. That would violate the First Amendment, and beyond that, it would be foolish and wrong. Rather, the debate is about the not-strictly-religious things that religious organizations often do: renting out banquet space, for example, or hiring employees for secular tasks. And it’s about religious individuals who for reasons of conscience wish to discriminate in secular settings.

Professor Corvino’s comments encompass three related claims, although they are unstated: (1) that facilitating a ceremony is not a religious act in the way that performing the ceremony itself is; (2) that an objector’s claim weakens when it extends to services routinely provided by commercial entities, such as renting a banquet hall; and (3) that a religious objector may legally or morally object when asked directly to “do the deed”—to solemnize a relationship—but that an objector’s moral or legal claim weakens when less direct actions are at stake.

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164 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing the legislative history of same-sex marriage legislation in selected states).
166 See, e.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:00:32 (statement of Councilmember Phil Mendelson).
167 Corvino, supra note 165 (emphasis added).
168 See id. Also implicit is the assumption that social services provided by religious organizations are not as inherently “religious” as other activities. Yet religious organizations
The first claim to assess is whether facilitating a same-sex marriage should be entitled to protection. Religious objectors, from wedding planners to landlords, all may seek to step aside from providing certain services because they “feel that they are being asked to promote or facilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin that ensues.”

Professor Douglas Laycock believes there is a tendency “to dismiss these feelings of moral responsibility” because “the person providing services to a same-sex couple is not participating in the . . . conduct she considers immoral and cannot reasonably think of herself as responsible for it.” Yet, he contends, “that is a mistake” because “[m]any religious traditions have a long history of theological teaching attempting to identify the point at which one who cooperates with another’s wrongdoing, or even one who fails to sufficiently resist, becomes personally responsible for that wrongdoing.”

Certainly, with other actions, ideas of complicity and vicarious moral responsibility have not seemed so far-fetched. They underpinned, for example, boycotts of companies doing business in South Africa during apartheid.

The religious liberty exemptions contained in recently enacted same-sex marriage laws clearly see claims of facilitation as worthy of respect: all of them exempt religious institutions from facilitating or celebrating a marriage through such actions as providing the space for a reception. In three instances, the laws exempt individual employees of religious organizations more generally from the duty to “celebrate[] or promote[]” same-sex marriage if doing so would violate their “religious beliefs and faith.”

may view these services as part of a larger ministry to which the group is called. See Thomas C. Berg, Taking Exception: Gay Marriage Legislation, 26 Christian Century 12, 12 (2009) (“People from many perspectives—religious progressives as well as traditionalists—should affirm the principle that the exercise of religion does not stop at the church door, but carries over into organizational works of charity and justice motivated by faith.”); Thomas C. Berg, Other People’s Freedom, Christian Century (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.christiancentury.org/blogs/archive/2011-12/other-peoples Freedom (“[F]or progressive Christians, acts of mercy and justice, serving all people, are at the heart of the gospel, even if these acts witness implicitly rather than explicitly. Catholic social services and health-care institutions reflect that model, as do many evangelical agencies.”).

Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 195.

170 Id. at 195–96.

171 Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (exempting individuals associated with religious organizations from providing “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to the
But those same laws offer no protection to businesses or individuals in the marketplace who provide catering, flowers, reception halls, or gowns. This brings us to the question of whether the law should distinguish between religious organizations and for-profit commercial vendors, even when providing identical services.

In other contexts, the law has not drawn the line for an exemption along a non-profit versus for-profit divide. For example, with respect to abortion, many conscience clauses exempt non-profit and for-profit providers alike. Thus, for example, the Church Amendment provides that the receipt of certain federal funds cannot be used by courts or public officials to force any entity to “make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if [it] is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions,” or “provide any personnel for [such services].” This protection is not limited to nonprofit organizations or denominational hospitals. Clearly, the services at issue are provided in the commercial marketplace by non-objecting institutions. Therefore, at least in the abortion context, it is not who the objector is, but what the objector is being asked to do that merits protection.

Moreover, the law has not always required direct participation in order to receive protection. Again, the abortion conscience clauses are illustrative. Many insulate not just the physician who performs the abortion, but any person asked to assist in its performance. This is true of solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage . . . and such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs”), with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (McKinney Supp. 2012) (providing that “any employee” of “a religious entity . . . or a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious corporation . . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage”) and H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (exempting religious officials from any requirement “to solemnize or officiate any [#] marriage” if doing so would impede the official’s free exercise rights).

To date, states have provided protection to religious institutions and nonprofit organizations when they provide space for a reception or otherwise facilitate or celebrate a marriage. See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. Thus, they would exempt a church-affiliated nonprofit from hosting a wedding reception for same-sex couples, but would not exempt a commercial bed-and-breakfast. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (discussing suits against the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association and the Wildflower Inn).


See Wilson, Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 55 (discussing the network of Planned Parenthood clinics across the country).
both state-level exemptions\textsuperscript{178} and federal conscience protection\textsuperscript{179}. Some federal protections reach services outside those that most would view as “core”—the abortion procedure itself—to encompass more peripheral activities, like training and referrals for abortion.\textsuperscript{180} Some health care conscience clauses are so broad that they exempt objectors from performing \textit{any} service they find objectionable if the facility receives certain program funding from the federal government.\textsuperscript{181}

The accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs in the employment context follows this pattern as well. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for an employee’s religious practice or belief unless the employer will experience an undue hardship.\textsuperscript{182} As thinned-out as Title VII’s protections are now,\textsuperscript{183} Title VII imposes this duty even

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{179} See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual”).
\item \textsuperscript{180} See, e.g., id. § 238n.
\item \textsuperscript{181} See, e.g., id. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”).
\item \textsuperscript{183} In the 1977 case \textit{Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison}, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement narrowly to hold that an employer need not provide reasonable accommodations to an employee if it would impose
when the objector does not directly facilitate the activity to which she objects. Thus, Title VII’s protections have extended to nurses who do not want to assist with abortions, clerks who process draft registration forms at the post office, and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents who process applications for tax exemption for abortion providers. Although employers may consider hardships to themselves and other employees in granting or refusing an accommodation, nothing suggests that only those directly involved in a challenged activity can or should be exempted. The expansive protections in the employment and health care contexts reflect the reality that many people believe they are personally accountable for facilitating another person’s actions.

It is possible that a claim for exemption may be so remote that it is beyond cognizance and society’s willingness to protect it. For instance, in the health care context, an Iowa Attorney General Opinion concluded that the state’s abortion conscience clause extended by its terms only to those who “recommend[], perform[], or assist[] in an abortion

more than a de minimis burden on the employer or an employee’s coworkers. See 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).

184 For example, in the 2000 case Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered staff nurse Yvonne Shelton’s Title VII religious discrimination claim that she was required to perform emergency abortions despite her request not to. 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2006). Although the court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Shelton’s employer, a state hospital, it concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Id. at 225, 228. Shelton worked in the hospital’s Labor and Delivery (L&D) section. Id. at 222. Although elective abortions were not performed in the L&D section, emergency abortions occasionally were. Id. A devout Pentecostal, Shelton refused to participate in the emergency abortions, delaying treatment on several occasions. Id. at 223. Budget cuts made it impossible for the hospital to hire staff around Shelton’s refusal. Id. The hospital informed Shelton that she could no longer work in L&D, but it offered to transfer her to another unit or to help her secure an open position elsewhere in the hospital. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 223. When Shelton refused, she was fired; subsequently Shelton brought suit under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Id. The court concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, which shifted the burden “to the Hospital to show either that it offered Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it could not do so because of a resulting undue hardship.” Id. at 225. The court concluded that the hospital provided reasonable accommodations for Shelton because the proffered transfer would not have resulted in a loss of pay or benefits, and the service Shelton would perform in another unit would not have been “religiously untenable.” Id. at 226. Shelton’s steadfast refusal to “cooperate in attempting to find an acceptable religious accommodation” ultimately doomed her claim. See id. at 228.

185 See id. at 355–57 (discussing Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979)).
procedure.” Consequently, nurses who provide comfort to a patient and pharmacists who prepare the saline solution used in abortions could not use the conscience clause to refrain from doing their jobs. The opinion emphasized the slippery slope that a contrary decision would create: “[O]ne could eventually get to the point where the man who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a factory to make instruments used in abortions could refuse to work on conscientious grounds.” Clearly, the state can and must draw lines to avoid hardships to the public, as well as frivolous claims of conscience.

The exemptions proposed in Appendix B would exempt religious groups from “provid[ing] goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration of any marriage” when the group cannot, for religious reasons, celebrate or promote a given marriage, and they would insulate such groups from private suit or government penalty for such refusal, as numerous states now do. The proposed package of exemptions would also provide protection to individuals in commerce and government employees, but only in those situations in which no substantial hardship for same-sex couples would result.

Professor Kent Greenawalt has asked about the outer boundaries of such exemptions: would they cover only the clerk who assists with and processes the marriage paperwork, or would they also extend to a clerk who hands blank forms to the couple or to the cashier who takes their license fee? All these services arguably facilitate the marriage because they all directly involve the marriage licensing process. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise degree of involvement warranting an exemption. But clearly, an exemption should not cover the security officer who unlocks the clerk’s office in the morning because unlocking the building is not particular to facilitating same-sex marriages—the office must be unlocked to facilitate all of the office’s other business throughout the day. Put another way, because the office must be open

188 See id.
190 See infra app. A.
191 See infra app. B. In the case of government employees, the couple must be able to receive the requested service immediately, but for commercial vendors, the couple must be able to secure the desired service without substantial hardship. See infra app. B. Thus, these exemptions would not allow religious individuals in commerce or government employment to act as a roadblock on the path to marriage.
192 See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 47, 60 (2010).
to the public for a number of services, there is no meaningful sense in which the guard’s service “celebrates” or “assists” the “solemnization” of any particular couple’s marriage. Neither is there any reason for the security guard to know the occasion for any particular couple’s visit to the clerk’s office; this suggests that any refusal has nothing to do with sincere religious objections to the marriage.

More fundamentally, there is no reason to take a crabbed view of assistance in the same-sex marriage context. It is true that limiting exemptions to direct involvement in a morally freighted activity is a device for minimizing hardships to same-sex couples, but an exemption qualified by hardship to same-sex couples also serves this limiting function. Thus, at a time when the public remains deeply divided about same-sex marriage, legislators can soften the blow of legislative defeat for people who cannot, consistent with their faith, facilitate same-sex marriages by allowing them to step aside—without imposing great costs on same-sex couples.

In the health care context, others have observed that, although exemptions have been granted in life-and-death matters—like abortion and physician-assisted suicide, both of which involve being forced to end a life—more general protections for conscience objections have not been as forthcoming. One way to interpret this pattern is that a religious objector’s claim weakens significantly when less direct actions are required.

At least one commentator would count as providing “assistance” anyone with “significant personal contact with the patients,” but not, for example, the person who makes a patient’s bed. Advocates like the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), which represented the nurses in

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193 The federal government and forty-seven states have provided some exemptions to the duty to assist with abortion. See Wilson, supra note 30, at app.; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885(4) (2011) (“No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a qualified patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”).

194 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 290 n.80. Conscience protections may be more capacious than Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle suggest. Some exemptions allow providers to step away from any service that violates their moral or religious beliefs—if the service is funded by specific federal programs. See supra note 181 (providing the text of the Church Amendment). Other federal conscience clauses reach services unconnected to the abortion procedure itself to encompass peripheral activities, such as training or referrals. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2006).

195 See Greenawalt, supra note 192, at 60 (“I do not think everyone remotely connected to patients . . . should have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the patient undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote.”). Professor Greenawalt’s argument concerns those who would not have qualified for protection in his view, but he may not intend “patient care” to be a requisite for protection for all objectors.
both *Danquah v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey* and *Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital*, described in the Introduction, contend that a nurse “assist[s] with the abortion [and therefore is entitled to protection] even if [he or she is] taking down [a] name, holding a patient’s hand during the procedure, or walking them to the door.”

Certainly, ADF’s test reaches too far. As with the religious objections to same-sex marriage discussed above, not every person who has contact with a patient seeking abortion services actually facilitates the objectionable procedure. For example, the attendant who wheels the patient to the hospital entrance for curbside pick-up does this for any patient who needs this assistance. There is nothing unique to the abortion procedure that the attendant makes possible through her work. Contrast this with removing the remains of a fetus after a dilation and extraction or prepping the operating room for the abortion procedure itself—in both cases, the procedure could not happen without the specific services described.

As these examples make clear, providers can facilitate an abortion without significant patient contact. Likewise, a provider can have significant personal contact with a patient and still not facilitate an abortion. Thus, the operating room technician who ordinarily uses an autoclave to sterilize instruments would be able to claim an exemption from sterilizing a particular batch of instruments used only in abortion procedures, but he would not be able to object to sterilizing instruments for other surgeries. Similarly, a technician who disposes of medical waste could claim an exemption for refusing to dispose of the remains from an abortion, but not for refusing to dispose of remains per se.

The *Cen Zion-DeCarlo* case offers a useful illustration of what would count as assistance—and thus receive protection—and what would not. In *Cen Zion-DeCarlo*, the clinical nurse manager who was responsible for “facilitating the flow” of the hospital’s daily surgeries, testified that Cen Zion-DeCarlo’s supervisor offered to allow Cen Zion-DeCarlo to leave the operating room during the abortion procedure. The hospital, however, would require Cen Zion-DeCarlo “to perform her pre-operative job

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duties because [the hospital] had not been able to locate a replacement for [her] and the physician made clear that the patient’s life was at risk.”199 The issue of whether anyone else could perform Cenzon-DeCarlo’s services remains contested, and presumably will figure prominently in any trial.200 Under the test articulated above, Cenzon-DeCarlo’s pre-operative procedures in preparation for a second-trimester abortion would clearly constitute “assistance.” Nonetheless, as explained in Part V below, accommodations for religious objectors should be qualified by hardship to the patient.201

The pressure to limit the scope of “assistance” stems precisely from the desire to avoid hardships on patients, employers, coworkers, and others that might be created by an unbounded exemption. The qualified hardship exemption illustrates, however, that there are more direct ways to satisfy this important, overriding objective.202 A number of states, in fact, have recognized the possibility of hardships for patients and raised the bar for objecting to assistance with abortion services—which states are free to do because the Church Amendment does not preempt this entire area of law. For example, Iowa law provides that “[a]n individual . . . shall not be required against that individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions to perform, assist, or participate in such procedures” unless “necessary to save the life of a mother.”203 Likewise, South Carolina law provides that “[n]o private or nongovernmental hospital or clinic shall be required to . . . permit their facilities to be utilized for the performance of abortions,” but may not “refuse an emergency admittance.”204

A number of common sense devices can also reduce dislocations to patients and others. Making objectors disclose ex ante any objections in writing would both eliminate the possibility of unfair surprise to those seeking services and give employers an opportunity to staff

199 Id. at 3.
200 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah).
201 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.
203 IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005); see also Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen., § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009) (no person shall be required to perform an abortion, except when it may cause “death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient” or when it would be “contrary to the standards of medical care”); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (West 2011) (providing that public employees need not perform abortions except when “necessary to save the life of the mother”).
around the objector.\textsuperscript{205} Disclosure ex ante would serve an important screening function as well—separating individuals with deeply held objections from those with less sincere or more ambivalent feelings.

The likelihood of hardships could be reduced by limiting the ability to object, as Title VII does, to only those situations in which an employee’s objections would not render her “unable to perform a substantial proportion of the duties of a particular position.”\textsuperscript{206} Kentucky and Pennsylvania make it unlawful to discriminate against an abortion objector when the health care facility is not operated exclusively for the purpose of performing abortions,\textsuperscript{207} but facilities that exist precisely to conduct abortions may elect not to hire and could legally discharge an abortion objector. Obviously, giving protections to abortion objectors inside an abortion clinic would cause real mayhem. In this way, states such as Kentucky and Pennsylvania have struck a workable balance between respecting the religious beliefs of objectors and ensuring the continued availability of abortion services. Policymakers in a range of contexts should strive to follow this example and minimize the likelihood of significant hardships to all parties.

\textsuperscript{205} See infra note 362 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{206} See Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1178–84 (holding that the IRS violated Title VII’s protections against religious discrimination when it refused to promote a Catholic IRS agent “solely” because he “refus[ed] to handle applications for exemptions from persons or groups which advocate abortion or other practices to which he objects,” he objected to working on cases comprising a tiny fraction of the overall volume of his work, and the IRS could have staffed around the agent without any undue hardship).

\textsuperscript{207} The Kentucky statute states:

\begin{quote}
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . [a]ny public or private agency, institution or person . . . [to] discriminate against any applicant for admission thereto or any physician, nurse, staff member, student or employee thereof, on account of the willingness or refusal . . . to perform or participate in abortion or sterilization by reason of objection thereto on moral, religious or professional grounds, or because of any statement or other manifestation of attitude by such person with respect to abortion or sterilization if that health care facility is not operated exclusively for the purposes of performing abortions or sterilizations.
\end{quote}

IV. FOURTH STICKING POINT: NO ONE IS BEING ASKED TO DO ANYTHING SO NO ONE NEEDS PROTECTION

Some assert that laws recognizing new civil rights do not need religious liberty guarantees because they do not require religious objectors to do any particular thing. For example, White House press secretary Jay Carney has said that the coverage mandate “does not signal any change at all in the administration’s policy on conscience protections” because it “does not direct an individual to do anything.”^208

Like Carney, legislators have expressed genuine confusion about how same-sex marriage can trigger a threat to religious liberty, asking for:

[C]oncrete examples . . . that would justify anything along the lines of this exemption. . . . I’m finding this very amorphous, you know, just understanding what the concern is, you’ve got to concretize the concern to get my attention on this. Otherwise I think we’re just, kind of, thinking in kind of an airy fairy way about possible problems and I want to know what the serious things are that you are, that you prompt us to consider this.^209

The fallacy of the notion that no one will be asked to do anything that would burden them is clearest in the same-sex marriage context. It overlooks a stream of advice to government officials and employees that they must serve all members of the public, even when another willing provider can do so immediately. After Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage, the chief counsel to then-Governor Mitt Romney told the state’s justices of the peace that they must “follow the law, whether you agree with it or not.”^210 One linchpin of that law is Massa-

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^208 See January Press Briefing, supra note 17.
^209 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:29:55 (statement of Councilmember Jim Graham). Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle make a similar claim as to government officials: “We have discovered no law on the question whether a Justice of the Peace or other official authorized to officiate is under a statutory duty to perform marriages when requested, and we expect no such specific duty exists.” See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 294.
^210 Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2004, at A15. In Massachusetts, some justices of the peace had previously announced that they would resign if forced to perform same-sex marriages. Kathleen Burge, Justices of the Peace Confront Gay Marriage, Bos. Globe, Apr. 18, 2004, at B1; see also 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2012) (statement of Rep. Laura Richardson) (“Simply put, religious freedom requires religiously affiliated employers to obey the law rather than to become a law unto themselves.”). Although this is a common refrain in discussions of whether to enact religious lib-
chusetts’ statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which subjects violators to as much as $50,000 in civil fines.\footnote{See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010) (imposing such a fine on those who have “been adjudged to have committed 2 or more discriminatory practices during the 7-year period ending on the date of the filing of the complaint”).}

Similarly, in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 same-sex marriage decision, \textit{Varnum v. Brien},\footnote{763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (holding that an Iowa statute defining marriage as between a man and a woman violated the equal protection rights of same-sex couples under the Iowa Constitution).} the Iowa attorney general told county recorders:

We expect duly-elected county recorders to comply with the Iowa Constitution as interpreted unanimously by the Iowa Supreme Court. . . . Our country lives by and thrives by the rule of law, and the rule of law means we all follow the law as interpreted by our courts—not by ourselves. . . . Recorders do not have discretion or power to ignore the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling. . . . All county recorders in the state of Iowa are required to comply with the \textit{Varnum} decision following issuance of procedendo from the Supreme Court, and to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples in the same manner as licenses issued to opposite gender applicants.\footnote{Statement of Tom Miller, Iowa Att’y Gen., County Recorders Must Comply with Supreme Court’s \textit{Varnum} Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html.}

As if this were not emphatic enough, the attorney general added: “if necessary, we will explore legal actions to enforce and implement the Court’s ruling, working with the Iowa Dept. of Public Health and county attorneys.”\footnote{Id.}

Similarly, on the heels of New York’s same-sex marriage law, the Office of Vital Records of the New York State Department of Health, in an informational memorandum to town and city clerks, told clerks that “[u]nder New York State Law the town or city clerk must provide a license to an applicant who meets all marriage requirements for New York State. It is a misdemeanor violation if the clerk refuses to do so for any reason.”\footnote{Id.} These unmistakable messages from the executive de-
partments of Iowa and New York left little doubt about local marriage clerks’ new obligations in those states.

Government employees and officials believe they are at risk. At least one Iowa magistrate, authorized by law to preside over weddings, has stopped performing marriages. Although some judges believe the decision to preside over weddings is entirely a “discretionary function,” a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office cautioned that “judges and magistrate judges have discretion whether they choose to participate in wedding ceremonies . . . . [but i]f they do, they should certainly do so without bias or prejudice, as per the Code of Judicial Conduct.” In Massachusetts, several justices of the peace said they would resign because no exemption was available, and at least one did so. In New York, two clerks resigned in advance of the law’s effective date rather than violate their religious beliefs.

In a case that has received national attention after it was first profiled in the New York Times, the town clerk for Ledyard, New York, Rose Marie Belforti, assigned the task of issuing marriage licenses to a deputy clerk, who would issue the licenses by appointment, rather than as a walk-in service. Belforti, a “self-described Bible-believing Christian,” instituted the new process saying:


218 See id. (quoting a spokesperson for Iowa’s Office of the Attorney General).
220 See Efrem Graham, Town Clerks Bullied over NY Gay Marriage Law, CHRISTIAN BROAD NETWORK (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2011/November/TownClerks-Bullied-over-NY-Gay-Marriage-Law- (quoting one clerk as saying, “I’d like to see [clerks] protected. . . . I think they should have a right to their religious beliefs, their biblical beliefs. . . . [T]hey should be able to stay in the office and just appoint someone else to do the job. It’s a very small percentage of work in a rural community”).
For me to participate in the same-sex marriage application process I don’t feel is right. . . . God doesn’t want me to do this, so I can’t do what God doesn’t want me to do, just like I can’t steal, or any of the other things that God doesn’t want me to do.222

Not surprisingly, the same-sex couple who presented for a marriage license on August 30, 2011, Katie Carmichael and Deirdre DiBiaggio, chafed at being put off to a later date, saying that “[s]eparate but equal is not equal. . . . We do not want to have to go in there on another day and be treated like a second-class citizen.”223 Later news reports suggest that the office—which serves a population of 1900 people, is open nine hours a week,224 and “issues fewer than seven marriage licenses a year”—now issues all marriage licenses by appointment.225 People for the American Way, together with attorneys at Proskauer Rose LLP, have threatened suit on behalf of Carmichael and DiBiaggio, arguing that “[p]ublic officials can’t pick and choose the laws they want to follow. . . . If a public official simply decides to shirk the obligations of her office, then she should resign and be replaced by someone who will do the job and carry out state law.”226 To date no suit appears to have been filed. As explained more fully below, the claim that government employees must perform all services offered by a government office conflates the public’s legitimate claim to receive the service from the state with a claimed entitlement to receive it from each employee of the office.227

222 See id.
224 See Kaplan, supra note 221.
225 See Graham, supra note 220.
227 New York law appears to authorize town clerks to delegate services to a deputy in certain instances:

[T]he clerk of any city with the approval of the governing body of such city is hereby authorized to designate, in writing filed in the city clerk’s office, a deputy clerk, if any, and/or other city employees in such office to receive applications for, examine applications, investigate and issue marriage licenses in the absence or inability of the clerk of said city to act, and said deputy and/or
Countries with a longer experience with same-sex marriage have also witnessed resignations and firings over the question of what duty is owed to same-sex couples.\textsuperscript{228} Although the laws governing in each jurisdiction surely differ in material ways, such resignations and firings provide further evidence that the law cannot simply remain silent on the question of duties.

The claim that “no one has to do anything” also overlooks the existing nondiscrimination statutes in every state that has embraced same-sex marriage, whether by legislation or judicial decision.\textsuperscript{229} Many of these state antidiscrimination laws contain some religious liberty protections.\textsuperscript{230} Yet, where statutes prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination do not contain religious liberty accommodations, they have been used to fine a photographer who refused to photograph weddings\textsuperscript{231} and to sue a Methodist association that refused to open its facilities employees so designated are hereby vested with all the powers and duties of said city clerk relative thereto.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(3) (McKinney 2010).

\textsuperscript{228} See Wilson, supra note 46, at 324–25 (chronicling resignations in Canada, dismissals in the Netherlands, and disciplinary actions against employees in the United Kingdom).


The [New Mexico Human Rights Act] regulates Elane Photography’s conduct in its commercial business, not its speech or right to express its own views about same-sex relationships. As a result, Elane Photography’s commercial
ilities to same-sex civil union ceremonies.\(^{232}\) Antidiscrimination statutes have provided a vehicle for these challenges, raising the question of whether objections to same-sex marriage are like any other form of discrimination against lesbians and gays.\(^{233}\)

Many laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and other prohibited classifications date to the 1960s and 1970s, long before same-sex marriage was widely considered.\(^{234}\) These laws largely address commercial services, like hailing taxis, ordering burgers, and leasing apartments, for which it is hard to imagine that a refusal to serve another individual can reflect anything other than animus toward that individual.\(^{235}\)

Refusals to assist a same-sex marriage are different in character, however—they can stem from something other than anti-gay animus.\(^{236}\)

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business conduct, taking photographs for hire, is not so inherently expressive as to warrant First Amendment protections. The conduct of taking wedding or ceremonial photographs, unaccompanied by outward expression of approval for same-sex ceremonies, would not express any message from Elane Photography.

Id.

Finally, the appellate court rejected the claim that the state’s RFRA could be used as a defense because the RFRA was intended to limit governmental intrusions into religious freedom and not suits between private parties. See id.

\(^{232}\) Jill P. Capuzzo, Church Group Complains of Pressure over Civil Unions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2007, at B4; see Hagerty, supra note 58.

\(^{233}\) E.g., Flynn, supra note 46, at 251–54.


\(^{236}\) This is not to say that every objection will be made in good faith. See supra notes 110–207 and accompanying text (discussing tests for the sincerity of claims). Although some faith traditions object to homosexual sex, an objection to facilitating a same-sex marriage on this ground alone would not be protected under the model provision in Appendix B, infra. The model provision, by its very terms, would protect refusals to “solemniz[e] or celebrat[e] [ ] any marriage” only when doing so would force one to “violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.” See infra app. B (emphasis added). All civil rights laws prohibit covered entities from discriminating on certain bases yet allow them to act on others. As a result, courts often must parse legitimate, permitted grounds from illegitimate ones, taking into account all surrounding circumstances. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, 664 F.3d 885, 898 (11th Cir. 2011) (examining the possible legitimate and illegitimate reasons for an employer’s failure to promote an African American employee).
For many people, marriage is a religious institution and wedding ceremonies are a religious sacrament.\textsuperscript{237} For them, assisting with marriage ceremonies has a religious significance that ordering burgers and hailing taxis simply do not have. Many of these people have no objection generally to providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to facilitating a marriage directly—just as some religious believers would object to facilitating an interfaith or second marriage.\textsuperscript{238} Without explicit protection in the antidiscrimination or same-sex marriage law, many will be faced with a cruel choice: your conscience or your livelihood.

The penalties for violating antidiscrimination laws are sobering. In Massachusetts, individuals violating the nondiscrimination statute can be fined up to $50,000.\textsuperscript{239} In Connecticut, business owners who violate the statute may be found guilty of a Class D misdemeanor, which can lead to thirty days in jail.\textsuperscript{240} In the District of Columbia, the penalties for violation of the Human Rights Act include liability for all of the typical money damages in civil cases, including damages for emotional distress and attorney’s fees.\textsuperscript{241} The defendant can also be forced to pay stiff civil penalties to the city: $10,000 or less for the first violation, $25,000 or less for a second offense in a five-year period, or $50,000 or less for a third offense in a seven-year period.\textsuperscript{242} These are harsh penalties in today’s economy, especially the threat of private lawsuits.


\textsuperscript{238}See supra note 68 (discussing religious objections to interfaith marriage).

\textsuperscript{239}See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010). The law excludes social clubs, fraternal organizations, employers with less than six employees, and religious organizations if the challenged practice is in furtherance of religious doctrine or involves giving a preference to members of the organization. \textit{Id.} § 1.

\textsuperscript{240}See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81d(b) (West Supp. 2011) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of such person’s sexual orientation or civil union status . . .”); H.B. 5145, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2012) (specifying jail sentences effective October 1, 2012). A public accommodation is “any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.” Id. § 46a-63.

\textsuperscript{241}See D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a) (LexisNexis 2012).

\textsuperscript{242}See id. § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E-1).
Similarly, the parallel claim that the coverage mandate does not ask objectors to do anything also fails. Under the Obama administration’s accommodation to religiously affiliated employers, employees receive the coverage as an adjunct to the insurance coverage the religious employer finances, making it part and parcel of the employer-provided coverage. Thus, the objector’s act of providing the mandated insurance facilitates an action the objector views as gravely immoral—the forestalling or ending of a life. The penalties for failing to provide the underlying coverage—coverage without which the “free” but objectionable coverage cannot be obtained—are staggering. If the University of Notre Dame dropped its coverage for all employees rather than violate its religious convictions under the regulations as they now stand and assuming no change in its number of employees, it would face an annual penalty of $32,830,000, although it may nonetheless come out ahead financially, as Part VI explains.

Furthermore, if no one will truly be asked to do anything, then it costs nothing to provide a specific religious liberty protection. If, however, someone will or may be asked to assist with an act that violates deeply held religious beliefs, then it is incumbent upon legislators to clarify whether individuals can step quietly aside.

V. Fifth Sticking Point: No One Should Have to Bear the Cost of Another’s Religious Objection

In the fight over the coverage mandate, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pointedly maintained that “[r]eligious liberty does
not mean the right to impose religious views on others. . . . Employers should not be able to impose their moral views about birth control on the women who work for them."247 The same claim is made about same-sex marriage.248

For the most part, appropriately crafted exemptions need not ask same-sex couples to bear the cost of protecting others’ religious beliefs.249 The protections for individual objectors in government employment or commerce that I and others have proposed seek to balance two competing concerns—marriage equality and religious liberty.250


248 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 ("[C]hurches should not get to push their beliefs onto their employees by denying benefits. There is no reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters." (quoting seller11, Comment to Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Marriage Equality Bill That Respects Religious Objectors, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102601653.html) [hereinafter Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill]).

249 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text (discussing employee benefits).

250 The proposed protections do not, however, cabin the exemption for religious organizations. Instead, religious organizations would be permitted to refuse to “(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or (2) solemnize any marriage; or (3) treat as valid any marriage.” See infra app. B. In other words, religious organizations could choose not to provide benefits to spouses when recognizing any marriage that would force them to violate their religious beliefs. The argument for an unqualified exemption even as to benefits coverage—one of the thorniest and least intuitive issues facing legislators—is taken up in Part VI. See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text. The model provision would also permit religious organizations to refuse to rent their space for receptions celebrating marriages that are not recognized by their faith traditions. It is possible that this unqualified exemption would create hardship for same-sex couples if, for example, there were no other spaces available in the marketplace, although it seems very unlikely that same-sex couples would be unable to find another space. Where a religious organization occupies a monopoly position in the marketplace, however, this pivotal position would justify qualifying the right to object even for religious organizations. See Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005) (arguing that a health care provider’s claim of “unfettered right to personal autonomy while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of the public trust,” and that health care providers who benefit from the monopolies created by state licensing systems have a corresponding collective obligation to provide services to all patients who seek them); Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83 (arguing that any exemption for religiously affiliated adoption placement providers should be qualified if an absolute exemption would erect a significant barrier to a same-sex couple’s ability to adopt). With
A government official could refuse to solemnize a marriage only if another government official is promptly available and willing to do so without inconvenience or delay.\textsuperscript{251} Under this construction, in an unavoidable contest between religious liberty and marriage equality, religious liberty must yield. Thus, no state official may ever act as a choke-point on the path to marriage. In the private commercial context, small business owners could say no because unlike government officials, they do not control access to the status of marriage.

The conditional nature of this protection is by deliberate design: an absolute exemption for government employees or officials—unqualified by hardship\textsuperscript{252}—could erect a roadblock to marriage for respect to health care providers’ collective obligation to serve all patients, Professor Alta Charo notes that the obligation:

\begin{quote}
does not mean that all members of the profession are forced to violate their own consciences. It does, however, necessitate ensuring that a genuine system for counseling and referring patients is in place, so that every patient can act according to his or her own conscience just as readily as the professional can.
\end{quote}

Charo, supra, at 2473. Professor Charo acknowledges that although it may be difficult to strike such a balance, doing so “represent[s] the best effort to accommodate everyone and is the approach taken by virtually all the major medical, nursing, and pharmacy societies.” \textit{Id}. This may occur with religiously affiliated hospitals that, for example, do not want to recognize the same-sex spouse of a patient for purposes of hospital visitation. As Part I documented, Catholic hospitals frequently do occupy a monopoly position in the marketplace, making these denials particularly burdensome, leading to significant and deserved public outcry. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. This public backlash precipitated new federal regulations that address this “very tender and sensitive topic” for both sides. See Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting Mitt Romney). The regulations, which govern all Medicare- and Medicaid-participating hospitals, allow patients to decide for themselves who they want to visit during their hospital stay, including same-sex partners. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(h), 485.635(f) (2012). The new regulations give the force of law to recommendations made by President Barack Obama in his April 15, 2010 Presidential Memorandum. See Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511, 20,511–12 (Apr. 15, 2010) (prohibiting hospitals from denying visitation privileges on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability).

\textsuperscript{251}See infra app. B.

\textsuperscript{252}Several states provide illustrative hardship restrictions. See, e.g., \textit{Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1790} (2011) (prohibiting the termination of a pregnancy unless the pregnancy: “(1) is likely to result in the death of the mother; (2) [t]here is substantial risk of . . . deformity or mental retardation; (3) [t]he pregnancy resulted from . . . incest, or . . . rape . . . ; [or] (4) [c]ontinuation of the pregnancy would involve substantial risk of permanent injury to the . . . mother”); \textit{Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen. § 20-214} (LexisNexis 2009) (providing that no person shall be required to perform an abortion or refer a patient to another for an abortion, except when failure to refer the patient would reasonably be determined as “[t]he cause of death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient” or if the failure was “contrary to the standards of medical care”); \textit{Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215} (West 2011) (mandating that public employees shall
same-sex couples at least some of the time. 253 For example, an accommodation that absolutely exempts clerks from processing a marriage license application would hobble a couple’s access to marriage in a number of foreseeable circumstances. This might occur when a solitary clerk is available within a twenty-mile radius and he or she objects for religious reasons to facilitating a same-sex marriage. 254 An absolute roadblock would also be erected when an otherwise willing clerk is unavailable due to illness or other reason, leaving no one else to assist the couple. Our proposed exemption forestalls such hardships to same-sex couples.

As with any rule that seeks to balance two separate interests, the proposed hardship exemption will involve some line drawing—specifically, what will count as “promptly,” or as “inconvenience” or “delay.” Such line drawing could be accomplished in the legislative process, which would permit states to make choices that reflect the facts on the ground in that state—for instance, how many clerks process the necessary paperwork in any given office. 255 Legislators would be wise to de-

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253 Many commentators are rightly concerned about conferring upon religious objectors an absolute, unqualified exemption to facilitating same-sex marriages. For instance, Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle observe that:

[T]he political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal access to publicly available goods and services, whether provided by the state, commercial entities, or others. This interest primarily arises from concern about those who are excluded from such benefits. Exclusion may imperil health and safety, limit opportunities for personal development, deny political and social equality, or impose psychic distress. State policies protecting against such exclusion also express the political community’s concerns about its own character and experience, because such exclusion may result in segregation and conflict.

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 280–81 (emphasis added). Because my colleagues and I share this concern, the protections we propose would not give an absolute exemption for government employees or commercial providers.

254 Such considerations are contextually sensitive and might vary considerably among specific state regulations. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 37:1-3 (West Supp. 2012) (“[A] marriage or civil union license shall be issued by the licensing officer in the municipality in which either party resides or, if neither party is a resident of the State, in the municipality in which the proposed marriage or civil union is to be performed.”).

255 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (presenting empirical evidence about the operation of clerks’ offices in Massachusetts, including the number of clerks and same-sex marriage license applications, suggesting that same-sex marriage licenses constitute a min-
cide to explicitly define such terms in any same-sex marriage legisla-
tion, as they routinely do in other statutes, rather than leaving it to the
courts to construe those terms. That said, asking same-sex couples to
wait any significant amount of time for a license that heterosexual cou-
pies would receive immediately would not be “prompt.”

The protection we propose will strike many religious objectors as
cold comfort. In a head-to-head contest between religious liberty and
marriage equality, religious liberty yields under this construction. Re-
stricting the ability to object to only those situations in which no hard-
ship for same-sex couples would result is principled: the state should
not confer the right to marry with one hand and then take it back with
the other by enacting broad, unqualified religious objections that could
operate to bar same-sex couples from marrying. Although the pro-
posed protection does not help every objector in every instance, the
exemption still has value. As I have argued elsewhere, a hardship ex-
emption will likely allow the vast majority of objectors to step aside.

Some will ask why same-sex couples should ever have to experi-
ence any dislocation, however slight or remote. A common refrain is
that religious objectors in government service should do all of their job
or resign. This stance conflates the public receipt of a service offered
by the state with the receipt of that service from each and every em-
ployee in the office who is available to do it. Same-sex couples clearly
iscule part of the workload for state clerk offices, and thus that staffing around religious
objectors would pose negligible costs).

256 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text (discussing promptness and the vir-
tues of making accommodations as invisible as possible so that same-sex couples “never
stand in another line”).

257 See Laycock, supra note 169, at 200 (“[A hardship qualification on religious objec-
tion] is inevitable in the governmental and commercial sectors. Religious dissenters can
live their own values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to prevent
same-sex couples from living their own values. If the dissenters want complete moral au-
tonomy on this issue, they must refrain from occupying such a choke point.”).

258 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (arguing that few cases of hardship to same-sex
couples would actually arise).

259 See Letter from James E. Gregory, supra note 226, at *2 (“[W]e fully expect the
Town Board to direct Ms. Belforti to either perform her essential duties, including the
issuance of marriage licenses to eligible applicants whether same sex or opposite sex, or to
resign immediately.”). One D.C. Council member expressed the idea this way:

If [an objector is a clerk] who chose[s] not to provide [a] service that [she
has] accepted the job to provide but . . . still want[s] an entire salary as if
[she] were providing 100% of the service, [then she is asking for] all of the
benefits of the position [yet feeling] entitled to discriminate.

Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of Council-
member David Catania).
have the right to receive marriage licenses and all other services from the state, but they do not necessarily have a claim to receive the service from a particular public servant. Indeed, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes upon governmental employers a duty to accommodate an objecting employee if reasonably possible without undue hardship to the government, while also reasonably preserving the employee’s employment status.\footnote{See Wilson, supra note 46, at 348–59; see also Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that employment status includes compensation, conditions, terms, and privileges of employment). There are other problems with the “do-the-whole-job-or-get-out” approach. As a pair of cases involving claims for accommodation of employees in predictable administrative jobs illustrates, speculative predictions regarding possible future disruptions are not to be considered; instead, employers are to be guided by the facts on the ground. See McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979). In its 1979 decision in Haring v. Blumenthal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted: “[U]ndue hardship” must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship. Were the law otherwise, any accommodation, however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship because, if sufficiently magnified through predictions of the future behavior of the employee’s co-workers, even the most minute accommodation could be calculated to reach that level. 471 F. Supp. at 1182. The best empirical evidence suggests, however, that allowing government employees to recuse themselves from facilitating same-sex marriages will cost the government and same-sex couples very little, if anything at all. See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39. Moreover, although accommodations for certain government employees who protect the public (like police officers and firefighters) have raised special difficulties and received special scrutiny in a string of cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, at most these cases stand for the proposition that employees of “paramilitary” organizations responsible for public protection must check their consciences at the door. See id. at 340–58 (citing Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925–27 (7th Cir. 2003); Rodriguez v. City of Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 775–80 (7th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991)). Patently, religious accommodations for employees of marriage licensure offices and other government employees who may object to facilitating same-sex marriages pose far less difficulty than accommodations for public protectors because these employees perform routine, predictable, easily staffed-around tasks. See id. at 349. Moreover, even in the public protector cases, which are the most hostile to the need for accommodations, public employers can and routinely do offer new assignments, transfers, and low-level workarounds short of a new assignment, which allow the religious objector to step aside from services that violate deeply held religious beliefs. See id. at 354.} More fundamentally, this stance vilifies people who could not have known when they took their jobs that they would be asked to facilitate a same-sex marriage. A New York clerk who resigned “just one day before gay marriage became legal” took her position as a clerk thirteen years before, in 1998—three years before the Netherlands first recognized
same-sex marriage and six years before same-sex marriage was recognized anywhere in the United States.261

Like the New York clerk, many state employees in the United States began working for the government long before same-sex marriage was legally recognized anywhere. The Council of State Governments reports that many public sector employees have held their jobs for decades.262 Many state employees are eligible for retirement.263 Generally, to be eligible for retirement, an employee must have worked for the state for a substantial length of time.264 Roughly one in every four or five employees working for state government in Iowa (17%), New Hampshire (22%), and Vermont (25%) qualified for retirement in 2002.265 There is no reason to think that clerks in state registrar offices or other employees as a group are more likely to be newcomers to the job than their counterparts.

Moreover, dismissal or resignation will likely be very costly for these employees. A job in the state licensure office pays well, and many long-time employees have built up retirement and other benefits that would be wiped out or significantly curtailed if they felt forced to exit rather than violate a religious conviction.266

Just as important as these very human costs to objectors is the fact that collisions will gradually become less and less prevalent. Resistance to recognition of same-sex marriage largely follows generational lines. In 2011, the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute annual national survey of college freshmen found that 71.3% of college freshmen supported same-sex marriage.267 In 2010, 53% of those surveyed between eighteen and twenty-nine supported same-sex marriage; 39%

261 See Graham, supra note 220; see also supra note 234 (discussing the origin of same-sex marriage in the Netherlands and Massachusetts); see also Wilson, supra note 113, at 328–31 (offering a more extensive discussion of this issue).


263 See id. at 16 (providing data for some states that recognize same-sex marriage). Numbers for Massachusetts are not available. See id.

264 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 330 n.66 (discussing length of service requirements for retirement).

265 See Carroll & Moss, supra note 262, at 16. On average, state workers in Iowa had worked thirteen years by 2002, in New Hampshire nine years, and in Vermont eleven years—all more than a decade before same-sex marriage was recognized by their states. See id. at 17.

266 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 329–30.

opposed it. Among older Americans fifty to sixty-four, 52% oppose it, with only 38% in support. This data suggests that conflicts over same-sex marriage rights will recede over time. As Professor Douglas Laycock has written, these conflicts will “gradually fade away, and nearly all the rest [of those who oppose same-sex marriage] will go silent, succumbing to the live-and-let-live traditions of the American people.”

In the commercial realm, our proposal gives more latitude to say “no” because the objector does not control access to the status of marriage. The wedding photographer and cake decorator are classic examples of commercial actors associated with marriage. Even the protection for these commercial actors is not unqualified, however. An objector in the stream of commerce may object only if a “substantial hardship” would not result. This provision allows them to step aside only when other providers can do the job. Because same-sex marriage laws remain largely a “blue state” phenomenon, the number of refusals should be vanishingly small. As Professor Laycock has explained:

Few same-sex couples . . . will have to go far to find merchants, professionals, counseling agencies, or any other desired service providers who will cheerfully meet their needs and wants.

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269 See id; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Politics of Accommodation: The American Experience with Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUALITY: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE (Timothy S. Shah ed., forthcoming 2013) (analyzing voter opinion in states that have yet to enact same-sex marriage statutes, as well as states that have enacted amendments banning same-sex marriage).

270 In perhaps one sign that same-sex marriage is decreasingly controversial and polarizing, a national poll conducted two weeks after President Obama’s endorsement of same-sex marriage revealed that the President’s stand had done little to affect public perceptions of him. See Julie Pace, Obama Team Trumpets New Polling on Gay Marriage, Huffington Post (May 23, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120523/us-obama-gay-marriage. Only seven percent of registered voters stated that President Obama’s open support for same-sex marriage raised concerns about supporting him, whereas sixty-two percent stated that his position did not make a difference to them. See id.

271 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 261.

272 See infra app. B.

And same-sex couples will generally be far happier working with a provider who contentedly desires to serve them than with one who believes them to be engaged in mortal sin, and grudgingly serves them only because of the coercive power of the law. Religious exemptions could also be drafted to exclude the rare cases where these suppositions are not true, such as a same-sex couple in a rural area that has reasonably convenient access to only one provider of some secular service. Such cases are no reason to withhold religious exemptions in the more urban areas where most of the people—and most of the same-sex couples—actually live.274

Of course, same-sex couples may experience inconveniences or dislocations under any exemption, even an exemption qualified by hardship.275 So why allow any dislocation? First, a qualified exemption “lowers the stakes” in the debate about same-sex marriage, where pub-

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274 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 261 (predicting that without religious accommodations, the number of people opposing same-sex marriage will increase); see also Berg, supra note 46, at 229 (noting that marketing surveys indicate that more than seventy-four percent of same-sex couples live in large urban areas).

275 One way to mitigate such dislocation is through information-forcing rules like those used with health care services. California law, for example, requires that any facility that does not offer abortion “on its premises shall post notice . . . in an area . . . that is open to patients and prospective admittees.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123420(c) (West 2012). This advance notice allows the patient to seek services knowing whether a provider is willing to provide such services. Information networks may also close knowledge gaps and ease dislocation. These information networks have been used to promote patient access to emergency contraceptives and to allow the patient to get emergency contraceptives without great dislocation, while allowing unwilling providers to live by their convictions. See Kyung M. Song, Women Complain After Pharmacies Refuse Prescriptions, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at A5 (arguing that “with better information, the patient would obtain the service without hardship or inconvenience”); Comments from Nathan J. Diament et al., Comments Submitted to the U.S. Dept’ of Health & Human Servs. with Regard to the Proposed Recission of the “Conscience Regulation” Relating to Healthcare Workers and Certain Healthcare Services 4 (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ouradio.org/images/uploads/HHS_Conscience_Regulation_Comments.pdf (“[W]omen who have experienced difficulty in obtaining emergency contraceptives have encountered ‘search costs’ that would be eliminated with better information. Thus, the patient in one complaint filed with the Washington State Board of Pharmacy obtained [emergency contraceptives] less than an hour after the initial refusal took place.”).

Advance notice of refusals will likely satisfy no one in the same-sex marriage context, despite the fact that it would avert needless inconveniences. We would no more tolerate signs saying, “This photography shop does not photograph same-sex ceremonies” than we would tolerate “Irish Need Not Apply” signs. The promise and hope of antidiscrimination laws is that they will erase differences or the importance of differences, not accentuate them. Thus, the information gain comes at an unacceptably high price—a loss of dignity—which is explored in Part VII. See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text.
lic opinion continues to be deeply divided. It preserves as much religious freedom as possible in a liberal society without significantly encroaching on others—a goal we should generally strive for, especially when the costs to the public are cabined. A qualified exemption also provides “elbow room” for citizens with widely divergent views to live together in a pluralistic society.

As Professor Laycock notes, “[t]he larger problem for same-sex couples is the insult, the pointed reminder that some fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of what they are doing. But same-sex couples know that anyway, and the American commitment to freedom of speech ensures that they will be reminded of it from time to time.”

The fact that the government should not violate deeply held religious beliefs in order to protect others from insult does not mean that the government should not be concerned about whether same-sex couples are subjected to insult.

Precisely to minimize any offense to same-sex couples, the process for accommodating religious objectors should make any objection as invisible as possible. As the next Part explains, this is achievable if the objector works in a large private-sector organization or government office. The couple asked by the Ledyard, New York town clerk to return at a later time to secure a marriage license from a deputy rightly

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[J]udges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is closely but intensely divided but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such primordial politics. Lowering the stakes means that judges should not prematurely constitutionalize fundamental issues where the nation is not settled; on the other hand, judges can sometimes ameliorate local conflicts that have escalated. Id.; see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, Bangor Daily News (Oct. 16, 2009, 8:41 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2009/10/16/opinion/samesex-marriage-law-lacks-religious-protection (arguing that religious liberty exemptions in same-sex marriage laws “go a long way to turning down the temperature in the heated debate over” same-sex marriage).

277 Federal and state laws reflect this intuition. See supra note 14 (discussing the federal RFRA and look-a-like statutes in sixteen states). In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court found that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states, hastening the enactment of state RFRAs. See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1995).

278 Laycock, supra note 169, at 198.

279 I am indebted to Professor Laycock for this observation.

280 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text.
felt “demean[ed],” as any of us would have.281 The felt disapprobation resulted not from having to make an appointment to secure the needed license—all couples must now do this282—but from the clerk’s articulated reasons for the change: “I don’t think it’d do the couple any service to have me as their person, because it . . . grieve[s] the Holy Spirit that resides in my heart, and I don’t know if I’d be able to cover that up for them. So, I want to remove myself from this process.”283 If New York law allows the delegation of one task to a deputy and the clerk followed the correct procedure for making this delegation, no one need ever have known the animating reason behind the change.

In the commercial context of a large organization, sensitivity and forethought sometimes will allow religious objections to recede from public view. In businesses owned by sole proprietors or with few employees, however, a member of the public who is turned away will always know it. Some will find this cost too high.

Here, the case for a qualified exemption rests, in part, on two predictive judgments. First, as discussed earlier, public attitudes are likely to harden against same-sex marriage in the absence of accommodations.284 Second, it seems likely that the market itself will police religious objectors. As noted above, in August 2011, a New Jersey bridal salon owner refused to assist a woman with her gown because she was a lesbian; the owner reportedly said that the customer “came from a nice Jewish family, and it was a shame that [she] was gay.”285 Although the

281 See Kingkade, supra note 223 (quoting Katie Carmichael as saying, “It’s demeaning, degrading and bottom line, it’s discrimination”).
282 Some of the early reporting suggested that same-sex couples could not secure a license at all. See id. (indicating that “the publicly elected official responsible for issuing marriage licenses[,] refused to issue one herself and told the couple to make an appointment with a deputy town clerk. There’s just one problem: There is no deputy town clerk”). Town officials later confirmed that the clerk “informed the town board on Aug. 8 that she would not issue same-sex marriage licenses because of her fundamental Christian beliefs. . . . [She] ‘agreed’ . . . to let her deputy clerk . . . issue all marriage licenses, including those to same-sex couples, in the future,” but “the bottom line for the town is that no one will be turned away and everyone will be treated the same.” See Scott Rapp, Same-Sex Couple Threatens Legal Action Against Cayuga County Town Whose Clerk Refused to Issue Marriage License, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse) (Sept. 14, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/same-sex_couple_threatens_lega.html (quoting Town Attorney Adam Van Buskirk).
owner denied the charges, the story went viral, and precipitated an onslaught of comments on the store’s Facebook profile condemning the alleged discrimination.286

This example illustrates that objectors will often pay a cost in the market for objecting. Presumably, the salon owner lost all the business of gay couples in her community—in itself a sufficient penalty, likely to limit refusals to those who feel quite strongly about it.287 And it appears that the salon owner also lost business from friends of those gay couples and others who heard about her stance. The possibility of social sanctions is not confined only to commercial businesses, as the significant penalties faced by nurses who object to abortion in the workplace illustrate.288

In short, appropriately crafted exemptions should carefully balance marriage equality and religious liberty. Such exemptions should take into consideration whether an objection will create an actual roadblock to marriage and should therefore apply differently to actions taken by governmental officials and private businesspersons.

VI. SIXTH STICKING POINT: WE CANNOT DENY SAME-SEX SPOUSES AND WOMEN INSURANCE COVERAGE THEY NEED

The benefits issue raises especially thorny questions in the same-sex marriage and health care contexts. Unlike facilitation, where a hardship exemption can affirm both values at stake—access and religious liberty, with one prevailing sometimes and the other prevailing at other times—insurance coverage does not allow both interests to be affirmed simultaneously. Religious liberty will either prevail (with no benefits required) or it will not (with benefits required). Thus, it matters a great deal how policymakers choose to handle the benefits question.

The argument for a benefits exemption is not that exemptions will pose no hardship, but that failing to give an exemption often leads to greater hardships. Before the ACA, federal tax policy provided a significant “carrot” to employers to induce them to provide health care


287 See supra notes 112–133 and accompanying text (discussing sincerity and the problem of lukewarm objectors).

288 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital).
coverage to employees, but it did not provide a “stick.”

No federal law required employers to provide benefits to employees or their spouses—they simply could elect not to provide health care coverage. Although twenty-eight states mandate that any insurance sold in the state must offer contraceptive coverage, all but eight “allow certain employers and insurers to refuse” to include such coverage.

289 Employers are motivated to provide such benefits because they are tax-preferenced. See Alliance for Health Reform, Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: A Primer 9–11 (2008), http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/Transcript-1367.pdf. Although employers “can deduct the cost of health insurance,” as they would for any business expense, “the real subsidies for health insurance come[,] from the fact that employees do not get taxed on the health benefits provided.” So, in other words, when an employer provides wages to an employee, those wages are taxed as income. When an employer provides health benefits to an employee, those benefits are not taxed as income. They’re essentially provided tax-free and, in effect, lower the taxes that an employee would otherwise pay.

Id. at 9–10; see also Gamage, supra note 25, at *9–10 (“The primary sources of this tax advantage were the tax exclusions for employer-provided health insurance,” permitting employees to “exclude the value of those subsidies from taxable income” and payroll taxes, and to take advantage of “cafeteria plan[s],” if offered by their employer, allowing them to use pre-tax dollars “to pay for health insurance premiums.”). For the specific tax treatment, see 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) (excluding employer contributions to fund health care benefits from employees’ income); id. § 105(b) (excluding from employees’ income benefits paid by employer-sponsored health care plans to the extent that benefits are paid to reimburse the cost of medical care for employees, their spouses, and dependents); id. § 162(a) (permitting employer deduction for ordinary business expenses); 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-10(a) (2012) (providing that amounts paid for health care benefit plans may be deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) if they are ordinary and necessary business expenses). After the ACA, small employers are incentivized to offer health care coverage to employees through tax credits. See Gamage, supra note 25, at *21 n.123.

Professor Amy Monahan calculates that, for two employees in the twenty-five percent tax bracket, both of whom “desire the same insurance coverage, [say, for example, an] individual policy that costs $3,750,” the taxpayer who receives the policy through her employer “receives an effective subsidy of $1,412 to purchase her health insurance coverage solely because her employer makes such coverage available to her, and regardless of whether her employer makes any contribution toward such coverage.” Amy Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes and Health Insurance 3–4 (Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 10-1 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531322.

Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1037, 1042 (1996) (“There is no statutory mandate requiring that employers must provide health insurance for their employees.”).

Far more crucially, however, such state mandates did not extend to private employer health plans unless the employer purchased insurance coverage from an insurer. This occurred because employee benefit plans of private employers enjoy substantial insulation from state law as a result of the broad preemptive shield erected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Thus, employers that provided health care coverage to their employees could easily es-

provide prescription drug coverage to include “the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices”).

Guttmacher Report, supra note 291, at *2 (describing a “limited refusal clause” in three states “that allows only churches and church associations to refuse to provide coverage, and does not permit hospitals or other entities to do so;” a “broader” refusal clause in seven states that “allows churches, associations of churches, religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools, and, potentially, some religious charities and universities to refuse, but not hospitals;” an “expansive refusal clause” in nine states allowing “religious organizations, including at least some hospitals, to refuse to provide coverage,” which extends in two states to “secular organizations with moral or religious objections;” a right to refuse in one state, Nevada, rather than an exemption; and an exemption in two states for insurers as well as employers); see Timothy Jost, Newland v. Sebelius: The General Welfare, Religious Liberty, and Contraception Coverage Under the ACA, HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (July 30, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/30/newland-v-sebelius-the-general-welfare-religious-liberty-and-contraception-coverage-under-the-aca (“Twenty-one [states] have some form of religious exemption . . . .”).

See Emp. Benefit Research Inst., ERISA and Health Plans 4–6 (1995), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1195ib.pdf (“States can indirectly regulate health care plans that provide benefits through insurance contracts by establishing the terms of the contract. . . . But they cannot do the same with respect to self-funded plans. That is one of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of self-funded plans.”); see also Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute requiring mandatory minimum health care benefits in any general insurance policy, even if sold to an employee health care plan, was not preempted by ERISA because it applies to insurance contracts purchased by the plan).

ERISA broadly preempts state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). The “saving clause,” however, saves state laws that regulate insurance from preemption. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The “deeme[r] clause” provides an exception to the saving clause exception. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Under the deemer clause, self-funded plans are exempt from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance within the meaning of the saving clause.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, ERISA preempts state laws regulating insurance with respect to self-funded plans, whereas insured plans are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. See id.

As a result of this broad preemption, a persistent criticism of ERISA has been that Congress, by failing to regulate meaningfully employee health benefit plans at the federal level, created a federal “regulatory vacuum.” William J. Curran et al., Health Care Law and Ethics 1076 (5th ed. 1998). One notable exception is mental health parity. See Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 471, 488–89 (2012) (noting that because the essential mental health and substance use disorder benefit that is part of the ACA’s “essential health benefits” provision, § 1302, doesn’t apply to all health plan settings, even after health care reform is fully implemented, full mental health parity will not be achieved because mental health and substance use disorder benefits will not be fully covered).
cape state-mandated benefits by simply “self-funding”—or paying for health care costs out of their own funds, sometimes backed up by a stop-loss insurance policy. ERISA’s significant insulation from state law “is one of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of self-funded plans,” in which eighty-two percent of employees in large companies now find themselves.

295 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293, at 4–6. Employers that have self-funded “may not themselves be regulated as insurance companies even if the self-funded or self-insured plan purchases stop-loss insurance to cover losses or benefits payments beyond a specified level.” Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that ERISA’s preemptive shield prevented Maryland from regulating self-funded private health benefit plans that used stop-loss coverage with a very low dollar threshold for payment by the insurer, because such regulations did not qualify as the regulation of the business of insurance and thus fell outside the saving clause). Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the question, lower courts have held that the purchase of stop-loss insurance does not cause self-funded plans to lose their status as self-funded. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 113–15 (2005).

296 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293 at 4–6. According to a 2012 survey, 81% of covered workers in large firms (with two hundred or more workers) were in partially or completely self-funded plans, whereas only 15% of covered workers in small firms (with three to one hundred and ninety-nine workers) were in similar plans. Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Annual Survey 186 (2012), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf; see also Michael J. Brien & Constantijn W.A. Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans 1 (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/eb/sa/pdf/deloitte2011-1.pdf (estimating that 42.7% of plans that filed a Form 5500 had a self-insured component); U.S. Dep’t Labor, Emp. Benefits Security Admin., Group Health Plans Report 1 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/eb/sa/pdf/ACA-ARC2012.pdf (reporting that, as of 2009, for the “approximately 50,000 private sector employer-sponsored group health plans that filed a Form 5500” 42%, or 21,000 plans, “can be categorized as self-insured” or as mixed-insured).

Drawing on state-mandated benefit laws, some commentators urge that “[t]he battle against legal contraception has been fought and lost before, not only in the 1960s, but also in the 1990s, when state legislatures and courts repeatedly rejected the argument that religious liberty provides a justification for undermining women’s equality and denying them contraceptive insurance.” 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2012) (statement of Representative Laura Richardson). These commentators cite such cases as Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court upheld California’s Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act against claims that it violated the establishment and free exercises clauses of the California and United States Constitutions. See 85 P.3d 67, 95 (Cal. 2004). Unlike the employer in Bartlett, discussed above, the church-affiliated employer in Catholic Charities of Sacramento did not enjoy the benefit of ERISA preemption because it had not self-funded; this necessitated its ultimately failed attempt to secure an exemption on constitutional grounds. By emphasizing that “state legislatures . . . repeatedly rejected the argument that religious liberty provides a justification for . . . denying them contraceptive insurance,” these commentators overlook the fact that ERISA’s broad preemptive shield made it unnecessary for religious objectors to aggressively advocate for religious exemptions in the handful of states that provide no exemption to the state’s contraceptive mandate.
As with the health care context, employers may also choose not to provide other insurance benefits, such as life insurance benefits, for an employee’s spouse. Thus, religious employers who believed they could not “recognize” same-sex spouses by providing insurance coverage could avoid the whole theological morass by refusing to provide benefit coverage to spouses of employees who are not already covered.

This is precisely what happened several years ago after the District of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage. When the D.C. Council gave groups like Catholic Charities no other option—that is, no exemption—the religious organization took the nuclear option by eliminating coverage for the spouses of its 850 employees going forward rather than cover spouses in marriages that it could not recognize for religious reasons. When Catholic Charities chose this path, both sides lost out. Its employees could no longer add spouses to their health care cover-
age, paid primarily by the employer with tax-free dollars. As a result, the employees had to buy new coverage for their spouses on the individual market, at higher prices and with after-tax dollars. Catholic Charities lost out as an employer, too. When an employer sheds or reduces benefits, it becomes harder for it to compete in the marketplace for employees.

The ACA did not substantially alter the calculus for private employers. The nuclear option remains available to some religious objectors at no cost, as explained below. To others, it comes at a price, measured by the number of employees, although the cost of the penalties will almost certainly be much less than the cost of providing subsidized insurance to employees, as the objecting institution may have in the past.

Under the ACA, employers providing health care coverage must comply with the interim final rules on the scope of coverage for preventative services. No plan can be sold—and no employer can self-insure—unless it complies with coverage requirements. The Obama administration’s “accommodation” requires insurers, and not employers directly, to provide those services free of charge. This arrangement simply does not work for self-insured employers because there are no insurers available to provide the mandated benefits for free, unless the government forces a plan’s third-party administrator to do this. Further, since more than one-third of employers act as their own ad-

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300 See Alliance for Health Reform, supra note 289, at 9–10.
302 See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text (discussing the need for employers to offer a greater salary when they fail to provide benefits in order to compete in the marketplace for employees).
303 See infra notes 313–317 and accompanying text.
306 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
ministrators, there is not even a third-party administrator to provide the coverage.\footnote{308 Press Release, HighRoads, HighRoads Study Shows Employers Anticipate Rising Costs in Outsourced Health Benefits Administration (Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101116005643/en/HighRoads-Study-Shows-Employers-Anticipate-Rising-Costs (noting that an employer's incentive to self-administer its health plan may change because of the ACA).}

Putting aside whether this arrangement will even work, religious objectors, whether institutional or individual, remain stuck receiving coverage that violates their religious convictions. This leaves only one way out: the nuclear option. Under the ACA, some employers can in fact take this way out, although at significant—but perhaps not devastating—cost.

Consider an employer who falls outside the ACA’s penalty threshold—that is, an employer with fewer than fifty employees or an employer with fifty or more employees, not one of whom receives a “premium credit” or government subsidy for his or her cost-sharing for coverage.\footnote{309 The ACA’s premium credit subsidizes an employee’s cost sharing when the employee’s household income is less than 400% of the federal poverty level and the employee is required to pay more than 9.5% of his or her household income for health care coverage. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 1029; I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. I 2011); Hinda Chaikind & Chris L. Peterson, Cong. Research Serv., Summary of Potential Employer Penalties Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 6 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/Documents/Employer Penalties.pdf.} If that employer objects to the new coverage mandate for religious reasons, it can simply trigger the nuclear option and abandon all health care coverage for its employees. Zaytuna College, which self-identifies as a “Muslim institution of higher learning,” provides one example.\footnote{310 See Our History, Zaytuna C., http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/our_history (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). Zaytuna’s cofounder joined the leaders of other universities in opposing the coverage mandate. See Garvey et al., supra note 24 (listing signatories).} Zaytuna College reported twenty-five employees on its 2009 Internal Revenue Service Form 990, meaning that it can simply drop all coverage and pay no penalty.\footnote{311 See Zaytuna College, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/330/ 330720978/330720978_201007_990.pdf (indicating that Zaytuna College had twenty-five employees for the taxable year beginning August 1, 2009 and concluding July 31, 2010).} Zaytuna College recently announced that it would terminate its student health insurance plan rather than obey the new requirement that the plan cover birth control. See Franciscan University Drops Student Health Insurance Plan over Birth Control Mandate, Costs, MSNBC.com (May 15, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://usnews.
For employers that do meet the penalty threshold (those with fifty or more employees, at least one of whom receives a “premium credit”), there would be substantial penalties for failing to provide coverage. The annual fine for an employer with fifty employees would be $40,000. This penalty, although considerable, would be offset by savings the objecting institution realizes by eliminating coverage, as a consequence of which their employees will fall on the insurance exchanges.

A substantial literature has developed showing that private employers will frequently come out ahead financially by eliminating the subsidized health care coverage they previously provided to their employees. With the health care costs for American families now ex-

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313 The formula for determining the annual penalty is: (total number of employees - 30) x ($2000). See ACA § 1513(a); I.R.C. § 4980H(a); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Research Found., ACA: Employer Mandate Penalties, Cribsheet 11-1 (2011), available at http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/cribsheets/employer-mandate-penalties-nfib-cribsheet.pdf. If an employer offers a health plan that simply does not include the mandated coverage, a different penalty is assessed, up to $100 per day per employee. See, e.g., Cynthia Brougher, Cong. Research Serv., R42370, Preventive Health Services Regulations: Religious Institutions’ Objections to Contraceptive Coverage 14, 16 (2012) (describing an excise tax under the Internal Revenue Service Code for noncompliant employment-based group health plans, as well as possible penalties under the Public Health Service Act for self-insured governmental plans, health insurance issuers providing group health coverage, and coverage in the individual market, and under ERISA for insured and self-insured group health plans and insurance issuers providing group health coverage). The fine for noncompliant plans and the annual penalty for failing to provide health care coverage appear to be alternative penalties. See, e.g., Jennifer Marshall & Dominique Ludvigson, Judge Issues Preliminary Injunction on Behalf of Business Owner in HHS Mandate Fight, Foundry (July 29, 2012, 8:17 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/29/judge-issues-preliminary-injunction-on-behalf-of-business-owner-in-hhs-mandate-fight/ (describing the “alternative[s]” facing religious objectors and calculating penalties under each scenario).

Employers that offer coverage that is deemed “unaffordable” also face penalties. This penalty equals one-twelfth of $3000 multiplied by the number of full-time employees that receive the exchange subsidies because the insurance offered to them by their employer was “unaffordable,” capped by “the amount that the employer would have been liable for had the [I.R.C. §] 4980H(a) penalty been triggered instead.” Gamage, supra note 25, at *22 (citing I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1)).

314 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (noting that some employers will be financially better off by paying the penalty and “dumping” their employees on the exchanges, rather than paying the employer’s portion of coverage costs); see also Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 U. Neb. L. Rev. 885, 906–12 (2011) (analyzing empirical data from Massachusetts and San Francisco to predict whether certain employers will choose to pay the ACA’s penalty rather than provide health care coverage); supra note 25 (citing scholarly opinion that the ACA creates perverse incentives that will lead some employers to drop certain employees on the insurance exchanges).
ceeding, by one estimate, $20,000 annually—315—and with average employers picking up 82% of the coverage costs of single individuals and 72% for families, on average—316—it is easy to see why employers may be eager to drop subsidized coverage, even in the absence of a religious exemption. Not all employees will be disadvantaged by such a move, especially employees who are low- and moderate-income earners. These employees qualify for substantial premium tax credits if their employer fails to provide health care coverage entirely or offers “unaffordable” coverage.317

It is true that employers that provide fewer benefits generally have to pay greater salaries to compete for employees, all other things being equal.318 Indeed, “[e]conomists generally agree employee benefits are a dollar-for-dollar substitute for wages.”319 Nevertheless, an objecting institution that drops coverage would not have to increase pay for lower-income employees to compensate for the missing benefit because such employees will be made better-off financially by receiving premium tax credits. For higher-income employees, the institution likely would have to adjust pay.320 Ultimately, the cost of the nuclear option may not be

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317 See Gamage, supra note 25, at *17, *23 (estimating that, for a worker in a family of four whose household income is 100% of the federal poverty level ($24,000 a year), the value of premium tax credits received, together with the value of cost-sharing subsidies received, equals $18,433, more than dwarfing the tax value of any employer-provided health care coverage, and, in one break-even analysis, calculating the net-benefit to the employee at $16,309). Coverage is considered “affordable” when the employee’s contribution for employee-only coverage is less than 9.5% of the employee’s household income. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(G)(i)(II) (Supp. I 2011).


320 Predicting the true cost of the nuclear option to an employer would require knowing how many full-time or part-time employees it has, the cost of existing coverage, the amount of the employer’s subsidy for that coverage, what the mix of low- and moderate-income employees is to higher-income employees, and the household income of lower-income employees (in order to determine the value of premium tax credits to them), among other factors.
nearly as great as the calculated penalty suggests and certainly may not be prohibitive for smaller religious employers.\footnote{Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4.}

As the number of employees increases, however, so does the annual penalty. It does not take long for the financial penalty to become massive. For example, the Catholic cable television broadcaster that filed suit challenging the coverage mandate would pay more than $700,000 annually.\footnote{Eternal Word Television Network (ETWN) reported 384 employees on its 2010 Form 990, filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Eternal Word Television Network, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2010), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/630/630801391/630801391_201012_990.pdf. This yields a penalty of $708,000 \( ([384 - 30] \times 2000) \). See also Tyler Kingkade, Catholic Colleges File Lawsuit Against Feds over Birth Control Rule, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/catholic-colleges-file-lawsuit-feds_n_1293814.html (reporting that EWTN filed suit to challenge the ACA).}


But here again, the true cost of the nuclear option needs to be adjusted to account for the religious objector’s savings in eliminating coverage for all its em-
ployees, offset by the additional wages that it must offer to remain competitive in the marketplace.\footnote{324 Supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text.}

For much larger employers, the annual costs of the nuclear option would seem at first blush to be almost unsustainable. For Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington, which employs over 1000 people, penalties would crest $2 million annually;\footnote{325 See Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Wash., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/530/530196524/530196524_201006_990.pdf (indicating 1118 employees for the tax year beginning July 1, 2009 and concluding June 30, 2010). This yields a penalty of $2,176,000 \([1118 - 30] \times $2000\).} the University of Notre Dame,\footnote{326 On May 21, 2012, the University of Notre Dame brought suit against the federal government over the coverage mandate. See Complaint at 1–4, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:2012-cv-00253 (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012), available at http://opac.nd.edu/assets/69013/hhs_complaint.pdf. As Notre Dame president Father John Jenkins, C.S.C., explained: Let me say very clearly what this lawsuit is not about: it is not about preventing women from having access to contraception, nor even about preventing the Government from providing such services. Many of our faculty, staff and students—both Catholic and non-Catholic—have made conscientious decisions to use contraceptives. As we assert the right to follow our conscience, we respect their right to follow theirs. And we believe that, if the Government wishes to provide such services, means are available that do not compel religious organizations to serve as its agents. We do not seek to impose our religious beliefs on others; we simply ask that the Government not impose its values on the University when those values conflict with our religious teachings. . . . This filing is about the freedom of a religious organization to live its mission, and its significance goes well beyond any debate about contraceptives. For if we concede that the Government can decide which religious organizations are sufficiently religious to be awarded the freedom to follow the principles that define their mission, then we have begun to walk down a path that ultimately leads to the undermining of those institutions. For if one Presidential Administration can override our religious purpose and use religious organizations to advance policies that undercut our values, then surely another Administration will do the same for another very different set of policies, each time invoking some concept of popular will or the public good, with the result these religious organizations become mere tools for the exercise of government power, morally subservient to the state, and not free from its infringements. If that happens, it will be the end of genuinely religious organizations in all but name. Press Release, Office of the President, Univ. of Notre Dame, A Message from Father Jenkins on the HHS Lawsuit (May 21, 2012), available at http://president.nd.edu/communications/a-message-from-father-jenkins-on-the-hhs-lawsuit (emphasis added).} with its 16,445 employees, would face an annual penalty of $32,830,000.\footnote{327 The University of Notre Dame reported 16,445 employees on its last Form 990, filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Univ. of Notre Dame, IRS Form 990, Return of}
be offset by the savings to the religious objector in no longer subsidizing health care coverage for its employees, although the objectors would need to provide some additional wages to higher-income employees to remain competitive as an employer.\textsuperscript{328}

It would not be surprising if some employees of religious groups shared the group’s religious objections to the mandated coverage, nor would it be surprising for ordinary individuals employed elsewhere to have religious objections.\textsuperscript{329} Yet, the impact on individuals has been largely lost in the debate over mandated coverage. Under the ACA’s individual mandate, an individual must show coverage through an employer or public insurance, or privately purchase coverage,\textsuperscript{330} unless exempt from the duty to do so as the result of low income or the lack of an affordable plan in the market.\textsuperscript{331} Failing to do so prompts a monetary penalty like those paid by employers, which varies with the individual’s income.\textsuperscript{332}


\textsuperscript{328} See supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{329} Some may ask how the coverage mandate is different from a general duty to pay taxes, which fund wars and other services to which an individual might object on secular or sectarian grounds. The coverage mandate has a disproportionate and direct impact on individuals who believe that by participating in an insurance pool, they are facilitating the use by others of drugs that cut off potential life, both before fertilization and after. Many faith groups are not opposed to taxes because government decisions are intervening acts and the result of those acts are too removed from the believer for the believer to have any moral culpability. Here, the objector, charged with responsibility for his or her own moral act of facilitating the end of a potential life, must decide whether to comply with the law or violate a religious tenet.


\textsuperscript{331} The individual mandate applies only if an individual is able to secure health care coverage that costs less than eight percent of the individual’s household income, after applying premium tax credits or employer contributions, if any. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2011). Moreover, “workers with household incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line will generally qualify for Medicaid.” Gamage, supra note 25, at 82, n.8.

\textsuperscript{332} If an employer exercises the nuclear option, some lower-income employees may come out ahead because they will receive subsidies to purchase coverage from an insurance exchange. See supra notes 314–317 and accompanying text (estimating that low- and moderate-income workers may benefit financially by securing health care coverage through ex-
So what recourse does the individual who objects to mandated coverage have? First, although the ACA contains an individual religious exemption, it is extremely narrow.\(^{333}\) ACA’s exemption parrots the religious exemption in the Social Security Act for the Amish, who are exempted from paying social security taxes.\(^{334}\) Although the Amish and substantially similar religious groups\(^{335}\) will qualify for ACA’s religious exemptions, most individual objectors will fall outside the exemption’s narrow bounds.\(^{336}\) A second option for the individual objector is to join a health care sharing ministry, shielding the individual from a tax penalty.\(^{337}\) These sharing ministries, however, offer very limited benefits. Few ministries exist, and because any qualifying sharing ministries must have been in existence on December 31, 1999, the market cannot grow.\(^{338}\) Further, even though members of sharing ministries pool their resources, participation in a ministry does not provide the security of a real insurance product: ministries do not guarantee payment or retain financial reserves.\(^{339}\) Regulators presumably could increase the protec-


\(^{335}\) See Jost, supra note 2, at 42 n.119 (identifying the religious groups likely to qualify).

\(^{336}\) To qualify for the individual religious exemption, an individual must meet five criteria. The first three establish basic elements: (1) he or she must belong to a religious sect and subscribe to its tenets; (2) the individual must waive Social Security benefits; and (3) the sect must establish these tenets. The remaining requirements are much more limiting: (4) the sect must have a substantial history of providing for and taking care of its dependent members; and (5) the sect has been in existence since December 31, 1950. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (exempting from the individual mandate any “member of a recognized religious sect or division thereof which is described in section 1402(g)(1), and . . . an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division as described in such section”); see id. § 1402(g).


\(^{338}\) See id.; Jost, supra note 2, at 43 (estimating that 100,000 people are members of such health care sharing ministries, which are generally restricted to Christians who abstain from alcohol, drugs, smoking, or extramarital sex); Michelle Andrews, Some Church Groups Form Sharing Ministries to Cover Members’ Medical Costs, Kaiser Health News (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insuring-Your-Health/Michelle-Andrews-on-Health-Care-Religious-Cooperatives.aspx (estimating that “the total number of people who are sharing their medical costs [is] roughly 120,000”).

\(^{339}\) Andrews, supra note 338 (“If there’s a shortfall one month . . . every household seeking help gets a prorated portion of its needs covered, and the ministry asks members for voluntary contributions to make up the difference. If the shortfall continues, members vote on raising the share amount.”). Fact sheets for the ministries explain that they do not operate as an insurance product. See, e.g., Alliance Health Care Sharing Ministries, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (“HCSMs [health
tion that sharing ministries provide to members, but it remains to be seen whether this will occur.340

The ACA’s individual mandate does contain a hardship exemption, but it provides very little detail about what would qualify for such an exemption.341 No regulations have been issued as to the scope and availability of any hardship waiver. Thus, it remains to be seen whether religious objectors can avail themselves of this way out.

The individual employee-objector’s third option is to drop his or her health care coverage and “go naked.” The costs for “going naked” include not just the monetary penalties, which may be stiff, but also the financial risks associated with having no health care coverage at all.342

The individual mandate applies if an individual or family’s income exceeds the federal threshold for taxation.343 For 2011, the threshold

[Notes and Citations]

340 The Obama administration has not yet released regulations fleshing out the scope of the individual religious exemption. One prominent supporter of ACA, Professor Timothy Jost, has noted that “these questions are unavoidable in a society that attempts to on the one hand adopt generally applicable laws addressing controversial subjects, and on the other hand maintain a high regard for religious liberty.” Jost, supra note 292. He suggests that a promising way forward for “reconciling” the “religious freedom of employers with the right of employees to access vital health services” would be to mimic federal legislation “excusing employer contributions to Social Security where both the employer and employee had religious objections, but not otherwise.” Id.


342 See No Insurance Creates Serious Health Risks, ACP Internist, available at http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2000/01/atpress.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (noting studies that indicate that “the uninsured may be three times more likely than the insured to experience adverse [health] outcomes . . . partly because uninsured individuals are less likely to have a regular source of care or to have visited a physician recently . . . [and] are also less likely to use preventive services”).

343 Any individual or family that does not meet the taxation threshold will be exempt from the individual mandate. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW 1 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. There are seven other groups exempted from the individual mandate: incarcerated individuals, undocumented immigrants, individuals for whom the required contribution exceeds eight percent of an individual’s income, individuals with a coverage gap less than three months in duration, individuals with a hardship exemption, Native Americans, and individuals with a religious exemption. See id. The individual religious exemption is very narrowly tailored and is generally used only by the Amish and some Mennonites. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2009); Maura
was $9500 for individuals and $19,000 for families. If an individual or family refuses to comply with the individual mandate, the monetary penalty, starting in 2016, will be the greater amount of either: (1) a flat fee ranging from $695 per year up to three times that amount (maximum $2085), or (2) two and a half percent of income. Four examples clarify how the penalty would play out in different circumstances:

1) A family of four earning the median U.S. household income of $49,445 would pay a fee of $2025 for “going naked,” because their flat fee amount is greater than the percentage fee.


The penalties begin to take effect in 2014, but do not reach their full amounts until 2016. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 343, at 1.


The $695 is calculated for each spouse, plus $695 for each dependent under the age of eighteen, with dependents under the age of eighteen resulting in a fractional amount of $695. See id. The limit on the flat fee is $2085 per family, no matter the number of dependents. See id. Thus, for example, a family of five with three children over the age of eighteen still will pay only the $2085 flat fee. See id.

The 2.5% of income is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount (for example, $19,000 for families in 2011) from the total amount of income reported. See id. A family earning $100,000 a year in 2011 would subtract $19,000, for a total of $81,000. The 2.5% would then be calculated against the $81,000, equaling $2025, the amount the family would have to pay as the penalty under the percentage. In other words: (Gross Income - Tax Threshold Amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; (100,000 - $19,000) x 0.025 = $2025.

All of the following examples are made using the 2011 tax threshold and the 2016 penalty schedule. See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text.


This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($49,455 - $19,000) x 0.025 = $761.38. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will apply to a family of four. Because $2025 is greater than $761.38, this family will pay $2025—the flat fee amount.
2) A family of four earning $150,000 would pay $3275 for “going naked,” because their percentage fee is greater than the flat fee.\textsuperscript{352}

3) An individual earning $50,000 would be subject to a penalty of approximately $1010, because the percentage fee is greater than the flat fee.\textsuperscript{353}

4) An individual earning $26,364, the 2011 median annual wage,\textsuperscript{354} would be subject to a penalty of $695, because the flat fee is greater than the percentage fee.\textsuperscript{355}

Of course, objectors who drop coverage and pay the fine will not be able to purchase an unobjectionable insurance product in the market once the ACA’s extensive regulation of the insurance exchanges begins.\textsuperscript{356}

Whether they be individuals or groups, religious objectors to the coverage mandate can solve the collision between their religious convictions and the demands of the law only by taking extreme measures, sometimes at great personal costs to themselves. A benefits exemption would give religious objectors a less extreme way out, which permits them to comply both with the law and with their religious tenets. Thus,

\textsuperscript{352} This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold amount) \times 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($150,000 - $19,000) \times 0.025 = $3275. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025 which will apply to a family of four. Because $3275 is greater than $2025, this family will pay $3275, the percentage fee amount.

\textsuperscript{353} This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee. The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold amount) \times 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($50,000 - $9500) \times 0.025 = $1012.50. As noted earlier, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned with an individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $1012.50 is greater than $695, the individual will pay $1012.50, the percentage fee amount.


\textsuperscript{355} This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee. The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold amount) \times 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($26,364 - $9500) \times 0.025 = $421.60. As above, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned with an individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $695 is greater than $421.60, the individual will pay $695, the flat fee amount.

\textsuperscript{356} See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text.
the question for policymakers becomes not whether to avoid harm, but rather which harm to avoid as they seek to balance two competing goods—access to a full range of health care services and religious liberty. Rather than forcing religious employers and individuals into taking extreme measures, policymakers may well choose to give them a less extreme option. The Obama administration has a ready vehicle for providing this way-out—the hardship waiver.  

VII. SEVENTH STICKING POINT: EXEMPTIONS WILL UNDERMINE DIGNITY

Many contend that religious liberty exemptions encourage or facilitate discrimination and bigotry and thus will undermine the dignity of same-sex couples. As a threshold matter, the possibility of dignitary harm will not take policymakers very far because there are two impositions of indignity here—the possible affront to lesbian and gay couples who are turned aside, and the affront to religious believers who are told that their beliefs are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public sphere. As Judy Brown, president of the American Life League, noted:

The Rev. John A. Leies, . . . president emeritus of St. Mary’s University, . . . reminds us that Vatican II declared, “In the depths of their conscience, men and women detect a law which they do not impose on themselves but which holds them to obedience, a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of men and women. According to it they will be judged.” This is what Obama’s mandate violates. He will strip us of the dignity that obedience to God’s moral law provides.

357 See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the hardship waiver).

358 See Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of Councilmember David Catania describing religious exemptions as a “get out of jail free” card authorizing discrimination); see also Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 (“Tolerate intolerance? Not a chance. Bigotry is bigotry, even if they’re pretending God told them to do so.” (quoting anarcho-liberal-tarian, Comment to Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 246)).

359 Press Release, Judy Brown, President of the Am. Life League, HHS Mandate Strips Catholic Freedom and Human Dignity (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.all.org/article/index/id/MTAwMTk. The controversy over the New York town clerk’s “creative solution” to her religious objection to same-sex marriage illustrates the competing claims of intolerance and harm. One of the women seeking the marriage license in New York told the New York Times that “[g]ay people have fought so long and hard to get these civil rights . . . . To have her basically telling us to get in the back of the line is just not acceptable.” See Kaplan, supra note 221. The clerk countered in the Wall Street Journal, stating that “people are opposed to accommodating [my] faith.” Gay Marriage, Religion Issues in NY Clerk Race, Wall. St. J. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/APdc4e266c6fe34cf34dc97b0
Legislators face dueling dignitary harms, and thus dignitary considerations cannot by themselves resolve the question of whether to have exemptions. They can, however, help us structure exemptions—at least some of the time.

In a perfect world, no one would ever know that a religious objector stepped aside. How would this work? Consider a government marriage license office with four clerks: Faith, Hope, Charity, and Efficiency. Only Faith objects to assisting with same-sex marriage license applications. If all four clerks randomly greet individuals and couples who present, disaster looms. Faith could easily pop up to assist a young man, Steve, only to find him later joined with his same-sex partner. If Faith refuses to assist the couple, surely they will notice and be offended.

Contrast this with a Division of Motor Vehicles-style intake scheme in which one clerk does the intake and farms out work to the others. In this scheme, Efficiency might serve in the intake role, or she, Hope, and Charity might switch off, leaving Faith to spend her day processing paperwork without greeting the public. When Steve arrives, Efficiency quickly and efficiently directs him and his partner to a willing provider. Faith does not receive a pass; she still has the duty to serve other couples.

But note what does not happen in this system: same-sex couples are not asked to step into another line. They are not asked to wait longer. And they never even know that they have been queued to a non-objecting clerk. Obviously, any dignitary harm evaporates if the exemption is invisible.

How an office chooses to staff around an objector would be within its sound discretion, absent some other provision of state law, since the best arrangement may change with the specific circumstances facing the office—such as the number of willing providers, the number of religious objectors, the volume of requests for marriage applications in relation to other work, and so forth.

Some voice a nagging “suspicion that, for some of these people—not all, but some—what’s cast as a ‘principled religious objection’ boils down to simple gut feeling.” The possibility of unfair surprise is a serious one and warrants attention. Willy-nilly refusals can be avoided by making objectors state their objections in advance and in writing—a

8b5a3c786654.html?mod=WSJ_NY_LEFTAPHeadlines. This trope is gaining a lot of traction. See Goodstein, supra note 100.

360 See supra note 227 (discussing a New York law allowing the delegation of tasks to other personnel).

361 See Corvino, supra note 165.
common device used to implement health care conscience clauses and conscientious objection to military service.\textsuperscript{362} Checking in with employees about possible objections is crucial in order to enable employers to staff around those who object and avoid unfair surprise to both the public and the employer.

Four concrete commitments would limit the possibility of dignitary harm to same-sex couples and should guide the staffing arrangement:

(1) Same-sex couples should never have to stand in another line;
(2) Same-sex couples should receive the service in the same manner that any other couple receives it (so that if heterosexual couples receive a service by appointment or mail-in request, same-sex couples would, too);
(3) Any scheme to staff around an objector should be invisible to same-sex couples; and
(4) If an employee gave no advance statement of a religious objection, no refusal should be allowed.

The controversy in New York over the town clerk’s delegation of marriage license applications to an assistant is again instructive. If New York laws indeed permitted such a delegation,\textsuperscript{363} there was no compelling reason for the clerk to articulate the reason behind this staffing change. The clerk’s public explanations created a lot of needless rancor.\textsuperscript{364}

Obviously, these commitments make sense for a government office or for a large bureaucratic organization in the private sector. They would not, however, shield same-sex couples from the insult of being denied services from small “Mom and Pop” businesses in the wedding industry. Nonetheless, as noted above, same-sex couples have considerable recourse in the marketplace for such refusals.\textsuperscript{365} In short, we should strive to make accommodations as cost-free as possible when we can do so, but the fact that we cannot achieve that end in each and every case does not negate the good that we can do.

\textsuperscript{362} Legislators can, and should, authorize employers to ask about potential objections or demand that potential objectors state their objections ex ante in writing. See Wilson, supra note 30, at 299–327 (excerpting selected state statutes permitting an objection only if the invoker shows proof or states his or her reasons in writing).
\textsuperscript{363} See supra note 227.
\textsuperscript{364} See, e.g., Dial, supra note 283.
\textsuperscript{365} See supra notes 118, 285–286 and accompanying text (discussing the backlash against a New Jersey bridal shop that refused to serve a lesbian customer).
Conclusion

This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether, and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should be exempted from the dictates of civil law. A number of the “sticking points” to providing religious liberty exemptions to same-sex marriage laws collected in this Article bear an uncanny resemblance to those raging in the debate over the Obama administration’s sterilization and contraceptive coverage mandate. Among these real-world points of resistance to providing religious accommodations are legitimate, troubling concerns in a pluralistic, democratic society: why should legislators accommodate anyone’s beliefs; how can we distinguish between legitimate religious beliefs and animus or mere silliness; how attenuated can one’s participation in an objectionable activity be and still warrant protection, among other issues. As this Article demonstrates, access and religious liberty need not be mutually exclusive social goods if policymakers embrace nuanced religious liberty accommodations qualified by hardship to the public. Indeed, qualified exemptions can transform a zero-sum proposition into one in which both access and religious freedom can be affirmed.

Ultimately, religious objectors must make convincing claims for legislative accommodations because they are not shielded from generally applicable, neutral laws as a matter of federal constitutional right. In the end, no matter how thoughtful an exemption or a claim for exemptions may be, realistically to obtain religious liberty protection requires that proponents understand how exemptions look to decision-makers on the ground.
Appendix A: Core Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex Marriage Legislation

All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly exempt clergy from requirements to solemnize or celebrate marriages inconsistent with their religious faith.


All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly allow a religiously-affiliated group to refuse to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage.


All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly protect covered religious objectors from private suit.


Six jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, and Washington) expressly protect religious objectors, including religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations, from being penalized by the government for such refusals through, for example, the loss of governments grants.

Three jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Maryland, and New Hampshire) expressly protect religious organizations from promoting same-sex marriage in violation of the religious society’s beliefs through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats.

See D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (exempting “the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals”); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (provided so long as the program receives no government funding). New York may provide this protection as well. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious . . . organization . . . from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.”).

Two jurisdictions (New Hampshire and New York) expressly protect religious organizations from promoting marriage through . . . housing designated for married individuals.

See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious . . . organization . . . to limit employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination.”).

Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire, and Vermont) expressly allow religiously-affiliated fraternal organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, to limit insurance coverage to spouses in traditional marriages.


Two states (Connecticut and Maryland) expressly allow a religiously-affiliated adoption or foster care agency to place children only with heterosexual married couples so long as they don’t receive any government funding.

Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire and New York) expressly exempt individual employees who are managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with a covered entity from celebrating same-sex marriages if doing so would violate their religious beliefs.


Two states (Maryland and New York) include non-severability clauses in their legislation.

APPENDIX B: PROPOSED SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGISLATION

The Marriage Conscience Protection Act that I and others have proposed\(^\text{366}\) would read:

**Section ___**

**(a) Religious organizations protected.**

No religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall be required to

1. provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or
2. solemnize any marriage; or
3. treat as valid any marriage

if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

**(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.**

1. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small business shall be required to

   A. provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or
   B. provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
   C. provide housing to any married couple

if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.

2. Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if

\(^366\) This proposal has previously appeared in Wilson, *supra* note 46, at 367–68.
(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another government employee or official is not promptly available and willing to provide the requested government service without inconvenience or delay; provided that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than a natural person

(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of the business; or
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or
(C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer units of housing.

(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges protected by this section shall

(1) result in a civil claim or cause of action challenging such refusal; or
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status.