SPECIAL REPORT

Australia–China law enforcement cooperation

Simon Norton

June 2019
About the author

At the time of writing Simon Norton was an analyst at ASPI, having joined the Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement Program in January 2016. Previously he worked as a sessional academic in the Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University and as a junior policy associate at the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. Simon also has experience working in government and the private sector, including several years working on anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorism financing and sanctions in the banking and financial services industry. Simon holds a Master of International Security from the University of Sydney, postgraduate qualifications in international relations and commercial law, and a Bachelor of Commerce from Deakin University, and is a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist.

The author gives thanks to those interviewed as part of the research for this paper, from both within and outside government. All of the views and recommendations here remain the responsibility of the author and do not reflect those of Australian Government departments or agencies.

About ASPI

ASPI’s aim is to promote Australia’s security by contributing fresh ideas to strategic decision-making, and by helping to inform public discussion of strategic and defence issues. ASPI was established, and is partially funded, by the Australian Government as an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.

ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

Cover image: White pills and bottle on Chinese yuan notes: iStockphoto baona.
Australia–China law enforcement cooperation

Simon Norton

June 2019
INTRODUCTION

Australia and China have an extensive and growing economic relationship underpinned by diverse people-to-people connections. China is Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods and services (A$195 billion in 2017–18). Chinese investment into Australia’s real estate industry increased by 400% in the five years to 2015, to A$12 billion in 2014–15. Money flows from China into Australia almost doubled between 2011–12 and 2015–16, from A$42 billion to almost A$77 billion. China is Australia’s largest source of overseas students (over 157,000 studied in Australia in 2016) and second largest and highest spending inbound tourism market (with 1.2 million visits in 2016).

This economic relationship is mutually beneficial, but it also creates opportunities for criminals. The large volume of money, goods and people moving between the two countries makes it easier to conceal crimes, such as trafficked drugs or laundered money. Much activity also takes place online, making the cyber realm a major vector for cross-border criminal activity. It’s therefore important that the two governments work together to fight transnational crime where there are links between Australia and China, or where either’s citizens play key facilitator roles.

Australian police already have one of the strongest relationships with China’s police of any Western liberal democracy. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has maintained a liaison office in China since the late 1990s and currently has six liaison officers based in China. The AFP has been working with its Chinese counterparts on a successful joint counter-narcotics effort called Task Force Blaze since 2015. Australia and China signed a treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters in 2006, leading to the confiscation and repatriation of criminal proceeds. The two countries signed a treaty concerning the transfer of sentenced persons, which came into force in 2011; Matthew Ng became the first Australian to be transferred back home to Australia under a prisoner exchange treaty. Australia and China cooperated in the ultimate arrest and conviction of Zhao Nuo, a Chinese-born Australian citizen who murdered his wife in Western Australia before fleeing to China on a false passport. The Australian financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, signed a memorandum of understanding with its Chinese counterpart in 2016 and announced in November 2018 the appointment of its first financial intelligence analyst to be posted to China. In April 2017, the inaugural Australia–China High-Level Security Dialogue was held, setting out a vision for future cooperation.

Despite these successes and much promise, there are also inherent risks for Australian authorities in working with China, and limitations on what Australian authorities can do with their Chinese counterparts. China has a very different political and judicial system from that of Australia and other liberal democratic countries. China is a one-party authoritarian state in which law enforcement agencies operate at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Australians have legitimate concerns about the rule of law and civil and human rights in China. The deteriorating human rights situation in Xinjiang Province is of particular concern, especially due to its nature and scale and because of Chinese authorities’ denial of any problems despite compelling physical, documentary and eyewitness evidence. And large-scale cyber espionage targeting Australia by Chinese cyber actors, including from the Chinese state, can’t be overlooked. Working with Chinese authorities can be politically difficult, and there are many domestic critics of cooperation. This means that Australia should make it clear to China that these differences complicate the ability to engage in law enforcement cooperation.
However, the Australian Government has a duty to protect Australia and Australians from crime and terrorism. Those threats are transnational, so effective relationships and collaboration with foreign countries are essential. Australia must prevent itself from becoming an attractive destination and safe haven for criminals. And Australians who are the victims of crime expect perpetrators to be brought to justice. Therefore, Australian authorities should continue to cooperate with their Chinese counterparts, guided by our legal framework and system of government, and look for opportunities to enhance cooperation where it’s in Australia’s interests to do so and where that cooperation doesn’t conflict with Australia’s laws and values.

This paper outlines existing law enforcement cooperation between Australian and Chinese authorities, highlights the risks and limitations in working with China, and suggests areas where future cooperation can be enhanced. The following sections examine:

- counter-narcotics
- concerns about and risks of working with the Chinese Government (using the debate over the ratification of the Australia–China extradition treaty as a case study)
- economic crimes (fraud and corruption)
- anti-money-laundering and proceeds of crime
- cybercrime
- counter-terrorism.

The final section provides recommendations for future cooperation.
Australia’s narcotics threat environment and the role of China

The Australian Government’s primary law enforcement interest in cooperating with its Chinese counterparts is counter-narcotics.

Australia has a serious crystal methamphetamine (or ‘ice’) problem, and Australian demand for the drug is among the world’s highest per capita. Ice-related hospitalisations and deaths have increased, and accidental deaths doubled between 2010 and 2015. In 2015, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott described Australia as being in the grip of an ‘ice epidemic’, calling it the worst drug problem the country has ever faced. In response, the Council of Australian Governments released the National Ice Action Strategy in 2015. A key pillar of this strategy is to disrupt the supply of ice.

International cooperation is a vital component of Australia’s efforts to target supply. While there is domestic ice production, large quantities of ice sold in Australia originate overseas. Australia is an attractive market to foreign ice suppliers due to relatively high prices and profit margins compared to source countries, underpinned by Australia’s wealth and growing demand. For example, the median price of a gram of ice in 2014 was A$111 in China compared with A$675 in Australia. Further, international supply chains are highly integrated and increasingly feature the involvement of transnational organised crime groups. For example, there are growing links between Chinese organised crime groups and Mexican drug cartels. This international dimension is why the National Ice Action Strategy called for increased international cooperation and engagement to improve intelligence to disrupt shipments into Australia. It’s also why Australia produced an international engagement strategy for the disruption of methamphetamine supply in 2017.

The Chinese Government is one of the most important for Australia to cooperate with due to China’s role as a major drug production and transit hub. The amount of methamphetamine tablets and ice seized in China tripled in the five years to 2014, making it the highest in the world in that year. A large proportion of those drugs originated in Myanmar, making China a major transit country, but there’s also industrial-scale domestic production. China is one of the world’s major producers and exporters of chemicals, and its domestic pharmaceutical market is the largest in the world. Such legal products can be diverted for use as drug precursors. Some precursor chemicals—such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—are illegally exported into Australia for use in domestic methamphetamine production.

China also has the largest number of clandestine ‘ice labs’ in the region. Seventy per cent of the total ice imports detected entering Australia (measured by weight) were shipped from China, including Hong Kong, between 2010–11 and 2013–14. Much of this appears to be manufactured in China and transported by organised crime groups in mainland China and Hong Kong. Those Chinese groups, along with others in the international supply chain network (such as Mexican drug cartels), are actively cooperating with organised crime groups in Australia, including Chinese diaspora groups and outlaw motorcycle gangs.
While ice is the biggest concern, it’s not the only drug entering Australia from China. China is one of the world’s major source countries for fentanyl and its precursors. This synthetic opioid is responsible for thousands of overdose deaths worldwide.\(^7\) China (including Hong Kong) is also a major source of performance and image enhancing drugs (such as steroids and hormones), anaesthetics (such as GHB and GBL\(^9\)), and synthetic drugs (such as synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones).\(^{29}\)

Anti-narcotics operations may be Australia’s primary interest in law enforcement cooperation with China, but they’re also an interest of China’s. China also suffers from a domestic illicit drug problem. There are around 2.5 million officially registered drug addicts in China, and their numbers have increased every year since the government’s first annual drug enforcement report in 1998. In recent years, methamphetamine has become increasingly popular.\(^{30}\) This creates a great incentive for Chinese authorities to cooperate with international partners, including Australia, to target production and supply.

### Australian and Chinese agencies’ counter-narcotics cooperation

The Chinese Government is one of Australia’s most important international partners in countering drug importation into Australia, and the AFP has one of the strongest police-to-police relationships with its Chinese counterparts of any Western liberal democracy.\(^{31}\) In November 2015, the AFP and China’s National Narcotics Control Commission launched a joint investigation effort called Task Force Blaze.\(^{32}\) This partnership seeks to understand concealment methods, trafficking routes and syndicates facilitating methamphetamine imports into Australia.\(^{33}\) The taskforce is based in Guangdong Province’s Lufeng City, which is China’s most active meth manufacturing region.\(^{34}\)

Task Force Blaze realised immediate success for both countries. In the first year, 72 operations resulted in the arrest of almost 130 people, including 48 in Australia. One operation intercepted 740 kilograms of liquid meth shipped to Sydney in sea containers.\(^{35}\) This success led to the taskforce being extended for a second one-year phase. By early June 2017, 10.5 tonnes of illicit drugs and precursors worth more than A$5 billion were seized, including 5,741 kilograms of drugs in China (including 1,734 kilograms of ice), and over 4,811 kilograms of drugs in Australia (including over 2,748 kilograms of ice and 1,480 kilograms of cocaine).\(^{36}\) A sign of the effectiveness of the cooperation is that Chinese authorities have provided Australia with proactive information, rather than simply information on request. Some of that information was previously unknown to Australian authorities.\(^{37}\) Further, in Guangdong Province, there’s been a dramatic increase in seizures of meth destined for Australia.\(^{38}\)

From China’s perspective, there’s been a shortage in the reliable supply of meth in Guangdong Province and a subsequent increase in wholesale prices. Chinese officials attribute this, in part, to the successful operational outcomes of Chinese and Australian law enforcement actions, including under Task Force Blaze.\(^{39}\)

Despite other countries’ interest in building such a relationship with Chinese law enforcement,\(^{40}\) Task Force Blaze is the only joint partnership Chinese authorities have with any foreign agency.\(^{41}\) As ASPI’s John Coyne has noted, this has only been possible due to Australia’s long-term investment in building trust between the AFP and Chinese police (see box, over page).\(^{42}\)
AFP relations with China

In 1987, AFP Commissioner Ron Grey became the first Australian police commissioner to make an official visit to the People’s Republic of China, following an invitation from the Public Security Ministry. During that visit, initial steps were taken to establish a program of cooperation and staff exchanges aimed at curbing international crime. This paved the way for the AFP’s first liaison office to open in Beijing on 2 April 1999. A liaison office was previously established in Hong Kong in 1984–85 while Hong Kong was under British administration.43

The AFP opened another liaison office in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, in 2007. Guangzhou was identified as a strategic location from which to combat the trade in precursor chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants. At the same time, the AFP launched its Management of Serious Crime Program for the first time in China. The course involved AFP officers training Chinese police officers at the superintendent level and focused on creating collaborative national and international networks between law enforcement agencies in the region.44

The AFP currently has six liaison officers based in China: two each in Beijing, Guangzhou and Hong Kong.45

Australian and Chinese officers have also attended training programs in each other’s countries, including the AFP College and state police academies in Australia and the Guangdong Police Academy in China.46 Training has had demonstrable success that has assisted Australian law enforcement. For example, Chinese police changed how they conducted their continuity of evidence (or chain of custody evidence) in drugs cases after observing Australian police practice. This not only improved Chinese practice, but also assisted Australian police investigations.47

The AFP isn’t the only Australian agency with a productive relationship with its Chinese counterparts. The Australian Border Force (formerly part of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection) has officers based in Beijing, collaborating on several issues, including counter-narcotics. A key focus for both countries has been precursor chemicals manufactured in China and supplied into Australia, and the two countries have had major success in stopping ContactNT entering Australia.

ContactNT is a cold and flu medication manufactured legitimately in China that contains a high proportion of pseudoephedrine as an active ingredient. Pseudoephedrine is a precursor chemical regularly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Beijing-based officers from what was then the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service worked with their Chinese counterparts to highlight the problem of ContactNT being smuggled into Australia and undertook efforts to target ContactNT exporters. The Chinese Government also reinterpreted existing legislation to allow for criminal penalties for the illegal exportation of pseudoephedrine precursors, including ContactNT.48 Following these successes, the illegal importation of ContactNT from China is no longer an issue at Australia’s borders.49

Future cooperation

In April 2017, the two governments agreed to implement a third phase of Task Force Blaze and to gradually transform the taskforce into a standing cooperation mechanism, without the need for annual review.50 This is a positive move that will allow for the significant operational successes to continue.

Counter-narcotics efforts in China require a greater focus on the diversion of precursor chemicals from the Chinese chemical and pharmaceutical industry. China controls all chemicals included in the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); however, it doesn’t currently control non-regulated chemicals or notify other countries of their export. Recent legislative and administrative efforts have been unsuccessful, and China is home to many unregistered or illegal precursor chemical factories.51 Australian
authorities should seek ways to work with their Chinese counterparts to counter the diversion of precursors from their source. This could involve assistance to develop appropriate regulation and compliance mechanisms to better control these precursor chemicals. Australia's approach could be informed by the successful ContactNT example, in which the Australian Government highlighted a mutual problem affecting both countries, leading to effective regulatory reform in China.

Such efforts should involve a range of Australian agencies and departments, including the AFP, the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Actions should be undertaken within a framework of a national supply reduction strategy to ensure appropriate coordination and the optimal use of resources.\textsuperscript{52}
Law enforcement cooperation with the Chinese Government comes with challenges. As this section outlines, concerns are often raised about China’s political and judicial system and human rights protections. Those concerns have been instrumental in discouraging the Australian Government from ratifying an extradition treaty with the Chinese Government. The debate about whether to ratify or not is an instructive case study on the concerns and risks of working with China.

The Treaty on Extradition Between Australia and the People’s Republic of China was signed on 6 September 2007, in the last months of the Howard government. However, successive governments of both political persuasions—under Kevin Rudd (twice), Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott—did not ratify it. Chinese leaders have raised ratification at every meeting with Australia over the past decade, but the pressure has increased since President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign began. Following advice from the AFP and DFAT that non-ratification was becoming a major diplomatic irritant, the Turnbull government tabled the treaty for ratification on 2 March 2017. However, it subsequently withdrew it the following day due to opposition.

**Concerns about treaty ratification**

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) recommended the treaty’s ratification. However, it made six recommendations for better human rights protection. Labor committee members issued a dissenting report, recommending that the treaty be delayed until after an independent review of the *Extradition Act 1988* to ensure that the extradition system meets international legal obligations regarding human rights and the rule of law. Criticism of the proposed treaty wasn’t limited to the opposition. A diverse group including the Greens, Nick Xenophon’s Team, Australian Conservatives’ Cory Bernadi, as well as the Law Council of Australia and Amnesty International, all raised concerns and opposed ratification.

The proposed extradition treaty includes a range of human rights safeguards. They include refusal of extradition if:

- there are substantial grounds for believing the person sought has been, or will be, subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment
- extradition is sought for a political offence or a purely military offence
- extradition is sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of their religion or political opinion
- the offence for which extradition is sought carries the death penalty, unless the country seeking extradition has provided an undertaking that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out.

The federal government has argued that these safeguards are sufficient. It notes that extradition isn’t an automatic process. It’s determined on a case-by-case basis and there’s the opportunity for review of decisions at each stage of the process.
However, several concerns were raised about ratification. While corruption is endemic in China, there are questions as to what degree the Chinese Government’s anti-corruption crackdown is politically motivated. Further concerns are expressed about *shuanggui*—the extra-legal system used for detaining and interrogating CCP members, who often disappear for months before emerging with prepared confessions. Some claim these confessions are coerced following ill-treatment or torture. The JSCOT report noted questions about whether Chinese authorities can guarantee the right to a fair trial for individuals extradited to the country. This is because of a body of evidence suggesting that the Chinese state’s criminal justice system “does not act in accordance with procedural fairness and rule of law standards in criminal proceedings.” In some cases, especially politically sensitive matters, suspects are unable to access legal counsel, and forced ‘confessions’ obtained through torture exist in China’s criminal justice system. Opponents of the treaty noted the 99.92% criminal conviction rate in Chinese courts. That statistic comes from a report by Zhou Qiang, head of the Supreme People’s Court, to the National’s People’s Congress that 1,039 accused were ‘declared innocent’ by Chinese courts in 2015, compared to 1.232 million found guilty. The treaty omits a common safeguard in Australia’s extradition treaties to ensure the protection of an extradited person’s right to a fair trial: the ability to refuse a request where extradition would be ‘unjust or oppressive’. And the Chinese Government has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. Australia is party to the covenant, and the Law Council of Australia believes that the Australian Government would violate its obligations under the covenant if it were to extradite a person to a country where there’s a risk of unfair trial.

Concerns were also raised about insufficient human rights safeguards. The Chinese Government imposes the death penalty for non-lethal offences—including drug-related crimes and economic crimes such as embezzlement, counterfeiting and bribe taking—and there’s a lack of transparency about its use. The treaty allows for the refusal of extradition if the offence carries the death penalty and the requesting party doesn’t provide an undertaking that the death penalty won’t be imposed or carried out. However, the Law Council of Australia maintains that this provision isn’t legally enforceable and notes that the treaty contains no consequences for noncompliance. The Attorney-General’s Department argues that such bilateral assurances carry considerable weight, and a breach would have a serious impact on the international crime cooperation relationship and the broader bilateral relationship. It also noted that Australia has similar agreements with other countries that have the death penalty. And Chinese authorities have previously honoured a death penalty undertaking in a mutual assistance case. Further concerns were expressed as to the Australian Government’s ability to effectively monitor people extradited from Australia.

Despite these concerns over access to fair trial and insufficient human rights safeguards, the Turnbull government tabled the treaty for ratification on 2 March 2017, to coincide with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Australia. However, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was forced to withdraw ratification a day later after it became clear MPs would lodge a disallowance motion in the Senate to stop it. This included the threat of government MPs crossing the floor.

Despite the withdrawal, the government reaffirmed to China ‘its commitment to pursue ratification of the bilateral extradition treaty’. As then Attorney-General George Brandis noted, ‘It does remain the policy of the Australian Government to move towards the ratification of the extradition treaty with China. We’ve told the Chinese that, they understand it.’

Chinese authorities’ use of arbitrary arrest and detention, including of foreign citizens (Canadian citizens are recent examples, seemingly in response to Canada’s arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou), has added to the grounds for not proceeding to ratification.
Consequences of non-ratification

Two major concerns were expressed about the failure to ratify the Australia–China Extradition Treaty. Some argued that the failure could hurt bilateral relations, either at the political level or in joint policing operations. However, there’s no evidence for this. At the political level, the Australian and Chinese governments convened the first ever Australia–China High-Level Security Dialogue in Sydney on 21 April 2017, the month following the treaty ratification withdrawal. The dialogue sought to enhance bilateral cooperation on several security issues. Joint policing operations have also continued. The two countries agreed to extend Task Force Blaze, and in September 2017 the AFP and China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) signed two new arrangements targeting transnational crime. Australian authorities continue to cooperate with their Chinese counterparts on economic crime matters.

That the bilateral relationship has continued despite the extradition treaty not being ratified by Australia is unsurprising; both governments see a mutual interest in continuing law enforcement cooperation.

A second concern was that, without an extradition treaty in place, Chinese Government authorities may place increasing pressure on criminal suspects to return to China. It’s believed that government pressure is the most common method used to return fugitives around the world back to China. This is done by Chinese investigators either pressuring a fugitive’s family in China, or Chinese police travelling to another country to pressure the suspect to return. There are even cases of kidnapping and forced repatriation, including allegations that this has happened in Australia. Liu Dong, a director of China’s Operation Fox Hunt, has stated that its operating principle is ‘Whether or not there is an agreement in place, as long as there is information that there is a criminal suspect, we will chase them over there, we will take our work to them, anywhere.’ Worldwide, a total of 1,300 fugitives suspected of economic crimes returned to China in 2017, 347 of whom were accused corrupt officials. Between 2014 and early 2017, 951 fugitives returned to China under Operation Fox Hunt, of whom only eight were extradited. Operation Skynet saw the return of 1,032 fugitives from 70 countries, including 39 of China’s top 100 most wanted.

Four of the 10 Chinese citizens living in Australia from the Chinese Government’s 2015 most-wanted list were convinced to surrender and return to China. Chinese police have pursued suspects in Australia without notifying Australian Government officials. In December 2014, police from Rizhao City in Shandong Province flew to Australia to pressure Australian citizen Dong Feng—a bribery suspect—to return to China to face charges. Upon discovering this, the Australian Government summoned senior Chinese diplomats to register ‘its deep concerns about this, making clear it was unacceptable’. In response, Chinese authorities vowed that there would be no repeat of this major breach of protocol, and to date there has been no publicly known breach.

The Chinese Government formalised this undertaking when the MPS and AFP entered into a joint agency arrangement on economic crime cooperation in September 2017. The agreement formalised the rules under which Chinese authorities can operate in Australia when questioning suspects. The rules include an AFP officer being present, interviews being recorded on video by Australian authorities, an independent translation, no suspect being forced back to China, and the banning of suspects who do return being paraded in front of Chinese television cameras. Australian officials will need to be vigilant that this commitment is adhered to.
ECONOMIC CRIMES

Economic crimes are likely to be the Chinese Government’s primary interest driver for enforcement cooperation with Australia, with a predominant focus on fraud and corruption. (Other economic or financial crimes, such as money laundering and proceeds of crime, are a lesser focus and are discussed in a later section). Many alleged economic criminals have fled China, taking their assets with them. Western governments such as Australia’s that don’t have extradition treaties with the Chinese state are particularly attractive destinations due to the lesser risk of fugitives being returned to China.

Many of these fugitives are accused of committing fraud or embezzlement against companies they worked for or managed. Indeed, most of the cases on which Australian and Chinese authorities collaborate involve the investigation of fraud allegations. However, China’s most prominent economic fugitives are corruption suspects, due to the Chinese Government’s high-profile anticorruption crackdown.

President Xi’s anticorruption crackdown and Operation Skynet

Anticorruption is one of the Chinese Government’s most important domestic and foreign policy issues. Corruption is of great concern to Chinese citizens, who have grown increasingly angry at cases of CCP officials abusing their positions to amass enormous amounts of money, assets and luxury goods. Upon coming to power in 2013, President Xi announced a crackdown on corrupt officials, vowing to bring down both ‘flies and tigers’—corrupt officials at all levels of government and the party. This crackdown is vitally important to Xi, who described corruption as the most serious threat to the ruling CCP.

Many officials accused of corruption flee overseas, taking the proceeds of their crime with them. This creates an international element to the crackdown. In July 2014, China’s MPS launched Operation Fox Hunt to locate and repatriate ‘economic fugitives’ and their overseas assets. In 2015, this campaign was extended to Operation Skynet, bringing in the involvement of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the People’s Bank of China. The Chinese Government’s interest in extradition and the recovery of assets has made international cooperation on corruption a foreign policy priority. A particular focus is bilateral law enforcement cooperation with developed countries, where most of those alleged to be ‘corrupt fugitives’ hide from Chinese authorities. One of those countries is Australia, which is thought to be in the top three destinations, along with Canada and the US, for allegedly corrupt officials and their families to flee to. In April 2015, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection—the CCP’s anti-corruption authority—released a 100 most-wanted fugitives list. The list included 10 suspects in Australia, 40 in the US and 26 in Canada.

The importance of the anticorruption campaign to President Xi means that international cooperation has become an important part of the Chinese Government’s foreign policy agenda, and the issue is consistently raised as a priority in high-level meetings. But Chinese authorities frequently complain that their anticorruption efforts have been hindered by many Western governments not signing and ratifying extradition treaties. China’s government doesn’t have extradition treaties with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US or the European Union (EU). (To date, seven EU governments have signed and ratified extradition treaties with the Chinese state: Bulgaria, France, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Spain).
Australia–China government-to-government economic crime cooperation

Countering economic crime may be of utmost importance to Chinese authorities. However, it’s in Australia’s interest too. The Australian Government must ensure that criminals can’t evade justice by simply crossing international borders. And it doesn’t want to be a magnet for corrupt money or other criminal proceeds. As then Justice Minister Michael Keenan stated in November 2016:

[W]e’re determined that Australia is not a haven for corrupt money. We’re determined that Australia is not a haven for criminals in any way, shape or form and the Chinese Government is well aware of our commitment to work with the region to ensure that that remains the case.

Without an extradition treaty in place, Australian and Chinese authorities still assist each other. In 2006, the two countries signed the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, which came into force in March 2007. The treaty allows law enforcement agencies to obtain information and evidence needed for the investigation or prosecution of serious crimes, including terrorism, drug trafficking, fraud, money laundering and people trafficking. It also facilitates the location, restraint, forfeiture and repatriation of the instruments and proceeds of crime.

This cooperation has had success. In 2009, the AFP presented China’s Guangdong Provincial People’s Procuratorate with confiscated proceeds of crime worth over A$4.16 million. The restrained money and property were thought to be the proceeds of funds misappropriated from a Chinese local government and sent to Australia via Hong Kong.

In 2014, Australian authorities agreed to a joint operation with Chinese counterparts that resulted in the forfeiture of assets. Initially, a priority list of economic fugitives residing in Australia was agreed upon by the AFP and MPS. The list was culled from a broader list of under 100 people and included naturalised Australian citizens and permanent residents suspected of laundering money out of China into businesses and investments. The value of assets pursued was in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Then, in September 2017, the AFP presented to Chinese authorities A$215,000 ‘forfeited in Australia under proceeds of crime legislation’ from a Chinese citizen who fled to Australia following a fraud committed in China.

Despite Australia not ratifying the extradition treaty, the Australian and Chinese governments can still consider extradition requests for offences under multilateral conventions that both states are parties to, such as the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Offences include corruption and money laundering. Any extradition request can be considered only when certain conditions mandated in the Extradition Act 1988 are met. Those requirements can be supplemented in bilateral treaties.

There have been no cases of extradition from Australian authorities to date.

Some countries without an extradition treaty with the Chinese state have repatriated criminal suspects to China. In 2015, the US repatriated Yang Jinjun, a bribery and corruption suspect featured in a list of the Chinese Government’s 100 most wanted fugitives. The US doesn’t have an extradition treaty with China but does cooperate under the framework of the China–US Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation. US officials tend to request more evidence from Chinese authorities before providing assistance.

This approach is an option available to Australia, but it’s likely be politically controversial. If the Australian Government were to extradite a person to China under a multilateral convention, it would need to do so for particularly egregious crimes, such as murder. Strong prima facie evidence to an Australian evidential standard would be necessary. And Australian authorities would need to obtain guarantees about the treatment of the accused, including guarantees that they would not receive the death penalty.
Detecting and restraining the proceeds of crime is another area requiring cooperation. This is because a large proportion of the drugs and drug precursors entering Australia come from China, with the profits from those sales being laundered and remitted back to China, and Australia is a prime destination for the proceeds of economic crimes, including fraud and corruption, remitted out of China.

Australian Government authorities see mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau as major source, destination and transit jurisdictions for proceeds of crime, including corruption, laundered into and out of Australia. Large sums of money are suspected to be laundered out of China into the Australian real estate market. In 2016, AUSTRAC investigated over A$3.3 billion of suspicious transfers between China and Australia, including A$1 billion invested in Australian property. In one notable case, Yang Hongwei, the corrupt former governor of Chuxiong Yi Autonomous Prefecture in southwest China, bought six properties in Melbourne with the proceeds of bribes.

AFP Assistant Commissioner Bruce Hill, a former manager of AFP operations in Asia, has noted that a typical *modus operandi* is for corrupt officials to send their spouses and children overseas, then use them as a conduit to shift assets offshore. This money is laundered through bank accounts, shares and real estate under the guise of being genuine business or investments. With few assets to their name, the so-called ‘naked official’ can then flee overseas at the first sign of trouble.

Some of the suspicious funds being transferred from China to Australia may be the proceeds of corruption or other crimes. Some may be legitimate funds used illegally to get around either Australian foreign investment laws or Chinese legal restrictions on foreign currency transfers. Australia has rules against foreign ownership of existing residential property (ownership of new property is permitted), and Chinese law prohibits Chinese nationals from transferring more than US$50,000 per year out of China without obtaining approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Chinese citizens are increasingly looking to move funds offshore, for understandable reasons: to protect against corruption and hedge against risks in the Chinese economy.

The desire to move money out of China and invest in Australia has resulted in fraudulent schemes in which Chinese nationals use friends, family, Chinese permanent residents or a web of incorporated companies to transfer multiples of US$50,000 out of China and illegally invest in Australian property.

Preventing this illegal activity is in Australia’s national interest. Not only does the Australian Government want to avoid Australia becoming a magnet for money laundering, corrupt funds and other illegal activities, but illegal investment can push up asset prices, including house prices, crowding legitimate local buyers out of the market. This is particularly troublesome considering the problem of housing affordability in Australia.
Australian–Chinese agency-to-agency money-laundering cooperation

Existing cooperation in detecting and restraining illegally obtained and laundered money is nascent. AUSTRAC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with its Chinese counterpart, the China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center (CAMLMAC) in November 2016. Then CEO of AUSTRAC, Paul Jevtovic, noted that the signing of the MoU allows for the formalisation of the relationship, providing transparency and accountability about how data will be used by both parties.¹¹⁵

Immediate collaboration under the MoU focused on ‘exchanging high value financial transaction reports where there is an identified connection between China and Australia’.¹¹⁶ In November 2018, AUSTRAC announced that a financial intelligence analyst would be posted to China, based in Guangzhou, to work closely with China’s financial intelligence unit.¹¹⁷ These exchanges, along with dialogue between AUSTRAC and CAMLMAC, will allow the two parties to learn about each other’s capabilities, interests and priorities. Over time, as the relationship matures, more advanced activities can be explored, including involvement in joint operations and taskforces, and eventually regular intelligence and analyst exchanges. Exchanges could focus on emerging technologies and financial crime methodologies.¹¹⁸

The AFP can also build on its strong relationship with Chinese law enforcement to develop a greater focus on money laundering, including of the proceeds of drug crimes in Australia, rather than just the ‘economic crimes’ of fraud and corruption that are China’s current priorities.

Australia can also take steps to strengthen its own domestic arrangements against financial crime emanating from China. That a large portion of suspicious transfers between China and Australia go into real estate is a reminder of the need to harden Australia’s anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing (AML/CTF) system against the misuse of that sector by regulating real estate agents, conveyancers, lawyers and accountants under the AML/CTF Act. Australia has yet to do this despite proposing to do so for over a decade, and not regulating those industries makes Australia noncompliant with international AML/CTF standards. Once regulated, these industries would become responsible for, among other things, undertaking customer due diligence, including, on a risk basis, requesting information about and verifying the source of wealth and source of funds for transactions, and be required to report suspicious matters to AUSTRAC.

The role of Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) should also be expanded to include investigating the source of funds for proposed foreign investments under its purview. The FIRB, AUSTRAC and the Australian Tax Office have made assessments of foreign residential investments a priority area and share information on Chinese investment.¹¹⁹ The FIRB should seek to enhance this collaboration with other government agencies, including AUSTRAC and the Tax Office, as well as the AFP and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, to help gain better intelligence.¹²⁰
In April 2017, the inaugural Australia–China High-Level Security Dialogue was held in Sydney. A joint statement outlined a range of areas for future cooperation. Enhancing existing efforts to combat transnational crime—including anti-narcotics operations and economic crimes—featured. Cybercrime was also mentioned.

Cybercrime is a growing problem for both the Australian and the Chinese governments. The vast majority of cybercrime targeting Australia originates overseas, and China-based perpetrators are thought to account for about one-third of all cybercrime attacks worldwide. The international nature of cybercrime makes it difficult for Australian law enforcement agencies to bring foreign cybercriminals to justice. Therefore, as Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy noted, ‘Working together at the diplomatic and operational levels is critical to ensuring that cybercriminals have limited opportunities to exploit cyberspace for malicious purposes.’

At the operational level, CERT Australia—the national computer emergency response team—works with China CERT, bilaterally and through the Asia Pacific CERT (APCERT), in which both countries are members of the steering committee responsible for general operating policies, procedures and guidelines for regional internet security. Bilaterally, CERT Australia and China CERT signed an MoU in 2013 to build contact mechanisms and enhance information sharing and incident response mechanisms. The CERT-to-CERT relationship has proven an effective one in which both countries share information on cybersecurity incidents affecting each other. Due to China’s size and the concomitant scale of cybercrime emanating from China, such cooperation is particularly beneficial to Australia. Existing bilateral cooperation, along with collaboration within the APCERT steering committee, has built a basis for the two CERTs to reach out to each other as cyber incidents occur in future.

Not only do cyber incidents need to be detected, but cybercriminals need to be brought to justice. Currently, the AFP’s cooperation with Chinese authorities on cybercrime primarily involves sharing common experiences, rather than casework. However, as cybercrime incidents occur with links to both countries there is the opportunity to work together on common cases. With the strong police-to-police relationship that currently exists, both countries are well placed to do this. Australian and Chinese authorities have agreed to establish a mechanism to share information to assist in the fight against and prevention of cybercrime and discuss options for joint operations to combat it. Key focus areas include malicious cyber actors, internet distribution of child sex abuse material, email scams and other transnational cybercrime activities.

At the political level, the Australian and Chinese governments have agreed that ‘neither country would conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, trade secrets or confidential business information with the intent of obtaining competitive advantage.’ The agreement aligns with a September 2015 agreement between the US and China and an October 2015 agreement between the UK and China. The Australian agreement with the Chinese state helps support an emerging international norm and provides a platform to benchmark any future Chinese cyber-espionage activity—although there’s little evidence that Chinese cyber intrusions into Australia have been reduced, which parallels the US experience since 2015.
While there’s room for increased dialogue and cooperation, particularly on information sharing, threat assessments and joint investigations, there are also limitations on working with Chinese authorities. Each state has different political views on the balance between security, freedom and privacy. For example, China’s Cybersecurity Law has raised concerns among foreign companies over data control, increased risks of intellectual property theft, and ambiguous drafting. Questions will also arise as to whether alleged crimes are legitimately crimes, or really about protecting regime security by targeting what Australia would view as legitimate political dissent. Further, China is a major source of state-on-state cyber espionage in Australia, where publicly known cases have included the hacking of the Bureau of Meteorology, the Australian National University and possibly the Australian Parliament and three major political parties. Therefore, the Australian Government will need to determine what it’s comfortable working on with its Chinese counterparts, what it’s not, and communicating this clearly.

Another barrier to cooperation is legislation. Australia has been a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention) since 2013. The Australian Government sees the convention as ‘a valuable mechanism to strengthen international cooperation on cybercrime, particularly through its provisions on mutual legal assistance’. Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy explains:

Countries are able to work together more effectively on trans-border investigations and prosecutions when domestic legal and law enforcement operational frameworks are harmonised in line with the provisions of the Budapest Convention. Reciprocal arrangements such as mutual legal assistance and intelligence sharing continue to be a critical mechanism for combatting cybercrime. Australia is keen to work with other countries to streamline these processes.

However, the Chinese state has not acceded to the Budapest Convention, and has instead advocated for a separate UN treaty. This lack of harmonisation between the two legislative regimes will further impair the ability of the two governments to work together. A goal of Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy is to assist Indo-Pacific states to strengthen their cybercrime legislation. But this divergent view on how to coordinate international approaches to cybercrime will limit the opportunity for such cooperation with Chinese authorities.

However, there’s still value in the high-level security dialogue’s agreement to ‘exchange cybersecurity delegations, relevant legal and regulatory documents and learn about each other’s legal environment [and] law enforcement procedures’. The Chinese Government has promulgated new cyber laws such as the 2016 Cybersecurity Law, which has been criticised for vague terminology and a lack of official guidance on complying with the law. A better understanding of this legislation and its interpretation might better guide the actions of both Australian Government agencies and Australian private-sector companies operating in China.
Domestically, China’s government asserts that its primary terrorist threat comes from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwest China. The Uygur minority ethnic group resents rule from Beijing, which is repressive and involves large-scale state surveillance by Chinese internal security and law enforcement agencies. This has led to social tensions, an exodus of Uygurs from China and violence against the state. Most of those who are the subjects of the Chinese state’s heavy-handed rule are not terrorists. However, a series of terrorist attacks, including train station and market attacks in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, in April and May 2013, have been attributed to Uygurs. Attacks have been conducted beyond Xinjiang, including a vehicle attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in October 2013 and stabbings at a Kunming train station in March 2014 that killed 31 people and injured 140.

Outside China, Beijing is facing some worrying developments. In August 2016, China experienced its first targeted terrorist attack against one of its embassies when a Uygur suicide bomber drove a car into China’s diplomatic compound in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, exploding the bomb outside the ambassador’s residence. Islamic State (IS) made its first direct threat against China in February 2017, when Uygur-speaking militants claimed allegiance to the group and vowed to return home to commit attacks. Between 118 and 167 IS fighters are thought to be Chinese or Uygur. The main Uygur terrorist group, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), is closely linked with al-Qaeda, which has also threatened China. TIP primarily fights alongside the al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria. Uygur terrorists have also had increasing links with South East Asian terrorist groups; a number have been arrested or killed in Indonesia, and two Uygurs have been charged with the bombing of Bangkok’s Erawan shrine in August 2015, which killed 20 people and injured more than 120. Uygur terrorism is now viewed as a transnational challenge by China’s government, making international counterterrorism increasingly important to Beijing.

In April 2017, the Australian and Chinese governments stated that carrying out counterterrorism cooperation ‘is consistent with their common interests’ and agreed to conduct ‘pragmatic cooperation on threats posed by terrorism through the bilateral Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, High-Level Security Dialogue, and the China–Australia ministerial level mechanism to fight transnational crime and counter terrorism’. Further, the two governments agreed to ‘enhance the exchange of information and intelligence on terrorism threats and trends, including on returning terrorist fighters, and share counter-terrorism approaches and experiences through established bilateral cooperative mechanisms’.

However, Australian authorities will need to be cautious about what counterterrorism assistance they provide to their Chinese counterparts. While China does face a level of domestic and international terrorism, its definition of terrorism is very broad, tied to its concept of ‘state security’, and inconsistent with international norms. Its conception of counterterrorism includes efforts to secure and legitimise the CCP’s rule in Xinjiang and Tibet. Chinese Government officials frequently refer to the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism—terms they use interchangeably when talking about challenges to their rule in those two regions. Counterterrorism is used to justify the CCP’s heavy-handed and discriminatory rule over Xinjiang. But its counter-terrorism actions may be making its legitimate terrorist problem worse and creating a human rights disaster.
Beijing has initiated a number of harsh and repressive policies against the Uygur population in Xinjiang. This includes the suppression of peaceful protest and dissent, regular ‘strike hard’ campaigns involving kinetic force and detentions, and the implementation of an advanced surveillance state based on China’s Skynet electronic surveillance system, which is underpinned by advanced technology. Added to this are attempts at ethnic dilution and cultural cleansing through forced integration based on extreme social, cultural and political control, involving repressive restrictions on religious practice, the use of political education centres, and the encouragement of settlement to Xinjiang by ethnic Han Chinese. Beijing has also imprisoned large numbers of ethnic Muslim minority members in a network of ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang without legal due process. This crackdown has also affected Australian citizens and their families.

Considering the Chinese Government’s problematic conception of terrorism and the human rights abuses against the Uygur population in Xinjiang, what counterterrorism cooperation can the Australian Government undertake with the Chinese state? And what activities should it avoid?

First, any cooperation on counterterrorism should be based on the Australian Government’s definition of terrorism, not that of the Chinese Government. Attempts to gain rhetorical or material support for Chinese authorities’ crackdown on the Uygur population are unacceptable, and the Australian Government should condemn the human rights abuses taking place in Xinjiang.

Cooperation would be necessary in situations in which Australians are hurt, or could potentially be hurt, in a terrorist attack or plot. While no Australians were injured or killed in domestic terrorist attacks in China or, for example, the Bangkok Erawan shrine attack, there’s the possibility that Australians could be caught up in future attacks. The AFP should continue to develop its relationship with Chinese counterparts in counterterrorism, so contact can be made quickly and effectively in the event of an attack affecting Australia. Desktop exercises simulating a crisis situation and how each country would cooperate could be undertaken.

Due to existing human rights violations, tactical training between each government’s agencies would not be acceptable. However, both sides should consider sharing information on their counterterrorism policies, structures and legislative approaches.
The Australian and Chinese governments have a mutual interest in law enforcement cooperation. Both states experience criminal threats from drug production and supply, economic crime, money laundering, cybercrime and terrorism. Those crimes cross borders, and crime emanating from one country can, and does, reach the other. This makes Australia–China law enforcement cooperation vital.

There are significant levels of cooperation already, particularly in relation to countering narcotics and economic crimes. The two governments have built a strong law enforcement relationship due to mutual interests and the AFP’s long-term investment in building trust and cooperation with its Chinese counterparts. This relationship provides a strong basis for future cooperation.

However, there are risks and limitations in cooperating with Chinese authorities. Concerns exist among many in the community over China’s political and judicial system, human rights, and strategic intentions. Some areas of crime will allow for greater cooperation than others. Future cooperation could be either enhanced or reduced depending on the future political directions of the Chinese state.

To ensure that Australian and Chinese authorities can continue to work on mutually beneficial law enforcement activities and enhance that cooperation in appropriate areas, while managing the risks involved with cooperation, the Australian Government should consider the following recommendations.

**Recommenadation 1.** The Australian Government should delineate what it is prepared to cooperate on with its Chinese counterpart, what it is not, and communicate this clearly. How much cooperation is undertaken and on what issues may depend on what crime type is involved and future developments in the Chinese Government’s domestic and international politics. For example, Australia may be able to undertake deeper cooperation on counter-narcotics, where legal definitions of the crimes are more aligned and less political, compared to counterterrorism or cybercrime. Regarding politics, the Australian Government may need to reconsider its future cooperation depending on the state of bilateral relations and future developments in Chinese policy, action and domestic politics. For example, a further deterioration in human rights in China may require Australia to reduce or curtail cooperation. Likewise, an improvement could allow for greater cooperation and assistance.

**Recommendation 2.** Australian authorities should continue, and where appropriate enhance, dialogue and exchanges with Chinese law enforcement counterparts, particularly at the operational level. First, this will help to build relationships that can be called upon in the event of a serious crime (for example, a terrorist attack or major cybercrime incident) involving both countries. Second, it will help both governments to develop a greater understanding of each other, including the perceived threat environment, interests, law enforcement operating procedures, and the legal environment in each country.

**Recommendation 3.** Australian organisations should continue, and where appropriate enhance, the training of Chinese law enforcement professionals. A particular focus should be placed on potential future leaders. Currently, various Australian organisations, such as the AFP, state police forces and universities, provide training and professional development courses for or involving Chinese law enforcement officers.
The opportunity to teach and demonstrate Australian policing practices, approaches and standards to Chinese law enforcement officers may help shape and improve the professional standards of Chinese officers at the operational and tactical levels, as well as influence their operating procedures. Training courses can also help build dialogue and relationships among counterparts in each country.

**Recommendation 4.** Australia should not ratify the extradition treaty with China unless there are significant changes to China’s political and judicial system. Opposition to this treaty from such divergent groups suggests that ratification has insufficient support from the Australia community.

**Recommendation 5.** Noting the agreement to regularise Task Force Blaze into a standing cooperation mechanism, Australian agencies should explore ways in which they can assist Chinese counterparts to improve regulation and compliance mechanisms to better control drug precursor chemicals manufactured in China. Australian authorities could also explore ways to work with Chinese authorities to help identify and target drug laboratories and the broader drug supply chain network within China.

Enhanced counter-narcotics efforts would require a greater investment in resources and involve a range of Australian agencies and departments, including the AFP, Home Affairs and DFAT. Activities should be undertaken within the framework of a national supply reduction strategy to ensure appropriate coordination and the optimal use of resources.

**Recommendation 6.** AUSTRAC and the AFP should work with their Chinese counterparts to develop a greater focus on money laundering and the proceeds of drug crimes and seek opportunities to build relationships and enhance practical cooperation on these crime types.

The government should consider funding an AFP liaison officer in Shanghai (China’s financial hub) to focus on financial crimes, including money laundering, and the proceeds of crime.

**Recommendation 7.** Australia should take steps to strengthen its own domestic arrangements against financial crime emanating from China. First, real estate agents, conveyancers, lawyers and accountants should be regulated under the AML/CTF Act. Second, the role of Australia’s FIRB should be expanded to include investigating the source of funds for proposed foreign investments under its remit and seek to enhance existing collaboration with other government agencies, including AUSTRAC, the AFP and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission to help gain better intelligence.

**Recommendation 8.** Australian Government departments and agencies with responsibility for cybercrime should continue to build dialogue and understanding with their Chinese counterparts, with a particular focus on basic information sharing and threat assessments. Building relationships can help to facilitate faster and more effective cooperation when serious cybercrimes that involve both jurisdictions occur. Dialogue will also help Australian officials develop a better understanding of China’s cyber-related legislation and policy approaches, which currently are broadly focused, difficult to interpret and frequently changing. Cyber intrusions emanating from China should be raised formally with Chinese authorities.

**Recommendation 9.** The AFP should continue to develop its relationship with its Chinese counterparts in counterterrorism, so contact can be made quickly and effectively in the event of an attack affecting both countries. The Australian and Chinese governments should consider sharing information on their counterterrorism policies, structures and legislative approaches.

Cooperation on counterterrorism should be based on the Australian Government’s definition of terrorism. Australian authorities should not provide rhetorical or material support for the Chinese Government’s crackdown on the Uyugur population and should condemn the human rights abuses taking place in Xinjiang.
NOTES

2 Linton Besser, Clay Richens, Mario Christodoulou, ‘Chinese investors flooding billions into the Australian real estate market prompt money laundering fears’, ABC, 12 October 2015, online.
3 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’, media release, Australian Government, 2 November 2016, online.
4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), China country brief, Australian Government, no date, online.
5 John Coyne, Vern White, Cesar Alvarez, Methamphetamine: focusing Australia’s National Ice Strategy on the problem, not the symptoms, ASPI, Canberra, October 2015, online; John Coyne, ‘China has a role to play in our National Ice Strategy’, The Huffington Post, 3 March 2016, online.
6 On the Matthew Ng case, see Brigid Andersen, John Stewart, Lorna Knowles, ‘“Chinese political prisoner” Matthew Ng released from jail’, ABC News, 16 June 2016, online.
9 See Mark Doman, Stephen Hutcheon, Dylan Welch, Kyle Taylor, ‘China’s frontier of fear’, ABC, 1 November 2018, online.
10 Some interviewees for this paper were wary or critical of enhancing law enforcement cooperation with China. Concerns about law enforcement cooperation with China are discussed under ‘Barriers to cooperation with the Chinese Government’.
11 Coyne et al., Methamphetamine, 7.
12 Coyne et al., Methamphetamine, 7; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, Australian Government, 2015, 32, online.
13 Coyne et al., Methamphetamine, 8.
14 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Ice Action Strategy 2015, online.
15 Coyne et al., Methamphetamine; PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, 8.
16 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, 8.
17 Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–18, 6, online; Coyne et al., Methamphetamine.
18 John Coyne, ‘Santa Muerte: are the Mexican cartels really coming?’, ASPI, Canberra, July 2017, online; Anthea McCarthy-Jones, Mexican drug cartels and dark-networks: an emerging threat to Australia’s national security, Centre of Gravity series, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, April 2016, online; Nigel Ryan, Ice dragon: a proposal to target the supply of methamphetamine from China to Australia, Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers, Australian Defence College, February 2017, online.
21 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, 7.
22 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, 7.
23 Ryan, Ice dragon, 14.
24 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce; Coyne et al., Methamphetamine.
25 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce, 55.
26 PM&C, Final report of the National Ice Taskforce; McCarthy-Jones, Mexican drug cartels and dark-networks; Ryan, Ice dragon.
28 GHB = gamma-hydroxybutyric acid; GBL = gamma-butyrolactone.
31 Coyne et al., *Methamphetamine*; Coyne, ‘China has a role to play in our National Ice Strategy’.
36 Michael Keenan, ‘Successful Taskforce Blaze to continue fight against illicit drug scourge’, media release, 6 June 2017.
37 Interview with an AFP assistant commissioner, Canberra, 5 September 2017.
40 Coyne, ‘China has a role to play in our National Ice Strategy’.
41 ‘8 arrested in joint China–Australia anti-narcotics operation’, *Xinhua*, 17 November 2016, online.
42 Coyne, ‘China has a role to play in our National Ice Strategy’.
46 Interviews with AFP and Queensland Police Service officers, Canberra and Brisbane.
47 Interview with an AFP commander, Canberra, 31 October 2017.
49 Interview with Director North Asia, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra, 30 October 2017.
51 Coyne et al., *Methamphetamine*, 25.
57 James Massola, ‘Senate set to reject treaty on extradition’, *The Saturday Age*, 25 March 2017, 8.
59 Amnesty International Australia, submission to JSCOT, 24 March 2016, online.
61 Massola, ‘Senate set to reject treaty on extradition’.
63 See, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, *Growing CCDI power brings questions of politically-motivated purge*, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 4 February 2015, online; Kerry Brown, cited in Tom Phillips, ‘China lashes out at US after claims Beijing is deploying “covert agents”’, *The Guardian*, 19 August 2015, online.
66 Amnesty International Australia, submission to JSCOT, 24 March 2016, online.
67 Massola, ‘Senate set to reject treaty on extradition’.
68 ‘China’s criminal conviction rate nearly 100% in 2015’, *The Japan Times*, 13 March 2016, online.
72 Amnesty International Australia, submission to JSCOT.
76 ‘Canberra recommits to China extradition’, SBS, 24 April 2017, online.
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’. 110
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC expands global financial intelligence capability with China posting’, media release, 8 November 2018, online.
111 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’; interview with senior AUSTRAC official.

NOTES
25

78 Kirsty Needham, ‘China will use “other options” to return fugitives as extradition treaty falters’, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2017, online.
80 Mark Mazzetti, Dan Levin, ‘Obama administration warns Beijing about covert agents operating in US’, New York Times, 16 August 2015, online.
81 Zhang Yan, ‘1,300 fugitives returned last year’, China Daily, 15 January 2018, online.
82 Needham, ‘China will use “other options” to return fugitives as extradition treaty falters’.
83 Primrose Riordan, ‘China identifies “fugitives” in Australia’, The Australian, 30 March 2017, online.
84 John Garnaut, Philip Wen, ‘Chinese police pursued a man to Australia on a “fox hunt” without permission’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 2015, online.
85 Interviews with senior AFP officials.
88 Interview with an AFP commander, Canberra, 31 October 2017.
90 Marian Wilkinson, Peter Cronau, Anne Davies, ‘Crown Confidential—Packer’s losing hand’, ABC Four Corners, 7 March 2017, online.
91 Bertram Lang, Engaging China in the fight against transnational bribery: ‘Operation Skynet’ as a new opportunity for OECD countries, 2017 OECD Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum, 8, online.
92 ‘US, Canada, Australia top spots for fugitive Chinese officials’, China Daily, 28 October 2014, online.
93 Philip Wen, Brendan Foster, ‘China’s most wanted fugitives in Australia’, 9 May 2015, online.
94 Wen & Foster, ‘China’s most wanted fugitives in Australia’.
97 Thomas Eder and Bertram Lang, ‘The pitfalls of law enforcement cooperation with China’, The Diplomat, 21 January 2017, online.
98 AGD, ‘National interest analysis’.
103 AFP, ‘AFP signs agreements with Chinese Ministry of Public Security’; Needham, ‘Chinese police to play by Australian rules under new deal’.
104 AGD, ‘National interest analysis [2016]’.
105 Zhuang Pinhui, Naomi Ng, ‘Beijing’s most wanted: US repatriates one of the leading “Sky Net” fugitives days before Xi Jinping’s visit’, South China Morning Post, 18 September 2015, online.
108 Paul Maley, ‘China’s dodgy $1bn in property’, The Australian, 30 January 2017. This figure is the value of transfers that banks, money remitters and other financial institutions reported as suspicious to AUSTRAC. Suspicious matter reports are not evidence of criminal activity, but provide an indication.
109 AUSTRAC, Strategic analysis brief: Politically exposed persons, corruption and foreign bribery, 2015, 16, online; Tom Phillips, ‘Chinese governor charged over opium fuelled lifestyle’, The Telegraph, 14 December 2012, online.
110 Wen, ‘Australia set to seize assets of corrupt Chinese officials’.
111 Maley, ‘China’s dodgy $1bn in property’.
112 Maley, ‘China’s dodgy $1bn in property’.
113 On this point, see the comments by the AFP’s Bruce Hill in Simone Fox Koob, ‘AFP seize cars, wine, allege Chinese buying homes with crime proceeds’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 2018, online.
114 In recent times, the level of Chinese and overall foreign investment in the Australian property market has declined, though Chinese investment is still high and dominates that from other countries. See Stephen Letts, ‘Foreign property investment plummets as tougher regulations bite’, ABC News, 30 May 2018, online.
115 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’.
116 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’.
117 AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC signs historic MoU with China’; interview with senior AUSTRAC official.
120 These recommendations have been made before. See Besser et al., ‘Chinese investors flooding billions into the Australian real estate market prompt money laundering fears’.
122 Stephen Letts, ‘Cyber crime, online scamming of businesses up 30 per cent, but just tip of the iceberg: ACCC’, ABC News, 19 May 2017, online; ‘Online crime continues to rise in China’, Xinhuanet, 8 November 2017, online.
123 DFAT, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, October 2017, online.
124 Thomas Eder, Bertram Lang, Moritz Rudolf, China’s global law enforcement drive, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 18 January 2017, 4, online.
125 DFAT, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy.
126 Simon Hansen, Australia–China cyber relations in the next internet era, ASPI, Canberra, December 2015, online.
127 Interview with an AFP commander, Canberra, 16 October 2017.
130 Hansen, Australia–China cyber relations in the next internet era, 13.
131 Jack Wagner, ‘China’s Cybersecurity Law: what you need to know’, The Diplomat, 1 June 2017, online.
132 Chris Uhlmann, ‘China blamed for “massive” cyber attack on Bureau of Meteorology computer’, ABC News, 2 December 2015, online.
134 Michael Shoebridge, ’Attributing the hack on Australia’s parliament will give clarity to the China relationship’, The Strategist, 7 May 2019, online.
135 DFAT, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, 36.
137 Hansen, Australia–China cyber relations in the next internet era, 13.
142 ‘Bloody Islamic State video puts China in cross hairs’, South China Morning Post, 1 March 2017, online.
143 Pantucci, ‘China’s terrorism threat and response in 2016’, 129.
146 ‘Thai military court opens trial in Bangkok Erawan shrine blast one year on’, The Telegraph, 23 August 2016, online.
147 Michael Clarke, ‘Does China have itself to blame for the trans-nationalisation of Uyghur terrorism?’, East Asia Forum, 30 March 2017, online.
148 See, for example, ‘US says looking at more counter-terrorism cooperation with China’, Reuters, 26 July 2016, online.
150 James Leibold, ‘How China sees ISIS is not how it sees “terrorism”’, The National Interest, 7 December 2015, online.
151 Leibold, ‘How China sees ISIS is not how it sees “terrorism”’. 152 Leibold, ‘How China sees ISIS is not how it sees “terrorism”’.
155 Adrian Zenz, New evidence for China’s political re-education campaign in Xinjiang, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 15 May 2018, online; ‘Chinese mass-indoctrination camps in Muslim-majority Xinjiang evoke Cultural Revolution’, ABC News, 18 May 2018, online.
156 ‘Uighurs live with fear, trauma as families remain stranded in China’s growing “re-education camps”’, ABC News, 24 June 2018, online; Rick Noack, ‘Uighurs fled persecution in China. Now Beijing’s harassment has followed them to Australia’, Washington Post, 8 February 2019, online.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML/CTF</td>
<td>anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCERT</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRAC</td>
<td>Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMLMAC</td>
<td>China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERT</td>
<td>computer emergency response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRB</td>
<td>Foreign Investment Review Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCOT</td>
<td>Joint Standing Committee on Treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Security (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Turkestan Islamic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some recent ASPI publications
WHAT’S YOUR STRATEGY?

Stay informed via the field’s leading think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

The Strategist, ASPI’s commentary and analysis website, delivers fresh ideas on Australia’s defence and strategic policy choices as well as encouraging discussion and debate among interested stakeholders in the online strategy community. Visit and subscribe to an email digest at www.aspistrategist.org.au.

facebook.com/ASPI.org
@ASPI_org

To find out more about ASPI go to www.aspi.org.au or contact us on 02 6270 5100 and enquiries@aspi.org.au.
Australia–China law enforcement cooperation