

December 2007 — Issue 11



The War on Terror after Iraq Report of an Independent Task Force

As part of a broad 'After Iraq' project, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute sponsored an expert Task Force in 2007 to consider the broad issue 'The War on Terror After Iraq'. The Task Force included specialists in international security, terrorism, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the possible use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. It met for extensive roundtable discussions, and its meetings occurred both before and after the delivery of General Petraeus' report (on progress in Iraq) in Washington in mid-September.

The Task Force members were:

Dr Rod Lyon (Chair) (Australian Strategic Policy Institute)
Dr Adam Dolnik (University of Wollongong)
Dr Greg Fealy (Australian National University)
Associate Professor Nicholas O'Brien (Charles Sturt University)
Dr Leanne Piggott (University of Sydney)
Dr Carl Ungerer (University of Queensland)
Professor Michael Wesley (Griffith University)

We asked the Task Force to make some judgments about what the War on Terror might look like in the future. The 'after Iraq' part of the title was not intended to suggest either the imminent demise of the state of Iraq or any abrupt Coalition disengagement from that country. It was intended to encourage a forward-looking perspective from the Task Force members by 'freeing' them from the specific problems of the Iraq conflict. This consensus report is the product of the discussions. It is presented—for easy digestion—in a dot point format, but we would invite readers to contact Rod Lyon for further detail if necessary.

We would like to thank the individual Task Force members for their contributions. All are academics who have experience in public policy development and are responsible for teaching and research programs at their home institutions. They gave generously of their time and their ideas in order to make the Task Force a success. Professor Bruce Hoffman, from Georgetown University, attended a meeting of the Task Force and participated in the group's presentations and discussions; we would like to thank him for this involvement, ideas and support, although the judgments offered here remain the responsibility of the Task Force members.

The 'After Iraq' project has already produced a number of publications related to the Middle East, US strategic policy and the use of force forum discussion. The titles are listed at the end of the report.

Key judgments

- Six years into the War on Terror, Western countries need to place meaningful boundaries around the conflict. The war has long been ‘a banner of many missions’, but the number and scope of those missions can’t be endlessly expanded.
- Lacking a clear understanding of the conflict, a coherent strategy for waging it, and good metrics for judging success, Western publics have become confused. That confusion is greatest in relation to the conflict in Iraq, where the costs have been highest and the gains the most abstract, and is reflected in the controversy over whether the war in Iraq is—or is not—an important component of the broader War on Terror.
- Despite those concerns, it would be wrong to see the War on Terror as strategically unimportant for Australia. The war lacks focus, not relevance. The rise of globalised terror networks is a serious development. Terrorism has traditionally been a tactic of the weak, but globalisation and the diffusion of technology already allow terrorist groups greater strategic latitude, and that latitude will increase in the future.
- The War on Terror has never been a ‘war’ in the traditional sense. Traditional war has focused on states, territory, and populations. Globalised terrorist groups nurture a deterritorialised conception of war, driven by grievance and millenarian beliefs. They retail a narrative of change attractive to diverse groups around the world.
- For the West, the War is not simply a campaign against Al Qaeda, but more broadly, against Al Qaeda’s supporters and even against what we might call the Al Qaeda ‘brand’. The war against Al Qaeda is going comparatively well, but the organisation endures after more than six years of pressure, and it continues to pursue hard targets, such as commercial aviation.
- In relation to the ‘broader’ campaign, results are more mixed. A principal effect of our targeting of terrorist groups has been to cause such groups to splinter, and we are as yet uncertain about the effects of such splintering.
- A major hurdle to any thinking about a world ‘after Iraq’ is the condition in which we leave Iraq after disengagement. The Coalition cannot afford to leave a broken state and a civil war at the heart of the Middle East.
- But the War on Terror will continue, even if we solve Iraq’s problems today. It will be fought primarily in Afghanistan, Pakistan and across a range of Western countries attempting to improve their homeland security. Muslim populations across Southeast Asia have proved resistant to the jihadist message, but we need to do what we can to ensure that condition continues.
- The prospect that terrorist groups will gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—and subsequently use them—remains a worry. But that worry needs to be seen in context: already terrorists are causing considerable misery for the world by exploiting low-cost, low-technology options. The WMD option is attractive to them because they know that such usage in a major Western city would have an important psychological impact on the West.

The Report

The War on Terror

- It is time to place some clearer boundaries around the War on Terror. Over recent years, a number of elements of broader strategic policy—such as promoting democratisation, redressing state failure and halting proliferation—have been bundled up as parts of the broader War on Terror. True, they do have some links to it. But endlessly conflating the scope of the War is not a recipe for success.
 - Six years into the War on Terror, we still lack a coherent strategy.
 - Neither the term ‘War on Terror’ nor the various attempts to rename the conflict (as the ‘Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism’, or ‘The Long War’) give much sense of what we are trying to do.
 - Nor do we have much sense of how we might do it. We have no underlying conception of how best to counter terrorist groups with global reach, and our security architecture still seems to be shaped primarily by traditional priorities.
 - Moreover, we still lack sensible metrics for defining ‘success’. Six years into the War on Terror, we don’t even know which side is winning. We can’t kill off the tactic of terrorism. We might not even be able to kill off terrorist groups’ global reach, which is a function of increasing global interconnectedness across the transport and technology sectors. What ‘victory’ might look like remains uncertain.
 - RAND analyst Brian Jenkins has long described the War on Terror as ‘a banner of many missions.’ Disentangling the separate missions is an important element in bringing greater clarity to our strategy.
- We need to prioritise our efforts at the sharp end of the struggle: preventing terrorist attacks, disrupting terrorist networks, and countering the jihadists’ ideology. Even then, the struggle will not be a quick one. It is likely to last not for one to two more years but for one to two more generations.
- The War on Terror has never been a ‘war’ in the traditional sense. In the Westphalian international system which has endured since 1648, ‘war’ has typically been a contest within a fixed conception of the international order; a contest between states, over territory and populations. But the War on Terror is a globalised asymmetric conflict, a bizarre conflict that is at once a battle between the very strong and the relatively weak, a battle between the secular and the religious, and a battle between state and non-state actors.
 - The War on Terror is not simply a campaign against Al Qaeda, but more broadly, against Al Qaeda’s supporters and even against what we might call the Al Qaeda ‘brand’.
 - Against the narrow target, Al Qaeda itself, we can point to considerable successes. But the group endures, and it is proving a resilient and adaptable foe. Further, it continues to attack and plot against what we might describe as the ‘hard target’ set, in particular commercial civil aviation.
 - The struggle against Al Qaeda’s supporters has also borne only mixed results. We lack sources of influence on militant Islam. The Taliban have been toppled in Afghanistan, but remain a potent force.
 - The struggle against the Al Qaeda ‘brand’ has probably been the least successful part of the struggle. The Internet has emerged as a potent tool of radicalisation, and the growth of jihadist websites has been marked. Moreover, the war in Iraq

has helped to advertise a broader ‘cult of insurgency’, both throughout the Middle East and at the global level. And Western military interventions in Muslim-majority states have been ‘radicalising’ events, because they support major reorientation of those states’ political structures.

- The direct assault on major terrorist groups has resulted in a ‘splintering’ of many terrorist structures. Splintering has both good and bad effects. Smaller groups are less likely to have talented capabilities. They are more likely to compete with each other for resources and may even turn on each other. But they are also likely to offer opportunities for the more radical to lead. They potentially offer a shorter-path in the process of ‘jihadisation’. Their targeting strategies may be more opportunistic. And their smaller footprint makes them harder for Western intelligence agencies to identify, accurately assess, and target.

The Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia

- The Middle East remains a region of developing states, with disputed borders, weak institutions, and subnational and transnational identities. Regimes there are typically authoritarian, with overdeveloped domestic security apparatuses. Further, a high level of external involvement exists in the region, in large part because of oil.
- In that environment, jihadist groups were, historically, relatively unsuccessful within state boundaries, and thus began to look at other (transnational) options. A global, deterritorialised ideology encourages a differentiation between the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemy, the latter identified as the Christian-Jewish ‘West’, represented predominantly, but certainly not exclusively, by the United States and Israel.
- The message of jihadists is a meta-narrative, that history for some three hundred years has gone, and continues to go, the wrong way. In that narrative, Islam has fallen from its global position as a world leader a thousand years ago, and now rests near the bottom of the international ladder under constant attack from the ‘West’. That slippage is attributed to the Muslim world’s turning away from the true message of Islam, adopting ‘apostate’ beliefs (including Shi’ism and Sufism) and importing the foreign doctrines of the West.
- For all the jihadists’ anger, there is little possibility of most states in the Middle East changing in the near term. That means that jihadists will continue to target the ‘far enemy’ as a viable alternative to their relative weakness in relation to the ‘near enemy’—regimes they view as puppets of the West.
- Bush’s hopes for political reformation in the Middle East look likely to founder on the same political reality.
- The situation in Afghanistan is also bleak. The democratic central government has little reach, and the south and east of the country face serious security threats which cannot be offset while the Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctuaries in north-west Pakistan remain.
- Pakistan remains a fragile, nuclear-armed state at the centre of the War on Terror. President Musharref’s position is delicate, despite the recent declaration of martial law, a declaration that attests to the country’s continuing status as an internally-conflicted society. Those conflicts promise to provide opportunities for jihadist groups to flourish there.
- In Southeast Asia, the counter-terrorist effort has a better story to tell. In Indonesia, abundant evidence exists of severe disruption to terrorist networks.

These networks have suffered a loss of their bomb-making expertise, and some reports suggest they are also finding it harder to get access to explosives. Jemaah Islamiyah's targeting of Christians and prosecutors show an emphasis on the 'near enemy' as opposed to the 'far enemy'. Such targeting suggests that JI believes it has not done well by attacking Westerners, and that those attacks have led to a fall-off in funding and membership.

- Limited terrorist training seems to continue in the Philippines. And Thailand faces large-scale violence in the south as the result of an ethno-nationalist conflict occurring there, but there is little evidence to suggest much international networking of that conflict.
- Importantly, the conflict in Iraq seems to have made little impact on levels of support for terrorism across Southeast Asia. We haven't seen Southeast Asians turning up in Iraq to fight Coalition forces there.
- Extremist options do not typically feature in the mainstream debate in Southeast Asia, and it is this factor which most distinguishes the region from the Middle East. But we need to be aware of a persistent radical subculture in Southeast Asia, a subculture of social ties, economic linkages, and ideological affiliation, which would endure even were groups like Jemaah Islamiyah to fade.
- How can we 'lock in' the gains in Southeast Asia? By helping Indonesia to stay focused on the problem: like other developmental states around the world—many of them critical to the global counter-terrorist effort—Indonesia faces many challenges, and may well succumb to a degree of 'War-on-Terror fatigue'. And by working towards prison reform (prisoners are often radicalised behind

bars), intelligence improvements, and strengthening our analytical capabilities against Salafi networks there.

- Muslim problems differ around the world and local problems require local solutions. That picture is often blurred by a tendency to talk of a 'globalised Islam.' In Europe, Olivier Roy has written of the rise of a 'globalised Islam', which he labels 'neo-fundamentalism' in its orientation: a fundamentalist form of the religion that is modern, draws upon technical skills and fits in with the Western life-style, but which aims nonetheless at a fundamental revision of society and its structures. This analysis might well describe some of the problems of Muslim youth in Western Europe, but it is not a picture that is universally applicable.
- Similarly, we need to beware perceiving all political violence in Muslim societies as being part of the War on Terror. Political violence has waxed and waned across the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia for decades; it is wrong to see all such violence now through the lens of a global War on Terror.

The War on Terror and security partnerships

- The protracted nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rising costs associated with them, are eroding both government and popular support across a range of Western countries for distant engagements in the War on Terror. In several NATO countries domestic debates are promoting the idea that affiliation with the United States undermines national security, and that opting out of security commitments enhances it. Some of this mood also colours the debate in Australia about our own role in the War on Terror.

- Western countries—including Australia—will likely face severe challenges of sustainability in the War on Terror. Popular support for the struggle will waver over time, and there is a danger some countries will slide towards policies of ‘cocooning’, in which they attempt to insulate themselves from a more barbaric and chaotic world order.
- But security and law enforcement partnerships will remain central to our ability to manage the threat of globalised terrorism. A globally-networked adversary cannot be fought unilaterally, by Australia or any other country.
- The presidential election due in the United States in 2008 is increasingly seen as being a cross-road in terms of the way forward. We expect to see an important revisiting of core strategy in the War on Terror in the next twelve to eighteen months. Coalition-style responses, outside traditional alliance structures, are likely to continue, but a new president would probably want more consultation and less unilateralism. If the Democrats win the presidency, there would be more, rather than less, pressure for US allies to ‘pull their weight’.
- Moreover, the pace of technological innovation by terrorist groups has been comparatively slow over recent decades.
 - Most terrorist groups are imitative rather than innovative.
 - As terrorism is pushed towards the ‘splinter’, or ‘home-grown’ end of the spectrum, deficiencies in a group’s skills may become more pronounced.
- Within the field of technological innovation, most emphasis is being placed on a wider adoption of dual-use communication technologies (like cell phones) and on innovative concealment of explosives (the ‘shoe-bomber’ and the ‘liquids’ plot).
- The use of sarin gas by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan in the mid-1990s demonstrates that CBRN plots can be more trouble than they are worth. The group put a large-scale effort into the plot, but ended up killing only a small number of people.
- Still, terrorists will become increasingly able to mount small-scale CBRN attacks, and those attacks might well have a political impact much greater than a similar-scale conventional attack. Terrorist groups know that CBRN use would ‘push the buttons’ of Western policy-makers and populations. They also know that relatively small attacks can have long-term effects. The anthrax attacks in the US in 2001 remain unsolved, but caused considerable social and economic disruption.

Terrorists and ‘exotic’ weapons

- Terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons is increasingly likely, but it is important to see this danger in context.
 - Terrorists do not need CBRN weapons to cause mass casualties.
 - CBRN weapons do not necessarily produce mass casualties.
 - Each of the CBRN categories is subject to different levels of availability, has different effects, and can be offset by different counter-measures.
- Some attempts have been made by the Iraqi insurgency to marry conventional explosives to chlorine gas, but with only limited success.
- Nuclear weapons remain the hardest category of weapons for terrorists to gain access to. That calculation might change if there were a wave of proliferation across the Middle East, but even then we

judge that terrorists could more easily gain access to biotechnologies than to nuclear technologies.

- Radiological attacks—attacks which merely exploit the radioactive properties of a wide range of materials—would be much easier to stage, but would do much less physical damage.

Homeland security

- Al Qaeda-related groups pose the most serious terrorist threat to Australia and Australian interests. But Al Qaeda lacks an infrastructure here. In this sense, Australia is not subject to the same threat as the United Kingdom and Spain. Moreover, the efforts that the government has made to strengthen border controls and to improve police and intelligence agencies' counter-terrorist capacities makes the Australian homeland a harder target for terrorists. Australians travelling overseas are actually still more likely to be involved in a terrorist incident than those staying at home.
- Australia's primary task is to ensure that neither Al Qaeda nor any other jihadist group develops a coherent terrorist structure here. To this end, the government needs to identify ways of engaging more closely with Muslim communities in order to minimise the prospect of group alienation and radicalisation.
- Combating the messages of radicalisation that come to Australia via the Internet might well prove a special challenge in coming years. Such messages assist the process of 'self-radicalisation' for individuals and small groups, providing both a jihadist world-view and a range of technical information about such issues as bomb-manufacture.
- Australia's second primary task is to find ways to reduce its vulnerabilities to groups that might use low-technology, low-cost attacks against it.
- Since vulnerabilities are numerous, the government needs to undertake a structured risk analysis to set clear priorities for safeguarding Australia from terrorist attack. Such an analysis has recently been used by RAND in the US to assist homeland security efforts there. That analysis found that 'risk' from terrorist attack was heavily concentrated in a relatively limited number of major cities. The same is almost certainly true here; in itself a reassurance to many Australians.
- Within Australia, over thirty agencies have an input into countering the terrorist threat. This makes for problems of coordination and cooperation. Still, counter-terrorism efforts both here and overseas have successfully disrupted a number of plots since 2001. And, importantly, there has been no attack on Australian soil.
- Improvements to intelligence have been made since the Flood inquiry, but much information remains stove-piped. More ominously, we probably haven't yet addressed the specific challenges that terrorist threats pose for intelligence networks: we aren't fully cognizant of how best to use information in this strategic environment. The recent unsuccessful court cases in Australia show that we haven't yet mastered the blending of intelligence and law enforcement in the counter-terrorism area.
- Further legislative reforms will be necessary to clarify the precise division of labour between counter-terrorism intelligence and policing.
- Relations between government agencies and business are still hampered by issues of security classification.

- There are only limited opportunities to use the ADF in domestic security arrangements. Public perceptions shift when it's the military donning the moon suits and not the firemen. The military must remain an aid to the civil power.

Implications for Australia

- There is nothing Australia can do—either by itself or in partnership with others—that can end the current wave of global terrorism in the next ten years.
- Similarly there is nothing Australia can do to guarantee that it will not be the subject of a major terrorist attack during that same ten-year timeframe (although there are things we can do to decrease the risk and better manage the consequences of such an event).
- So Australia needs to consider issues of sustainability during a long War on Terror. It needs to prioritise its efforts, enhance its resilience, and decline the open-ended conflation of all threats as issues relevant to the War on Terror.
- Setting clear priorities for our counter-terrorist effort means focusing on those terrorist groups which most threaten Australia and its interests. That means focusing on two particular types of terrorist threat. We are threatened firstly, by terrorists of a broad anti-Western mindset with global reach, who might have both the intention and capability to do us harm. And we are threatened secondly, by locally- or regionally-based groups who could readily target Australians within their more limited reach. We are not really threatened by ethno-nationalist terrorist groups with a specific domestic agenda, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
- Against the first group, the anti-Western terrorists of global reach, we should work with global partners to reduce the terrorists' reach, attacking the networks that give them global connectivity. Against the second group we should work here at home or with regional partners to reduce the terrorists' capabilities, attacking the group itself, its access to explosives, bomb-making expertise, and local sources of support.
- To attack both networks and groups we will need to know well where to strike, so maintaining a vigorous counter-terrorist intelligence effort will be central to our security.
- In future, other terrorist groups might also come to have a higher priority for us. State-sponsored terrorist groups have in the past been a major worry for some countries. Hizbollah, for example, supported by Iran, has demonstrated a capacity to strike at civilian targets as far afield as Argentina. Were such groups to have a higher regional profile in Asia, and to pose a direct threat to Australia and its interests, countering them would obviously be a priority.
- Like all Western countries we still need to improve our understanding of terrorism, and of the dynamic relationships between terrorism and counter-terrorism. The anti-terror laws should be amended to encourage, rather than to hinder, systematic academic study of relevant terrorist materials and proper academic interviewing of people closely involved with terrorist organisations. And government departments and agencies most closely engaged with the counter-terrorist effort should be encouraged to fund research of direct relevance, perhaps even by the provision of specifically tagged government funding. It will be important to sustain research in this area even during times when other issues—like global warming—have moved to the front rank of foreign and security policy concerns.

About the Task Force members

Dr Rod Lyon is the Program Director, Strategy and International, with ASPI. Rod was most recently a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland where he taught courses on conflict, international security, and civil-military relations. His research interests focus on a range of problems associated with global security, nuclear strategy and Australian security. He was appointed to the National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues in April 2005. He also authored ASPI STRATEGY report *Alliance Unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age* released in June 2005, SPECIAL REPORT *Australia's strategic fundamentals* released in June 2007 and another SPECIAL REPORT *Whither the Bush doctrine?* released in August 2007. Email: rodlyon@aspi.org.au

Dr Adam Dolnik is the Director of Research Programs and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong in Australia. Formerly he has served as chief trainer at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore, and as a researcher at the Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and at the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna. He has lectured for various governmental and nongovernmental organisations and agencies in over thirty countries, and has also conducted field research on terrorist networks in conflict zones. His books include *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technologies, Tactics, and Global Trends* (London: Routledge, 2007) and *Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists* (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2007) as well as over forty reports and articles on terrorism related issues.

Dr Greg Fealy is Fellow and Senior Lecturer, Indonesian Politics, Department of Political and Social Change, and the Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU. His main research interest is Indonesian politics, especially political Islam.

His publications include: (co-edited with Virginia Hooker), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006); (with Aldo Borgu), *Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005); (co-authored with Anthony Bubalo), *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute Paper no. 5, Lowy Institute for International Policy (Sydney: Longueville Press, 2005); (ed. with Greg Barton) *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996). He has also worked as an Indonesia analyst at the Office of National Assessments.

Associate Professor Nicholas O'Brien is Associate Professor in Counter-Terrorism, Charles Sturt University. Before joining the university, Nick O'Brien represented the UK Association of Chief Police Officers - Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee (ACPO-TAM) and all the UK police forces as the Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officer (CTELO) at the British High Commission in Canberra. Nick covered Australasia and had a 'watching brief' on the Asia and the Pacific region.

Prior to this posting Nick was in charge of International Terrorism Operations and Intelligence in Special Branch at New Scotland Yard. He also had responsibility for the National Terrorist Financial Investigations Unit (NTFIU) and International Liaison. Nick has represented the UK at the G8 Counter Terrorist Practitioners Meetings. He has also represented the UK at Europol and the European Police Working Group on Terrorism.

Nick is a visiting Fellow at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation (JCLEC) in Indonesia.

Nick has had a number of articles published and has appeared on radio and television commentating on terrorist and security related matters.

Dr Leanne Piggott is the Deputy Director of the Centre for International Security Studies at The University of Sydney. She is a specialist on Middle East politics and security, having just completed a book on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Between 1999 and 2002 Leanne was a member of the International Commission for Security and Cooperation in West Asia (SACWA), which acted as a third track diplomatic bridge between regional governments and civil societies in the region.

Leanne is a member of the Australian Government's Foreign Affairs Council.

Dr Carl Ungerer is a lecturer at the University of Queensland. Prior to joining the university in January 2004, he was the Foreign Affairs and National Security Advisor to the Leader of the Labor Party. He has worked previously in Australia and overseas with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1999–2002, he was a senior Strategic Analyst in the Office of National Assessments. Carl has lectured and tutored at the University of Queensland and Griffith University. He has published widely on foreign policy and national security issues. His most recent book is an edited text on Australian Foreign Policy in the Age of Terror (UNSW Press, 2008). Dr Ungerer teaches a range of undergraduate and post-graduate courses on foreign policy, terrorism and arms control.

Professor Michael Wesley is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. Prior to taking up this position in July 2004, he was the Assistant Director-General for

Transnational Issues at the Office of National Assessments. Before he joined ONA, he was a Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales and a Research Fellow at the Asia-Australia Institute, also at UNSW.

Professor Wesley's books include: *Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars* (1997), *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (2003, second edition 2007) (co-authored with Allan Gyngell), the edited collections, *Regional Organisations of the Asia-Pacific: Exploring Institutional Change* (2003) and *Energy Security in Asia* (2006) and ASPI Strategy report *Power plays: Energy and Australia's security* (2007). His latest book is *The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996–2006*.

Professor Wesley is the Editor of the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, a member of the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (AUS-CSCAP), a member of the Australian Research Council's College of Experts and a Trustee of the Queensland Art Gallery.

Other ASPI 'After Iraq' reports

SPECIAL REPORT Issue 3 — March 2007

Australia and the Middle East

by Rod Lyon and William Maley

This report looks at Australia's interests in the Middle East. Dr Lyon's approach is that of a strategic analyst, with a fascination for power shifts and conflict. Professor Maley's approach is that of the regional expert, enriched by a close knowledge of the countries and cultures of the Middle East.

SPECIAL REPORT Issue 8 — August 2007*Whither the Bush doctrine?*

by Rod Lyon

With Congressional criticism of the war in Iraq mounting, and the Bush presidency now deep into its fourth quarter, speculation is increasing about the future trajectory of US strategic policy. This paper considers the 'Bush doctrine', geopolitical realities and the outlook for US strategic policy.

SPECIAL REPORT Issue 10 — October 2007*Middle East security after Iraq*

by Leanne Piggott

This report provides a general framework for analysing the region's security environment before considering the present political and security situation in Iraq that has arisen in the wake of the 2003 invasion. It provides the context for identifying the impact of the war on wider regional security and considers the key currents and players likely to influence Middle East security over the next five to ten years. It concludes with some reflections on the implications for Australian policy.

STRATEGIC POLICY FORUM — May 2007*The use of force after Iraq*

In this web-only feature, Rod Lyon begins the discussion on how we should think about the future use of force in the aftermath of the Iraq intervention and its consequences. The other authors respond with input and ideas. The range of their contributions underlines just how diverse the issues regarding the use of force have become. Rod Lyon provides concluding remarks.

The reports are available on our website for free download or printed copies are available for purchase. The forum is online only.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

About Special Reports

Generally written by ASPI experts, Special Reports are intended to deepen understanding on critical questions facing key strategic decision-makers and, where appropriate, provide policy recommendations. In some instances, material of a more technical nature may appear in this series, where it adds to the understanding of the issue at hand. Special Reports reflect the personal views of the author(s), and do not in any way express or reflect the views of the Australian Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

ASPI

Tel +61 2 6270 5100

Fax + 61 2 6273 9566

Email enquiries@aspi.org.auWeb www.aspi.org.au

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2007

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the *Copyright Act 1968*, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.

TELL A FRIEND ABOUT ASPI

Join Australia's liveliest minds writing today on defence and strategic issues. Each year the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) will produce up to ten issues of **Strategy**, ten shorter **Strategic Insights** and a number of **Special Reports** on issues of critical importance to Australia and the Asia-Pacific.

Thoughtful, ground-breaking and often controversial, ASPI leads the public debate on defence and security issues.

JOIN ASPI

Name _____

Position _____

Company/Organisation _____

Government

Non-Government

Address _____

City _____

State _____

Postcode _____

Country _____

Telephone _____

Email _____

SELECT 3 FREE PUBLICATIONS

- Your Defence Dollar: The 2006–2007 Defence Budget
- Riding the wave: The rise of China and options for Australian policy
- A Big Deal: Australia's future air combat capability
- Alliance Unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age
- Future Unknown: The terrorist threat to Australian maritime security
- Cutting their cloth: New Zealand's defence strategy
- Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands
- Living with Giants: Finding Australia's place in a more complex world

INDIVIDUAL

1 year \$199

2 years \$378

3 years \$537

STUDENT*

1 year \$99

2 years \$188

3 years \$263

CORPORATE (Oct 06+)

1 year \$649

2 years \$1233

3 years \$1752

*(STUDENT ID _____)

To join

- 1) Subscribe online www.aspi.org.au
- 2) Mail to Level 2, Arts House, 40 Macquarie St, Barton ACT 2600, or
- 3) Phone (02) 6270 5100 or fax (02) 6273 9566

Cheque Money Order Visa MasterCard AMEX Diners

Payable to Australian Strategic Policy Institute ABN 77 097 369 045

Name on card _____

Card no. _____

Expiry Date _____ / _____

Total Amount \$ _____

Signature _____

This will be a **TAX INVOICE** for GST purposes when fully completed and payment is made. Please note specialist publications are not included.