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Alliance Unleashed:

Australia and the US in a new strategic age

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June 2005



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
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First published June 2005

Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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Lyon, Rod, 1951– .
Alliance unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age.

ISBN 1 920722 68 8.

1. Australia Treaties, etc. 1951 Sept. 1. 2. Australia—Foreign relations—United States.
3. United States—Foreign relations—Australia. 4. New Zealand—Foreign relations—United States.
5. United States—Foreign relations—New Zealand. I. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. II. Title.

327.94073

Contents

Director's introduction	1
Executive summary	3
Chapter 1:	
A debate renewed	5
Chapter 2:	
The transformation of international security	15
Chapter 3:	
Security partnerships post-September 11	25
Chapter 4:	
ANZUS and its mechanisms	33
Chapter 5:	
Recommendations for policy	39
References	43
Suggested further reading	44
About ASPI	45



Director's introduction

Australia's alliance relationship with the United States as formally expressed in the ANZUS Treaty has proven to be an enduring and central element of our national security. The treaty was signed in September 1951 and it has been invoked only once—exactly fifty years later—following the terrible attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon in September 2001. Now in its fifty-fourth year, as the alliance attains a full and stable maturity, it's time to ask what the future holds for Australia's relationship with the United States.

Few Australians are better placed than Rod Lyon to help define the future strategic path of ANZUS. For many years Dr Lyon was a senior analyst of the strategic balance at the Office of National Assessments and he now writes and teaches on international affairs with the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.

Dr Lyon presents us with a unique perspective on the alliance. Most studies about ANZUS focus on what might be called the daily traffic of alliance relations—the intelligence exchanges, military training and exercises, the practical day-to-day contacts between military forces. Here we take a broader approach by asking whether alliances have continuing value in a strategic environment vastly different to the world in which ANZUS operated for the first half century of its existence.

The events of September 11 2001, and those that followed soon after, are challenging the structure of Western alliances. How should alliances adapt to changes in the international order? Dr Lyon surveys the increasingly lively debate—one that 'haunts the mainstream of strategic analysis'—about how America should shape its foreign and defence policies and how this has impacted on Washington's allies around the world. He argues that it's wrong to conclude that alliance pressures are simply the result of Bush Administration policies. Rather

we are witnessing a lasting change in how alliances need to respond to new threats, often coming from non-state actors.

The paper explores the future of security partnerships, arguing that ‘what Washington undoubtedly wants is a set of security partnerships that are of strategic rather than merely tactical advantage in relation to the security environment of the 21st century.’ On occasions that may mean loose coalitions rather than alliances may be the preferred way to handle security threats. At other times the US may operate unilaterally—‘Of course it can; it’s the unipolar power’—but at the end of the day alliances will remain vital for the US, and also for Australia.

Alliance Unleashed ends with some challenging conclusions for Australia’s policy makers. It argues that we need to reshape ANZUS to reflect the reality that security partnerships are becoming more like full-time enterprises and less like insurance policies for a rainy day. It argues too that the alliance needs to be ‘optimised’ to handle a broader range of threats, including from non-state actors and that we will need to become more ‘risk-tolerant’ in the face of more complex military operations. Alliances should have a broader reach, beyond their immediate regions, but also have the capacity to meet domestic threats like terrorist attacks in-country. ANZUS, Dr Lyon argues, should become a proactive alliance, aimed at a new class of adversaries rather than a reactive alliance most applicable to a world of defence and deterrence.

My thanks to Rod Lyon for his thought provoking work, to Peter Jennings for his shepherding of the project and to Janice Johnson for her dogged commitment to high quality design standards.

Peter Abigail

Director, ASPI

Executive summary

The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror have reinvigorated the Australia–US security partnership. The ANZUS alliance, which languished through the 1990s, has been given new purpose and energy, and the security connection between Canberra and Washington has been broadened and strengthened. Not all Australians are reassured by this turn of events. Some believe Australia has tied itself too closely to the Bush Administration, and the Australian Government should find more overt ways of separating its own interests from those of its unipolar partner. Some even suggest placing the ANZUS Treaty into a period of ‘suspended animation’ until the excesses of the Bush Administration run their course.

But the forces for change in our bilateral security partnership don’t emanate solely, or even primarily, from the Bush Administration. Western Cold War alliances are under pressure to adapt to a transformational international security order. That order is increasingly characterised by new adversaries, against which the old, static, reactive and geographically constrained alliances offer only limited capacities. That’s why the US Government has increasingly turned to ‘coalitions of the willing’ to carry more of the load in the War on Terror. Coalitions are versatile, comparatively easy to build, and provide opportunities to reach out to new friends. Unfortunately, they require almost constant tending. Moreover, they probably lack the durability to nurture a range of capabilities that can be developed only over time, for example through sustained cooperation on military exercises and training, the networking both of information flows and of forces, and shared experience in joint operations. These latter capacities have traditionally been generated within the West’s long-lived alliances, providing good reasons for Washington to find a larger role for alliances in any protracted conflict.

So we can expect a second-term Bush Administration to show greater interest in alliances. Still, that doesn’t mean Washington wants to go back to the sorts of alliances it promoted during the decades of the Cold War. Rather, it will be pressing an agenda of change. For alliances to be effective security partnerships in the new security environment,

they will have to take on a set of characteristics different from those of the past fifty years. They will need to be proactive in their engagement against terrorist groups and expansive in their reach. They will need to possess the fine motor skills that will allow them to cope with small war-making units and not merely large ones. They must become adept at coping with transnational adversaries, and capable of countering threats within their own societies, rather than merely focusing outwards in the search for external enemies.

Such a reinvention of the bilateral security partnership has already begun. Australia is already engaged in much closer security cooperation with the US than are many other Western allies. But pressures to deepen the intimacy of security cooperation will increase rather than decrease in the years ahead, driven by deep, fundamental changes in the nature of international security in an era of globalisation and technological diffusion. We should begin thinking now about what our future security partnership might look like, how much of the new partnership we wish to place under the formal auspices of the ANZUS alliance, and how the emerging pattern of closer cooperation can best serve Australia's interests.

A DEBATE RENEWED

For over a century, the notion of partnership has been a key feature of Australia's approach to security—we've never gone to war alone. The Anzac tradition was forged within the partnership of the British Empire. And since World War II, and more particularly since the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US in 1951, we have regularly deployed and fought alongside familiar partners, often as part of even broader coalitions. In brief, security partnerships have been, and remain today, the foundation stone of Australian security policy.

For all their importance, security partnerships have attracted comparatively thin policy and academic interest within Australia in recent decades. Since the 1970s, Australian strategic thinkers have fostered a doctrine of defence self-reliance. Moves towards greater self-reliance were given initial impetus by a judgment that Britain saw its long-term future as part of Europe. They were given greater force by the Vietnam War and President Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969, urging US allies to carry more of the burden of their own defence.

In our partnership with the US, the doctrine of self-reliance has been a mixed blessing.

In our partnership with the US, the doctrine of self-reliance has been a mixed blessing. It has encouraged the development of a more balanced and well-rounded Australian Defence Force (ADF), which in some ways is a better partner for its US counterpart. But the doctrine has also frequently been held to imply greater detachment from our superpower ally, and to be a means whereby Australia might free itself from the yoke of dependency on great and powerful friends.

And in our universities, a generation of international relations students has been taught that dependency upon others is shameful; that middle powers find their true partnerships in the world only with other middle powers; and that Australia's 'national identity' is to be a regional player in Asia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War increased public uncertainties in most Western countries about the purpose and durability of the West's Cold War alliance system. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disappearance of the Soviet threat had direct ramifications for Europe, but also excited discussion about the future of the US-dominated 'hub-and-spokes' alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. With the ANZUS alliance caught in a pincer between the doctrine of defence self-reliance and the prospect of historical irrelevance, interest in it dwindled during the 1990s and became more narrowly confined to a handful of government ministers and departments. Public defence of the alliance began to stress its by-products—training, procurement, intelligence exchange and technology transfer—rather than its core purposes. The Sydney Declaration of 1996, intended by the then newly elected Coalition Government to reaffirm the importance of Australia's traditional alliance with the US, was one of the few efforts to reinvigorate the partnership at the broader level.

The events of 11 September 2001 have been a watershed for the ANZUS Treaty. Invoked for the first time in its existence, the treaty provided a framework for a pattern of cooperation between the US and Australia that is now as close as it has ever been. The security partnership has enjoyed a new lease of life in Australian strategic thinking. But the reawakening of the idea of the security partnership and the renewed vigour of the treaty have also helped to provoke a more intense debate in the Australian body politic. Alliances, by their nature, court controversy. They generate fears of both abandonment and entrapment: abandonment because allies might not be there when needed; entrapment because the price of alliance might be an abdication of the smaller partner's interests in favour of the larger partner's. Concerns about both possibilities have been fired by the condition of unipolarity, since our unipolar ally naturally has wider and grander interests than does Australia. So it should come as no surprise that the issue of the bilateral relationship between Australia and the US is once more both a prominent and a contentious one for Australian policy makers and the public.

... fractious debate about the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq suggests a disturbing loss of bipartisan support for our broader security partnership with the US.

The controversy has been especially heated since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. With a recent public opinion poll showing that Australians are as worried about US foreign policy as they are about Islamic fundamentalism (Cook 2005), the shape and texture of the security partnership between Australia and the US demands careful thought. What, if anything, has gone wrong? In one sense, perhaps less than some might think. Public support for the ANZUS alliance is still remarkably strong, and a parliamentary committee recently concluded that there was almost no demand from a series of parliamentary submissions for any major rewriting of the ANZUS Treaty. But the fractious debate about the War on Terror

and the invasion of Iraq suggests a disturbing loss of bipartisan support for our broader security partnership with the US.

The loss of bipartisanship was evident throughout most of 2003 and 2004, with the war in Iraq and the Australian federal and US presidential elections serving as focusing lenses for disagreement. While John Howard's Government was one of the strongest supporters of the US in the war in Iraq and the broader War on Terror, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was much more equivocal in its support, whether under the leadership of Simon Crean or Mark Latham. Latham was especially vehement in his attacks on the US Administration, describing President Bush as 'the most incompetent and dangerous president in living memory'. The ALP restated its own 'three pillars' policy: that Australian security should rest upon a tripod of the ANZUS alliance, Australian engagement in Asia and a more prominent global role for the United Nations. Arguments about ANZUS—or perhaps more accurately about how to handle it—were clearly one of the principal points of division between the government and the parliamentary opposition.

Over recent months, the tempo and vigour of the debate have been temporarily diluted by various factors, including the re-election of the Coalition Government in the 9 October election, the change of leadership in the ALP, and the comparative success—notwithstanding the Sunni boycott—of the January elections in Iraq. The Iraqi elections have helped to lend greater legitimacy to the initial actions undertaken by the 'coalition of the willing', and Howard's re-election seems to have produced at least a short-term diminution in the volume of protests by the government's opponents. In the medium term, however, his re-election—like George Bush's in America—may even help to spur public discussion about the future of the alliance, as opponents of current policy sense a greater urgency in their quest to distance Australia from the proactive strategic policies of our main ally.

The debate has also shifted ground with the re-election of Kim Beazley as leader of the ALP. Beazley's defence credentials are sufficiently strong to allow the ALP to reposition itself on security issues, though perhaps not strong enough to pull the party away from its three-pillars policy. Beazley's own comments, made when the government decided in early 2005 to deploy a further 450 troops to southern Iraq, suggest a willingness to support the occasional deployment of ADF elements in support of US forces on distant operations, but only to provide a token 'Australian flag' to such operations. He revisited this theme in an address to the Lowy Institute on 18 April, defending a set of regional priorities for Australian security on the grounds that our interests would be clearest and our capabilities strongest in our own region.

So the debate hasn't yet run its course. At the public level, key protagonists have included some of the most respected figures in Australian strategic academia. Owen Harries, Coral Bell and Bruce Grant, for example, can between them point to decades of experience in the analysis and assessment of international affairs.

In his 2003 Boyer Lectures, Owen Harries explored the idea that the US was becoming an imperial rather than a benign power, and (especially in the sixth lecture) urged both a clearer separation of Australian and American interests and an Australia that could say 'no' to its ally. In a January 2005 op-ed piece for the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Harries claimed the conflict in Iraq might well qualify as one of international relations 'pyrrhic defeats'—namely,

a defeat that had a large and unanticipated benefit—by driving Washington away from a course of imperial hubris and making it once again a partner more fit for Australians.

Coral Bell, an emeritus professor at the Australian National University, writing for a post-election publication by ASPI, suggested that the jury was still out in relation to the security policies of a second Bush Administration (Bell 2004). It was possible, she believed, that the ‘neo-con’ influence was faltering after the conflict in Iraq, and that the mood of messianic nationalism and military hubris that had characterised the first Bush term would wane in the second term. If that judgment proved to be incorrect, she argued, the ANZUS alliance might have to be ‘put into suspended animation for four years and revived when better counsellors return to the White House.’

Bruce Grant, rehearsing an argument he had made over thirty years earlier in *The crisis of loyalty*, again bemoaned the ‘fatal attraction’ that great power dependency seemed to have for Australia’s national identity. For Grant, the principal danger from the ANZUS alliance was the worry about entrapment. Alliance loyalty had tied Australia’s foreign policy fate to the excesses of the Bush Administration, a ‘cosmic avenger’, when Australia’s own interests were more closely tied to policies of cooperation and to the primacy of laws and rules rather than of force. Grant argued for a more open debate about the future of the alliance, and claimed that supporters of the alliance needed to make the case for a fresh mandate.

[Howard] has followed this course in the belief that American power isn’t about to fade, that American influence will continue to be formative in the international system, and that America’s economy will remain the world’s largest in coming years.

But are these criticisms, even from such venerable commentators, indicative of an alliance facing genuine difficulties? Perhaps they are merely the straws in the wind typical of most academic discussions. After all, a counter-argument can easily be made that the ANZUS alliance has probably never been in better health. Relations between Washington and Canberra are harmonious and a degree of intimacy has clearly emerged in policy discussions between the two capitals, driven by a particular confluence of circumstances and leadership personalities. The Australian Government has been a strong supporter of the US during its War on Terror, just as it has been in a string of earlier conflicts. Howard has made clear his dislike of a ‘cherry-picking approach’ to alliance obligations. And he has worked assiduously for years to strengthen Australia’s ties to its main ally, as a conscious geopolitical choice. He has followed this course in the belief that American power isn’t about to fade, that American influence will continue to be formative in the international system, and that America’s economy will remain the world’s largest in coming years.

So the alliance’s supporters have driven policy outcomes, leaving its opponents to mutter darkly about the dangers of being tied to a unipolar power apparently committed to a unilateralist agenda. The current condition is perhaps best described as ‘contested cosiness’, and the level of contestation about the ANZUS Treaty seems to rise in direct proportion to

the cosiness. Indeed, the debate over the future of the alliance—and its utility—seems likely to be determined by the prospective dimensions of bilateral security cooperation.

The broader challenge

Despite the cosiness of Australia's current bilateral security relationship with Washington, another set of worries—arising from a broader shift in the nature of Western security relationships—may prove more important for the future of the treaty than the debaters have so far acknowledged. This particular constellation of concerns arises from the fact that it's impossible for the US and Australia to think about their relationship in isolation. Washington would not be particularly reassured by the intimacy of its ANZUS alliance were its other alliance structures in disarray. And given the important structural shifts that are under way in the international security environment, it's timely to think about the ways in which broader Western security partnerships—those that were instrumental to victory in the Cold War—might be pulled in new directions during coming years.

Starting with this broad contextual problem brings a number of different issues to the fore. The question about the future of ANZUS—the question most directly relevant to Australian policy makers—can be addressed only by tackling a set of much larger uncertainties. What will be the future of the Cold War Western alliance systems? Have they entered their greying years, mirroring the ageing demographic profile of many Western countries? More broadly still, what might we expect to be the future shape and characteristics of Western security partnerships? When the question is posed in this broader setting, it's important to see that we aren't merely discussing policy choices, but a more comprehensive political and academic debate that has assumed a new intensity in recent years. Some analysts are already insisting that the era of alliances is over. Others say such a claim is premature. A third group, its hand strengthened by the rise of a different (and competitive?) species of security partnership—the coalition—points to approaching shifts in the nature of alliances. To foreshadow my own argument, let me say that I find myself most in agreement with that third group, and before this paper concludes I'd like to press some ideas about the looming changes in Western alliances, and what they might mean for the ANZUS Treaty.

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the strength and coherence of the 'West' as a strategic community has been tested. The current divisions within the Western strategic community are not of the standard Cold War type ...

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the strength and coherence of the 'West' as a strategic community has been tested. The current divisions within the Western strategic community are not of the standard Cold War type, inspired in the main by left-wing protest groups disenchanted with the principal themes of Western strategic policy. Rather, they reflect rifts in the 'mainstream' of strategic thinkers, and between national governments of Western countries. France and Germany have publicly fallen out with the US on an issue that Washington has described as vital to its interests. Timothy Garton Ash has written of a West 'in crisis' (Garton Ash 2004); David Calleo of a West 'broken' (Calleo 2004). Philip

Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro from the Brookings Institution have written a book, *Allies at war*, in which it is the allies that have been at ‘war’ with each other (Gordon and Shapiro 2003). So broad is the level of disagreement between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies that Elizabeth Pond’s work, entitled—ominously—*Friendly fire* (Pond 2003), is subtitled ‘the near-death of the transatlantic alliance’.

The divisions in the Western strategic community have been felt most profoundly in the transatlantic setting, and especially within the West’s single most important alliance, NATO. So it’s valid to ask about their relevance for Australia, and in particular for the coherence and durability of the ANZUS alliance.

It’s true that many of the specific factors that have eroded the transatlantic relationship aren’t replicated in Australia’s case. We enjoy no supranational relationship with our neighbours, as European countries do; we have no equivalent of the European Union or of the European security identity, however superficial that identity might be. Nor do we feel confirmed and enriched by being surrounded by many other affluent, stable democracies. Moreover, Australia has always felt threatened by potential large power shifts beyond our own neighbourhood, whereas European countries have traditionally felt most threatened by such shifts within their own region and have consequently toiled to construct a peaceful set of relationships among the great European powers.

Australia’s strategic interests are global, and always have been. A world in which ANZUS existed but other key Western security partnerships did not ... would pose enormous strategic challenges for Australia.

Transatlantic divisions raise important issues for other Western countries, including those—like Australia—half a world away from the tensions. One question concerns the durability of the West as a coherent strategic community. Since virtually the beginning of the Cold War, the West has formed a single strategic community. For Australia, whose foreign policy essentially dates from the end of World War II, almost the entire spectrum of independent foreign policy experience covers the period of a coherent Western strategic vision. We need to bear this constraint in mind when we now claim that the ANZUS relationship is free from broader tensions. Even during the Cold War, Australian strategists were happy to admit that other Western alliances besides ANZUS were important to Australia’s security. Indeed, some might even have admitted that greater damage could be done to our security by a foundering of NATO, or a collapse of the US–Japan alliance, than by the demise of ANZUS itself. Australia’s strategic interests are global, and always have been. A world in which ANZUS existed but other key Western security partnerships did not, or a world in which the West was divided between competing and non-complementary strategic visions, would pose enormous strategic challenges for Australia.

A second issue arises from the NATO experience. Are the troubles now coursing through NATO merely the harbinger of future tensions in other Western security partnerships? Is the real argument between France and Germany on the one hand, and the US and Britain on the other, not merely a clash over national interests, but a deeper difference over what the

security environment now looks like, and what role alliances should have in managing that environment and countering new adversaries? If this is the case, then Australians, who have an intense interest in the future of security partnerships, would also have a strong interest in assessing what has gone wrong with existing structures, and in thinking about how those partnerships might need to change in the years ahead.

Since 1951, we've been accustomed to our security partnership with the US taking a certain form. It has been embodied in the ANZUS alliance, formalised as a security guarantee of the kind typical of its era. Under the treaty's most important clause, Article 4, the parties agree to 'act to meet the common danger' in the event of an armed attack upon one of them in the Pacific area. But does that reactive sort of arrangement suit our current and emerging needs? What's the role of a security partnership in the current international security environment? What should we expect the partnership to look like, what do we want it to do, and how might we work to improve the design of the structures that carry the weight of the partnership's traffic?

In short, we should be thinking about—and preparing ourselves for—a 'reinvented' relationship.

George's fault?

So far, sound thinking about the changing shape of Western security partnerships has been deflected by a more readily available explanation for the fracturing of existing alliance systems. For those fixated on the Bush Administration and its key personalities, the difficulties currently haunting the Western alliance system derive—essentially—from a more immediate cause: a series of missteps in US security policy. Those missteps are usually laid at the feet of the 'neo-cons'. Neo-conservatism, insists Pierre Hassner (2002), can be understood as 'Wilsonianism in boots', which is a shorthand way of saying that the neo-cons believe in both the moral purity of the American cause and the efficacy of military force. John Ikenberry (2004) has described in colourful terms the particular world view that supposedly animated the neo-con vision after 11 September 2001:

Driven by fear of terrorism, contempt for perceived European pacifism, and a willingness to take big risks, and emboldened by the rise of American unipolar power, those 'new fundamentalist' thinkers argue for an era of American global rule organised around the bold unilateral exercise of American military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism and an aggressive push to bring freedom and democracy to countries where evil lurks.

For Ikenberry, a thinker whose own work has repeatedly stressed the importance of the transatlantic bargains and the institutions arising from them, the neo-conservative agenda was a 'geostrategic wrecking-ball' that destroyed the international architecture put in place by previous administrations across a span of fifty years.

For the Australian Government's main critics, too, the primary difficulties in the current alliance relationship can be laid at the feet of policy makers in Washington. The policy choices of the Bush Administration—including its 'war' on terror, its willingness to use pre-emptive force when necessary, and its proactive strategic engagement against its adversaries—are usually depicted as the key complicating factor in alliance politics. These policy choices are seen as having exerted a compelling gravitational pull on close US allies, drawing them into orbits where alliances and national interests don't readily intersect.

For the Australian Government's main critics, too, the primary difficulties in the current alliance relationship can be laid at the feet of policy makers in Washington.

It's almost certainly true that a particular approach to foreign policy, which Walter Russell Mead in his work *Power, terror, peace and war* characterises as American Revivalism, plays some part in the current alliance difficulties. As Mead notes, the Revivalists aren't really Wilsonian, for in place of the Wilsonians' joint emphasis on moral values and international institutions the Revivalists have put values on steroids and thrown institutions out the window. But the more relevant question is about how large a part Revivalism has played in setting the current alliances on edge, and the answer to that question is usually coloured heavily by the particular theories of interpretation that individual analysts bring to their assessments.

Central to the argument that US policy choices have been the main generator of alliance disarray is a judgment about the Bush Administration's foreign policy: that the policy has been marred by a mixture of inexperience (on the President's part) and malfeasance (on the part of the neo-cons in his administration). The war in Iraq has provided considerable grist to the mill of those who wish to argue that view. Because the Bush Administration is seen as the key problem for the alliance, the principal means of addressing the problem are the policy recommendations that Bell, Harries and Grant outline above: 'waiting out' the second term of a Bush Administration, increasing the distance between Australian and American security policy, and becoming an ally who can just say 'no'.

This line of analysis is ruthlessly monistic in its focus. Its explanatory force is directly proportional to the degree to which the Bush Administration represents a radical departure from the mean of US foreign and security policy. But as Walter Russell Mead and John Lewis Gaddis have argued, the presidency of George W Bush hasn't been anomalous either in terms of the predominant foreign policy 'currents' across American history or in how it has reacted to the strategic test imposed by surprise attack. Indeed, in his recent work *Surprise, security and the American experience* Gaddis argues plausibly that the opposite has been the case: George Bush has been entirely 'normal' in his reaction, even though that normality has been defined by the bluntness of the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (see the box on the next page).

Further, the belief that 'it's all George's fault' produces policy counsel—'wait it out', 'just say no'—depressingly limited in its scope. There's no sense of active Australian engagement with the world's new difficulties, but rather a blinkered yearning for the pre-September 11 world. Putting the ANZUS alliance into suspended animation for four years presupposes that the next US Administration will behave differently, and that the strategic policies of the current one are reversible. Even if the policies are reversible, the 'suspended animation' option might not be a wise one. New Zealand has been on the alliance's 'suspended animation' list since 1986, as a direct consequence of the Lange Government's anti-nuclear policy. If Australia were also to opt for such a course, it's entirely possible that ANZUS would not survive. Washington might simply judge that both its smaller ANZUS partners had now

entered the category of ‘friends’ rather than ‘allies’. Besides, the wait-and-dissent policy counsel blinds us to a much more substantial question: what do we want our security partnership with Washington to look like in the future, and what can we do to make it into that more satisfying instrument?

... the thesis that ‘it’s all George’s fault’ fails to take into account the profound transformation of international security since the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, the thesis that ‘it’s all George’s fault’ fails to take into account the profound transformation of international security since the end of the Cold War. It has, for example, nothing to say about the work of Philip Zelikow, Robert Cooper, or other analysts who have struggled to enhance our understanding of the multiple challenges of the new security environment (see box pp. 14–15). It has nothing to say about the return of ‘raiding’ as an important form of warfare. And most importantly of all, the thesis has nothing to say about the ability of alliances to transform themselves to address new and emerging security threats. Instead, it treats alliances as static mechanisms that are unable to adapt.

Without a fuller consideration of these issues, the debate over the future of our security partnership with the US will be constricted and false. It will contain no creative thinking about how the ANZUS alliance might adapt to address more fully the emerging security problems of a new era. It will remain stale and repetitive, reminiscent of arguments about alliance dependency in the 1970s and 1980s.

The National Security Strategy of the United States

The *National Security Strategy of the United States*, released in October 2002, outlines the Bush Administration’s official security policy. While its predecessors had often tended towards the lofty and rhetorical, the 2002 document reflects the hard-headed US strategic thinking that emerged in the wake of the September 11 attacks the previous year. The document makes clear that US security is most threatened by ‘shadowy networks of individuals’ and the tyrants who harbour and support them. The diffusion of technology to such groups, and the strategic reach that globalisation has conferred upon them, makes those adversaries especially dangerous. Publicly, the document is best known for its presentation of the doctrine of pre-emptive action against undeterrable threats, and its assertion of the right of the US to undertake unilateral action when its vital interests are threatened. But the document itself features a much more wide-ranging set of themes, including the need to build good relations among the world’s great powers and the need to encourage the growth of free and open societies at the global level. Some of its major themes—the desire to extend democracy and human rights in the world—would not have seemed out of place even in a Clinton-era document.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Because security partnerships are attempts to identify and build upon areas of congruence in security need, they're most stable when sited atop common world views, interests and values. Unfortunately, common world views have been in dangerously short supply since September 11. Robert Kagan's well-known aphorism—that Americans are from Mars but Europeans are from Venus—implies that American strategic thinkers are of one mind and European strategic thinkers of another, but Kagan's idea is simply not true. The US is perfectly well aware that it is 'feeling its way' in a new and dangerous form of strategic competition with an adversary about which it knows a lot less than it wishes to. In that context, good strategic thinkers in the US disagree with each other. The same is true in Europe and in Australia: good strategic thinkers disagree about the shape of the emerging security environment and the appropriate policy framework within which to address it.

... that strategists are currently claiming both continuity and change, and a future that is both better and worse. The debate spans the spectrum of opinion. It haunts the mainstream of strategic analysis.

The intensity of the disagreement—and its swirling, inchoate character—can be seen by separating out the different schools of thought within it. At least one school alleges that nothing much

Photo opposite: General strike and demonstration called by 15 Muslim coalition groups in protest at Colin Powell's visit, the Pakistani government and bombings against the Afghans.
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changed on 11 September 2001. At the academic level, this group can perhaps be represented by John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. For such analysts, the international environment is still anarchic, and the key strategic worry is the possibility of great-power conflict. For a second school, the likely future strategic landscape has more in common with a medieval model, in which armed force is much less the preserve of states. Here the principal authors include Martin van Creveld and Kalevi Holsti, and the key strategic worry isn't strong states but weak ones, in which non-state war-making units can thrive. A third school consists of a group of strategic optimists, such as Francis Fukuyama, John Mueller and Michael Mandelbaum. The optimists point either to the end of ideological contest or to the possible obsolescence of war itself. And a fourth school consists of the strategic pessimists, such as Samuel Huntington, Robert Kaplan and Michael Klare. This diverse group anticipates a future of intense conflict, whether because of coming clashes between 'civilisations', a looming anarchy, or a struggle for resources in a world of scarcity.

In essence, these four schools represent a theme of continuity, a possible return to medievalism, a brighter future and a darker one. This division is certainly not the only way to think about the current debate between security thinkers, but it demonstrates an important point: that strategists are currently claiming both continuity and change, and a future that is both better and worse. The debate spans the spectrum of opinion. It haunts the mainstream of strategic analysis.

Perhaps no other single factor so bedevils the long-term future of the existing Western alliances, or so corrodes strategic cooperation, than profound disagreement over the nature of the international security environment. What is important is to see that the current international security environment is more heterogeneous than it was during the Cold War, when the major players were nation-states and the dominant strategic doctrine was deterrence of major-power conflict. Then, the principal strategic threats were 'symmetrical': superpower versus superpower, bloc versus bloc, and bloated nuclear arsenal versus bloated nuclear arsenal.

The idea that strategic contests would remain symmetrical was an incidental casualty of the end of the Cold War. Academics began to speculate about the 'end' of major-power war, but a new form of warfare was on the rise in its place. For example, Kalevi Holsti, one of the doyens of international relations, argued that over recent decades we had witnessed the emergence of a 'third kind' of warfare, unlike the institutional and total wars that had previously typified the Westphalian vision of warfare. Such wars of the third kind, he claimed, were typified by long duration, weak adversaries and the central role of civilians as both combatants and victims. They were marked, too, by critical absences: of declarations of war, front lines, uniforms, decisive battles and peace treaties.

For most of the 1990s, Western strategic thinkers believed such wars were safely distant from Western homelands, and that geographically distinct zones of peace and zones of war had emerged. Most analysts believed that the major security question confronting Western policy makers was the issue of intervention. When, why and how should the West's advanced and well-trained militaries be put in harm's way by intervening in protracted and bloody localised conflicts? The events of 11 September 2001 transformed that agenda: they showed that weak but ambitious actors could not be confined to weak states. Rather, such actors could pose important international security threats, including to the metropolitan territories of strong states.

Views on the future of international security

Today's battle lines are less international and more transnational ... In the past, the geography of national security was defined by foreign frontiers. Dangerous enemies had to possess mass and scale as they first accumulated armies, navies or air forces and then deployed them. Today the frontiers of national security can be everywhere ... Threats can emerge more quickly ... Nor do the greatest threats necessarily come from large states that have much to lose ... The line between internal and international security becomes blurry ...

Philip Zelikow, 2003. 'The transformation of national security', *National Interest*, Spring issue

Both the spread of terrorism and that of weapons of mass destruction point to a world where Western governments are losing control. The spread of the technology of mass destruction represents a potentially massive redistribution of power away from the advanced industrial (and democratic) states towards smaller states that ... have less of a stake in world order; or, more dramatically still, away from the state itself and towards individuals, that is to say terrorists and criminals.

Robert Cooper, 2003. *The breaking of nations*

As the second millennium A.D. is coming to an end, the state's attempt to monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering ... Over the long run, the place of the state will be taken by warring organizations of a different type ... Armed conflict will be waged by men on earth, not robots in space. It will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large-scale conventional warfare.

Martin van Creveld, 1991. *The transformation of war*

We are moving towards the demassification of destruction in parallel with the demassification of production.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, 1993. *War and anti-war*

Hopes for peace will probably not be realised, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result ... Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others.

John Mearsheimer, 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*

The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War, but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations ... The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes ... or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities ... Power is shifting from the long predominant West to non-Western civilizations.

Samuel Huntington, 1996. *The clash of civilizations*

Views on the future of international security *continued*

We remain at the end of history because there is only one system that will continue to dominate world politics, that of the liberal-democratic West. This does not imply a world free from conflict, nor the disappearance of culture. But the struggle we face is not the clash of several distinct and equal cultures fighting amongst one another like the great powers of 19th century Europe. The clash consists of a series of rearguard actions from societies whose traditional existence is indeed threatened by modernization. The strength of the backlash reflects the severity of the threat. But time is on the side of modernity.

Francis Fukuyama, 2001. 'The West has won', *The Guardian*, 11 October

Certain ... classic varieties of war—particularly major war, or wars among developed countries—have become so rare ... they could well be considered obsolescent, if not obsolete. Also in notable decline, it appears, are international war more generally, conventional civil war, colonial war, and ideological civil war ... Two kinds of war remain. By far the most common is unconventional civil war, most of which take place in the poorest countries of the world ... The other ... includes what might be called 'policing wars' ... by developed countries to bring order to the civil conflicts ...

John Mueller, 2004. *The remnants of war*

The intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka—to say nothing of what obtains in American inner-cities—indicates something very troubling ... It is this: a large number of people on this planet ... find war and barracks existence a step up rather than a step down ... In the map of the future ... instead of borders, there would be moving 'centers' of power ... Henceforth the map of the world will never be static. This future map—in a sense the 'Last Map'—will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.

Robert Kaplan, 2000. *The coming anarchy*

Resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment ... The distinctive features of this new strategic geography look very different from those of the Cold War ... Regions that once occupied centre stage, such as the east–west divide in Europe, will lose all strategic significance ... A wide band of territory straddling the equator ... encompass(es) the world's principal sources of petroleum, many important supplies of minerals, all of its tropical timber, and several of its most important river systems ... While conflict may occur ... outside this zone, the heaviest fighting is likely to occur within its broad reaches.

Michael Klare, 2001. *Resource wars*

As Westerners have become more competent at mastering the complexity of modern battlefields, so too have adversaries become more reluctant to engage them there.

This is bad news for Westerners accustomed to winning wars by fighting decisive battles on traditional battlefields. As Westerners have become more competent at mastering the complexity of modern battlefields, so too have adversaries become more reluctant to engage them there. In fact, the phenomenon of the ‘emptying battlefield’ has paralleled the emergence of the Revolution in Military Affairs among Western militaries. Instead of decisive battles, we’ve witnessed the flourishing of asymmetrical war, in which weak actors happily trade time and space for elusiveness and the empowerment of globalisation. Weak actors don’t seek decisive battles; indeed, usually they don’t seek to engage the military forces of advanced Western states at all. Terrorists are typical of such weak actors, and they don’t fight a ‘war’ in the way that we’ve come to understand that term over the past few centuries.

The return of the raiders

But terrorism itself isn’t a new form of warfare. It is, in fact, an old typology from the anthropology of war. Stripped of a couple of particular characteristics, it’s nothing but a form of ‘raiding’. The Huns raided against the Roman Empire, and the Zulus and their impi raided against the British Army. Raiders don’t conquer, they don’t seize and hold territory, and much of their violence is ritualised. Westerners aren’t familiar with raiding; indeed, given Western technological prowess, we’ve never been inclined to see raiders as posing much of a threat. So why should we worry about raiders now, when we never have in the past?

Three good reasons exist for doing so. The first is globalisation: in previous times, raiders never enjoyed strategic reach. As Anna Simons observes (Simons 2003), even the strongest and boldest warrior among Africa’s raiding war-fighters couldn’t hope to fight his way to London to attack the British Empire at its core. Even if he’d managed to do so, he would have lacked the political knowledge about where to land a blow in order to maximise its effect. Such warriors didn’t know the vulnerabilities of the Empire well enough, or how to attack them. Now, raiders using the tools of globalisation have been able to bring warfare back to Western homelands, from which it has been remote since World War II. They know better where to land the blow, and how to exploit the interconnectedness of the modern world in order to be able to do so at long range. So a Saudi dissident, living in Afghanistan and leading a multinational cohort, some of whom trained in Hamburg and others at a Miami flight school, can bring destruction to the World Trade Center in New York.

The second reason for worrying more about today’s raiders has to do with what Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993) call ‘demassification’. Among all Napoleon’s contributions to warfare, the greatest was that he brought ‘mass’ to the battlefield. Martin van Creveld (1991) tells us that Napoleon was merely continuing—if in dramatic fashion—a process of coagulating power that reaches back for centuries and had its historical zenith in World War II. In more

recent decades, we've seen the demassification of the war-making unit. Today, much smaller groups can constitute such a unit, waging violence for political gain—war, to use Clausewitz's classical definition. Some theorists even claim that we've reached an era when 'mass' itself may be a distinct disadvantage in war. (Samuel Huntington is probably the only strategic theorist who argues that war-making units are still coagulating—as war moves up the ladder from states to civilisations.)

The third reason we should worry more about the return of the raider has to do with the dispersal of technology and knowledge. In their earlier historical guises, raiders fought principally with spears and swords, and only occasionally with muskets and rifles. Terrorists have for some decades mastered the car bomb and the aircraft hijacking. Some might argue that September 11 was merely a more imaginative way of bringing basic raw explosive power to a target by rolling those two skills together, but today's raiders are showing greater technological capacity in their own right. Down that path lie more sophisticated weapons and—at some point—some variant of weapons of mass destruction.

... globalised raiders armed with WMD could make life more than a little unpleasant—so unpleasant that it might be worth bearing almost any cost to prevent such a raid.

Each of these three factors—globalisation, demassification and technological proliferation—empowers the raider, and strengthens the claim that future trends in the evolution of warfare might not necessarily follow the Western models that have dominated and defined warfare in recent centuries. The return of raiding to the international security environment is therefore an important issue and not a trivial one. Even though they don't seek to conquer or seek global hegemony, globalised raiders armed with WMD could make life more than a little unpleasant—so unpleasant that it might be worth bearing almost any cost to prevent such a raid.

The 'old' geopolitics

But the 'continuity' school also has much to tell us about the future strategic environment. The growing importance of weak actors in the global security environment doesn't mean the old geopolitics—the politics of material power and geographic location—have gone away. The relationships between great powers are still a primary determinant of global security, and those relationships are currently relatively harmonious. Potential strategic contests between the world's major powers are also held in check by US hyperpower, and probably will be for some decades. However, neither great-power harmony nor unipolarity seems likely to last indefinitely.

Moreover, the Asia-Pacific security environment faces particular challenges from a shifting great-power balance. The past twenty years have been turbulent at the great-power level. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union and Japan were both strong players at the regional table. Growth of the Soviet Pacific fleet pointed to a larger role for Moscow in regional security calculations, and Japan was tipped as the great power most likely to overtake the US. By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union had collapsed. Russia, its successor state, is now

only a marginal player in the Asia–Pacific. For Japan, the 1990s were a prolonged period of economic stagnation. As the stars of both powers waned, that of China waxed. Much changed in a comparatively short time, and this should give us pause when we think about a future security environment primarily in terms of the threats posed by weak actors. If the next twenty years resemble the past twenty in the Asia–Pacific power balance, large changes in the relationships between the region’s great powers are not only possible, but likely.

It’s also true that unipolarity is not an unalloyed benefit. US power provokes its own wave of resentment and gives other actors, including other large powers, reason to offset it where they might. The wave is tempered by Washington’s determination to be a hegemon supporting liberal values and free markets. The Pew Research Center’s global opinion survey, *What the World Thinks 2002*, suggested that the bulk of the world’s peoples weren’t keen to see the rise of a second great power, challenging the position of the US. Still, a challenger might well emerge whether we wish it or not, so we can’t be indifferent to the mechanisms that have helped us deal with great-power threats in the past.

... the government is signalling that it knows it has entered a new strategic era—an era in which many of the dominant strategic instruments of the Cold War, indeed, perhaps even of warfare since the age of Napoleon, will have only limited utility.

Setting priorities

Given that resources are finite, how do we prioritise the current security threats? There are clear signs that the Australian Government acknowledges the importance of weak-actor threats. Prime Minister John Howard’s speech to ASPI on 18 June 2004 set out competently and concisely the threatening nature of the new security environment. Pointing to Joseph Nye’s description of the current environment as ‘the privatisation of war’, Howard claimed that ‘for the foreseeable future, the major threats to Australia are more likely to come from terrorists and international criminals than from conventional military attack.’ Indeed, Howard quoted approvingly from Philip Bobbitt’s work, *The shield of Achilles* (Bobbitt 2002), suggesting that ‘the changes in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as anything that the state has yet undergone’. So the government is signalling that it knows it has entered a new strategic era—an era in which many of the dominant strategic instruments of the Cold War, indeed, perhaps even of warfare since the age of Napoleon, will have only limited utility.

The events of September 11 seem to have been important in helping to reforge consensus—at least at the intergovernmental level—within the US–Australia security partnership by providing opportunities to redefine both congruent interests and joint strategic approaches. In this sense, the rise of asymmetrical war might well form a key threshold for the future of Australian–American security cooperation, in that the relationship over the next fifty years will be as centrally configured around the asymmetrical threat as it was around

symmetrical great-power threats during the past fifty. This is because the asymmetrical threat looks likely to become a more important structural driver in the future security environment, regardless of the course of great-power relationships.

In this new strategic era, adversaries and threats will not be typical of those we faced during the Cold War, when the great powers were comparatively risk averse and threats were geographically fixed. The classic model was the threat from the Soviet Union itself: a threat of great-power conflict, of hegemony, of conquest, of a reconfiguration of the world's power balance. The response to that threat was relatively straightforward: Western alliances sought to contain Soviet expansionism, to deter Soviet aggression, to balance Soviet power and to limit potentially open-ended contests through the mechanism of arms control. The new transnational threats, such as terrorism, don't fit this model. Our new adversaries aren't geographically constrained, are dynamic rather than static, are highly tolerant of risk, and aren't containable by policies of containment. Deterrence is of limited use, since it isn't possible to deter an actor who values an opponent's destruction more highly than his own life. Arms control is only a second-order benefit: it's still useful because it might help limit the availability of certain weapons and technologies to groups that are parasitical upon the efforts of others, but it isn't a mechanism with which to engage demassified actors directly.

In this brief examination of the current international security environment, it's important to see a world of dynamic change, and not merely the arrival at the White House of a particular president or a specific set of advisers. What policy recommendations flow from this analysis? First, putting ANZUS into suspended animation would do absolutely nothing to enhance Australia's security. Rather, it might damage it in serious and irreparable ways. It would have no effect on the deeper historical shifts that are transforming the world and changing the nature of international security, adversaries and security relationships all at the same time. Similarly, if Australia were to become an ally that said 'no' to Washington more frequently, the benefits—or more precisely the lack of them—would be essentially the same. Our future security partnership with the US needs to address a new security environment characterised by technological diffusion and the rise of smaller war-making units able to exploit global networks. It also needs to address a broader set of security challenges, and to think through the logic of interdependency that is needed if we are to offset new adversaries.

Every Western alliance constructed during the heady days of the Cold War was built to manage a different strategic problem. Then, the key strategic worry was great power, not weak power.

When Lord Robertson, the former secretary-general of NATO, wrote recently in the *Harvard International Review*, he sketched a future security environment characterised by instability, spill-over, terrorism, proliferation and failed states (Robertson 2004). Do we have the tools to manage those problems? How will our existing security partnerships help us? Every Western alliance constructed during the heady days of the Cold War was built to manage a different strategic problem. Then, the key strategic worry was great power, not weak

power. That focus was entirely realistic; indeed, it was the direct result of two devastating world wars fought in a period of about thirty years, and it mirrored the patterns of major conflict over recent centuries, when strategic symmetry was the order of the day. The events of September 11 advertise the relative demise of that strategic world. True, it hasn't disappeared completely. But we've reached a point where we have to think more carefully in order to separate the war maker from the criminal, and harder in order to see the relative utility of different instruments of security.



SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS POST-SEPTEMBER 11

What are the effects of the shifting international security environment? They're obviously many and varied, but I believe that we should be focusing more intensely on the nature and design of our existing security partnerships and arrangements. In one sense, of course, we already have been. The prominence accorded to 'coalitions of the willing' as—apparently—the primary vehicles of US security policy in the post-September 11 world has pushed Western governments to reconsider the long-term future of their traditional Cold War alliance structures. Are alliances as a species of security partnership coming to an end? Alternatively and more specifically, but almost as disturbingly, are the West's Cold War alliances simply dying of old age? If the answer to either of these questions is 'yes', the implications for Australian security policy are large.

... considerable uncertainties existed in Washington about the importance of its traditional Western security partnerships in responding to the new century's security threats.

What problems did the Bush Administration have with its legacy alliance structures in September 2001? One problem, certainly, was that it viewed the alliances as static, reactive and geographically

Photo opposite: Great Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, Spain's Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and US President George W Bush speak to the press during a press conference after the Azores Summit. The leaders declared that Monday March 17, 2003 would be the last day of international diplomatic negotiations on Iraq. © APL/Brooks Kraft

constrained—scarcely the qualities it thought necessary in security partnerships intended to counter a dynamic, agile opponent with global reach. Alliances were also seen as awkward and contentious, a judgment reinforced by the practical difficulties the American military had encountered in conducting the air war in Kosovo in 1999, when every target had to be agreed by the then nineteen-member NATO alliance. This ‘war by committee’ approach was seen as particularly unsuitable to threats involving US vital interests. Further, all too often Washington saw its allies’ defence forces as inadequate, a direct result of stunted and underfunded defence modernisation programs since the end of the Cold War.

So considerable uncertainties existed in Washington about the importance of its traditional Western security partnerships in responding to the new century’s security threats. But two other judgments reinforced the Bush Administration’s negative views of traditional allies. First, its rejection of Clinton’s counter-terrorism policies as too defensive coloured its views about other defensively oriented arrangements. It reinforced a belief that a defensive set of alliances wouldn’t be much use in a struggle that could not be won defensively. Such mechanisms ceded the initiative to the terrorists, leaving the US to play catch-up.

Second, American policy makers judged the Western alliances to be too narrow to cope with the emerging security challenges that September 11 represented. While this might seem a strange concern for an administration frequently accused of unilateralism, it’s certainly true that Washington’s Cold War alliances were narrow in a way that made them inappropriate as mechanisms for an effective War on Terror. Reliance on the alliances as the primary vehicle of response to September 11 would send the wrong political message: it would risk signalling that the key struggle in the war was between radical Islam and the West, when the struggle was much broader than that. So for a variety of reasons, in the post-September 11 environment Washington was always likely to ask which potential security partnerships would give it greatest leverage in the War on Terror.

The appeal of the coalition lay in its simplicity, which was thought to offer both an escape from the hard work of intra-alliance negotiations and an opportunity to work with the willing and to jettison recalcitrants among existing alliance partners.

Coalitions of the willing

Washington’s exploration of alternatives to the existing alliances was encouraged by the relative success of the various coalitional arrangements it had used during the 1990s. American policy makers didn’t invent the idea of ‘coalitions of the willing’ in the aftermath of September 11. They already knew well how such coalitions were constructed and maintained. They saw coalitions as versatile instruments, which could be built quickly and adapted to circumstance. Thus, they had been tools of choice in the 1991 Gulf War and Kosovo, and were soon to become so again in Afghanistan and Iraq. In each case, coalition mechanisms allowed for broad participation, and their structures could be individually designed according to the range of missions required. Coalitions could be either

multilateral or bilateral as the need arose, and their focus might be military cooperation, law enforcement, financial interdiction or political support. Further, the idea of a coalition was broad enough to allow for a coalition of coalitions, and the diverse forms of cooperation necessary in the current War on Terror offered an opportunity to show such a mechanism working at its optimal capacity.

The appeal of the coalition lay in its simplicity, which was thought to offer both an escape from the hard work of intra-alliance negotiations and an opportunity to work with the willing and to jettison recalcitrants among existing alliance partners. Just as importantly, the coalition structure allowed Washington to reach out to two categories of new ‘friends’. The first category comprised Russia, China, and India—the first two the great powers of the former Communist world, and the third the rising great power on the subcontinent. Each might now be brought into a closer pattern of cooperation with the US against a common adversary. Each had problems of its own with terrorist movements, and two were among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In China’s case, the link was seen in Washington as crucially important in diluting a potentially adversarial relationship in relation to Asia–Pacific flashpoints.

The second category of new friends comprised the moderate Islamic states, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey. Of these, only Turkey fell within the ranks of an already established Western alliance, but each would have an important role to play in partnering a ‘war’ against radical Islamic elements. These partners would be bound to the conflict in a way that smaller Western allies might not: by judgments about the severity of the radical challenge to their own positions.

So a variety of pressures were pushing the US away from its Cold War alliances and towards ‘coalitions of the willing’ in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. True, the enthusiasm for coalitions wasn’t shared universally across the US political spectrum. During the 2004 US presidential campaign, John Kerry frequently touted the traditional virtues of alliances and criticised the Bush Administration’s impatience, which he claimed had cost the nation the support of its allies in relation to Iraq. In March 2003 Kerry had described the ‘coalition of the willing’ participating in the invasion of Iraq, as a ‘coalition of the bribed, the coerced, the bought and the extorted.’ (Beaumont 2003) Those words echoed across the 2004 campaign. Kerry’s supporters in various think-tanks and academic positions advanced similar arguments. Ashton Carter, for example, used an article in *Foreign Affairs* to argue that short-term coalitions didn’t serve US interests as well as did stable partnerships, and insisted that the US ‘should regard coalitions of the willing as a desperate fallback, not a preferred vehicle for US leadership’. Kurt Campbell, another of Kerry’s close advisers, wrote an article for *The Washington Quarterly* entitled ‘The end of alliances? Not so fast’.

It’s true that coalitions have their own limitations. They differ from alliances in some important ways: they don’t have fixed memberships, they don’t contain formal security guarantees, and they aren’t intended to be durable instruments. Because they are different from alliances, they contain little in the way of agreements for joint training and exercising, procurement of common equipment, or procedures for optimising interoperability. This is an important limitation, because some capacities can be developed only over time. And the more hostile the security environment, the more central will be the sorts of capabilities that only time can create. Washington might well hope—for a time, at least—to offset that factor using its own impressive military strength and its ability to co-opt a small number of key allies when necessary. The coalitions that it has put together since the 1991 Gulf War

have always had at their core a set of competent alliance partners tackling the hardest of the military tasks. So even the Bush Administration, which sees the War on Terror as likely to last for fifty years or more, is probably reluctant to rely too heavily on a form of strategic partnership that is quick to build but relatively constrained in its capabilities.

... in practice the challenge of sustaining ‘coalitions of the willing’ has proved difficult for Washington. Some willing members of the coalition, such as Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, were voted from office by their electorates.

Moreover, in practice the challenge of sustaining ‘coalitions of the willing’ has proved difficult for Washington. Some willing members of the coalition, such as Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, were voted from office by their electorates. Other members, such as the Philippines, decided that caution was the better part of valour during some dangerous months in Iraq. Each time a coalition member withdraws, another must be found to pick up the abandoned tasks, imposing continual stresses on the coalitional structure. Australians are only too familiar with these problems, having witnessed the dispatch of approximately 450 ADF personnel to southern Iraq in April this year, to replace a Dutch force rotating out. Maintaining the coalition ‘cart’ frequently requires replacing one of its wheels while it is moving. Weariness with the interminable juggling required by coalitions of the willing has also become apparent in Washington’s thinking about the sort of security partnerships it wishes to use during a protracted and difficult conflict.

A return to alliances?

Since his 2004 re-election, George Bush has already made a visit to his European allies, and some have suggested that a re-warming of ties with NATO and a healing of the intra-alliance breach is in prospect. Critics of Bush’s policies during his first term see in his February 2005 trip a sign that Washington now knows that it has bitten off more than it can chew in Iraq, that unilateralism can’t work, and that the idea of pre-emption enshrined in the National Security Strategy isn’t as well thought through as it initially believed. But this view of Bush’s trip—and thinking—is flawed. The administration does not think that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. Nor did it ever think that unilateralism could work, except perhaps on the battlefield, where American military dominance over the Iraqi war machine was so pronounced. Nor does it believe now that the central precepts of the National Security Strategy are wrong. If George Bush had truly concluded that his first-term policies were wrong, then—at a minimum—a sweeping set of personnel changes should have been seen at the beginning of his second administration. No such sweeping change occurred.

Rather, US thinking has become clearer about the nature of security partnerships in the War on Terror. Washington takes as axiomatic that such partnerships are a necessary part of the war. Indeed, it believes that the War on Terror can be won only through a strategy based on security partnerships. Unilateralism can’t succeed against a transnational enemy that’s already embedded in something like sixty countries. This is not to say that the US can’t act unilaterally sometimes, and wear the cost of doing so. Of course it can—it’s the unipolar

power. Nor does this judgment say anything about the style of leadership that Washington ought to adopt towards its partners, although it's clear that some partners would prefer a more consultative approach and less US trailblazing. But it does say that—in the long run—the way that the War on Terror is fought is critical to the outcome, and Washington knows that to be the case.

This is not to say that the US can't act unilaterally sometimes, and wear the cost of doing so. Of course it can—it's the unipolar power.

Washington has also concluded that security partnerships in the War on Terror will look different from those that characterised the Cold War era. Those who expect that a second Bush Administration will return to the traditional alliances as the influence of the neo-cons declines underestimate the transformative effects that the new security environment will have on alliances. It would be wrong to assume that relationships will slip back into the old comfort zone and that life will 'return to normal'. That's too backward-looking. Western alliances are under pressure to redefine their shape, their purpose and their orientation, and need to be redesigned. But American policy makers also believe that, even in the event that such alliance transformation occurs, coalitions of the willing won't soon fade from the scene. The War on Terror can't be won unilaterally, but neither can it be won solely by greater Western coherence. So coalitions will remain important instruments to engage new friends even after Western security relationships have been reconfigured.

So what does the transformative path for Western alliances look like? Indeed, does such a path even exist? Some analysts state bluntly that alliances can't be transformed along the lines that Washington might wish to reconstruct them. They claim that alliances, with their pre-emptive, proactive agendas, end up looking like the secret appendix to the Molotov–Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939, whereby Hitler and Stalin agreed to invade Poland and share the spoils. Such agreements reek of aggression and expansionism. But that argument isn't entirely persuasive: although proactive alliances don't work well in a security environment characterised by great-power war and strong-state actors, Colin Powell (2004) has already made clear that the doctrine of pre-emption was never intended to apply to the normal level of state-to-state engagement.

What Washington undoubtedly wants is a set of security partnerships that are of strategic rather than merely tactical advantage in the security environment of the 21st century.

What Washington undoubtedly wants is a set of security partnerships that are of strategic rather than merely tactical advantage in the security environment of the 21st century. This means it wants those partnerships to be more than mere tool-boxes—collections of capabilities from which it might select an appropriate instrument in times of need. Rather,

it wants its security partnerships to be mechanisms for bringing to bear against modern adversaries the full range of the instruments of power available to developed states. In this sense, it's looking to develop a set of relationships that actively advance a range of shared objectives and interests. These partnerships would continue to provide their members with the classic political and material advantages common to such elective enterprises. Politically, they would shore up support at both the domestic and international levels, while simultaneously helping to isolate the adversary and legitimise coercive action of various types. Materially, they would provide access to facilities, rights of overflight, intelligence and logistical support, financial assistance, and an ability to deploy multinational armed forces capable of working towards a common objective.

... we have every reason to be confident that alliances will have a future in the War on Terror; but we have very little reason to be confident that those alliances will look much like those of yesteryear.

It is not, *prima facie*, an absurd claim that in any particular security environment some objectives and interests might be better advanced by formal, long-term security partnerships (alliances) than by informal, short-term partnerships (coalitions). What is important in choosing the appropriate mechanism is its particular utility in a given instance. For some Islamic countries, for example, formal long-term security ties to the West are politically difficult. But even for relationships between Western countries, we shouldn't take for granted that the formal long-term ties most appropriate to the changing security environment will necessarily be those that have served us since the start of the Cold War. In short, we have every reason to be confident that alliances will have a future in the War on Terror; but we have very little reason to be confident that those alliances will look much like those of yesteryear. So it's probably worth investing the effort necessary to understand better what a 'security partnership' might look like in the War on Terror. This involves us in issues of design, and design, Herbert Simon (1996) tells us, 'is concerned with how things ought to be, with devising artifacts to attain goals.'

Security partnerships resemble classic artificial systems, and like all such systems they need both sensory channels and motor skills—the first to tell them what the world is like and the second to allow them to act on the world. Thinking about a partnership's sensory channels forces us to focus on information flows in the broadest sense. Such flows would obviously include a finely grained view of specific concerns—the exchange of intelligence about a particular terrorist group planning an attack, for example. But finely grained pictures are demanding on resources, and require elegant focusing mechanisms. Moreover, focusing on one issue usually relegates others to the area of peripheral vision. Another important part of the sensory channels would have to be mechanisms for dialogue. Talking and listening to each other more, both at governmental and at non-governmental level, would help nurture a more coherent and shared world view. It would also provide opportunities to exchange ideas about how the partnership might work more effectively in new areas, such as closer law enforcement cooperation and cooperative assistance efforts to reconstruct weak states.

Similarly, thinking about a partnership's motor skills encourages us to focus on the mechanisms available for action. The era of great-power conflict essentially nurtured a set of security partnerships with gross motor skills, developed in the expectation of fighting large-scale war rather than small-scale war. Fine motor skills will be in higher demand if we are to become adept at countering the demassified war-making unit. Subtlety and nuance must increasingly take the place of crudity and simplification in the interactions of security partners with each other. As security worries move towards the boundary between crime and war, more of the most relevant skills might well be found in police forces rather than in current military forces. Further, as the idea of security partnership broadens to include a wider range of foreign policy activities, pressure will grow for partnerships to develop motor skills in areas other than military capacity. Some analysts have already suggested, for example, that what the transatlantic relationship most needs is a new non-military institution, tightly linked to NATO but able to do all the things that NATO can't.



Aboard
Marine One

ANZUS AND ITS MECHANISMS

At this point, it's worth canvassing briefly what our alliance with the US currently entails. The ANZUS Treaty text is brief—a mere eleven paragraphs and a short preamble—but this hasn't prevented an ongoing, roiling debate over the years about what the parties' obligations under the treaty actually are. The treaty is reproduced at the end of this chapter. Perhaps more important than the text itself are the expectations that have developed around the alliance in the years since its signing. In Australia, the expectations fall into two sets. The first belongs to the Australian public, and is based on an understanding of the alliance as an insurance policy. The second set belongs to the Australian Department of Defence, and is based on the conception of the alliance as an enabler of Australian military capacity. Both sets of expectations undergird a governmental perspective, which sees ANZUS as a key instrument for ensuring US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and as an important contribution to regional stability.

... the ANZUS Treaty is popular with ordinary Australians, but in a distant, non-immediate sort of way. For Defence Department officials, the reverse is true: the alliance has almost nothing to do with sentimentality and virtually everything to do with practicalities.

Under the insurance policy vision of ANZUS, the treaty is sentimentally popular but practically remote. This vision sees the alliance as about coping with ultimate threats, rather than day-to-day exigencies.

Photo opposite: United States President George W Bush steps off Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House. © APL/Brooks Kraft

Like all insurance policies, it's a guarantee against statistical outliers, which by definition are infrequent. Over the years, a string of critics have argued that, even in such circumstances, the treaty isn't the guarantee that many Australians suppose. And it's certainly true that the fine detail of the treaty is general rather than specific: while Article 4 obliges the parties to act to meet a common danger, for example, it doesn't specify how they should act. Still, the image of the treaty as an insurance policy is a live one. Most Australians have never read the treaty text; nor do they have any wish to do so. And the fact that the treaty has been invoked only once in its fifty-odd years of existence reinforces the internal logic of the 'insurance' vision. So the ANZUS Treaty is popular with ordinary Australians, but in a distant, non-immediate sort of way.

For Defence Department officials, the reverse is true: the alliance has almost nothing to do with sentimentality and virtually everything to do with practicalities. In their view, the ANZUS Treaty is the foundation stone of Australia's relationship with Washington. Without it, a host of military-to-military activities would disappear. Included among these would be the opportunity to train and exercise with the world's most advanced conventional power, Australian access to high-technology military equipment and high-quality intelligence, interoperability between the two nations' forces, and access to key space support services for the ADF. Each of the services works closely with its US counterpart to maximise the practical benefits of cooperation. Indeed, the submission that Defence provided in 2004 to a parliamentary joint committee investigating Australia's defence relations with the US was a powerful testimony to the comprehensiveness of current exchange arrangements.

Ironically, all these cooperative arrangements have been critical in allowing the ADF to espouse a doctrine of 'self-reliance'. Were they to disappear, Australia's military capabilities would be profoundly affected. The ADF would be a mere shadow of its current self. It would have few opportunities to exploit technological 'edges' in order to help offset its small size. The arrangements that have developed under the ANZUS umbrella have been instrumental in allowing Australia to deploy some of the attributes of powers larger than we are. This should tell us something about the sort of alliance that ANZUS is, and remind us of the historical context within which it was created. It was designed at a time when alliances were a critical part of the West's mechanisms for managing the problems of great-power war.

Moreover, Defence and other government officials see the current arrangements as important to the story that we tell the world about our commitment to security. Were the arrangements to wither, it's likely that Australia would slip in Washington's priorities and that high-level access for Australia's diplomats would decline. It's also entirely possible that our access in other countries, including those in Asia, would diminish if we were to turn aside from our alliance commitment.

The two visions of the treaty—the public vision and the Defence vision—pull in different directions. The public has almost no appreciation of the day-to-day security workings of the alliance. It expresses consistent support for the ANZUS Treaty in public opinion polls, but sees the treaty as conceptually remote. It accepts that Australia should be 'self-reliant' in dealing with lesser challenges. Conversely, the Defence Department sees the alliance as a practical instrument enabling military-to-military cooperation with the world's strongest power. But a criticism of the Defence vision is that the current pattern of cooperation is

focused too narrowly on high-intensity operations and the threat of great-power war—the sorts of cooperation that would allow RAN and US Pacific fleet forces to work together in the event of a major conflict in East Asia, for example.

The public vision of the treaty is broad and sentimental; the Defence vision is narrower and more specific. What Australia needs most urgently is a new vision of the treaty that is a mixture of the two: a vision that is both broad and specific, and that extends our current pattern of cooperation into those new areas where future adversaries will challenge us. Such extension isn't intended to devalue the cooperation that already exists under the rubric of the alliance. The existing pattern of cooperation is valuable and in all probability irreplaceable, but it isn't optimised for the post-September 11 world. It was never designed to be.

THE ANZUS TREATY SECURITY TREATY between AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA¹

THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,

REAFFIRMING their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

¹ Quoted from Australian Treaty Series 1952 No 2, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. (from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Treaties Library)

THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.²

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

[Signed:]

PERCY C SPENDER

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

[Signed:]

C A BERENDSEN

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

[Signed:]

DEAN ACHESON

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ALEXANDER WILEY

JOHN J SPARKMAN

² Instruments of ratification were deposited for Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America 29 April 1952, on which date the Treaty entered into force.



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY

Australia should approach the future of its security partnership with the US with confidence. So far, we have adroitly managed the opening stages of the transition from the ‘old’ type of security partner to the ‘new’ type, although the government has probably outrun the Australian public in its acceptance of that shift. Australia has shown itself willing to work ‘out of area’, willing to bear risks, and capable of fielding well-trained forces that work smoothly with those of our main ally. We’ve also shown ourselves willing to accord a much higher priority to the emerging threats of the post-September 11 security environment, willing to reach out to new friends across our region, and willing to bear the financial costs of intervention in cases—like the Solomon Islands—where Australia is the obvious lead actor. All this suggests that the current security relationship between Canberra and Washington is on sound footing. Realistically, what more can we do?

... the current security relationship between Canberra and Washington is on sound footing. Realistically, what more can we do? The question can be answered only by careful thought about the shape and design of future security partnerships ...

The question can be answered only by careful thought about the shape and design of future security partnerships, which raises another question: What are the key design features that we expect those partnerships to have? Alliances are likely to play an important role in

Photo opposite: President George W Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, now Secretary of State, at the White House February 2004. © APL/Brooks Kraft

the War on Terror, for they are durable instruments and the war will be a long one, but it's unlikely that the alliances best suited to that war will be the same ones that got us through the Cold War. Even for alliances that currently look successful, it will be important to revisit fundamental issues of design in the years ahead. Western alliances need to behave more proactively than they did in the Cold War, be more capable of countering weak-actor threats to their members' security, and be more able to act jointly against a globalised transnational actor who may already have links inside their own borders. The best partners will be those that share a common world view and have relatively open and transparent societies.

If we look at the subject generically, we should expect to find the following characteristics in the redesigned security partnerships of the 21st century.

- We've entered a period when security partnerships must be proactive rather than defensive. If alliances are to play their part at the front line of global and regional security, they must be made operative not merely by an armed attack upon one of the parties. Alliances will have to become more actively engaged in shaping their security environment, and in using the full range of instruments at their disposal to do so. This will require a forward-looking partnership, willing to act on the world rather than merely react to threats. The War on Terror can't be won defensively. Security partners must meet incipient challenges earlier. This doesn't mean that we must always be committed to pre-emptive war, but it does mean that we'll often need to act to prevent adversaries from threatening us.
- Because of the first characteristic, alliances (that is, those partnerships that include formal guarantees of security assistance) will probably include a higher proportion of risk-tolerant actors. This doesn't necessarily mean that all military engagements by security partners will be dangerous ones in which loss of life is likely. But many of them will carry a higher risk of casualties and loss than was perhaps typical of alliance actions during the days of the Cold War. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western alliances were characterised by a doctrine of deterrence of conflict, and actual use of force was the exception rather than the rule. Security partnerships in the current strategic environment will be typified by greater direct use of force, even though they will frequently have resort to other means. In such circumstances, they will become rather less the safe refuges of the risk averse.
- Security partnerships will tend to become more expansive in their reach. Because geography will be a less important determinant of threat in the future than it was in the past, regional partnerships will be preferred to local ones, and global partnerships will be preferred to regional ones. Globalisation is creating a more interconnected and interdependent world, and geographical boundaries are becoming a less useful way of thinking about security priorities. With our engagement in the war in Afghanistan, Australia has already reached a point where we accept under the ANZUS treaty that the response to an armed attack against one of the parties need not be limited to the geographical area of the attack, whether it's in the Pacific or in New York.
- Security partnerships will become more full-time enterprises and less insurance policies for a rainy day. Because of the increased blurring between peace and war, they must work overtly to shape the security environment towards certain objectives, helping to offset the vulnerabilities of weak states, and pre-empting and preventing emergent threats. Such shaping can't be short-term and transitory. On the contrary, it might well be an activity that never ceases.

Security partnerships will become more full-time enterprises and less insurance policies for a rainy day.

- Security partnerships will be increasingly optimised to cope with a much broader range of security threats than purely state-on-state conflicts; they will offer capabilities across a spectrum of threats. Especially in a world of diverse security threats, alliances will be required to possess a range of fine motor skills, and to become adept at actions other than crude bludgeoning. They must become better equipped at countering weak-actor threats, such as terrorists, who practise a form of warfare that is neither linear nor continuous.
- Security partnerships will have both an internal and an external dimension, and won't be engaged only to deal with external threats. At a time when the main threat to Sydney might well come from a group already living in the city, and when the main source of information about such a group might be the FBI rather than the Pentagon or the CIA, it would make no sense to constrain our security partnership to externally based threats and those institutions of our partners that deal with them.
- Partnerships in the 21st century will also contain a deliberate obligation of 'outreach'. When Western alliances don't have the reach to offer genuine, sustained leverage against a modern transnational adversary, it will be critical for partnership members to 'engage' with important non-members (for example, other great powers or moderate Muslim countries). In this sense, it will be important for Australia to build mechanisms for long-term cooperation with countries like Indonesia and with other regional partners.
- From all the points above, we can say that security partnerships in the 21st century will become less the exclusive preserve of national defence departments, and more the instrument of whole-of-government policies. We will pursue security linkages with our partners at many levels, but under an umbrella relationship that characterises the nature of those transactions at the uppermost level. It would be meaningless, for example, for us to agree to share high technology within the defence sphere but not elsewhere, or to agree to intelligence or training cooperation between our armed forces but not more broadly.

If this paper's analysis is correct, we can conclude that security partnerships are becoming more broadly based, proactive and expansive. How do we cope with these changes? Basically, we can approach them with two options in mind about the future of our alliance.

The first option is to resolve to leave our alliances as they are and pick up more of the future pattern of security cooperation using other mechanisms. Such mechanisms might be memoranda of understanding about law enforcement cooperation, or exchanges of information on banking and financial trails, or even joint, cooperative aid programs. ANZUS would then remain what it's always been: a flexible but reactive mechanism focused almost exclusively on the use of force and brought into play by an armed attack against one of the parties.

A second option is to bring more of the future pattern of security cooperation under the formal ‘alliance’ hat, seeing in that course a means of engaging our major ally’s security assistance across a wider range of Australia’s increasingly diverse security interests. The alliance might then take on more of the characteristics of a forward-looking partnership of the type outlined in this paper. The regular Australia–US ministerial meetings would canvass a much wider security agenda, would be attended by a considerably larger number of ministers, and might well coordinate policies across a wide spectrum of economic and aid activities, rather than merely military and defence cooperation.

In the first option, ANZUS would remain a reactive alliance most applicable to a world of defence and deterrence; in the second, it would become a proactive alliance aimed at a new class of adversaries.

In the first option, ANZUS would remain largely the property of the Department of Defence; in the second, it would become the property of many Australian Government departments. In the first option, ANZUS would remain a reactive alliance most applicable to a world of defence and deterrence; in the second, it would become a proactive alliance aimed at a new class of adversaries.

Naturally, the first option would have considerable support: the Australian Government and public will be hesitant to tamper with a winning formula that has served the nation well for over fifty years. However, the price of choosing the first option is that the alliance may become less rather than more relevant as years go by. More of what we think of as security cooperation will take place outside it, in an increasingly interdependent world. Regardless of which option we choose, we will need to think carefully about optimising the substance of security cooperation, and design the structures to support it.

Conclusion

The events of September 11 have fostered a new interest in the nature, shape and purpose of Western security partnerships. Such partnerships are being pulled in new directions, and the old, reactive Cold War alliances—including the ANZUS alliance with which Australians are so familiar—are already under pressure to ‘reinvent’ themselves. The Australian–US security partnership has already been partly reinvented, given that Australia sits comparatively far forward in the saddle in the War on Terror.

The pressures for reinvention don’t arise solely from the Bush Administration, or from the supposed influence of the neo-cons within it. They arise from a deeper and more fundamental shift in the nature of the security environment, and are likely to grow rather than shrink in the years ahead.

The Australian Government and public need to start thinking now about the future of the security partnership between Canberra and Washington, for it won’t remain as it once was.

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
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Alliance Unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age

The bilateral security relationship with the United States has long been a core foreign policy and security interest for Australia. The War on Terror has re-excited debate about that relationship. Some Australians are not pleased by the cosiness of current patterns of cooperation. Some are even suggesting that the ANZUS alliance should be put into 'suspended animation' until the excesses of the Bush Administration have passed.

But is the Bush Administration to blame for the current controversies now swirling around the West's traditional security alliances? Or are those controversies the product of deep, long-term shifts in the international security environment? If the latter is the case, the pressures on our partnership will increase—not decrease—in coming years. Both America and its traditional Cold War allies will be pushed towards a reconsideration of the security links upon which they have relied for five decades. As the international security environment changes, so too must the design of those security mechanisms intended to operate within it.

By looking at the changing nature of security partnerships in the post-September 11 era, *Alliance Unleashed* sets out a framework for thinking about the future of our relationship with Washington. Sidestepping the debates about 'dependency' that have characterised most academic discussion of the alliance over the last 30 years, this publication attempts to anticipate the ways in which our partnership with the United States may evolve.

Broadly, it suggests that we should expect the security partnerships of the new century to become more proactive and less defensive in orientation, more expansive and less restrictive in geographic scope, and more transnational in their scope rather than merely being focused on external threats. It suggests too that we should abandon the notion that our alliance with the United States is an insurance policy—something that applies only in extreme circumstances—and anticipate a more interdependent future where good security partners will always be conscious of each other's interests. And it recommends a pattern of closer cooperation with our main ally across a much wider range of security-related activities.