On 24 March this year the United Kingdom unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy. The 175-page document, *The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* is the first major revision of the *Contest* strategy first developed by the Home Office in 2003.

*Contest Two* points out that the terrorist threat to the UK comes primarily from four groups: the al-Qaeda leadership, groups affiliated to al-Qaeda, self-starting networks or lone individuals motivated by an al-Qaeda-style ideology, and groups with their own identity and agenda following a broadly similar ideology to al-Qaeda. The document notes that while al-Qaeda itself was likely to fragment, its ideology would outlive changes to its structure, and possibly lead to a greater threat to the UK from smaller self-starting organisations.

The *Contest Two* strategy is divided into four strands: *Prevent*, *Pursue*, *Protect* and *Prepare*. These cover preventing radicalisation of potential terror recruits, disrupting terrorist operations, reducing the vulnerability of the United Kingdom and ensuring the country is ready for the consequences of any attack.

In 2006 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that terrorism was not the consequence of foreign policy. *Contest Two*, however, acknowledges that political and economic grievances, including perceptions of British foreign policy in the Islamic world being hostile to Islam, have played a role in radicalisation. It lists five factors that support violent extremism in the UK including ideology, social networks, vulnerable individuals, an ‘absence of resilience’, as well as real or perceived grievances including foreign policy. It observes, however, that while many terrorist organisations purport to have religious objectives, many terrorists have little or no religious understanding or knowledge.

*Contest Two* spells out the implication of this analysis. Along with identifying, disrupting, and where possible, prosecuting propagandists for inciting violence it’s also about the application of soft power: the need to build support at the community level and to engage with vulnerable individuals who are at risk of being recruited or have already been recruited by violent extremists.

Later this year the Rudd government will issue its own counter-terrorism white paper, five years after the Howard government issued a document...
on this subject. In the preparation of the new white paper, this paper examines what Australia can learn from Contest Two with respect to domestic counter extremism policy. Extremism here refers to both political ideologies that advocate racial or religious supremacy and/or oppose the core principles of democracy, as well as methods used by political actors that show disregard for the life and human rights of others.

This Policy Analysis recommends an array of policy measures, from resourcing the Attorney-General’s Department to developing a counter extremism strategy and addressing how information about best practice is filtered down to the local level, to establishing a federal information hub of other countries’ counter extremism programs to see whether there are any lessons to apply within Australia, and changing the funding guidelines to allow the federal Department of Immigration and Citizenship to support projects that would tackle online radicalisation.

A tougher approach to UK extremism

Most of the British media focus on Contest Two was the document’s warning that chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons are now within terrorists’ grasp and in particular the threat of a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ which could contaminate a wide area.

From an Australian perspective, however, the most interesting section of Contest Two is the Prevent strategy that tackles the problem of individuals and groups in the UK who promote the extremist ideology that lies behind the terrorist threat.

Contest Two makes it clear that this isn’t just a strategy about protecting rights: it’s about promoting rights, values and, as the document notes, the ‘kind of society we want for ourselves’. And that means challenging those who reject those rights and values, ‘for whatever reason or cause’.

Contest Two points to the need to stop the spread of Islamist ideology through education, counter-propaganda and by disrupting the funding to organisations run by Islamist extremists. It explicitly argues the need to challenge those who ‘reject parliamentary democracy, dismiss the rule of law and promote intolerance and discrimination on the basis of race, faith, ethnicity, gender or sexuality’.

In unveiling Contest Two the Home Secretary (approximately equivalent to our Attorney-General) stated that the UK Government had no intention of outlawing these views or criminalising those who held them: ‘Freedom of thought and speech are rights which are fundamental to our society. But we will not hear these views in silence. We should all stand up for our shared values and not concede the floor to those who dismiss them.’

Recognising the need to challenge and disrupt those who propagate a violent philosophy represents a tougher approach to extremism in the United Kingdom than outlined first in Contest six years ago. It’s now not just about initiatives to be undertaken across the UK on preventing ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ but challenging ‘extremism’ within the Muslim community.

This stems from an official view that successive UK governments and the broader community tolerated for too long those advocating hatred and extremism. Indeed the document identifies that by the early nineties advocates for extremist organisations were living in London and that some
British extremist organisations started to support overseas terrorism. As was pointed out by the head of a British counter-terrorism think tank in March 2009: ‘Though they haven’t lifted a finger themselves, that violent philosophy has then been adopted by others who have lifted a finger’.\(^5\)

Whilst stopping short of outlawing public dissemination of views that, at their core, promote social division and violence, *Contest Two* advocates a verbal confrontation with those activists and community or religious leaders who advocate cultural separatism and intolerance. This has for some time occurred in the UK with respect to the rebuttal and public censure of the racist far right, but for some reason, hasn’t been extended to the case of Islamist extremists or activists. The Home Secretary cited the example of British Muslim activists who recently protested at a homecoming parade in Luton for British forces returning from Iraq. She stated that: ‘The civil challenge means that, if people feel it appropriate to demonstrate against our troops coming home from defending this country abroad, we, as Government and others, will say in turn that we think that that’s wrong. Not that they’ve broken the law. One of the things we’re defending in this country is the right to free speech, but that isn’t free speech that will go unhindered or unchallenged by either Government or, I think, the broader community.’

One of the most debated issues in counter-terrorism studies is whether the condition of democracy contributes to the terrorist threat. One line of argument suggests that the principles of democracy offer protection to those elements in the community who promote violent Islamism under the proviso of free speech. Ironically, the guarantee of free speech, a fundamental democratic right, extends to those who openly reject the very principles of democracy.

On the other hand, removing the right to free speech through laws that seek to censure and stifle debate would drive those with extremist views underground and contribute to issues of marginalisation and isolation. Producing a counter argument by publicly challenging and denouncing public dissemination of anti-democratic views allows states to retain their commitment to the principles of democracy and free speech while at the same time clearly articulating the limits and responsibilities of free speech.

Standing up for the principles of moderation, and robustly isolating intolerant views is a key message of the Prevent strand of *Contest Two*. A rethink in the UK was certainly in order: a recent report highlighted the way in which the UK Government’s Prevent strategy had in recent years over-emphasised the need to engage radical individuals and groups, and in doing so had too often provided support to local groups sympathetic to the broader Islamist threat.\(^6\)

One of the most interesting counter extremism initiatives noted in *Contest Two* is the Channel project.\(^7\) *Channel* seeks to intervene in the lives of people who may be vulnerable to the message of violent extremism and whose behaviour raises concerns, bringing them to the attention of the police or other agencies. These individuals may not have committed any criminal offence but information is received, sometimes from community members, about their activities. This might include accessing terrorist websites or frequently talking about taking violent action.

If the risk assessment suggests that an intervention is required to prevent a person or group moving towards violent extremism, then police, statutory partners, councillors and appropriate local community leaders will consider
what community interventions are available and appropriate in each case. There are currently 11 Channel sites and another 15 are planned.\(^8\)

**The Australian setting**

In examining what Australia can learn from *Contest Two* with respect to counter radicalisation, we must be careful not to overreact and equate our situation directly with that of the United Kingdom. Britain has 1.6 million Muslims, 2.6% of the population of the UK and is the centre of gravity for the Islamist movement in Europe, mainly because of the historical links between the British Muslim communities and Pakistan. Nearly half of the British Muslims are of Pakistani descent (about 750,000), where support for *sharia* remains a strong source of legislation and national identity. The next largest groups are Bangladesh (280,000) and India (130,000). UK authorities face real problems in monitoring a significant number of British Pakistanis who regularly travel to Pakistan and disappear into radical Islamic seminaries or militant training camps, returning to the UK with knowledge and skills to carry out an attack.

British security officials estimate that about 4,000 people have been trained in this way in Pakistan or Afghanistan and now account for three quarters of serious terrorist threats in Britain: the Head of MI5 announced in November 2007 that there are 2,000 individuals in the UK who were part of militant Islamist structures, with perhaps another 2,000 whose identities were unknown to MI5.\(^8\)

The socio-economic conditions of British Muslim communities are relatively bad compared to the general population: there’s very widespread poverty, for example, amongst Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain. The unemployment rate for these communities is much higher than for the broader population.\(^10\)

The situation of the 340,000 Muslims living in Australia, 1.65% of our population, is very different from that of Muslims in the United Kingdom. Australian Muslims come from over 40 different national backgrounds, with relatively few originating from Pakistan. Australian-born Muslims represent the largest cohort of Muslims in Australia followed by those born in Turkey and Lebanon. Australian Muslims suffer some disadvantage in the labour market and lower income levels than the national average, but are relatively much better off than their British counterparts.\(^11\)

While the UK has been very accommodating to Muslim religious practices, Britain’s approach to multiculturalism has had much less success than Australia’s. A study released on 7 May 2009 by Gallup, a polling organisation, using a broad measure of economic and personal wellbeing, found that only 7% of British Muslims called themselves ‘thriving’ compared to 56% of the British public.\(^12\) Our multicultural policy has helped sustain one of the most successful multi-ethnic, multi-faith and tolerant democratic societies in the world. The policy, first introduced in 1973, acknowledges respect for the rights of Australians to retain aspects of their cultural heritage within an overriding commitment to the rule of law and the values of Australian democracy. Commitment to these values challenges anti-democratic beliefs, racism, intolerance, and terrorist ideology and promotes integration, democratic participation and respect for difference: Australian multiculturalism has never promoted separatism.

While the Australian homeland security setting is thus different from the UK, we cannot afford to be complacent. ASIO stated in its latest annual report that it’s ‘aware of a significant number of Australians who hold, or have
held, extremist views. Some of these Australians have shown a willingness to put these views into action – some have travelled overseas to train with terrorist groups or engage in jihad activities, and some have been charged or convicted of terrorist offences.’

And while our multicultural policies have a history of success, we ought not to rest on our laurels. In October 2008 Attorney-General Robert McClelland warned that the racial tensions that sparked the 2005 Cronulla riots are still simmering in Australia. There's some evidence that members of new and emerging communities such as African Muslim youth in Australia feel excluded on both religious and racial grounds and there's been attention given by the Australian Federal Police to radicalism among some Somalis.14

**Labor’s approach**

There have already been some clear signals that the Rudd government wishes to develop a more coherent approach to Australia’s counter extremism efforts. The first sign was in early December 2007, less than a month after the election of the Rudd government. Attorney-General Robert McClelland stated that in the context of Australian counter-terrorism policy that he didn’t think there had been enough emphasis on community building. He intended to ‘do what I can to start building bridges with communities at risk of alienation. I think national security has to be dealt with by a mix of hard intelligence and law enforcement, as well as steps to promote greater inclusiveness and opportunity in Australia. It is a responsibility that must be shared by the leaders of all communities…the cultural diversity we enjoy in Australia is not only an asset for social enrichment – it is also a potential asset for our national security’.15

The Smith Review of homeland and border security was handed to the Rudd government in late June 2008. It too noted the importance of the Commonwealth and state governments working closely together on counter-radicalisation programs and for there to exist clarity about their respective roles in this area.16

In September last year, the federal Attorney-General emphasised that the most fundamental goal of our counter-terrorism responses should be *prevention*. He noted that the danger of radicalisation leading to potentially violent extremism is present in our communities and stressed that to prevent home-grown extremism, ‘we must understand the different stages of radicalisation and the activities likely to be associated with each of these… I’ve tasked my Department to work with other relevant agencies, as well as the states and territories, to develop strategies for helping Australian communities to counter extremism, taking note of the UK example…’.17

In the first Australian national security statement issued in December last year, Prime Minister Rudd underlined this objective. He observed that in our own community, individuals have been convicted by Australian courts on charges relating to preparing for terrorist attacks in this country. He noted that extremism leading to violence or terrorism continues to pose a direct threat to Australia and that effective mitigation of terrorist attacks involves the combination of an appropriate security response with ‘broader strategies to enhance social cohesion and resilience and lessen the appeal of radical ideology’. The Prime Minister pointed out that through community engagement we can undermine the influence of violent ideologies and preserve social cohesion.18
On the 23 March this year, Attorney-General McClelland delivered a sober warning: a terrorist attack in Australia has ‘as much prospect of emanating from a disgruntled and alienated Australian youth as it does from an overseas terrorist organisation’. He pointed out that throughout 2009 the government would be engaging closely with other Commonwealth agencies and state and territory bodies to determine how governments can work together to develop options to address issues of violent extremism and to promote social cohesion.\(^\text{19}\)

This priority was reflected in this year’s Attorney-General’s Department portfolio budget statement. The second Departmental priority listed under the outcome objective for 2009–10, Federal criminal justice, security and emergency management activity, for a safer Australia, is ‘developing and progressing initiatives to engage more closely with vulnerable individuals and communities to increase self-reliance and resilience and to reduce the risk of resort to violent extremism.’\(^\text{20}\)

At this stage the Rudd government has yet to unveil its counter extremism strategy. It has, however, decided not to reconstitute the Howard government’s Muslim Community Reference Group (MCRG) set in response to the London bombings and growing awareness of the threat of homegrown terrorists. The reference group comprised 14 Muslim community representatives who met over a 12-month period beginning in September 2005 and finishing in September 2006. It advised the government on strategies that aimed to tackle radicalisation among young Australian Muslims by harnessing support from moderate sections of our Muslim communities.

Public money was given to the MCRG to help turn youth away from the lure of radicalisation. Following the disturbances in Cronulla and other parts of Sydney in December 2005, some MCRG members took an active stance against the violence. The MCRG, however, received a high level of criticism from Muslim communities who argued that the composition of the groups was not representative of Australia’s Muslim communities, and had limited capacity to engage with those individuals the Australian Government wished to influence. The main problem that will continue to present a challenge to engaging with the broader community of Australian Muslims is that Australian Muslim communities are diverse in ethnicity, culture and religious belief (religious sect and level of practice) as well as other demographic aspects (age, gender, race, location, length of time in Australia, education and employment status).

In response, the Rudd government decided it preferred a more informal, decentralised approach, rather than trying to communicate through a single umbrella organisation of doubtful authority.\(^\text{21}\)

Since its election in November 2007, the Labor government has supported specific initiatives that were undertaken by the Howard government and several state governments involving civil society, government departments, the police and Muslim communities in attempting to build bridges.

This has included, for example, the Australian Federal Police community engagement teams, (previously called Islamic engagement teams) in Sydney and Melbourne that have engaged in strategies to promote the exchange of dialogue, particularly with young Muslim people most at risk of marginalisation.

Most Australian state and territory police agencies have dedicated multicultural advisory units that work with counter-terrorism police units to
consult with communities and educate them about policing methods with a view to clarifying the legal responses to terrorism that were perceived to be specifically targeting Muslims. State police have also made greater efforts in recent years to recruit more culturally and linguistically diverse personnel.

The Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) runs the National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security (NAP). The NAP has received a total funding of $41.51 million since its inception in 2005–06 to the present. A range of activities are undertaken, often in partnership with state and territory governments and communities, to achieve outcomes under the four focus areas of employment, education, integrating communities and security. DIAC, which fulfils the role of the NAP coordinating agency, receives around $3 million annually. Under DIAC’s NAP allocation, $500,000 is available for NAP community grants to enhance the resilience of Muslim communities and to build understanding between Australia’s Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This is undertaken through community integration activities including those that encourage participation in sports, arts and other activities, encourage emerging community leaders, and provide mentoring and volunteering opportunities to young Muslims.22

Last year the Australian Human Rights Commission, in collaboration with the Australian Multicultural Foundation, approved 19 projects under a new program to improve trust between Muslim communities and police at the local level.23

Within the Australian Attorney-General’s Department, a newly established National Security Policy Branch aims to identify and respond to gaps in domestic security policy, particularly ways of working with communities to strengthen homeland security. The Branch, (which includes a Community Security Section), appears to sit halfway along the spectrum between the hard-edge, ‘pointy-end’, work of security and law enforcement agencies and the ‘softer’ approach of DIAC that’s focused on social cohesion. In that sense it’s a micro-version of the role the Home Office plays in the UK.

Next steps

A lot of the ‘hard-yards’ on countering extremism must be done at state and local government levels. This will be challenging: the June 2008 Smith Review on homeland security found that there were legislative, technical and cultural barriers to national security information sharing within and between Australian governments.

At this stage it’s not clear what direction the Australian Government’s counter extremism policy will take. Its unclear, for example, what the Attorney-General’s Department new body of counter extremism work will look like or when it will commence. It’s disappointing that the Attorney-General’s Department was given no new funding to advance their counter extremism work in this year’s budget. The Attorney-General’s Department should now undertake a series of measures to strengthen and better coordinate Australia’s counter extremism efforts by:

- collaborating with the Homeland and Border Security Division in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to ensure that the new counter-terrorism white paper outlines a comprehensive counter extremism strategy
- working with the Office of National Security in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to support projects designed to develop a counter narrative to extremist messages, thus filling a gap in DIAC’s work
program that’s focused on community integration responsibilities under the NAP

- acting as a repository for lessons learned at the state and local levels, evaluating gaps in implementation and feeding that information through to state and local governments. It could also act as a repository of other countries’ counter extremism programs to see whether there are any lessons to apply within Australia

- supporting, in cooperation with the Prime Minister’s Department, interdisciplinary research to plug gaps in our knowledge: we still don’t have a good picture of what is happening in some of our most vulnerable neighbourhoods and the cycle of radicalisation

- liaising with the Commonwealth Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations on how Australian schools can be active in dealing with the narratives of extremists

- working with the jurisdictions to develop programs, beyond the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, designed specifically to intervene early in the radicalisation process to prevent it from taking place. The UK Channel project is a good model

- developing a strategy, in cooperation with DIAC, to combat online radicalisation. Political extremists are increasingly using the internet for radicalisation and to support real-world recruitment. The government is committed to introducing mandatory filters to block content as the best line of defence, but little thought has been invested in Australia on how to deter the production of extremist material or how to reduce the appeal through education and promoting counter-terrorist messages.24

The UK Government, for example, has invested nearly $2m in the London-based Quilliam Foundation, a counter extremism think tank with a very active website.25 Quilliam openly challenges extremist groups and accuses them of having twisted Islam beyond all recognition. The UK Radical Middle Way website is financially supported by the UK Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.26

While this UK approach may prove too costly to adopt here, there’s no sound reason why DIAC couldn’t encourage web content related to countering extremism by funding through its community grants scheme a range of websites designed to counter extremists’ efforts.

At the moment existing funding guidelines don’t permit this; there’s official concern that websites are too difficult to monitor. The guidelines should be changed to allow some experimentation in utilising new and emerging technologies to counter the extremists’ arguments and see what sort of traction they gain with particular communities. There should be some focus here on the extremist chat rooms: Web 2.0 is now more important as a communication and recruitment tool than websites.27

Finally, Australia ought to adopt a variant of the civil challenge program as outlined in Contest Two. We shouldn’t flinch from verbally confronting those promoting intolerant, separatist and anti-democratic doctrines. We have seen examples of this over the years such as statements from Melbourne’s Sheik Omran and Sydney-based Sheik Taj a-Din al-Hilali. Some groups
have a divisive agenda which contributes to an environment that makes violence more acceptable. A good example of such a ‘conveyor belt’ group in Australia is Hizb ut-Tahrir that introduces members to social networks that make it easier to move from peaceful political activity to violent extremism.  

All Australian governments must tread a fine line between respecting the right to free speech and dealing with those who promote extremism. Confronting those spreading intolerance will, however, be widely supported by the overwhelming majority of Australia’s Muslim communities who are committed to constructing a more inclusive society.

Endnotes

2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5382454.stm
4 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf p87
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7960466.stm The comment was made by Maajid Nawaz, head of the Quilliam Foundation
7 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf p90
10 This is not to argue that poverty is a cause of terrorism. Indeed the majority of terrorists come from the middle class. see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2008
11 A recent study found study found that 38%of British Muslims said they had a job, lower than the figure for the British general public — 62%. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/07/AR2009050702794.html. According to the 2006 Census, 61.2% of Australia’s population were employed and 3.4% were unemployed. 44.9% of Muslims were employed and 7% unemployed. In 2006 Muslim youth unemployment among 15-24 year olds was 18.4%. The national average was 9.3%. In that year, 58.17% of Muslims earned less than $399 per week compared to the Australian percentage of 41%.
12 ‘Pious, loyal and unhappy’, The Economist, 9 May 2009, p53
16 http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0659.cfm. The Smith conclusions and recommendations are listed at the end of the Prime Minister’s national security statement of the 4 December 2008. The full Smith review has not been released.
18 http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0659.cfm
20 http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(084A3429FD57AC0744737F8EA134BACB)+o2+pbs08-09_AGD_final.pdf/$file/02+pbs08-09_AGD_final.pdf p20 The other two broad outcome objectives listed for the Department in 2009-10 are to achieve an equitable and accessible system of federal civil justice and assisting regions to manage their own futures.
22 The latest list of National Action Plan community projects can be found at http://www.harmony.gov.au/ The plan was originally developed by COAG in 2005 to address marginalisation and promote understanding.
23 http://www.hreoc.gov.au/partnerships/projects/projects_funded.html Last year the

24 There are over 4000 terrorist related websites. For a discussion of the issue in the Southeast Asian context see Anthony Bergin, Sulastrri Bte Osman, Carl Ungerer and Nur azlin Mohamed Yasin, Countering internet radicalisation in Southeast Asia, RSIS-ASPI Joint Report, ASPI Special Report 22, March 2009.

25 The founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist organisations http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about-us.html

26 http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/
