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01

Recovering from Terror Attacks
A Proposal for Regional Cooperation

PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE

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Director's introduction

At the start of June 2002, our colleagues at The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) convened a conference of Asia Pacific Defence Ministers and other strategic thinkers and commentators in Singapore for two days of informal discussion. One of the key topics, of course, was the way in which countries of the Asia Pacific could cooperate to respond to the threat of terrorism.

Among the many interesting points that were made on this topic was a suggestion from Professor Ross Babbage that governments in the region might cooperate to improve their abilities to manage the consequences of a mass terror attack. This idea generated a lot of interest among conference participants, and was discussed informally by some of the Ministers and other delegation leaders.

To build on this interest, ASPI commissioned Professor Babbage to develop his proposal as a short paper. We are delighted to publish his work as the first of ASPI's *Occasional Papers*. Our aim in doing so is to generate further discussion of the proposal, and to see whether there might be scope to develop it to the point that governments in the region would be prepared to place it on their agenda.

We believe this is worth doing, not only because the idea has great intrinsic merit, but also because it provides an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the IISS Defence Ministers' conference in stimulating regional cooperation on an issue that is vital to regional security.

IISS's Director, Dr John Chipman, has kindly agreed to help us distribute the paper to all participants in the Singapore conference. We look forward especially to any comments and suggestions those participants may have on the proposal, as well as those from others who may be interested. If the response warrants it, we will consider publishing a revised proposal taking account of the comments we receive.

This project has been coordinated by Elsina Wainwright, the manager of ASPI's Strategy and International Program. She and I would like to thank Professor Babbage for the speed and efficiency with which he has fulfilled our commission.

Hugh White
Director

Executive summary

The Asia Pacific's response to the threat from international terrorism has so far focused primarily on the 'front-end' challenges of detection, apprehension and prosecution. These activities are essential. However, no matter how effective the region's intelligence and preventive measures might be, prudent planning cannot exclude the possibility that terrorist operational preparations might go undetected, and one or more Asia Pacific countries might be struck, possibly with devastating consequences. At present few, if any, countries in the region are well prepared for this eventuality.

In consequence, it was suggested at the first IISS conference of Asia Pacific Defence Ministers in May–June 2002 that it might be appropriate for the region to now devote some attention to the 'back-end' challenge of terrorist incident management and recovery. A potentially useful approach could be for Asia Pacific governments to agree to facilitate close cooperation in preparing for—and pooling resources to respond to—any future major terrorist attacks in the region. Such an agreement might encompass:

- Early steps to establish direct communication links between relevant emergency management and response organisations
- Periodic meetings of the heads of such organisations
- Information sharing on relevant organisational, command and control and resource issues
- Some combined training and exercises.

In the event of a participating country being struck by a major terrorist attack, each member state could agree to assist, within its available means, through the provision of specialist search and rescue teams, medical specialists and facilities, engineering specialists and other capabilities, as may be agreed.

This type of agreement would help Asia Pacific governments to better manage the increased risks they now face from international terrorism. Participating authorities should then be better placed to respond to major terrorist incidents with efficiency and effectiveness, and to save many lives.

An appropriate way to launch practical cooperation in this field might be for a meeting of relevant senior officials to be convened at an early stage to sketch the parameters of such an agreement for consideration by governments. Apart from the direct practical benefits, this would boost the public's sense that governments are responding to the challenge effectively, and could also usefully reinforce other cooperative security measures in the Asia Pacific and contribute to a growing sense of regional community.

Recovering from terror attacks
A proposal for regional cooperation

Introduction

The suggestion of an agreement to facilitate practical cooperation between the countries of the Asia Pacific in managing and responding to any major terrorist attack was first raised at the conference of Asia Pacific Defence Ministers in Singapore that was hosted by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) from 31 May to 2 June 2002.

During the conference several senior Ministers discussed the challenges posed to the region by international terrorism.[1] They emphasised regional operations to detect, apprehend and prosecute terrorists and to degrade and destroy terrorist organisations and structures. This focus on what might be seen as the 'front-end' challenges posed by international terrorism is understandable and important. There is also, however, a critical 'back-end' to effective counter-terrorist strategy. This acknowledges that no matter how effective national and international intelligence and operational cooperation may be, prudent planning must assume that in the period ahead one or more countries in the region may suffer a major terrorist attack. Moreover, the types of terrorist strikes that may be launched in the Asia Pacific in the future could be so catastrophic as to be beyond the immediate capacities of local authorities to manage alone.

In consequence, the tentative suggestion was made at the Defence Ministers' conference that Asia Pacific governments may wish to consider an agreement that would facilitate close cooperation in the key area of terrorism incident management and recovery. This suggestion received the immediate support of several national delegations. A decision was subsequently taken to draft this short discussion paper to explore the idea of the proposed agreement, the logic of the agreement's creation, its possible shape and potential ways of moving it forward.

The challenge of 'new terrorism'

The effective management of terrorist incidents is, in a sense, not a new challenge for most of the Asia Pacific region. The anti-colonial struggles and the communist insurgencies experienced by many regional countries during the 1940s, 50s and 60s were characterised by many incidents of domestic violence. In more recent times, regional states have had to cope with threats, or potential threats, from the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Moro National Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf and a range of other politically-driven violent groups. In general, these diverse groups behaved in what might be seen as 'traditional' terrorist ways. Their motivations were clearly political; they generally used terrorist violence in order to gain political attention, not to generate large body counts; they were organised and financed in predictable ways; and they usually behaved as 'rational' political actors in order to attract public attention and extract specific concessions from the authorities.

…prudent planning must assume that in the period ahead one or more countries in the region may suffer a major terrorist attack.

Now, however, the Asia Pacific region faces a threat from a new, more dangerous form of international terrorism.[2] It has been described as being: 'increasingly networked; more diverse in terms of motivations, sponsorship and security consequences; more global in reach; and more lethal.'[3]

In contrast to the old, social-revolutionary leftist or nationalist-separatist terrorists, the new terrorists are likely to be one of the following: a religious, extremist terrorist; a transnational terrorist; a 'new religions' terrorist; a right-wing terrorist; or an isolated, rogue terrorist from a shared 'community of belief'.[4]

Many of the 'new terrorists' are driven by apocalyptic ideologies, and unhesitatingly accept high risks. Moreover, because almost all of these new terrorist groups have a broad international focus, they are largely indifferent to the interests of local constituencies. Amongst other things, this makes them extremely difficult to deter. Their highly networked and dispersed organisations also make their activities far more difficult to detect and stop. Their level of creativity and innovation, and their apparent willingness to contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, make their operations both very unpredictable and also potentially catastrophic. Several of these groups have become well established in the Asia Pacific during the last decade. Their active members and direct supporters now number several hundred at least, and possibly a few thousand.

The consequences for the Asia Pacific of the emergence of this new style of terrorist threat are many. Amongst the more important and immediate are the following.

- The horizontally networked and highly dispersed nature of these new terrorist organisations reduces markedly the effectiveness of traditional methods of detection and apprehension.

- In contrast to most forms of traditional security threat, these new terrorists may be effectively non-deterrable.

- Whilst these groups may find the novel use of 'conventional' weaponry generally to be preferred, they are likely to be less constrained in the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weaponry than their predecessors were.

- Several of these new-style terrorist groups have strong links into parts of the Asia Pacific and some have already undertaken operations in the region.

- The level of destruction that may be wrought by these new terrorist organisations on countries in the Asia Pacific may be an order of magnitude greater than any previous terrorist threat, and could be catastrophic.

In addition to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, there have already been some dramatic examples of this new threat in the Asia Pacific. On 20 March 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin, a deadly nerve agent, into Tokyo's subway system, killing 12 people and injuring some 3,800. In November–December 2001,

Singapore's Internal Security Department arrested 13 members of Jemaah Islamiah, a terrorist network that reportedly spans Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Intelligence subsequently gained indicates that this group had already acquired and stored four tons of ammonium nitrate and planned to acquire a total of 21 tons of this explosive, that was to be assembled into seven truck bombs. These seven bombs, each larger than the Oklahoma City bomb (which killed 168 people), were to be detonated in Singapore almost simultaneously. Were this plan to have reached fruition, the scale of the casualties and the extent of the infrastructural damage would almost certainly have been very high.[5]

The scale of the problem was captured by the United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, when he said that it was not a question of whether weapons of mass destruction would be used by these new terrorists somewhere in the world, but when.

The consequences of terror: the potential effects of a biological weapons attack on an urban area

The likely effects of a biological attack on an urban area are difficult to calculate because there are so many variables including population density, the urban layout and terrain, and the weather at the time of the attack. Nevertheless, the World Health Organisation calculated in 1970 that the release of 50 kilograms (perhaps two suitcases worth) of anthrax over a developed urban area of 5 million people could infect as many as 250,000 people, of whom 100,000 could be expected to die. However, in other conditions, the same 50 kilograms of anthrax might kill a much smaller 36,000 people, and incapacitate another 45,000.

A 1993 report by the United States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment estimated that between 130,000 and 3 million people would die following the release of 100 kilograms of aerosolised anthrax over the greater Washington area. A separate part of this same study estimated that 100 kilograms of a 1 to 5 micron aerosol of anthrax could kill 3 million people in the Washington area, compared to the likely deaths of 750,000 to 1.9 million people following the detonation of a 1 megaton thermonuclear bomb. The economic costs of the consequences of an anthrax attack of this type were estimated to be US$26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed.

Sources

World Health Organisation, *Health Aspects of Biological Weapons*, World Health Organisation, Geneva, 1970, pp. 98–99.

Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks*, United States Congress, Washington DC, OTA-ISC-559, 1993, pp. 52–54.

…the proposed agreement should help the governments of member countries save many lives.

Weighing the terrorist threat to the Asia Pacific

Some experienced security analysts have suggested that, following the allied operations in Afghanistan, al-Qaida and other terrorist operatives have come to view Southeast Asia, in particular, as a potential safe haven and even as a 'second front'. This judgment is partly seen as being a consequence of the 'push factors' of allied operations in the Afghan theatre, the reduced level of state sponsorship of terrorist groups in most parts of the Middle East and the severe security crackdowns in the United States and Europe.[6]

However, there is also evidence to suggest that a series of 'pull factors' could be drawing additional terrorist activity to the region. Some parts of Southeast Asia do appear to be potentially attractive to terrorist groups, largely because of their extant armed extremist groups, the anti-US attitudes of many younger people, large pools of urban and disaffected poor, porous national borders, exceptionally large air/sea/land transport hubs from which people can disperse with little trace, and sometimes weak national security and law enforcement capacities.

However, whilst parts of Asia may possibly be attractive to some terrorist groups in present circumstances, the available evidence suggests that this is not a new phenomenon. For instance, the 13 members of Jemaah Islamiah who were arrested in Singapore appear to have been working on their major bombing plan since at least 1997.

Moreover, the leader of Jemaah Islamiah is alleged to be Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian resident who lived in Malaysia for several years. It now appears that, whilst in Malaysia, Hambali met two of the hijackers who crashed the airliner into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and he possibly also met a man suspected of involvement in the bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen.[7]

In Indonesia there have been many reports of armed Muslim radicals, who have links with al-Qaida, operating openly in recent years. On 12 December 2001, Lieutenant General Abdullah Hendropriyono, head of Indonesia's national intelligence service, stated that al-Qaida personnel were actively supporting the Indonesian radical Islamic group, Laskar Jihad, in its clashes with Christians in central Sulawesi, though he subsequently withdrew this claim. Since 1999 Laskar Jihad has not only been leading combat operations against Christians on several of the islands of central and eastern Indonesia, it has also reportedly been providing supporters with ideological and military training in secret training camps.

Laskar Jihad's leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, reportedly fought alongside Osama bin Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Despite al-Qaida's links elsewhere in the region, it is the Philippines that is believed to have been the organisation's regional hub since the early 1990s. At that stage, bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, arrived in the country to serve as the organisation's regional representative. Inadequate immigration controls in the Philippines simplified the entry of numerous other al-Qaida personnel in the years that followed. Several of these people moved into the southern Philippines largely to train members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf terrorist groups, in camps that reportedly bear more than a passing resemblance to those which were operated by al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

The financial operations of al-Qaida in the Philippines also appear to have been the most substantial in Southeast Asia. Branches of the Saudi based International Islamic Relief Organisation were established as a mechanism for feeding money to both al-Qaida and Abu Sayyaf personnel and also to compensate the widows of Muslim radicals killed by the security forces.[8]

The Philippines appears, in addition, to have served as the primary logistics centre for radical Islamic groups in the region. Arms, explosives and other priority supplies appear to have been traded through the Philippines between radical Islamic groups in Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and other places, sometimes using vessels owned by the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

In short, whilst the dramatic events of 11 September may have made some analysts see Southeast Asia as suddenly emerging as an attractive base and operating area for al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, this appears not to be a new development. This region has been host to a range of the more dangerous terrorist groups since at least the early 1990s.

This short (and necessarily selective) review of some terrorist group activities in the region suggests that at least some radical terrorist organisations are now well established in parts of Southeast Asia and possess quite sophisticated operational, training and logistic systems. They certainly pose a serious threat to regional states themselves, but also to the United States and other countries further afield.

The regional response

In recent months the countries of the Asia Pacific have universally condemned the major terrorist attacks that have been conducted in the region itself and, in particular, those conducted in the United States. Specific responses have included:

- Strong government statements condemning terrorism
- The apprehension of suspected and known al-Qaida members
- Expanded intelligence exchanges

- Intensified investigations of individuals and groups that have potential linkages with terrorist groups
- The strengthening of national counter-terrorism legal frameworks
- Widespread support for the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing and for other measures designed to suppress the financing of terrorism
- Closer operational cooperation between relevant law enforcement agencies
- A general tightening of border surveillance
- Increased cooperation between regional immigration authorities
- The commitment by some states of elements of their armed forces to fight in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom
- The provision of logistic, over-flight and other support services to the forces of other countries engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom
- The provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction funds to help rebuild Afghanistan
- The proposal of the Trilateral Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to address border and security incidents, transnational crime and other illegal activities
- The engagement of senior officials in cooperative dialogues, including under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.

All of these measures have been worth while. Nevertheless, recent events have reinforced the judgment that the war against terrorism will not be over quickly. It is most likely to require sustained effort over many years and, perhaps, over several decades. In this context of an extended effort, it is timely to review the adequacy of the measures that Asia Pacific countries have so far put in place.

International experience and international analysis suggest that, in order to be successful in an extended campaign, a counter-terrorist strategy needs to contain at least five key elements, as follows.

- **Detection and surveillance** of terrorists, and assets that may be used by terrorists. This includes the monitoring of known suspects, the tightening of border controls, the checking of suspicious financial movements, and the collection, management and timely assessment of all sources of intelligence that are likely to be relevant to the challenge.
- **Prevention**, by seriously constraining access by potential terrorists to dangerous capabilities. This includes the destruction of unnecessary and poorly protected radioactive, chemical and biological materials and the tight control of explosives, weaponry and other instruments that terrorists may seek to employ. Effective preventive measures also include the close control of potentially dangerous assets, such as nuclear reactors, germ cultures, and major means of transport (ships, aircraft, trains, and so on).

- **Protection** of populations and key elements of national infrastructure by designing or modifying key buildings and aircraft, ship, train and other transport systems so as to make them less attractive targets for terrorist groups. In some situations, protection might require the vaccination of the population and other public health measures.

- **Interdiction**, which means proactive operations to disrupt or destroy terrorist groups and their active supporters. These interdiction measures can involve both political operations—designed to undermine the terrorists' legitimacy and bases of support—and armed force/law enforcement operations, designed to detain and/or destroy the terrorists and their supporting capabilities before they can launch attacks.

- **Incident management and recovery**, which involves measures to limit the number of casualties and level of damage by having well structured command and control systems, well trained and equipped emergency response capabilities, and flexible capabilities that facilitate the speedy recovery and rehabilitation of both people and key infrastructure systems.[9]

…the responses of Asia Pacific governments have so far made virtually no reference to the back half of the terrorism response equation—that is, measures designed to strengthen incident management and recovery.

The case for a regional agreement for terrorist incident management and response

In reviewing the primary emphases of Asia Pacific government responses to the increased terrorist threat, a notable but perhaps understandable feature has been a strong focus on the first four categories of action—measures that the official US literature categorises as 'crisis management measures'.[10] By contrast, the responses of Asia Pacific governments have so far made virtually no reference to the back half of the terrorism response equation—that is, measures designed to strengthen incident management and recovery. The US literature labels this second half of a comprehensive counter-terrorism response 'consequence management measures'.[11]

There is a strong case now for Asia Pacific decision-makers to not only maintain the momentum of detection and surveillance, prevention, protection and interdiction efforts, but to also intensify efforts in the field of incident management and recovery. Current cooperative incident management and recovery activities in the Asia Pacific are very limited

and spasmodic. For instance, the International Meeting on Disaster Relief, formed under the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum, convened in 1997 and 1998 but has not met since. The Asia Pacific chapter of the United Nations-sponsored International Search and Rescue Advisory Group normally meets annually, but the breadth and intensity of its activity is limited. Similarly, whilst there have been several combined urban search and rescue exercises conducted in the region, none has so far dealt with the challenges that would be posed by the use of chemical, biological or radiological materials.

…several types of potential terrorist attacks could overwhelm regional state disaster management and recovery capabilities.

Whilst these endeavours may have a useful continuing role, the current need for effective terrorist incident management and recovery is much larger and more urgent. The case for Asia Pacific governments to pursue a far more comprehensive approach can be summarised along the following lines.

- Whilst the international community has made some progress in the fight against international terrorism in recent months, several highly dangerous terrorist groups remain active, including within the Asia Pacific.

- There have been several terrorist attacks within this region, but fortunately the most dangerous known planned attack on an urban area—that organised by the Jemaah Islamiah on Singapore—was thwarted in its later stages.

- It might reasonably be anticipated that more serious terrorist attacks will be planned on a range of targets in the Asia Pacific in the future.

- Some of these future terrorist attacks could employ unconventional means, including weapons of mass destruction.

- There can be no certainty that future terrorist attacks in the Asia Pacific will be detected and thwarted in advance.

- The capacities of regional countries to manage and recover from a major terrorist attack vary greatly but, in almost all cases, are less than fully developed. Indeed, several types of potential terrorist attacks could overwhelm regional state disaster management and recovery capabilities.

In consequence, Asia Pacific governments would appear to have a strong incentive to go well beyond the very limited cooperative activity that has been undertaken in this field in the past. They have a strong interest in putting in place an agreement that would facilitate close cooperation in preparing for, and in pooling resources to respond to, any future major

Management challenges following the 1995 sarin chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system

The following is a simple listing of some of the more important management challenges that arose following the inexpert release of diluted sarin gas on five trains in Tokyo's subway system on 20 March 1995.

- There were delays in recognising the problem
- There were delays in taking decisive action (for example, to stop further movement of trains)
- There were delays in recognising the multi-site nature of the crisis
- There was poor communication and weak cooperation between relevant agencies
- Police and military authorities did not advise hospitals or the railway authorities of the nature of the problem
- Only the military had a contingency plan to deal with a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack
- The deployments of fire and medical emergency teams were poor and mis-timed
- The Ambulance Control Centre's communications were over-loaded
- Emergency teams were unable to determine which hospitals had spare beds
- There was no public information plan, and mass confusion and public fear followed
- The supply and distribution of protective equipment was inadequate
- There were inadequate decontamination facilities (even of basic showers) in hospitals
- Medical surge and patient transportation capacities were inadequate (688 patients were transported by ambulance on the day of the attack and 5,500 people went to 280 medical facilities on the days following the attack)
- Proximate hospitals and medical staff were overwhelmed
- Police powers were inadequate to facilitate the prompt prosecution of the perpetrators
- No concerted effort was made to address the unique psychological consequences of WMD terrorism
- There was serious damage to public trust in government agencies.

Source

Robyn Pangi, *Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System*, Belfer Center and the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2002-4, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2002-1, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 2002, pp.1–41.

terrorist attacks in the region. Amongst the practical measures that could be considered for cooperative activity under such an agreement might be the following.

- Agreement to provide direct communication links between national emergency management and response organisations across the region.

- Agreement for the heads of national emergency management and response organisations to meet to share information on their organisations, capabilities, planning and operational experiences.

- Agreement that each member state, within its available means, will assist other member states to manage and recover from any major terrorist attacks on their territories and in adjacent maritime areas. This may involve the contribution of specialist search and rescue teams, medical and health specialists and facilities, drug, serum and other priority medical supplies, engineering specialists skilled in restoring essential services, and other capabilities, as may be agreed.

- Agreement to share information on the command and control arrangements that will be employed in each country in the event of a major terrorist attack.

- Agreement to explore the potential for making essential equipment and systems employed in rescue, recovery and other key activities interoperable.

- Agreement to consider the potential for cooperating in, and sharing, some categories of training for national emergency management and response.

- Agreement to consider combined exercises dealing with the types of challenges that may be anticipated in managing and responding to major terrorist attacks. These might include both command post exercises and periodic field exercises.

- Agreement to review periodically the effectiveness of the cooperative arrangements that are conducted under the auspices of the agreement.

Some practicalities

In considering how cooperation might be undertaken under the auspices of such a terrorist incident management and response agreement, it is important to note some of the practicalities of conducting such cooperative activity.

First, the national emergency management and response organisations of the countries in the Asia Pacific differ markedly. The lead authorities/organisations that are tasked with this function in certain Asia Pacific countries are listed in Table 1. Even a cursory review of these organisations' current roles, responsibilities and capabilities indicates that most are structured primarily to cope with floods, fires, storms, earthquakes and related natural disasters.[12] A few, such as those in the United States, Australia and Japan, have made some efforts to also prepare for the sorts of management and recovery challenges that could be presented by major terrorist attacks. Indeed, some of these countries are currently accelerating such precautionary planning and preparations.

Second, the sorts of challenges that may arise in managing and recovering from a major terrorist attack would almost certainly require the involvement

of a wide range of national organisations and assets that do not fall formally within the ambit of the core emergency management and response organisations of most countries. National hospital and health systems, police organisations, defence forces, construction agencies and corporations, power, water and sewerage management authorities, communication and media organisations and so on may all have important roles to play in such situations. The manner of organising their diverse contributions would clearly be for the relevant national emergency management authorities to determine. Nevertheless, in undertaking comprehensive planning for the effective management of and response to major terrorist attacks, it would be valuable to have access to the experience and advice of other countries, as would be facilitated by the proposed agreement.

Asia Pacific governments … have a strong interest in putting in place an agreement that would facilitate close cooperation in preparing for, and in pooling resources to respond to, any future major terrorist attacks in the region.

Third, a great deal of valuable cooperative activity may be possible in preparing national capabilities for managing and recovering from major terrorist attacks. However, the scale, nature and timing of the practical assistance that agreement members may be able to provide in the event of their partners actually being struck by a major terrorist attack could be limited. Constraints on agreement members would include the scale of the resources that could be freed from homeland priorities; the difficulties of physically transporting some categories of recovery assets (for example, construction machinery); the readiness of some key personnel to travel to foreign locations; and the simple time delays that would inevitably apply in moving key personnel and capabilities across the region.

Fourth, in considering the benefits that could flow from the proposed agreement, there does appear to be the potential for very valuable synergies to be developed. Some countries in the region clearly have comparative advantages in contributing some categories of goods and services that would be vital in saving lives and facilitating rapid recovery. For instance, some countries have greater capabilities than others to make available emergency medical teams, some have greater capabilities than others to supply large quantities of drugs and serums, some have greater capacities to provide rapid air and sea transport of critical personnel and equipment, and others have leading capabilities to provide substantial funding to support emergency management and recovery efforts. Potentially, the agreement could facilitate the development of mechanisms for coordinating emergency management and response activity across the region in ways that would be far more effective than would be feasible for individual countries acting alone.

Conclusion

The challenge to the countries of the Asia Pacific now posed by international terrorism is markedly different from that of the past.

The agreement proposed in this discussion paper is designed to complement the very important regional cooperative activity that is aimed at detecting, preventing, protecting against, and interdicting terrorist operations. It addresses directly the problem that few, if any, countries in the region are currently well prepared for the sorts of terrorist attacks with which they may be confronted in the period ahead. The proposed agreement is intended to help Asia Pacific countries manage the increased risks with which they are now faced. Activities proposed under the agreement's auspices should mean that in the event of a member state suffering a major terrorist attack, it would both be better prepared to manage its own national resources and be able to call on the substantial technical, physical and financial resources of its partner countries.

At its most practical level, the proposed agreement should help the governments of member countries save many lives. In the event of a serious incident, local authorities should be far better placed to respond quickly and with great efficiency and effectiveness.

Should regional governments agree, an appropriate way to launch practical cooperation in this field might be for a meeting of relevant senior officials to be convened at an early stage. They might be tasked to agree to the parameters of an arrangement to facilitate practical cooperation in this field for early consideration by governments.

News of progress towards such an agreement should help reinforce the public's sense that governments in the region are responding to the terrorist challenge with maximum effectiveness. Social and economic confidence might also be boosted. In an important sense, such an agreement has the potential to contribute to a strengthening of national and regional resilience.

Finally, the proposed agreement would usefully reinforce and complement other cooperative security measures in the Asia Pacific. In a modest way, it may have the effect of strengthening the growing sense of community and common interest across the region.

Your comments

This discussion paper is designed to explore the logic for the creation of an agreement to facilitate practical cooperation between the countries of the Asia Pacific in managing and responding to large-scale terrorist attacks. It is also designed to consider the possible shape of such an agreement and raise possible ways of moving the idea forward.

Recipients of this paper are encouraged to provide comments and suggestions on the proposal for the sort of regional agreement proposed. Please direct your written remarks to:

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Notes

1   Terrorism is defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as:
    'The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
    intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
    segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.'
    *CONPLAN—The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
    of Operations Plan*, January 2001, p. B-5. Available from:
    <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf>

2   For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of 'new' and 'old'
    terrorism, see: Rod Propst, 'New Terrorists, New Attack Means?
    Categorising Terrorist Challenges For the Early 21st Century',
    Journal of Homeland Security, March 2002. Available from
    <http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.
    asp?article=48>

3   Ian Lessor, 'Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy'
    in Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele
    Zanini, Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering the New Terrorism*,
    Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 87.

4   Rod Propst, p. 4.

5   For details of this case see: 'The East Asian Strategic Balance After 9/11'
    (The address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the first IISS Asia
    Security Conference on Friday, 31 May 2002 at the Shangri-La Hotel,
    Singapore).

6   The possibility of Southeast Asia becoming a terrorist 'second front'
    is discussed, for instance, in Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna,
    'Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia', *The Washington Quarterly*,
    Vol. 25, No.2, Spring 2002, p. 162.

7   Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, p. 163.

8   Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, p. 165.

9   This list of the key elements in a comprehensive counter-terrorism
    campaign is modified from that appearing in: Ashton B. Carter, 'The
    Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism', *International
    Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001–02, p. 15.

10 *CONPLAN*, p. 7.

11 *CONPLAN*, p. 7.

12 For details, see the web site of the Asian Disaster Reduction Center:
    <http://www.adrc.or.jp/disaster_information.asp>

Table 1

Leading national disaster management organisations in selected Asia Pacific countries

COUNTRIES	NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Australia	Australian Emergency Management Committee Emergency Management Australia
Cambodia	National Committee for Disaster Management
China	Ministry of Civil Affairs
India	Disaster Management Division, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation
Indonesia	National Disaster Management Coordinating Board
Japan	Central Disaster Prevention Council
Korea, Republic of	National Disaster Prevention and Countermeasure Headquarters (NDPCH)
Lao People's Democratic Republic	National Disaster Prevention Committee National Disaster Management Office
Malaysia	Disaster Management and Relief Committee
New Zealand	Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
Philippines	National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)
Russian Federation	Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Unified Emergency Prevention and Response State System (UEPRSS)
Singapore	Singapore Civil Defence Force Singapore Police Force
Thailand	The National Defence Committee (NCDC) National Civil Defence Centre
United States of America	Department of Homeland Security The Federal Emergency Management Agency
Vietnam	Department of Dyke Management and Flood Control (DDMFC) Organisation

NB. Primary source: <http://www.adrc.or.jp/disaster_information.asp>

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the Government to provide fresh ideas on Australia's defence and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming years, and will help Government make better-informed decisions.

For more information, visit ASPI's web site at **www.aspi.org.au**.

ASPI's Research Program

ASPI Policy Reports: Each year ASPI will publish a number of policy reports on key issues facing Australian strategic and defence decision-makers. These reports will draw on work by external contributors.

ASPI Annual Publications: ASPI will publish a series of annual publications on key topics, including the defence budget, regional capabilities and Australian Defence Force capabilities.

ASPI Occasional Papers: ASPI plans to publish a series of shorter studies, of up to 5000 words each, on topical subjects that arise in public debate.

Commissioned Work: ASPI will undertake commissioned research for clients including the Commonwealth, State governments, foreign governments and industry.

ASPI's Programs

There are four ASPI programs. They will produce publications and hold events including lectures, conferences and seminars around Australia, as well as dialogues on strategic issues with key regional countries. The programs are as follows.

Strategy and International Program: This program covers ASPI's work on Australia's international security environment, the development of our higher strategic policy, our approach to new security challenges, and the management of our international defence relationships.

Operations and Capability Program: This program covers ASPI's work on the operational needs of the Australian Defence Force, the development of our defence capabilities, and the impact of new technology on our armed forces.

Budget and Management Program: This program covers the full range of questions concerning the delivery of capability, from financial issues and personnel management to acquisition and contracting out—issues that are central to the Government's policy responsibilities.

Outreach Program: One of the most important roles for ASPI is to involve the broader community in the debate of defence and security issues. The thrust of the activities will be to provide access to the issues and facts through a range of activities and publications.

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Recovering from Terror Attacks
A Proposal for Regional Cooperation

PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE

Professor Ross Babbage is an Adjunct Professor in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University (ANU), Manager of ANU's Graduate Program in Strategy and Defence, a Council Member of the IISS in London and Managing Director of Strategy International (ACT) Pty Ltd. During his career, Professor Babbage has held senior positions in the Department of Defence, the Office of National Assessments, ADI Limited and the Australian National University.

This discussion paper argues that Asia Pacific governments, in responding to the increased threat of international terrorism, should focus on more than the 'front-end' challenges of terrorist detection, apprehension and prosecution. Given that some major terrorist attacks may be unavoidable, it is time to consider a cooperative agreement to improve regional capabilities to manage, and recover rapidly from, such strikes.

An agreement of this type could both help regional countries prepare for such an eventuality, and also provide mechanisms for pooling resources to help an attacked country recover. This proposal has the potential to save many lives, build national confidence and strengthen the sense of regional community.