AUSTRALIAN
WAR MEMORIAL

AWM103 R569/2/26

Title: [Headquarters, 1 Australian Task Force (HQ 1 ATF):] Operation Leeton

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AWM
103

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

R569	2	26

(FILE No.)

LEETON

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SECRET

TO BE PASSED BY HAND

LEETON

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ARCHIVAL CATEGORY

22/6/71

(FILE No.)

R569	2	26

SUBJECT: OPERATION/S/AL
1 ATF PARTICULAR
OP LEETON

FOLIO No.	REFERRED TO	DATE	CLEARING OFFICERS INITIALS
	G3	16/8.	
	GSO2	16/8.	
	D Comd	31/12	
	G502 Int	31/12	
	Comd		
	D Comd		
2	Despatch	13/12.	
2	PA	13/12	
	G502 Ops	15/12	

FOLIO No.	REFERRED TO	DATE	CLEARING OFFICERS INITIALS

Box 6

FILE SUMMARY

Location of File: WAR MEMORIAL ANNEX
Box Number: 163
File Originator: 1 ATF
File Number: 569-2-26
File Title: OPERATION LEETON

Flag/ Folio No	Document Title	Synopsis	Associated Papers
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
FLAG A	OPERATION LEETON HQ AFV Ref R569-1-59 dated 15 Aug 67	Requests information and comments on barrier minefield constructed during Op LEETON - Horshoe Feature to Lang Phuoc Hai. Sub para 1.c. requires proposed method for control of regrowth in cleared areas.	AFV 569-1
FLAG B	EVALUATION - OP LEETON 1 AFV 569-2-26 dated 21 Aug 67	Reply to request at Flag A. Vegetation regrowth to be controlled by 'periodic aerial spraying of defoliant and herbicide'.	FLAG A

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Hq 1ATF
Box 6.
AWM 103
HQ 1ATF

FILE NO ..... 569/2/26 .....

SUBJECT: ..... OPERATION LEETON .....

According to Jim Stewart AWM 181 this material of no value or interest should NOT have been sanitised for Herbicide Enquiry - Ashley Ellis

With the exception of the following folios the contents of this file are cleared for public access.

Folios :

TAB	TITLE
1.	TRAC AFTER ACTION REPORT DATED 14 JUN 67.
2.	1 ATF EVALUATION OF LEETEN, DATED 21 AUG 67.
3.	MINUTE FROM COMD PHUOC TUY SECTOR (ARVN) DATED 28 NOV 67.
4 - 7 ?	CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COMD PHUOC TUY SECTOR AND COMD 1 ATF.

(J. S. HAYNES)
COLONEL
INSPECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

2 - DEC 1982

November 1982

For (A.M. McDONALD)
Colonel
Director of Army Information and Management

Colonel
Director of Military Intelligence

OP LEETON
1967

REVIEW OF FILE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Reference: A. DGCO 6812/82 dated 20 Oct 82

A review of the security classification of the documents on this file was conducted during the period 29 Nov - 3 Dec 82. Guidance for the review was provided by Reference A.

2. In accordance with a requirement to confirm the decision of the initial review, this file has been re-examined in accordance with the guidance contained in Reference A and the documents it contains have been cleared for public access subject to prior action as indicated in the attached sheet, numbered .1.....

Also Note Minute One down

For Director Defence Security and Director Military Intelligence

(J. S. HAYNES)
COLONEL
INSPECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

17 Dec 82

For First Assistant Secretary Policy Coordination and Director Army Information Management

HJWSholto

Dec 82

17 DEC 1982

Department of Defence

MINUTE PAPER

OP LEETON

Reference: 1967

Subje[redacted] OP LEETON 1967 : MINEFIELD CONSTRUCTED NEAR LANG PHUOC HAI

Note agree release for DAIG

(J. S. HAYNES)
COLONEL
INSPECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
17 DEC 1982

ADMIN

1. The attached documents may be considered sensitive, in view of attitudes which developed later towards the minefield constructed on OP LEETON. Many M16 mines were subsequently 'lifted' by the VC and used against Australian troops, causing many casualties. The minefield proved ineffective in the longer term

2. In my view there is no reason to withold this information, and I have written accordingly. But I bring the papers to your attention — you may wish to be aware of their imminent release.

17 Dec 82

LTCol
DDSEC-A

Hq 1ATF
Box 6

FILE NO 569/2/26

SUBJECT: OPERATION LEETON

With the exception of the following folios the contents of this file are cleared for public access.

Folios :

TAB	TITLE
1.	1 ATF AFTER ACTION REPORT DATED 4 JUN 67.
2.	1 ATF EVALUATION OF LEETON, DATED 21 AUG 67.
3.	MINUTE FROM COMD PHUOC TUY SECTOR (ARVN) DATED 28 NOV 67.
4 - 7	CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COMD PHUOC TUY SECTOR AND COMD 1 ATF.

(J. S. HAYNES)
COLONEL
INSPECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

2 - DEC 1982

November 1982

For (A.M. McDONALD)
Colonel
Director of Army Information and Management

for Colonel
Director of Military Intelligence

RESTRICTED

ANNEX C TO
DGCO 6812/82
DATED 20 OCT 82

FILE COVER SHEET
DECLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE

1. Personal Particulars

No Name Rank

Appointment

2. Certification

I have checked through all folios of this file and in my judgement all documents can be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED except as noted below. In addition, in my judgement, there is no reason to withhold any document from public access because of personal privacy reasons, except as noted below.

Document No	Title	Present Classification	Remarks
① 7 Bn RAR Report of 14 Jun 67	'OPERATION LEETON - COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT'	CONFIDENTIAL	DESCRIBES OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
② Hq 1 ATF letter of 21 Aug 67	'EVALUATION - OP LEETON'	CONFIDENTIAL	DESCRIBES OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
③ Typed letter in English ④ Typed letter in Vietnamese ⑤ Draft letter in English	Letter from Comd Phuoc Tuy Sector to Comd 1 ATF of 28 Nov 67	UNCLAS	NAMES FRIENDLY AGENTS ✓

Retain.
Lt Col
11/11/82

Signature .....

Date 2 NOV 82

RESTRICTED

Flag 1. This describes the construction of a major obstacle and as such is very similar to barrier ops conducted in WWII which are available to the public. I don't believe the disclosure of this document could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security therefore I believe it should be disclosed.

Flag 2. Releasable.

Flag 3 Delete Vietnamese name (Signature block) (also delete name on back of sheet).

Flag 4 Delete Vietnamese name (Signature block).

Flag 5 Vietnamese language version of above - to be read by Vietnamese linguist to check for other names - All names and signatures to be expunged.

Flag 6 Releasable.

Flag 7. Releasable.

All the above to be de-classified and released after privacy action has been carried out.

Peter
Lt Col

28 Nov 67

From: Comd PHUOC TUY Sector
To: The Brigadier, Comd 1 ATF NUI DAT

On 20 Nov 67, Australian Officers, American advisers and myself went to examine the fence from DAT DO Sub Sector to PHUOC HAI and I saw that the fence had been cut in 10 places by the VC.

I also observed that there were no indications to prove that the VC had infiltrated the DAT DO Sub Sector area.

To enable us to fix the breaks in the fence, our Sector wishes the Brigadier to help us out by supplying the following items:

300 long steel pickets.

60 25 kilogram rolls of concertina wire.

25 50 kilogram rolls of barbed wire.

130 M16 mines.

260 M26 grenades.

Sector will fix the fence immediately on receipt of the above items from 1 ATF

Thanking the Brigadier,

Yours sincerely,

Major NGUYEN BA TRUOC
Sector Chief

3

NAM - PHẦN

VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA

TỈNH PHƯỚC - TUY

Số 001.

Phước-Tuy, ngày 28 tháng 11 năm 1967





G

Tỉnh-trưởng Phước-Tuy

kiêm Tiểu-Khu-Trưởng Tiểu-Khu Phước-Tuy

Kính gửi : THIẾU-TƯỚNG, Tư-Lệnh Chiến-Đoàn ÚC-ĐẠI-LỢI

tại NÚI-ĐẤT.

Ngày 20 tháng 11 năm 1.967, tôi và các Sĩ-Quan Úc-Đại-Lợi và Cố-Vấn Mỹ Tiểu-Khu Phước-Tuy, đã đi thị-sát hàng rào chiến-lược từ Chi-Khu Đất-Đỏ đến Phước-Hải và tôi nhận thấy dọc theo hàng rào này có chừng (10) khoảng trống bị VC. nhằm phá-hoại cắt đứt đã từ mấy tháng qua .

Chúng tôi cũng nhận thấy không có dấu vết gì để lại chứng tỏ VC. đã băng qua những lỗ trống nầy để xâm nhập vào nội địa Chi-Khu Đất-Đỏ .

Để có thể tu sửa ngay những khoảng trống bị VC. cắt đứt, Tiểu-Khu chúng tôi kính xin THIẾU-TƯỚNG vui lòng giúp đỡ một số vật-liệu dưới đây :

- 300 cọc sắt dài .
- 60 cuộn concertina loại 25 kg.
- 25 cuộn kẽm gai thường loại 50 kg.
- 130 quả mìn M.16.
- 260 quả lựu đạn M.26.

Tiểu-Khu chúng tôi sẽ đảm trách ngay việc rào lại sau khi nhận được các vật-liệu kể trên của Chiến-Đoàn Úc-Đại-Lợi.

Trân trọng kính chào THIẾU-TƯỚNG ./.



Thiếu-Tá NGUYỄN-BÁ-TRƯỚC

BẢN SAO KÍNH GỞI :

Trung-Tá AUSTIN Cố-Vấn Tiểu-Khu

" Để kính tường "

- Lưu .

5

1. OP LEETON file
2 BF 5502 (Ops)

28 Nov 67

FROM: COMD PHƯỚC TUY SECTOR.
TO: THE BRIGADIER, COMD 1 ATF NÚI ĐẤT.

On 20 Nov 67, Australian officers, American advisors from Sector and myself went to examine the fence from ĐẤT ĐỎ Sub-Sector to PHƯỚC HẢI and I saw that the fence had been cut in 10 places by the VC.

I also observed that there were no indications to prove that the VC had infiltrated the ĐẤT ĐỎ Sub-Sector area.

To enable us to fix the breaks in the fence, our Sector wishes the Brigadier to help us out by supplying the following items:

- 300 long steel pickets
- 60 25 kilogram rolls of concertina wire
- 25 50 kilogram rolls of barbed wire
- 130 M 16 mines
- 260 M 26 grenades

Sector will fix the fence immediately on receipt of the above items from 1 ATF.

Thanking the Brigadier
Yours sincerely
MAJOR NGUYỄN-BÁ-TRƯỚC
SECTOR CHIEF

4

HQ IATF 569/2/26.

5 folios removed → Drawer 4, item (15)

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE 569/2/26 (CONTINUED)

RECEIVED 15 DEC 1967

1 Fd Sqn RAE
NUI DAT
140800 Dec 67

569-2-26.

Op O[illegible]5/67

Situation

1 a En forc s
(1) En forces have breached the minefield fence from the Horseshoe feature to LANG PHUOC HAI (YS5153) in several places.
(2) Recent low level reports indicate VC movement in the area.
b Friendly Forces. 4/48 ARVN is to repair the fence in a one day operation.
c Atts and Dets
(1) Under comd from 160630H until released two interpreters from det 1 Div Int Unit
(2) In DS from 160630H until released 1 Sioux helicopter.

Mis i n

2 1 Fd Sqn is to provide engr stores and assistance to 4/48 ARVN bn. Assistance provided is to be in the form of proving areas safe to work and subsequent supe vision of fence repair by ARVN tps.

xecution.

3 a General Outline
(1) The task is to be carried out in phases.
(a) Phase One. 4/48 bn secure LZs.
(b) Phase Two. Engr teams fly in to LZs and prove access routes across to breached areas.
(c) Phase Three. Fly in of wiring stores.
(d) Phase Four. Teams supervise repair of fence and lay trip flares.
(e) Phase Five. Fly out of team and any excess stores.

b 1 Tp
(1) Grouping. Provide one combat team on 15 minutes standby.
(2) Task. R ady reaction team

c 2 Tp
(1) Grouping
(a) Under comd from 160630 until released 6 sprs from 3 troop (to be split 2 per team) 2 interpreters from Det 1 Div Int
(b) In direct sp from 160630 until r leased 1 soiux.
(2) Task
(a) Provide 1 mini team with radio operator and interpreter to each Areas TOP HAT and BLACK WATCH to check fence for any breaks (protection be provided by 4/48 Bn)
(b) Provide two teams to area SILK LACE, one team on west of minefield, one team on EAST of minefield. Each team is to repair minefield and fence in area.
(c) Provide one team to area BLUE GARTER to repair both sides of minefield fence in this area.

d 3 Tp
(1) Grouping. 6 Sprs to come under comd of 2Tp from 160630 until released
(2) Tasks As ordered by 2 Tp.

e 21 Sp Tp
(1) Grouping. Provide a stores dispatching party at WOMBAT pad from 160630 until r leased by 1 Fd Sqn.
(2) Tasks. Dispatch of stores as required (detailed stores listing is to be provided to 21 Sp Tp Comd by 2 Tp Comd no later than 150800 hrs)

f Co-ord Instrs
(1) LZs
(a) LZ Alpha (for team to BLUE GARTER) YS513546
(b) LZ BRAVO for team to SILK LACE WEST YS 493579
(c) LZ Charlie for team to SILK LACE EAST YS 501582
(d) LZ Delta for teams to TOP HAT and BLACK WATCH YS 504608

CONFIDENTIAL

Op O 5/67
f.(1).(d)

(e) LZ for stores drops to be advised by radio.

(2) Timings
See Anx A

(3) Air
See Anx B

Admin and Log

4. a Rats
(1) Each man to carry 1 x C rations
(2) Kitchen is to hold hot meals until return of teams.
(3) Early breakfast is to be provided for teams at 0600hrs.

b Water Each man is to carry 4 water bottles.

c Med
(1) Each man is to carry shell dressing
(2) Dustoff requests are to be passed on 1ATF comd net.

d Def Stores 2 Tp comd is to provide 21 Sp Tp with detailed list

e Flak Jackets All personnel taking part in the operation are to wear flak jackets.

Comd and Sigs

5 a Sqn HQ is to remain in present loc.

b Tp net is shown in Anx C on Sqn frequency

c Each substation of tp net is to be in possession of the following
(1) Points of Origin codes
(2) 2 hr
(3) TF and Sqn comd net frequencies

d 2 Tp is to have call sign 25 on 1ATF command net from 160630hrs

e O Gp Final O Gp and update briefing to be held at 151500hrs

g Air Frequency All air request will be on freq UV (Squelch to be off when calling aircraft)

(J.A. KEMP)
Maj
OC.

Authentication Capt

Distr
OC
2IC
Admin Offr
1 Tp
2 Tp
3 Tp
21 Sp Tp
1 ATF
SECTOR
4/48 ARVN
161 Recce Flt
Det 1 Div Int Unit
9 Sqn RAAF

Anx A

Time	Event	Remarks
160630	1 x Sioux comes in DS 1 Fd Sqn 2 x interpreters come under comd 1 Fd Sqn	RV Wombat Pad
160645	Tp comd airborne	
160650	Commence fly in to LZs BRAVO and CHARLIE	Fly in NOT to commence until 2 Tp Comd confirm LZ secure
160720	Commence fly in to LZs Alfa and Delta	Fly in NOT to commence until 2 Tp comd confirm LZ secure
on a rival LZ	Commence proving route to breaches	
160815	Stores carrying helicopters to come on standby. To move forward with stores as required.	
on arrival of stores	Commence repair and check of fence	
on completion of task and no later than 1800	Fly out of teams plus stores.	Each team to be picked up completely LZ to be advised.

493579

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AIR REQUIREMENT

Serial	Task	Remarks
1.	Tp Cond command and Gp Vehicle	Provided by Sioux in DS from 060630
2.	Fly in of 9 pax to LZ Bravo and 9 pax to LZ Charlie	To occur simultaneous Fly in commencing 060630
3.	Fly in of 8 pax to LZ Delta and 9 pax to LZ Alpha	To occur simultaneous Fly in commencing 060720
4.	Fly in of Stores as required	Detailed loads and destination to be advised to G 2 air by 050500 hrs.
5.	Fly out of 35 pax and stores left over	LZ's and times to be advised.



Freqency 43 - 50 U.V.

Alternote 57 - 25 W.E. Standbu Alternate

Task Force Net.



Frequency

61 - 40 A.G. Standby Alrernate

56 · 35 K.P.

Confidential

Hmx P 50
1 Fd Sqn Op O 5/67
dated 140800H

1 Fd Sqn Areas



Confidential

(2)

MESSAGE FORM

R569-2-26

PRIORITY 130245Z Dec 67

FROM: 1 ATF

TO: 1 FD SQN DET 1 DIV INT UNIT GSO2 (A/R) CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: 2 RAR A SQN 3 CAV REGT ARTY RAAF OPS OPS2052
67 GL SECT USAF LO OP Ø

AMENDMENT TO OUR OPS2044 DATED 111300Z DEC 67 (.) FRIENDLY FORCES (.) 4/48 (ARVN) BN WILL REPAIR FENCE ON 16 DEC 67 (.) ADD 24 HOURS TO REMAINDER OF TIMINGS

Page 1 of 1 pages Classified YES

Drafter's Name	Office	Tele
MARTIN	OPS	EBONY 50

Releasing Officer's Signature & Rank

[signature] Maj

(1) Yule

MESSAGE FORM

PRIORITY 111300Z DEC 67 R569-2-26

FROM: 1 ATF

TO: 1 FD SQN DET 1 DIV INT UNIT GSØ2 (A/R) CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: 2 RAR A SQN 3 CAV REGT A/TY RAAF OPS OPS 2044
67 GL SECT USAF LØ ØP Ø

SITUATION (.) EN FORCES (.) THE MINEFIELD FENCE BETWEEN THE HORSESHOE FEATURE AND LANG PHUOC HAI YS5153 HAS BEEN BREACHED IN NUMEROUS PLACES (.) FRIENDLY FORCES (.) 4/48 (ARVN) BN WILL REPAIR THE FENCE ON 15 DEC 67 IN A ONE DAY OPERATION (.) PROTECTION TO WIRING PARTIES AND 1 ATF ENGRS WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED BY 4/48 BN (.) AO FORD HAS BEEN ALLOTTED TO SECTOR (VIDE 1 ATF R92-1-1 DATED 111430H) (.) MISSION (.) 1 FD SQN IS TO PROVIDE ENGR ASSISSTANCE AND STORES (.) EXECUTION (.) OPERATION IS TO BE CONDUCTED AS FOLLOWS CLN

PHASE ONE (.) 4/48 BN SECURES AREAS EAST AND WEST OF FENCE (.)

PHASE TWO (.) COMBAT ENGR TEAMS 1 FD SQN FLY IN TO SECURE LZs AND PROVE ACCESS ROUTES TO BREACHED AREAS (.)

PHASE THREE (.) FLY IN OF WIRING STORES FROM NUI DAT BY RAAF HELICOPTERS (.)

PHASE FOUR (.) COMBAT ENGR TEAMS SUPERVISE REPAIRS AND SET TRIP FLARES (.)

PHASE FIVE (.) EXTRACTION OF COMBAT ENGR TEAMS BY RAAF (.) 4/48 RETURN TO OWN LOCATIONS (.)

161 (INDEP) RECCE FLT (.) ONE SIOUX IN DS 1 FD SQN FROM 150630H (.)

DET 1 DIV INT UNIT (.) TWO INTERPRETERS UNDER COMD 1 FD SQN FROM 150630H (.)

AIR (.) TOTAL OF 18 SORTIES RAAF ARE REQUIRED AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED (.)

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (.) THREE PRC 25 SETS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED FROM Q (.) FLAK JACKETS ARE TO BE WORN BY ALL 1 ATF PERSONNEL DURING OPERATION (.)

COMMAND AND SIGNAL (.) 1 FD SQN CAN REQUEST SPARE CALLSIGN FOR COMBAT ENGR TEAMS TO JOIN 1 ATF COMD NET FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS FROM AREA FENCE TO 1 ATF CP

Page 1 of 1 pages Classified Yes

Drafter's Name	Office	Tel No
D V SMITH	OPS	EBONY 34

Releasing Officer's Signature and Rank

Maj

28 Nov 67

NO 1 ATF 569/2/26

SANITISED COPY

FROM: COMD PHƯỚC TUY SECTOR.

TO: THE BRIGADIER, COMD 1 ATF NÚI ĐẤT.

On 20 Nov 67, Australian officers, American advisors from Sector and myself went to examine the fence from ĐẤT ĐỎ Sub-Sector to PHƯỚC HẢI and I saw that the fence had been cut in 10 places by the VC.

I also observed that there were no indications to prove that the VC had infiltrated the ĐẤT ĐỎ Sub-Sector area.

To enable us to fix the breaks in the fence, our Sector wishes the Brigadier to help us out by supplying the following items:

- 300 long steel pickets
- 60 25 kilogram rolls of concertina wire
- 25 50 kilogram rolls of barbed wire
- 130 M 16 mines
- 260 M 26 grenades

Sector will fix the fence immediately on receipt of the above items from 1 ATF.

Thanking the Brigadier

Yours sincerely,

MAJOR [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

SANITISED COPY

28 Nov 67

From: Comd PHUOC TUY Sector
To: The Brigadier, Comd 1 ATF NUI DAT

On 20 Nov 67, Australian Officers, American advisers and myself went to examine the fence from DAT DO Sub Sector to PHUOC HAI and I saw that the fence had been cut in 10 places by the VC.

I also observed that there were no indications to prove that the VC had infiltrated the DAT DO Sub Sector area.

To enable us to fix the breaks in the fence, our Sector wishes the Brigadier to help us out by supplying the following items:

300 long steel pickets.

60 25 kilogram rolls of concertina wire.

25 50 kilogram rolls of barbed wire.

130 M16 mines.

260 M26 grenades.

Sector will fix the fence immediately on receipt of the above items from 1 ATF

Thanking the Brigadier,

Yours sincerely,

Major [redacted]
Sector Chief

MINUTE

FILE No.

Folio

To D Comd

Subject REPAIRS TO MINEFIELD AND FENCE DAT DO - PHUOC TAY

1. Letter to Brig was received whilst you were on R+R.

2. Capt Heywood SA 3/48 ARVN visited the HQ with the info shown on Flag A 27 Nov 67.

3 Maj Kemp has copies of both Flag A and the letter below. He is arranging why mines and M26 grenades are required.

4. As long as 4/48 ARVN repair the fence, as agreed by the Province Chief, and DATF only assist it could be the breakthrough.

5 Maj Kemp is liaising direct, but has delayed a few days due to the new bn arriving

GSO 2 Ops.

Capt Heywood Senior Advisor 3/48 ARVN reports that after a long period he has succeeded in having the 3/48 ARVN directed by the Deputy Divisional Commander 18 ARVN DIV to "Get the fence fixed or tell me why you cannot do it."

The Deputy Divisional Commander 18 ARVN DIV has requested that senior advisor 3/48 ARVN obtain a plan of the minefields in the fence and the assistance of one of our mine detector teams ie 4 or 5 men.

Comment from Capt Heywood. "The man in charge of the mine detector team could retain the minefield ~~chart~~ chart. It would not necessarily need to be handed over to the Vietnamese"

Possible starting date 9 Dec 67. Duration about 3 days.

D Comd orders engrs to wear flak jackets

L Engr.

Comd Seen
G502 (Ops) Maj 28/11
G502 (Int) 4/12

Return to me please Maj

Lee Engrs.

6

R569-2-26

HQ 1 ATF
NUI DAT
21 Aug 67

AFV (5)

EVALUATION - OP LEETON

Reference A. AFV R569-1-59 dated 15 Aug 67.

Effectiveness.

1. There is an increasing volume of evidence to show that the barrier of the minefield and the fence have caused the VC at least a considerable amount of inconvenience, expense and reorganisation of supply systems. Since its construction, there has also been a notable lack of activity by VC main force units along the eastern approaches to the population base of PHUOC TUY Province. The VC have been forced to expend effort both to neutralize the barrier and make up the supply and support deficiencies that it has caused them.

2. From a study of all available information it appears that the fence has reduced supply to the VC on this traditional axis by anything up to 80%. The one fact that the VC are offering to pay three times as much for rice as they were before, indicates the cost increase to the VC. Changes in resupply patterns in PHUOC TUY Province became evident soon after the completion of the fence. These were reflected in the interception at check points of a greater quantity of prohibited items - surplus food, medicines and other materials. This traffic had been reoriented NORTH along Route 2 where it would subsequently be taken off in a wide arc to the NORTH-EAST and into the main VC base camps. A concurrent increase in supply to the VC was noted moving SOUTH from LONG KHANH Province. The restrictions imposed by the fence thus became manifest in the increased flow along these alternative routes.

3. The villages from DAT DO to PHUOC HAI were constantly threatened by main force and provincial forces prior to the erection of the fence. These VC forces would approach from EAST of the SONG RAI, carry out final rehearsals (including sand - table models) WEST of the river, move to an FUP some 2 - 3000 metres EAST of the target village and then launch a reinforced battalion assault. With the building of the fence and minefield barrier the final stage of this general course of action has become considerably more dangerous. A breaching operation before the final assault is now necessary. The VC have so far not been prepared to accept the added risk this entails. Their answer seems to take the form of isolated blowing of gaps, encouraging civilians to create gaps when moving out to farm, but mainly falling back to the infiltration of small groups. In this way the fence has imposed major restrictions on offensive action by VC main force units in this area.

4. The fence does not achieve maximum effect because our engineer plant capability was inadequate to:-

a. Complete it in the dry.

b. Clear all foliage well back on either side.

c. Properly resite and reconstruct RF posts.

d. Bank it up in areas which would be flooded in the wet.

e. Mine it for the full length.

Lessons Learnt.

5. a. ARVN must be made to patrol the fence.

/5. b. Check

b. Check points must be effective.

c. Mines should run the whole length of the obstacle.

d. There should be no large gaps and few "authorised passage" gaps.

e. Both ends must be controlled by strong points.

f. 100 metres between fences is adequate.

g. Gaps when made by enemy must be repaired quickly. Mines should be replaced immediately.

h. Where possible 50 cal (long range) machine guns should cover down the line of the fence. Fence should be sited so that overs don't go into friendly areas.

i. VN forces must accept the responsibility for the fence when it is completed.

j. Patrols should operate in depth on the enemy side of the fence to give early warning and find caches of breaching equipment.

k. Likewise the enemy must be searched out on the home side and all persons thoroughly checked to see that they are not taking food-stuffs etc out.

l. Surveillance devices (especially radar such as PPS5) are needed.

6. The use of LOs from the constructing unit to the six ARVN posts in the area proved valuable throughout the construction period.

a. On the first night 24/25 May, ARVN sent out a patrol to the EAST (apparently orders had not come down from Sector directing patrols only to the WEST of Route 44).

b. LO GOM outpost wanted to open fire to the NORTH on night 29/30 May. Had they done so A Coy would have come under fire.

c. Many mortar reports of firing to the WEST were received through LOs and passed back to 1 ATF.

7. It is considered that stores available should always be one day ahead of requirement in order that ground positioning can be carried out before last light to permit troops at first light to start on actual construction in the cool hours of the day.

Vegetation Control.

8. It is intended to control vegetation growth by periodic aerial spraying of defoliant and herbicide. No other method is really feasible because of the mines laid between the two fences.

Conclusion.

9. Despite all above, the fence has worked well. It has helped protect the RF posts behind it. It has annoyed the VC to the extent that they keep trying to breach it.

10. It should be emphasised that the fence is only one of a number of complementary methods being used to control the population and resources. Its value should not be rated in isolation.

A Graham

Brig
Comd

Capt Heywood Senior Advisor 3/48 ARVN reports that after a long period he has succeeded in having the 3/48 ARVN directed by the Deputy Divisional Commander 18 ARVN Div to "Get the fence fixed or tell me why you cannot do it".

The Deputy Divisional Commander 18 ARVN Div has requested that Senior Advisor 3/48 ARVN obtain a plan of the minefields in the fence and the assistance of one of our mine detector teams ie, four or five men.

Comment from Capt Heywood: "The man in charge of the mine detector team could retain the minefield chart. It would not necessarily need to be handed over to the Vietnamese".

Possible starting date 9 Dec 67. Duration about three days.

D Comd orders engrs to wear flack jackets.

(signed G Ayre)

From: Brig R.L. Hughes, DSO.

R569-2-26

15 November 67

Major NGUYEN BA TRUOC
Province Chief PHUOC TUY

I note with considerable concern, that there is an increasing number of breaches in the fence between DAT DO and LANG PHUOC HAI. Repeated verbal requests have been made to Sector Headquarters in the past to have these breaches repaired, but with no result.

At present there are breaches between Grid References YS497583 and YS500576 - there being nine gaps in the Eastern fence, nine in the middle fence, and seven (including three large breaches) in the Western fence.

At the Northern end of the swamp (vicinity YS514547) there are three gaps, through one of which runs a definite small cart track.

There is a single well worn track in the vicinity of YS500600. The Eastern entrance is not apparent and it is likely that the VC either crawl under the fence, or hook the wires back to the stakes after transit.

It is possible that there are other breaches at present overgrown and undetected.

In the last few days there have been two incidents which lead me to believe that the VC are enjoying unrestricted passage through the fence. The first occurred on the 9 Nov 67 at YS524613 when one of my patrols contacted an estimated VC platoon moving from WEST to EAST. Captured packs and documents indicated that the VC had just been replenished and could not have come from anywhere except one of the villages on the WEST of the fence. The second incident occurred on 13 Nov 67 when a report from DAT DO indicated that a well armed VC unit of approximately company size had moved from YS520558 to the WEST through the fence at YS510555.

I request that you make 3/48th Bn responsible for the inspection and maintenance of this obstacle. The fence, since its construction has proved to be a most effective barrier to VC movement of personnel and supplies. I further consider that our joint efforts in this province will be seriously prejudiced if breaches of this obstacle continue to go unrepaired.

Please give this matter your urgent attention. I shall be pleased to provide whatever stores, equipment and assistance you may require from 1 ATF resources.

RLH.

Copy to:

SA PHUOC TUY SECTOR

Originals passed by hand to Lt Col Hutchin for himself + Major Truoc.
RLH.

RECEIVED
16 AUG 1967

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
R569-1-59

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
AUSTRALIAN FORCE
VIETNAM

15 Aug 67

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE
FILE
G 569/2/26.
(CONTINUED)

1 ATF

OP LEETON

1. AHQ have requested information and comments on the barrier minefield constructed during Op LEETON, as follows:

a. "How effective is the obstacle considered to be in relation to the aim originally set.

b. What lessons have been learned from the concept of this type of barrier in the particular setting.

c. What methods are proposed for the control of re-growth of vegetation in cleared areas."

2. It is appreciated that it may be too early at this stage to give useful answers to the above questions. However it is considered that a review at this time would be useful in enabling AHQ to modify operational and training doctrine and to answer questions asked of it.

3. Your answers to the above queries, and any other comments you have on the subject, would be appreciated by 25 Aug 67 if possible. This request came on the Engineer net but it is considered that it is really a general staff matter and your views would be more appropriate.

(E M GRIFF)
Col
C of S

G503 Int.
/G302/ Coord.
for 7RAR comments see flag A.

CONFIDENTIAL

16/8.

AAF—L 28
Reprinted May 1966

INSTRUCTION MEMO

C.D.O. 9913

TO Sgt Brooks.

- ☐ NOTE AND RETURN
- ☐ NOTE AND RETAIN
- ☐ NOTE AND FILE
- ☐ FOR ACTION
- ☐ PREPARE DRAFT REPLY
- ☐ PLEASE SPEAK
- ☐ FOR INFORMATION
- ☐ FOR COMMENTS
- ☐ FOR APPROVAL
- ☐ FOR SIGNATURE PLEASE

BF

FURTHER COMMENTS

I believe I am to write a TF after action report on this. PA until I call for it.

DATE

SIGNATURE AND APPOINTMENT

8/6

AAF – L 27
Reprinted Oct, 1964
C.D.O. 9875

CALL MEMO

TO [redacted] 3 SD

CALLER

OFFICE

PHONE No and EXTENSION

SUBJECT OR MESSAGE

Should this NOT carry a higher security classification?

TIME Yes DATE 8/6

TAKEN BY Conf.

IS WAITING	
WAS HERE	
WILL RETURN	
PHONED	
WILL PHONE AGAIN	
PLEASE PHONE	
PLEASE VISIT	

TELEPHONE

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

G. 569/2/26

RESTRICTED

Quote in Reply

ADDRESS

A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
NUI DAT

JUN 67

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation LEETON.

2. 240800H (May) to 011300H (Jun).

3. From LANG PHOUC HAI YS5153 to XA HOI MY YS5055.

4. Command Headquarters: 7 RAR.

5. Supporting Forces:

2 Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt had attached the following:

a. Two mortar carriers.

b. One fitters' vehicle.

c. An interpreter.

d. A medical orderly.

6. Alloted when required for special tasks were the following:

a. One rifle platoon.

b. A combat engineer team with mine detectors and explosives.

EXECUTION

7. Phase 1. The Insertion.

2 Tp moved D Coy 7 RAR to the AO. By a series of mounted patrols and the establishment of OP's. The Troop assisted in establishing that the area was clear of enemy. During this and other phases they also carried Commanders on reconnaissance tasks.

8. Phase 2. The Construction

Patrolling and surveillance tasks continued. The APCs were in heavy demand as load carriers as no wheeled vehicles could move along the fence line. Unfortunately the heavy going and loads led to a very high breah-down rate. The general shortage of spare parts made these break-downs more serious. Loads were reduced and the rate of breakdowns fell, to some extent.

9. Phase 3. The Withdrawal

In this period 2 Tp was under operational control of D Coy 7 RAR again. Besides the tasks previously mentioned, the task of escorting a convoy of mines to BARIA YS3860 and soft-skinned vehicles to DAT DO YS4860. The withdrawal from the area involved escorting two bulldozers (moving on their tracks) from LO GOM YS 5154 to LONG DIEN YS4359 along Route 326. This route was necessary because the bulldozers could not negotiate the bridge at YS501563 but it involved checking 5000metres of little-used road for mines and moving across the front of an enemy force (reported in the LONG HAI massif) which had cover and good observation. This was accomplished by using artillery preparatory fire, by sweeping for mines from both ends of the road and by providing a close escort and a mobile reserve. The wet paddy beside Route 326 was found to be negotiable by APCs at this time (1 Jun 67).

ADMINISTRATION

10. The only difficulty lay in obtaining air transport for the spare parts for vehicles as so many were required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Because APCs are essentially armoured fighting vehicles they should not be used for load carrying where this can be avoided. In this case the problems were accentuated by the soft going and the difficulty in obtaining some spare

RESTRICTED

2/.

parts. An excessive failure rate resulted. It may not have been possible to avoid using APCs to carry wiring stores and mines altogether, but the problems could have been reduced as follows:

a. By reducing loads in APCs even more.

b. By distributing CH-47 (CHINNOOK) helicopter loads of stores by other means. The following methods might have been employed:

(1) By arranging the CH-47 load in two or three portions on seperate slings which could be released in different areas. A similar system is used with fuel bladders.

(2) By using UH-1B or UH-1D to distribute stores in difficult areas.

(3) By using wheeled vehicles where practicable. Some preparation of tracks with a dozer may have been necessary, but this need not be a large task.

(4) By doing more man-carrying. This would slow the rate of construction but the job was completed ahead of time.

12. It should be noted that mortar carriers (M125A1) are fully laden when carrying 90 bombs and there is no scope for a useful load of stores to be carried on such a vehicle.

13. The bridge at YS501563 imposed theneed to take a difficult and tactically undesirable route during the withdrawal because of its narrow width and low capacity. It is recommended that it be replaced by a Class 50 or 60 bridge as other operations in this area can be envisaged.

G Clyne Capt for

(G J MURPHY)
Maj
OC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

TELEPHONE

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

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Quote in Reply

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ADDRESS

A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
NUI DAT

6 JUN 67

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RESTRICTED

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G Murphy Capt for

(G J MURPHY)
Maj
OC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

TELEPHONE

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

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Quote in Reply

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A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
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G Ayre Capt for

(G J MURPHY)
Maj
OC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

RECEIVED
22 JUN 1967

369-2-26

CONFIDENTIAL

7th Battalion
The Royal Australian Regiment
AP AN PHU

14 Jun 67

OPERATION LEETON
COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

References A. 1 ATF SOP Annex A, Appendix 4.

B. 1 ATF Frag O 2/67 (Op LEETON) of 231435 May 67.

C. 7 RAR OP 4 of 24 May 67.

D. Maps: VIETNAM 1:25,000 Sheet 6429-1 NW.

Name and Type of Operation

1. Operation LEETON, designed to erect a wire barrier.

Dates of Operation

2. 240800H May - 011600H Jun 67.

Location

3. Area SOUTH EAST of NUI DAT YS 4367, centre of area YS 5154.

Command Headquarters

4. HQ 7 RAR.

Task Organization

5. 7 RAR with:

a. Under Op Control from 250600 H May

One tp and two mortar APC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

One tp 1 Fd Sqn

b. In Direct Support

106 Bty 1 Fd Regt

One OH13 161 (Indep) Recce Flt

c. At Priority Call

161 Bty RNZA

d. In Support

Max effect 9 Sqn RAAF

ISM

Two dozers 17 Const Sqn

...Rebro..

CH 47 sorties (as required)

Supporting Forces

6. Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

a. The troop of APC was employed initially to lift D Coy, one section of mortars plus a section of the Aslt Pnr Pl to PHUOC HAI YS 522540 leaving 7 RAR base camp at NUI DAT at 240800H. Until the main force of 7 RAR arrived the following day, the troop assisted D Coy in its tasks on 24 May 67 as follows:-

(1) Surveillance and patrolling of the EAST approaches to PHUOC HAI.

(2) Knocking down and clearance of scrub along the proposed fence line.

(3) Establishing the mortar section fire base with the M 125.

b. From the time of arrival of 7 RAR main body until conclusion of the operation on 1 Jun 67 the troop assisted the battalion in carrying out its task. In particular, the main tasks of the troop included:-

(1) Surveillance of likely enemy approaches, both by day and night.

(2) In conjunction with troops on foot and engineer dozers, clearance of the general line and precincts of the fence of old mines, booby traps, blinds and foliage.

(3) The rapid movement and layout of all stores from various LZs to selected points along the barrier.

(4) Resupply of water and rations to companys operating along the fence lines.

106 Bty

7. Although 106 Bty was in Direct Support of 7 RAR and accordingly provided BC, FO parties, liaison and communications, 106 Bty remained at NUI DAT. Direct artillery fire support had it been required, was the responsibility of 161 Bty RNZA, located at the HORSESHOE feature YS 495620. Protection of the gun position at the HORSESHOE was not the responsibility of 7 RAR.

8. During Operation LEETON troops of 7 RAR were located relatively close to local inhabitants, particularly the towns of PHUOC HAI and LC GOM. Because of this factor the planning of artillery DFs each afternoon presented a problem since it was virtually impossible to guarantee 100% safety to civilians after allowing for troop safety distances.

....However...

However the need to use DFs did not arise. The problem was overcome to a degree by the planned use of mortars where line of fire and smaller splinter distance, in this case, was more satisfactory.

9. Each FO party has now had individual experience on past operations and TAOR patrols and co-operation with company commanders is good.

Tp 1 Fd Sqn

10. Although two dozers of 17 Constr Sqn were in location at PHUOC HAI with effect from 25 May 67, the Engr Tp did not arrive in the area until 27 May 67. During the period 27 - 30 May 67 the troop, in conjunction with 7 RAR Aslt Pnr Pl, sewed a three strip (density1)minefield within the eighty metre gap of the wire barrier consisting of type M16 US anti-personnel mines and M 26 booby traps. Details of the minefield are as follows:-

a. East strip: 50% of the mines in this strip were fitted with anti-lift devices made up of M26 grenades fitted with US MK V pressure release switches and instantaneous detonators. All anti-lift devices were layed by the field troop without assistance from the pioneers.

b. Trip wires were laid on the outside cluster of each 12 o'clock mine.

c. Centre strip: This consisted of M16 mines only, with no trip wire attachments or anti-lift devices. This strip was laid by the pioneer platoon.

d. West strip: NORTH of the LO GOM gap, 50% of the mines in the strip were fitted with anti-lifting devices and trip wires were layed as for the EAST strip. SOUTH of LO GOM gap the WEST strip was layed as for the centre strip.

11. An accident involving the engineers which resulted in one death and two injuries (one serious) occurred when a mine detonated on 30 May 67. Whether the explosion was the result of a personal error or caused by a faulty fuze is not known. No further M16 mines were laid after the accident and the remaining 500 fuses on site were destroyed.

17 Const Sqn

12. Two dozers from this unit were provided to assist 7 RAR in the construction of the wire barrier. Both dozers were employed continuously by day in an effort to prepare the ground for both the wire and the mine field. On many occasions all work on the fence had to cease until the dozers had sufficiently prepared the way.

13. It is considered that additional dozers would have allowed 7 RAR to construct the barrier more quickly providing the wiring stores had also been available. The capacity of the battalion to construct the wire barrier in a given time was, perhaps, a little underestimated. It was found that there were two primary factors which regularly restricted more rapid and continuous progress of the barrier:

...a...

15. US Aviation

a. In troop lifts Chinook CH 47 aircraft were used to lift C Coy, Battalion Headquarters and one section of mortars on 30 May 67 from YS 516549 to NUI DAT base camp.

b. Sorties of CH 47 were used daily to deliver the necessary wire and mine stores to the AO as follows:-

(1) 25 May 67

7 x sorties of wire stores
3 x sorties of mine stores

(2) 26-29 May 67 incl

6 x sorties of wire stores
3 x sorties of mine stores

(3) 30 May 67

4 x sorties of mine stores
3 x sorties of wire stores

... c. Total amounts of barrier stores delivered by types is included at Annex C.

d. Owing to the limited number of daily CH 47 sorties allotted, 7 RAR was confined to building an average of only 800 metres of each fence daily during the period 25-27 May 67 using two companies, one on each fence.

e. It is worthy of note that a rifle company can build 1200 metres of double cat wire type 2 fence daily.

f. US Aviation was particularly co operative and receptive to the needs of the battalion at all times.

Intelligence

... 16. See Annex A.

Terrain

17. The terrain fell into three main categories viz; sand dunes, padi and flat open country covered with light scrub.

18. The first two days of the operation the weather was hot and humid and no rain fell. The remaining days however were cool and cloudy with moderate showers falling during the late afternoon and evenings.

Mission

19. 7 RAR was to erect a wire barrier from the ARVN pl outpost at approximately YS 523541 to link the RF pl outpost at YS 511549 and the proposed outpost at YS 507560.

20. The task was to begin on 24 May and end on 30 May 67.

21. General Outline

a. The operation was to be carried out as follows:-

(1) D Coy, with under command sect mors, Aslt Pnr Pl, Bn Navigation Party, AQ Cell and Tp of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt was to move in APCs to PHUOC HAI YS 522540 departing NUI DAT at 240800H. Tasks included securing NORTH EAST of PHUOC HAI, clearance and layout of proposed fence line and securing of beach for landing of stores by LSM by 1100 hrs 24 May 67.

(2) Starting at 250730H, 7 RAR was to be hel lifted into the LZ secured by D Coy. Order of flyout was to be A Coy, B Coy, Battalion Headquarters, Fire Aslt Pl and C Coy.

(3) Tasks in the AO were to be:-

(a) A Coy to erect WEST fence and protect it by night.

(b) B Coy to erect EAST fence and protect it by night.

(c) C Coy to provide protection in depth to cover the EAST and NORTH EAST approaches.

(d) D Coy to provide local protection.

(e) Fire Aslt Pl to protect Battalion Headquarters.

(4) 7 RAR was to be responsible for the AO EAST of route 44. ARVN were to be responsible for the area WEST of route 44. Accordingly 7 RAR located members of the unit as LOs in each ARVN outpost as follows:-

1 Coy 3/48 Bn located	YS 515535
One Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn	YS 514541
2 Coy 3/48 Bn	YS 500570
612 RF Coy (-)	YS 502558
3 pl 612 RF Coy	YS 511549
36 PF Pl	YS 515536

(5) Each LO remained on the Battalion Command Net at all times. The LOs were positioned on 24 May 67 and withdrawn on 31 May 67. Unit interpreters accompanied each LO.

22. Execution

In conjunction with dozers, the APCs were employed to cover every inch of ground methodically, up and down, to ensure the entire area was free of enemy laid booby traps and mines. In addition, the pioneer platoon continuously employed eight (8) mine sweepers.

Constant difficulty was encountered by the pioneer operators during clearing owing to the great quantity of shrapnel in the area. The task of the Battalion Navigation Team commanded by IO 7 RAR was to lay out the direction of the barrier and clearly mark each fence line. 7 RAR had expected to find enemy laid booby traps and mines in the area but only blinds were encountered.

23. A and B Coy were continuously employed in the construction of the WEST and EAST sides of the fence respectively. The barrier consisted of a type 2 cat wire fence constructed each side of an 80 metre gap. Within the gap was sewn the M16 anti personnel minefield. Along the inside of each fence an apron was constructed.

24. Each company building the barrier adopted slightly different systems of organization as follows:-

a. B Coy

The coy was divided into six groups of half platoon strength. Five groups each constructed 100 metres before midday and a further 100 metres after midday thus, in theory, the coy constructed 1000 metres daily - In practice the length of each side of the fence constructed daily was as follows:-

25 May 67	530 metres
26 May 67)	
27 May 67)	800 metres
28 May 67)	
29 May 67)	
Total	3,730 metres.

b. The sixth group was employed in a close protection role and this group was changed daily.

c. The stores were laid out by APCs working with the coy and was coordinated by the Bn 2IC.

d. A Coy

On Day 1 (25 May) A Coy adopted the six group system but on Day 2 reverted to using each platoon, less a section for protection, to build a separate portion of the barrier.

e. It is worthy of note that A Coy's progress was identical to that of B Coy as in para 24 a. above.

25. An enlarged diagram of the AO showing details of the barrier including the minefield is attached at Annex B.

26. Mine-laying commenced on 27 May 67 with the arrival of the engineers starting at YS 517545 from the NORTH edge of the sand dunes in the manner described in para 10 up to YS 516548, the edge of a 100 metre belt of wet padi. The minefield then continued NORTH WEST from YS 515548, the NORTH side of the padi, to YS 507558. No M16 mines were laid further NORTH of YS 507558 for the reasons described in para 11.

An effective booby trap field however was sewn from YS 507558 to YS 506560.

27. Booby traps were also sewn in the 100 metre belt of padi and, in addition, SOUTH from YS 517545 to the southern tip of the barrier at YS 523541.

28. Battalion Headquarters, up to 27 May 67, was located with the section of mortars mounted in M125s at YS 524542 and relocated during the afternoon of 27 May 67 to YS 517548 where it remained until extraction on 30 May 67.

Rehearsal

29. On 24 May 67 (D minus 1) the battalion Pioneer platoon held a demonstration at NUI DAT base for officers and NCOs of A and B Coys. By explanation and demonstration the exact method of constructing a cat wire No 2 fence was clearly indicated. It is thought that the results achieved on operation LEETON indicate the value of such a demonstration.

Commanders Analysis and Recommendations

30. In the event, the LSM could not land on 24 May 67 owing to the unsuitable nature of the beach shore. A delay in the arrival of the first barrier stores was therefore unavoidable. Stores had to be flown in by CH 47 Chinook and only up to 7 sorties per day were made available to 7 RAR. Because of the risks involved it was NOT practicable to move stores to the barrier by road convoy.

31. The limited amount of stores being flown in only allowed two companys to be employed concurrently on construction of the barrier. Had additional stores and more dozers been available to prepare the ground, 7 RAR could have increased its fence laying capacity by employing more troops on the actual construction.

32. It is thought that the speed with which the barrier was constructed, together with nightly protection of work completed and the ground over which the fence was scheduled to pass throughout its entire length prevented:-

a. Enemy reaction

b. Small parties laying booby traps.

In addition it is emphasised that the rapid construction of a major obstacle can only be carried out effectively if an efficient flight control of stores organization/distribution centre exists. This function was handled by the Bn 2IC through the unit AQ Cell.

33. It should also be mentioned that on two occasions a CH 47 Chinook jettisoned its load. The first time accidentally and whilst over the South China Sea and the second occasion deliberately when the plane was coming in to land and lost power. The lessons here are clear:-

a. Look up when an outside load carrying CHINOOK passes overhead.

b. Keep well clear of the LZ when a load is being dropped.

34. The use of LOs from the unit with each of the six ARVN posts in the area proved valuable every night e.g.

a. On the first night 24/25 May ARVN sent out a patrol to the EAST (apparently orders had not come down from Sector directing ptls only to the WEST of Route 44).

b. I[illegible] GOM outpost wanted to open fire to the NORTH on night 29/30 May. Had they done so A Coy would have come under fire.

c. Many mortar reports of fighting to the WEST were received through LOs and passed back to 1 ATF.

35. ~~Finally~~ It is considered that stores available should always be one day ahead of requirement in order that ground positioning can be carried out before last light to permit troops at first light to start on actual construction in the cool hours of the day.

E H Smith

(Eric H Smith)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Enclosures

Annex A: Enemy Intelligence before the Operation.
Annex B: Plan of the Barrier and Minefield.(External addresses only)
Annex C: Analysis of Barrier stores delivered by CH 47.
Annex D: Stores Control. Administrative Aspects.
Annex E: A Coy Operational Analysis Report.
Annex F: B Coy Operational Analysis Report.
Annex G: C Coy Operational Analysis Report.
Annex H: D Coy Operational Analysis Report.

Distribution

A Coy
B Coy
C Coy
D Coy
Admin Coy
Sp Coy
Mor Pl
Sig Pl
F/Aslt Pl

CO
2IC
Adjt
S3
CP
FCC
OC Sp Coy
BC
IO
RSM
File (2)
Comd's Diary (5)
Spare (IO)

External

HQ 1 ATF (4)

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Annex 'A' to 7 RAR
Combat Operations After Action
Report
dated 14 Jun 67

EN FORCES

1. The AO lies astride the southern approach route used by the VC to enter and/or harass the populated areas of southern PHUOC TUY. PHUOC HAI has been the target for mortar attacks; LO GOM was attacked by a VC Bn on 21 Mar, and other villages on Route 44 have suffered attacks and harassment by main force, provincial and district units.

2. Main base areas used by VC are the thickly timbered country NORTH of the SONG BA DAT and the LONG HAI hillsto the WEST. VC def posns (incl up to coy size posn), camps and food caches have been found recently NORTH and SOUTH of the RACH ONG HEM, specifically in squares 5256, 5355 and further to the EAST in 5556.

3. The areas has been used as an AO by 2 Bn 275 Regt. It is a traditional AO for D445 Bn, and the LONG DAT District Coy makes forays against it from the LONG HAI hills.

4. VC production units (generally small groups) may be encountered working the fields or sending livestock throughout the AO. These people are contacted by commo-liaison personnel from either VC province procurement cells or VC logistic representatives of Group 84. Logistics units of Group 84 up to coy strength may also be discovered on procurement missions in or close to the AO.

5. No main force units are believed to be presently in the AO. Elms of D445 have recently been identified in the northern base area and the LONG DAT Coy is believed to be in base areas in the LONG HAI hills. In the last week there have been minor clashes between ARVN and VC in DAT DO and near PHUOC LOI. LO GOM is a target for spasmodic mortar attacks and this contingency should be considered in planning.

6. There is increasing evidence that the fence is proving to be a growing source of annoyance and inconvenience to the VC and maximum preventative action should be taken to prevent him from conducting either close recce or undetected assembly for counter-attack at any level against our ops.

7. Once the VC can judge the intended direction of the fence he may attempt to booby trap along that line.

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Annex C To 7 RAR
Combat Operations
After Action Report
dated 4 Jun 67

ANALYSIS OF FENCE STORES DELIVERED BY CH 47 CHINOOK

Serial	Date	Concertina wire rolls	Wire rolls 28 lb	Picquets 6'	Picquets 8'
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	25 May 67	447	216	1680	-
2	26 May 67	288	200	1050	1270
3	27 May 67	224	158	650	1195
4	28 May 67	328	174	600	1488
5	29 May 67	360	185	660	1443

Annex D To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report
dated 14 Jun 67

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS

General

1. This Annex deals with those administrative aspects of the operation worth consideration when planning for similar operations is undertaken. Some comments are, by necessity, of an operational nature, but they effect the administrative effort.

Pre-Planning

2. Wiring Equipment. It is essential that adequate wiring equipment as dollies (both 4 inch and 3 inch incl, dependent on the type of picket used), wire cutters, gloves and windlassing sticks are readily available. The quantities required depend on the type of fence to be constructed and the number of working troops involved. A reserve is needed to make good inevitable losses in sandy and swampy ground.

3. Wiring Stores. Stores such as concertina wire, barbed wire coils and both long and short pickets must be delivered on a proportional basis. The amount of fence which can be erected is directly related to the particular item in shortest supply. Excesses of any items create movement problems to new locations where they can be used. It is best to order wiring stores on a "distance" basis; the "distance" being the capacity of the working troops involved. As a guide one rifle company with no movement resources can erect 1200 yards of catwire type 2 in one day. This assumes ground clearance of trees etc for both the fences and the minefield strips is not a retarding factor.

4. Reserves of Wiring Stores. It is tempting to establish a reasonably large reserve of wiring stores. Care must be taken in this regard as, unless adequate movement resources exist, the reserve may:

a. Create a protection problem at some distance from the present working site.

b. Require a major lift over 1,200 yards or more, usually over rough country.

c. To an extent this problem can be overcome by accurate positioning of further deliveries but this in itself can produce protection problems.

5. Training. To ensure that the fence was correctly constructed with the minimum confusion it was found beneficial to conduct a demonstration for all Cpls and above. The time involved was well spent.

Construction

6. Positioning of Stores. Helicopters are extremely flexible equipments and it was possible to place stores of all types exactly where they were wanted. Desirably, stores for a days work should be positioned late on the previous day because:

a. The days progress is known and accurate locations can be assessed for the resupply.

b. Any mistakes in type or quantities of stores can be rectified before work has to commence.

/c

c. Protection of the dumped stores is usually not a problem at that time because of the relative positions of the protecting troops.

d. The troops are able to commence work in the cool of the day.

e. Morale is improved if there are no delays in commencing work.

f. The order of fly-in of stores is not of great consequence.

7. Movement of Stores. APC's are ideal for the task (top-loading, not inside-loading). Care must be taken not to overload the APC's. Firm control of the movement resources is essential. Tasks, routes and priorities must be laid down and adhered to. A potential trap in the selection of routes is that once mining commences, routes become quite limited and passages through the wire non-existent. If a vehicle is placed on the wrong side of a fence it may have a trip of up to 6,000 yards to arrive at a destination 100 yards away.

8. Protection Force. Protection normally takes two forms; one in depth and one for close protection. The close protection group must maintain communications with the wiring companies, as continual redeployment is necessary as the fence progresses.

9. Clearing Ground. Unless sufficient dozers are made available the tasks of clearing fence lines and the central ground between the fences for the mine strips can unduly delay the wiring companies. As only two dozers were made available it was found necessary to leave 15 yard gaps in the fences every 100 yards to allow the rubbish from the central ground to be pushed out from between the fences. The gaps then had to be closed with stores previously positioned.

10. Danger to Aircraft. Once mine laying is commenced there is a danger that low flying helicopter can set off armed mines by the down pressure of their rotors. This particularly applies to CH 47 helicopters. An air control must be permanently established on the Unit Air Frequency and detailed flight directions must be given to all aircraft, these include:

a. Direction of Fly-in.

b. Direction of Fly-out.

c. Description of areas containing armed mines.

d. Locations of arming parties.

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Annex 'E' to 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report
dated 14 Jun 67

A COY OP ANALYSIS REPORT
OPERATION LEETON

Reference: Map DAT DO SW 1:25,000.

1. Sub Unit. A Coy 7 RAR.

2. Comd. Maj E J O'DONNELL.

3. Operation. Op LEETON.

4. Duration. 250730 H - 301420 H May 67.

5. Outline of Tasks. Construct Type Two cat wire fence from the coast at GR 526539 to Route 326.

6. Sequence of Events. See Appendix I attached.

7. Assessment of Operation. The fence was completed to specifications in the time allotted. If more wire and pickets had been available, about 1½ days could have been cut from the time of construction. Stores were frequently not available when required. The soldiers of the coy worked extremely well and the organization within the coy was a credit to the coy 2IC.

(E J O'DONNELL)
Maj
OC A Coy

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Appendix I to Annex 'E'

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

25 May. At 0730 hrs the coy flew by RAAF IROQUOIS to LZ at GR 526539. There was a delay until 1200 hrs before work could commence because of the lack of stores and the late arrival of bulldozers to clear the area. 700 metres of fence were constructed by last light.

26 May. Work did not start until 1000 hrs because of unavailability of stores until that time. 800 metres of fence were constructed and the padi at GR 516547 was reached.

27 May. 1 pl was able to start work at 0615 hrs but the other two platoons were again held until 1015 hrs because of lack of stores. 700 metres of fence were constructed for the day and the fence reached GR 511551. There was an incident during the evening when a Vietnamese woman put a lantern close to 1 pl's position at GR 551549. The lantern was taken by the platoon and given back to the woman in the morning.

28 May. Two platoons were unable to start before 1000 hrs because of the late arrival of stores. 700 metres of fence was constructed and a 15 metre gap left outside the LO GCM fort. The coy established a night position on the projected Northern end of the fence at GR 507560 because of reports that D445 Bn might try to move through the area that night. There was no incidents.

29 May. The remaining 550 metres of fence was completed and the gaps closed. A strong coy position at GR 507560 was prepared and the APC tp, Aslt Pnr Pl and attached engr tp were placed under comd for possible enemy sabotage of the fence. Again there was no incidents. The company was subjected to a mild experience of tear gas during the morning of 29 May 67. Friendly air had apparently dropped tear gas on suspected VC locations, several thousand metres away in the foothills to our WEST. The prevailing wind at the time caused some of the gas to drift across to the area of the barrier. However, no harm was done.

30 May. The coy was flown back to LUSCOMBE field at 1400 hrs on completion of its task.

Annex 'F' To 7 RAR
Combat Operation After
Action Report
dated 14 Jun 67

B COY OP ANALYSIS REPORT
OPERATION LEETON

1. Sub Unit. B Coy 7 RAR.

2. Comd. Maj D J MEALEY.

3. Tasks. Fly in to battalion AO, erect EAST fence of barrier and secure fence by night.

4. Sequence of Events.

a. Fly In. This was uneventful.

b. Fence Building. A total of 3650 metres of cat wire fence type 2 was constructed. The system used was as follows:

(1) Each platoon was divided into 2 half platoons giving a total of 6 work parties.

(2) One of these parties was used exclusively in a close protection role.

(3) The remaining 5 groups were each given a unit of 100 metres of fence to complete. The company then worked on and completed 500 metres of fence before progressing to the second unit.

c. Using the above system with the necessary stores available, one company is capable of completing 1200 metres of fence in one day.

d. Clearing the Route. The terrain required considerable effort by two bulldozers to clear the line of fence of undergrowth and timber. Generally the work of fence construction was held up awaiting the arrival of the dozers which had other tasks. (e.g. construction of an ARVN fort, clearing lanes for minelaying).

e. Bn Administration. Food, water, tools and stores arrived by heli on time as requested. After four major operations the company has complete confidence in the unit maintainence system.

f. Use of ARVN tps. It is not considered to be successful to use ARVN troops as labourers.

g. Use of APCs. These were invaluable. They were used almost exclusively by the coy 2IC for the laying out of pickets, wire and other defence stores. The crews were cheerful and cooperative.

5. Suggested Sequence of Fence Building.

D - 1 a. Secure area - Fly in stores and equipment.

b. Clear route of mines and booby traps.

...c...

c. Layout route especially for day 1.

d. Clear fence line along route prepared for day 1.

e. Layout wire, pickets etc for day 1.

f. Fly in coys and picquet prepared line of fence.

D Day a. Commence wiring.

b. Layout wire and pickets for day 2.

(D J MEALEY)
Maj
OC B Coy

Annex G To 7 RAR
Combat Operations
After Action Report
dated 14 Jun 67

C COY OP ANALYSIS REPORT
OPERATION LEETON

1. Report by C Coy, 7 RAR commanded by Maj G K CHAPMAN.

2. Duration. 251000H - 301500H.

3. Tasks. C Coy was to provide protection for companies employed on construction of the barrier by providing close protection and patrols in depth.

4. Sequence of Events.

a. 25 May 67. Fly in to a secured LZ. After concentration by pls, C Coy started the initial clearance of the coy AO by pl ptls up to 1000 metres out from the proposed barrier route. By night C Coy established three pl ambushes on possible VC routes.

b. 26 May 67. Pl patrols in depth to 3000 metres. Again C Coy established three pl ambushes ni 26/27.

c. 27 May 67. Three sects with APCs were employed in close protection tasks whilst the remainder of the sub-unit patrolled in depth. By night C Coy provided a pl ambush in depth and three defensive locs close to the barrier route in conjunction with the cav tp.

d. 28 May 67. Close protection of the barrier by two pls with a pl patrolling in depth. At night C Coy concentrated and occupied a defensive posn as depth coy of the bn layout.

e. 29 May 67. Close protection of the barrier with one pl and patrolling and securing in depth by the remainder of the company. At night two pls and Coy HQ provided close protection of the barrier while the third pl occupied a ni ambush posn outside the AO on a likely VC withdrawal route.

f. 30 May 67. Close protection of the barrier. Test firing of weapons and fly out in Chinook hels during the afternoon.

4. Comments

a. Continued ni ambushes without the use of mosquito nets could increase the number of malaria cases. Since the op C Coy has issued every man with a face veil to help eleviate the problem.

...b...

b. The close protection of bull-dozers is a very tiring and exacting task which requires the assistance of APCs to give the group reasonable mobility.

c. Civilians encountered within the AO can become a problem unless the commander on the ground is given some flexibility in the subsequent handling of them.

d. An "apprehend and evacuate" order can become extremely difficult to carry out if the numbers get into double figures.

5. Assessment of Op

The tasks given to C Coy were successfully completed and the lack of VC contact may, in fact, have been due to continuous patrolling by this sub unit in depth.

(G K CHAPMAN)
Maj
OC C Coy

Annex 'H' To 7 RAR
Combat Operations After
Action Report
dated 14 Jun 67

D COY OP ANALYSIS REPORT
OPERATION LEETON

Reference: 1. 7 RAR OP 4 (OP LEETON) dated 24 May 67.

General Outline

1. a. Duration of Operation 0800 hrs 24 May 67 to 1300 hrs 1 Jun 67.

b. Command OC D Coy Maj D E PATERSON.

c. Summary of Tasks Security of Bn LZ, beach landing site and of personnel and material whilst a barrier was erected and a minefield laid from approximately YS 523541 - YS 511549 - YS 507560. In addition, the escort of two bulldozers from LO GOM 5154 to TAM PHUOC 4458 along Route 326.

Sequence of Events

2. 24 May Move at 0800 hrs by APCs to beach east of PHUOC HAI 5153. Prepared to assist beaching of LSM VERON STURDEE. Beaching aborted after two attempts due to weather, sea and beach conditions. Secured LZ for fly in of battalion and stores.

25-27 May Clear and secure area through which fence and minefield would be constructed.
Close protection to east of wiring parties using platoon mounted in APCs.

28-31 May Security of completed fence and protecting mine laying parties.

1 Jun Escort two bulldozers from LO GOM 5154 to TAM PHUOC 4458 along route 326.

Incidents

3. a. One 4 gallon petrol can of polished rice found in cache at approximately 525553.

b. 12-18 CBUs found in general area south half square 5255 and north half square 5254. CBUs were not found in any pattern and were not set as mines or booby traps.

c. Located enemy position at 481559. Constructed of five weapon pits with OHP in an area about 40 metres and had been used recently. Consider this position could have been used as patrol base for VC operations northeast of PHUOC LOI 4957 during the period of OP LEETON. This position was not destroyed.

Own Casualties

4. Nil.

Assessment of Operation

5. Successful.

(D E PATERSON)
Maj
OC D Coy

Appendix I to Annex H

ESCORT TASK ON 1 JUN 67 ON ROUTE 326

Reference: 1. VUNG TAU - 6429/IV/NORTH E
2. PHUOC HAI - 6429/I/NORTH W

Situation

1. When the two bulldozers had completed their task on OP LEETON on 31 May 67 that had to be moved from LO GOM 5054 to TAM PHUOC 4458 for further movement by lowloader to the HORSESHOE 4961.

2. The dozers could not cross the narrow bridge at 510563 on Route 44 or by-pass the bridge because of wet ground conditions. Movement was limited to Route 326, however this road had been cut in three places by the VC restricting the movement of a low-loader and thereby limiting the speed of the dozers to 2 MPH. The flooded paddi to the north of Route 326 prevented the dozers from moving off the road in this direction. Movement was also restricted to the south of Route 326 in most places due to terrain conditions.

3. At least two companies of D445 and a local guerilla coy were believed to be in the LONG HAI hills South of Route 326, and there had been several enemy contacts in the general area of Route 326 during the period of OP LEETON. The VC could have expected to have mined the road and the ground near the road.

4. The following troops were available for the escort task:

D Coy 7 RAR with:

Under Command
- One tp APCs
- One sect of Mors in APCs
- One sect Fire Aslt Pl (trained as pioneers)
- One SIOUX helicopter

Under command for movement
- Two engineer bulldozers

In direct support
- FO party 106 Bty RAA
- 161 Bty RNZA

In support
- One med Bty (US)
- Light Fire Team (US)

In addition 7 RAR liasion officers used in ARVN posts during OP LEETON and stationed along Route 44, had to be collected.

Concept of Operations

5. The plan was not to make contact with the enemy but to neutralize likely enemy ambush positions using artillery, the rapid deployment of infantry in APCs to secure both ends of the road, and establishment of a fire base on the most dominating feature in the centre of the route.

...This was....

This was coupled with continuous search of the road for mines, with mine sweepers from each end of the route, and clearance of the timber on the sides of the road with infantry. They were to search for enemy parties and cables to command detonated mines. Speed and security were essential to prevent the enemy reacting to our movement.

The Execution of the Task

6. A reconnaissance by helicopter was carried out just before last light on 31 May 67. The helicopter did not fly directly over the route and only made one pass.

7. A platoon mounted in APCs was sent on a long but fairly secure route from PHUOC HAI 5153, along route 44 to DAT DO 4860, along route 23 to LONG DIEN 4359, to TAM PHUOC 4458. It was accompanied by a pioneer element with their minesweepers and an FO ack. Its task was to clear Route 326 to the south east.

8. Another platoon mounted in APCs and accompanied by a mortar FO and pioneers with their minsweepers moved from PHUOC HAI to 5153 to the junction of routes 44 and 326 in square 5055. Its task was to clear and secure route 326 to the north west and escort the dozers after they were handed over by the third APC/platoon group.

9. The third platoon of D Coy mounted in APCs, (together with CHQ and Tp HQ) escorted the two dozers from the military post at LO GOM 5164 to the location of the platoon on Route 326 moving north west, collected the LOs at the ARVN posts along Route 44, then secured a fire base in the vicinity of 476570. During the latter stage of this move the artillery FO was picked up by helicopter to register then neutralize a likely enemy ambush position in the timber between 475566 and 482558. The helicopter was left on the task of route surveillance until this move was complete.

10. Whenever the ground would permit, the dozers were moved off the road to save the time required to clear the road with minesweepers. The dozers were also used to fill and repair culverts that had been destroyed by the VC so that they could cross.

Conclusion

11. The dozers were escorted to TAM PHUOC and handed over to Engr escort party with the low loader without incident.

Comments

12. The following points arose during this move which could prove of value under similar circumstances:

a. The need for exceptionally close co-operation between the APC and Infantry commanders during the planning and execution of such a move.

b. Practice by troops riding in APCs to avoid:

(1) Pl Comds "jamming" the net when they use armoured veh wireless sets for communications.

(2) Confusion by infantry commanders with the large number of callsigns on the armoured nets.

...(3)...

(3) Pl comds giving inaccurate locstats when moving in APCs

(4) Bad packing of heavy infantry packs in APCs so that infantry cannot get out of APCs easily

(5) Troops riding on top of APCs (many troops do not like being enclosed inside APCs).

c. The value of the SIOUX helicopter for route surveillance and its capacity to pick up an artillery observer from the escort force to engage likely targets, or the commander of the group for co-ordination and control under certain circumstances.

d. The need for a high powered APC mounted wireless in Tp HQ that can be used by the infantry commander of the administration/air net in addition to the set now used on the battalion command net.

ANNEX 'B' TO 7RAR
COMBAT OPERATION AFTER ACTION
REPORT DATED 11 JUN 67.

MAP 6530 III
1: 25,000

OP LEETON



File - Sgt Brooks
569-2-26

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

31 May 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 300001H to 302400H May 67.

TO: Commanding General,
II Field Force, Vietnam (4)

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. Patrolling of the TAOR continued with minor contact. At YS644807 at 1028H a LRRP contacted two VC along a track. One was seen to be carrying a weapon. Results 1 VC KIA (poss) 1 VC WIA (poss). The patrol was extracted at 1715H.

(2) LRRP

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours - One.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt continued participation in Operation LEETON with 2 Tp under operational control of 7 RAR. There was negative contact. Location 2 Tp is YS527541.

(4) Task Force Artillery continued support for Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR. 65 H and I missions were fired in the reporting period. Locations are unchanged.

(5) 2 RAR arrived in country and assumed operational control from 6 RAR at 1359H.

(6) 6 RAR concluded operations in Vietnam at 1359H.

(7) 7 RAR continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. At 0800H at YS507558 a mine was detonated causing 1 Aust KIA, 2 Aust WIA. Possible cause of detonation was fuze failure. At 1530H HQ 7 RAR, A Coy, B Coy, C Coy returned to base loc. Night location of D Coy was YS527542. At 1912H at YS437693 a standing patrol at the water point fired on 1 VC approaching their location. There was no result.

(8) Air Support. At 1215H at YS557694 an airstrike on a VC base camp and staging area destroyed two large and two small bunkers and uncovered 20 metres of trench.

(9) Plans for next 24 hours. Operation LEETON concludes 311800H. Patrolling of the TAOR continues.

-/2.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

C. Objectives - No change

D. Forces

D1.	1 SAS	301028H/301035H	AUST	NIL	NIL
D2.	7 RAR	301912H/301915H	AUST	NIL	NIL

K. Losses/Damages

K1. Enemy

D1.	1 SAS	2 VC/UNK	1 VC KIA (Poss)/ 1 VC WIA (Poss)/	NIL	NIL
D2.	7 RAR	1 VC/UNK	UNK/UNK	NIL	NIL

K2. NIL

K3. NIL

K4. NIL

K5. Company - NIL
Platoon - Three
Squad - NIL

K5A. Two

GRAHAM
BRIG

Copies to:

HQ AFV (2)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)
Lists A, D and E.

Internal:

Ops 1
Ops 2
G2 (Air)
CP (2)
PR (2)

May be destroyed after reading, but in any case to be destroyed after 30 days.

OFFICIAL

J Tierney Capt

Duty Officer for
MAIZEY
S3

569-2-26

~~HQ Coy~~

CP FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

30 May 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP) From 290001H to 292400H May 67.

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, VIETNAM (4)

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. Patrolling of the TAOR continued with negative contact.

(2) LRRP

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - NIL

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt continued Operation LEETON with 2 Troop under Op control of 7 RAR. There was negative contact. Location 2 Troop YS507560.

(4) Task Force artillery continued to support Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR. Forty-two H and I missions were fired in the reporting period. Remaining H and I missions were cancelled as there were five fire plans fired all night into the area of LONG HAI Hills centre of mass YS 4555.

(5) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON and patrolling with negative contact.

(6) 7 RAR continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. The wire barrier is nearing completion. 2072 mines were laid leaving 100 metres to be completed. Locations Bn HQ YS515549, A Coy YS507560, B Coy YS515550, C Coy YS510556, D Coy YS526542.

(7) Air Support. At 1120H at YS450534 an airstrike was made against a possible VC battslion location. No BDA was possible. At 0500H an airstrike on VC camps at YS472540, YS464550, YS468550 and YS471548 uncovered 15 tunnel entrances, destroyed 3 bunkers, and 3 metal roofed structures and collapsed 5 underground rooms. At approx 1730H an airstrike on a camp at YS544708 destroyed 2 large bunkers and 30 metres of trench.

(8) Plans for the next 24 hours. Operation LEETON and patrolling continues.

-/2.

b. Major Unit Operations.

(1) through (9) no change

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

C. Objectives No change

D. Forces

K. Losses/Damages

K1. Nil

K2. Nil

K3. Nil

K4. Nil

K5. Company - Nil
Platoon - Two
Squad - Nil

GRAHAM
BRIG

Copies to:

HQ AFV (2)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)
Lists A, D and E.

Internal:

Ops 1
Ops 2
CP (2)
PR (1)
Diary (2)

May be destroyed after reading, but in any case to be destroyed after 30 days.

OFFICIAL

for Duty Officer for
MAIZEY
S3

F – Sig[redacted]
Reprinted Oct '63

MESSAGE FORM

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE RAR DISCONTINUED

PA 869-2-26

NUMBER

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		29 2300Z MAY	

From A SQN 3 CAV REGT

To 1ATF

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

Q 377

Info

Fixed

File

29 May.

OPERATION LEETON MAINTDEM 3/67

ALPHA 2TP A SQN 3 CAV REGT

BRAVO 1000 GALS DIESO

CHARLIE 300800H MAY 67

DELTA 301000H MAY 67

ECHO HELI LANDED

FOXTROT TBA 505559

GOLF 36-Ø

HOTEL TANGO 2

INDIA BACKLOAD EMPTY BLADDERS

Page.....of.....pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME CRIBB

OFFICE QM

TEL No ESCORT

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

DyCribb 2Lt

C.D.O. 5058

MESSAGE FORM 569 2 26

NO 1ST TASK FORCE FILE

File

PRIORITY PRIORITY 2701002

FROM 1 ATF

TO 1 ARSG

RESTRICTED

Q 937

INFO 4 FDREGT 1FD SQN 6RAR 7RAR & 9ATR
5SAESS 5COY RAASC COMP ORD COY

OP LEETON ⊙ MAINT FORECAST ⊙ 29 MAY 30 MAY 31 MAY ⊙ 29 MAY ⊙
FIRST ⊙ FOR ROAD MOVE ⊙ CARTS 105 MM HE WITH PD FZ 600 ⊙ SECOND ⊙
MINES ANTI PERS M16 QTY 2000 ⊙ FIRING DEVICE DEMO PRESSURE RELEASE
1350 ⊙ CAPS BLASTING SPEC NON ELECT 1350 ⊙ GREN HAND FRAG 1350 ⊙
STANDARD PIG FENCE 1500 YDS ⊙ 30 MAY ⊙ MINES ANTI PERS M16 QTY 2000 ⊙
FIRING DEVICE DEMO PRESSURE RELEASE 1350 ⊙ CAPS BLASTING SPEC NON ELECT
1350 ⊙ GREN HAND FRAG 1350 ⊙ STANDARD PIG FENCE 1500 YDS ⊙
31 MAY ⊙ MINES ANTI PERS M16 QTY 2000 ⊙ FIRING DEVICE DEMO
PRESSURE RELEASE 1350 ⊙ CAPS BLASTING SPEC NON ELECT 1350 ⊙
GREN HAND FRAG 1350 ⊙ STANDARD PIG FENCE 1500 YDS

1 OF 1 YES

HUNT ST 16

S/ Hunt Capt

May 67
280001Z

ROUTINE
1ATF
AFV 1ALSG

SECRET

G870

A Sqn 3Cav Regt 102 Ed Wksp
EME

A VEH M113A1 (FITTER) Code No 6608 ⊙ this veh on charge to A Sqn 3Cav Regt is unserviceable because ∫ non avail ∫ replacement engine and other parts ⊙ due to Ops LEETON and future Ops essential that A Sqn possess serviceable fitters veh ⊙ Request 102 Fd Wksp M113A1 (FITTER) veh complete with CES but less crew be issued temporarily on F1A to A Sqn until own veh repaired ⊙ Est at least one month

/ ∫ /

Gunner Ops / Engr

F Sigs 52-2
Reprinted Dec., 1964

MESSAGE FORM

569-2-26
NUMBER

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME — GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		240300Z	

PREFIX GR

From 1ARY

To 1ATF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
A 0520

Info

REF 1ATF OPS 825 OF 231435 MAY67 ⊙ ACK

Page ____ of ____ pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE
CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME: F. DUNWOODIE
OFFICE: CLERK.
TEL No: EXPRESS

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK
Dunwoodie Sgt

41

MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE-ACTION
PRIORITY

DATE TIME GROUP
23 0650 Z (May 67)

FROM: 7 RAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

TO : A COY B COY C COY D COY SP COY
ADMIN COY MOR PL PNR PL FIRE ASLT PL
CO 2IC S3 RSO RMO IO RSM
A SQN 3 CAV REGT 106 BTY RAA 1 FD SQN
GLO 1 ATF

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
G195

WNG O (.) OP LEETON (.) ALFA (.) 7 RAR IS TO COMPLETE THE BARRIER FROM PHUOC HAI TO HORSESHOE (.) D COY PLUS ONE TP APC'S CMM PNR PL AND ONE SECT MOR IN MOR CARRIER MOV AT 241200H TO PHUOC HAI (.) TASKS (.) FIRST (.) PROTECT PNR PL IN CLEARING AREA OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS AND MARKING OUT FENCE (.) SECOND (.) COMMENCE CLEARING BRUSH ALONG LINE OF FENCE (.) THIRD (.) SECURE LZ FOR FLY IN OF BN VIC PHUOC HAI BY 250800H (.) FOURTH (.) LOCAL PROTECTION OF WIRING PARTIES (.) A COY AND B COY WIRING PARTIES (.) C COY DEPTH PROTECTION (.) BRAVO (.) NO MOV BEFORE 241200H (.) CHARLIE (.) O GP RV 7 RAR BRIEFING TENT 240700H (.) DELTA (.) FIRST REHEARSALS OF WIRING TO BE CONDUCTED ADMIN COY AREA COMMENCING 240900H (.) ALL RANKS DOWN TO AND INCL CPL TO ATTEND (.) SECOND (.) ONE LT OR SGT PER COY TO ACT AS LO TO ARVN POSTS CMM NOMINATIONS TO CP BY 232000H (.) THIRD (.) COY OP STR STATES TO CP BY 232000H

DRAFTER'S NAME
ATKINSON

OFFICE
S3

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK
[signature] Lt

F - Sigs
Reprinted Nov 1963

MESSAGE FORM

569.2-26

(40)

Number

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
~~HQ~~ PRIORITY		240100Z	

From HQ Coy 1ATF.

To HQ 1ATF.

Info

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTD.

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

HQ Coy A558

Ref your OPS 825 of 231435 MAY 67 (.) ACK

Page 1 of 1 pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

~~CLASSIFIED~~ ☐ YES ~~☐ NO~~ /

DRAFTER'S NAME BURSTALL OFFICE ORD Room 7 TEL No

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

Burstall Capt

569-2-26

(39)

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy 42 of 80

7 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

24 May 67

Op 4 (OP LEETON)

Reference Map: VIETNAM 1:25,000 6429

1. Situation

a. En Forces Annex A

b. Friendly Forces

(1) ARVN/RF/PF posts are loc as fol:

(a) 1 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 515535

(b) One Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 514541

(c) 2 Coy 3/48 Bn YS 500570

(d) 612 RF Coy (-) YS 502558 (str 126)

(e) 3 Pl 612 RF Coy YS 511549 (str 20)

(f) 36 PF Pl YS 515536 (str 30)

(2) Sector intends to build up pl posts vic YS 523541 and YS 507560.

(3) 2 RAR/6 RAR assume responsibility for TAOR ptls and barrier protection.

(4) 1 ARU assume responsibility for def of WP and check points from 240800 hrs.

(5) ARVN accept responsibility for def WEST of Route 44 and will NOT mov EAST of present locs.

c. Atts and Dets

(1) Under op con from 250600H - One tp and two mor APC. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
One tp 1 Fd Sqn.

(2) In DS 106 Bty RAA
One OH13 161 Recce Flt.

(3) In sp Max effort 9 Sqn RAAF
LSM
Two dozers 17 Const Sqn
Rebro (HORSESHOE)
CH47 sorties (as required)

CONFIDENTIAL

...Mission...

2. Mission. 7 RAR is to erect a wire barrier from the ARVN pl outpost vic YS 523541 to RF pl outpost vic YS 511549 and the proposed outpost YS 507560.

3. Execution

a. Gen Outline

(1) One coy mounted in APC's plus sect pnr and one sect mor in mor carr mov to and secure area NORTH EAST of PHUOC HAI 24 May 67. Pnr pl commence clearance of proposed fence line and layout of markers and stores. Remainder pnr pl fly in when area secure.

(2) Coy secures LZ NORTH EAST of PHUOC HAI for fly in of remainder of 7 RAR. After fly in 25 May 67 one coy each to build two Type 2 catwire fences, one coy on local protection and one coy protecting approaches.

b. A Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Task.

(a) First fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Erect WEST fence, Type 2 catwire, along line marked by pnr pl and navigation party. Protect fence by ni.

c. B Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Task.

(a) Second fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Erect EAST fence, Type 2 catwire, along line marked by pnr pl and navigation party. Protect fence by ni.

d. C Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Fourth fly in 25 May 67.

(b) Maintain ptls and ambushes on approaches to the barrier in the area shown on trace Annex B.

e. D Coy

(1) Grouping. Normal plus:

(a) Under comd from 240600H to 250900H Sect Pnr pl, sect mor pl.

(b) Under comd from 241200H to 250900H Pnr Pl, Bn navigation party, AQ cell.

(c) Under op con from 240745H to 250900H Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

(d) Att one interpreter.

(2) Tasks

(a) Mov by APC to PHUOC HAI YS 522540.

(b) Clear area near LSM YS 529541 beaching point of mines and booby traps and secure it.

(c) Guide LSM to beaching point and assist as req in unloading.

(d) Protect pnr pl and navigation party during their marking and laying out of def lines.

(e) Follow up pnr pl and assisted by APC's clear area of mines and

(f) Provide protection for dozers working vic map square 5055.

(g) Secure LZ for fly in of 7 RAR vic YS 522541 by 250700H.

(h) Provide close protection for work parties for duration of the op.

f. Mor Pl

(1) Grouping

(a) MFC to each coy.

(b) One sect under comd D Coy from 240600H to 250900H.

(c) Two sects under comd OC Base Area.

(2) Tasks

(a) One sect mov in mor carr with D Coy.

(b) Two sects remain in base area.

(c) Provide fire sp as required.

g. Pnr Pl

(1) Grouping

(a) One sect under comd D Coy from 240600H.

(b) Under comd D Coy from 241200H to 250900H.

(2) Tasks

(a) One sect to mov by road with D Coy with all mine detectors.

(b) Pl less one sect to mov by hel to LZ YS 529541 at 241100H.

(c) Clear LSM beaching point of mines and booby traps.

(d) Clear fence lines, 80 meter gap between fences 20 metres each side of EAST and WEST fence.

(e) Clear area, to be cleared by dozers, of mines and booby traps.

(f) Provide technical advice to coys doing wiring.

(g) Assist tp 1 Fd Sqn in laying minefield (mines without anti-lift devices only).

h. Fire Aslt Pl

(1) Grouping Nil.

(2) Task. Protection of Fire Sp Base and tasks as ordered.

j. Base Area

(1) Grouping

(a) Normal rear elms plus 10 fit men per coy.

(b) Comd by OC Admin Coy.

(2) Tasks

(a) Maint of 7 RAR.

(b) Def of base area.

k. Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

(1) Grouping. Under comd D Coy from 240745H to 250900H.

(2) Tasks

(a) Mov D Coy plus one sect pnr (103 pers) to YS 529541.

(b) Assist D Coy in knocking down scrub along fence lines.

(c) Ptl on EAST approaches as ordered by OC D Coy and later Pn HQ.

l. 106 Bty RAA

(1) Grouping. FO party to each coy.

(2) Task. Fire sp as required from 161 Bty on priority call.

m. Tp 1 Fd Sqn

(1) Tasks. Lay mines with anti-lift devices between fences commencing 26 May 67.

n. OH13 161 Recce Flt

(1) Tasks. Remain on call in present loc.

o. 9 Sqn RAAF

(1) Tasks. Lift pers as fol:

(a) 241100H. Pnr pl less one sect from LUSCOMBE to YS 529542 (24 pers).

(b) 250730H. A Coy from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (94 pers).

(c) Fol by B Coy " " " " (94 pers).

(d) Fol by Bn HQ and Fire Aslt Pl from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (81 pers).

(e) Fol by C Coy from LUSCOMBE to YS 523542 (92 pers).

p. Co-ord Instr

(1) Timings

(a) APC's report 7 RAR	240745H.
(b) D Coy, sect pnr pl, mor sect mov	240800H.
(c) Fly in pnr pl less one sect, and AQ cell commences.	241100H.
(d) LSM arrives PHUOC HAI	241100H.
(e) Fly in 7 RAR commences	250730H.

(2) Liaison

(a) LOs with radios are appointed as fol:

(1)	1 Coy 3/48 Bn	2Lt O'BRIEN c/s 9F.
(11)	Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn	Sgt ALLEN c/s 9G.
(111)	2 Coy 3/48 Bn	WO2 MAHONEY c/s 9H.
(1V)	612 RF Coy	2Lt MARTIN c/s 9J.
(v)	3 Pl 612 RF Coy	Sgt MAY c/s 9K.
(V1)	36 PF Pl	Sgt ADSHEAD c/s 9L.

(b) LO's to accompany navigation party and AQ cell under comd IO in four trucks ¼ ton escorted by two "gun ships". IO to posn LO's and arrange interpreters as required.

(c) IO's party depart 240830H.

(3) Fence Lines

(a) Direction. See trace Annex B.

(b) Type. Type 2 catwire with tie down.

(c) Distance between fences. 80 metres.

(4) Navigation Party. SOP.

4. Admin and Log

Rations.

a. All 7 RAR to carry 3 days plus one emergency rat. Further supply by Maintdem.

b. 7 RAR to provide lunch from 25 May to end of op for 100 ARVN per day (US type one meal packs).

c. Armour and Engr atts to provide own rats.

d. LO's (and their att interpreters) to carry 6 days rats.

Water.

a. 4 full water bottles per man - resupply by one-for-one system.

b. 124 filled water cans to move on Landrovers with A/QM to op loc.

c. 7 RAR to provide water for Engrs and ARVN as required.

Med.

a. Med asst with D Coy to handle all cases until arrival RAP.

b. RAP loc Bn HQ 523541 wef approx 0900 hrs 25 May.

c. "Dust-Off" procedures as normal.

Ammo.

a. Normal 1st line on tps.

b. All magazines in base to be filled and aval at TIGER 5 for emergency resup.

c. Mor ammo - 85 HE, 10 Illg, 5 SMK per Mor.

Radio Btys. One bty per set plus one res carried for each set.

POL. 7 RAR vehs - full tanks plus one jerrycan of petrol and one jerrycan of water.

Wiring Stores and Eqpt. Distr to be advised by 2IC in loc on 25 May.

5. Comd and Sig

a. Bn HQ

(1) Mov in third lift.

(2) Remain vic YS 522541.

b. Radio

(1) SOP plus:

C/S 9F LO 1 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9G LO Pl 1 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9H LO 2 Coy 3/48 Bn

C/S 9J LO 612 RF Coy

C/S 9K LO 3 pl 612 RF Coy

C S 9L LO 36 PF Pl.

(2) Rebro on HORSESHOE.

c. Line. Bn HQ area only as ordered.

d. Codes. As issued plus additional points of origin as fol:

(1)	250800 to 260800 May	CONDIMENT	5255
(2)	260800 to 270800 May	CITY	5156
(3)	270800 to 280800 May	GIRLS NAME	5254
(4)	280800 to 290800 May	CLOTHING	5155
(5)	290800 to 300800 May	TOOTHPASTE	5154
(6)	300800 to 310800 May	COUNTRY	5254

ACKNOWLEDGE

(Eric H SMITH)
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

ANNEXES: A. En Forces.
B. Layout of Ops.

Official

(D.K. ATKINSON)
Maj
S3

Distribution. List C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex 'A' to 7 RAR
OP 4 dated May 67

EN FORCES

1. The AO lies astride the southern approach route used by the VC to enter and/or harass the populated areas of southern PHUOC TUY. PHOUC HAI has been the tgt for mor attacks; LO GOM was attacked by a VC Bn on 21 Mar, and other villages on Route 44 have suffered attacks and harassment by main force, provincial and district units.

2. Main base areas used by VC are the thickly timbered country NORTH of the SONG BA DAT and the LONG HAI hills to the WEST. VC def posns (incl up to coy size posn), camps and food caches have been found recently NORTH and SOUTH of the RACH ONG HEM, specifically in squares 5256, 5355 and further to the EAST in 5556.

3. The area has been used as an AO by 2 Bn 275 Regt. It is a traditional AO for D445 Bn, and the LONG DAT District Coy makes forays against it from the LONG HAI hills.

4. VC production units (generally small groups) may be encountered working the fields or sending livestock throughout the AO. These people are contacted by commo-liaison personnel from either VC province procurement cells or VC logistic representatives of Group 84. Logistics units of Group 84 up to coy str may also be discovered on procurement missions in or close to the AO.

5. No main force units are believed to be presently in the AO. Elms of D445 have recently been ident in the northern base area and the LONG DAT Coy is believed to be in base areas in the LONG HAI hills. In the last week there have been minor clashes between ARVN and VC in DAT DO and near PHOUC LOI. LO GOM is a tgt for spasmodic mor attacks and this contingency should be considered in planning.

6. There is increasing evidence that the fence is proving to be a growing source of annoyance and inconvenience to the VC and maximum preventative action should be taken to prevent him from conducting either close recce or undetected assembly for counter-attack at any level against our ops.

7. Once the VC can judge the intended dir of the fence he may attempt to booby trap along that line.

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex 'B' to 7 RAR
OP 4 dated May 67



Recommencement of wiring.

MAY 23 RML

38

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE 752/1/1 (CONTINUED)

29

N 050/25.

EVV JJ[illegible]O RAMABC

DE RAMAC 007 23/0100Z

ZNY SSSSS

O 23YRTZ

FM AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

TO RAMABC/1 ATF

INFO RAMAAC/1 ALSG

Recommencement of wiring.

BT

S E C R E T OPS 07668 YOUR OPS 818 OF 221600Z CMM REF ALFA• 1 ALSG

OPS 5286 OF 210200Z OF 210200Z CMM REF BRAVO• VERNON STURDEE• IN THE LIGHT OF REF BRAVO PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER ONE DAY DEFERMENT OF

TASK IS POSSIBLE

BT

reference is not on file.

TOR 23/0629

NNNNV

GX C

[illegible] RGBRBFZIYHMZHTDHBR BQDUFQRMRYMYSYPPBDZL

BG

Recommencement of wiring

MAY 23 PM

38

IN 050/25

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE 752/1/1 (CONTINUED)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FM AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

TO RAMABC/1 ATF

INFO RAMAAC/1 ALSG

BT

S E C R E T OPS 07668 YOUR OPS 818 OF 22[redacted] CMM REF ALFA. 1 ALSG

OPS 5286 OF 210200Z OF 210200Z CMM REF BRAVO. VERNON STURDEE. IN THE LIGHT OF REF BRAVO PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER ONE DAY DEFERMENT OF

TASK IS POSSIBLE

BT

Recommencement of wiring

reference is not on file.

TOR 23/0629

59

NNNNV

GX C

(P)(2) RGBRBFZIYHMZHTDHBR BQDUFQRMRYMYSYPPBDZL

G 25/5

NNNNERE MATE THAT WAS ØØ4 NOT ØØ3 BY MY RECORDS IS THEI THIS CORRECT

KKKKKK

37

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE AUST

G 752/1/1

26

TYEAH THE FIRST ONE WE SENT TO YOU UNDER ØØ3 WAS CANCELLED THERE WAS NOTE ON THE BOTTOM TAKE THE SECOND ONE AS THREE

HERE Ø4

IN 021/24.

VV MBAØØ4

PP RAMABC

DE RAMAAC Ø52 24/2130Z

ZNY SSSSS

P 242100Z

FM 1 ALSG

TO RAMABC/1 ATF

INFO RAMAC/AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

RAMAC/ 1 LOG COMD (TAN SON NHUT)

ZEN/VUNG TAU SUB PORT

BT

TOR 2340 838 BT

S E C R E T QOPS53Ø2. MOVEMENT OF DOZERS BY SEA. YOUR OPS ~~223~~ OF 231112Z (NOT TO ALL).

ONE. LCW 1523 SAILED FOR RENDEZVOUS 25Ø35ØH. ETA IS 1ØØØ HRS.

TWO. COMD LCW BRIEFED THAT HE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT A BEACHING IN OTHER THAN FAVOURABLE WEATHER AND THAT HE REMAINS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS SHIP.

THREE. BRIEFED ALSO THAT BEACH PARTY WOULD PROVIDE SAME FACILITIES AS FOR LSM. OUR QOPS 5295 OF 231745Z REFERS.

FOUR. SHIP - BEACH RADIO. AS FOR LSM.

FIVE. AT REQUEST OF ASTER OF LCW TWO OFFICERS FROM LSM EMBARKED TO ASSIST HIM. (FOR AFV. LSM REMAINS OPERATIONAL IN INLAND WATERS)

BT

F - Sigs 52 - 1
Reprinted July 1966

MESSAGE FORM

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE
752/1/1
NUMBER

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

36 ~~25~~

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP
PRIORITY		23 1112 Z

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

From 1 ATF

To CG IIIFV

Info 1st Logistic Command (TAN SON NHUT 9s838
1 LSG VUNG TAU

Request priority approval be given for LCU to deliver 1/2 bull dozen from VUNG TAU to area of the Banana YS 525 538 tomorrow. Our LCU unable to land today and now unserviceable. Transportation at VUNG TAU believe job possible depending on weather and tide by Marines

Page ____ of ____ pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME OFFICE TELE No.

FOR OPS. USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

008 /24

752-1-1

NOV 24 AM

(35) ~~24~~

NNNNMVVVMVMMVV OBA022 UAJ

PP RAMABC

ZNR UUUUU ZOV RAMAC

UU

PRIORITY

PP RAMAC

DE RAMAAC 002 24/0010Z

ZNR UUUUU

P 232310Z

FM VERNON STURDEE

TO ZEN/HQ 1 ALSG

INFO RAMAC/HQ 1 ATF

BT

UNCLAS SS3/219. REF YOUR Q OPS 5296. CONFIRMED

BT

TOR 24/0200

29.

TOP (9L01)

752-1-1

IN/139/23/1920

34

23

Landing

~~PRIORITY~~

VTVD011"VV VBA 039 HH
PP RAMABC
DE RAMAAC 056 23/1900Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 231900Z
FM 1 ALSG
TO ZEN/VERNON STURDEE
INFO RAMABC/1 ATF
BT

SECRET

S E C R E T QOPS5296. CONFIRM BY 0630 HRS THAT BEACHING POINT IS TO BE HEADING OF 325 DEGREES TRUE ON YS530540.
FOR 1ATF. OUR QOPS5295 OF 231745Z AND YOUR OPS804 OF 231400Z REFER
BT

NNNN

→ G Br.

~~PRIORITY~~

Routine

~~PRIORITY~~ / / 127 / 23 / 1835

752-1-1

MAY 24 A.M.

(33)

(22)

SECRET

NNNNVV BA 039 HH
PR[redacted]MAC RAMABC
DE RAMAAC 055 23/7745Z
ZNY SSSSS
P 231745Z
FM 1 ALSG
TO ZEN/AV VERNON STURDEE
INFO RAMAC/AUST FORCE VIETNAM
RAMABC/1 ATF
BT

S E C R E T QOPS5295. OP TASKING FOR 24 MAY.
CONFIRMING DISCUSSIONS COMD AND DAQMG 1 ATF - MASTER - DAQMG(OPS)
1 ALSG OF 23 MAY.
ONE. YOU ARE TO LOAD COMMENCING 240130H TWO TD 15 DOZERS WITH OPERATORS
ONE TLR DOZER STORES WIRING STORES FOR 1000 YDS FENCE FIFTY PICKET
DRIVEING DOLLIES.
TWO. YOU ARE TO PROCEED TO BEACH AREA YS530540 AT 241100H TO DISCHARGE
STORES. DOZERS ARE PRIORITY FOR DISCHARGE.
THREE. YOU RETAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF YOUR VESSEL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ALSG OP INSTR 1/67. IN PARTICULAR YOUR
DECISIONS ON BEACHING/LEAVING THE BEACH ARE FINAL.
FOUR. 1 ATF ARE PROVIDING CLN
PROTECTION AT BEACHING POINT
BEACH MARKER (APC WITH FLUORESCENT PANELS)

PAGE 2 RAMAAC 055 S E C R E T ~~PRIORITY~~
RECCE OF ROUTE FROM SHIP TO EXIT FROM BEACH
ASSISTANCE WITH UNLOADING IF REQUIRED.
FIVE. ALFA. SHIP- BEACH RADIO AS NOTIFIED SEPARATELY.
BRAVO. SITREP TO THIS HQ ON BEACHING AND LEAVING BEACH
BT

NNNN

FILE & bring back.

752/1/1

21

32

IN 15/21/ORD

TOR 0400 BB.

8 -;3 ,95 &95 6974 005
WKKKKKKKKKKPE

3;;FV VBA005 HH
RR RAMABC
DE RAMAAC 002 21"0210Z
ZNY SSSSS
R 210200Z
FM 1 ALSG
TO RAMABC/1 ATF
INFO RAMAC/AUSTFORCE VIETNAM
ZEN/VERNON STURDEE
BT
S E C R E T Q OPS 5286 VERNON STURDEE. REF AUSTFORCE Q07500 OF 200 430Z. ONE. SUBJECT TO AVAL OF BERTH AT SAIGON PRESENT PLAN IS FOR LSM TO LOAD MON CMM MOVE SAIGON WED CMM RETURN VUNG TAU LATE THU. GRATE-FUL YOU KEEP IN MIND IN PLANNING TWO. IF YOUR TASK EVENTUATES MASTER WOULD REQUIRE AIR RECCE IF POSSIBLE
BT

NNNNAVZCZCVBA

F Sigs 52-2
Reprinted Oct 63
C.D.O. 9855

MESSAGE FORM

569-2-46

Number .....

MAY 24 A.M.

[redacted] CEN/SIGNALS USE .....

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME — GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
		2401452	31

PREFIX ..... GR .....

From 104 SIG SQN

To 1 ATF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
SIGS 047

Info

YOUR OPS 825 OF 231435 MAY 67 @ ACK

Page ..... of ..... pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME LAWRENCE

OFFICE OC

TELE No

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

Lawrence Maj

File

SECRET

Copy No

1 ATF

231435 May 67

OPS 825

69

30

Frag O 2/67 (Op LEETON)
To: Lt Col E.H. Smith, CO 7 RAR
Maps: VIETNAM 1:25,000 Sheet 6429 I NW
Time Zone used throughout this order: HOTEL.

1. Situation.

a. En Forces. Annex A.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) The loc of ARVN/RF/PF outposts are as fols:

(a)	1st Coy 3/48 Bn	YS515535.
(b)	One pl 1st Coy 3/48 Bn	YS514541.
(c)	2nd Coy 3/48 Bn	YS500570.
(d)	612th RF Coy (-)	YS502558.(Str 126)
(e)	3rd Pl 612th RF Coy	YS511549. (Str 20)
(f)	36th PF Pl	YS515536. (Str 30)

(2) Sector intends to build a pl post at approx YS523541 and YS507560.

c. Atts and Dets.

(1) Under op con from 250600 May -
One tp and two mortar APC A Sqn 3 Cav
One tp 1 Fd Sqn Regt

(2) In DS - One bty 1 Fd Regt
One OH13 161 Recce Flt

(3) In sp - Max effort 9 Sqn RAAF
LSM
Two dozers 17 Const Sqn
Rebro (HORSESHOE)
CH47 sorties (as required)

2. Mission.

a. You are to erect a wire barrier from the ARVN pl outpost at approx YS523541 to link the RF pl outpost at YS511549 and the proposed outpost at YS507560.

b. Your task begins on 24 May and ends 30 May.

3. Execution.

a. Tasks in Gen.

(1) Engr stores and dozers will be landed by LSM on 25 May, details later.

/(2)

SECRET

(2) You are to assist Sector forces as far as possible in the const of the ARVN pl outpost.

(3) You are to provide your own security during the const of the barrier.

b. Tasks in Particular.

(1) You are to secure the LSM landing site by 250800 May.

(2) You are to const the barrier 80 metres wide. Each fence is of double cat wire with strainers inside.

(3) You are to leave a gap, 15 metres wide at the SE cnr of the outpost at YS511549. This gap is to have four thicknesses of wire either side of the gap.

(4) You are to clear as much of the vegetation EAST of Route 44 as is possible consistent with your main task.

4. Admin and Log.

a. Engr and Def Forces.

(1) 1000 metres of cat wire Type 2 wiring stores will be carried on the LSM, on 5 X 2½ ton trucks.

(2) Balance of wiring stores will be del by CH47 under arrangements HQ 1 ATF.

(3) All wiring tools less a small unit reserve at present held by units 1 ATF will be del to QM 7 RAR on F1A by 241700 hrs for the period ending 311500 hrs.

(4) Reinforced shell cases, to be used as 4 inch dollies for US pickets, will be carried on the LSM.

(5) Mines M16 will be del by CH47 commencing 26 May.

b. Resupply.

(1) Units are responsible for their own resupply.

(2) Unit forecasts in excess of capability are to be submitted to DAQMG ASP.

5. Comd and Sig.

a. HQ 1 ATF remains present loc.

b. Callsigns and frequencies as shown in SOI except for rebro, details later.

c. Password and Q hr as notified.

d. Points of origin as notified, plus:

(1) 250800 to 260800 May CONDIMENT 5255.

/(2)

(2)	260800 to 270800 May	CITY	5156.
(3)	270800 to 280800 May	GIRLS NAME	5254.
(4)	280800 to 290800 May	CLOTHING	5155.
(5)	290800 to 300800 May	TOOTHPASTE	5154.
(6)	300800 to 310800 May	COUNTRY	5254.

ACK

(S.C. Graham)
Brig
Comd

Annex: A. En Forces.

Distribution:

List Z
2 RAR (73-74)

Authentication

(S.J. Maizey)
Maj
Ops 1

SECRET

Annex A to 1 ATF
FRAG O 2/67 of 23 May 67

EN FORCES

The AO lies astride the southern approach route used by the VC to enter and/or harass the populated areas of southern PHOUC TUY. PHOUC HAI has been the tgt for Mor attacks; LO GOM was attacked by a VC Bn on 21 Mar, and other villages on Route 44 have suffered attacks and harassment by main force, provincial and district units.

Main base areas used by VC are the thickly timbered country north of the SONG BA DAT and the LONG HAI hills to the WEST. VC def posns (incl up to Coy size posn), camps and food caches have been found recently NORTH and SOUTH of the RACH ONG HEM, specifically in squares 5256, 5355 and further to the east in 5556.

The area has been used as an AO by 2 Bn 275 Regt. It is a traditional AO for D445 Bn, and the LONG DAT District Coy makes forays against it from the LONG HAI hills.

VC production units (generally small groups) may be encountered working the fields or sending livestock throughout the AO. These people are contacted by commo-liaison personnel from either VC province procurement cells or VC logistic representatives of Group 84. Logistics units of Group 84 up to Coy str may also be discovered on procurement missions in or close to the AO.

No main force units are believed to be presently in the AO. Elms of D445 have recently been ident in the northern base area and the LONG DAT Coy is believed to be in base areas in the LONG HAI hills. In the last week there have been minor clashes between ARVN and VC in DAT DO and near PHOUC LOI. LO GOM is a tgt for spasmodic mor attacks and this contingency should be considered in planning.

There is increasing evidence that the fence is proving to be a growing source of annoyance and inconvenience to the VC and maximum preventative action should be taken to prevent him from conducting either close recce or undetected assembly for counter-attack at any any level against our ops.

Once the VC can judge the intended dir of the fence he may attempt to booby trap along that line.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

29

[redacted] HH

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

O 230320Z

FM 1 ALSG

TO RAMABC/1 ATF

INFO RAMAC/AFV

[redacted]

/N031/ORD

S E C R E T. Q OPS 5292. YOUR OPS 818 OF 221600Z(.) OP LEETON(.)
ONE(.) ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO LOAD TWO DOZERS
TD 15 PLUS FIVE TRUCKS WIRING STORES WED 24
MAY FOR DEL THU 25 MAY(.)
TWO(.) MASTER LCM AND REP THIS HQ TO VISIT YOU
APPROX 1500 HRS TODAY(.)
THREE(.) EFFECT OF PROVIDING THIS EFFORT FROM LSG
RESOURCES WILL BE TO CUT BACK PROGRESS ON
RESITING WKSPS BEFORE RAINS BY FIFTY PERCENT(.)
FOUR. REQUIRE VEHS TO BE RETURNED TO ALSG WITHOUT
DELAY
FIVE(.) FURTHER RESUPPLY OF WIRING STORES SHOULD BE
BY AIR

[redacted]

TOR 23/0400Z

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

NNN

File

Priority

May 67
230001Z

Secret
OPS 821

28

IADF

List I

OP LEETON O Propose to commence mining and clearing of barrier O Work to be predicated on 7Knt down to 4 Sqn 2 Cdo Coy comm by day comm to 1 Sqn O Engr stores and divers have been requested to be std by 4 Sqn O Area of ops vic PHUOC HAI O Timings from 25 to 30 May incl O Flag O cleared 23 May O Responsibilities for WP comm check pts comm bdys in TAOR remain as shown in Op Instr 15/67 dated 5 May

1 of 1 Yes

SMITH

Brigadier

Sgt Brooks.
Enemy encampments.
Intelligence.
16/5

OPS 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No 53 of 76

5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

OPS 601

142130H Mar 67

27

Frag O 1/67 (OP LEETON)

Ref : No change from OPO 8/67 (OP LEETON)

Time Zone used throughout this order : HOTEL.

1. Situation.

a. En Forces. No change.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1 ATF Concept of Ops.

(a) OP LEETON. No change.

(b) OP PORTSEA. The op is scheduled to commence not before 18 Mar and has the following tasks.

i. Search and destroy the enemy in the area EAST of Dat Do to the Song Rai River.

ii. Open Route 23 from Dat Do to the Song Rai River and later to Xuyen Moc.

iii. Open Route 327 from Duc Thanh.

iv. Clear Route 328 to the sea.

v. Repair and extend the existing airfield at Xuyen Moc.

vi. Relocation of certain villages and squatters.

c. Atts and Dets.

(1)	Remaining under comd	One tp and two mor APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
		One TD 15B
		One combat engr team.
(2)	Under comd from 160700H	One combat engr team
		Two mor APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
(3)	Remaining in DS	103 Fd Bty RAA.
(4)	Remaining in sp	One H13.

2. Mission. 5 RAR is to complete OP LEETON and prepare for OP PORTSEA.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) A Coy (-). TAOR patrolling.

(b) B Coy. Standby/duty coy.

(c) C Coy(+). Build a wire fence from Horseshoe feature at Phuoc Loi.

(d) D Coy. Continue with prep of the Horseshoe feature.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) A Coy in APCs clear AO ALICE.

(b) B Coy. Patrol the TAOR.

(c) C Coy (+). No change.

(d) D Coy. No change.

b. A Coy.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping. One pl under comd C Coy from 160700H. This pl will revert to under comd D Coy from 1800H to 0700H nightly.

(b) Tasks.

i. Continue patrol programme. See 5 RAR R569-1-9(A) of 10 Mar.

ii. All patrols must be capable of returning to the base within 12 hours.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping.

i.	Under comd	Sect mor pl in APCs
		One combat engr team
ii.	Reverting to under comd	One pl from C Coy.
iii.	In Sp	One tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

b. Tasks. Clear AO ALICE.

c. B Coy.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks. Duty/standby coy. 5 RAR R569-1-9(A) of 10 Mar refers.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks.

i. Provide a five day foot patrol inside Line ALPHA in the NW

in the NW of the TAOR. Details later.

ii. Be prepared to take over the construction of the wire fence from C Coy.

d. C Coy.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping.

i.	Under comd from 160700H	One sect Aslt Pnr Pl Recce Pl Combat Engr Team.
ii.	Under comd from 160700H until 1800H daily	One pl A Coy.
iii.	In sp from 160700H	One tp (+) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt One TD 15 B.

(b) Tasks.

i. At 160700H move by APCs to the Horseshoe Feature and build a wire fence from the Horseshoe Feature to Phuoc Loi.

ii. Release the pl of A Coy to D Coy at 1800H each day.

iii. Move into a harbour/ambush position by night to cover approaches to the wire fence and to protect engr stores.

iv. Recce Pl in APCs to patrol the Horseshow TAOR and provide protection to the wiring party.

v. Effect liaison with Sub-Sector Dat Do regularly to determine the exact location of the fence gaps.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping.

i.	Under comd D Coy from 1800H/0700H.	One pl
ii.	Reverting to under comd A Coy.	One pl
iii.	Reverting to under comd A Coy	Tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt less two mor APCs

(b) Tasks.

i. Provide one pl from 1800H to 0700H nightly to assist D Coy protect the Horseshoe Feature.

ii. Continue to build the wire fence.

iii. Be prepared to take in support elms of ARVN to assist in the construction of the fence.

e. D Coy.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping.

/i. Remaining under comd

i. Remaining under comd — One sect Aslt Pnr Pl

ii. Under comd from 161800H to 0700H nightly — One pl A Coy.

iii. In loc — One sect M or Pl

(b) Tasks. No change.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping.

i. Rel to under comd A Coy — One pl A Coy

ii. Under comd from 1800H to 0700H nightly — One pl C Coy.

(b) Tasks. No change.

f. Mor Pl.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping.

i. Pl less one sect remains in the base area.

ii. One sect in loc D Coy.

(b) Tasks.

i. Base Area Sects. Base area def and sp for the A Coy patrols.

ii. D Coy Sect. Support of C Coy and D Coys.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping.

i. Pl less two sects in base area.

ii. Sect in loc at D Coy.

iii. Sect in APC under comd A Coy.

(b) Tasks.

i. Base Area Sect. No change.

ii. A Coy Sect. Be prepared to move in APCs from the base in sp of A Coy.

iii. D Coy Sect. Be prepared to move with C Coy to give sp to C and D Coys when wiring teams move out of range.

g. Aslt Pnr Pl..

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping..

i. One sect remains under comd D Coy.

ii. One sect under comd C Coy from 160700..

(b) Tasks. C Coy sect to assist C Coy in the construction of the wire fence.

(2) OP PORTSEA. No change from OP LEETON.

h. Recce Pl.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping. Under comd C Coy from 160700H.

(b) Tasks. With the aid of APCs patrol the Horseshoe TAOR and protect the C Coy wiring party. OC Recce Pl is to comd the APC/Recce Pl gp.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks. Patrol by foot and protect the C Coy wiring party.

i. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks.

i. At 160700H move C Coy (+) from their lines to the Horseshoe feature.

ii. Provide two APCs to assist C Coy with the loading of def stores.

iii. Provide tpt to the Recce Pl to protect the C Coy wiring party and patrol the Horseshoe TAOR.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping. As for OP LEETON except:

i. Under comd A Coy — Two Mor APCs

ii. Under comd 5RAR — One ACV

(b) Tasks.

i. Move A Coy to AO ALICE.

ii. Provide one tpt to A Coy to search A O ALICE.

iii. When ordered provide two mor APCs to move a sect of mors in sp of C Coy and to carry def stores to C Coy.

j. Arty.

(1) OP LEETON. No change.

(2) OP PORTSEA. Details later.

k. Engrs.

(1) OP LEETON.

(a) Grouping.

i. Remaining under comd D Coy. One engr combat team.

ii. Under comd C Coy from 160700H. One TD 15B
One engr combat team.

(b) Tasks.

i. C Coy team. Daily mine clearing.

ii. D Coy team. No change.

iii. Clear a path for the wire fence.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Grouping. Under comd A Coy. One engr combat team.

(b) Tasks. A Coy C Coy D Coy teams - mine and booby trap clearing.

l. 161 Recce Flt. No change.

m. Air. No change.

o. Coord Instrs.

(1) Timings.

(a) 160700H. C Coy (+) move to commence fence construction.

(b) D Day OP PORTSEA. Not before 18 Mar.

(2) AO ALICE. South of the Soug Ba Dap and EAST of Route TL 44 excl PHUOC HAI.

(3) Wire Fence.

(a) Type.

i. Two double cat wire fences approx 100 metres apart.

ii. There is to be a single apron on the outside of each fence.

(b) Location.

i. Details later.

ii. Rough location - SE from the Horseshoe feature to LTL 23 then SOUTH along the EAST BUND of Dat Do to 502577 on the Phuoc Loi bund thence along the Phuoc Loi bund to Route TL 44.

(c) Gaps. Details later.

(d) Def Stores. In loc at the Horseshoe feature.

(e) Wiring Stores. Available from the Asst QM from 151600H.

(4) A Coy, B Coy Patrols. Details later.

5. Administration and Logistics.

a. Water. For tps operating near the Horseshoe all water is to be drawn from the Horseshoe feature.

b. Rations.

(1) OP LEETON. Three days combat rations to be carried by the C Coy group.

(2) OP PORTSEA. Three days combat rations to be carried by the A Coy group and Bn HQ and 5 days for B Coy.

6. Command and Signals.

a. Rear Area Comd. Capt BADE.

b. Bn HQ.

(1) OP LEETON. Remain present location.

(2) OP PORTSEA.

(a) Personnel as per SOP less following:

i. RP's. CO's escort to go on op.

ii. Sp Coy ord and clerk.

iii. RMO and RAP elm.

iv. Int dutyman. One Int dutyman required on op.

(b) Sig pl linesmen to be returned to Nui Dat when line tasks for Bn HQ and D Coy is complete.

(c) Bn HQ to move to Horseshoe feature.

c. Radio.

(1) Current SOI apply with amendments as detailed below.

(2) Bn Comd Net.

(a) Frequencies. Main 45.6, Alt 55.1.

(b) Deletions. From 160700H - Recce Pl.

(3) Additions and deletions to coy internal nets will be made as required. Pls use their own callsigns regardless of net joined.

(4) AQ Flick Net. Frequency 37.8.

(5) C Coy Comd Net. Frequency. Main 57.2 Alt 45.2

(6) Rear Base Def Net.

(a) Frequency. 43.2 (Admin Coy Net).

(b) Callsigns.

Control	90
A Coy	1ØB
B Coy	2ØB
C Coy	3ØB
D Coy	4ØB

(c) Effective from commencement of OP PORTSEA until completion of OP PORTSEA.

(d) When any coy vacates its base loc for any operation, the coy rear details will join the Bn Comd net using the callsigns shown allocated to companies in Para 5 c. (6) (b) above.

d. Line.

(1) Normal Bn HQ line will be laid.

(2) Line to be laid from Bn HQ to D Coy.

(3) Sig Pl linesmen to continue on linelaying within D Coy Horseshoe feature.

e. Point of Origin Code, Q Hour. As issued.

f. Codes. As issued.

g. Nicknames. To be effective at commencement of OP PORTSEA. Time to be advised.

Nickname	Meaning	Issued By
BOOT BRUSH	Move/Moving	All callsigns
TIE PIN	Clearing Ptls Out	"
HAT BAND	" " In	"
SHIRT TAIL	Stand To	"
SHOE LACE	Stand down	"
CHIN STRAP	Ambush	"
BOOK WORM	Lift ambush	"
BULL WHIP	Harbour	"
STICKY TAPE	Cordon in posn	"

Ack Instrs ACK.

Headquarters 1 Bde
(J.A. Warr)
Lt Col
CO
AOD

Distribution:	Number of Copies:	Copy No 53 of 76
A Coy	2	1 - 2
B Coy	2	3 - 4
C Coy	2	5 - 6
D Coy	2	7 - 8
Sp Coy	1	9
Recce Pl	1	10
Aslt Pnr Pl	1	11
Mor Pl	1	12
Sig Pl	1	13
Admin Coy	3	14-16
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	3	17-19
1 Fd Regt	5	20-24
103 Fd Bty	2	25-26
Bty A 1/83 US Arty	1	27
161 Fd Bty RNZA	1	28
1 Fd Sqn	1	29
103 Sig Sqn	1	30
6 RAR	1	31
3 SAS Sqn	1	32
1 ARU	1	33
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	1	34
1 ATF	24	35-58
CO	1	59
2IC	1	60
Adjt	1	61
Asst Adjt	1	62
IO	1	63
OC Sp Coy	1	64
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HQ 1ST TASK FORCE
FILE
569/2/26
(CONTINUED)

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETANM
NUI DAT

26

9 May 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 080001H to 082400H May 67.

TO: Commanding General,
II Field Force, Vietnam (4)

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON. Patrolling continued with negative contact. Operation LISMORE concluded at 1900H when all elements involved had returned to 1 ATF.

(2) LRRP.

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted cf more than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt concluded Operation LISMORE at 1900H when participating elements returned to 1 ATF. At 1250H at YS518567 two VN were detained by 2 Troop when they presented Chieu Hoi leaflets. They were evacuated to 1 ATF.

(4) Task Force Artillery concluded support for Operation LISMORE. At approximately 1600H A Bty 2/35 Artillery returned from the Horseshoe feature YS4962 to 1 ATF. 58 H and I missions were fired during the reporting period.

(6) 6 RAR continued patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(6) 7 RAR concluded Operation LISMORE at 081900H. At 1042H a hut 20x6 feet was located at YS546587 and was destroyed. At 1023H two old enemy camps of unknown size at YS549589 and YS532554 were located. No further details are available. At 1300H A Coy, D Coy and Bn HQ were airlifted to 1 ATF base location C Coy was lifted by A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and returned to 1 ATF at 1900H.

(7) Air Support. There were no airstrikes in the TAOR during the reporting period. Surveillance of the TAOR continued.

(8) Plans for the next 24 hours. Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR continues.

b. Major Unit Operations.

(1) through (7) no change.

(8) 081900H May 67.

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(9) Results (accumulative).

AUST LOSSES	ENEMY LOSSES
NIL	5 VC KIA (BC) 2 VC KIA (poss) 3 VC WIA 6 Detainees 1 weapon 28 bunkers destroyed 6 huts destroyed 1 sampan destroyed 2 x 44 gal drums of rice destroyed. 24 weapon pits destroyed 2⅛ tons unpolished rice destroyed Small quantity of documents recovered. 3 packs recovered Armourers tools Booby trap manufacturing equipment 2 ox-carts 2 oxen 1 cement lined well destroyed 5 fish farms destroyed One mine and booby trap school destroyed.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

C. Objectives No change.

D. Forces.

D1	7 RAR	C2	081042H/081130H	AUST	NIL	NIL
D2	2/A Sqn	C2	081250H/081300H	-	NIL	NIL

K. Losses/Damages.

K1. Enemy.

D2.	2/A Sqn	2/UNK	2 Detainees (CHIEU HOI)	NIL	NIL

K2. Enemy

D1.	7 RAR	NIL/ NIL	1xhut destroyed	NIL

K3. Nil.

K4. Nil.

-/3.

K5. Comapny - Nil.
Platoon - Four.
Squad - One.

BRIG
COMD

Copies to:

HQ AFV (2)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)
:osts A, D and E.

Internal:

Ops 1
Ops 2
CP (2)
PR (1)
Diary (2)

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569-2-26

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

25

3 May 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 020001H to 022400H

TO: Commanding General,
II Field Force, Vietnam (4)

Copy To: HQ AFU
HQ NZ Force, Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1ATF commenced Operation LISMORE at 020643H. Operation LEETON continued with negative contact. Patrolling of the TOAR was continued. At YS403823 at 021045H three VC were ambushed by a LRRP. En casualties were 3 KIA (BC). There were no friendly casualties.

(2) LRRP.

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - One.

(3) A Sqn commenced Operation LISMORE at 0643H. Location is YS594608.

(4) Task Force Artillery continued in support of operations LEETON and LISMORE. Locations are unchanged except for Bty A 2/35 Arty - YS4962. 23 H and I missions were fired in the reporting period.

(5) 6 RAR Continued Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact. At YS502589 the wire fence was cut with a large charge. The gap was approximately twenty metres wide. At YS500587 the inner fences had been cut with a large charge. The gap was approximately twenty metres wide. At YS498586 the inner fence was cut in one placeand the outer fence cut in two places. All cuts are approximately thirty metres wide. At YS498580 all three fences were cut to a width of twelve feet. The cuttings occured at approximately 0320H and all have been repaired.

(6) 7 RAR commenced Operation LISMORE at 0643H. There was negative contact.

Locations are: A Coy - YS590588
B Coy - YS590606
C Coy - YS599601
D Coy - YS599621
Bn HQ - YS601604

(7) Air Support. At 0630H between Eastings 53 to 56 Northings 70 to 72 a preplanned B52 strike on VC camp uncovered five tunnels, 350 metres of trench and destroyed one tunnel, 45 bunkers, 4 large military structors and one circular trench forty metres long. There were some suspected KBA sighted but not confirmed. At 0915H at YS555705 an airstrike on VC camp uncovered fifty metres of trench and destroyed two bunkers.

(8) Plans for the next 24 hours. Operations LEETON and LISMORE and patrolling of the TAOR continue.

b. Major Unit Operations.

(1) LISMORE.

(2) Search and destroy.

(3) Destroy VC installation and VC in area.

(4) AO - Area bounded by YS510598 to YS600620 to YS595576 to YS522536 to YS510598.

(5) 7 RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, Bty A 2/35 Arty, 161 Bty RNZA.

(6) 1 ATF.

(7) 020643H.

(8) N/A

(9) Nil

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

C. Objective:

C1. Phoûc Tuy Phuoc Tuy Search and destroy LISMORE 020643H.

D. Forces.

D1. Nil.

K. Losses/Damages.

K1. Enemy.

D1.	1 SAS	3VC/UNK	3VCKIA(BC)	NIL	1 US M1 carbine 1 Fr Mat 49 SMG
					NIL

K2. NIL.

K3. NIL.

K4. NIL.

K5. Company - Four.
Platoon - Three.
Squad - Three.

K5A. One.

GRAHAM
BRIG

Distribution:

Lists A, D and E.

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S3

569-1-26

IN79/01

29

NNNNVV OBA065A UU

RR RAMABC

DE RAMAC 089 0170615Z

ZNR UUUUU

R 010613Z

ROUTINE

FM HQ NZ V FORCE

TO 1 ATF

BT

UNCLAS 53 PT 2. YOUR OPS 618 OF 221535H APR 67. ACK

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

TOR 21182
B71

569-2-26

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1 ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

(13)

1 May 67

SUBJECT: Commanders Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 300001H to 302400H

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force, Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON and PUCKARPUNYAL with negative contact. Patrolling was continued with no contact.

(2) LRRP

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil

( ) Number of patrols extracted of more 24 hours duration - One.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt remained in 1 ATF base location for maintenance.

(4) Task Force Artillery continued in support of Operations LEETON and PUCKAPUNYAL. Locations are unchanged. 52 H and I missions were fired in the reporting period.

(5) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(6) 7 RAR continued Operation PUCKAPUNYAL with two platoon ambush patrols. There was negative contact.

(7) Air Support. At YS 335687 at 0020H an air-strike was conducted on a VC Company camp. There was negative BDA due to foliage. At YS 562748 at 1135H an airstrike was conducted on a VC Base camp damaging two bunkers. At YS 665817 at 1525H an airstrike on a VC base camp destroyed 30 metres of trench and uncovered 2 bunkers.

(8) Plans for next 24 hours. Operation LEETON continues. Operation PUCKAPUNYAL concludes at 011000H.. Patrolling continues.

b. Major Unit Operations

(1) through (9) No change.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

C. Objectives - No change.

D. Forces

K. Losses/Damages -NIL

K1. NIL

K2. NIL

K3. NIL

K4. NIL

K5. Company - Nil.
Platoon - Three.
Squad - Nil.

GRAHAM
BRIG

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J Wilkinson Capt
MAIZEY
S3

569-2-26

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

29 Apr 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 280001H to 282400H Apr 67.

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force, Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation PUCKAPUNYAL, Operation LEETON and patrolling continued with negative contact.

(2) LRRP.

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - One.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. 2 Tp conducted a convoy escort to YS599637 at 0800H. The remainder continued maintenance and training in 1 ATF base locality.

(4) Task force artillery continued support for Operation PUCKAPUNYAL. At 1452H 161 Field Bty RNZA was airlifted from a Fire Support Base at YS391683 to HORSESHOE feature YS4962 in support of Operation LEETON. Support for Operation LEETON continued and 52 H and I missions were fired in the reporting period.

(5) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON with negative contact.

(6) 7 RAR continued Operation PUCKAPUNYAL. At 1025H at YS402786 and YS409787 two enemy camps were located. Both were tunnel/bunker complexes about platoon size and were unused for several months. At 1725H ten very old pits were located at YS413715. At 1915H all sub-units were in base location with the exception of:

5/B/7 RAR YS409736
2/A/7 RAR YS379683

(7) Air support. At 1240H at YS549697 a preplanned airstrike was carried out on VC bunkers and trenches destroying 15 bunkers and uncovering 20m of trench. At 1350H an airstrike was carried out on a VC camp area at YS562749 destroying 5 bunkers and 20m of trench. At 1505H at YS559709 an airstrike on a VC camp known to be occupied destroyed six bunkers and damaged six bunkers. During this airstrike the FAC received groundfire (approximatly 40 rounds of 30 cal). Height was 1500 feet and flying speed was 70 knots. At

1525H an immediate airstrike on YS559709 on an occupied VC camp destroyed 100m of trench, 10 bunkers, estimated 4 KBA and one automatic weapon possibly destroyed. There was one secondary explosion and one delayed explosion 100 feet high. At 1600H at YS549697 an airstrike on a VC camp (suspected occupied) uncovered 50m of trench and destroyed four bunkers.

(8) Plans for next 24 hours. Operation PUCKAPUNYAL, Operation LEETON and patrolling continue.

b. Major Unit Operations.

(1) through (9) no change.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

C. Objectives No change.

D. Forces.

K. Losses/Damages.

K1. Nil.

K2. Nil.

K3. Nil.

K4. Nil.

K5. Company - Nil.
Platoon - Two.
Squad - One.

GRAHAM
BRIG

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

27 Apr 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 260001H to 262400H Apr 67.

TO: Commanding General,
II Field Force, VIETNAM

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ force VIETNAM
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. Patrolling continued with negative contact.

(2) LLRP

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - NIL.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - NIL.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt remained in 1 ATF base for maintenance.

(4) Task Force artillery continued in support of Operation LEETON and patrolling activities. Locations are unchanged. 48 H & I missions were fired in the reporting period.

(5) 5 RAR continued patrolling of the TAOR until 260830H when 7 RAR assumed operational control from them.

(6) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(7) Air Support. At YS 389827 at 1008H a preplanned airstrike on a VC camp destroyed 20 metres of trench and damaged a further 50 metres. At YS 389829 at 1157 H a preplanned airstrike on a VC main base camp destroyed two bunkers, three military structures and 35 metres of trench. At YS 370741 at 1135H a diverted airstrike on a VC camp damaged one military structure. At YS 390830 at 1445H a preplanned airstrike on a VC camp under construction uncovered 150 metres of trench and destroyed three bunkers and one table. At YS 517830 at 1505H a preplanned airstrike on bunkers and trenches damaged three bunkers.

(8) Plans for the next 24 hours. Operation LEETON continues. Patrolling continues. Operation PUCKAPUNYAL a search and destroy for 7 RAR will commence at 270700H.

b. Major Unit Operations

(1) through (9) no change.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

C. Objectives No Change

D. Forces

K. Losses/Damages

K1. Nil

K2. Nil

K3. Nil

K4. Nil

K5. Company Nil
Platoon Four
Squad One

GRAHAM
BRIG

Distribution

Lists A, D, E Plus

G (2)
PR
Diary (2)
CP (2)

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J. Wilkinson Capt

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

20

26 Apr 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP) From 250001H to 252400H Apr 67.

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, VIETNAM

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force VIETNAM
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARIES.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON with negative contact. Patrolling continued with negative contact.

(2) LRRP

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt remained in 1 ATF base area for maintenance.

(4) Task Force Artillery continued in support of Operation LEETON and patrolling activities. Locations are unchanged. 85 H & I missions were fixed in the reporting period.

(5) 5 RAR continued patrolling of the TAOR. There was negative contact.

(6) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON. Patrolling continued also with negative contact.

(7) Air Support. At 0710H an airstrike on a VC camp at YS555743 destroyed 2 bunkers, uncovered one pit and 10 mortar trenches.

At 1605H an airstrike on a VC occupied base camp at YS517828 destroyed 150 metres of trench, 8 bunkers, 1 well and uncovered 200 metres of trench and 6 bunkers. One military type wooden structure was damaged.

At 0855H the Light Fire Team (LFT) destroyed 3 sampans at YS599605. At 1425H the LFT engaged a bunker at YS547572 causing a large secondary explosion with dark smoke.

At YS540570 a hut and what appeared to be a mortar tube was destroyed by the LFT. At YS538577 the LFT destroyed one sampan and one hut at approx 1500H.

At approx 1730H the LFT in support of a PHUOC TUY Sector FAC destroyed 2 huts and damaged one hut at YS765687.

(8) Plans for the next 24 hours. Operation LEETON continues. Patrolling continues.

b. Major Unit Operations

(1) Through (9) no change.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

C. Objectives No change

D. Forces

K. Losses/Damages

K1. NIL

K2. NIL

K3. NIL

K4. NIL

K5. Company - Nil
Platoon - Three
Squad - One

GRAHAM
BRIG

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MAIZEY for
S3

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

19

22 Apr 67

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
From 210001H to 212400H Apr 67.

TO: Commanding General,
II Field Force, Vietnam

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1 ATF continued Operation LEETON and platoon patrolling.

(2) LRRP.

(a) Number of patrols extracted of less than 24 hours duration - Nil.

(b) Number of patrols extracted of more than 24 hours duration - One.

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt remained in 1 ATF for maintenance and refit.

(4) Task force artillery continued in support of Operation LEETON. Locations are unchanged. 41 H and I missions were fired in the reporting period.

(5) 5 RAR continued patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(6) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON and patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(7) Air support. At YS366812 at 1030H an airstrike on a VC base camp was conducted. Two bunkers were destroyed. Negative further BDA was possible due to smoke and foliage. At YS732808 at 1225H an airstrike was conducted on a VC camp area. Two large huts and two small huts were destroyed, 300m of trench was uncovered and four other wood frameworks were damaged. At YS732808 at 1415H an airstrike was conducted on a VC camp area. Two large huts and three small huts were destroyed, twelve bunkers and 20m of trench were also destroyed.

(8) Plans for next 24 hours. Operation LEETON continues. Patrolling of TAOR continues.

b. Major Unit Operations.

(1) through (9) No change.

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2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

C. Objectives No change.

D. Forces.

D1. 1 ATF 210905H/210910H AUST NIL NIL

K. Losses/Damages.

K1. Enemy.

D1. 1 ATF 4/UNK 2 KIA (BC) NIL NIL
1 WIA

K2. Nil.

K3. Nil.

K4. Nil.

K5. Company - Nil.
Platoon - 5.
Squad - Nil.

K5A. One.

GRAHAM
BRIG

Distribution:

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OFFICIAL

J. M. Mathers Capt
for

DEIGHTON
S3

LEETON

18

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

SUBJECT: Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP) From 200001H to 202400H Apr 67.

TO: Commanding General
11 Field Force , Vietnam.

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. General.

(1) 1ATF continued Operation LEETON and platoon patrolling with negative contact.

(2) LRRP
(a) No of patrols eetracted of less than 24 hours duration - NIL

(b) No of patrols eetracted of more than 24 hours duration - NIL

(3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt remained in 1ATF for maintenance & refit.

(4) Task Force Artillery continued in support of Operation LEETON . Locations are unchanged. 57 H & I missions were fired in the reporting period

(5) 5 RAR continued patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(6) 6 RAR continued Operation LEETON & patrolling of the TAOR with negative contact.

(7) Air support. At 0945H an airstrike on an area from which an aircraft received ground fire at YS624845 caused 2 VC KBA (possible)

At 1130H an airstrike was conducted on VC structures at YS680656. Negative BDA due to foilage.

At 1400H an airstrike on a VC base area at YS686618 d destroyed 1 bunker , 40m of trench, uncovered 150m of tunnel & started one sscondary fire with blue smoke.

At 0845H a recce aircraft received 35 - 30 rounds AW fire from YS622842. Aircraft was flying at 70 knots at 100 feet.

(8) Plan for next 24 hours. Operation LEETON continues, Patrolling continues.

b. Major Unit Operations

(1) through (9) No Change.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

c. Objectives no change

o. Forces.

k. Losses / Damages.

k1. NIL
k2. NIL
k3. NIL
k4. NIL
k5. Company NIL
Platoon 3
Squad 1

GRAHAM
BRIG

Distribution:

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DEIGHTON for Capt

S3

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F - Sigs 52 - 1
Reprinted Nov 1963

MESSAGE FORM

17

Number

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

RG 15 TASK FORCE FILE
569 226
(OUTHOUSE)

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY	PRIORITY	09 0450 Z	AFU

From 1 ATF

To 1 ALSG
AFV

Info 1 FD S/N 55 AIRS

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
Q 558

OP LENTON (.) POL MATERIALS URGENTLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FD DEPS
HOMEBASE (.)
ALFA (.) SOFTWOOD (.)
ONE (.) 6 IN X 6 IN (.) 78 X 18 FT LENGTHS (.)
44 X 20 FT LENGTHS (.)
78 X 21 FT LENGTHS (.)
TWO (.) 12 IN X 4 IN (.) 25 X 20 FT LENGTHS (.)
37 X 21 FT LENGTHS (.)
THREE (.) SHORTER LENGTHS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED QUANTITIES INCREASED
15 PER CENT (.)
BRAVO (.) HARDWOOD (.)
ONE (.) 6 IN X 4 IN (.) 30 X 14 FT LENGTHS (.)
TWO (.) 4 IN X 4 IN (.) 144 X 14 FT LENGTHS (.)
THREE (.) SHORTER LENGTHS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED QUANTITIES INCREASED
10 PER CENT (.)
FOUR (.) 3 IN X 2 IN (.) 650 LINEAR FT (.)
FIVE (.) 4 IN X 1 IN (.) 2800 LINEAR FT (.)
CHARLIE (.) OGI (.) 100 X 8 FT SHEETS
160 X 7 FT SHEETS

Page 1 of 2 pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☑ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME | OFFICE | TEL No

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

F - Sigs 52 - 1
Reprinted Nov 1963

MESSAGE FORM

1 -

Number.....

FOR COMM-CEN/SIGNALS USE.....

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

From | PREFIX GR

To | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

Info

50 X 6 FT SCREEN (.)

DELTA (.) MISC (.) BRIDGING CUTTER 6 IN QTY 1000 (.)

HALLS 4 IN XEX QTY 4 CASES (.)

HALLS ROOFING QTY 2 CASES (.)

APOVE MATERIALS WERCO SHIPMENT REQUESTED THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS (.) NON DELIVERY CAUSING OPERATIONAL DELAYS/

Page 2 of 2 pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☒ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME: XEX WELLS | OFFICE: DAGIE | TEL No: XEXTY 4

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

W Keeley Capt

INT QSL KKKKK

[redacted] QSL ARARAR

APR 10 P.M.

569-2-26

RESTRICTED

16

ROUTINE

VV [redacted] HH

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

R 100130Z

FM 1 ALSG

TO [redacted]G/1 ATF [redacted]

[redacted]G/AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

[redacted]

RESTRICTED Q(OPS) 5143 OP LEETON. MATERIALS FOR FIELD DEFS. REF 1 ATF Q 558 OF 090450Z. FAIL TO UNDERSTAND STATEMENT CONCERNING UNSUCCESSFUL REQUESTS THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. NO PREVIOUS DEMAND RECEIVED BY THIS HQ FOR THESE ITENS FOR OPERATION LEETON. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF AVAILABILITY. ITEM ALPHA. ONE. 8 IN X 8 IN 2060 LINEAL FEET PLUS 2000 LINEAL FEET 10 IN X 10 IN AND 2000 LINEAL FEET 10 IN X 8 IN. TWO. 12 IN X 4 IN NIL STOCKS CMM IN LIEU 2000 LINEAL FEET 12 IN X 6 IN. ITEM BRAVO. ONE. 6 IN X 4 IN HARDWOOD SUFFICIENT STOCKS. TWO. 4 IN X 4 IN VERY SMALL STOCKS CMM AS IN LIEU SOFTWOOD IS AVAILABLE. FOUR. 3 IN X 2 IN SUFFICIENT STOCKS. FIVE. 4 IN X 1 IN SUFFICIENT STOCKS. ITEM CHARLIE. CGI AVAILABLE. DELTA. BRIDGING SPIKES AVAILABLE CMM NAILS 4 IN NIL STOCKS CMM NAIL ROOFING AVAILABLE

[redacted]

TOR
10/03257
N50

AC

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RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

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FM 1 ALSG

TO [redacted]/1 ATF [redacted]

[redacted]/AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

[redacted]

R E S T R I C T E D Q(OPS) 5143 OP LEETON. MATERIALS FOR FIELD DEFS. REF 1 ATF Q 558 OF 090450Z. FAIL TO UNDERSTAND STATEMENT CONCERNING UNSUCCESSFUL REQUESTS THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. NO PREVIOUS DEMAND RECEIVED BY THIS HQ FOR THESE ITENS FOR OPERATION LEETON. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF AVAILABILITY. ITEM ALPHA. ONE. 8 IN X 8 IN 2060 LINEAL FEET PLUS 2000 LINEAL FEET 10 IN X 10 IN AND 2000 LINEAL FEET 10 IN X 8 IN. TWO. 12 IN X 4 IN NIL STOCKS CMM IN LIEU 2000 LINEAL FEET 12 IN X 6 IN. ITEM BRAVO. ONE. 6 IN X 4 IN HARDWOOD SUFFICIENT STOCKS. TWO. 4 IN X 4 IN VERY SMALL STOCKS CMM AS IN LIEU SOFTWOOD IS AVAILABLE. FOUR. 3 IN X 2 IN SUFFICIENT STOCKS. FIVE. 4 IN X 1 IN SUFFICIENT STOCKS. ITEM CHARLIE. CGI AVAILABLE. DELTA. BRIDGING SPIKES AVAILABLE CMM NAILS 4 IN NIL STOCKS CMM NAIL ROOFING AVAILABLE

[redacted]

TOR
O/C 3252
N50

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

[redacted]

INT QSL KKKKK

RGR QSL ARARAR

VV VBA005 HH

12/10/10/080

RR RAMABC
DE RAMAAC 005 10/0300Z
ZNY RRRRR
R 100130Z
FM 1 ALSG
TO RAMABC/1 ATF
INFO RAMAC/AUSTFORCE VIETNAM
BT
R E S T R I C T E D Q(OPS) 5143 OP LEETON. MATERIALS FOR FIELD DEFS.
REF 1 ATF Q 558 OF 090450Z. FAIL TO UNDERSTAND STATEMENT
CONCERNING UNSUCCESSFUL REQUESTS THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. NO PREVIOUS
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4 IN NIL STOCKS CMM NAIL ROOFING AVAILABLE
BT

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OP LEETON FILE

F - Sic
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MESSAGE FORM

Number 15

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY	PRIORITY	09 0450 Z	APR

From 1 ATF

To 1 ALSC
AFV

Info 1 FD SQN 55 AESS

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
Q 558

OP LEETON (.) POL MATERIALS URGENTLY REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FD DEPS
HORSESHOE (.)
ALFA (.) SOFTWOOD (.)
ONE (.) 8 IN X 8 IN (.) 78 X 18 FT LENGTHS (.)
44 X 20 FT LENGTHS (.)
78 X 21 FT LENGTHS (.)
TWO (.) 12 IN X 4 IN (.) 25 X 20 FT LENGTHS (.)
37 x 21 FT LENGTHS (.)
THREE (.) SHORTER LENGTHS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED QUANTITIES INCREASED
15 PER CENT (.)
BRAVO (.) HARDWOOD (.)
ONE (.) 6 IN X 4 IN (.) 36 X 14 FT LENGTHS (.)
TWO (.) 4 IN X 4 IN (.) 144 X 14 FT LENGTHS (.)
THREE (.) SHORTER LENGTHS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED QUANTITIES INCREASED
10 PER CENT (.)
FOUR (.) 3 IN X 2 IN (.) 650 LINEAR FT (.)
FIVE (.) 4 IN X 1 IN (.) 2800 LINEAR FT (.)
CHARLIE (.) SGI (.) 100 X 8 FT SHEETS
160 X 7 FT SHEETS

Page 1 of 2 pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE
CLASSIFIED ☑ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME OFFICE TEL No

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MESSAGE FORM

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From

To

Info

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

50 X 6 FT SHEETS (.)

DELTA (.) MISC (.) BRIDGING SPIKES 6 IN QTY 1000 (.)

NAILS 4 IN XXX QTY 4 CASES (.)

NAILS ROOFING QTY 2 CASES (.)

ABOVE MATERIALS URGENTLY REQUESTED THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS (.) NON DELIVERY CAUSING OPERATIONAL DELAYS/

Page 2 of 2 pages

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OFFICE DAQMC

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~~Z RAMAC 071 25/1048Z~~

~~ZNY CCCCC~~

R ~~250 30Z~~

MAR 26 A.M.

569-2-26

1/11/79/25 (74)

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE 569/2/10(9) RESTRICTED

FM AUSTFORCE VIETNAM

TO 1 ATF

BT

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BT

AC

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G clerks

~~G~~ Fwd to AFV

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569/21/10(4)

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MAR 11 A.M.

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ROUTINE

5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

10 Mar 67

ATT (13)

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE FILE 569/2/26

69-1-9 (A)
1st A

ALLOCATION OF TASKS 11 - 18 MAR 67

Reference: A. 5 RAR OPO 8/67 (OP LEETON)

1. Annex B to reference A is cancelled.

2. Revised allocation of tasks:-

Serial	Date	A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	D Coy	Sp Coy	Admin	Remarks
1	Sat 11 Mar	Beach 1000 hrs	a. Duty coy/standby (note a & b) b. Send one pl to A Coy by ni	a. 8 Pl in Horseshoe TAOR. b. Pl to D Coy to relieve Recce Pl at 0830 hrs	HORSESHOE	a. Recce Pl return to base 0830 hrs. b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe. c. Pnr Pl (-) to Nui Dat by ni	Band to man North rd block until 1330	a. Assume duties return from beach. Take over North rd block at 1330 hrs. b. Provide work party to construct defences at WP. A/RSM to supervise
2	Sun 12 Mar	Pl TAOR ptl (note a)	a. Duty coy/standby (note b) b. Send one pl to C Coy by ni.	a. 8 Pl in Horseshoe TAOR. b. Pl at Horseshoe. c. Pl to Horseshoe to rel D Coy pl 0830.	1st pl return to base for 24 hours rest 0830	a. Recce Pl in base. b. Pnr Sect at Horseshoe		a. Details advise separately. b. Provide work party to construct defences at WP. A/RSM to supervise
3	Mon 13 Mar	a. Duty coy/standby. b. Send one pl to C Coy by ni	TAOR ptl (note a.)	a. 8 Pl in Horseshoe TAOR. b. 2 pls at Horseshoe	1st pl returns to Horseshoe. 2nd pl returns to base for 24 hrs.	a. Recce Pl ptl b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe (note a)		a. Ptl details advised separately

Serial (a)	Date (b)	A Coy (c)	B Coy (d)	C Coy (e)	D Coy (f)	Sp Coy (g)	Admin (h)	Remarks (i)
4.	Tue 14 Mar	Duty coy/standby	TAOR ptl return by 1700 hrs	a. 8 pl Horseshoe TAOR b. 2 pls at Horseshoe	a. 2nd pl returns to Horseshoe. b. 3rd pl returns to base	a. Recce Pl ptl b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe change over 0830		
5.	Wed 15 Mar	Pl TAOR ptl (note a)	Duty coy/ standby	a. 8 pl return to base 0830. b. Pl return to base from Horseshoe 0830 c. 1 pl at Horseshoe	a. 3rd pl returns to Horseshoe 0830	a. Recce Pl ptl b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe c. Pnr sect to Binh Gia(note b)		a. Ptl details advised separately b. Details advised separately.
6.	Thu 16 Mar	a. Pl TAOR ptl b. Pl to Horseshoe 0830.	Duty coy/ standby	Pl returns to base from Horseshoe 0830	Horseshoe	a. Recce Pl ptl b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe. c. Pnr sect at Binh Gia		
7.	Fri 17 Mar	a. Pl TAOR ptl. b. Pl at Horseshoe	TAOR ptl (note a)	Duty coy/ standby	Horseshoe	a. Recce Pl ptl. b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe. c. Pnr sect at Binh Gia		a. Ptl details advised separately.
8.	Sat 18 Mar	a. Pl at Horseshoe. b. Pl to Horseshoe to relieve D Coy pl. c. Pl returns from TAOR ptl	TAOR ptl	Duty coy/ standby	One pl to base for 48 hrs	a. Recce Pl ptl b. Pnr sect at Horseshoe. c. Pnr sect at Binh Gia		

3. Duty Coy Tasks.

a. Provide one rifle sect to man the NORTH road block by 0645 hrs to 1700 hrs. Orders as published.

b. Send out one close TAOR ptl of sect str before 1200 hours and one other after 1200 hrs. Details of bdrys published vide 5 RAR G 513 MAR 3 1967

c. Send two men to clean up the MAYFAIR Theatre between 0900 hrs and 1100 hrs daily.

d. Have eight men report to HQ Admin Coy at 0800 hrs daily. This party is to be employed by OC Admin Coy until 1700 hrs.

e. Provide a duty offr for the Bn CP and a runner for Bn HQ.

f. Provide one pl for protection of the AP AN PHU WP by ni. To be in posn by 1800 hrs. Return to base by 0700 hrs. Radio to be on Bn Comd Net.

(P. J. Isaacs)
Capt
Adjt

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List A

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CONTINUED

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R569-2-26

Mar 67

Rowne
1AT

to 000125

SAMR 1Ka Regt Sec 1 Div Topo Sqy Pb
Pb Arty Tac Avn Ops Cmbt USAF
USA
Plane Tay Sector

Cont

G312

MRA Boys ⊙ The bdry between Recessions Hill is a dirt
Do is defined as the bend in dirt wall of the
village ⊙ for Topo Sqy has also this bend can be more
Hwy to the East of 561 so will eventually be the plan

/ /

Lynnley Ops / Bn S

Cayuga Ka

F Sigs 52-2
Reprinted Oct 63
C.D.O. 9855

MESSAGE FORM

Number .....

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE Mar67

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME — GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		090001Z	(11)

From IATF

To IARU

PREFIX GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTD

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
G295

.Info

THOR © You are to restrict your activity in your THOR to the NORTH SZ Route 520 The period of the restriction is from 140900H to 141800H Mar67 © sub sector has an activity planned in this area for this period

Page 1 of ..... pages

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MESSAGE FORM

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NUMBER 19

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE Mar 67

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME — GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		060200Z	

PREFIX GR

From 1 ATF

To 5 RAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFD

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
G271

Info

Your OPS 512 of 040600Z Mar 67 ⊙
OPO 8/67 OP KEETON ⊙ Copy Nos 40
thru 61 ⊙ ACK

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(9)

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5 RAR
AP AN PHU
SOUTH VIETNAM

OPS 512

040600 Mar 67

OPO 8/67 (OP LEETON)

Ref: A. L8015 VIETNAM. Sheet 6430 III SE BINH BA (SE), Edition 1 AMS, 1:25,000
B. L8015 VIETNAM, Sheet 6430 II, XUYEN MOC (SW), Edition 1 AMS, 1:25,000
C. L8015 VIETNAM, Sheet 6429 IV NE VUNG TAU (NE), Edition 1 AMS, 1:25,000
D. L8015 VIETNAM, Sheet 6429 I NW DATDO (NW), Edition 1 AMS 1:25,000

Time zone used throughout this order : HOTEL

1. Situation.

a. En Forces. Annex A.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1 ATF Concept of Ops.

(a) 1 ATF is to assist the Vietnamese authorities to maintain control of the SOUTHERN Phuoc Tuy Province.

(b) Establish a permanent coy def loc on Horseshoe Hill vic 4961.

(c) Clear the timber line from the 50 to 52 Easting and from the coast to the 63 Northing.

(d) Erect a wire fence EAST of Dat Do vic 4960 and Phuoc Loi vic 5057.

(e) Relocate certain sub units of 1 ATF within the 1 ATF base area.

(2) 6 RAR. Tasks are:

(a) Patrol TAOR to line BRAVO.

(b) From 160800H erect the wire fence.

(c) Provide protection for the engrs clearing the timber

(3) ARVN/RF/PF Forces.

(a)	3/43 ARVN Bn (-)	489593
(b)	One coy 3/43 Bn	500570
(c)	3A/181 Arty Pl	477597
(d)	612 RF Coy	515536
(e)	615 RF Coy	502577
(f)	32, 33, 34 PF Pls	477597
(g)	35 PF Pl	575536

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6/3/67

Released. copy held OPS 1

c. Atts and Dets.

(1)	Under comd from 051500H to 151600H	One tp and two mor APCs from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
		Engr Elm
		One combat engr team
(2)	Remaining in DS	103 Fd Bty RAA
(3)	In sp from 051600H until 081600H	Five TCVs
(4)	In sp from 060730H until 151800H	One H13
(5)	In sp at 060730H	One Airmobile Coy

2. Mission. 5 RAR is to assist the Vietnamese authorities to maintain control of SOUTHERN Phuoc Tuy Province.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline.

(1) D Coy plus the Recce Pl establish a def loc on Horseshoe hill by 151800H.

(2) Patrol the new TAOR to line BRAVO.

(3) Maintain ambushes WEST of HOA LONG as often as possible by day and night.

(4) Vacate present D Coy base area by 061000H and hand over to 3 SAS Sqn by 091000H.

(5) Maintain one coy on 30 minutes notice to move as 1 ATF standby from 030630H

b. A Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts excl SBs.

(2) Tasks. Annex B.

c. B Coy.

(1) Grouping.

(a)	Normal atts excl SBs	
(b)	Under comd from 051500H	One combat engr team
(c)	Under comd from 060700H until rel 091000H.	One tp and two mor APC A Sqn 3 Cav Regt

(2) Tasks.

(a) Annex B.

/(b) At 060700H

(b) At 060700H mount in the tp from A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and with the two mor APCs move to the Horseshoe feature.

(c) Clear the Horseshoe Feature, estb an LZ for the air mobile coy by 061000H and hand over to D Coy on their arrival.

(d) When D Coy are in position act as a screen for D Coy while they are estb their base by denying the en access to the Horseshoe TAOR.

(e) With the tp of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt provide, within the horseshoe TAOR three night ambush patrols up to and incl night 8/9 Mar.

d. C Coy.

(1) Grouping. Normal atts excl SBs.

(2) Tasks. Annex B.

e. D Coy.

(1) Grouping.

(a)	Normal atts excl SBs.	
(b)	Under comd from arrival at the Horseshoe Feature on 6 Mar until 151600H	Engr elms
(c)	Under comd from 060900H	Recce Pl
(d)	Under comd when rel by B Coy on 9 Mar until 151800H	One tp and two mor APCs A Sqn 3 Cav Regt
(e)	Under comd from 091200H	Sect Aslt Pnr Pl
(f)	In sp from 060730H until 081600H	Five TCVs
(g)	In sp from 061000H until rel on 6 Mar	One airmobile coy
(h)	In sp from 060730H to 150800H	One H13

(2) Tasks.

(a) Vacate D Coy base area Nui Dat by 061000H and have the base ready for handover to 3 SAS Sqn by 091000H.

(b) Estb an ech base loc in Admin Coy area by 061000H.

(c) Move from D Coy by 5 RAR tpt to Luscombe Fd by 061000H.

(d) Marry up with the Recce Pl at Luscombe Field at 061000H.

/(e) At 061000H

(e) At 061000H be prepared to fly into the Horseshoe Feature when ordered by Bn HQ.

(f) On reaching the Horseshoe Feature take over the feature from B Coy and estb a def base loc on the Horseshoe Feature by 151800H.

(g) At 091000H be prepared to take under comd the tp of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, the mor sect and an infantry pl from C Coy. This group will still be required to patrol the Horseshoe Feature TAOR by day.

(h) Until 151800H restrict your patrolling to daily clearing patrols.

(i) Until 091000H maintain close contact with B Coy screen which will be protecting you while you estb your base.

(j) Be prepared to rotate your pls for a rest in 5 RAR base from 101000H.

f. **Mor Pl.**

(1) Grouping.

(a) Pl less one sect remains in the base area.

(b) One sect in APCs placed under comd B Coy from 060700H until 091000H

(c) The APC sect move under comd D Coy at 091000H.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Base Area Sects. Base area def.

(b) APC Sect.

i. Load stores less mors into the mor APCs at 051500H.

ii. Load mors and move to B Coy by 060700H

iii. Provide fire sp for B Coy during the move to the Horseshoe Feature.

iv. Be prepared to move on patrol with B Coy and the tp of APCs.

g. **Recce Pl.**

(1) Grouping. Under comd D Coy from 060900H.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Move to and join D Coy at Luscombe Field by 061000H.

(b) While under comd D Coy, as directed by OC D Coy.

h. **Aslt Pnr Pl.**

(1) Grouping. One sect under comd D Coy from 091200H.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Destroy all grenade blinds on D Coy range by 061000H.

(b) Move by helicopter to the Horseshoe Feature by 091200H.

(c) Be prepared to take to the Horseshoe Feature those items of Aslt Pnr Pl equipment needed to carry out the Aslt Pnr tasks as directed by OC D Coy.

(d) Annex B.

i. **Band.** Tasks. Annex B

j. **A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.**

(1) Grouping.

(a) Under comd 5 RAR from 051500H until 060700H	One tp and two mor APCs
(b) Pass to under comd B Coy from 060700H until 091000H	One tp and two mor APCs
(c) Pass to under comd D Coy from 091000H until 151600H	One tp and two mor APCs

(2) Tasks.

(a) Two mor APCs move to the mor pl lines at 051500H and load mor stores. These mor APCs load the mors at 060630H and move to B Coy lines by 060700H.

(b) One tp of APCs moves to B Coy lines at 060700H and B Coy mount up.

(c) At 060715H assume convoy comd and on orders from 5 RAR move with the mor APC and B Coy to the Horseshoe Feature.

(d) At 060700H provide one sect APCs to escort three engr dozers across country from 1 Fd Sqn to the Horseshoe Feature.

(e) At 060730H provide one sect APCs to escort engr plant and stores vehs from a SP at the junc of Route TL2 Canberra Ave SOUTH to the Horseshoe Feature. The TCVs will return to 5 RAR and carry out a minimum of two more trips and will require escort both ways

(f) Provide APC escort for stores vehs departing 5 RAR on 7/8 Mar. Stores vehs will operate between 0800 - 1600H.

/k. Arty.

k. Arty.

(1) Recce and layout a Fd Bty gun position at the Horseshoe Feature.

(2) Obtain approval for D Coy FO on the Horseshoe Feature to be an authorised OP for 1 Fd Regt.

l. Engrs.

(1) Grouping.

(a) Under comd B Coy from 051500H — One combat engr team

(b) Under comd D Coy from arrival at the Horseshoe Feature on 6 Mar until 151600H — Three TD 15 B, One Cat 12 Grader, One ¾ ton LR and Tlr, One offr and 13 ORs

(2) Mov.

(a) At 060700H the three TD 15 Bs will depart 1 ATF base and move cross country to the Horseshoe Feature protected by a sect APCs.

(b) At 060730H the remainder of the engr plant and pers report to the junc of Route TL2/Canberra Ave SOUTH in preparation for the move to the Horseshoe Feature at 060730H.

(3) Pri of Tasks.

(a) Construct a rd into the Horseshoe Feature by 081600H.

(b) Clear fire lanes on the WEST of the Horseshoe Feature.

(c) Clear fire lanes on the NORTH side of the Horseshoe Feature.

(d) Clear the timber and brush from the SOUTH side of the Horseshoe Feature.

(e) Assist D Coy with the construction of bunkers.

m. 161 Recce Flt

(1) Grouping One H13 in sp 5 RAR from 060730H until 151800H.

(2) Tasks

(a) Provide air obsn with CO 5 RAR over B Coy and the engr plant moving across country from 060700H to 060930H.

(b) Remain on standby at Tiger 5.

(c) Be prepared to assist in recce, liaison visits and air resup.

n. Air

(1) RAAF Two HUIBs are on call to 5 RAR to assist in the maint of the D Coy group on Horseshoe Hill.

(2) US Army Avn At 061000H on orders from 5 RAR provide one air mobile coy to lift D Coy (+) from Luscombe Field to the Horseshoe feature.

o. Coord Instrs

(1) Timings

(a) 060715H B Coy and sect Mor Pl depart for the Horseshoe Feature by APCs

(b) 061000H D Coy (+) flies to the Horseshoe feature by air mobile coy on orders from 5 RAR

(c) Other timings. Annex B.

(2) 1 ATF and Horseshoe Feature TAOR. Annex P.

(3) Rules of Engagement No change.

(4) Regrouping/ for 5 RAR base Def Annex B.

(5) TAOR Patrolling - Relief of D Coy Patrols. Annex B.

(6) Route. SP, SOUTH along TL 2 to HOA LONG 4264 then SOUTH to XA LONG DIEN 4359 then EAST to DAT DO 489602 then NORTH along TL 52 to the Horseshoe feature.

(7) SPs

(a) B Coy B Coy lines.

(b) Rd Convoy The first rd convoy of engr plant and TCVs will depart from junc route TL2/CANBERRA Ave SOUTH. Subsequent TCV convoys will depart from Admin Coy.

(8) Emplan ing Offr Adjt 5 RAR (Callsign 9B)

4. Administration and Logistics.

(a) D Coy Ech Move to Admin Coy by 061000H.

(b) Handover of NUI DAT to 3 SAS Sqn

(1) G recce by 3 SAS Sqn 051000H

(2) Q handover to 3 SAS Sqn 091000H

(3) All stores except tentage (less the orderly room), kitchen refrigerator, and 200 gal water containers are to be removed.

(4) The Asst QM is to prepare the necessary documentation for handover by 091000H.

(5) The RQMS is to ensure the coy is ready for inspection and handover by 091000H.

(6) C Coy is to provide ten men as a work party to the RQMS between 0830 and 1630 hrs on 6, 7 and 8 Mar.

(c) Rations Three days combat rations are to be carried by all personnel operating in the Horseshoe Feature from 6 Mar.

(d) Water

(1) Initially until the WP is estb at the Horseshoe feature resup will be by air/rd

(2) 300 jerrycans are to be moved to the Horseshoe feature in the stores veh

(3) The Basis of resup is 5 gal per man per day

(e) POL A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and Engrs are to provide their own requirements for POL

(f) Ammo

(1) Claymores are to be carried by B Coy and D Coy

(2) Explosives are to be moved to the Horseshoe feature in the first rd convoy

(g) Tpt

(1) Grouping In sp from 051600H until 071600H. 5 TCVs

(2) Tasks

(a) At 051600H five TCVs are to report to the TO 5 RAR for loading under the direction of OC Admin Coy.

(b) At 060715H the loaded TCVs will move under the direction of the TO to CANBERRA Ave SOUTH where they will join up with the engr vehs and move at 060730H under the protection of A Sqn 3 Cav Regt to the Horseshoe feature.

(c) On rel at the Horseshoe feature the APCs are to escort the vehs to and from 5 RAR. This convoy will continue on 7 and 8 Mar.

(d) The initial loading of the TCVs is to be:

i. Two for water.
ii. One for sandbags.
iii. One for picquets.
iv. One for explosives - (To travel last and the detonators to be carried in another vehicle.

(e) The build up will then be for Coy stores and wire.

(f) The TO 5 RAR is to org all soft skinned convoys, and arrange 13 vehs for tpt for D Coy to move from NUI DAT to LUSCOMBE FIELD by 061000H

5. Command and Signals.

a. Bn HQ. Remains present location.

b. Radio.

(1) Current SOI apply.

(2) Bn Comd Net.

(a) Frequency Main 45.2 Alt 55.1

(b) Deletions From 060900H - Recce Pl - Callsign 61.

(3) Additions to D Coy Net. From 060900H - Recce Pl Callsign 61.

(4) AQ Flick Net. With effect from 061000H this net will be operative to D Coy and will be maintained continuously as the D Coy/5 RAR Admin link.

c. Line.

(1) Temporary internal company line is to be laid at the new D Coy position.

(2) Permanent internal line will be laid by Sig Pl line section when ordered.

(3) Line will not be laid from 5 RAR to D Coy at this time.

(4) A switchboard 993 GT and sufficient telephones are to be taken by D Coy

(5) All excess telephone equipment is to be returned to the Signal store.

d. Additional Points of Origin.

(1) 060800H to 070800H BEER 4962.

(2) 070800H to 080800H TOOL 5061

e. Codes, Q Hours. As issued.

f. Nicknames. As issued.

Ack Instrs. ACK.

(J.A. Warr)
Lt Col
for CO AOD

ANNEXES.
A. Enemy
B. 5 RAR Allocation of Tasks.
P. 1 ATF and Horseshoe TAOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No 40 of 81

ANNEX A TO 5 RAR
OPO 8/67 DATED 040600H

EN FORCES

1. Although the main towns and villages in the area between Long Tan (YS4965) and Phuoc Hai (YS5153) are nominally under GVN control the area and people are largely VC dominated. Domination is maintained by a continuous VC presence in the area and the small ARVN/RF/PF forces employed in static security roles are completely ineffective. The VC forces which have made this possible are:

a. D445 Bn.

b. C25 Coy, Long Dat District Coy.

c. Village Guerilla Squads from:

Long Tan	An Ngai
An Nhut	Long Dien
Phuoc Tho	Phuoc Tinh
Phuoc Thanh	Long Hai
Phuoc Hoa Long	Phuoc Hai
Phuoc Loi	Hoi My
Tam Phuoc	Phuoc Loi

2. a. D445 Bn has operated continually in this area and mounted two large operations as recently as 17 Dec 66 and 17 Feb 67. These operations appear to have had the aim of demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the local GVN forces and showing the people that the VC are the real strength in the area. Although suffering moderate to heavy casualties during the battles on 17 Feb 67 the aim was partially achieved and the battalion remains as an effective fighting force; it is likely to react offensively against any operation which successfully cuts its supply from the Dat Do area.

b. After the battle on 17 Feb 67 D445 is believed to have withdrawn to the Tan Ru area (YS4568) but there has been one report of its being located East of the Song Rai at YS6563. In either case it is less than a nights march from the operational area.

3. C25 Coy, strength about 100, is located in the Long Hai Mountains, probably in the area YS4752. This company has always cooperated with D445 Bn when it has operated in the Dat Do area but is usually restricted to an area West of Route 44.

4. The guerilla squads listed in para 1 c above maintain pressure on the civilian population and organize collection of food and supplies, taxes, and intelligence. They conduct sniping and mining attacks against GVN/FWMAF and organize road demolitions.

5. The pressure of C25 Coy and guerilla forces astride 1 ATF communication routes into the operational area will offer the VC opportunities to mine and booby trap the road and to snipe at vehicles. This activity is likely to increase if the operation seals successfully the resupply routes from Dat Do. The possibility of interference by C25 Coy should not be underestimated especially in view of recent reports that the Commanding Officer of D445 Bn has taken command of C25 Coy.

6. The VC have maintained their interest in the Dat Do area mainly because of its value as a procuring and provisioning centre and because of its proximity to the jungle bases along the Song Rai and in the May Tao. Control of the area gives the VC access to the main population centres of Phuoc Tuy, and to the rice, fish, salt and fruit producing region. It also gives them free access to the town's market where they are able to purchase unlimited quantities of medical supplies, cloth, batteries and other supplies obtained in Vung Tau and Saigon.

7. Because of its value as a resupply base Group 84 has been active in the area and the following units have been identified.

K1A, Purchasing and Food Supply Agency at Dat Do and Cay Cam (YS5863).

K5, Purchasing and Food Supply Agency at Phuoc Loi.

In addition a transportation company and a corridor security company probably operate in the area but have not been positively identified. Many PW, ralliers and agents have given information that the main supply routes from the area are:

a. Via Route 52 to the vicinity of Long Tan.

b. Via Route 23 to vicinity YS5561.

c. Via various routes and tracks to the area of the Song Rai (YS5959).

These routes however are general axes of movement rather than the exact path.

8. Some indication of the extent of the resupply occurring in the area can be seen by the fact in addition to the Group 84 activities a main force battalion was twice during 1966 employed for about three weeks on a rice carrying mission south of Route 23.

9. The 275 Regt is currently located in the area YS6679. This is about two days march from the operational area and it is unlikely that any main force units will be encountered for at least two weeks after the operation commences. Some reaction after that date is possible but unlikely until the operation begins to have some telling effect on the VC 5th Div operational capability. This is not likely to happen in the first two months.

Copy No 40 of 81
ANNEX B TO 5 RAR
OPO 8/67 DATED 040600H

ALLOCATION OF TASKS 6 - 16 MAR

Serial	Date	A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	D Coy	Sp Coy	Admin Coy	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	6 Mar (Mon)	TAOR ptls (note a)	Ptl vic Horshoe feature	Duty coy stand by coy (note b)	Estb base at Horshoe feature	Recce Pl under comd D Coy (note c)	(note d)	Notes: a. Separate task table to be issued. Ptls to depart on return of C Coy from ptl at approx 1000 hrs. b. Duty coy on 30 mins notice to move if required as reaction force. Nil requirement to provide NORTH rd block on 6 Mar. Duties now include provision of a pl to protect the AP AN PHU water point which will be operating at night. One pl to occupy A Coy base by night. Radio to be on the Bn Comd net. c. Aslt Pnr pl to occupy D Coy base at NUI DAT by night. Radio to be on Bn Comd net. d. Band to occupy NORTH rd block from 0645 hrs.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
2	7 Mar (Tues)	TAOR ptl	Ptl vic Horseshoe feature	Duty coy standby coy (note a)	Estb base at Horseshoe feature	Recce Pl under comd D Coy (note b)		a. C Coy to take over NORTH rd block. Pl to occupy A Coy base by night. b. Aslt Pnr pl to occupy D Coy base by night.
3	8 Mar (Wed)	TAOR ptl	Ptl vic Horseshoe feature	Duty coy standby coy (note a)	Estb base at Horseshoe feature	Recce Pl under comd D Coy (note b)		a. Pl of C Coy to A Coy base by night. b. Aslt Pnr pl to occupy D Coy base by night.
4	9 Mar	TAOR ptl (note a)	Duty coy standby coy (note b)	One pl to relieve B Coy One pl on standby One pl TAOR ptl (note c)	Estb base at Horseshoe feature	Aslt Pnr pl sect to D Coy (note d)	(note e)	a. To return to base by 1700H. b. Assume duties/standby on return to base less NORTH road block and morning close TAOR ptl. c. One pl on standby to be under comd B Coy if reaction coy reqd. F+1 details issued separately. d. Sp Coy to provide morning Close TAOR ptl. e. Band to man NORTH rd block.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
5	10 Mar	Duty Coy standby coy (note a)	Beach R & R note d	One pl vic Horseshoe feature one pl TAOR ptl one pl relieve pl of D Coy (note b)	Return one pl to have 24 hrs rest (note b)	Aslt Pnr sect with D Coy Recce pl ptl (note c)		a. One pl to occupy C Coy base by night. b. Details of relief of a D Coy pl issued separately. c. Ptl details issued separately. d. Details published in 5 RAR R487-11-7.
6	11 Mar	Beach (note a)	Duty coy standby (note b)	"	changeover of pls for 24 hr rest	Aslt Pnr sect changeover Recce Pl ptl (note d)	(note e)	a. Details published in 5 RAR R487-11-7. b. Assume duties on return from BEACH at approx 1100 hrs. Take over NORTH rd block from Band at 1330 hrs. c. Details to be advised. d. Details of changeover to be advised. e. Band to man rd block until 1330H
7	12 Mar	Nil tasks (note a)	Duty coy standby	" (note b)	changeover of pl for rest	Aslt Pnr Pl sect with D Coy (note [redacted])		a. Return from beach at approx 1100H One pl to C Coy base during night. b. Pl returns from TAOR ptl. [redacted]. Recce Pl returns from ptl.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
8	13 Mar	One pl vic Horseshoe feature (note a)	TAOR ptl (note c)	Duty coy standby coy (note a)	Estb base at Horse shoe feature (note b)	Aslt Pnr sect with D Coy		a. A Coy to man NORTH rd block and send out morning and afternoon TAOR ptls. C Coy to undertake remaining duties on return to base. b. Pl to return to Horseshoe feature details to be advised. c. Ptl details advised separately.
9	14 Mar	One pl vic Horseshoe feature (note a)	TAOR ptl	Duty coy standby coy (note a)	Estb base at Horse shoe feature	Aslt Pnr sect with D Coy		a. A Coy pl to protect water point Ni 14/15 Mar.
10	15 Mar	One pl ni Horse shoe feature	TAOR ptl	Duty coy standby coy	"	Recce Pl ptl (note a)		a. Ptl details issued separately.
11	16 Mar	"	TAOR ptl	"	"	"		

Distribution	Number of Copies	Copy No ..40.. incl Annexes A B P
A Coy	2	1 - 2
B Coy	2	3 - 4
C Coy	2	5 - 6
D Coy	2	7 - 8
Sp Coy	1	9
Recce Pl	1	10
Aslt Pnr Pl	1	11
Mor Pl	1	12
Sig Pl	1	13
Admin Coy	3	14 - 16
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	3	17 - 19
1 Fd Regt	5	20 - 24
103 Fd Bty	2	25 - 26
Bty A 1/83 US Arty	1	27
161 Fd Bty RNZA	1	28
1 Fd Sqn	1	29
103 Sig Sqn	1	30
6 RAR	1	31
3 SAS Sqn	1	32
1 ARU	1	33
Det 1 Div Int Unit	1	34
161 (Indep) Recce Flt	1	35
1 ATF Pro Sect	1	36
1 ATF CA Sect	1	37
1 ATF	24	38 - 61
1 ATF ATOC	2	62 - 63
CO	1	64
2IC	1	65
Adjt	1	66
Asst Adjt	1	67
IO	1	68
OC Sp Coy	1	69
OC Admin Coy	1	70
RSM	1	71
Comd's Diary	6	72 77
File	1	78
Spare	3	79 - 81

ANNEX "P" TO 5 RAR OPO 8/67
DATED 040600H

LEGEND
- NO FIRE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES
- FIRE ONLY IF IN CONTACT WITH VC
- LOCALS PERMITTED TUESDAY & THURSDAY 0730-1600H
- M MINEFIELD

AREA 1
AREA 2
AREA 3
AREA 4
AREA 5

Province Boundary
Grid Line 83 Northing
Grid Line 32 Northing
Grid Line 63 Easting
Creek
Track
LINE BRAVO
LINE ALPHA
LINE
Distinct Bdy
South side of creek
N side of Creek
Main Ridge System
Fence
Road
CATTLE
Eastern side of Track
800m North of LTL 23
River
Canal
9500M
14600M
16800M

DUC THANH TAOR
BINH BA TAOR
HOA LONG TAOR
HORSE SHOE TAOR
5 RAR = 6 RAR
5 RAR = IARU
IARU = 6 RAR

1 ATF TAOR
AND
ARTILLERY STRIKE ZONES

F Sigs 52-2
Reprinted Dec., 1964

MESSAGE FORM

NUMBER

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE — Mar 67 — (0)

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME — GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTINE		060200Z	

From: 1 AIF

To: 1 FD REGT

PREFIX: GR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~UNC~~ CONFD

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER: G 272.

Info

your ORO 7/67 OP MEETING of 4 Mar 67 ⊙
ACK

Page ____ of ____ pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE
CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME: SCHMITT — OFFICE: G — TEL No: Ebony 20

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	Operator

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK: for C McKnight Jr

FILE GS02

SECRET

Copy No. 18
1 Fd Regt RAA
NUI DAT

4 Mar 67

Op O 7/67 (OP LEETON)

1. SIT

a. En Forces. Annex A

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 1 ATF will assist the Vietnamese authorities to maint con of Southern Phuoc Tuy Province.

(2) Concept of Ops

(a) Estb permanent coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL YS 4962.

(b) Clear timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from the coast to 63 Northings.

(c) Erect a wire fence EAST of DAT DO YS4960 and PHUOC LOI YS5057.

(d) Reloc 103 Fd Bty and other sub-units of 1 ATF within TF base area.

(3) 5 RAR Tasks

(a) Estb coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL by 151800H Mar 67.

(b) Ptl TAOR within line BRAVO (Fd gun range)

(c) Maint ambushes WEST of HOA LONG as frequently as possible by day and ni.

(d) Vacate present D Coy base area by 061000H Mar 67.

(e) Maint one coy on 30 mins notice to mov as 1 ATF standby.

(f) Place coy on HORSESHOE HILL under op con 1 ATF from 151800H Mar 67.

(4) 6 RAR Tasks

(a) Ptl TAOR inside line BRAVO (Fd Gun range)

(b) From 160800H Mar 67 be prepared to erect a wire fence EAST of DAT DO and PHUOC LOI.

(c) Prot engr elms clearing timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from coast to 63 Northings.

(5) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Tasks:

(a) Provide prot for engr elms on:

i By pass rd.

ii HORSESHOE HILL until 15 Mar 67.

iii Clearing timber from coast to 63 Northings

/(b).

(b) Screen 5 RAR during occupation of HORSESHOE HILL and screen 6 RAR during erection of wire fence EAST of DAT DO.

(c) Escort stores convoy into HORSESHOE HILL approx 8 Mar 67.

(d) Maint one tp on 20 mins notice to mov, by ni, as 1 ATF standby.

(6) 1/83 Bn. No change

(7) A Bty 2/35 Bn. Remains under op con II F FORCE V.

(8) 3 SAS Sqn. Tasks:

(a) Foster 1 SAS Sqn from 2 Mar 67,

(b) By day man OPs on NUI DAT.

(c) By ni maint two tps on Nui Dat from 6 Mar 67.

(d) Occupy Nui Dat by 16 Mar 67.

(9) 161 Recce Flt Tasks

(a) Rotary wing. One ac for 1 ATF standby.

(b) Fixed wing. Vis recce by day and ni.

(10) 1 ARU Tasks

(a) Assist constr new 103 Fd Bty base area from 060800H Mar 67.

(b) Occupy 103 Fd Bty pres loc by 061800H Apr 67.

(c) Maint ambush ptls in TAOR.

(11) ARVN Loc of ARVN/RF/PF units are:

(a)	3/43 ARVN Bn (-)	YS 489503
(b)	One Coy 3/43 Bn	YS 500570
(c)	3A/181 Arty Pl	YS 477597
(d)	612 RF Coy	YS 515536
(e)	615 RF Coy	YS 502577
(f)	32, 33 and 34 PF Pls	YS 477597
(g)	35 PF Pl	YS 575536

(12) Timings

6 Mar 67	D Coy 5 RAR mov to HORSESHOE HILL
15 Mar 67	Coy 5 RAR on HORSESHOE HILL under op con 1 ATF.
16 Mar 67	6 RAR commence constr of wire fence.
	SAS occupy NUI DAT
6 Apr 67	1 ARU occupy present 103 Fd Bty area.

c. Atts and Dets, In sp from 060800H:

(1) 1 ARU

(2) Elm 1 Fd Sqn

(3) One FO of 1/83 Bn

.....2.....

2. Msn. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF during Op LEETON.

3. Exec

a. Gen Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains in TF base area, but 103 Fd Bty is to reloc within base area, 161 Bty RNZA re-equip with M2A2 guns on 15 Mar 67.

(1) Grouping

101 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 6 RAR
103 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 5 RAR
161 Fd Bty RNZA remains in sp 1 ATF but at pri call to 5 RAR

(2) Ammo. All btys restricted to ASR.

b. 101 Fd Bty RAA

(1) Grouping. Remaining under comd. One FO 161 Bty RNZA

(2) Tasks

(a) Remain in DS 6 RAR

(6) Be prepared to deploy to HORSESHOE HILL from 15 Mar 67.

c. 103 Fd Bty RAA

(1) Grouping.

(a) Remaining under comd. One FO 161 Fd Bty RNZA.

(b) In sp from 060800H Mar 67

i 1 ARU

ii Elm 1 Fd Sqn

iii One FO of 1/83 Bn

(2) Tasks

(a) Remain in DS 5 RAR

(b) Reloc base area by 311800H to vic YS 440676.

(c) Be prepared to deploy one sec at HORSESHOE HILL from 6 Mar 67

d. 161 Bty RNZA

(1) Grouping No change

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to provide one FO to 101 Fd Bty RAA and one FO to 103 Fd Bty RAA.

(b) Be prepared to provide FO with A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (C/S 33)

(c) Bring M2A2 guns into action from 151000H Mar 67.

e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty

(1) Survey

(a) Provide theatre grid vic HORSESHOE HILL by 15 Mar 67.

(b) Provide theatre grid for 103 Bty new base area by 20 Mar 67.

(2) Radar

(a) Be prepared to mov one radar to HORSESHOE HILL from 15 Mar 67.

(b) Be prepared to deploy one LP on HORSESHOE HILL from 6 Mar 67.

f. Co-ord Instrs

(1) FOs

(a) Capt Campbell, FO with D Coy 5 RAR (C/S 24) is an authorised observer, for DFs only.

(b) FO from 161 Bty RNZA when deployed with A Sqn 3 Cav Regt will use C/S 33.

(c) FO from 1/83 when assistinging BC 103 Bty on specific tasks will use his own callsign (81,82 or 83).

(2) Survey. Theatre grid will be provided ASP for all gun posns and radar.

(3) Recce. Completed.

(4) Gun Areas

a. New base loc 103 Bty vic 440676.

b. Gun area HORSESHOE HILL vic 493620

(5) TAOR. New TAOR and no fire zones issued separately.

(6) Met. Bty or Sec deploying outside base area to carry R5223.

(7) Fire Plans. CB fire plan for HORSESHOE HILL Annex B.

4. Admin and Log . No change

5. Comd and Sig

a. RHQ. Remains base loc.

b. Liaison. No change.

c. Radio.

(1) A 1 ATF air net will be used by all ac flying tac tasks for 1 ATF. Frequency 40.30

(2) A unit air net will be used for air mov and air resupply Frequency as on Sig Instr.

d. Line

(1) Permanent lines to be laid to new 103 Bty base area by 30 Mar 67.

(2) Sig Offr be prepared to lay line to HORSESHOE HILL gun area, not before 30 Mar 67.

e. Pts of origin. Additional pts.

060800H to 070800H Mar 67	BEER	4962
070800H to 080800H Mar 67	TOOL	5061

ACK

A Kamm Capt

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Annexes: A. En Forces
B. CB Fire Plan TOPWEIGHT

SECRET

Distribution	No of Copies	Copy No
101 Fd Bty RAA	2	1-2
103 Fd Bty RAA	2	3-4
161 Fd Bty RNZA	2	5-6
Det 131 DivLoc Bty RAA	1	7
HQ Bty	1	8
1 Fd Regt LAD	1	9
Comd Post	1	10
Tac HQ	1	11
5 RAR	1	12
6 RAR	1	13
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	1	14
1/83 Bn	1	15
1 ARU	1	16
HQ 1 ATF	3	17-19
CO	1	20
2IC	1	21
Adjt	1	22
QM	1	23
RMO	1	24
IO	1	25
LO	1	26
RSO	1	27
Sig O	1	28
RSM	1	29
Comds Diary	3	30-32
File	1	33

SECRET

Annex A to
1 Fd Regt RAA OP O 7
4 Mar 67

EN FORCES

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Phuoc Tho	Phuoc Tinh
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In addition a transportation company and a corridor security company probably operate in the area but have not been positively identified Many PW, ralliers and agents have given information that the main supply routes from the area are:

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c. Via various routes and tracks to the area of the SONG RAI (YS5959).

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Annex B to
1 Fd Regt RAA
Op O 7/67

TASK TABLE

Originator 96 Fire Plan TOPWEIGHT Task in Support 1 ATF H hr On call Sheet 1 of 3

Date time of origin 041600H Mar 67

Serial	Time		Tgt No	Grid Ref and Height or Description	Btys to engage				Ammo	Rate	Remarks	Ammo Ex
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	j	k	l	m	
1	On	call	JJ 6240	5055 6500	UNSPECIFIED							
2	"		JJ6241	5130 6531								
3	"		JJ6242	5186 6483								
4	"		JJ6243	5050 6421								
5	"		JJ6244	5219 6420								
6	"		JJ6245	5113 6366								
7	"		JJ6246	5268 6342								
8	"		JJ6247	5217 6285								
9	"		JJ6248	5343 6251								
10	"		JJ6249	5411 6203								
11	"		JJ6250	5091 6270								
12	"		JJ6251	5052 6171								
13	"		JJ6252	5138 6176								
14	"		JJ6253	5090 6039								
15	"		JJ6254	5230 6032								
16	"		JJ6255	5250 5981								

TASK TABLE

Originator..96.. Fire Plan TOPWEIGHT. Task in Support. 14TH hrs. ON CALL..Sheet .2...of..3..

Date time of origin..041660H.Mar.67

Serial	Time		Target Number	Grid Ref and Height or Description		Btys to Engage			Ammo	Rate	Remarks Registration	Ammo Expend. Not for Transmiss.
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)		(f)	(g)	(H)	(J)	(k)	(I)	(m)	
17	On Call		JJ 6256	5317	5988								
18	"	"	JJ 6257	5151	5950								
19	"	"	JJ 6258	5226	5950								
20	"	"	JJ 6259	5257	5893								
21	"	"	JJ 6260	5212	5866								
22	"	"	JJ 6261	5066	5830								
23	"	"	JJ 6262	5128	5829								
24	"	"	JJ 6263	5158	5804								
25	"	"	JJ 6264	5217	5768								
26	"	"	JJ 6265	5085	5760								
27	"	"	JJ 6266	4870	5717								
28	"	"	JJ 6267	4792	5759								
29	"	"	JJ 6268	4750	5811								
30	"	"	JJ 6269	4755	5730								
31	"	"	JJ 6270	4700	5774								
32	"	"	JJ 6271	4649	5782								

TASK TABLE

Originator 96 Fire Plan TOPWEIGHT Task in support 1 ATF H HR On Call Sheet 3 of 3

Date time of origin 041600H Mar 67

Serial	Time		Tgt No	Grid Ref & Ht or Description	BTYs to engage				Ammo	Rate	Remarks	Ammo Ex
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	j	k	l	m	
33	"		JJ6272	4575 6064								
34	"		JJ6273	4650 6127								
35	"		JJ6274	4540 6158								
36	"		JJ6275	4600 6204								
37	"		JJ6276	4708 6184								
38	"		JJ6277	4763 6248								

ROUTINE
IAFF
Lich Z

040001Z

R569/2/26

SECRET

(6)

G262

OP LEETON ⊙ Ref IAFF 050 2/67 ⊙ Amdt ⊙ Amend para 5c to read 151800H - 220800H Mar 67 Coun Grace P ⊙ Amend date to read Mar ⊙ delete minefd shown at YS 467700

/ / ✓ Stanley Pls / Bangkok

ROUTINE
1ATF

03 1180 Z

HQ 1ST TASK FORCE
FILE
R569/2/26
(CONTINUED)

(5)

5RAR 6RAR 4Sqn Hawk Regt 1Fd Regt
1Fd Sqn 16 Recce Tp CP Arty Tac

SECRET

C 263

AO ⊙ Ref 1ATF OpO 2/67 Annex P ⊙ 5RAR is allotted the AO from 050700N Mar67 until 151800H Mar67 ⊙ AO is as fols from YS 506609 along Route 23 to 52 Easting along 52 Easting to YS 520654 along track to YS 517658 along track to creek/track junc YS 508645 along creek to 479630 along T40R Bary to Route 23

1Sqn

Lt Mabey Ops/Coy

Bayey

FILE:

(Mar 67)

IMMEDIATE 030100Z

1 ATF

ASQN 3 CAV REGT, 5 RAR, 6 RNZR, 1 FD REGT, 1/83 ARTY, 1 FD SQN, 103 SIGS, 547 SIG TP, 3 SAS, 161 RECCE FLT HQ COY 1 ARU, 67 GL SEC, 1 ALSG, 11 ACR, 9 INF DIV, II FFORCE V, AUSTFORCE VIETNAM, NZ FORCE V, COMTF, OPS 1, OPS 2, LOG 2, OP, ARTY TAC, DEPTY, DEPTG, USELMAG, USMA, AVN OPS CENTRE, ST

SECRET

CIPS 263

Ref 1 ATF OPS 87 of 2 Mar 67 (OPO 2/67 OP LEETON) O

Ref is amended as fol:

ONE O PARA 3.a.(1) O delete YS 4691 and insert YS 4962 O

TWO O PARA 3.i.(2) O delete JUN 67 and insert APR 67 O

THREE O ANNEX B LAST LINE O delete JUN 67 and insert APR 67

Amended

Lt

SIMALEE OPS 1. Ebony 3

Bayonet

SECRET

(3)

Copy Number 95

1 ATF
NUI DAT
2 Mar 67
OPS 87

Op O 2/67 (Op LEETON)

Maps: Vietnam, 1:25000.

1. Sit.

a. En Forces. Annex A.

b. Friendly Forces. The loc of ARVN/RF/PF units are as fols:

(1)	3/43 ARVN Bn (-)	YS 489593
(2)	One Coy 3/43 Bn	YS 500570
(3)	3A/181 Arty Pl	YS 477597
(4)	612 RF Coy	YS 515536
(5)	615 RF Coy	YS 502577
(6)	32,33 and 34 PF Pls	YS 477597
(7)	35 PF Pl	YS 575536

c. Atts and Dets.

In sp from 160800H Mar 67 ARVN/RF/PF units as allotted.

2. Msn. 1 ATF is to assist the Vietnamese authorities to maint con of Southern Phuoc Tuy Province.

3. Exed.

a. Concept of Ops.

(1) Estb a permanent coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL, YS ~~4691~~ 4962.

(2) Clear the timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from the coast to the 63 Northing.

(3) Erect a wire fence EAST of DAT DO YS 4960 and PHUOC LOI YS 5057.

(4) Reloc certain sub units of 1 ATF within the 1 ATF base area.

b. 5 RAR.

(1) Grouping.

(a)	Under comd from 051500H Mar 67 until 151600H Mar 67	One tp A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Engr elm
(b)	In DS	One bty 1 Fd Regt
(c)	In sp and at pri call	One bty 1 Fd Regt
(d)	In sp from 060730H Mar 67 until 151800H Mar 67	One H13
(e)	In sp at 060730H Mar 67	One airmobile coy
(f)	In sp at 070800H Mar 67	One airmobile coy

SECRET

(2) Tasks.

(a) Estb a coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL BY 151800H Mar 67.

(b) Ptl your allotted TAOR. Ptls to remain within line BRAVO.

(c) Maint ambushes WEST of HOA LONG, as frequently as possible by day and ni.

(d) Vacate present D Coy base area by 061000H Mar 67.

(e) Maint one coy on 30 mins notice to move as 1 ATF standby from 030630H Mar 67.

(f) Place the coy on HORSESHOE HILL under op con 1 ATF from 151800H Mar 67.

c. 6 RAR.

(1) Grouping.

(a)	Under comd from 160700H Mar 67	A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (-) one tp Engr elm
(b)	In DS	One Bty 1 Fd Regt
(c)	In sp from 160700H Mar 67	One H13
(d)	In sp from 160800H Mar 67	ARVN/RF/PF Units

(2) Tasks.

(a) Ptl your allotted TAOR. Ptls to remain inside line BRAVO.

(b) From 160800H Mar 67 be prep to erect a wire fence EAST of DAT DO and PHUOC LOI. Details of fence later.

(c) Provide protection for engr elms clearing the timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from the coast to the 63 Northing.

d. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.

(1) Grouping.

(a) One tp under comd 5 RAR from 051500H Mar 67 until 151600H Mar 67.

(b) Sqn (-) one tp under comd 6 RAR from 160700H Mar 67.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Provide protection for the engr elms on:

(i) The by pass rd.

(ii) HORSESHOE HILL until 15 Mar 67.

(iii) Clearing the timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from the coast to the 63 Northing.

(b) Provide a screen for 5 RAR during the occupation of HORSESHOE HILL and for 6 RAR during the erection of the wire fence EAST of DAT DO.

(c) Provide escort for the stores convoy into HORSESHOE HILL on or about 8 Mar 67.

(d) Maint one tp on 20 mins notice to move in 1 ATF base area, by ni, as 1 ATF standby.

e. Arty.

(1) 1 Fd Regt.

(a) Grouping.

(i) One bty in DS each 5 RAR and 6 RAR.

(ii) One bty in sp and at pri call 5 RAR.

(iii) In sp from 060800H Mar 67 1 ARU

(b) Tasks.

(i) Fire sp as required.

(ii) Reloc 103 Fd Bty to an area to be selected within 1 ATF base area.

(iii) Vacate 103 Fd Bty area by 311800H Mar 67.

(2) 1/83 Bn.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks. Fire sp as required.

f. 1 Fd Sqn.

(1) Grouping.

(a) One elm to be under comd 5 RAR from 051500H Mar 67 until 151600H Mar 67.

(b) One elm to be under comd 6 RAR from 160700H Mar 67.

(c) One elm to be in sp 103 Fd Bty from 060800H Mar 67.

(2) Pri of Tasks.

(a) Cont constr Route 2 by pass rd.

(b) Cont drainage vic KANGAROO LZ.

(c) Constr a rd into HORSESHOE HILL.

(d) Estb a WP in HORSESHOE HILL.

(e) Clear timber and assist 5 RAR estb a coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL.

(f) Clear timber for erection of fence EAST of DAT DO starting on or about 15 Mar 67.

(g) Clear timber from 50 to 52 Eastings and from the coast to the 63 Northing after completion pri f.

(h) Assist 103 Fd Bty to constr its new base area.

g. 3 SAS Sqn.

(1) Grouping. No Change.

(2) Task.

(a) Foster 1 SAS Sqn from 2 Mar 67, to incl ptls. Areas separately.

(b) By day, man the OPs on NUI DAT. By ni, maint two tps in the position vacated by D Coy 5 RAR from 061000H Mar 67.

(c) Vacate existing area by 16 Mar 67.

(d) 1 SAS Sqn is to occupy D Coy 5 RAR position on NUI DAT as soon as possible but not later than 16 Mar 67.

h. 161 Recce Flt.

(1) Grouping.

(a) One H13 in sp 5 RAR from 060730H Mar 67 until 151800H Mar 67.

(b) One H13 in sp 6 RAR from 160700H Mar 67.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Rotary Wing.

(i) One ac for LO to II FFORCE V at 0730 hrs daily.

(ii) One ac for 1 ATF standby.

(iii) As required by inf bns.

(b) Fixed Wing. Vis recce by day and by ni.

i. 1 ARU.

(1) Grouping. In sp 103 Fd Bty from 060800H Mar 67.

(2) Task.

(a) Assist constr new 103 Fd Bty base area from 060800H Mar 67.

(b) Occupy 103 Fd Bty present loc by 061800H ~~Jun~~ Apr 67.

(c) Maint ambush ptls in your allotted TAOR.

j. Coord Instrs.

(1) Bdrys. Annex P.

(2) Timings. Annex B.

(3) Air.

(a) RAAF.

(i) Cont to provide tac and log sp.

(ii) Maint two UHIBS on staddby:

(aa) At KANGAROO LZ when SAS ptls are out.

(bb) At VUNG TAU when SAS ptls are not out.

(iii) Be prep to assist maint of group on HORSESHOE HILL.

(iv) Provide airlift for 120 daily from LUSCOMBE FIELD to VUNG TAU and retunn.

(b) US Army Avn.

(1) Provide one lt fire team on KANGAROO LZ during those periods when SAS ptls are out.

(ii) Provide one air mobile coy to lift one rifle coy of 5 RAR at 060730H Mar 67.

(iii) Provide one air mobile coy to lift one rifle coy of 5 RAR at 070730H Mar 67. Air mobile coy to remain for stores lift to HORSESHOE HILL or retrg with inf.

(iv) Provide CH47 for fwd loading tasks after 8 Mar 67. DAQMG to advise requirements.

(c) USAF.

(i) Vis recce.

(ii) Cont air strikes on known and suspected VC forces bases and lastls.

4. Admin and Log.

a. Gen. Unit admin is to be normal except as varied below:

b. Material and Svcs.

(1) Ammo. Arty. Resup fire sp base dir from 1 ALSG by air or rd commencing on 17 Mar 67.

(2) POL. Dieso. Initial estb of stocks at HORSESHOE HILL is to be a unit responsibility. Resup by bulk tanker from 1 ALSG on demand.

(3) Rats.

(a) For all pers outside 1 ATF base area. Combat Rats.

(b) All resup is to be coord by inf bns as required.

(c) Tinned equivalent or fresh rats is to be provided for the coy def loc on the HORSESHOE HILL as shoon as practicable.

(4) Water.

(a) Initially and until WP estb in HORSESHOE HILL resup is to be by air. Basis of sup to be 5 gals per man per day. 5 RAR is to coord.

(b) Resup to 6 RAR as required after 16 Mar 67.

(c) In the event of the WP failing water will be del dir to HORSESHOE HILL from 1 ALSG. 1 ATF will arrange and coord.

(5) Tpt.

(a) Once the rd is through to the HORSESHOE HILL all def stores are to be lifted by rd and air.

(b) Initial estimate is for:

(i) 101 loads wiring stores.

(ii) 2 loads CGI and timber (tropical hut).

(iii) 12 loads CGI and timber (revetting).

(iv) 4 loads miscellaneous.

(c) No convoy before 8 Mar 67.

(6) Stores.

(a) 10,000 yds Catwire type 2 with single apron.

(b) 4,000 yds low wire entanglement.

(c) CGI and timber for revetment.

(d) CGI and timber for one tropical hut 60 ft by 20 ft.

(e) One Scale A Kitchen.

(f) Water storage facilities.

(7) Postal and Canteen. As arranged by inf bns.

c. Med.

(1) After 16 Mar 67 5 RAR is to ensure RMO visits HORSESHOE HILL not less frequently than twice weekly.

(2) Med ord is to be provided by 5 RAR after 16 Mar 67.

(3) Med evac from HORSESHOE HILL by hel.

5. Comd and Sig.

a. Loc. HQ 1 ATF remains present loc.

b. Frequencies. A 1 ATF air net is to be estb. The net is to be used by all ac flying tac tasks for 1 ATF. The frequency is 40.30 mc/s

c. Callsigns HORSESHOE HILL Coy 151800H - 210800H Mar 67 - 18.
220800H - 310800H Mar 67 - 46.

d. Pts of Origin. Additional points of origin:

060800H to 070800H Mar 67 BEER 4962
070800H to 080800H Mar 67 TOOL 5061

e. Q Hr. Password. No change.

ACK

S.C. Graham
Brig
Comd

Annexes: A. En Forces.
B. Timings.
P. TAOR.

Distr: List Z

Authentication

(S.J. Maizey) for
Maj
S3

SECRET

ANNEX A TO
1 ATF Op O 2/67 OF

2 Mar 67

EN FORCES

1. Although the main towns and villages in the area between LONG TAN (YS4965) and PHUOC HAI (YS5153) are nominally under GVN control the area and people are largely VC dominated. Domination is maintained by a continuous VC presence in the area and the small ARVN/RF/PF forces employed in static security roles are completely ineffective. The VC forces which have made this possible are:

a. D445 Bn.

b. C25 Coy, Long Dat District Coy.

c. Village Guerilla Squads from:

Long Tan	An Ngai
An Nhut	Long Dien
Phuoc Tho	Phuoc Tinh
Phuoc Thanh	Long Hai
Phuoc Hoa Long	Phuoc Hai
Phuoc Loi	Hoi My
Tam Phuoc	Phuoc Loi

2. a. D445 Bn has operated continually in this area and mounted two large operations as recently as 17 Dec 66 and 17 Feb 67. These operations appear to have had the aim of demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the local GVN forces and showing the people that the VC are the real strength in the area. Although suffering moderate to heavy casualties during the battles on 17 Feb 67 the aim was partially achieved and the battalion remains as an effective fighting force; it is likely to react offensively against any operation which successfully cuts its supply from the DAT DO area.

b. After the battle on 17 Feb 67 D445 is believed to have withdrawn to the TAN RU area (YS4568) but there has been one report of its being located East of the SONG RAI at YS6563. In either case it is less than a nights march from the operational area.

3. C25 Coy, strength about 100, is located in the LONG HAI MOUNTAINS, probably in the area YS4752. This company has always cooperated with D445 Bn when it has operated in the DAT DO area but is usually restricted to an area West of Route 44.

4. The querilla squads listed in para 1c above maintain pressure on the civilian population and organize collection of food and supplies, taxes, and intelligence. They conduct sniping and mining attacks against GVN/FWMAF and organize road demolitions.

5. The presence of C25 Coy and guerilla forces astride 1 ATF communication routes into the operational area will offer the VC opportunities to mine and booby trap the road and to snipe at vehicles. This activity is likely to increase if the operation seals successfully the resupply routes from DAT DO. The possibility of interference by C25 Coy should not be underestimated especially in view of recent reports that the Commanding Officer of D445 Bn has taken command of C25 Coy.

6. The VC have maintained their interest in the DAT DO area mainly because of its value as a procuring and provisioning centre and because of its proximity to the jungle bases along the SONG RAI and in the MAY TAO. Control of the area gives the VC access to the main population centres of PHUOC TUY, and to the rice, fish, salt and fruit producing region. It also gives them free access to the towns' market where they are able to purchase unlimited quantities of medical supplies, cloth, batteries and other supplies obtained in VUNG TAU and SAIGON.

7. Because of its value as a resupply base Group 84 has been active in the area and the following units have been identified:

K1A, Purchasing and Food Supply Agency at DAT DO and CAY CAM (YS5863).

K5, Purchasing and Food Supply Agency at PHUOC LOI.

In addition a transportation company and a corridor security company probably operate in the area but have not been positively identified. Many PW, ralliers and agents have given information that the main supply routes from the area are:

a. Via Route 52 to the vicinity of LONG TAN.

b. Via Route 23 to vicinity YS5561.

c. Via various routes and tracks to the area of the SONG RAI (YS5959).

These routes however are general axes of movement rather than the exact path.

8. Some indication of the extent of the resupply occurring in the area can be seen by the fact in addition to the Group 84 activities a main force battalion was twice during 1966 employed for about three weeks on a rice carrying mission south of Route 23.

9. The 275 Regt is currently located in the area YS6679. This is about two days march from the operational area and it is unlikely that any main force units will be encountered for at least two weeks after the operation commences. Some reaction after that date is possible but unlikely until the operation begins to have some telling effect on the VC 5th Div operational capability. This is not likely to happen in the first two months.

SECRET

ANNEX B TO
1 ATF Op O 2/67 OF

2 Mar 67

OUTLINE TIMINGS

3 Mar 67	Combined inf/arty/engr recce of HORSESHOE HILL.
6 Mar 67	Rifle coy 5 RAR move to HORSESHOE HILL. 3 SAS Sqn to man OPs on NUI DAT by day. Not less than two tps on position by ni. 103 Fd Bty commence new base area assisted by 1 ARU.
7 Mar 67	Air lift stores to HORSESHOE HILL Plus additional inf as required.
8 Mar 67	Rd resup may commence.
15 Mar 67	Coy def loc on HORSESHOE HILL occupied. Coy to come under op con 1 ATF.
16 Mar 67	6 RAR commence constr of wire fence. SAS vacate existing area, occupy NUI DAT.
31 Mar	103 Fd Bty vacate existing area. 1 ARU commence occupation.
6 ~~Jun~~ Apr 67	1 ARU in occupation present 103 Fd Bty area.

SECRET

ANNEX P TO I ATF O/02/67 OF
02 0200 Z FEB 67

LEGEND

NO FIRE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES

FIRE ONLY IF IN CONTACT WITH VC

LOCALS PERMITTED TUESDAY & THURSDAY 0730–1600H

M MINEFIELD

AREA 1

AREA 2

AREA 3

AREA 4

AREA 5

Province Boundary

Grid Line 83 Northing

Grid Line 32 Northing

Grid Line 63 Easting

DUC THANH TAOR

BINH BA TAOR

HOA LONG TAOR

IARU

5 RAR = 6 RAR

5 RAR = IARU

IARU = 6 RAR

LINE ALPHA

LINE BRAVO

LINE

CATTLE

Track

Creek

District Boy

South side of creek

N side of creek

Road

Eastern side of track

800m North of LTC 23

GL 63 N

Main Ridge System

Fence

Canal

River

16800M

14600M

9500M

W0056

I ATF TAOR

AND

ARTILLERY STRIKE ZONES

SECRET



SECRET

Mar67

M26

(1)

Secy
1RAR
5RAR 6RAR ASqn 3CavRgt 1FdRgt 1FdSqn
3Sig Sqn CP Arty Tac

CONFD

G2445

1RAR Bdys ⊙ the new 1RAR Bdys are to be effective from 030800H Mar67 ⊙ Refer ANNEX P to 1RAR O/O 2/67 dtd 2Mar67 ⊙ 5RAR is responsible to clear the area bounded by YS 4444356835 to YS 4444356925 along southern bank SOUTH CAU to YS 4283356915 to YS 4283356850 ⊙ ACK

1 of 1

SJ MAILEY Ops1 Ebony 3

Bayonet

F - Sigs 52 - 1
Reprinted Nov 1963

MESSAGE FORM

Number 1

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE — ACTION	PRECEDENCE — INFO DEFERRED	DATE — TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY		060001Z Mar 67	

PREFIX GR

From 1ATF

To SRAR 6RAR ASqn 3Cav Regt 1FA Regt 1/83 Bty 1FA Sqn 3SAS Sqn 1ARV 161 Recce Flt HQ Coy Sigs ~~CP A Q Log~~ ~~USAF~~ ~~USAA~~ ~~Avn Ops Cntre~~ 1ALSG AFV

Info

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER

G233

WNG O O OP LEETON O Estb a coy def loc on HORSESHOE MTN comm wire EAST of DAT DO - PHUOC LOI - PHUOC HAI comm ne loc 103 Fd Bty - 3SAS Sqn - 1ARV within base area O O Gp 1ATF Conf 100m 021400H Mar67 O For HQ Coy ensure tables and chairs avail for OGp O Ack

1 of 1

SS MAIZELS Ops 1 Coy 3

Page ____ of ____ pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DRAFTER'S NAME OFFICE TEL No

FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND RANK

AWM 184 AWM 103

War in Vietnam

1 ATF

AWM 103

783156