4/14/2/3

JANUARY 1943

ORIGINAL

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H.Q. ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES-NEW GUINEA

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 100M 2/42

Unit H.Q. ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES. NEW GUINEA Date and Time.—From 22, January, 1943 To 23rd, January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	22nd, Jan	2153	RED WARNING. Unidentified enemy aircraft made one run over Harbour Area	
			from SE to W and were engaged by six gun sites. Bombs dropped in Harbour.	See appendix (iv)
		2345	WHITE WARNING.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Heavy rain in early hours of morning. Sunny cloudless sky	
	23rd, Jan		Rain in afternoon.	
	23rd, Jan		OPERATIONS.-	
		0300	RED WARNING. Unidentified enemy aircraft over area made run from N to W.	
			Six sites engaged. Bombs dropped 4000 yards S of Waigani	See appendix (iv)
		0430	WHITE WARNING.	
			STRENGTH. - 3 Officers 7 Other Ranks.	See appendix (ii)
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Dense overcast throughout night. Clear sunny day.	
			MOVEMENTS.- Two reinforcements and two personnel of 2/17 Aust Lt A.A.Bty	
			together with three personnel of 162 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty embarked to join their	
			respective units at Hairoil.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 1COM 2/c2

Unit H.Q. ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES. NEW GUINEA. Date and Time.—From 24, January, 1943 To 26th, January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	24th, Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.- Hot sunny day few scattered clouds.	
	25th, Jan.		OPERATIONS.-	
		0332	RED WARNING. Number of unidentified enemy aircraft made one run over area	
			from S to NE at 20,000 feet. Approx 30 bombs dropped at S end of 7 Mile drome	
			One DC 3 destroyed.	See appendix (iv)
		0430	WHITE WARNING.	
			Three Red warnings were reported during period from 2000 on 24th to 0530 hrs	
			on 25 Jan.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Bright day with few light scattered clouds. Overcast in	
			afternoon, slight rain.	
	26th, Jan.		OPERATIONS.-	
		0237	RED WARNING. Two enemy aircraft MB, type Betty or Sally made one run over	
			Port Moresby area from WNW to ENE at 26,000 ft. Four bombs dropped W of 7	
			Mile drome	See appendix (iv)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted,)

H. 1COM 2/c2

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES.NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 26th,January,1943. *To* 28th,January,1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	26th,Jan.	0332	WHITE WARNING.	
			Equipment of 234 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty arrived in this area.	
			Equipment of 73 Aust.A.A.S.L.Coy arrived in this area.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Scattered cumulus all day.Cloudless sky at night.	
	27th,Jan.		OPERATIONS.-	
		0252	RED WARNING. 3 Enemy aircraft MB type Sally made two runs over area.Night	
			fighter airborne attacked enemy aircraft at 24,000ft.Bombs dropped NW Wards	
			Drome.	Sse appendix (iv)
		0415	WHITE WARNING.	
			GENERAL.- Colonel.J.A.Robinson returned from Cape Rodney.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Heavy overcast all morning, cooler than usual. Low	
			ceiling in afternoon. Rain at night.	
	28th,Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.-	
			Changeable overcast sky with slight rain.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 1000M 2/42

Unit H.Q. ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA Date and Time.—From 29th, January, 1943 To 31st January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	29th, Jan.		GENERAL.- Advice received that 78 Aust AASL Coy is en route from Melbourne to Brisbane then to ~~Port Moresby.~~ Milne Bay.	
			Captain W.Tomkinson made reconnaissance for siting guns of 234 Aust Lt A.A. Bty. One troop for Seven Mile, 2 troops for Five Mile Dump and one troop for Three Mile petrol dump.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Scattered clouds, heavy in sections, very hot.	
	30th, Jan.		STRENGTH.- 2 Officers 7 Other Ranks.	See appendix(ii)
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Scattered thin clouds, very hot. Clear over Port Moresby. High clouds over mountains.	
	31st. Jan.	0815	OPERATIONS.- B and C troops of 156 Aust Lt A.A.Bty withdrew from positions at Seven Mile Drome and emplaned for move to Wau	
			Two troops C and D of 234 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty occupied positions on Seven Mile Drome vacated by 156 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty. A troop of 234 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty went to position NE end of Seven Mile Drome. B troop in position at waterfront.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted,)

H. 100M 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA Date and Time.—From 31st January, 1943. To

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY	31st, Jan		METEOROLOGICAL.- Clear sunny day. Few scattered clouds overcast late in afternoon, slight rain at night.	

(P. B. TOOSE) Major
B.M. A.A. Defences N.G.F.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 1COM 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 19th, January, 1943. *To* 22nd, January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	19th, Jan.		GENERAL.- Capt.W.H.Lindsey returned from Milne Bay	
			Capt.D.Dendle returned from Buna.	
			METEOROLOGICAL. - Overcast morning. Rain in afternoon, with low ceiling at	
			night.	
	20th, Jan.	1515	OPERATIONS.- G3 out of action, broken cable. Sent to Workshops.	
		2029	G3 back in action.	
			GENERAL.- Col.J.T.Wrean arrived back from Dobodura.	
			Plan of defence of Sector No.22 (includes 40 area) issued this day.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Low ceiling. Hot day.	
	21st, Jan.		GENERAL.-LtCol.J.A.Robinson left by launch for Cape Rodney on reconnaissance	
			for S/L positions.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Scattered clouds, low ceiling in morning. Sunny afternoon	
			few light clouds.	
	22nd, Jan		OPERATIONS.-	
		2138	YELLOW WARNING.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted.)

H. 100M 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 12th, January, 1943 *To* 14th, January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	12th, Jan.		OPERATIONS.- Advised by Air Force that the P38s were standing by for night fighting operations in case of raid.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Heavy low ceiling early morning. Rain in afternoon and evening. Low ceiling at night.	
	13th. Jan.		INSPECTIONS.- Colonel. J.B.Fraser, Lt-Col J.A.Robinson and Lt.A.J.Cornell left for Buna Area.	
			GENERAL. Capt.D.Dendle arrived back at Port Moresby from Milne Bay.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Low thin clouds early morning, clear sky by 0900. Hot day	
	14th, Jan.	1020	OPERATIONS. Personnel of M1 Milne Bay arrived at Port Moresby.(23rd Bty)	
			OPERATIONS.- G.L.equipment known as G3, out of action.	
		2231	Red Warning. One unidentified aircraft attacked area. Bombs dropped off MANUBADA Island	See Appendix(iv)
			GENERAL.- Major.P.B.Toose had conference with Col Anderson re air move of 156 Aust Lt A.A.Bty. "C" Troop.	
			Capt.D.Dendle left for Dobodura to inspect captured Jap 80 mm guns.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Hot clear sunny day, some disbursed clusters of clouds. Half moon at night.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 1COM 2/c2

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES.NEW GUINEA. *Date and Time.—From* 15th,January,1943. *To* 16 January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	15th,Jan.	2035	OPERATIONS. - RED WARNING	
		2059	WHITE WARNING. Nothing eventuated.	
		2200	G2 out of action.	
		2242	YELLOW WARNING.	
		2249	RED WARNING. one probable type NELL made run over area. Four bombs dropped west Wards Drome and three NE Kila.(Latter confirmed by NGF)	See appendix (iv)
		2356	WHITE WARNING.	
			GENERAL.- Major.P.B.Toose had conference with Col Anderson RAA re air move "C" Troop 156 Aust Lt.A.A.Bty. [illegible]	
			METEOROLOGICAL. - Clear all day except for few scattered clouds. 1/10 cloud cover at night.	
	16th,Jan.	0330	OPERATIONS.- G3 back in action	
		1530	G2 back in action.	
		2153	RED WARNING.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted,)

H. 100M 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 16th, January, 1943. *To* 18th, January, 1943.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY,	16th, Jan	2333	WHITE WARNING. Nothing eventuated.	
			GENERAL.- Colonel. J.B.Fraser, Lt-Col.J.A.Robinson and Lieut.A.J.Cornell	
			arrived at Port Moresby from Buna area.	
			Lt-Col.J.T.Wrean of NG A/A Provisional Groupment and Capt.W.H.Lindsey left	
			for Milne Bay to supervise the air move of 709 CA (AA) Sep Bty to Buna Area	
			STRENGTH.- 3 Officers 7 Other ranks.	See appendix (ii)
			METEOROLOGICAL. Very hot but overcast sky. 5/10 night cover.	
	17th, Jan.		GENERAL.- Major.W.Perry of 32 Aust Hy AA Bty advised that Ordnance has	
			information of 4/3.7" guns for H8 site leaving Melbourne on 5 Jan.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Clear hot day.	
	18th, Jan.	0100	OPERATIONS. - RED WARNING.	
		0146	WHITE WARNING. Nothing eventuated.	
		1225	No.6. gun of "H" Bty 208 CA (AA) Bty out of action.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Light overcast in morning. Heavy rain in afternoon and through night. Also low thick ceiling.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted)

H. 1COM 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES.NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 6th, January,1943 *To* 12th,January.1943

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	6th,Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL. - Overcast and fine rain in morning. Sun shining in afternoon	
	7th,Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL. - Thick overcast sky, ceiling low.	
	8th,Jan.		GENERAL. - Capt.D.Dendle left for Milne Bay to inspect A/A W/shop situation INSPECTIONS. - Colonel.J.B.Fraser, Major.P.B.Toose and Capt.W.H.Lindsey	
			inspected "D" Troop 94 C.A.(AA)	
			GENERAL.- Arrangements with R.A.A. to return "D" Troop of 156 Aust Lt.A.A.	
			Bty from RORONA to this area.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Alternately cloudy and sunny. Light rain in late afternoon	
	9th,Jan.		INSPECTIONS.- Colonel.J.B.Fraser and Capt.W.H.Lindsey inspected "G" Bty of	
			94 C.A.(AA).	
			STRENGTH.- 3 Officers 7 Other Ranks. METEOROLOGICAL.- Cloudless sunny morning. Overcast late afternoon. Heavy	See appendix (ii)
			rain during night.	
	10th,Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.- Heavy rain before dawn. Day lightly overcast.	
	11th,Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.- Heavy overcast all morning. Heavy rain in afternoon.	
	12th,Jan.	1620	GENERAL.- Col.R.T.Gibson C.O.94 CA (AA) Regt visited this area. OPERATIONS.- G.L.set at H6 Heavy Gun Site known as G3 in action	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118 (adapted)

H. 1000M 2/42

Unit H.Q.ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, NEW GUINEA *Date and Time.—From* 1st, January, 1943 *To* 5th, January, 1943.

Place	Date 1943	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PORT MORESBY.	1ST, Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.- Overcast and slight rain in morning. Heavy rain afternoon	
	2nd, Jan.		OPERATIONS.- 162 Aust Lt A.A.Bty withdrew from positions at 5 mile supply dump and Bipod 4 mile and commenced loading equipment on Van Heutz for LILLIPUT.	
		1407	No.2. gun of H7 back in action.	
			STRENGTH. 3 Officers 7 Other Ranks.	See appendix (ii)
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Cool overcast day.	
	3rd, Jan.		OPERATIONS.-	
		1800	Balance of 162 Aust Lt A.A.Bty personnel embarked.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- Rain in early morning, overcast in afternoon.	
	4th, Jan.		METEOROLOGICAL.* Rain in morning with a heavy overcast sky.	
	5th, Jan.		GENERAL. - Advised that "D" Troop and H.Q. of 2/17 Aust Lt A.A.Bty arrived safely at Hairoil.	
			METEOROLOGICAL.- sparsely overcast sky.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDICES. NO.1.

A.A.DEFENCES (AASL) OPERATION ORDER. NO.1. 11 January,1943.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

(d) O.C. 73 Aust AASL Coy will liaise with O.C. Sigs 2 Aust A.A.Bde concerning supervision of line extensions and installations.

(e) As Sigs 2 Aust A.A.Bde instal multi-airline communications to S/L stations & C.O.R's , the temporary lines detailed above may be discarded.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

J.A. Robinson Capt.

(J.A.Robinson) Lt.-Col.
Comd. AASL, A.A.Defences,
N.G.F.

Method of issue : D.R.
Time of issue : 1030/12
Distribution :

67 Aust AASL Coy. (1)
73 " " " (2)
" I " Bty - 206 CA Regt. (3)
Comd. A.A.Defs. N.G.F. (4)
Sigs 2 Aust A.A.Bde (5)
AASL file (6)
War Diary. (7)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

4. METHOD :

(a) Stations, 10, 14, 17 will be operated in 73 Coy area by 67 Coy detachments supervised by an N.C.O. i/c (No.1) and one No. 5 of 73 Coy. These numbers will teach the Sperry drill and equipt to 67 Coy personnel.

(b) The following stations will be operated by 73 Coy personnel with 2 - 90 cm. S/L each :

Station No. 1	MINE TUNNELS	056 410
22	TUPUSELEI	062 284

(c) The following stations will be operated by 73 Coy personnel with 2 - 90 cm. S/L each if sufficient personnel are available :

Station No. 8	OYSTER BAY	965 333
13	VABUKORI	963 328

5. ADMINISTRATION :

(a) Transport will be employed as follows :

67 Coy - Eight lorries S/L 3 Ton
73 " - Eight lorries Cable 3 Ton.

(b) Ration and supply responsibilities will be as follows :

67 Coy - Stations 1, 2, 4, 5, 22.
73 " - " 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 24.

(c) 73 Coy will also administer the following station now being operated with 67 Coy personnel :

Station No. 24 - TUAGUBA (2-90 cm. S/L) 867 354

6. COMMUNICATIONS :

(a) 67 Coy will extend with field cable the following lines :
From existing station No. 7 (976 405) to new station No. 5, approx 1 mile.

(b) 73 Coy will extend with field cable the following lines :
From existing station No. 8 (962 352) to new station No. 8, approx 1 mile ;
From abandoned A.2 Single S/L position to new station No. 14. This line will then connect with existing 67 Coy A Section H.Q. near MURRAY BARRACKS, thence to existing 67 Coy C.O.R.

(c) 73 Coy will instal with field cable the following lines :
From 73 Coy C.O.R. to Station No. 10, approx 1 mile ;
From existing U.S.A. BOFORS gun position (920 487) to station No. 7, approx 150 yds.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

SECRET.

0351.

H.Q. A.A.Defences,
N.G.F.

11 Jan 43.

Copy No. 7.

A.A. DEFENCES (AASL) OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

1. REFERENCE : Map PORT MORESBY (SPEC) 1" - 1 mile.

2. INFORMATION :

(a) Enemy is expected to attack PORT MORESBY, commencing about 14 Jan 43, with High Level bombing during this Moon period.

(b) Eight 60" Sperry AASL equipts have arrived PORT MORESBY aboard S.S." ULOOLOO ". They should be unloaded 12/14 Jan. Eight lorries S/L 3 Ton and eight lorries cable 3 Ton are also aboard. This equipt is consigned to 67 AASL Coy.

(c) 67 Aust AASL Coy have personnel sufficient to man this equipt but untrained in it's use. 73 Aust AASL Coy have personnel sufficient to man six S/L stations and trained in Sperry 60" equipt.

(d) Twentyfour 90 cm. S/L at present in the PORT MORESBY area are at present available for operational use.

(e) Sigs 2 Aust A.A.Bde are proceeding as quickly as possible with with new multi-airline communications to positions where 60" S/L will be employed. This work will NOT be completed before the equipt is required for operational use.

3. INTENTION :

(a) To deploy and emplace in PORT MORESBY area the equipt as follows :-

Station No.	6	OROROKIA	953 439
	9	LIGHTNING RIDGE	923 385
	5	BUTLERS HILL	990 388
	2	SIXTEEN - MILE	021 450
	4	BOGORO	025 335
	10	BARONA	890 436
	14	TANUBADA	865 383
	17	WAIGANI	920 409

(b) These stations, which have already been prepared for the equipment, will be put into action as soon as possible.

(c) Communications will be provided to enable all stations to receive Red Warning information to enable " CASE C " action to be adopted.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDICES. NO.2.

W3008	2nd January, 1943
W3008	9th January, 1943
W3008	16th January, 1943
W3008	23rd January, 1943
W3008	30th January, 1943
W3009	2nd January, 1943
W3009	9th January, 1943
W3009	16th January, 1943
W3009	23rd Janiray, 1943
W3009	30th January, 1943.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3009
(page 1)
(Adapted)

SERIAL 16
WE REF AMF
VI/13N/2
5 x 15
Auth attached - x - AIF 3 x 67

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

H.Q. A.A. DEFENCE N.G.F. (Unit) 2 - 1 - 1943 (Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1		2			3	4
Detail.		Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).			Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1	-				-
W.Os. Class II.	-	-				-
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	-	-				-
Staff Serjeants	2	-				2
Serjeants	1	1 (x)				1 (x)
Corporals	1	-				1
Troopers, Privates, &c.	10	6				4
TOTALS	15	67	-	6	* -	* 88

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached ~~from other Corps.~~ allowed by WE Attached, not allowed by WE

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
		1 Gnr. - 23 Aust H.Q. A.A. Bty	
NIL		1 Sgt. - 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	
		1 Bdr. - do -	
		1 L/Bdr. - do -	
		1 Pte - do -	
		1 Pte NG Postal Unit	
		1 Pte 30 Inf Bde	
		7 TOTAL	

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
(x)	Sergeant Arty Clerk carrying out duties of			
	Clerk - Arty - S/Mgr - W.O.I			

a.w. Jm bks. 5/42

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HQ AA DEFENCE - NGF ..... Unit.

Army Form W. 3009
(Adapted) (Aug. 41)
(page 2)

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners			Fire Control Operators			Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers			Fitters			Pattern Makers		
Armourers			Fitters and Turners			Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery			Fitters, Cycle			Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen			Fitters, Drivers			Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers			Fitter's Mates			Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors			Fitters, M.V.			Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.			Fitters, Railway Signal			Plumbers		
Blacksmiths			Fitters, Signal			Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers			Grinders			Printers		
Bricklayers			Gun Layers			Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers			G.P.O. Assistants			Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller			Gun Operators			Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner			Hammermen			Riggers		
Clerks			Height Takers			Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering			Helio Operators			Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply			Instrument Mechanics			Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical			Instrument Mechanics, Surgical			Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers			Instrument Operators			Sawyers		
Computers			Intelligence Duties			Shoemakers		
Concretors			Joiners			Signallers		
Cooks			Leather Stitchers			Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital			Linesmen			Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths			Linesmen, Signals			Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies			Lithographers			Surveyors		
Despatch Riders			Machinists			Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers			Masons			Tailors		
Draughtsmen			Masseurs			Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural			Mechanics, Dental			Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical			Mechanics, M.T.			Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal			Mechanics, Typewriter			Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical			Mechanics, Wireless			Turners		
Driver Mechanics			Millwrights			Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators			Miners			Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant			Moulders			Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters			Nursing Orderlies			Watermen		
Electricians			Nursing Orderlies (Mental)			Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units			Nurses, Trained			Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal			Observation Post Assistants			Wheelers		
Engine Artificers			Operating Room Assistants			Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C			Operators, Signal			Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers			Opticians			Woodturners		
Farriers			Painters					
Casual duty			FIRE CONTROL					
Sergeant to include			INSTRUCTORS					
1 bombardier								
			for RAA - Staff Post		1			
			" RAE - do -		1			
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)		6			8			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

HQ AA Defences ..... *Unit.*

..... *Signature of Commander.*

Date of Despatch 2-1-43

NGF ..... *Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.*

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (W).

War Diary

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

(Unit)

(Date)

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	2	3	4
Detail.	Total strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Sergeants			
Staff Sergeants			
Sergeants			
Corporals			
Troopers, Privates, &c.			
TOTALS			

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 3 of Army Form W.3909

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3009
(page 1)
(Adapted)

SERIAL 17
W.E. REF AMF
V1/13N/2 5 x 15.
Auth. attached
— x —
AIF 3 x 7

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

HQ AA DEFENCES N.G.F. (Unit) 9-1-1943 (Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	W.E.	AIF	CMF	TOTAL	3	4
Detail.		Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).			Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1	-				-
W.Os. Class II.	-	-				-
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	-	-				-
Staff Serjeants	2	-				2 } Reinforcements being
Serjeants	1	1 (x)				1 } arranged for from
Corporals	1	-				1 } NSW L of C Areas
Troopers, Privates, &c.	10	6				4
TOTALS	15	7	-	7	-	8

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached ~~from other Corps.~~ ALLOWED BY W.E. ATTACHED NOT ALLOWED BY W.E.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
NIL		1 Gnr - 23 Aust Sty A.A. Bty	
		1 Sgt - 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	
		1 Bdr - do -	
		1 L/Bdr - do -	
		1 Pte - do -	
		1 Pte N.G. Postal Unit	
		1 Pte 30 Inf. Bde	
		1 Bdr. 2/17 A Lt. A/A Bty	pending move to
		16 Gnrs - do	join unit with
			Lilliput Force

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
(x)	Sgt	Arty. Clerk carrying out duties of		
		Clerk Arty - Sgt/Hqr - WOI		

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HQ AA DEFENCE - NGF Unit.

Army Form W. 3009
(Adapted) (Aug. 41)
(page 2)

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W E	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W E	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners				Fire Control Operators				Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers				Fitters				Pattern Makers		
Armourers				Fitters and Turners				Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery				Fitters, Cycle				Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen				Fitters, Drivers				Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers				Fitter's Mates				Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors				Fitters, M.V.				Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.				Fitters, Railway Signal				Plumbers		
Blacksmiths				Fitters, Signal				Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers				Grinders				Printers		
Bricklayers				Gun Layers				Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers				G.P.O. Assistants				Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller				Gun Operators				Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner				Hammermen				Riggers		
Clerks ARTY Sjmc WOI	1		-	Height Takers				Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering Sgt	1		1	Helio Operators				Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply				Instrument Mechanics				Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical				Instrument Mechanics, Surgical				Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers				Instrument Operators				Sawyers		
Computers				Intelligence Duties				Shoemakers		
Concretors				Joiners				Signallers		
Cooks				Leather Stitchers				Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital				Linesmen				Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths				Linesmen, Signals				Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies				Lithographers				Surveyors		
Despatch Riders				Machinists				Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers				Masons				Tailors		
Draughtsmen				Masseurs				Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural				Mechanics, Dental				Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical				Mechanics, M.T.				Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal				Mechanics, Typewriter				Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical				Mechanics, Wireless				Turners		
Driver Mechanics				Millwrights				Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators				Miners				Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant				Moulders				Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters				Nursing Orderlies				Watermen		
Electricians				Nursing Orderlies (Mental)				Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units				Nurses, Trained				Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal				Observation Post Assistants				Wheelers		
Engine Artificers				Operating Room Assistants				Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C				Operators, Signal				Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers				Opticians				Woodturners		
Farriers				Painters						
				FIRE CONTROL						
General duty				INSTRUCTORS						
Personnel	11		5	ASS. RAA Staff Sgt	1	-	1			
includes 1				ASS. RAE -do-	1	-	1			
Bombardier										
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)			6				8			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

HQ AA DEFENCE
Unit.

Signature of Commander.

Date of Despatch 9-1-43.

NGF
Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3009
(page 1)
(Adapted)

SERIAL 18
WE REF AMF
41/13W/2 - 5x15
Auth attached - x -
AIF 3x7

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

NR AA Defences-NGF (Unit) 16-1- 1943 (Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	WE	2 AIF	EMF	TOTAL	3	4
Detail.		Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).			Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1	-				
W.Os. Class II.	-	-				
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	-	-				
Staff Serjeants	2	-				2 } Reinforcements being
Serjeants	1	1 (x)				1 } arranged for from
Corporals	1	-				1 } NSW L of C Area
Troopers, Privates, &c.	10	6				4
TOTALS	15	7	-	7	* -	8*

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps. ALLOWED BY W.E. ATTACHED NOT ALLOWED BY W.E.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
NIL		1 Gnr. 25 Aust Hy AA Bty	
		1 Sgt. 6 Aust Dev Postal Unit	
		1 Cpl. - do	
		1 Cpl. - do	
		1 Pte - do	
		1 Pte NG Postal Unit	
		1 Pte 2 Inf Bde	
		1 Bar } pending move to join unit	
		16 Gnrs } with "Harrow" Force (detailed	
		list attached)	

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
(x)	Sgt Arty Clerk carrying out duties of			
	Clerk Arty Sgt/Mgr - WOI			

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HQ AA Defences - NGF Unit.

Army Form W. 3009
(Adapted) (Aug. 41)
(page 2)

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W E	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W E	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners				Fire Control Operators				Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers				Fitters				Pattern Makers		
Armourers				Fitters and Turners				Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery				Fitters, Cycle				Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen				Fitters, Drivers				Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers				Fitter's Mates				Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors				Fitters, M.V.				Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.				Fitters, Railway Signal				Plumbers		
Blacksmiths				Fitters, Signal				Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers				Grinders				Printers		
Bricklayers				Gun Layers				Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers				G.P.O. Assistants				Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller				Gun Operators				Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner				Hammermen				Riggers		
Clerks Duty Shorthand	1		-	Height Takers				Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering Sgt	1	-	1	Helio Operators				Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply				Instrument Mechanics				Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical				Instrument Mechanics, Surgical				Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers				Instrument Operators				Sawyers		
Computers				Intelligence Duties				Shoemakers		
Concretors				Joiners				Signallers		
Cooks				Leather Stitchers				Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital				Linesmen				Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths				Linesmen, Signals				Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies				Lithographers				Surveyors		
Despatch Riders				Machinists				Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers				Masons				Tailors		
Draughtsmen				Masseurs				Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural				Mechanics, Dental				Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical				Mechanics, M.T.				Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal				Mechanics, Typewriter				Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical				Mechanics, Wireless				Turners		
Driver Mechanics				Millwrights				Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators				Miners				Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant				Moulders				Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters				Nursing Orderlies				Watermen		
Electricians				Nursing Orderlies (Mental)				Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units				Nurses, Trained				Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal				Observation Post Assistants				Wheelers		
Engine Artificers				Operating Room Assistants				Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C				Operators, Signal				Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers				Opticians				Woodturners		
Farriers				Painters						
				FIRE CONTROL						
General duty				INSTRUCTORS						
personnel				ASS RAA Staff Sgt	1	-	1			
includes 1				" RAE "	1	-	1			
Bombardier	11	-	5							
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)			6				8			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

HQ AA Defences
Unit.

Signature of Commander.

Date of Despatch 16-1-43

NGF
Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (11)

DETACHMENT OF 2/17 AUST. LT. A.A. BTY. ATTACHED TO H.Q. A.A. DEFENCES, N.G.F.

NX73873	A/Bdr.	Day, C.R.
NX78578	L/Bdr.	Wadsworth, C.
NX54689	Gnr.	Rea, J.F.
NX58888	"	Barr, A.R.
NX82120	"	Beck, J.P.
NX44234	"	Dawson, W.H.
NX82765	"	Lacey, S.J.
NX82095	"	Bermann, J.
NX56331	"	Haggarty, J.L.
NX58926	"	Gibbons, N. C.
NX73141	"	Sullivan, H.E.
NX80922	"	Ely, J.
NX54658	"	Miller, M.R.
NX80755	"	Cunningham, N.
VX67092	"	Gregson, W.G.
VX66848	"	Godfrey, L.R.
NX59081	"	Miller, W.J.

J. Adams Capt

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3009
(page 1)
(Adapted)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

.....(Unit) 23-1- 19 43 (Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	2	3	4
Detail.	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants			
Staff Serjeants			
Serjeants			
Corporals			
Troopers, Privates, &c.			
TOTALS		*	*

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

a.w. 3m bks. 5/42

Army Form W. 3009
(Adapted) (Aug. 41)
(page 2)

AB AA Defences NGF Unit.

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W.E.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	W.E.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners				Fire Control Operators				Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers				Fitters				Pattern Makers		
Armourers				Fitters and Turners				Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery				Fitters, Cycle				Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen				Fitters, Drivers				Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers				Fitter's Mates				Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors				Fitters, M.V.				Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.				Fitters, Railway Signal				Plumbers		
Blacksmiths				Fitters, Signal				Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers				Grinders				Printers		
Bricklayers				Gun Layers				Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers				G.P.O. Assistants				Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller				Gun Operators				Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner				Hammermen				Riggers		
Clerks ARTY SGT/MJR WKT	1	-	-	Height Takers				Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering SGT	1	-	1	Helio Operators				Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply				Instrument Mechanics				Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical				Instrument Mechanics, Surgical				Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers				Instrument Operators				Sawyers		
Computers				Intelligence Duties				Shoemakers		
Concretors				Joiners				Signallers		
Cooks				Leather Stitchers				Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital				Linesmen				Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths				Linesmen, Signals				Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies				Lithographers				Surveyors		
Despatch Riders				Machinists				Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers				Masons				Tailors		
Draughtsmen				Masseurs				Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural				Mechanics, Dental				Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical				Mechanics, M.T.				Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal				Mechanics, Typewriter				Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical				Mechanics, Wireless				Turners		
Driver Mechanics				Millwrights				Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators				Miners				Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant				Moulders				Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters				Nursing Orderlies				Watermen		
Electricians				Nursing Orderlies (Mental)				Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units				Nurses, Trained				Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal				Observation Post Assistants				Wheelers		
Engine Artificers				Operating Room Assistants				Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C				Operators, Signal				Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers				Opticians				Woodturners		
Farriers				Painters						
				FIRE CONTROL						
General duty				INSTUCTORS						
personnel										
engineer 1				ASS RAA-Staff Sgt	1	-	1			
Bombardier	11	-	5	RAE - - -	1	-	1			
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)			6				8			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

AB AA Defences
Unit.

(R. J. ADAMS) Capt.
Staff Capt. (Asst.) A.A. Def. N.G.F.
Signature of Commander.

Date of Despatch 23-1-43

NGF
Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (11)

War Diary

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3009
(page 1)
(Adapted)

SERIAL 20
HE REE ARTE VII/13MT/2
5x15
(authorised attached)
AIF — 2x1

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

HR AA Defences NSW (Unit) 30-1-43 (Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	HE	AIF	2	TOTAL	3	4
Detail.		Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).			Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1	-	-	-		-
W.Os. Class II.	-	-	-	-		-
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	-	-	-	-		-
Staff Serjeants	2	-	-	-		2 (Reinforcements being
Serjeants	1	1 (1)	-	1		1 (arranged for from
Corporals	1	1	-	1		- (NSW L of C Area
Troopers, Privates, &c.	10	5		5		5
TOTALS	15	7	-	7	* —	8 *

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps. ATTACHED NOT ALLOWED BY WE ALLOWED BY WE

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
	NIL	1 Pte (Sig) attd to HQ 17 Div (pending move to par unit at Parramatta	
		1 Pte - 30 Inf Bde	
		1 Gnr 23 Fd Sy HR	Fly
		1 CH. NG Postal	Unit
		2 Rks — do —	

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
(1)	Sgt Clerk	Clerk carrying duties of Clerk Duty Sgt (Mjr WO 2		

a.w. jm bks. 5/42

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HQ AA Defences - NGF ..... Unit.

Army Form W. 3009
(Adapted) (Aug. 41)
(page 2)

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.		Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.		Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners				Fire Control Operators				Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers				Fitters				Pattern Makers		
Armourers				Fitters and Turners				Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery				Fitters, Cycle				Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen				Fitters, Drivers				Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers				Fitter's Mates				Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors				Fitters, M.V.				Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.				Fitters, Railway Signal				Plumbers		
Blacksmiths				Fitters, Signal				Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers				Grinders				Printers		
Bricklayers				Gun Layers				Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers				G.P.O. Assistants				Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller				Gun Operators				Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner				Hammermen				Riggers		
Clerks ARTY SGT/MTR WO	1	-	—	Height Takers				Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering SGT	1	-	1	Helio Operators				Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply				Instrument Mechanics				Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical				Instrument Mechanics, Surgical				Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers				Instrument Operators				Sawyers		
Computers				Intelligence Duties				Shoemakers		
Concretors				Joiners				Signallers		
Cooks				Leather Stitchers				Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital				Linesmen				Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths				Linesmen, Signals				Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies				Lithographers				Surveyors		
Despatch Riders				Machinists				Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers				Masons				Tailors		
Draughtsmen				Masseurs				Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural				Mechanics, Dental				Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical				Mechanics, M.T.				Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal				Mechanics, Typewriter				Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical				Mechanics, Wireless				Turners		
Driver Mechanics				Millwrights				Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators				Miners				Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant				Moulders				Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters				Nursing Orderlies				Watermen		
Electricians				Nursing Orderlies (Mental)				Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units				Nurses, Trained				Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal				Observation Post Assistants				Wheelers		
Engine Artificers				Operating Room Assistants				Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C				Operators, Signal				Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers				Opticians				Woodturners		
Farriers				Painters						
				FIRE CONTROL						
General duty				INSTRUCTORS						
personnel	11	-	5							
includes 1				ASS RAA Staff/Sgt	1	-	1			
Bombardier				--- RAE -do-	1	-	1			
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)			6				8			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

HQ AA Defences ..... *Unit.*

[signature] ..... *Signature of Commander.*

Date of Despatch 30-1-43

NGF ..... *Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.*

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (11)

War Diary

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

(Unit)

(Date).

To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	2	3	4
Detail.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Sergeants			
Staff Sergeants			
Sergeants			
Corporals			
Troopers, Privates, &c.			
TOTALS			

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3099.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 1)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

.....(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	**Posted** strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed

APPENDIX (11) War Diary

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 1)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

.....(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	**Posted** strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed

APPENDIX (11)

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 1)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

.....(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed

APPENDIX (11)
War Diary

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 1)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

.....(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	3 Surplus to Establishment	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 2)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps Allocation	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
LT-COL	NX 40603	ROBINSON J.A.	Gen'l AASL	Yes	-
MAJOR	NX 76552	TOOSE F.B.	B.M.	Yes	-
CAPT	NX 103001	ADAMS R.J.	STAFF/CAPT AASL	Yes	-

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment ALLOWED BY W.E.
CAPT	NX 70251	DENDLE D.C.	12 AA Bkt Pty	5/12/42	No

HQ AA Defences
(Unit)

9-1-43
(Date of Despatch)

[signature] Capt
(Signature of Commander)

NEF
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (ii)

W.D.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted)
(Page 1)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

.....(Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals			

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed

APPENDIX (11)

APPENDICES. NO.4.

Intelligence	Report	No.218	for	Air	Raid	No.97	on	Port	Moresby	Area.
"	"	No.220	"	"	"	No.98	"	"	"	"
"	"	No.233	"	"	"	(No.99	"	"	"	"
						(100	"	"	"	"
"	"	No.236	"	"	"	No.101	"	"	"	"
"	"	NO.237	"	"	"	No.102	"	"	"	"
"	"	No.238	"	"	"	No.103	"	"	"	"

Intelligence Summaries Nos 16 to 22 inclusive.

Intelligence Reports Nos 195 to 247 inclusive for month of January.1943.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV)
FOR RAID NO 97

HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 15, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0100I/15.
Number. . . . . 218)

7 AUST. DIV.

In the SANANANDA Area, the 2/12 Bn are across the road, the 2/9 Bn is closing in and the 2/10 Bn is carrying out local encirclement around left of 2/7 Cavalry. The 163 Regt. is advancing South down both routes as well as patrolling and holding the enemy on the North. The 163 Regt. is trying to encircle and trap the enemy South of the road block.

In dications that the Japs are withdrawing from the forward area are confirmed by a PW captured on the 14 January. He reports the enemy to be well armed with plenty of ammunition but short of food. The Japs have orders to withdraw to GIRUWA.

In the GONA area 50 well armed Japs proceeding WEST GONA MISSION were attacked by HQ 14 Brigade DID staff and natives. Some casualties were inflicted before the Japs escaped to the South.

Patrol activity is continuing in the AMBOGA RIVER mouth area. In the KUMUSI River area enemy are repairing barges in the vicinity of KURENADA villages. There are continuous enemy patrols on the beach between KURENADA and BAKUMBARI. An enemy MG post has been located in the coconut grove on the beach 1000 yards South of the KUMUSI RIVER. The KUMUSI - CAPE WARD HUNT Area is clear of the enemy.

KANGA:

43 Jap reinforcements arrived at MUBO from KOMIATUM on the 12 January. Jap heavy mortar posts to the North and West of MUBO bombed our positions East of the village on the 12th and 13th January. .5 MG firing explosive bullets were also used. The enemy casualties so far are heavy.

The enemy are active at LABU on defences. 10 barges were observed moving from LABU to LAE.

AIR OPS:

BAKUMBARI was bombed and straffed starting fires. No movement seen in this area. The track KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA was straffed but no movement was seen.

At LAE probable dump areas near the beach were heavily bombed causing large fires and dense smoke. Considerable AA encountered. GASMATA runway bombed but effects unobserved.

MORESBY AREA - RAID 97:

Red Warning received 2231 hours 14 January '43 of unidentified aircraft approaching from the NW.

This aircraft circled to the West and made one run over the area from the West to the East. H.1 Heavy Gun Station engaged this aircraft with barrage fire at height of 26,000 feet at 2330 hours. The length of the engagement was 20 seconds during which 16 rounds were expended. Fuze length during the engagement was 29.29

Searchlights illuminated the target for a period of 60 seconds when obscured by cloud cover. The aircraft was not identified as to type but appeared to be a twin engine plane.

Approximately three bombs were dropped in the water in the Joyce Bay Area between Manubada Island and the beach. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment was reported.

At 0010 hours 15 January '43, plots were received from RDF bearing160 degrees - 50 miles out. Night fighter was airborne to intercept. Nothing eventuated however, and white warning was issued at 0048 hours.

Arthur J. Cornell
ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV)
FOR. RAID No 98

HEADQUARTERS
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 16, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2400L/15.
Number. . . . . 220)

5 AUST. DIV.

D Company 15 Bn relieved a company of the 2/5 Bn at WEDAU and TAUPOTA on the 14th January. Handover of Headquarters 17 Brigade to Headquarters 29 Brigade now completed.

7 AUST. DIV.

Present disposition of troops:-

18 Brigade Headquarters now established at the southern end of the plantation.

The 2/10 Bn has passed through plantation area North along the track for 1500 yards where the track ends.

The 2/9 Bn and 2/12 Bn less one company are located in the plantation area. One company of the 2/12 Bn is moving to secure the track junction.

The 36 Bn is disposed along the GONA - JUMBORA track. A patrol operating 300 yards South of ADS killed a party of seven Japs, two of which believed to be officers. Our casualties were nil. Active patrols are being maintained.

The 49 Bn is now protecting the GONA Line of Communication against parties of stray Japs.

The 2/7 Cavalry found no enemy whilst cleaning up former Jap positions South of the road block.

1 Bn 163 Regt. is engaging an enemy pocket in the vicinity of the road junction.

KANGA FORCE:

Advanced Headquarters 17th Brigade and 2/6 Bn arrived 15th January. Advanced Headquarters 17 Brigade now Headquarters KANGA FORCE.

AIR OPS:

Tracks in the vicinity of SANANANDA POINT were bombed and strafed with nil results observed.

The MAMBARE DELTA was well strafed. Signs of activity were observed on DEAD MANGROVE ISLAND. No serviceable barges were seen from KUMUSI to SANANANDA.

LAE dumps in the TERRACE Area were bombed but the results were unobserved.

RABAUL harbour and aerodromes were bombed but damaged was not observed. At GASMATA bombs were dropped on the runway.

MORESBY RAID - NO. 98

Yellow Warning was received at approximately 2242 hours 15 January, '43, of unidentified aircraft approaching Port Moresby from the Southeast.

Red Warning was given at 2249 hours. One aircraft, probable type NELL, after shadowing B-24s in, made one run over the area from the South to the North, returning to the Southeast.

H.1, H.2 and H.6 gun stations engaged this aircraft with barrage fire at heights of 24,600 feet to 26,000 feet at approximately 2300L/15 expending a total of 38 rounds.

Approximately four bombs were dropped to the West of Wards Drome. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported. Searchlights illuminated the target for seven minutes on the way out to the Southeast when plane was out of range of the guns.

During the entire raid the B-24s continued to circle the area with navigation lights on preparatory to landing.

White Warning was given at 2356L/15.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV).
FOR RAIDS NOS 99
100.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 23, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0500L/23.
Number. . . . . 233)

7 AUST. DIV.

All organized enemy resistance has now been overcome. In the 163 U.S. Regt. Area 475 enemy dead have been counted and there are many more uncounted.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The coastal strip TARAKENA to GIRUWA is now being consolidated. A strong patrol is investigating the Jap hospital located 600 yards South of GRIUWA.

A total of 200 enemy are believed to have been killed in the operations West of KONOMBI CREEK. There are large numbers dead still uncounted, including many in the hospital area. Thirteen PWs have been taken.

KANGA:

In the MUBO Area, our reconnaissance patrol at BUIBAINING observed an enemy patrol of approximately 50 strong moving from the BITOI RIVER towards BLACK CAT track. They also observed 15 Japs bathing in the BITOI RIVER near BUIBAINING. A fighting patrol has been sent out to intercept.

MADANG:

A report for a reliable source has been received that Japs are at KUMIANG near KAINANTU, about 65 miles South of MADANG.

AIR OPS:

The shipping in the harbour of RABAUL was successfully attacked at 0740L/22. Two ships each 2,000 to 4,000 tons were sunk and direct hits were made on two others. The store dumps at LAE were attacked and fires started in the TERRACE area.

PORT MORESBY -

Raid No 99.

Yellow Warning was received at approximately 2138 hours of unidentified aircraft approaching the area.

At 2153 hours a Red Warning was issued and G.1 began to receive indications bearing 140 degrees, 42,000 yards. One or possibly two aircraft, type unknown, made one run over the harbour from the Southeast to the West and then returning to the Southeast at heights of 14,500 feet down to 11,000 feet.

H.1, H.2, H.3, H.5, H.7 and H.8 engaged this target with barrage fire and H.6 with G.L. control, from 2238 to 2244 hours. Heights during the engagement ranged from 16,500 feet down to 11,500 feet. Period of engagement lasted from 10 seconds to three minutes during which a total of 176 rounds were expended.

It is estimated that from four to six bombs were dropped in the harbour and surrounding area. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported.

Searchlights illuminated one plane for a short period only, through a break in the cloud. Cloud conditions during this engagement were 10 tenths, and the ceiling was 12,000 feet to 14,000 feet.

During the entire run the aircraft changed course continuously and lost height.

White Warning was issued at 2345 hours 22 January.

Raid No. 100

Red Warning was issued at 0300 hours 23 January of unidentified aircraft flying over the Port Moresby Area from the Southeast to the North.

Enemy aircraft, probably two, type unknown, made a second run from the North to the West at heights of 20,000 feet to 24,000 feet.

H.2, H.4 and H.7v engaged this target with barrage fire; H.6 with G.L. control, and H.9 and H.11 with radio control from 0350 to 0353 hours.

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Heights during the engagement ranged from 21,000 feet up to 24,500 feet. Periods of engagement lasted from 20 seconds to two minutes during which a total of 213 rounds were expended.

A report received from several gun stations indicate bombs were dropped approximately 4,000 yards due South of WAIGANI.

Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported.

Searchlights were unable to illuminate the target due to cloud cover. Cloud conditions were 5 to 7 tenths and ceiling on this particular raid was 15,000 feet to 18,000 feet.

When the gun stations opened fire, the target was definitely turned from its course.

White Warning was issued at 0430L/23 January.

RED ALERTS:

In addition to the above two Raids, two alerts were also received. The first red alert was received at 2359 hours 22 January. Indications were received on a bearing 20 degrees, at extreme range. These indications were lost however, and a White Warning was given at 0032L/23 January.

The second Red Alert was given 0505L/23 January as RDF had indications bearing 50 degrees at extreme range. These indications faded and a White Warning was issued at 0518L/23 January.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV).
FOR. RAID NO. 101

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 25, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 0430L/25.
Number. . . . . 236)

7 AUST. DIV.

The 14 Brigade is still engaging small parties of Japs endeavouring to escape westward across the JUMBORA GONA track, particularly in the vicinity of the ADS and DID.

The 3 Bn. 163 Regt. is moving to GONA on the 24th January to relieve the 14 Brigade.

Native patrols killed further three Japs on the 21st January at SAGARI. The enemy in this area are now estimated at 100.

Two enemy barges were engaged off AMBASI River by PT boats at 2200L/21 January. One was probably sunk. At 0245L/22 January two large enemy barges were engaged by native patrols from AMBASI bluff. The barges returned the fire and withdrew to the sea. PT boats attacked two barges off KUMUSI River on the morning 23rd January and one was left smoking.

KANGA FORCE:

One rifle platoon of the 2/7 Bn with attached MMG section, sigs and medical personnel completed air movement to BENA BENA on the 23rd January.

The enemy troops reported moving towards BIACK CAT are now considered to be camping in the BUIBAINING area.

AIR OPS:

SALAMAUA was bombed and strafed causing dense smoke but the extent of the damage is NOT known.

About 100 native craft reported as lakatois are on the beach from SALAMAUA to CAPE KUBUMI.

RABAUL aerodromes were bombed 0330L/24 January. Fires were left burning on LAKUNAI and VUNAKANAU.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 101

Red Warning was issued at 0332 hours 25th January ~~xxxxx~~. A number of enemy aircraft, possibly 3/6, following B-17s into the area, made one run over the Port Moresby Area from the South to the Northeast at a height of approximately 20,000 feet.

Approximately 20/30 bombs were dropped at the southern end of Jacksons Drome and surrounding area destroying one DC-3. Nill casualties were reported.

H.A. Gun Stations engaged the aircraft by radio control at 0334 25 January. The period of engagement lasted approximately 3 seconds during which 5 rounds were expended. Serachlights were illuminated but were unable to pick up target. White Warning was given at 0432 hours.

RED ALERTS:

In addition to the above raid, Port Moresby had three Red Alert during the period 2000 hours 24 Jan. and 0530 hours 25th January.

Arthur J. Cornell
ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV)
FOR RAID No. 102.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 26, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0400L/26.
Number. . . . . 237)

5 AUST. DIV.

Air Raid No. 17 was carried out by approximately three enemy aircraft which dropped 6 to 8 bombs in the vicinity of TURNBULL strip. This raid tookplace at 0304L on the 25th January. No casualties reported although some damage was done.

The 41st U.S. Division has now assumed command of all troops in the ORO BAY GONA area as from 1200L/25 January.

MOROBE AREA:

A reliable source reports at least four barges full of enemy troops landed at KOBO, south of the WARIA River mouth. Jap troops and two barges were hidden on the North bank of the WARIA mouth, also Jap sentries have been posted at BAU.

KANGA FORCE:

Enemy estimated at 100 strong have been reported moving along the track HOUSE/COPPER, WANDUMI, in the direction of WANDUMI. They were later believed to have swung right towards BLACKCAT.

One platoon of the 2/6 Bn has been sent to re-inforce BAICKCAT. Our reconnaissance patrols have been patrolling from BAILAMS CAMP to the WANDUMI Area. BALLAMS is now being reinforced by two platoons of the 2/5 Bn.

AIR OPS:

Reconnaissance aircraft strafed 15 canoes on the beach near KEL KEL and sighted another 9 sheltered by undergrowth at KUI.

LAE dumps were bombed by B25s at 0932L/25 January. Fires were started.

RABAUL harbour and aerodromes were heavily bombed on the night 24/25 January. Hits were observed on two vessels.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 102

Red Warning was issued at 0237 hours of imepnding raid by enemy aircraft. Two enemy medium bombers type BETTY or SALLY made one run across the PORT MORESBY area from the WNW to the ENE at heights of 26,000 ft. down to 21,000 ft.

Approximately four bombs were dropped to the West of the 7 Mile Drome causing neither casualties nor damage.

H.2 engaged with barrage, H.3 engaged with barrage and height control, H.6 engaged with height control and G.L., H.7 engaged with barrage, H.9 engaged by Radar control and H.11 engaged with radar control and visual sighting with director. The period of engagement was from 0316 hours to0322 hours. Total numbe of rounds fired during the entire engagement was 325.

Searchlights illuminated the target for approximately six minutes. During the entire run, the target changed course continuously and lost height from the beginning of the run.

White Warning was given at 0332 hours 26 January.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

APPENDIX (IV).
FOR RAID NO 103.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 27, 1943.

Intelligence Report:
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/27.
Number. 238:

41 U. S. Div.

An enemy barge landing was found on the North branch of the KONOMBI CREEK 600 yards from TARAKENA. Two motor barges and motor launches were found there with charts and equipment.

The 3 Bn 163 U.S. Regt. has now completed the relief of the 14 Brigade.

KUMUSI AREA.

It is estimated that approximately 200 enemy are at DEUNIA but NO movement has been seen on the KUMUSI River in this area. An additional enemy party of approximately 200 arrived SABARI from SENANI.

MOROBE AREA.

A reliable source reports dumps at KOBO and BIBILA and that enemy troops are quartered at BAU. Air reconnaissance on 26 Jan strafed and rendered unserviceable four barges on the South bank of the WARIA River. This aircraft also observed activity in the vicinity of KOBO and some troops at ZAKA. The natives report some Japs are in the MOROBE village North of WARIA.

KANGA.

In the BLACKCAT WANDUMI area a total of 300/350 enemy were observed movin towards BLACKCAT.

One of our mortar detachments moved from WAU to BLACKCAT. Two more of our platoons are moving from BALIAMS to WANDUMI.

AIR OPS.

Our aircraft bombed and strafed MATMAT HILL and MUBO. No movement was seen from KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA. Four barges at the mouth of the WARIA RIVER were strafed and sunk.

KOBO was strafed and SALAMAUA bombed during our coastal reconnaissance. Supply dumps in the TERRACE Area at LAE were strafed then bombed with unobserved results.

B-17s attacked shipping in SIMPSON Harbour at RABAUL on the night of 24/ January. Bombs were dropped on a 2,000 ton ship causing a large explosion which li up the whole area. The ship was possible a munitions carrier. One 500 lb. bomb dropped from 200 feet on a ship tied to KOKOPO Wharf, left a large hole in the ship side. 500 and 1,000 lb. bombs were dropped on other targets, but results could not be observed.

Seven B-17s attacked shipping in SIMPSON HARBOUR on the morning of 26 Ja A fire was started close to the shore North of the MAIAGUNA Strip. Hits were scor on one unidentified ship at the extreme North end of SIMPSON harbour starting a la fire. Our planes were attacked by night fighters and A.A. but all returned safely to their base.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 103

Red Warning was issued at 0252 hours, 27 January of impending raid by enemy aircraft. Night fighter was airborne from JACKSON Drome to intercept.

Three enemy medium bombers, type SALLY, came in from the Southeast and were illuminated by the searchlights. These aircraft made one run in staggering formation at heights of 24,000 ft. down to 22,500 ft and went out to the Southwest.

On the second run, the aircraft came in from the Southwest in a V formati and were illuminated by searchlights. This run was made at heights of 22,000 ft. down to 19,000 ft. Approximately 15 bombs were dropped at the Northwest end of Wards Drome destroying one Beaufighter. Nil casualties have been reported. One other bomb which was evidently hung in the bomb bay, fell in the 96 Engineer Area near PITT Street causing slight damage.

Night fighter intercepted these aircraft after bombs had been released and engaged them on their way out to the East. All Clear was given at 0415 hours.

Arthur J Cornell
ARTHUR J CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 2, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 16

OPERATIONS SOLOMON ISLANDS 7 - 29 AUGUST, 1942
LESSONS FROM OPERATIONS NO. 3

NOTE: The following training notes are based on a report submitted by Wing Commander Dale, RAAF, reprinted, 27 November, 1942, by Hq. First Australian Army. Reproduced by I.O., Headquarters, A.A. Defences, N.G.F.

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I. AIRDROMES

a. The Airdrome, as laid out by the Japanese was modified slightly upon its capture by the Americans.

b. The enemy appears to have employed coolie methods of construction, working both day and night. The construction work was lighted by portable electric plants. It was necessary to prepare a sub-grade, which involved filling up to three feet across a depression and grading 1/600 longitudinally and laterally. This was covered by 6" of gravel. This gravel was carried up from the river bed in small baskets and loaded on a small industrial railroad, then dumped in place. This was covered with two inches of decomposed coral for binding. Both the gravel and the coral were rolled together by ten small tandem rollers.

The dimensions of the runway were 1200 metres long by 50 metres wide. This runway was located almost in the centre of the clearing.

c. A taxi-way leading out to the splinter-proof pens had received a surface treatment of decomposed coral, bound together with 20% cement.

d. A number of splinter-proof workshops, designed to shelter fighter type aircraft were in various stages of construction. The design of these splinter-proof pens, made of coconut trunks and sandbags, was similar to our own. They consisted of flat steel trusses on which was laid a one inch thick steel roof, supported by a timber framework, which was to be filled with sandbags. These were proof against anything but a direct hit.

e. Two fully equipped Radio Direction Finder Installations were captured intact. The Japanese did not do any damage to these Radio Direction Finders. However, the RDFs could not be used by the US Forces, due to a lack of personnel with the requisite technical knowledge. It is interesting to note that the Japanese did not receive any warning of the approach of the task force, with these RDFs.

f. Water supply was available from the river and was pumped and stored in tanks around the airdrome.

g. Living quarters were constructed some distance from the air field and well hidden in the coconut groves. They were well built and subsequently used by the US Forces as a hospital. They were of a standard that was comparable to an Australian temporary camp. Workshops had also been erected.

h. The airdrome was built on black loamy soil, which may become

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very boggy during the wet season. There was no indication that the Japanese had planned or commenced construction on any other air field. Our ground reconnaissance show that other air fields could be constructed practically anywhere along the grassy plain areas found on the Island. Drainage difficulties were very likely to be encountered during the wet season, however. More rain falls on the east coast than on the west.

II. OUR TACTICS.

a. Our tactical doctrine throughout this entire operation proved basically sound. Too great an emphasis cannot be placed upon quick decisive action in closing with the enemy and the development of initiative and boldness by junior leaders. This development of initiative and boldness by junior leaders was illustrated repeatedly in three types of operations.

b. at GUADALCANAL, where the enemy was surprised, the landing was effected under covering of naval bombardment, followed by the rapid extension of the beach head and in the advance to the LUNGA camp area, a distance of over 8,000 yards in less than four hours. The rapid overcoming of resistance in dug-outs and pockets was due to the aggressive action of junior leaders.

c. In this area, overhead shelters, and quite an elaborate system of underground dug-outs were encountered. These dug-outs were generally constructed approximately six feet deep and four feet wide, reinforced with 4 x 4 hardwood timber, covered with half-inch steel plating and up to five feet of sandbags. In general, they were located around camps, air fields, and where any concentration of troops could be expected. These dug-outs provided exceptionally effective protection during the naval and aerial bombardment. The landing party expected to find a great many casualties, whereas only thirteen were killed and ten wounded. This conclusion should be taken with caution, due to the probable detonation of shells in the tops of the coconut palms, which caused the majority of explosions to take place prematurely at tree-top height, together with the fact that many shells landed in soft areas. Of the shells that landed in soft ground, a large number failed to detonate.

COMMENT: - Naval gun fire was quite ineffective against personnel in protected shelters - particularly so when trees detonate the shells at tree-top height. However, it was believed in the PHILIPPINES that overhead shelters were undesirable because troops were unable to observe the direction of enemy barrages and aerial attack. In slit trenches, troops move promptly out of the line of fire to avoid a creeping barrage or an aerial attack. Another disadvantage is that troops have the tendency to remain too long after the attack in dug-outs with overhead protection.

d. In TULAGI area the attack was essentially divided into two simultaneous actions, first action of which consisted of clearing the enemy from the north end of the island, while the main part of the force crossed the island and advanced to the south with an established rate of advance. The decisive and aggressive action by the individual subordinate commanders was demonstrated when their advance was temporarily held up due to snipers in villages of houses of European construction on the axis of advance. The tactical situation did not permit these centers of resistance to be by-passed. These houses were promptly demolished by mortar fire and all enemy resistance overcome to avoid leaving an enemy occupied locality in the rear of the advance.

e. In the third type of operation at TANAMBOGO, a parachute battalion because of its greater fire power, was employed as infantry in landing craft to make a frontal attack, which met with great opposition. Unfortunately an oil dump was set on fire, which silhouetted our troops and disrupted the entire plan of attack. In this case, it was necessary to withdraw after suffering severe losses. Initiative and good judgment on the part of the junior leaders handling their troops in this most difficult operation prevented the annihilation of these especially selected troops and resulted in the majority effecting their escape by swimming.

COMMENT: - This use of specially trained paratroops is questionable. Their use as infantry can only be justified on the ground that no other troops are available. The frontal attack is most difficult form of attack.

f. This illustrates the necessity for every member of the landing force to be able to swim with full equipment.

III. OUR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

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a. The weapons and equipment carried by the individual soldier were standard and non-essentials were left behind. He traveled light with all the extra ammunition he could carry.

b. Uniforms - It is believed that the uniform for this type of operation should be redesigned to include a greater number of large pockets to facilitate the carrying of extra ammunition, particularly grenades. These pockets should have flaps on them to prevent the contents from falling out and should not be on the front of the clothing, where they will interfere with the soldiers firing from the prone position. All insignia was removed, but officers and NCOs carried pistols. This is contrary to sound battle practice, since all should be dressed alike. Our uniforms were quite similar to those worn by the Japanese, only of a lighter shade. There is a great similarity between the two types, so that our patrols on occasions were in doubt as to identification. Som pre-arranged means of identification should be worked out for future operations. Our troops initially used green water colors to camouflage their faces and hands. This was not effective, due to the heat of the tropics and excessive perspiration.

c. Gas Masks - Gas masks were carried by all troops, which raises the question of the advisability of such procedure. In ship to shore operations, these gas masks may get wet and be rendered useless. Consideration should be given to a new policy in regard to the carrying of gas masks. In the middle East, some Australian units adopted the policy of transporting the units' gas masks with their ammunition. The reason for this was when the gas mask was carried continuously it soon became unserviceable. Hence the commander took the risk of keeping the gas mask intact for an emergency., for which he felt reasonably sure there would be ample warning. In case no warning, they simply faced the fact that the first troops subjected to gas attack would find themselves in a regrettable situation. The latest information from NEW GUINEA area indicates that some Japanese units have already adopted this policy, as no respirators were reported from KOKODA - IORIBAIWA Area. There is even a greater need for taking this risk of a gas attack in a landing operation. The gas masks in a dry state, can readily be taken ashore later with the ammunition.

d. American Helmet, New Type - This new type American helmet was worn. Several of these were observed with bullet holes piercing completely through the back and front. Helmets were punctured by calibre .25 bullets fired at about 30 yards range. In the cases observed, there was no difference in the diameter of the bullet holes in the front and rear. Opinion is that the present helmet has the added advantage of protecting the back of the neck from shrapnel fire. However, troops who saw the damaged helmets and noted the effect of the small calibre rifle bullet, lost a certain amount of confidence in the ability of the helmet to protect them.

e. Head Net - It was noticed that the head net in this operation was carried between the liner and steel helmet. A better suggested way of carrying this and one which is now being used by an American Division is to place the head net securely inside the liner. This has the added advantage of having the head net immediately available when needed and also to absorb the sound waves from the wearers' voice.

f. Infantry Weapons - Standard American weapons were utilized throughout this entire operation.

1. Calibre .30 Rifle and Browning Automatic Rifle - The calibre .30 Springfield rifle, 1903, as well as the M1 rifle and Browning automatic rifle, proved particularly effective. Many of the Marines seemed to prefer the Springfield rifle on account of its accuracy. Many fleeting targets appeared at ranges varying from 100 to 500 yards. In general, due to the fighting taking place at longer ranges than are normally encountered in Jungle warfare, because the terrain was more open, the hitting power of the calibre .30 was unquestionably superior to the smaller calibre Japanese weapons.

2. Bayonet - The American bayonet is not sharpened. It is believed that consideration should be given to a sufficiently sharp tempered steel bayonet, that could be used for the dual purpose of bayonet and bolo.

3. 37mm Anti-Tank Gun - This weapon was effectively employed against personnel, when no tanks were encountered. Shrapnel was fired into concentrations of troops holding up our advance.

4. Mortars - Both 60 and 81 mm mortars were used in this operation and proved to be very effective. The Marines seemed to prefer the 60 mm mortar, due to the greater ease of transport and concealment, where troops were

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moving rapidly in this situation. Some consideration should be given to the development of a light mortar, similar to the Japanese, which can be carried forward quickly into position by the soldier and fired from the thigh. Our 60 mm mortar lacks this degree of mobility. The 81 mm mortar was effective in the operations on TULAGI, where houses containing snipers had to be demolished.

5. Thompson Sub-Machine Gun - In this particular operation, there was the impression by observers, that the troops apparently used full automatic. It was particularly noticed that in the early stages of the landing, the troops were careless in conserving ammunition, even to the extent of shooting coconuts out of trees to get the milk. Junior leaders quickly stopped this practice. Consideration should be given in the instruction of troops, to impress upon them the need to conserve ammunition. Greater accuracy of fire and conservation of ammunition is accomplished when the TSMG is employed as a single shot weapon, but volume of fire from a small group is more effective and should be used on appropriate targets.

6. Grenades - Grenades were effective in mopping up operations where the Japanese had retreated to caves and underground passages. These shelters were primarily protection against air and naval bombardment, but were useless in infantry defensive positions. The narrow passage from these caves and dug-outs only permitted one or two men to fire at a time. To enter such a restricted passage would have been suicidal for our troops. Our Marines were able to blast the Japanese out of small dug-outs with grenades. In the larger dug-outs where the bursting effect of our grenades was not sufficient, these were supplemented by the use of TNT or gasoline. Particular comment as to the use of grenade has arisen in this operation for a grenade of a different color and with a shorter time fuse. At night, it was found that our grenades should be painted with a dull green coat of paint, because the Japanese would throw back the shiny grenades at our troops. During the day for close-in work of mopping up machine gun nests, etc., if the grenade was thrown as soon as the pin was pulled the Japanese would throw these grenades back at our troops. Hence our troops allowed the fuse to be armed while they counted up to three and then threw the grenade. Grenades thrown in this manner were not picked up and appear to have solved the difficulty.

7. Machine Guns - Machine guns were excellent in breaking up night attacks, where short fields of fire had been prepared. Training in selecting positions for automatic weapons should be emphasized.

8. Artillery - The information regarding artillery was extremely meagre and contained only the barest details.

1. Field Artillery - Field artillery was employed effectively in this operation. The employment in the early stages of landing operations differs from their normal employment. In ordinary land operations, field artillery from the beginning executes preparatory and supporting fire, whereas this has to be done by naval guns until the artillery is ashore. Difficulty is encountered in transporting guns and ammunition ashore. Co-ordination must be worked out with naval fire. Control of the field artillery must be decentralised in the initial phases of the operations, so that the artillery can accompany the infantry unit to which attached. This required much careful advanced planning and setting up of time schedules.

(a). The 75 mm Pack Howitzer was especially suited for this type of operation, because it could be disembarked from transports by manpower, transported in small boats, landed and moved forward on shore by hand. Assembled it weighs 1390 lbs. and has a maximum effective range (which is 85% of its extreme range using standard ammunition) of 8,100 yards.

(b). In addition to the 75 mm Pack Howitzer, the 75 mm dual-purpose guns, mounted on half tracks were effectively employed in these operations. These self-propelled mounts were able to displace quickly to areas where fire power was required. An illustration of this was the counter battery role of these guns in causing a submarine, firing on LUNGA POINT area to submerge.

(c). 105 mm Howitzers furnished the remaining artillery support. These weigh approximately 4,800 lbs. and have a maximum effective range (85% extreme range using standard ammunition) of 10,300 yards. Apparently 155 mm howitzers nor guns had not been brought ashore during the period covered by this report.

2. Antiaircraft Artillery -

(a). AA Defense of Task Force - The task force had one or more AA ships in the convoy. The number of these ships was not disclosed. These AA ships are either light cruisers or transports mounting several 4 inch or 5 inch AA guns. In addition on each transport, about five of the dual mount 20 mm AA guns were set

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up to increase the density of fire. The 20 mm AA guns were mounted in pairs on a carriage similar to the 37 mm AA mount. In general, the air-cooled calibre .50 AA MGs were not employed to supplement the fire from the transports. These AA MGs were apparently reserved for the early stage of the operation, because of the shor life of the air-cooled calibre .50 AA MG barrels.

(b). AA Defense of Airdrome - The calibre .50 AA MGs were emplace around the perimeter up to 500 yards away from the airdrome, which was located in the center of a clearing. This disposition of AA MGs permits a greater ease in tracking targets, because of a less angular travel of the target, when it is straf fing the airdrome and attacking gun positions. Dual mount 20 mm AA guns were disposed in a similar manner to the calibre .50 AA MGs. Two 90 mm AA Gun Batteries (8 guns) were taken ashore. The average bombing attack was made from 15,000 to 18,000 feet. Each of the two batteries of the 90 mm AA Guns were disposed in prolongation with the air field.

(c). Dual role of AA Artillery - Consideration should be given to the use of 90 mm AA guns in the dual role as a breech defense weapon in an area such as the airdrome at GUADALCANAL. AA Artillery has the dual role in anti-mechanized defense already and it might be desirable to employ these guns against naval or land targets of opportunity. In the MILNE BAY operation, when the 3.7 inch AA ammunition was armed with 25 pounder, 117 or 119 fuse, in lieu of the 29.52 second 3.7 inch AA fuse, it was found that the range was increased from 9,200 yards to approximately 20,000 yards. The time fuse was the limiting factor on the range. When the AA fuse was set to safe, the projectile did not detonate upon impact. The 3.7 inch is the Australian equivalent of the American 90 mm AA gun. The range of the armor piercing 90 mm ammunition is not known. This dual mission should not be overlooked when terrain conditions permit these guns to be so used, and appropriate ammunition should be provided.

IV. JAPANESE TACTICS.

a. Primarily the Japanese have been trained through five years of war, including much jungle fighting in CHINA and MALAYA. As a result the Japanese is both physically and medically prepared for this type of warfare. Reports suggest that the Japanese have anti-toxins for jungle diseases that we do not possess. They have been particularly trained in night operations and are reluctant to fight in the open or in the day time. They are convinced that when captured they will be killed and hence few prisoners are taken on either side. Physically they possess great endurance. There are numerous cases where the Japanese will crouch or lie in one position, highly camouflaged, for as long as three days to obtain information or to fire one shot, knowing that he will be killed after that shot.

b. Their fanatical attitude was noticed in the case of a Japanese Lieutenant and two privates charging a Marine Battalion HQ shouting "American Marines you die". One of the Japanese bayoneted a Marine Sergeant before the thr were killed. Another instance was when Japanese nurses led stretcher bearers with wounded Marines into an ambush at a Japanese field hospital. The entire party, including the Japanese nurses, were wiped out by machine gun fire from the hospita Another example was when Japanese nurses came out to surrender and when within range, threw hand grenades at our Marines. On the second or third day after the landing, a Japanese Captain of a Labor Battalion walked into the Marine Division HQ and surrendered. After being questioned by the Division Intelligence Officer, the Japanese Captain stated an entire Labor Battalion would surrender if a detail would accompany them back to the Division HQ. This Marine Colonel took a detail of twenty Marines in a landing boat and proceeded to the specified point along the beach. When the detail stepped ashore all were ambushed and killed, except two runners and one sergeant, who were wounded and escaped. This sergeant reported to Hq that instead of a Labor Battalion there was a special Japanese Weapons Detachment. Later the Marines wiped out this detachment of about two hundred (200) Japanese. The Japanese frequently attempted to ambush parties by sending natives to inform the Marines that they could lead rescue parties to their wounded. Bitter experience has warned us against ambushes. Then there was the case of a Marine doctor, who was stabbed by a wounded Japanese whose injured leg he was dressing.

c. The Japanese is able to live and move around in swamps, which are considered inaccessible for our troops. Individual Japanese soldiers are equipped for independent action with a most efficient type of gear, light but effective. With this equipment they will crawl sometimes through the jungle so thick that it would appear impossible for a human being to move, yet they wriggle through on hands and knees or on their stomach for miles, taking days if necessary. We find that the Japanese frequently crawls over the jungle as well as in the under

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brush. They are patient and painstaking in their preparation for operations. Theyhave accurate and complete intelligence information to include the most minute maps, even of jungle areas. They have learned to live off the land, whether in swamps or jungle. They normally go out on a mission with only a pocketful of rice and dried fish. This is supplemented with jungle food of a type that we could not eat. They are experts on knowing what is edible and in avoiding poisonous shrubs, insects, and jungle animals.

d. Their main tactics in jungle warfare is infiltration. They infiltrate behind enemy lines and rendezvous in effective patrols to cut off and wipe out enemy outposts. This infiltration has been developed so extensively that they are apparently able to outnumber such enemy positions at will. The Japanese then attacks with fanatical devotion to duty and seldom surrenders.

e. An illustration was when a Japanese bomber was shot down and five members of the crew got into the plane's rubber boat. A US destroyer approached the rubber boat to rescue the Japanese. When it became apparent they were going to be forcibly rescued, the only Jap with a gun killed his companions and was turning the gun on himself, when he was killed by machine gun fire from the destroyer

f. They are careful and successful in their radio interceptions and exploit it to their best advantage. On the second day of the SOLOMONS action, considerable resistance was encountered on a hill on the island of TANEMBOGO. Our Marines withdrew and designated as a target for 1000-lb bombs the occupied area, which has been dug out and developed into a veritable gun turret. The Group Air Commander from the USS "SARATOGA" was ordered to bomb this target. On his way to do so he received a counter order, stating that the Marines had now gained possession and not to bomb this gun position. The Group Commander checked the authenticator. Authenticators had been worked out among the pilots the previous night, by using the pilot's nickname. The voice, using a perfect American accent and countermanding the bombing order, was unable to furnish the correct authenticator, so the bombing mission continued uninterrupted,

g. The Japanese as a standing operating procedure, outline their front lines by using flares, alternating red and white. These were sent up by front line units and also by units extending the line to the flank. This furnished useful information for our artillery. Another method of indicating front lines has been by displaying a white flag with a rising sun tied to a tree. This has been countered by our bombing the area in which these flags were displayed.

h. Direction of attack at night is sometimes maintained by the use of flares, set up well to the rear of the Japanese troops. These flares are called for by portable voice radio of a type superior to ours. Also the Japanese apparently used bird calls for unit identification.

i. The Japanese did not use conventional sandbags for revetment, but utilized a bag made of rice, straw and filled with dirt. Under the influence of heat and rain, the emplacements grew green sprouts, which blended exceptionally well with the surrounding background. The Japanese have developed the art of camouflage to an exceptionally high degree. They were able to change in constantly with each change of surroundings.

j. The Japanese tactics in this operation varied somewhat to meet the terrain encountered, which varied from swamp land to sparsely cultivated land and dense woods. In the attack on GUADALCANAL, a brief description of the operation is given. The first two waves reached BEACH HEAD, under the protection of our naval guns and landed unopposed. A beach head was established and extended. Thes troops pushed rapidly to the south and to the west to extend the beach head as mor troops arrived. As the troops came to the vicinity of the ILU RIVER, they found the river bed had dried up, leaving nothing but mud. To overcome this terrain obstacle the "Alligator" landing craft was used to get the troops across. The troops advancing to the west advanced through open coconut palms. By noon the troops were west of ALLIGATOR CREEK, where the country was a combination of coconut palms and tall grass, without any jungle underbrush. At this point the Japanese resistance consisted mostly of rifle and machine gun fire from dug-outs and prepared emplacements, supplemented by snipers. These snipers were employed both as tree snipers and ground snipers. As a result the fight at this time consisted of a series of attacks on these dug-outs and destruction of the snipers in the trees. Improvised flame throwers and the dynamiting of dug-out entrances proved the most effective means of overcoming these defences,

k. The daytime Japanese defensive tactics was to withdrew and counter attack by night. They would leave a few snipers to harass our troops, but the main body would counter attack by night. It is the usual practice of the

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Japanese snipers to wait until their target has passed by them in order to shoot the individual in the back. Snipers prefer to fire on a stationary target, rather than on troops in movement. For this reason, troops must adopt the standard procedure of taking cover whenever they halt.

l. During night attacks, the following characteristics were noticed. Infiltration by the enemy, operating on a very narrow front, was the usual method employed. The enemy would try to destroy any automatic weapons that had not been given all round protection. This emphasizes the need for training in the proper siting of automatic weapons, which must be protected and be capable of firing in all directions. During the night attacks the Japanese fired their automatic weapons extensively, but made very little use of their rifle fire. Enemy fire was usually high in order to allow their troops to approach our position with grenades. The assault was delivered immediately after a grenade barrage, accompanied by yells and screams. The Japanese used offensive grenades for this purpose.

m. One of the principles employed by the Japanese, which differs from operations in the jungle and thick underbrush, was the direction of the attack at night. The Japanese attacked from low ground, in order to silhouette our troops against the skyline in the more open country. This, of course, conforms to our sound tactical doctrine, which teaches the occupation of alternate positions at night. Where the advance of our troops is held up at dusk by the enemy occupying opposing ridgelines, it is essential that strong patrols be sent forward to occupy the low ground to the front, which would silhouette the enemy against the skyline. The main body of our troops must avoid the crest of the hill, but not give up the high ground secured during the day. In brief, our forces must dominate "No Man's Land" during the hours of darkness.

n. In this operation supplies of Japanese ammunition were captured, which included cartridges containing long-nosed wooden bullets. Prior to finding this type of ammunition, there were rumors of explosive bullets being used. However, there was no confirmation of this. It is believed that this ammunition was employed by the Japanese after they had infiltrated through our lines and then attacked our troops from the rear. Due to the short range of this ammunition, their own troops were not endangered. The American riot gun or commercial shotgun is believed to be far more effective than this wooden bullet and some consideration should be given to arming our troops with shot guns for use in a similar situation and for close-in defense, particularly at night.

o. Japanese Anti- Tank Tactics and Anti-Tank Weapons - A platoon of six M3 light tanks were sent to the aid of the attacking force, during the fighting west of LUNGA RIVER. These tanks were moving in a column across the grassy clearing from the infantry, to attack Japanese machine guns on the edge of the jungle.

No. 4 Tank went into the jungle and was never seen again. HQ tank was disabled by a hit on the first sprocket wheel, after going about forty feet into the jungle.

No. 5 Tank backed out of the jungle after entering a short distance, when it was unable to locate any targets. The Japanese threw grenades under the tracks of this tank, as it entered the jungle. The explosions of these grenade jarred the tank, but did no appreciable damage. While this tank was stationary it was hit on the righthand forward side by a shell from an Anti-Tank Gun, estimated to be about 100 yards away. The shell penetrated the turret and hit the opposite wall, where it exploded. Filling from the shell was splattered and started to burn with a yellow flame and bluish smoke. Almost immediately a second hit was received, which likewise splattered filling around and began to burn. Efforts to put out the fire failed. The survivors jumped out of the tank as soon as it was hit, and when last seen the tank was burning fiercely.

No. 1 Tank was circling in an open field in rear of tank No. 5 when it received a hit on the turret, killing the lieutenant and radio men. The diameter of the hole in No. 1 Tank was slightly larger than that of a 37 mm anti tank shell. The fire in this tank was extinguished with great difficulty and the tank was recovered.

The Company Commander estimated from the number of hits and the location of the tank when hit, that the enemy had about five (5) anti-tanks guns of a calibre believed to be about 47 mm. This is the first encounter with a Japanese 47 mm anti-tank gun. These guns were employed at close range before opening fire. Attention is drawn to the ammunition, which easily penetrated the

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turret armor of M3 light tank at short ranges. The action of the shell after entering the tank, seems to indicate an explosive filler made from a picrate derivative.

Although magnetic tank grenades were captured previously none appeared to have been used against these tanks. It is interesting to note the lack of use of magnetic mines by the Japanese. The failure to use these mines may have been due to the belief that our tanks had been protected against magnetic mines. One method of protection which the Japanese used at MILNE BAY was to cover the tank thoroughly with thick grease.

V. JAPANESE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

Japanese Antiaircraft Equipment - A translation has been made of the inscription on the breech block of captured Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery captured at GUADALCANAL which shows that it is identified as "40 calibre 8 C.M. A/A Gun (VIII) Improved, MK88, Weight 599 Kgms, Japan Steel Manufacturing Works, 1921".

VI. SUMMARY

a. Careful advance planning should insure that:

(1) Secrecy is maintained.
(2) Air, artillery, and naval support is co-ordinated before, during and is continued after the landing.
(3) A thorough system of signal communications is established early and rapidly expanded to provide for the maximum control of all units.
(4) Troops selected for a Task Force are adequate to carry out their normal tactical missions and should not be diverted from such mission.
(5) Service troops are organized and supplied with proper and adequate equipment to perform their assigned mission.
(6) Specialized personnel are included with proper service troops to repair, operate, and salvage captured enemy equipment.
(7.)The success of any landing is part of a well co-ordinated plan for future offensive action and includes the ultimate disposition of captured enemy territory.
(8) Control between Navy, Army and Air is maintained throughout the entire operation, before, during, and particularly after the landing has been effected.

COMMENT: After the Marines had secured their objective at GUADALCANAL, the Navy might have landed the supplies closer to the base of operations, in order to avoid the unnecessary work on roads, bridges, etc.

b. Training in addition to Combined Operation Training, should insure that:

(1) All troops have been trained as infantry in addition to their normal training.
(2) Troops are trained in standard operating procedure to ensure teamwork, to prevent confusion and error under the stress of combat, and to develop speed in execution.
(3) All troops are in proper physical condition and are able to swim with full equipment.
(4) All troops have been instructed in jungle operations, particularly how to make the jungle their friend, so they can live in the jungle on limited supplies.
(5) Troops be indoctrinated on how to avoid ambushes and how to take cover, particularly at halts.
(6) Troops are imbued with the offensive spirit; to close quickly with the enemy; to secure the high ground; and at night, by aggressive patrolling to the front, dominate the low ground.

VII CONCLUSION

Careful advance planning is essential to insure success and is dependent upon:

(1) Proper organization and adequate equipment.
(2) Teamwork within all tactical units.
(3) Co-operation between Navy, Army, and Air.
(4) Future development and use of captured territory.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

, January 5, 1942.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 17

NEWS FROM OTHER FRONTS:

Timor: - Composite Japanese and native patrols have been fairly active and skirmishes with Allied detachments in the central area have been reported. Heavy vehicle traffic on the north coast road and barge movement along the coast continues to be a feature of enemy operations.

Four transports and a destroyer off LAIVAI (an anchorage on the north coast, 82 miles east by north of DILLI) were reported to be disembarking troops on 24 December. A later unconfirmed report stated that 5,000 troops had landed with stores and many trucks and guns. These vessels were unsuccessfully attacked by three Hudsons and on 25 December the convoy entered DILLI.

Enemy aircraft has been reported on the FUILORO airfield for the first time and on 24 December BEAUFIGHTERS strafed two planes on the ground, setting fire to one and damaging the other. A further attack was made on 28 December.

Allied air attacks were made on Japanese occupied points on 26 December when LAGA (on the north coast, 72 miles east by north of DILLI) was bombed and strafed by six Hudsons at 1030L, causing fires and demolishing buildings. At 1217L, LAGA and LAIVAI were strafed by twelve BEAUFIGHTERS.

Burma: - Following the commencement of the Allied drive towards AKYAB, Japanese forces evacuated MAUNGDAW (56 miles NW of AKYAB) and BUTHIDAUNG (56 miles NNW of AKYAB) during night 15/16 December, and these villages were occupied by Allied troops on 17 December.

Two small bridges on the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG road had been blown by the enemy but no major demolitions had been carried out and the tunnels were intact.

The push was made in persistent rain and the condition of the track impeded the rate of advance. However by 1800L on 18 December no contact with enemy had been made and our troops had reached a point on the KALAPANZIN River ten miles south of BUTHIDAUNG.



The reason for the enemy retirement is unknown but it is likely that he has overestimated our strength. Latest reports corroborate that there was one battalion of enemy troops at BUTHIDAUNG and 500 odd at MAUNGDAW, while previous reports gave considerable artillery strength at MAUNGDAW. Apparently the main Japanese force evacuated by river direct to AKYAB while approximately 500 withdrawing overland were reported to have reached KONDAN (five miles west of RATHEDAUNG), on the evening of 19 December and started digging trenches.

An enemy stand north of AKYAB is considered unlikely. Photographs taken 18 December disclose a constructed beach defence position on the western shore AKYAB Island. Japanese strength on and just north of AKYAB Island is estimated to be a regiment plus some A.A. units and some artillery.

OUR AIR ACTIVITY - GENERAL:

During the past week aerial strikes have been on a slightly increased scale. There have been few direct support missions in the BUNA area, but armed reconnaissance aircraft have covered the north coast of NEW GUINEA from BUNA to SALAMAUA and inflicted considerable damage on enemy installations and shipping. Our fighters have maintained constant patrols over the forward area and the army Co-operation Squadron has provided daily tactical reconnaissance a artillery reconnaissance for forward formations as well as photographic reconnaissance missions. Totals for the period are as follows: -

	No. of Missions	Bombs Dropped
Bombardment	10	660 (233600 lbs.)
Direct air support	1	Nil (14100 rds.)
Reconnaissance	39	117 (56500 lbs.)

ENEMY EQUIPMENT - LAND:

Equipment captured BUNA area 26 December includes a Japanese version of ou "Molotov Cocktail". Unfortunately the fuse had been separated from the specimen and was not available. The "cocktail" consists of a clear coloured "Lemonade" bottle three-quarters filled with a clear mixture. The mixture is reported as being much slower burning than straight petrol, and burns with increasing heat in the action of scattering.

Also captured BUNA area is a rubber fabric ammunition pouch and bayonet frog which suggests the following possibilities:-

(a) Naval equipment - effect of salt water not as severe as on leather.
(b) Shortage of leather and increased availability of rubber.
(c) Some units BUNA area were previously located in N.E.I. - possibilit of equipment being manufactured that area.

Attached is a diagrammatic sketch showing the fuse of a 75 mm AA shell.

TACTICS:

Japanese defences in the BUNA - CAPE ENDAIADERE area included two types of earthworks.

The bunker type consists of a covered trench with closely timbered sides and top. The top is built up into a mound with coconut logs piled longitudinall and packed with earth to make a burster course proof against mortars and light anti-personnel bombs, and this gives partial protection against direct hits from 25 pounder shells. These mounds have ground level slits for forward automatic fire and are camouflaged by local natural materials and connected by crawl trenches.

The second type is similar in appearance but not loopholed for firing. These are used for shelters and protection against artillery and mortar fire. Attacking troops are attracted by these raised structures and tend to make them objectives but are then caught in fire from ground level posts on flanks and in rear.

The type of defences in these areas are governed by the nature of the ground which is very swampy and necessitates most defences being built mainly above ground.

Attached to this Summary are sketches showing types of defences in the BUNA - CAPE ENDAIADERE AREA.

CHEMICAL WARFARE: Japanese hand thrown toxic smoke candles.

Enemy material found SOPUTA area included three cases of tear gas candles and one case of nose gas candles. Both types are of the same size and shape - approximately 7 inches long, 2 inches diameter and painted grey. The tear gas type is distinguished by a ½ inch green band and the nose type by a ½ inch red band.

Preliminary examination showed that it contained a mixture of nitrocellulose, camphor and diphenyl arsenic acid. The mixture is ignited by a match head and friction striker. After a 3-4 seconds delay, the diphenyl arsenic acid is evolved in a toxic smoke form. Diphenyl arsenic acid is a nose gas of about a quarter the irritancy of DA. The service respirator affords complete protection, but, as with other toxic smokes, if the smoke is breathed before the

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respirator is adjusted, the effects persist for some time after protection has been gained.

As far as is known the enemy in NEW GUINEA have not attempted to use gas, and in view of the small quantity of generators found, these may have been brought for the purpose of testing respirators if and when they were to be carried.

Detail and sketch of the tear gas generator (candle) is attached.

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

Attached is a chart showing average statistics of meteorological and climatic conditions in NEW GUINEA, for the month of January.

JAPANESE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FROM SUBMARINES:

That submarines borne Japanese aircraft may be operating on reconnaissanc duty in North Eastern Area, is indicated by sightings made, on 9/12, in the Bowan - Mackay district. This is the first sighting of possible submarine based aircraft.

The observer states that one aircraft came in from a southerly direction. This aircraft is described as a single wing type with single blunt nose engine, which appeared to slope up towards the front, single rudder and fin, two floats, and red circles clearly visible on the underside of the wing. About eleven minutes later, another aircraft, considered however to be identical with the first sighting, appeared from the same southerly direction, circled low and again departed in the direction from which it came. Twenty-five minutes later the two aircraft, flying together, approached, circled, and made off in a southerly direction.

JAPANESE SUBMARINE CARRYING AIRCRAFT:

Headquarters U.S.A.I.S.P.A. Administrative Informational Bulletin No. 6 furnishes the following facts on Japanese submarine capable of carrying aircraft.

"It is reported that about 30 I-type Japanese submarines are designed to carry small float-planes in watertight compartments on their decks. Four submarines of a similar type carry midget submarines instead of planes. The latest information regarding the maximum speed of the I-type submarine is 20 knots surfaced and 9 knots submerged."

"Either of the two types of seaplanes noted in a and b below may be carried."

"The wings and fuselage are stored in separate tubular compartments which are water tight and located side by side, with their axes parallel to the submarine and in prolongation of the conning tower. No catapult or crane is reported although a portable crane is a possibility. Time of launching of plane is estimated by unofficial source as one hour after surfacing.

a. Type 96, small reconnaissance seaplane. Maximum speed 170 mph at 11,000 ft. Endurance 500 miles without bomb load.

b. Type Zero No. 1, small seaplane, Model 1. Maximum speed 190 mph. Endurance 475 miles."

RECENTLY MANUFACTURED ZEKE IN SERIVCE:

From Type "O" S.S.F. (ZEKE), which crashed approximately 1/11/42, near BUNA, the following information has been obtained.

Examination of its landing gear shows that its date of manufacture was October 3, 1942, and indirectly indicates manufacture by the Koizumi Factory, located north of TOKYO. Other parts of this aircraft were manufactured in September of this year. It is concluded that the maximum possible life of this ZEKE could be no more than 45 days.

EXAMINATION OF TYPE 1 M/B BETTY:

Examination of the Type 1 M/B BETTY which crashed near DARWIN on 23/11, has been made and the interesting facts, listed below, have been obtained.

Examination of this aircraft shows that it was apparently a prototype for a new model or a modification of the BETTY that crashed at NIVENI Island. The Darwin BETY carried a crew of nine in place of the usual crew of seven. All information gathered to date suggests entirely different instruments and radio installations.

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In addition, the engine is probably a new type. Information on hand shows it to be Kasei, Model 15, instead of the usual Kasei Model 11. The Kasei Model 15 operates on 92 octane fuel for take-off and 87 octane fuel for cruise. It is well built, and of clean design. Internal and external finishes are excellent indicating a large amount of hand finishing. The most obvious characteristic of the aircraft is its lightness of construction. This in manifest by the relatively light gauge metal used for its construction which is standard Japanese practice.

The aircraft is extremely vulnerable to gun fire. The main points being the engine nacelles, the wing section between the engines, no armour plating except two very light and small hinged doors at the rear of the fuselage apparently for the rear gunner, crude self-sealing tanks (which have not proved effective) and the absence of bullet proof glass.

The following data has been gained from the DARWIN BETTY.

Manufacturer:	Mitsubishi
Name:	Type 1 Land Attack Plane
Net Weight:	14756 lbs.
Loading Capacity:	5733 lbs.
Gross Weight:	20489 lbs.
Fuel Capacity:	1183 Imperial Gallons.
	1426 U.S. Gallons.

Performance figures have been derived from various reliable sources for this specific aircraft:-

Maximum level flight speed:	273 mph T.A.S. at 13,500 ft.
Cruising speed:	248 mph T.A.S. at 13,500 ft.
Service Ceiling:	30,000 ft.
Rated Altitude:	13,500 ft. estimated.
Maximum range:	2,500 statute miles (estimated)

The usual armament is carried but an extra 7.7 mm. machine gun has been located in the wreckage. No indication of the placement of this gun is given other than it is not a belly gun. There are indications that a power driven turret might exist, but nothing definite has been proved, and, if so, it is new to Japanese practice.

REPORT ON TYPE 1 M/B (BETTY) BLISTER GUN MOUNTING:

Information has been established from examination of the BETTY shot down at Darwin on 23 November 1942, regarding the operation of the Lewis gun mounting in the side blister. A complete mounting has now been recovered, upon which the following description is founded.

To operate the gun, the rear half of the blister window is removed completely into the aircraft and hung on a special hinged bracket and holder provided. The rollers are situated on the removable section of the window and the race they operate along is left as the end section of the solid portion of the blister. The end of the mounting bar has mounted on it three rollers set on an arc of the radius of the blister window. The mounting bar, being flexible, pivoted permanently at one end, is lifted and the outer end fed into the blister window race. The end is also fitted with a trigger grip and spring-operated locking pin which slips into receiving holes provided in the face of the window race. Thus it is possible to set the mounting bar in any of 15 positions and, consequently, any 15 angles across the open section of the blister.

ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF DETERMINING TYPE NUMBERS OF JAP AIRCRAFT:

The following appeared in Technical Aviation Intelligence Report No. 3, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Dept., Washington.

"An alternative method of stating type number is to use the year of the current Emperor's reign (dating from 1925). This may be converted into the year A.D. by adding 25 to the number given. Thus a Type 10 indicates that the aircraft was accepted as a Service Type in the year 1935.

COMMENT: This is one Japanese method of determining a year. No information is possessed at this Headquarters that it is actually being used to designate aircraft types.

NAMEPLATE IDENTIFICATION OF JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY AIRCRAFT:

The following appeared in Technical Aviation Intelligence Report No. 3,

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Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington.

"Inasmuch as numerals expressed in ordinary Japanese ideographs preclude the possibility of mathematical calculations, Arabic numerals are employed by Japanese pilots and observers for calculation of position, etc. Similarly, their instruments are marked with ordinary Arabic numerals, the metric system being used throughout for distances, pressures, capacities, etc., except in the case of air speed indicators when either Km/hr or knots may be used."

"In the case of dates of manufacture of equipment, these are stamped on nameplates in Arabic numerals, the year being marked first, followed by the number indicating the month, and finally the day of the month itself, the two latter items being computed the same way as for our calender (e.g. 6-21 June 21st, 12-25 - December 25th etc.) Thus, for example, the nameplate of an instrument may be marked: - 2-10-31 corresponding to October 31, 1942.
similarly, it may be marked: - 7-10-31 corresponding to the same date."

COMMENT: The 17 is arrived at by the method mentioned in paragraph above.

MARKINGS ON JAPANESE ARMY AIRCRAFT:

There has been some difficulty in definitely establishing the type of markings used on Japanese Army aircraft which serve to distinguish them from Naval aircraft. From a reliable source it is learned that Japanese Army planes do not have the Rising Sun or the red circle painted on the fuselage. This is further confirmation of reports already at hand and published, and may be considered as trustworthy.

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES OF JAP WARSHIPS:

The following appeared in Headquarters USAISPA Administrative Informational Bulletin No. 6.

"Because land based aviation is being called upon more and more frequently to operate against enemy naval units, information on the antiaircraft armament of Axis warships, as well as the number of planes they normally carry, is of interest to all air personnel. The following tables give the antiaircraft defenses of Japanese warships."

"The number of light antiaircraft guns listed may not always be accurate since the number and position of these smaller weapons often vary from week to week. One of the standard machine guns is the 78 calibre weapon, whose characteristics are given on the table below; and generally thecalibre of weapons in this category is below 40 mm. Some machine guns are mounted for a 360 degree traverse and elevations up to 90 degrees, while others are more limited.

Characteristics of Japanese Naval Guns:-

	5"	4.7"	3"	*.780"
Maximum elevation	85°	85°	85°	
Max. Horizontal range.	18,000 yds.	21,000 yds.	9,000 yds.	5470 yds.
Max. vertical range.	33,000 ft.	25,000 ft.	20,000 ft.	3289 ft.
Muzzle velocity	3,000 f/s	3,000 f/s	2,500 f/s	
Weight of shell	60 lbs.	45 lbs.	13 lbs.	

* The 20 mm. Oerlikon A/A Machine gun has similar characteristics.

JAPANESE BOMBING TACTICS: (From H.Q., U.S.A.I.S.P.A. Administrative Informational Bulletin No. 6)

"Glide bombing is usually undertaken by light bombers, the attack being launched at approximately 19,000 ft. When this maneuver is employed, aircraft nose down towards the target at an angle of about 45 degrees and level off at from 3,000 to 2,500 feet before releasing their bombs. If the limits of antiaircraft fire are clearly defined, swing bombing has been used. In this case planes fly towards the target until the perimeter of antiaircraft is reached, and, making a banked turn, release their bombs with a centrifugal "throw". The inaccuracy of this method is obvious".

"In dive-bombing, the practice of the Japanese is to approach the objective at about 12,000 ft. and gradually work down to about 7,000 ft. As the attack develops, the aircraft go into dives of about 60 to 80 degrees with diving flap lowered. The dives culminate in pull-outs ranging down to 800 feet. As many as 60 to 70 Japanese aircraft have been used in these dive bombing attacks."

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JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH - INDIA - BURMA FRONT:(The following is based on recent reports from A.H.Q., India).

Although frequent movement of Japanese aircraft from one base to another makes it difficult to estimate and locate their strength, it is considered that there is little permanent strength based in Burma other than on aerodromes within the Rangoon - Toungoo area, where strength is estimated at 100 fighters, 50 medium bombers and heavy bombers.

In order to conserve aircraft the Japanese policy appears to be , first to avoid action except where circumstances are favorable and, secondly, to take t utmost precaution to avoid ground losses . In their precaution to avoid losses o the ground it is to be noted that their aircraft are usually based outside the range of our aircraft, and, in some instances, are withdrawn after Sorties to places such as Singora, Kota Baru and Alor Star (Malay Peninsula).

COMMENT: The use of Kendari and Kavieng for this reason has been noted in S.W.P.A.

It is thought possible also, that the Japanese are moving some aircraf even further afield to Sumatra and perhaps Java, and if this be so, the assumptio can be made that it is done either to mislead us in regard to strength or on account of aircraft shortage generally.

The Japanese Order of Battle, estimated on a maximum first line basis, in the undermentioned areas is as follows:-

Burma, Thailand, North Malaya	2,0
Indo- China	70
Southern Malaya, Sumatra, Andamans	50
China	180
TOTAL	550

In addition to the above, information from reliable sources discloses that the Japanese have an additional 200 to 300 aircraft in Indo-China, consisting mainly of obsolete Types 97 Army fighters, light bombers and medium bombers which, it is believed, are used mainly for operational training but could be used as reserves.

Arthur Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution . B.

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CONSTRUCTION DETAILS JAP EMPLACEMENT - CAPE ENDAIADERE





NOTE: The angular plan of some of the dugouts made it impossible to eliminate all enemy resistance from one dugout by throwing in a grenade. There have been instances where this was apparently assumed, with the result that men who have actually got into the entrenchments, have been shot from behind.

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DETAILS OF BUNKERS - JAP DEFENCES - CAPE ENDAIADERE



FRONT VIEW



CROSS SECTION



REAR VIEW SHOWING CONSTRUCTION



SPIKE FOR HOLDING LOGS

8"

All dugouts and bunkers have had firing slits so small as to be invisible from the front, and with hy overhead cover made it impossible to reduce them with a frontal assault with infantry. It is therefore necessary either to secure a direct hit with artillery or to overrun or envelop them and attack from the rear.

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JAPANESE SHELTER AND BUNKERS - CAPE GLOUCESTER AREA.

(A) BUNKER FRONT VIEW



PLAN VIEW



(B) ONE MAN PIT WITH FIRING SLIT : SIDE VIEW



(C) EMPLACEMENT REAR VIEW



PLAN VIEW



FRONT VIEW



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JAPANESE TOXIC SMOKE CANDLE - CAPTURED SOPUTA AREA
(Hand Thrown Type)



NOTE: (a) Candle is ignited by a match-head and friction striker.
(b) The gas is emitted through the two holes situated one on each side of the match-head.
(c) Service respirator gives full protection.

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CAPTURED EQUIPMENT - 75 mm AA Fuze

Reproduced below is a diagrammatic sketch showing the fuse of a Japanese 75 mm AA shell, specimens of which were captured in the SOPUTA area. The fuse and shells are identical with the type used at GUADALCANAL, and reported in previous summary.

Action of the fuse is as follows: -

On shock of discharge the detonator sets back, overcomes the creep spring, and is pierced by the needle. The detonator is fired and the flash passes through the flash hole in the brass stem, and ignites the fuse composition in No. 1 time ring. In each case the top ring, after burning for its set period, ignites the ring immediately below it. Nos. 1 and 3 time rings burn anti-clock wise, and Nos. 2 and 4 burn clockwise. The rings burn around until after an interval of time determined by the fuse setting, the flame reaches the gun powder in the fire channel, and then in turn the gunpowder in the magazine. The powder in the magazine ignites, and the flashes passes through the base of the fuse to the gaine, and the gaine in turn detonates the shell filling.



JAPANESE RIFLE GRENADE-SMOKE

THE GRENADE

TOTAL WEIGHT: 1.29 lb.



SMOKE MIXTURE .6 lb

Hexachlorethane	56.2%
Zinc, metallic	27.6%
Zinc, chloride	2.9%
Zinc, oxide	13.4%

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

JAPANESE TYPE 92
MG "JUKI"



Telescopic Sight

III. TOPOGRAPHICAL.

(a). Meteorological and Climatic Conditions

January Rainfall Conditions

Station	Period of average	JANUARY RAINFALL				Normal January Rainfall	Reliability of Norm			Max Jan fall in 24 hrs.	Annual Rainfall		
		Max recorded		Min recorded			Jan rainfall				SE May - Oct. ins.	NE Nov - Apr. Ins.	Total Ins.
		Ins	Days	Ins	Days	Inches	Norm al %	Above %	Below %				
KOKODA	30	32.04	29	3.26	8	9-15	49	27	24	-	58.34	84.06	142.5
EFA	30	24.95	26	1.75	7	9-17	68	16	16	-	41.66	78.95	120.61
KONA	20	27.57	25	7.00	5	12-22	62	19	19	-	58.95	96.81	155.76
NORGEE	8	7.42	-	2.66	-	4-5	70	10	20	-	57.96	58.88	116.84
SAIAMAUA	5	6.93	-	3.88	-	5.90	-	-	-	-	108.15	51.03	159.10
WAU	3	7.85	-	5.03	-	6.07	-	-	-	-	29.14	43.95	73.09
LAE	7	12.40	-	1.42	-	8.24	-	-	-	-	104.28	73.99	178.21
SATELBERG	11	8.92	-	2.17	-	5.03	-	-	-	-	135.28	43.28	180.56
CAPE NELSON	30	3 2.54	2 7	1.06	13	15.90	20	10-19	70	17	13	-	40.91
BANIARA	20	2 2.72	26	2.36	5	10.62	15	6-12	60	24	16	-	24.81
SALAMO	8	11.59	-	2.14	-	7.63	-	5-9	68	24	8	-	57.98
SAMARAI	29	19.16	22	1.88	5	6.92	16	1-9	72	16	Nil	-	58.89
ADAU	25	15.78	21	Nil	Nil	5.10	10	2-8	75	17	8	-	41.92
RIGO	20	16.35	23	.3 0	3	6.53	13	3-7	60	27	13	-	10.83
PORT MORESBY	49	18.55	23	2.03	6	6.92	15	4-9	64	16	16	5	7.82
KOITAKI	12	23.66	29	5.06	15	13.39	22	5-17	75	25	Nil	-	39.16
KURIVA	30	15.27	27	3.25	6	9.28	16	3-13	68	12	Nil	-	86.09
KEKORI	20	18.69	27	4.40	11	11.62	18	9-13	49	34	17	-	147.75

HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA FORCE

January 9th, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 18

No.	TYPE	DIMENSIONS				Main Filling	Fusing	Colour	Markings	Remarks
		Bomb Body Length	Bomb Body Diam.	Overall Length	Wall Thickness					
1	1Kg Anti-Personnel		3"	10½"		Red phosphorus powder	Nose	White body. Black bands on nose	White body. Black bands on nose	Has Spherical rubber nose. Bomb is in dangerous condition as U.X.B.
2	2Kg Incendiary	1'3"				White phosphorus powder				
3	15Kg Anti-Personnel (Type 96)	1'5"	4"	2'1"	7/32"	Picric powder	Nose	Black	Red band on yellow nose & yellow and white band on body	Flying fragments travel outwards in all directions with a "Grass Cutting" effect.
4	50Kg. High Explosive, (General Purpose)	2'11"	7"	3'4"	5/32"	Hexanite & anisol	Nose & tail	Black	White & Yellow band on body. Green band on tail fin	Has been used extensively. Details of fuse components not verified.
5	50Kg Incendiary	2'8"	7¾"	3'4"	3/16"	Thermite in containers	Nose	Light grey.	Red tail fin supports.	Has been used extensively.
6	50Kg Gas	2'8"	7¾"	3'8½"		Mustard & lewisite	Nose	Greyish green.	Red & Blue band on nose, yellow, white & yellow band on body	Distinguishing gas marking (double cross) on body.
7	60Kg High Explosive (Type 97), Gen.Purp.	2'8¼"	7⅜"	3'4"	9/32"	Hexanite & anisol	Nose	Grey	Blue band on body. Thin red line along body. Green band on tail fin.	Some recent samples recovered have had a green band on nose in addition.
8	60Kg High Explosive (Type 98) Gen.Purp.	2'11"	9"	3'6"			Nose	Light grey	Red line along body. Green band on fin	Details incomplete, though bomb has been used extensively.
9	60Kg High Explosive. Gen.Purp.	2'8½"	7⅜"	3'4"	1/4"	Lyddite	Nose	Admiralty grey	Thin red line along body. Green band on tail fin	Has been used extensively.

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No.	Type	DIMENSIONS				Main Filling	Fusing	Colour	Markings	Remarks
		Bomb Body Length	Bomb Body Diam.	Overall Length	Wall Thickness					
10	60Kg Incendiary	2'11"	9½"	3'6"	1/8"	Paraffin wax and Kerosene	Nose	Blue grey	Red band on tail fins. Thin red line along body	Recently recovered.
11	60Kg High Explosive. Incendiary	2'9"	7½"	3'4½"	1/8"	Phosphorus bungs & picric	Nose	Grey	White band on body	Dual purpose bomb.
12	63Kg High Explosive									
13	63kg High Explosive (type 99)	2'1½"	9"	3'7"	1/4"	Picric	Nose	Body dark Green. Tail, unit blue-grey	Thin red line on tail unit. Green band on tail fin	Base plate type. No filling in tail cone.
14	100Kg High Explosive Gen. Purp.	3'10"	9"	4'4½"			Nose & tail	Black	Yellow & white band on body.	Details incomplete
15	250Kg High Explosive. Gen. Purp.	4'10"	13¼"	6'0"	1/4"	Hexanite & anisol	Nose & tail	Grey	Nose painted green. Blue band on body. Green band on tail	Has been used extensively.
16	250Kg High Explosive (Later type)	3'3"	12"	6'0"	½" approx	Hexanite & anisol	Nose & tail	Grey	Broad green band on nose. Thin red line along body. Green band on tail fin	Later type used. Recently recovered.
17	500Kg High Explosive									
18	800Kg High Explosive									
19	1000Kg High Explosive									
20	Seamarker									
21	Float Fla...		4½"	22"			Ignition Chemical action of water	Yellow		
22	Smoke Float		4-3/4"	18½"		Smoke producing composition		White		

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DESCRIPTION OF JAPANESE BOMBS

1 KG. Anti-Personnel

The bomb consists of a main body of cast iron in which is housed a mushroom-headed striker, a safety pin, shear wire, and a spring loaded plunger.

A detonator is incorporated and passes through the rear of the main body into a tail piece. A rubber nose cap is attached to the nose of the main body fitting over the head of the striker.

A tail piece is attached to the main body by three quick release screws. Incorporated in the tail piece is a central tube of Picric Powder surrounded by the main filling of red phosphorous powder.

Four fins are welded to the rear end of the tail piece and a suspension lug is welded on at the point of balance.

On impact the rubber nose cap collapses and the striker is forced in, overcoming the shear wire and striking the detonator. The flash from the detonator initiates the picric powder in the central tube which explodes blasting the main body into fragments and throwing out the burning phosphorous.

These bombs, when found unexploded are in a dangerous condition and must not be disturbed, or subjected to vibration in the immediate vicinity of the bomb.

2 KG. Incendiary

Details incomplete though bomb has been used extensively. The weight of this bomb is 1.7 Kg. and the main filling is White Phosphorous and Picric Acid.

15 KG. Anti-Personnel (Type 96)

No unexploded specimen of this bomb has been recovered, therefore the information available is incomplete.

So far as is known, the bomb consists of a cylindrical mild steel body and is nose fused. The tail unit, with four fins attached is welded or rivetted to the body. Two suspension lugs are fitted to the bomb, one at the point of balance and the other at the end of the tail fins.

The bomb is fused at the nose. A fuse incorporating components to ensure instantaneous action on impact would no doubt be fitted, resulting in little or no cratering. The lateral effects are such that the bomb is sometimes referred to as a "daisy cutter."

50 KG. High Explosive, General Purpose

No unexploded specimen of this bomb has so far been recovered, but from pieces found it appears to have been extensively used.

The detail information now given is therefore incomplete.

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel barrel, to which is screwed a cast steel nose. The nose is prevented from unscrewing by means of a grub screw.

A tail unit conical in shape, with four fins, is welded to the other end of the barrel.

A suspension lug is rivetted at the point of balance.

Both nose and tail fuses are normally fitted. Those probably used would be Nose Fuse Type "D" and Tail Fuse Type "C".

The simultaneous functioning of both fuses can either be instantaneous or short delay according to the plugs selected for incorporation in the gaine.

50 KG. Incendiary

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel barrel to which is rivetted a cast steel nose.

A tail unit, with four steel fins, is rivetted to the other end of the body.

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Inside the casing are four (4) Electron inserts filled with Thermite.

A suspension lug is rivetted to the barrel at the point of balance.

On impact, a nose fuse fires a magazine. This in turn ignites a length of fuse which passes down the centre of the bomb. This igniter fuse ignites the electron containers, and a black powder charge in the nose of the bomb is exploded, bursting the bomb and throwing the four inserts in all directions.

This bomb sometimes tends to an amount of penetration in soft soil before the Thermite becomes properly ignited, in which case, it would burn out harmlessly underground. Evidence of an unexploded bomb (buried) being incendiary type may be indicated by a deposit of grey powder on the sides of the crater or bomb hole, heat, or smoke issuing from the hole.

50 KG. Gas Bomb (Type 92)

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel body and a tail portion with four (4) fins welded to it. A cast steel nose is fitted to the main body by three ¼" grub screws.

Incorporated in the bomb is a Burster system, containing a Booster, in which is fitted a detonator, the two being surrounded by a charge of Picric.

On impact, the fuse functions, and initiates a detonator, a picric exploder pellet, and a picric charge in the nose portion.

This action is intended to throw the main body upwards, simultaneously forcing the striker against a creep spring on the detonator which initiates the picric charge in the booster and fires the main charge, thus the case of the bomb is burst and the gas liberated.

60 KG. High Explosive (Type 97), General Purpose

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel barrel to which is rivetted a cast steel nose. A conical shaped sheet steel tail unit is rivetted and screwed to the other end of the barrel. Two rows each of 14 only ⅜in screws are used. Four fins are welded to the tail cone and around the end of the fins is a supporting band.

The tail and the body are filled separately, and later screwed together, a felt disc about ¼" thick with a paper disc on each side being used to fill the gap between the surfaces of the two fittings.

A nose fuse only can be fitted. The fuse most commonly used to date has been Nose Fuse Type "A". Instantaneous or short delay action can be set before flight by selection of the gaine components.

60 KG. High Explosive (Type 98), General Purpose

No unexploded specimen of this bomb has been recovered, but frompieces found it appears to have been extensively used.

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel barrel, to which is spot welded a cast steel nose. A conical shaped tail unit with four fins is rivetted to the other end of the barrel.

Around the end of the fins is a supporting band 1⅜" wide. Two suspension lugs are rivetted diametrically opposite to one anoth at the point of balance.

A nose fuse only is fitted, and it is thought that either Nose Fuse Type "A" or "H" may be used. Each of these can be set before flight to function, either with instantaneous or short delay action, by selection of the gaine components.

60 KG. High Explosive, General Purpose

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel body to which a cast steel nose is rivetted and welded. A conical shaped tail unit with four fins is rivetted and welded to the other end of the body. The end of the fins are stabilized by a 1⅝" steel strap or band.

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The bomb is fused at the nose only, and it is thought that the fuse most commonly used is Nose Fuse Type "A", which can be set before flight for either instantaneous or short delay action.

60 KG. Incendiary

This bomb consists of a cylindrical steel $\frac{1}{8}$" thickness outer casing, enclosing a cylindrical inner casing. The nose is welded to the outer casing. A conical shaped tail unit is secured to the outer casing with 32 screws.

The inner casing has a steel central tube incorporated, filled with Thermite, inside of which is a copper tube, which contains a length of quickmatch. Around the central tube are six (6) steel compartments filled with a mixture of paraffin wax and kerosene.

On impact, the magazine in the fuse initiates a black powder charge, which explodes, forcing the inner casing out of the outer casing, shearing the 32 screws. Simultaneously, a length of quickmatch is ignited and initiates the black powder charge and thermite in the central tube. The thermite and paraffin wax burn as a compact mass.

This bomb sometimes tends to an amount of penetration in soft soils before the ignited mass is expelled from the bomb, in which case it would burn out harmlessly underground. Evidence of an exploded (buried) bomb being incendiary type may be indicated by a deposit of the oily substance on the sides of the bomb hole or crater, heat or smoke issuing from the hole.

60 KG. Incendiary and High Explosive

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel body with a cast steel nose, filled with picric. The nose is secured to the body by three (3) grub screws and welded. A tail unit with four (4) fins encased by a $1\frac{7}{8}$" band, is welded to the other end. Incorporated in the nose end of the body is a cast steel ring, into which is screwed a central tube filled with picric. The remaining space contains a solution of Carbon Disulphide and Phosphorous, and about 475 rubber bungs impregnated with this mixture. A suspension lug is held by a band around the body at the point of balance.

On impact the fuse functions, causing the picric in the nose to explode. This explosion initiates the picric in the central tube, which scatters the rubber bungs in all directions. They ignite on drying out when exposed to the air.

A bung will normally burn for about 2 hours, and numerous subsidiary fires link up to form a major conflagration if the rubber bungs are not gathered up at once.

63 KG. High Explosive

The bomb consists of a cylindrical steel body, to which a cast steel nose is rivetted and welded. A conical shaped tail unit with four fins, is rivetted and welded to the other end of the body. The ends of the fins are stabilized by a $1\frac{5}{8}$" steelstrap.

The bomb is fused at the nose only. It is thought that the fuse most commonly used is Nose Fuse Type "A", which can be set before flight for either instantaneous or shot delay action.

63 KG. High Explosive (Type 99)

The construction of this bomb is radically different from that of other known types of Japanese General Purpose Bombs.

The body and the nose are a single casting, which has apparently been machined. The nose is more pointed than other type G.P. bombs, and somewhat resembles the outward appearance of the Armour-Piercing type.

Screwed into the rear end of the body is a base plate with a projecting flange, to which the conical shaped sheet steel tail unit is screwed by twenty 3-16" diameter screws.

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Each of the four fins is attached to the tail unit by seven ⅛" diameter rivets, and supports are rivetted to the fins. A suspension lug is rivetted to the body at the point of balance.

A conical tail portion is not filled with explosive, and is likely to be sheared off in the path of a U.X.B. through the ground.

The bomb is nose fused only, one specimen recovered was fitted with Nose Fuse Type "A". The gaine components are almost certain to be set for short delay action.

100 KG. High Explosive, General Purpose

No unexploded specimen of this bomb has yet been recovered, but from pieces found it appears to have been extensively used.

The bomb consists of a cylindrical mild steel body, and is apparently both Nose and Tail fused. A tail unit fitted with four fins is welded to the other end of the barrel. A suspension lug is welded to the barrel at the point of balance.

The bomb can be fused at either nose or tail, or both. If fused at both ends the fuses would probably be:-

At Nose -- Nose Fuse Type "D"

At Tail -- Tail Fuze Type "[illegible]"

250 KG. High Explosive, General Purpose

This bomb consists of a cylindrical steel barrel, to which a cast steel nose is welded. A conical shaped tail unit, with four fins, is screwed to the other end of the barrel. the ends of the fins are stabilized by four steel strips.

The bomb can be fused at either nose or tail, or both. Fuses used in unexploded specimens recovered to date are:-

At Nose - Nose Fuse Type "A".

At Tail - TAil Fuse Type "E".

Fused either for instantaneous or short delay action. Tail Fuse Type "B" would be fitted at the tail if long delay action was desired.

250 KG. High Explosive (Later Type)

The nose is welded to the cylindrical body by means of a continuous weld and twelve large spot welds. The tail is made of welded sheet, held on to a machined insert by a continuous weld and 18 spot welds. This insert slips into the body section, and is held by 40 set screws in 2 rows of 20 each. A machined collar is welded on to the end of the conical shaped tail unit, and is machined internally to take the tail fuse.

Each of the four tail fins is attached to the tail unit by 5 welds. The bomb is also fused at the nose.

The bomb can be fused either at the nose or the tail, or both.

One bomb recovered was fused at the nose with Nose Fuse Type "A", and at the tail with Tail Fuse Type "E".

Tail fuse Type "B" would normally be fitted at the tail if long delay action was desired.

800 KG. High Explosive

The body consists of a single casting, heavily constructed, at the nose, and threaded internally at the base to take the base plate. A suspension lug is held by screws at the point of balance of the bomb.

Eight indentations are spaced around the nose, probably for the fitment of a mild steel nose cap, to prevent the bomb from skidding.

A solid aluminium plug at the forward end of the body cavity cushions the main filling on impact.

The base plate provides for two fuses, the tail unit being held in position by a number of screws.

It is presumed that impact fuses, set up for short delay, would be fitted.

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Seamarker

Construction:--
The nose or head is made of metal.
The body is made of light cardboard, supported by thin strips of wood.
The tail is of cardboard.

There is another report of a "Seamarker" identical in all respects to the one above, with the following exceptions:-
The bulk of the body is aluminium, with light wooden ends for retention of the aluminium powder.

Float Flare

Thin metal bands at the nose, and running up the side of the flare is withdrawn.
Thin metal band surrounding the flare cap and holding the rubb nozzle in position is withdrawn.
Float flare is then thrown into the water.
On impact with the water, inlet holes allow entrance of water into the flare, which mixes with a carbide preparationin the container. The carbide gas is then (apparently) carried upwards in the container tube until it comes into contact with the brown powder (unknown), which causes spontaneous combustion. (Brown powder may be Calcium Phosphide).

Smoke Float

This Smoke Float consists of the following main parts: -
Buoyancy Chamber
Nose Piece
Smoke Candle Unit
Ignition System

The Buoyancy Chamber is conical in shape and constructed of 22 S.W.G. sheet metal. Three fins are soldered to the tail end.
An emission tube is positioned in the centre of the chamber and is supported by three metal discs. A corkpplug is waxed in position at the tail end of the tube.
The Nose Piece is of cast brass weighted with lead, and is soldered to the buoyancy chamber. The weighted position is threaded internally, into which is screwed the smoke candle unit.

The Smoke Candle Unit consists of a casing of light alloy, containing a smoke-producing composition. A wick from the smoke composition, which is impregnated with quickmatch, connects with the safety fuse, which extends to the igniter system.

The Igniter System consists of a spring loaded striker pin, a firing rod and a cartridge cap. The cartridge cap is pressed into a small brass housing, which contains a small quantity of flash powd The whole is enclosed in a brass sleeve, which is bound to the emissi tube with copper wire. A brass ring is fitted to the end of the firing rod, which projects through the tail of the buoyancy chamber.
The firing rod is withdrawn by hand approximately ¾" to release the firing pin immediately before the smoke float is launched from the aircraft. On release the firing pin moves forward under pressure of the spring and strikes the firing cap. The flash from th cartridge cap ignites a powder charge in the cartridge housing which ignites the Safety Fuse. The Safety Fuse burns for 25 seconds before igniting the Smoke Candle.

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Delay Action Fuses

As the bomb is released from the aircraft a safety pin is withdrawn from the fuse thus allowing the arming vanes and the boss to rotate. This action screws the arming spindle and the steel rod into the arming vane boss clear of the pressure cap. On impact, two things happen:-

(a) A pressure cap moves downward until the spring loaded plunger engages in a cut-away of the shank, thus holding the striker unit under compression.

(b) A lead ball then fractures the container, allowing a solvent to escape into a compartment above, and dissolve a soluble ring.

When the soluble ring is sufficiantly softened, a steel ball, due to the pressure of a striker spring will be forced away from a chamfered shoulder, so allowing the striker spring to exert itself and force a needle of the striker unit into the gaine detonator.

No definite information can be given as to time of actual explosion after impact, and delays obtained by the use of the above type fuses range from instantaneous to 130 hours, and it is advised that extreme caution must be taken by personnel in the vicinity of an unexploded bomb.

When buried bombs explode, the splinter and blast effects diminish as the depth of the bomb below the surface increases; but clods, stones, pieces of brick and concrete, etc., are flung into the air and may be projected some considerable distance.

Note:--

For all practical purposes, the safety distance is 300 yds.

The Bomb Disposal Officer should be consulted immediately after a U.X.B. has been found, and under no circumstances should be tampered with by inexperienced personnel.

Immediate Safety Precaution:-

(a) All aircraft should be advised to land outside danger area.

(b) Flagging of areas and pasting of white strips visible from the air.

(c) Evacuation of personnel and equipment.

The 20mm AUTOMATIC CANNON - Description

General - The Japanese 20 mm Oerlikon Automatic Cannon is a recoil operated aircraft weapon. It can be used either as a flexible gun or as a fixed gun. It is air-cooled and is fed by a drum type (French) magazine.

The structure and function of the Japanese weapon are almost identical with the American-made Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun. Principal differences are in the size, the American gun being much larger and heavier, the buffer system, the charging and firing systems, and the extractor. In addition, the Japanese version does not have the breech lock incorporated in the American weapon, which prevents the bolt closing when the chamber is empty.

The cannons, which are mounted in the wings, are rigidly bolted to the wing structure with the bore-sighting adjustments for both windage and elevation, the drum magazine to the side, the air charging cylinder on top. The force of recoil is taken up by the recoiling parts of the gun, no provision being made for movements of the gun with relation to the wing structure.

As the 20 mm guns are pneumatically charged and fired, there must be an air compressor and an air reservoir. It is believed that there is but one compressor and reservoir for both guns, and further that the compressor is mounted on the gear case at the rear of the engine. Air hoses connect the charging cylinders on the guns to the reservoir, with a single valve to control the air pressure to both guns. This valve is operated by a manual control in the cockpit. There is also a similar valve in the air lines to the firing cylinders on the guns. This valve is connected by a control cable to a manual trigger in the cockpit.

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H.E.



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

60 KG. 2 types



For detail of 63KG (2) see schedule

ANTI-PERSONNEL



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

15KG.

GAS



50KG.

-6-



100KG.



250KG

For details of latest type see schedule.

INCENDIARY



50KG.

DUAL PURPOSE INC. & H.E.



60KG.



60KG.

Type of Bomb	Unburied Bombs	Normal Depth of Penetration	Size of Bomb Holes	Craters
1. 50Kg. HE	On the surface or under 2' depth.	10 ft.	8"-12"	10' to 14' diameter
2. 60Kg. HE	On the surface or under 2' depth.	10 ft.	8"-12"	10' to 14' diameter
3. 100Kg. HE	On the surface or under 3' depth	12 ft.	8"-12"	14' to 18' diameter
4. 250Kg. HE	On the surface or under 4' depth	15 ft.	14"-18"	18' to 25' diameter.
5. 500Kg. HE	On the surface or under 6' depth	20 ft.	18" and over	25' to 30' diameter
6. 800Kg. HE				
7. 1000Kg. HE				

Plate 1.

Examples of penetration into ground.

high altitude



Low altitude



Determining Vertical Position of Bomb

common types of camouflet

Plate 2.



Fig1

Shallow type Before subsidence

After subsidence.

Fig.2

Possible blackening

Cracked ground.

Debris

Path of entry may be filled in with debris.

Fig. 3



Deep type of camouflet in which there is no indication whatever on the surface that a camouflet has been formed.

Hole of entry.

Limit of possible crater.



Depth

Path of bomb

Position of bomb and point of explosion.

Fig. 4



Fig.5



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20 mm. Aircraft Cannon Ammunition - Japanese

1. PRELIMINARY: Ammunition of this type may be encountered in a "safe" condition, or may possibly have been fired but failed to explode, in which case it is then in a very dangerous state, and methods laid down for handling must be strictly adhered to by B.D. personnel, when called upon to dispose of it.

2. TYPES: The colours and markings of the projectiles and their respective functions are:-

REF	TYPE	COLOUR AND MARKINGS
A.	H. E.	Dark brown.
B.	Incendiary	Greenish-yellow with ½" white band, above driving band.
C.	H.E. - Tracer	Red, with band as for B.
D.	Incendiary	Yellow
E.	H.E. - Tracer, self-destroying.	Red

3. CARTRIDGE CASES are solid drawn brass, and of the rimless type, a recess providing the means of extraction. The brass percussion cap are pressed into the cap chamber, and the annuli are lacquered black. The case is crimped on to the shell.

4. FUZES The fuzes of A, B and D are similar in external profile, but A has a long gaine. The fuzes in C and E are similar, and differ from the others in that they have a winder percussion diaphragm. The gaine in E is longer than in C and is perforated at the base (for self-destruction).

The principle of all five fuzes is the same. At the nose of the fuze a brass diaphragm is secured by spinning over the lip of the fuze body. Beneath this is an aluminium striker pin, supported on a centrifugal bolt, and housed at the lower end in a striker guide. The centrifugal bolt is locked into the fuze body by a detent and spring= beneath the striker guide is the gaine. Both striker guide and gaine screw into the fuze body with a left-hand thread.

5. ACTION OF FUZES: On setback on firing, the detent compresses the spring beneath it and releases the centrifugal bolt which is then free to fly out radially under centrifugal force clear of the shell, when acceleration ceases. The fuze is now armed and on impact the striker is free to drive into the gaine.

6. GAINES: The gaines are all of similar construction, with slight differences such as length, and, in the case of E, adaption for self-destruction.

The primary filling of the gaines is P.E.T.N., into which is pressed a core of Lead Azide. Above this filling is a layer of detonating composition held in a perforated brass cup. This cup is inverted and pressed into the brass gaine body to complete the assembly and the upper surface is coated with transparent blue lacquer. A tinfoil disc is present between the upper surface of the detonating composition and the perforated cup, and this forms the only barrier to the striker pin on impact. An armed fuze is thus very sensitive to impact.

7. PROJECTILES - DETAILS OF FILLING.

(a) Lacquered Brown - High Explosives: This shell is H.E. and contains 10.25 g. of Pentolite. The filling is recessed at the top to

house the gaine.

(b) Lacquered Greenish Yellow with White Band - Incendiary: This shell is primarily incendiary. Pressed into the base is 3.3g. of T.N.T. Above this is a sealed aluminium canister containing 3.5g of yellow phosphorous . Above and at the side of this canister is 1.03g. of a pyrotechnic mixture. The action of this shell seems to be as follows:-

On impact the gaine detonates and ignites this pyrotechnic mixture. This flashes on to the T.N.T., which does not detonate but acts as a burster charge, splitting the shell and scattering the phosphorous.

(c) Lacquered Red with White Band ^H.E./ Tracer: This shell is H.E./ Tracer. The explosive is Pentolite. Across the shell is a steel septum. In the upper portion is 5g. of H.E. and in the lower portion is 6.6g of tracer composition. A small steel sleeve, grooved internally, holds 1.14 gms. of priming composition. A brass closing disc is spun in at the end of this sleeve, and the sleeve in turn is held in the shell by spinning the wall of the shell over

(d) Lacquered Yellow ^ Incendiary: This shell is primarily incendiary. Into the base of the shell is pressed approximately 4.8 of T.N.T. There are seven small lead shot at the base of the T.N.T. Above the T.N.T. is a sealed aluminium canister containing yellow phosphorous and above that again is a pyrotechnic xxxxx mixture. The only differences between (b) and (d) are the narrowing of the cavity towards the base of (b) and the presence of lead shot in (d).

(e) Lacquered Red, H.E./Tracer. This shell is H.E./Tracer, and is similar to (c), but with the important difference that it is self destroying. The tracer and primer are the same as in (C), but the septum in this case is perforated. Through this septum and extending to the base of the gaine is a train of 3 gunpowder pellets, weighing approx. 0.3g. Thus the gaine is ignited direct when the tracer is burned out. The explosive charge is 3.6g. of Pentolite.

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JAPANESE 20 M/M. AIRCRAFT CANNON AMMUNITION



A D E

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JAPANESE 20 M.M. AIRCRAFT CANNON AMMUNITION



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The 7.7 mm. Machine Guns

The synchronizing mechanism is entirely mechanical. A single synchronizer is provided to synchronize both guns. It is mounted on and driven from the gear case on the rear of the engine. A shaft, geared to the engine shaft, is set in bushings in the synchronizer body. Keyed to this shaft is a hub on either end of which is mounted a cam, secured by a nut. The contacting faces of hub and cams are saw-toothed, and by loosening the nut the cams may be rotated with respect to the hub to synchronize the guns with the propellor. The cams have three lobes. A roller follower riding on each cam is connected to an impulse tube. One of each of these impulse tubes runs direct to the trigger mechanism on each gun.

The manual trigger in the cockpit is connected by wire cables to the trigger mechanism on each machine gun. Compressing the trigger grip in the cockpit causes a link in the trigger mechanism of the gun to be moved up in contact with the plunger on the end of the impulse tube and with the trigger trip. The reciprocating plunger on the end of the impulse plunger, due to the action of the cam, cam follower, and impulse tube, then forces the trigger trip to release the sear each time the roller follower is raised by a cam lobe. The gun safety, which is connected by a cable to the manual safety control in the cockpit, consists of a lock to prevent movement of the link in the trigger mechanism into engagement with the impulse plunger and trigger trip when the manual trigger is squeezed with the cockpit safety control in the "safe" position.

The action of the weapon and its parts are identical with those of the Vickers, Mark V. machine gun, with several minor exceptions, consisting of later modifications to the basic weapon copied by the Japanese.

Although the Japanese machine gun is normally of 7.7 mm. and the cockpit controls are so labeled it is chambered for ammunition of exactly the same dimensions as the British .303 caliber cartridge, and the latter can be used in it.

Japanese Small Arms Ammunition

The following types of Japanese S.A. Ammunition were submitted by C.I.S.A. and S.A.A. for examination: -

A. Cartridges S.A., H.E. Approx. ".....".5" Exam. Note 10018
B. Cartridges S.A., Ball. Approx. ".....".5" Exam. Note 10017
C. Cartridges S.A., Incendiary, Approx. ".....".3" Exam. Note 10016
D. Cartridges S.A., A.P. Approx. ".....".3" Exam. Note 10015

The brass cartridge cases are all of the semi-rimless type. The percussion caps consist of brass cups, and are secured in the case by ringing the mouth of the cap chamber. The annulus is not lacquered, but in A there are traces of white identification paint around the cap. A metal foil covers and is lacquered to the composition in the caps. The anvils are of the Berdan type, and in A and B intrude deeply into the composition. Intrusion is only slight in C and D. Two flash holes lead from the cap chamber to the propellant charge.

In all instances the propellant consists of a chopped graphited tubular nitrocellulose powder. In A and B a small amount of anti-fouling tinfoil is present with the propellant.

The bullets of types A and C have been examined in detail.

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A. Cartridges - S.A., H.E., Approx. 0.5", Japanese.

One bullet was selected for breaking down. The dimensions of the bullet are as follows:-

Weight	3.49 grms.
Diameter	.515 in.
Length	1.848 in.

C. Cartridges - S.A. Incendiary, Japanese, Approx. 0.3"

A transparent violet dyed band is painted round the cannelure.
The dimensions of the bullets are: -

Weight	0.56 grms.	10.49 grms
Length	1.48 in.	1.488 in.
Diameter	.311 in.	.310 in .3

Radiological examination of the bullet showed that the interior filling was in two parts, a sheathed core of dense material at the base, and a much lighter material in the nose.

JAPANESE MORTAR SHELL - ML. H.E., 2-INCH

1.

2. Description
(a) See attached, Figs. 1 and 2.
(b) Overall length: 5¾ inches.
Diameter: 2 inches.
Filling: H.E. (Probably amatol).
Colour: Body - Black. Red ring around nose. Yellow ring filling/on body.
Driving Band: Copper ⅝ inch.

3. Construction
The body is made of steel, and consists of three components, which screw together to make one complete unit.
(i) The Shoulder, threaded to take the percussion fuze. The shoulder is screwed to the main body (RHT) after the projectile has been filled. The shoulder is also filled with a quantity of explosive pressed around an aluminium cup, which is fitted to accommodate the paine body.
(ii) The main body to which the shoulder is screwed contains the bursting charge.
(iii) The base plate is screwed on to the main body (RHT) The copper driving band is pressed over the base plate and studded with five (5) steel screws to prevent it from slipping as it engages the rifling of the discharge. The base plate is perforated at the base and sides to allow the propellant gases to escape and build up in the gas chamber of the discharger.
The primary charge is made up of a percussion cap and small quantity of gunpowder contained in a small brass plug, which is pressed into the center of the base plate.
(iii). The secondary charge consists of a quantity of N;C;Y; or Ballistite, contained, firstly, in a paper container encircling the primary charge and secondly enclosed in a copper cylinder which is pressed over the brass plug containing the primary charge and shellacked to the inside of cavity of the base plate.

4. Fusing.
The fuze body is of brass made up of two separate parts, viz:

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(1) The Nose Cap, which screws into body part (1) is prepared internally to accommodate the striker assembly and striker, ferrule, arming spring, creep spring, stirrup spring, and four (4) segments.

(2) The Main Body (Body Part II) is threaded internally and externally.
Internal Thread (RHT) to take the nose cap and gaine.
External Thread (LHT) to screw into the projectile.
Part (2) is drilled centrally to act as striker guide, and two (2) holes are drilled across diameter to take the safety pin.

5. Action.

Remove the safety pin before loading into discharger.

On acceleration of projectile up the bore of the discharger the ferrule sets back, overcoming and compressing the arming spring= at the same time the ferrule overrides the 3 flanges of the stirrup spring. The three flanges will then grip in the groove inside the ferrule. As de-acceleration takes place the arming spring will gradually release itself from its state of compression, taking with it the ferrule and the stirrup spring, which is held in the ferrule by the three flanges. When the stirrup spring is withdrawn the four segments are left free to be thrown out by centrifugal force.

On impact, the striker assembly is forced in, overcoming the creep spring and arming spring, and piercing the detonator.

Japanese Grenade - H.E., Hand or Rifle.

1.

2. Description.

(a) See Fig. 3 and 4.

(b) This grenade is a straight-sided cast iron container filled with H.E., and grooved to ensure maximum fragmentation. A closing plug at the head of the grenade is threaded to take a fuze.

3. Fusing.

The fuze consists of a hollow brass body, containing a striker, a percussion cap, inertia weight and creep spring, and is drilled to accommodate a safety pin. The exterior of the body is grooved. A brass plate fixes over the body and presses into the groove to prevent the inertia pellet and creep spring from flying out when the safety pin has been removed. A brass cartridge containing a 6 seconds pyrotechnic delay is screwed into the base of the fuze body. A copper tube, containing the detonator and explosive charge is inserted over the brass cartridge case. The copper tube runs centrally the full length of thegrenade body.

4. Use.

This grenade can be used either as a hand grenade, or fitted to rifle attachment.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution B.

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JAPANESE 2" H.E. MORTAR SHELL - EXTERIOR



FIG. 1.

JAPANESE 2" H.E. MORTAR SHELL FUZE - CROSS-SECTION



FIG. 2

JAPANESE H.E. HAND OR RIFLE GRENADE EXTERIOR



FIG. 3.

JAPANESE H.E. HAND OR RIFLE GRENADE FUZE - CROSS-SECTION



FIG. 4.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 12, 1943.

Intelligence Summary No. 19

NEWS FROM OTHER FRONTS:

Timor - Generally there is increased Japanese activity over entire Portuguese TIMOR, extensive patrolling, sporadic skirmishes and burning by the enemy assisted by natives, in all areas has been reported. Troops and supplies have been transported from BAUCAU and LAUTEM, on the north coast, to LORE BAGUIA (15 miles SE BAUCAU) and FUILORO ILIOMAR, 27 miles SSW of LAUTEM. At OSSU, 24 miles SSW BAUCAU, daily training by their troops is carried out. Armed natives are very active in the NOVA CAMINHA (21 miles SE of DILLI) TURISCAI and MAOBISSE areas, while in the south Japanese and natives are patrolling the beach east from BETANO to the KELAN River.

All information indicates that the enemy is making an all out effort to clear the Island of Allied troops.

The enemy air force has been less active and apart from an abortive attack on an Allied vessel in the ARAFURA SEA on 26 December, little has been reported. Allied planes, on the other hand, have been making frequent bombing and strafing attacks over a wide area, including LAGA, LAIVAI, OSSU, FUILORO, VINA LALE and BETANO. DOBO in the AROE Islands has also been attacked.

Five vessels were reported in an anchorage on the north coast (possibly DILLI) on 30 December. These vessels are probably the convoy composed of four transports and a destroyer, which was previously reported off LAIVAI disembarking troops and supplies on 24 December. A further unidentified vessel was reported to be moving west along the coast from the direction of LAGA on the same day.



BURMA - ARAKAN Area - Continuing their advance our patrols have reached a point 7½ miles south of KWAZON, 34 miles north of AKYAB. In the RAUTHE-DAUNG area, 10 miles further south it is reported that there have been no Japanese in the area since 19 December; our air reconnaissance has failed to reveal any signs of defence. A further patrol reached a point ten miles south of AIETHANGYAW near the coast 40 miles NW of AKYAB. The latest estimates of enemy strength at AKYAB is 3,300, with many coast defence guns. These guns may be MG and not artillery.

CHIN HILLS - A patrol engaged a Japanese force, estimated over two companies on 24 December, and after inflicting casualties, withdrew.

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Another patrol met sixty Japanese seven miles NW of KAMAYO (152 miles NW of MANDALAY).

JAPANESE TACTICS:

(1) The following examples of ruses employed by the enemy in the BUNA area have been received from the forward area:

a. Dummy snipers. A patrol advancing up the coast was fired on by a tree-top sniper. They halted, located him and apparently shot him down. They then advanced and were fired on again. This happened several times. Thorough investigation revealed that one sniper had been holding up the patrol and dummies had been placed in other trees; these being dropped by a pulley arrangement after the Americans had fired sufficient shots, making them imagine that they had cleared the opposition.

b. "Drop Shorts". The morale and spirit of an American company advancing under covering fire of their own guns was seriously affected by this ruse.

Every time our guns opened up to provide covering fire for an advance or gun fire on any target, the one known Japanese 70-mm gun in the Government Gardens area also opened up and placed its rounds amongst the forward Americans The Japanese timed the activity of their own gun to coincide exactly with that of our own supporting artillery. This made the troops imagine that they were being blitzed by "Drop Shorts" of their own guns. No amount of demonstration by showing our troops dud 70-mm shells would convince them that the shelling wasn't from our own guns.

JAPANESE CAMOUFLAGED GARMENT:

The information below is taken from G-2 Information Bulletin No.22 Headquarters, U.S.A.F.I.S.P.A.,

"An interesting example of Japanese thoroughness and ingenuity in the preparation of camouflage equipment is illustrated in a cape-type garment made from coconut palm leaf fibre, and worn by enemy troops in the Solomons operations. These garments were captured in bale lots, indicating contemplated wide usage. It is possible that the place of manufacture was Formosa or the Philippines. The color of the garment is a light cocoa brown that blends easily with the foliage in the tops of palm trees and with the normal vegetable debris found in palm groves - a very appropriate color and texture for the area in which employed. Composition is principally of dry palm leaves with the sheathing removed from all except the butt ends, which are folded over and sewed back to the leaves. A small cord passes through the loops thus formed, thereby strengthening the material of the garment. The edges of the leaves are also stitched together to form the continuous piece of the cape. The neck of the cape is bound with cheap oilcloth. This oilcloth serves as a housing for the cord, which passes around the neck of the wearer. To the inside of the cape is secured an additional piece which encircles the body of the wearer. A cord is secured to the apex of each pnael of the body-piece and passed through the neck piece, acting as shoulder straps for the body-piece. Minor adjustments in fit are secured by taking up or letting out these cords. Across the front of the body the two panels of the body-piece come together, and are probably tied together by cords. The body-piece is sewed to the cape in the back in such a manner that the cape bulges up and would cover the pack customarily carried on the back."

NEW TYPE JAPANESE FLOAT-PLANE:

Several sightings of an aircraft similar to Type 99 D/B VAL on floats have been reported recently. Reconnaissance photographs in this area show an aircraft whose dimensions and shape correspond to VAL on floats. The dode name JUNE has been allotted this aircraft.

Air Ministry reports the following:-

"Reconnaissance photographs of Kiska Harbour, received from U.S.A. and another, from A.H.Q. India, of a merchant vessel converted into a seaplane

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carrier, confirm the existence of a new single engine Japanese twin-float monoplane. The following characteristics are evident from the photographs:-

Wing of deep chord with slightly swept-back leading edge and more sharply swept-forward trailing edge, with curvature on the outer sections.

Rounded tips, Radial engine. Horizontal tail surfaces, approximately elliptical in plan. Twin floats. Cockpit enclosure of medium length."

COMMENT: - The aircraft corresponds closely, except for the float undercarriage, to the Aichi T99, Navy dive-bomber, (VAL) and confirms the existence of a previously reported Japanese aircraft described as "Aichi type 00 floatplane with Mitsubishi engine." In this connection it may be pointed out that the Aichi 99 is fitted with a Mitsubishi "Kinsei" 14 cylinder radial engine.

CONCLUSIONS: - The Japanese twin-float monoplane described above is believed to be the Aichi 00 floatplane probably fitted with a Mitsubishi "Kinsei engine. A preliminary estimate of performance figures is given below. This has been drawn up on the assumption that the span is 48'6" (from reconnaissance photographs), a corresponding gross wing area of 420 sq. ft. and estimated loaded weight of 8,300 lbs. This weight excludes bombs but allows for a fuel tankage of 210 gals. corresponding to that of the Aichi T99 dive bomber (VAL).

Max. Speed:- 210 m.p.h. at 7,000 ft.
Normal cruising speed: - 185 mph at 10,000 ft., corresponding range of 780 miles.
Max. Range:- 1,130 miles at 140 mph and 10,000 feet.
Mean service ceiling:- 29,000 to 30,000 ft.

The maximum power output of the Mitsubishi "Kinsei" engine is 1,060 b.h.p. at 6,500 feet.

NOTES FROM TEST REPORT OF TYPE 0 S.S.F. (ZEKE)

The following is based on Technical Aviation Intelligence Brief No.3, Navy Department, Bureau of Aeronautics, Washington.

Preliminary tests of the Type 0 S.S.F. ZEKE which was forced down on Atukan Island, were conducted between 26th September and 15th October, 1942. The tests were conducted at a U.S. Naval air station.

The fact that the ZEKE was recovered and operated shows it to be a very serviceable and dependable aircraft.

All performance ttests were made with the aircraft ballasted for its full armament and internal fuel load.

It is probable that the aircraft in its original condition was somewhat faster than indicated in these notes, due to lack of a flush fit at wheel well fairings and cabin enclosure in the overhauled plane, and the addition of non-specular paint. The propellor stops were shifted from the original Japanese settings to obtain maximum R.P.M. at take-off and climb at low altitudes.

The manifold pressure regulator has an emergency shift which raises its regulating figure from 35" to 38". The latter figure was only used for brief comparisons as the engine appeared definitely rough at this setting. Further tests will be continued when an engine failure will be less critical to the test program.

Cooling of the engine was unusually good and a critical altitude is reached with a single stage, single speed blower.

Performance:-
Maximum speeds and rate of climb are given below:-

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Max. Speed.	Sea/ Level	270 mph.	T.A.S.
" "	5,000 ft.	287 "	" " "
" "	10,000 ft.	303 "	" " "
Max. Speed at critical altitude	16,000 ft.	326 "	" " "
Max. Speed	20,000 ft.	321.5"	" " "
" "	25,000 ft.	315 "	" " "
" "	30,000 ft.	306 "	" " "

Service Ceiling: - 38,500 ft.
Range: - (With built-in tankage) at 10,000 ft. - 223 mph (fixed high pitch) 1,108 miles. Improved range may be obtained with higher blade angles and lower speeds.

Ailerons are abnormally large and the rate of roll at low speeds is extremely high. However, the aileron forces increase excessively with airspeed and, above 200 knots indicated, the aircraft is very difficult to roll. At speeds above 250 knots, it is almost impossible to maneuver the aircraft laterally. At moderate to high speeds the rate of roll to the right is definitely lower than to the left, due to relative control forces.

TYPE 97 SSF NATE AND BEAUFIGHTERS:

Two NATES took off from Fuiloro strip, TIMOR, during a straffing attack by three Beaufighters, and were immediately engaged by our planes. One of the Jap fighters was probably destroyed.

The importance of this report lies in the fact that the Japanese may be increasing their use of this fighter, which recently was not considered operational in S.W.P.A. It is furthermore definite evidence of their presence.

AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS:

Four P-40E aircraft were on patrol north of Darwin and flying towards the west at 25,000 feet. An enemy aircraft, heading north at the same height, was seen at 9 o'clock from the P-40s. The P-40s took a full turn to port and chased the enemy aircraft towards Melville Island. The enemy aircraft went into a very slight dive, and drew away from the P-40s. During the shallow dive at 23,500 ft. the leader of the P-40s noticed his speed as being 240 mph. A.S.I. The enemy aircraft was at that time steadily drawing away from our aircraft.

The enemy aircraft is stated to have resembled a Beaufighter and may have been either Type 99 M/B LILY or, more probably, the Naval reconnaissance aircraft DINAH. An aircraft battery near Darwin reported an aircraft thought to be DINAH at between 27,000 and 30,000 ft. Reliable information during this sighting gives a true speed of approximately 360 mile per hour at one time while the normal speed was 280 mph true.

COMMENT: - [illegible]. The reported speed of 360 mph T.A.S. was probably in a dive.

JAPANESE ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE AT 35,000 FT.

Several instances have been recently reported of Jap A/A attaining bursts at altitudes up to 35,000 ft. In one instance a B-17E while over RABAUL at an altitude of 30,500 ft. received fire from Jap A/A batteries, from which bursts were observed 3,000 to 4,000 ft. above the aircraft. Some were even estimated to have reached 35,000 ft.

COMMENT: - As a heavy cruiser was reported present in RABAUL Harbor, the A/A probably came from its 4.5 inch or 5 inch batteries.

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AIR TORPEDO ATTACK ON ALLIED SHIP

There appeared, in North-Western Area Air Intelligence Summary No. 41, the following description of a combined torpedo and straffing attack by 9 Japanese bombers, 4 fighters, and one unidentified floatplane which resulted in the sinking of an Allied Ship.

The attack was initiated when nine Type 1 M/B BETTYS approached and circled the ship in flights in "Vic" line astern, with 4 Type O SSF ZEKES acting as escort. After circling above for approximately 15 minutes, the three flights temporarily disappeared over the horizon, and were next seen approaching the ship one flight from 10-15 degrees on the starboard bow, another flight from 40 degrees on the starboard quarter, and the third flight coming in on the port beam. Their heights were between 300 and 400 feet.

Flights A and C released their torpedoes from 1000 yards distance from the ship and continued steadily on their course, coming straight in and over without attempting any evasive tactics. Flight B apparently did not release its torpedoes. Two torpedoes hit the ship on the port side, and also there occurred one explosion which was at first believed by the crew to be a near miss from the bomb. However, it is probable that the explosion was caused by a torpedo. In addition to these, one torpedo passed in front of the bow, one passed behind the stern, while another apparently "held up" and crossed a few feet above the bridge of the ship. The ship turned over on its side and sank in three and one half minutes. At the instant the BETTYS released their torpedoes, the 4 ZEKES dived and straffed, and as the BETTYS passed over the ship, they added to the attack by straffing with tail cannon and 2 side blister guns. All aircraft returned to machine gun the ship's personnel while they were helplessly exposed in the water. Both the motor boat and whaler used as lifeboats were holed, and of 22 personnel in one boat only two were not wounded.

There appears no doubt that the bombers were BETTYS. The torpedoes were stowed in the bomb bay, which also appeared to have doors. All torpedoes had a gold colored nose. The unidentified floatplane remained circling above during the torpedo attack, but came down and participated in the straffing of the crew in the water. In the opinion of the Captain of the ship, the entire operation appeared to be well planned and executed with determination.

Earlier in the day, two enemy aircraft, identified by a qualified Officer as Navy Light Bombers, "DINAH", dive-bombed the ship. The dive was made at an angle of 40 degrees, the aircraft pulling out at about 800 feet. No bomb landed within 100 yards of the ship. An observer who had personally experienced attacks by Stukas stated that those made by the DINAHS were, in comparison, very poor.

ADOPTION OF STANDARD NAMES FOR JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

Advice from the United States that the name list, as standardized by this Headquarters, has been officially adopted by all United States forces, was received on December 25th.

In view of this it is felt that additional information should be given on the list previously published attached to Summary 49 and in Intelligence Information Memorandum No. 12, Third Edition, where it appears complete.

Emphasis must be placed on two facts. First, that the "code name" is in no sense a complete replacement of the proper name. Instead, it is an excellent brief, but positive, reference to <u>one</u> particular type of Japanese aircraft whether made by one or more manufacturer, and whether used by either or both the Army and Navy.

Secondly, while not <u>alone</u> the complete proper name, it definitely is an essential part of the name. Thus, the complete name of the familiar fighter is: Type "O" S.S.F. ZEKE". In this instance, as in many others which could be cited, it must be remembered that positive evidence has been repeatedly examined to support these facts:-

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(a). That the Japanese never use a 00 in naming this aircraft.
(b). That it is known to be manufactured by both the Mitsubishi and Nakajima companies.
(c). That Nagoya is a geographical location of one of the Mitsubishi factories and, therefore, the term "Nagoya Zero" is an erroneous method of describing the aircraft.
(d). That the Japanese do not refer to their aircraft using the manufacturers' names, and certain reliable evidence is at hand to the effect that such reference would only confuse them.
(e). That Zeke is used by the Navy from carriers and from land, and also by the Army.

In Intelligence Information No. 12, it will be noticed that the name of the original manufacturer is given wherever known and also whether the aircraft is Army or Navy. It is felt, however, that this is incidental information and should not be considered a part of the name proper. If the type number, classification or aircraft, and the code name are all three given in documents, and only the code name whenever brevity is desired, as in signals, then positive identification is always made. On the other hand, it cannot be said without actually examining many of the Japanese aircraft in certain theatres whether, for example, the ZEKE was a Navy or Army aircraft, unless the observer or pilot was able to note the absence of a red dot on its fuselage, indicating an Army aircraft.

The use of code names in this theatre has aided greatly in analysing reports. Since Memorandum No. 12 has been distributed to all airforces engaged against the Japanese airforces, it is felt that this standard system will aid all inter-theatre communications. In this respect, it might be added that, immediately upon the adoption of the system by Allied Air Forces, S.W.P.A., it was also officially adopted by Allied Land Forces, S.W.P.A., and supported by the U. S. Navy in S.W.P.A. and S.P.A. It is likewise standard for all voluntary Air Observers.

CAMOUFLAGE.

Very reliable sources have indicated that Japanese aircraft camouflage often covered the leading edge of the mainplanes in a yellow color similar to the R.A.A.F. training yellow.

Further confirmation is obtained from the Type 1 M/B BETTY which crashed at Darwin 23/11/42. Examination showed that the leading edges of the wing outboard of the engine nacelles were painted yellow.

A Japanese aircraft of unconfirmed type crashed on 15th December East of Cox Bassar, in India. The leading edges of the mainplane and propellor spinners were yellow.

A Focke-Wulf 190 FRED was recently seen to have the following camouflage: -- leading edge of mainplane - yellow; engine cowling - light brown: tail fin - light brown or dark yellow; whole of underside - very light green. Two others are described as colored light grey with yellow round the crosses on the wings and more patched of yellow around the cockpit.

INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY THE ENEMY FROM ALLIED P.O.W.

Evidence has come to hand that the enemy have succeeded in obtaining from Allied prisoners, captured in New Guinea, accurate information about the location and strength of units and formations in S.W.P.A. It is realized that no Allied prisoner would voluntarily or knowingly give such information to the enemy. It is, however, not improbable that prisoners unwillingly give away valuable information, because they are not aware of the methods by which such information can be obtained from prisoners without their knowing it. The following paragraphs summarize the best known of these methods.

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What the enemy wants to know: - The Air Force information that is likely to be of operational value to the enemy can be classified under the following headings, in the order of their importance:-

UNITS

Their strength.
Their composition.
Their location.
Their serviceability.
Their identification.
Their projected movements.
Their past movements.

AERODROMES

Their location.
Their defenses.
Their size.
Their serviceability.
The weather conditions over them.
Location of the bomb and petrol dumps.

AIRCRAFT

Types in use.
Their performance figures.
Their armament.
Their armor.
Their blind spots.
Their fields of fire.
Their serviceability.
Their designs.
Projected types.
Tactics to which they are best suited.

TACTICS

Favorite times for Allied raids.
Courses taken by Allied Aircraft.
Flying formations.
Combat formations.
Bombing tactics.
Fighter tactics.
Allied knowledge of enemy tactics.

COMMUNICATIONS

By aircraft.
By ships.
By road.
By signal.

TRAINING.

-Nature, duration and methods of training of various classes of air men.
-Training aircraft.

GENERAL

Allied defense Organization and Air raid warning systems.
Home conditions: - political - economic - financial - food - clothing - supply - raw materials - civilian and service morale.

Methods of obtaining information: - The above are the main classes of information, which the enemy desires from prisoners, and he may ask direct questions about them. The purpose of such questions would, however, be so obvious that few prisoners would be likely to answer them. The enemy's approach is, therefore, much more likely to be indirect. The interrogation may be either formal or informal, but in either case the most dangerous questions are those which lead up to the point about which information is really desired, so gradually that the prisoner is led by slow degrees and imperceptible stages from opening questions that are, on the face of them, quite innocuous, to a disclosure of a large number of circumstantial facts, from which conclusive inferences can be drawn on the vital points, without the prisoner having become aware that he has disclosed anything of importance.

The only safe rule is to answer no questions, however innocent they may seem, except to give the only information required to be given under the Geneva Convention - name, number, rank. It is generally not safe to try bluff. The interrogator is likely to be much more experienced at that game. Nor is it safe to argue. The interrogator always has the upper hand in any argument. The opposite extreme of appeasing him is no less dangerous. That will probably cause him to persist with the questioning for days or weeks, until he finally gets what he wants. There is no respite on the course. The only safe course is to answer no questions and to engage in no general conversation of any kind. A favorite trick is to engage prisoners in amiable platitudes and then to tell them what other high-ranking prisoners have said, thereby suggesting that there is no point in maintaining silence. The probability is that no other prisoner has said any-

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thing, and that it is a pure shot in the dark; but, even if other prisoners have talked, that is no reason for giving the enemy further information or confirming what he has learned.

Threats are an obvious device. The danger of giving in to them is the obvious one that they will be repeated in worse form again and again until they have lost their effect, when the worst of them will probably be carried out.

Stool pigeons are not so likely to be used by the Japanese, except possibly in the form of sympathetic nurses, who will invite confidences or letters or "messages" to friends to be broadcast.

Genuine friends, however, are likely to be used. Nothing is more natural than that Allied prisoners should, when thrown together and apparently alone, talk about this and that. Such conversations, though apparently entirely private, can, however, be picked up by hidden microphones and recorded. It is not safe to discuss anything that happened prior to capture, with anyone - not even with friends.

Letters written by prisoners are an obvious source of information. These should discuss nothing that happened prior to capture and should never be addressed to any station, unit, school, or to any named officer. They should be addressed merely to Allied Air Force Headquarters, S.W.P.A. - nothing more. No base, place, or city should be mentioned, and if it is intended that the letter should be dropped over Allied territory, no indication should be given where it should be dropped.

No documents of any kind, except those necessary for the particular operation engaged in, should be taken into the air. Personnel should turn out their pockets and aircraft should be examined as a matter of routine, and a place provided in the briefing room where all personal letters, etc. can be safely kept until the return of the crew. A single tram ticket has before now provided the clue to a whole series of vital facts. No written or printed scrap of paper is so trivial that it is not better left behind. Scraps of paper are trivial only to the person who carries them, because he does not know what link they may form in a chain of evidence which the enemy has.

Too much attention can, therefore, not be given to the two most precious attributes of Security - SILENCE and EMPTY POCKETS.

Arthur J. Cornell
ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

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IDENTIFICATION - JAPANESE WATERBOTTLES

Illustrated below is a Jap Army and Naval waterbottle. The Naval type normally bears the designation of the unit and with the difference in appearance serves as a ready identification of Army or Naval troops.

ARMY TYPE



NAVAL TYPE
(As carried by Marines)



(Both water bottles are of aluminium)

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 16, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 20.

NEWS FROM OTHER FRONTS:

TIMOR - The Japanese consolidation continues, bridges are being repaired and ground forces are active in all areas. More attention is being paid to the south coast and BEACO is now strongly occupied while an unknown number of enemy are active in the BETANO - SAME area.

On the eastern tip of the Island Allied reconnaissance aircraft encounter machine-gun fire from a well built settlement, with a good jetty, on 1 January. Sporadic Allied attacks have been made on enemy occupied areas and the FUILORO air field with marked success.

Merchant shipping movement has increased, especially round KOEPANG in Dutch Timor, and several sightings of medium and large vessels have been reported

GENERAL: DOMEI Agency states that a citation was given to the KAMBE Inf. Unit and attached units for work in the capture of KOEPANG. The Units formed part of the ITO detachment in the attack on TIMOR on 20 February 1942.

TANIMBAR GROUP: Analysis of air photographs taken on SAUMLAKI, JAMDENA Island, on 2 January, reveal 5 new MA positions and many MG positions, also new fire trenches behind thetown.

KAI ISIAND: On 6 January, our aircraft attacked and scored one, possibly two, hits on an enemy torpedo boat heading on a northerly course, 6 miles dues no of TOEAL. At the same time a vessel similar to a sloop was sighted entering TOEAL harbour. A stationary Japanese destroyer, 21 miles NW of TOEAL harbour was unsuccessfully bombed on the same day.

BURMA - ARAKAN - On 26 December our levies occupied PALETWA (50 miles north of AKYAB. By midday 28 December, our troops encountered enemy resistance, estimated at two companies, just north of THITKADO.

In RATHEDANG (24 miles north by west of AKYAB) our fighting patrol of a company was attacked by the enemy estimated a company, At dawn 30 December our company reinforced by a company and a section of mountain artillery attacked and captured the line TAUNDRA TAUNGU, 5 miles north of RATHEDAUNG. On 31 December no further contact with the enemy was reported though an enemy party was reported in the hills 3 miles north of THITKADO. An aerial reconnaissance over the area on 1 January saw no movement and carrier patrols reported that most of the coast was clear to FOUL POINT, though evidence of recent enemy occupation was seen.

The enemy has established mortar and machine-gun strongpoints on the high ground immediately north of RATHEDAUNG where numerous snipers are also active. (hundred Japanese occupy KYAUKTAW, 50 miles north by east of AKYAB.

It now appears that the enemy having over-estimated our strength and rapidity of advance has reconsidered the situation. It is considered that up to one battalion of enemy are now operating north of AKYAB.

CHIN HILLS - There is little to report apart from increased enemy boat activity on the MYITTHA River.

The enemy force which was moving up the MYITTHA Valley has joined with th KALEMYO (on the MYITTHA River, 140 miles NW of MANDALAY) garrison, making approximately two battalions in that area. The presence of 215 Regt. in the GANGAW Valley (70 miles south of KALEMYO) is confirmed.

CHINDWIN AREA: - The enemy is believed to be constructing a road between KALEWA (14 miles east of KALEMYO) and MAWLAIK (28 miles north by east of KALEMYO) and is said to be complete as far as CHAUNGZON. Our air reconnaissance on 30 December reported the road MAWLAIK - KALEWA appeared serviceable with new bridge but in poor condition further south.

JAPANESE EQUIPMENT:

JAPANESE 20 mm FLEXIBLE CANNON. The cannon is a recoil operated automat

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weapon patterned on the OERLIKON. It is air cooled and fed by a drum type (French) magazine in sizes to hold 15, 30, 60 or 100 rounds. The cannon is mounted at the point of balance allowing lateral and vertical movement. The winding handle on the right side, draws the recoil portions to the rear, cocking the cannon. The rate of fire is reported to be 500 rpm and each cannon is allotted 200 rounds when going on a sortie.

It is normally operated by an air-gunner and so is designed for use in bombing planes. Fighter aircraft using cannon have them fixed in wings. These fixed cannons are cocked, fired and set to safe by the use of compressed air cylin and Bowden cables. In the "Zeke" a trigger grip mounted on the left side of the cockpit, can be set to "7.7 mm only" or "7.7 mm and 20 mm cannon" as required.

Ammunition:- The shells are 5½" overall and are centre fired with a propellant charge of granulated nitrocellulose. The projectile is of steel construction with a driving band. The HE used is TNT. The incendiary shells contain a phosphorous pellet which is broken and scattered on contact by a TNT burster.

As the fuse is very delicate and the fillings extremely sensitive strict safety precautions must be exercised when handling this ammunition.

GENERAL - AIRCRAFT CARRYING SUBMARINE:

The following are details of Japanese aircraft carrying submarines, some of which are possibly operating in the S.W.P.A.

I 5 Class (4 known to exist)

Range - 34000 miles minimum speed.
Surface displacement - 1900 tons.
Submerged 0 2500 tons.
Length - 320 - 350 ft.
Beam - 30 feet.
Normal draught - 15 ft.
Carries - 15-21 inch torpedoes, 1 5.5" gun, 2 AA/MG.

Carries seaplane either I 96 (SIIM) or T ZERO (GIEN) - hanger aft of conning tower, gun between conning tower and hanger.

I 9 Class (17 known to exist, 4 probably completed 1942)

Similar size to above class.
Standard displacement - 2180 tons.
Length - 348 ft.
Beam - 30 ft.
Draught - 16 ft.
Same armament as above.
Range - 25480 miles - minimum speed.

SECURITY:

The practice among troops of despatching captured enemy war material through the post as souvenirs is growing to an alarming extent.

Parcels recently intercepted by Post and Telegraph Censorship have been found to contain such articles as: -

Japanese Respirators
Japanese Small Arms
Japanese Ammunitions (live)
Parts of Japanese Aircraft
Japanese Grenades (live)
Japanese telescopic sights
Japanese Rations
Japanese Waterbottles
Japanese diaries and other documents.

The value of articles of this nature for Intelligence and research purposes is just as obvious as is the criminal folly of sending live ammunition, grenades and the like to civilians through the post.

The number of these parcels and the fact that they are "franked" and im pre

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with a Unit Censor stamp makes it quite obvious that officers and other ranks are either unaware of the nature of Unit Censorship instructions or are deliberately disregarding them. If the former alternative be true, steps should be taken to ensure that unit censorship instructions are promulgated in all unit Routine Orders, if the latter, the strictest disciplinary action is clearly indicated. In either event the need of properly educating troops in Security and Censorship is abundantly clear.

Furthermore, reports received at LHQ indicate that what has hitherto been regarded as "Souveniring", particularly in the case of small arms and ammunition, may in reality be a regular "Traffic" carried on for subversive purposes. These reports make it the more urgent to ensure that the practice is stamped out forthwith.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 19, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 21

1. ENEMY SHIPPING:

At Rabaul there has been a sharp increase in enemy shipping until more enemy shipping is now reported than ever before. At Buin-Faisi, where 61 ships were reported on 12 Nov. (two days before the last big naval action off Guadalcanal), there has been a steady decline, until on 30 Dec. 2 vessels were reported there.

1. RABAUL. It will be noted that the same units of the 8th fleet, with Headquarters at Rabaul, remain in that area. They are Chokai (the/ heavy cruiser of the Atago class reported), and one light cruiser of the Tenryu class. The customary 2 or 3 oilers, and one or two seaplane carriers, continue to be reported. One of the latter was Chiyoda or Chitose. The most significant recent change is in the volume of merchant shipping, which increased by about 100,000 tons at the last sighting. There is enough new shipping of this description reported, to carry out a large-scale new landing. Noteworthy also in recent sightings is the small number of warships, lower than usual at Rabaul, in whose heavily defended harbor merchant vessels have always predominated. If there is shipping enough for an enemy offensive, there is warship protection only for a movement in such a direction as Dutch New Guinea, where relatively small opposition might be anticipated, or to Lae-Salamaua where the same applies to a lesser degree. To be sure, it is always possible that the warships necessary for screening such a movement might be brought directly from north of the Bismarcks. It would be possible for enemy warships to rendezvous at such a point as Melle Passage, in the St. Matthias Group, within easy sailing distance for convoy purposes, but outside our present zone of aerial reconnaissance. The enemy is known to have used this anchorage on several occasions in the past.

2. The Buin-Faisi Area has seen notably less shipping in the last month. It is possible that this fact reflects lessened enemy interest in the reinforcement of GUADALCANAL. His chief naval activity in the Solomons in the past month has been in supplying and reinforcing his new and expanded bases at Munda and Rekata Bay. In several cases, this was attempted by fast destroyer convoys, the so-called "Tokyo Expresses", and there is to be found in the fluctuation of enemy warship strength at Buin, an accurate record of these attempts, some involving as many as ten destroyers. From one to three oilers were usually present at Buin during this period to refuel these vessels after their forays. One of these oilers may have been Omurosan or Otowasan Maru. Submarines appear to have used the anchorage not only for refueling, but as a base of operations as well. At least one submarine was reported on more than half the days of the month.

Again a higher proportion of warships was reported at Buin than at Rabaul; but no heavy cruiser was sighted after 6 Dec. (the date of the last naval action at Guadalcanal) and no light cruiser after 13 Dec. There were only three sightings of possible seaplane carriers during the month. No battleship or carrier was reported at all.

3. The scattered sightings reported from Kavieng confirm the belief that this is an important rendezvous point for convoys from Truk. Heavy cruisers were sighted there on 23 and 26 Dec., and large seaplane carriers, transports, and cargo vessels on several other occasions.

4. The interest at Buka is principally in what has been going on at Buka itself. Two transports and a n oiler, with escort, came and went on 16 Dec. A transport and a cargo vessel were reported present between 20 and 27 Dec., during which time there were frequent air reports of activity ashore around the aerodrome. Then on 30 Dec. 8 ships were sighted by aircraft at Buka. There is little doubt that the enemy is improving his facilities there.

2. DATES OF JAPANESE OCCUPATIONS IN S.W.P.A.

A list of landing dates connected with Japanese operations since December 7, 1941, but covering mainly the South West Pacific Area, is shown hereunder. In some cases, the exact date is not known, but several sources have

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been checked for this compilation. (The following were occupied between March 31 and April 19, 1941: Fak Fak, Hollandia, Mabire, Manokwari, Moema, Sarmi and Sorong.) Some Japanese visits were merely patrols and these have been identified as such.

DATES OF JAPANESE OCCUPATIONS IN S.W.P.A.

Alexishafen (patrol)	April 30th	Koepang	Feb. 20th
" (occupied)	Dec. 18th	Kokoda (occupied)	August 14th
Ambon	Jan. 30th	" (re-occupied)	Nov. 2nd
Aroe Island	August 2nd	Kota Bharu (1941)	Dec. 7th
Auki (Malaita)	July 30th	Lae	Mar. 8th
Babo	Feb. 16th	Lorengau	Apr. 8th
Boli	Feb. 19th	Lunga (occupied)	July 6th
Bolikpapan	Jan. 23rd	" (re-occupied)	Aug. 7th
Bandjermasin	Feb. 16th	Luzon (1941)	Dec. 7th
Batavia	Mar. 6th	Macassar	Feb. 9th
Benkoelen	Feb. 25th	Madang (patrol)	May 1st
Billiton Island	April 14th	" (occupied)	Dec. 18th
Boela	Mar. 31st	Malahang	Feb. 8th
Buka	April 1st	Milne Bay (occupied)	Aug. 26th
Buka Passage (patrol)	Jan. 25th	" " (re-occupied)	Nov. 2nd
Buna (occupied)	July 22nd	Nauru Island	Aug. 26th.
" (re-occupied)	Jan. 3rd	Ocean Island	Aug. 26th
C. Gloucester (patrol)	Jan. 24th	Palembang	Feb. 15th
Dilli	Feb. 20th	Rabaul	Jan. 23rd
Faisi	Mar. 31st	Rekata Bay	July 6th
Finschafen (patrol)	Feb. 10th	Rembang	Feb. 28th
" (occupied)	Dec. 18th	Rendova Island	Oct. 10th
Fona (occupied)	Aug. 24th	Rossel Island (patrol)	Jan. 28th
" (re-occupied)	Nov. 2nd	Salamaua	Mar. 8th
Gasmata	Feb. 9th	Tanimbar Island	Aug. 2nd
Goodenough Island (occupied)	Aug. 21st	Tulagi (occupied)	May 2nd
" " (re-occupied)	Nov. 2nd	" (re-occupied)	Aug. 7th
Guam (1941)	Dec. 10th	Vangunu Island	Oct. 6th
Hong Kong (1941)	Dec. 18th	Viru Harbor	Oct. 2nd
Indramava	Feb. 28th	Wake	Dec. 23rd
Iorabaiwa (occupied)	Sept. 20th	Wewak	Dec. 18th
" (re-occupied)	Sept. 28th	Wickham Harbor	Oct. 2nd
Iringila (Vella Lavella)	Oct. 13th		
Kai Island	Aug. 2nd		
Kavieng	Jan. 21st.		
Kendari	Jan. 24th		
Kessa	Mar. 9th		
Kieta (patrol)	Jan. 22nd		
" (occupied)	Mar. 30th		

3. PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

According to the lastest available intelligence Main Japanese dispositions in the E. portion of Portuguese Timor are as follows:-

Place	Numbers	Date of Report
Ossu	50 Japanese 300 Natives	6/12
Laga	500 Japanese	6/12
Laivai	5000 Japanese	24/12
Iauten	2000 Japanese	6/12

4. ENEMY CASUALTIES.

Estimate of Japanese aircraft casualties in all theatres resulting from Allied operations from 28th to 31st December, inclusive:

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Locality	Destroyed	Probable	Damaged
S.W.P.A.	16	1	13
Solomons	8	-	-
India	10	11	2
	34	12	15
Previously estimated to 27/12	3149	567	615
	3183	579	630

5. JAPANESE RATIONS.

The following which appeared in Information Bulletin No. 19 Hq. U.S.A.F.I.S.P.A. gives additional detail on Japanese rations.

"Japanese parachutists are using iron rations made in wafer form and composed of ground rice and wheat and some sesame seed. Besides this, they have an extract of mussel flesh, dried plums, preserved ginger, crushed bean meal, and nori (dried seaweed containing alkali, soda and iodine). For one meal these rations weigh about one-half pound. They have been successfully tried out in the climates of Malaya, East Indies, Philippines, China, Manchuria, and Siberia."

"All foreign iron rations were previously tested, but the Japanese selected the above type as most suitable for the Japanese soldier."

"The Japanese have three types of field rations, a variable emergency ration, and a 'peacetime' ration. Rice, sometimes barley, is the basic food in each type of ration."

"A 'Peacetime' Ration. This consists of 21.16 ounces of rice, 6.6 ounces of barley, and a cash allowance per man of approximately 9 1/2 cents per day. The cash allowance is spent on meat, fish, vegetables and sometimes for extra cooking and heating fuel. The caloric value of the ration in kind is 2,780. A total food equivalent for each man of 3,500 calories a day is allowed in barracks, and 3,700 to 4,000 calories a day is allowed on maneuvers."

"Emergency Rations. These are of two types -- the 'a' scale and the 'b' scale. In Burma, reliable information shows that each soldier carried rations for three days on the 'a' scale and for one day on the 'b' scale. Neither was to be eaten except on orders of the Commanding Officer when the unit was separated from its supply column."

"(1) 'A' Scale. This scale consists of about 1 pound 3 ounces of rice (sufficient for two meals) and one small can of mixed beef and vegetables per man. The rice, which is simple to prepare, is frequently cooked by the soldier in a small bucket carried for that purpose.

"(2) 'B' Scale. It consists of three paper bags of hard biscuits (sufficient for three meals)."

"c. Field Ration. These generally are of two types, 'normal' and 'special', although an 'alternative' ration may be substituted for either of them. The 'special' ration usually is issued when the rations are carried on the soldier."

"d. Vitamins. The Japanese are using vitamin tablets to supplement their rations, and also as an emergency ration in the jungle. Some of the vitamin tablets are known to consist mainly of vitamins A and D."

6. ENEMY METHOD OF FIXING OF HEIGHT FOR A/A.

During the Allied night raid of 26th Dec. on Rabaul, it was reported that enemy fighters were seen flying at the same height as our bombers. No attempts were made at interception.

This maneuver, which has often been noted before, is probably carried out to notify A/A positions of the height of our bombers.

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7. JAPANESE FLARES IN DEFENCE OF RABAUL.

B-17s upon return from raiding shipping in Rabaul Harbor reported that the Japanese sent up 20 flares to approximate the aircrafts' altitude (5000 feet). These flares emitted a yellowish light and burned for a duration of 30 seconds.

Similar defensive tactics were experienced by a later formation of six B-17s attacking shipping at Rabaul. The crews described flares fired from the ground as bright and effectively blinding them - these in conjunction with effective searchlights. These last however did not pick up the B-17s until after the runs had been completed.

8. TYPE 97 HB SALLY TYPE 1 SSF OSCAR AT DINJAN.

The following appears in India, A.H.Q., W.I.S. No. 43 dd/ 11th Nov., 1942:-

"The 25th Oct. attack on Dinjan was in three phases. Type 97 M/B (SALLY) came in first at under 1,000 ft. in threes aloft line abreast. This was followed by two further waves of 9 each SALLY in shallow Vs of three, at 8/10,000 ft., pattern bombing in sticks. Immediately afterwards, fifteen Type 1 SSF (OSCAR) appeared at 0' in threes almost line astern and machine gunned, firstly, aircraft on the ground, and, afterwards, A/A gunposts. Fighters attacked in shallow dives frequently pulling up to almost stalling positions before repeating dives. 15 Fighters remained as top cover throughout."

9. TYPE 1 SSF OSCAR.

The following appeared in A.H.Q. India, W.I.S. No. 43 dd/- 11 November, 1942.

"Four of these fighters (OSCARS) have been located on the ground so far, and as the result of the enemy raids on the Dinjan area at the end of October, No other type of fighter has been found."

"Despite previous reports to the contrary the armament of this type has been found to be still only 1 x 12.7 mm, cannon and 1 x 7.7 mm machine gun, firing through the airscrew arc. There is no wing armament, and it is doubted if the wings as at present known to be constructed on this type of aircraft are strong enough to carry any."

"Detailed reports on this aircraft will be issued later, but preliminary information has been received about the following:-

"Three at least of the fighters had a form of self sealing covering to the fuel tanks. The total thickness of the covering is only one-eighth of an inch and is made up of six layers of different types of rubber, the outer one of which is vulcanized. This is a different covering to the rubber pad type used on the tanks of the Navy 1 HB (Type 1 M/B BETTY) and is the first report received in this Command of the use of self-sealing tanks on Japanese fighters."

"The ammunition belting of the 12.7 mm. cannon appeared to be almost entirely explosive. No ball of A.P. ammunition was included. From hits observed on our armor, penetration seemed to be poor."

"R/T was found on one of these aircraft."

"The wing band round the tail of the fuselage has been found as previously but, in addition, red circles of 2 feet diameter on either side of the fuselage in addition to those on the wing tips. These red circles have a 1" white border all round. (These fuselage circles have never before been found on any crashed Army Air Force aircraft, but only on those of the Navy Air Force.)"

10. ALLIED SHIPPING ATTACKED BY TYPE 99 DB F/P "JUNE".

A Type 99 DB F/P JUNE recently attacked an Allied ship in the Merauke

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area with two 100 lb bombs from a 30 degree dive. Damage was not considerable and the ship proceeded on course.

JUNE is a twin-float, 2 place Dive Bomber, operational in S.W.P.A., with single radial engine, covered cockpit, and elliptical wing. Inits attack the aircraft appeared to be slow in speed.

11. TYPE O SSF ZEKE TACTICS AGAINST B-25s.

Following a raid on Lae aerodrome, a flight of six B-25s was intercepted by a similar number of ZEKES in V formation keeping beyond range on the port and starboard sides, and above the bombers. All formation was lost, however, after the ZEKES had made their first pass. Most of these passes were pressed from the top and rear, and appeared only half-hearted; in fact, during the greater part of the engagement the Japanese remained well beyond range of our guns.

The ZEKES were olive drab in color. Insignia was observed on the wing tips, but the absence of any insignia on the fuselage of these planes may possibly be taken as indication that they were Army aircraft.

12. P-38 COMBAT WITH TYPE O SSF ZEKES.

A bomber escort of 12 P-38s was met at Lae by 10 to 12 ZEKES, of which only two closed in to attack each of the two bomber flights. These attacks were made simultaneously from the front quarters - both right and left and slightly below, inflicting minor damage on our aircraft.

The ZEKES, flying in small formations in trail, were engaged by the P-38s in the following manner. One flight dived from 10,000 feet on five of the Japs at 5000 feet, the two other P-38 flights followed down to attack the enemy fighters scattered by the opening attack. In thoensuing engagements, eight ZEKES were shot down, one probably was destroyed, and two were damaged. All P-38s returned safely, one with its right wing tip smashed from colliding with a ZEKE.

Japanese evasive tactics consisted mainly of rapid climbing turns into the attacking P-38s. In several instances, when attacked, the ZEKES went into long shallow dives, whereupon two more ZEKES came in, one on the right and one on the left of the tail of the attacking P-38. Our pilots commented that the quality of enemy pilots and aircraft appeared much higher than in the Buna combat of December 27th. ZEKE camouflage was grey blue and dark brown. Red circles were painted on both wings and fuselage; one aircraft carried a red stripe around the fuselage just forward the tail.

13. EXAMINATION OF TYPE 1 M/B BETTY AND SQUARE WING TIP SSF (HAP).

The first examination of Japanese aircraft on BUNA Aerodrome, Papua, reveals the following: Two type 1 M/B BETTY type aircraft were examined. These aircraft were apparently the prototypes or experimental models of the present BETTY and were called Type 12, Test Model. One BETTY was manufactured in August 1940 and the other in October 1940. Both were fitted with the Kasei 11 Engine and a three bladed variable pitch, constant speed, airscrew.

An examination of the four HAPS on the same aerodrome shows that the square wing tip SSF HAP is apparently a modification of the Type O SSF ZEKE with the folding wing tips removed. The same armament in the same positions are carried on both these aircraft.

The only difference noted was that HAP is equipped with a Nakajima EI (Sakae) Model 21 engine in place of the usual Nakajima E.I. (Sakae) Model 12 engine carried by ZEKE. Both of these engines are of the 14 cylinder twin-row radial type.

HAP is known as Type O Mark 2, Model 2, ship-borne fighter and ZEKE is the Type O, Mark 1, Model 2, ship-borne fighter. The only differences being the Mark Numbers. This examination was conducted under enemy fire and is therefor limited.

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14. FIELD INSPECTION OF TYPE 0 MARK 2, MODEL 2, SSF HAP.

HAP is an all metal, low wing, semi-monocoque constructed aircraft, similar in all respects to ZEKE but with two exceptions, namely:- The square wing tips and engine cowling.

All indications point simply to the removal of the old type rounded tip which is thus replaced by the new square wing tip. Close inspection reveals that the original hinge and locking device of the Type 0 Mark 1 Model 2 SSF ZEKE is still incorported in the wing.

The new square wing tip is constructed of light gauge alloy sheet, pressed in two halves and welded along the leading edge of the tip making the complete unit. Nine inches along the chord from the trailing edges, the wing tip is reinforced with a web type rib (owing to its not having any attachment to the wing proper) and covers the end of the aileron. This portion of the wing tip is the only section which has a reinforcement rib, the rest of the tip being full monocoque.

HAP has an all metal, three bladed, variable pitch, constant speed airscrew, similar to the Hamilton Type. The rotation is clockwise when viewed from the cockpit.

The spinner and de-icing equipment is made up of three sections which when assembled, form a well constructed and efficient unit.

ARTHUR J. CONNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 30, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 22

1. ENEMY TACTICS IN THE BUNA-GONA AREA.

The following extracts dealing with operations at BUNA are reproduced for information.

Special Grenades - The Japanese bunkers and dugouts had been so well constructed that they were comparatively impervious to the normal hand and rifle grenades (not to say mortar and artillery fire). It was necessary to devise a special grenade to blow the enemy out of these strong positions, and the method suggested by the Engineers was adopted and improved upon.

The ordinary Australian rifle grenade (same as hand grenade except had a flat plate on the bottom) was used, and to it were tied two pounds of ammonal, in one pound blocks. The extra HE provided the necessary blast effect when thrown into the dugouts through an entrance way to eliminate the Japanese therein (the grenade was not used in an effort to blow in the roof or sides of the dugout); the ordinary grenade had formerly produced casualties in the dugouts only to those Japanese who received direct hits from the fragments.

Some of the first grenades used were made with gelignite, but ammonal was substituted in order to prevent accidental detonation by gun fire while the grenade was still in the pocket of its user.

Enemy Persistence - It would be impossible to overstress the tenacity with which the Japanese clung to their prepared positions. As already mentioned in the preceding paragraph, ordinary grenades and gun mortar fire were comparatively ineffective.

There were many instances (not isolated ones) wherein dugouts were grenaded inside, then covered with gasoline and burned, then sealed with dirt and sand, only to yield, two or three days later, Japanese who came out fighting. One souvenir hunter, entering a dugout that had been sealed four days after the battle, was chased out by a Japanese officer wielding a sword. Some of the instances in which Japanese lived on in these positions, through the burning and detonation, in the filth and gore, when sorely wounded themselves, are almost incredible.

Enemy Bunker Construction - The enemy bunkers and dugouts were constructed of coconut palm logs, dirt, sand, and sand bags, covered with natural camouflage. In some instances pieces of armor plate (later well used by our engineers as roadway on bridges) were set up. No concrete positions were found The log-and-dirt bunker construction was done carefully and strongly. The corner posts were firmly embedded in the ground, and the horizontal logs neatly and strongly attached and interwoven. Several alternate layers of logs and earth were used generally to give full protection against mortars and light artillery. Roofs were thick and also made of alternate layers, giving excellent protection. Bunkers were connected to systems of radiating fire and communication trenches on both sides.

In some instances, underground trenches were used, and the enemy used these to place snipers in our midst even after they had long been driven from the general area. Leaves and grass were well used to camouflage all bunkers; in addition, the bunkers had been planned and built for just this purpose long before the campaign actually started, and the natural quick jungle growth, sprouting up over the earthworks, gave first-class natural camouflage.

The enemy work was generally neat and strong. One position, in BUNA MISSION, consisting of kitchen, latrines, dugouts, and trenches, was, in consideration of the localeand the terrific bombardment that it had endured, a model of neatness and efficiency.

The enemy dugout positions were well sited and mutually supporting. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to by-pass any of the positions, each of which had to be reduced in turn.

2. ENEMY EQUIPMENT.

(A). Japanese Ammunition Wagon - The following description of an

ammunition wagon captured at GONA, has been received.

Length	-	11 ft. 3 ins.
Width	-	6 ft.
Height	-	2 ft. 11 ins.
Wheel Base	-	7 ft.

BRIDGESTONE tyres (24 x 6) are fitted to the four wheels, and the connecting turntable, which is rather an ingenious device, projects out 4 ft. in front.

The compartments vary in size and are mostly perforated, thereby enabling the shells to be packed tightly and safely.

A number of corridors throughout the wagon separate the numerous compartments.

The plating, being approx. 1/16 of an inch thick, is NOT bullet proof and the wagon is riddled with holes - probably due to machine gun fire from the air.

The roof, apart from a man-hole measuring 1 ft. x 2 ft. 10 ins., has been camouflaged with sods and blocks of wood. Gun fittings suitable for AA gun are also situated on the roof.

(B). Japanese Infantry Flame Throwers. - The equipment is carried and operated by one man, no special protective clothing being worn.

It is known that Flame Throwers were issued to 55 Engineer Regiment on the scale of one per platoon. A petrol driven compressor, capable of being transported by two native carriers, is used to charge the compression cylinder.

(C). Japanese Bangalore Torpedo. - The Bangalore Torpedo consists of six, 8 ft. strips of bamboo, lashed together to form a cylindrical tube approximately 4 inches in diameter. Five individual explosive charges are spaced evenly within the cylinder, through which runs a primer cord. A detonator and short length of igniter fuse is attached to the end of the primer cord. The detonator causes the charges to explode almost instantaneously.

3. UNEXPLODED JAPANESE BOMBS, GURNEY FIELD. (MILNE BAY)

Out of the total of twenty six (26) bombs dropped in a recent raid on Gurney Field, eight (8) were classed as unexploded incendiary type. Examination shows that although their fuses had functioned, the incendiary composition failed to ignite completely in fifteen (15) feet of soft ground.

The Australian Army Bomb Disposal Unit furnishes the following additional data concerning the four (4) bombs which it examined:

1. One bomb penetrated light yellow clay soil to the depth of thirteen (13) feet. Size of the entry hole measured 12-14 inches; horizontal effect four (4) feet six (6) inches.

2. A second bomb penetrated eight (8) feet of hard gravel. Measurement of the entry hole was 12-14 inches, and horizontal effect is calculated at four (4) feet.

3. The tail unit of the third bomb was found at nine (9) feet, but the bomb itself remains unlocated in the watery slush. Offset is similar to (1) and (2) above.

4. The fourth bomb's tail unit was found at eight (8) feet and by probing, the bomb itself was reached at eleven (11) feet in red clay soil. Its composition was confirmed by odor to be that of the other bombs. The offset was identical with the other.

The bombs that exploded on the surface were probably of two sizes, about 250 lbs. and 500 lbs., which blasted craters eighteen (18) feet wide and twenty five (25) feet wide with depths varying from seven (7) feet to twelve (12) feet. Exact depth cannot be decided as much of the soil fell back into the crater indicating delayed action bombs in soft clay.

4. WEATHER AS AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON.

The following appeared in RAAF Western Area, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 103.

Received from U. S. Sources, the following is of interest:

1. Our enemies have shown exceptional ability in using weather knowledge as a powerful offensive weapon. It is doubtful whether any great strategists and tacticians will emerge from this war who do not make maximum use of weather, both as offensive and defensive weapons.

2. German cleverness in utilizing long range forecasts is illustrated by

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the escape of the "Ginieseneau" and "Scharnherst" through the English Channel on February 12, 1942, when the major factor in the success of the operation was the accurate German forecast that a "cold front" with low clouds would sweep into the Channel that day.

3. The Japanese successfully employed the use of shifting storm zones in their attack on the Aleutians and seizure of Atta and Kiska in June, 1942. Japanese weather ships stationed southeast of Dutch Harbor and in the sea at Okhotsk maintained liaison with the Japanese task force at all times, enabling it to take complete advantage of the storm cover and protect itself against shifts in weather.

Interpreting weather forecasts, whose accuracy was subsequently verified by the Western Defense Command, was in the hands of our forces in Alaska one week before Japanese attacks, so that we were prepared and alert, even though severely hampered in defense operations by the same weather that aided the Japanese. Defense forces cannot adequately patrol this area in storm conditions.

An extensive research program, already finding application at the Army Weather Control and resulting in tremendous aid to our forces throughout the world, is aimed at completely surpassing the enemy in the accuracy of long range forecasting. This Research Work is proving that accurate long range forecasting is possible, contrary to the view of some.

5. MORE ABOUT THE TYPE "O" MARK 2 S.S.F. HAP.

Further to information in regard to S.S.F. HAp, the ailerons of HAP are approximately eleven inches shorter than those of the Type "O" Make 1 SSF ZEKE.

There is a solid section between the flap and the aileron which makes up most of the difference in aileron lengths. It is thought that greater maneuverability at higher speeds might be obtained through the reduction of wing span and aileron length. The ZEKE has had a noticeable stiffening of aileron control at high speeds.

6. NEW VERSION TYPE 97 M/B SALLY.

Wing span measures 74.8 feet; length of fuselage is 48 feet. Chord is estimated at 15 feet. There is a distance of 15 feet from the trailing edge of the mainplane to theleading edge of the tail plane, and 15 feet from the turret forward. The aircraft is equipped with two (2) Type 100 engines, of 1450 horse-power each, described as an absolute copy of the Wright double Cyclone, and dated, May, 1942. There are 14 cylinders, twin, air cooled radials of 52 inches diameter and probably fitted with two (2) speed superchargers. Change in propellor pitch is electrically operated by a motor situated under the spinner. Outboard of the engine nacelles were located two (2) self-sealing oil tanks, one on each side, the rubber outer covering forming part of the actual leading edge and painted yellow.

The Sally's armament consisted of one (1) 12.7 mm machine gun located in the aft part manual turret, and five (5) 7.7 mm machine guns, one (1) in the nose, one (1) on each side lateral forward and below the leading tailplane edge, one in the belly under the leading edge of the tail plane, and one (1) in the tail tip remotely controlled from the dorsal turret by levers and mirrors. All guns have ring and bead sights except the gun in the turret, which has a reflector sight similar to that used by the RAF but with optional ring and bead sights.

7. POSSIBLE NEW EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION FROM TYPE "O" SSF ZEKE

Immediately subsequent to a strafing attack on Dobodura by ZEKES on 26th December, 1942, a bullet was salvaged from the attacked area which consists of a steel case, one and one-half inches long and approximately eleven mm. diameter, hollow at the rear, and containing an incendiary or explosive mixture. The salvaged ammunition bears no rifling marks, nor are there any indications to show that the steel case is enclosed in an envelope, although this may be quite possible, which would make the cartridge of about .50 calibre. There is, however, a cannelure at the rear of the projectile which could have had a copper driving band fitted before firing.

An Allied bomber, attacked by ZEKES using this ammunition, reports that it exploded in the aircraft, wrecking the radio equipment and wounding the gunner. Definite identity between this and the bullet recovered at Dobodura has been established by comparison of the nose dimensions.

COMMENT:- This and other instances of the use of .50 ammunition indicates the use of OSCAR rather than ZEKE. There were many identifications of OSCAR during recent combats in the Lae-Gasmata area.

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8. COMPARISON OF TYPE 1 SSF OSCAR AND TYPE 0 SSF ZEKE.

The following is a brief comparison of easily recognized differences between two of the fighters used by the Japanese in this area - the OSCAR and the ZEKE. Five points to be noted are as follows:-

The rudder of the OSCAR extends from the top of the fin to the bottom of the fuselage; the ZEKE's rudder extends from the top of the fin to the top of the fuselage only.

The end of the OSCAR's fuselage is rounded. The fuselage of the ZEKE terminates in a point.

The tail wheel of OSCAR is set well forward under the leading edge of the tail-plane; the tail wheel of ZEKE is situated well aft, behind the tail plane, and may be retracted.

No wing gun ports are present in OSCAR, while one gun port in each wing is present in ZEKE.

A red circle on the wing tips only marks the OSCAR, since it is an Army aircraft; the ZEKE, a navy aircraft, carries red circles on both wing tips and fuselage.

9. BLACK CAMOUFLAGED TYPE 95 RF/P. DAVE.

Allied bombers recently sighted a Type 95 RF/P DAVE painted black indicating its use as a night fighter.

10. NEW STRIP REPORTED NEAR RABAUL.

Allied reconnaissance aircraft previously reported a new strip under construction three miles from Kokopo (7 miles SE of Rabaul). A further report dated 5th Jan., has now been received that the strip is immediately W. of Kabakaul (5 miles from Kokopo) in a coconut plantation. Debris has been burned off part of the clearing which is over 2000 yards long and 200 yards wide running in a NNE - SSW direction.

COMMENT: - A photograph (21st Dec., 1942) showed what appeared to be the beginnings of a new strip NW of Kabakaul. It should be mentioned, however, that, as no previous photographs have been received of this area, it cannot be said how long this clearing had been in existence. It is known that there is an area of fairly level ground around Kabakaul where there are three coconut plantations Kabakaul, Rapopo and Vunapope Mission Plantation, covering a total area of about 8 square miles. An informant with local knowledge states that this area is undoubtedly suitable for construction of landing grounds.

11. KEI ISLANDS.

Native reported, on 5th Jan., the existence of an aerodrome on Greater Kei Island.

COMMENT: - The Kei (or Ewab) Islands lie between Lat. 5°08'S and Lat. 6°02'S, Long. 131°56' and Long. 133°10'E and may be divided into four groups, viz.

(1) Koer Islands
(2) Tajandoe Islands
(3) Noehoe Rowa (Little Kei)
(4) Noehoe Tjoet (Greater Kei)

Generally speaking the Islands are mountainous and densely wooded. (Greater Kei Island) is the easternmost of the Kei Group. It is wooded, with patches of cultivation on the slopes of the mountains, which traverse its center, The N. part of the island is very mountainous, the highest mountain, the sharp peak Dab, is 2628 ft. S. of Mount Dab the mountains are lower and lie nearer the E. Coast, where they rise almost vertically from the sea. The narrow part of the island is composed of ridges from 300 to 500 ft. high, S. of which, Mount Nonaibal and Morbuits, are respectively 1939 ft. and 2201 ft. high. The mountain chain continues to the S. at an elevation of from about 1300 to 1700

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fect to Langiar, when it descends to a ridge of an average elevation of 300 ft. terminating at the steep Tandjong Weduwar. On the E. side of the island the coastal range comes close to the sea, leaving here and there a narrow strip of sand beach where numerous villages are situated.

Information regarding possibilities for aerodrome construction on these islands is very limited. One report states that the islands are quite unsuitable, while another says that, although apparently suitable terrain for landing fields exists, the labor required for clearing the dense forests would be formidable.

12. MATKOES ISLAND.

Photographs, taken on 2nd Jan, covering the S. half of the runway on Matkoes Island and most of the S. part of the Island, show no activity. The plantation and native tracks are unused and overgrown suggesting the withdrawal of labor to fortification works on the N. end of the Island.

COMMENT: - Matkoes Island is located in position Lat. 8°04'S Long. 131°13'E at the entrance to Saumlaki Bay about 8 miles S.W. of Saumlaki. The island is surrounded by reef which prevents close approach. Even small craft cannot land during low water. Saumlaki Bay is an excellent harbor for ships up to 10,000 tons.

The landing field at Matkoes Island stretches across the Island in an E-W direction, and is about 1400 yards by 200 yards wide. Dispersal areas could easily be constructed, N. and S. of the runway. On 13th Oct., it was reported that the strip was serviceable for light aircraft and could be used by any aircraft and could be used by any aircraft for an emergency landing.

13 JAPANESE NOMENCLATURE FOR SHIPBORNE FIGHTERS.

The Type 0 S.S.F. is described on makers plates as Kanjo - Sentoki.

This has in the past been literally translated as "Shipborne fighter." It is now known that the Japanese draw a distinction between Kanjoki and Kansaiki, both of which can designate aircraft carried by Naval vessels. The distinction is that Kanjoki is used for aircraft with wheels designed to take off from and land on aircraft carriers and Kansaiki for all other types of aircraft carried by Naval vessels. The latter term, however, has not been encountered at this Headquarters, as part of any specific type name.

In view, however, of the distinction, which is now known to exist, this Headquarters, will, in future, translate Kanjoki as "Carrier borne plane" and the full title found on makers plates, Rei-Shiki Ichigo Kanjo Sentoki Ni-Gata, as "Type 0 Mark 1 Carrier borne fighter Model 2."

14. JAPANESE PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS.

There is published below a chart showing Pyrotechnic Signals in connection with Landings. The Pyrotechnic Signals in connection with landings have been received from a trustworthy source, and relate to this theatre, but, in this case, it is not certain how far they are of general or permanent application.

PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IN CONNECTION WITH LANDINGS.

Green 2 stars, or burn something on land.	:	Have succeeded in landing.
Yellow Dragon	:	Bombing completed.
Black Dragon	:	Attack by enemy tanks.
Green hanging star.	:	Request ships guns open fire.
Red Hanging Star.	::	Request ships guns cease fire.
Red - Green Lights Yellow flat in day-time.	:	Mark for landing spot.
Green light or flag.	:	Water route.

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Red light or flag.	:	Reef.
Red Cross Flag.	:	Relief or rescue ship.
2 shots of green tracer, together with 1 shot of incendiary arrow.	:	Success of landing.
2 shots of red tracer.	:	Enemy resistance is great.
2 shots of white tracer.	:	No enemy resistance.
1 red signal bullet or incendiary arrow	:	Enemy planes are attacking.
White signal bullet	:	Sighted enemy submarine afloat.
Torn-up paper thrown out of air-craft once on odd days of the month, twice on even days.	:	I am a Japanese plane.

15. ENEMY CASUALTIES.

Estimate of Japanese aircraft casualties in all theatres resulting from Allied operations, from 8th to 10 Jan., 1943, inclusive:-

LOCALITY	DESTROYED	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
S. W. P. A.	62	27	25
Solomons	9	-	12
India	-	-	-
	71	27	37
Previously estimated to 7th January	3221	598	655
	3292	625	692

Total casualties by type S.W.P.A. included in the above figures:-

	DESTROYED	PROBABLE	DAMAGED
Fighters	500	219	200
Bombers	184	47	122
Recce.	31	5	16
Unidentified	78	24	37
	793	295	375

16. RELIABILITY RATING IN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

The following directive has been issued by order of the Commander in-Chief, Allied Forces, S.W.P.A.

Effective immediately all Intelligence Reports will be rated according to the following system:-

a. When reports are known to be true, they will be reported as such, for instance, occurrences witnessed by the reporting officdr would be in this category

b. Reports not constituting "first-hand" or eye-witness information will be graded according to the reliability of the source and also the probability of the news, and will be designated by the following:-

Evaluation of Information as to SOURCE.	Evaluation of Information as to TRUTH, CREDIBILITY, or PROBABILITY.
A - Completely reliable.	1 - Rpt. confirmed or by other source.
B - Usually reliable.	2 - Probable true report.
C - Fairly reliable.	3 - Possibly true report.
D - Not usually reliable.	4 - Doubtfully true report.
E - Unreliable.	5 - Improbable report.
	0 - Truth cannot be judged.

For example, "C-2" indicates a report from a fairly reliable source, and the information is probably true. Also, "C-0" indicates a report from a fairly reliable source, the truth of which cannot be judged.

c. If a report is known to be false, it will be reported as such as it may be possible to deduce the truth from the fact that certain reports are being circulated by the enemy.

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d. The rating "A-1", will be used only when the information is received from the most authentic source, and is confirmed beyond doubt. Due consideration will be given before designating a report "A-1".

e. When reports contain information on several parts or phases of a subject such as to require separate rating action on the several parts, such separate ratings will be made by marginal notation.

f. When intelligence is forwarded in dispatch form, the reliability rating will be given as appropriate.

The symbols for indicating the evaluation of intelligence are identical with those being used by British Naval Intelligence. The same system has been adopted by the United States Army and Navy.

It is desired that provisions of this Directive be brought to the attention of all concerned.

17. ALLIED AIRCRAFT TYPES.

Operational American aircraft in all theatres, and Australian and British aircraft in the S.W.P.A., by number and by name are included in the following lists.

AMERICAN AIRCRAFT

U.S.A.F. NAME	MANFRS. NAME AND SERIAL NUMBER IF ANY	U.S. DESIGNATION	R.A.F. DESIGNATION	PURPOSE
A-17	Northrop	-	Nomad	S/E LB
A-18	Curtis	-	-	2/E LB
A-20	(Douglas DB-7 (Day)	-	Boston	2/E MB
	(Night)	-	Havoc	2/E F.
A-24 (SBD)	Douglas	-	Dauntless	S/E DB
A-29	Lockheed 14	Hudson	Hudson	2/E MB
A-31	Vultee 72	Vengeance	Vengeance	S/E DB
B-17	Boeing B-299	Fortress	Fortress	4/E HB
B-18A	Douglas (DB-280)	-	Digby	2/E MB
B-24	Consolidated 32	Liberator	Liberator	4/E HB
B-25	NA - 40	Mitchell	Mitchell	2/E MB
B-26	Martin	Marauder	Marauder	2/E MB
	Martin 167	-	Maryland	2/E MB
A-30	Martin 187	-	Baltimore	2/E MB
C-38, 39 41 and 42	Douglas DC-2	DC-2	DC-2	2/E Transport
C-60	Lockheed 18	Lodestar	Lodestar	2/E Transport
C-47,53,68	Douglas DC-3	DC-3	Dakota	2/E Transport
C-54	Douglas DC-4	DC-4	-	4/E Transport
C-46	Curtiss CW-20	Commando	-	2/E Transport
F4F	Grumman G-36	Wildcat	Martlet	S/E SSF
F5F	Grumman	Skyrocket	-	2/E SSF
F4U	Vought	Corsair	-	S/E SSF
OS2U	Vought	Kingfisher	-	S/E Scout
SOC	Curtiss	Seagull	-	S/E Scout
SB2U	Vought	Vindicator	Chesapeake	S/E Scout B.
TBD	Douglas	Devastator	-	SE/TB
TBF	Grumman	Avenger	-	S/E TB
SBA	Brewster (340)	Buccaneer	Burmuda	S/E DB
SBC	Curtiss	Helldiver	Cleveland	S/E DB
SB2C-1(A-25)	Curtiss	Helldiver	-	S/E DB
PBB	Boeing	Sea Ranger	-	2/E FB
PBM	Martin	Mariner	-	2/E FB
PBY	Consolidated 28	Catalina	Catalina	2/E FB
PB2Y	Consolidated 29	Coronado	Coronado	4/E FB
PB2M	Martin	Mars	-	4/E FB

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U.S.A.F. NAME	MANFRS, NAME AND SERIAL NUMBER IF ANY	U.S. DESIGNATION	R.A.F. DESIGNATION	PURPOSE
P-38	Lockheed 322-61	Lightning	Lightning	2/E SSF
P-39	Bell (P-400)	Airacobra	Airacobra	S/E SSF
P-40 B.C.	Curtiss H-81	Tomahawk	Tomahawk	S/E SSF
P-40 D.E.	Curtiss 87	Kittyhawk	Kittyhawk	S/E SSF
P-40F	Curtiss (Merlin engine)	Warhawk	Warhawk	S/E SSF
P-43	Republic	Lancer	Lancer	S/E SSF
P-44	Republic	Warrior	Warrior	S/E SSF
P-48	Vultee 48-61	Vanguard	Vanguard	S/E SSF
P-51	North American(73)	Apache	Mustang	S/E SSF
L-1	Vultee	Vigiland	-	S/E Liaison
L-3	Aeronca		-	S/E Liaison
L-4	Taylorcraft			S/E Liaison

BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN A/C (OPERATIONAL IN THIS THEATRE)

AUSTRALIAN IDENT. NO.	MANFR. NAME AND SERIAL NO. IF ANY	R.A.F. DESIGNATION	PURPOSE
A-46	Commonwealth A/C CA - 12	Boomerang	S/E SSF
A-19	Bristol	Beaufighter	2/E F
A-9	Bristol	Beaufort	2/E MB
A-4	A.V. ROY	Anson	2/E Recon. Trainer
A-25	Airspeed	Oxford	2/E " " "
A-3	Commonwealth A/C	Wackett	S/E Trainer
A-20	Commonwealth	Wirraway	S/E Recon. Trainer
A-17	De Havilland	Tiger Moth	S/E Trainer
A-2	Vickers Armstrong (Supermarine)	Seagul (Walrus)	S/E F/B
A-18	Short	Empire	4/E F/B Transport

Arthur J. Cornell

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Distribution B.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 195)

Intelligence Report to 0900L/1.

7 AUST. DIV.

Harassing fire by our artillery kept up throughout the night 30/31 December. Eight Japs killed on the morning 30/Dec. in the 30 Bde Area. Two Japs killed in the road block area on 31/Dec.

MAMBARE AREA:

A large enemy launch arrived DUVIRA CREEK from the direction of SALAMAUA on the night of 28/29 Dec., thus making a total of two launches in that locality. One launch is believed to have been damaged by strafing. On 30/Dec a patrol raided 30/40 Japs with HMG near these launches. Some Japs were killed and a launch damaged. Our casualties were nil.

AIR OPS:

The GIRUWA - SANANANDA POINT track was strafed on 31/Dec, results unobserved.

LAE airdrome was attacked by medium and light bombers, the area being well covered by bombs. 5 BETTYS and 1 ZEKE were strafed causing fires. Japs were seen running from the aircraft. About 12 ZEKES which were patrolling the area attempted interception but our 12 P38's giving top cover, shot down eight and probably a further two. Three of our aircraft were damaged but all returned safely. Intense AA was encountered on this raid.

GASMATA runway effectively bombed and strafed. A twin engined bomber and dummy aircraft were parked near the strip. AA MG fire was encountered.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 196)

Intelligence Report to 0900L/2.

32 U.S. DIV.

In the GIROPA POINT Area, the 2/12 Bn attack turned SE to expand area seized in first phase of attack. The left flank is attempting to clear up to the mouth of the GIROPA CREEK. The right flank is now level with the mouth of SINEMI CREEK. Heavy fighting on this flank has been going on for five hours. Eight tanks are now serviceable. An unconfirmed report has been received that 200 Japs from GIROPA POINT are now in the area west of GIROPA CREEK. The 2/12 Bn reports it is now in contact with larger works than previously encountered.

On 31/Dec. 25 pounders scored direct hits on six bunkers. Japs who ran from these bunkers were successfully engaged by our MGs.

7 AUST. DIV.

Enemy localities were harassed by artillery and mortar fire on the night 31/1.

MAMBARE AREA:

Japs were observed repairing the launch at DUVIRA CREEK on the night 31/1.

KANGA FORCE:

Four transport planes landed at LAE on 31/Dec, unloaded cargo, then headed south. Bombers and fighters continuously used the LAE drome during the day, with fifteen ZEKES patrolling.

AIR OPS:

RABAUL was heavily attacked 1/Jan. Bombs fell on the airdromes and in the harbour. One large transport was left burning fiercely and three others smoking. Several fires were also started. LAE was bombed but the results were unobserved. GASMATA was bombed and hits were scored on the runway. Five ZEKES attempted interception, one was probably destroyed, and one possible.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE:

Shipping in RABAUL Harbour - The merchant vessels appear to be concentrated along the west side of SIMPSON Harbour. One vessel of 5000 tons is emitting smoke both fore and aft. It has been beached off MALAGUNA strip and is undoubtedly a total loss. Another merchant vessel of 6000 tons is burning fiercely astern. Fifteen power launches are grouped about it attempting to salvage cargo. This vessel is also located just off MALAGUNA.

There are two other merchant vessels of 5000 tons and 6000 tons which appear to be smoking slightly astern. These, however, have probably received only minor damage, if any.

There are two merchant vessels of 6000 and 4000 tons which are loaded with eleven landing barges each. They are fully laden and appear ready to move. Additional barges are visible on at least three other vessels; while others appear to be heavily loaded with supplies and equipment.

KAVIENG - Thirty medium bombers and twenty-three fighters were seen on the drome. Resurfacing of centre of runway is evident. Additional revetments have been added about the dispersal bays. The general activity is still intense.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 197)

Intelligence Report to 0900L/3.

11 AUST. DIV.

GOVERNMENT STATION - TUFI dive-bombed and strafed by nine dive-bombers from the North. These planes departed to the NW.

32 US. DIV.

The GIROPA POINT Area was cleared on 2/Jan. with the exception of snipers. The 2/12 Bn is concentrating and reorganising on the GIROPA CREEK. The 2/10 Bn is taking over the coconut grove area and is responsible for clearing snipers and beach defence between SINEMI and GIROPA CREEK. The 3 Bn 128 Regt. is guard on the left flank of the 2/12 Bn. The 1 Bn 128 Regt. is responsible for the beach defence from SINEMI CREEK to CAPE ENDAIADERE Area. The 2/9 Bn is reorganising.

The GOVERNMENT STATION Area is now in our hands and mopping up is proceeding. The only enemy resistance left in the whole BUNA Area is a small pocket of enemy to the WEST of GIROPA CREEK. A PW captured before the attack on GIROPA POINT stated there were 50 troops in the GOVERNMENT STATION Area and 100 troops in the coconut grove area. The 14 Construction Unit identified in this Area is from JAPAN and the 15 Construction Unit is from KOREA. The supply of Jap MG ammunition and grenades is very low. The 3 Bn 229 Jap Regt was badly cut up on or about 18/December.

MAMBARE AREA:

Natives report N O craft in DUVIRA CREEK on the morning 2/Jan. From the debris in DUVIRA CREEK mouth, larger craft was believed to have been sunk after the raid on 30/Dec. The few Japs remaining in the DUVIRA CREEK area are hidden in the swamp between the CREEK and the beach.

7 AUST. DIV.

In the ROAD BLOCK AREA the 2/7 Aust. Cav. Patrol ambushed and killed 6 Japs. The relief of the 39 and 49 Bns by the 1 Bn 163 Regt. is in progress. C and D Coys of the 39 Bn were moved to GONA after being relieved.

WEWAK:

Enemy were reported in the vicinity of ANGORAM on the SEPIK River on 1/Jan.

AIR OPS:

SALAMAUA was bombed 2/Jan. destroying new customs shed. AA was encountered. The SALAMAUA GIROWA track was strafed and only four Japs were seen.

In the BAKUMBARI Area it has been reported there are signs of considerable native activity.

A "J" made of drift wood was again observed on the beach 300 yards NORTH of OPI.

At LAE, 2 BETTYS and 1 ZEKE on the airdrome were strafed. Intense AA was encountered. Many unserviceable aircraft were observed along the strip. LAE was dive-bombed on 2/Jan. and hits were scored on a possible dump at CONEALLS as large fires were started.

Visual observation of RABAUL indicated about 17 naval vessels and 50 merchant vessels as well as many small craft in the harbour on 2/Jan.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1500L/3.
Number. . . . .198)

32 U.S. DIV.

E Company, 127 Regt. at the BUNA GOVERNMENT STATION has pushed along the coast and contacted the 2/12 Bn at GIROPA POINT, cutting off from the sea a small pocket west of GIROPA CREEK. This pocket of enemy now completely enclosed by our troops. PW states only 100 Japs remain in this pocket and ammunition and food is very low. The mopping up of snipers is continuing.

Improvised blast bombs of 2-lbs. ammonal FID and grenades are successful in clearing the Jap pillboxes.

Approximately 200 enemy were killed in the GOVERNMENT STATION Area and approximately 450 in the GIROPA POINT Area killed on 2/January. 35 laborers who surrendered show signs of maltreatment by the Japs.

The 1 Bn 128 Regt has now been relieved by the 3 Bn 128 Regt.

7 AUST. DIV.

Ten men of the 2/7 Aust. Cav. are carrying out long range patrols behind the Jap lines. The 2/7 Cav. has been relieved by the 1 Bn 163 Regt. Two successful artillery shoots on large Jap dump has been reported by a captured native.

Two PsW captured at WAITUTE POINT had swam and waded from MANGROVE ISLAND and were in the water for some considerable time.

KUMUSI - MAMBARE AREA:

Natives report 20 to 30 Japs are on the west island MAMBARE CREEK mouth. Two serviceable barges moored off mouth KUMUSI CREEK.

KANGA FORCE:

200 natives moved from MUBO and WAIPALI to BLACK CAT area which has been declared a bombing sanctuary.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE:

Photographs taken of RABAUL cover SIMPSON Harbour from VULCAN Crater to B.P wharf. Hazy and partially obscured by clouds. Sightings as follows: - 6 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 1 minelayer, 4 submarines, 3 tankers, 40 merchant vessels of following tonnage: 2 of 10,000, 1 of 8,000, 1 of 7,000, 1 of 6,000, 10 of 4,000, 7 of 3,000, 4 of 2,000, 8 of 1,000, 1 of 5,000 shown sunk off MALAGUNA, 5 small merchant vessels.

Sightings of LAKUNAI airdrome as follows: - 23 fighters, 4 medium bombers, new dispersal lanes under construction outside runway. Heavy ack ack being installed at each end of runway. New aircraft revetments are visible.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 199)

Intelligence Report to 0900L/4.

7 AUST. DIV.

Headquarters 21 Brigade and 2/7 Cav. have been relieved by part of Headquarters 163 Regt. and 1 Bn 163 Regt. respectively. Part of the 36 Bn on the left of the track advanced 50 yards during the morning of January 3 and killed six Japs. During the last 24 hours eight Japs waded ashore at GORAYA WAUTUTU POINT. Four of these Japs were killed, two captured and two are still free.

MADANG AREA:

The enemy are reported to have bridged the mouth of the GUM RIVER and are endeavoring to do the same on the GOGOL RIVER. An enemy patrol is reported in the BOGADJIM Area.

AIR OPS:

On 3/January a submarine was sighted about 50 miles NORTH CAPE WARD HUNT on a SE course. It crash dived on the approach of reconnaissance aircraft. The MADANG township and airdrome was bombed but the results were NOT observed.

RABAUL:

Heavy bomber attacked shipping in RABAUL harbour on 3/January. Hits or near misses on three motor vessels and also a probable fuel dump was left blazing.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 200)

Intelligence Report to 1530L/4.

11 AUST. DIV.

The result of dive bombing of TUFI on 2/January was two casualties, no damage. The attack was aimed at the shipping in McLAREN HARBOUR.

32 U.S. DIV.

Mopping up of stragglers continues but all organized resistance has been destroyed. Our activity on 3/January confined to re-organizing and combing area for individual Japs hiding in swamps. 149 dead counted in the GOVERNMENT STATION AREA.

A patrol from the 127 U.S. Regt. traversed the area from the Government Gardens to the Coast. The 2/9 Bn is in bivouac at the east end of the new strip.

7 AUST. DIV.

Slight progress has been made on the right of the track. Four Japs were killed. There are indications that the Japs are withdrawing forward elements to main position astride the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track.

The bridge at SOPUTA over the GIRUA RIVER is open to traffic.

KANGA FORCE:

MUBO OP has been destroyed by the Japs. Personnel and equipment have been evacuated safely to WAIPALI.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 201)

Intelligence Report to 0800L/5.

11 AUST. DIV.

CAPE NELSON was bombed at 0940 hours on the 4/January. One BETTY was shot down NE of GOODENOUGH ISLAND 4/January.

32 U.S. DIV.

In the BUNA AREA approximately 50 Japs were killed and many prisoners were taken on 4/January. Enemy activity in the vicinity of TARAKENA is apparently increasing. Our troops are improving positions and are carrying out patrols.

7 AUST. DIV.

Our patrol contacted Jap MG post NW of road block . 3 Japs and 3 snipers killed.

The relief of the 55/53 Bn by the 39 Bn is now complete. Headquarters of the 21 Bde is now located at SOPUTA.

KANGA FORCE:

No serviceable aircraft left on LAE drome after the raid on 3/January.

MORESBY AREA:

Advanced Headquarters 41 U.S. DIV. has been established in the BOOTLESS AREA.

AIR OPS.

SANANANDA POINT was bombed causing fires. No AA was encountered. MUBO and KOMIATUM were strafed on 4/January. No enemy were seen but there were signs of activity in the villages. At LAE, DIDDYMANS was bombed and a direct hit was scored on the building causing fires. A strafing run was made on the aerodrome.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1400L/5.
Number. . . . . 202)

11 AUST . DIV.

On 4/January an unidentified heavy bomber circled GOODENOUGH ISLAND and then headdNorth.

32 U.S. DIV.

The enemy at TARAKENA village attacked our patrol causing it to withdraw to SIWORI.

KANGA FORCE:

Our patrol to within three miles SALAMAUA reports BUSAMA-SALAMAUA track mined and regularly patrolled by Japs. Natives are not permitted routes to MALOLO or BUSAMA. Two Jap flags seen on island in MARKHAM River mouth.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0800L/6.
Number. . . . . 203)

7 Aust. Div.

The remainder of the 36 Bn has now arrived in the GONA area.

KUMUSI AREA:

Tactical reconnaissance reports well camouflaged tents in the area south of the KUMUSI RIVER mouth.

KANGA FORCE:

Natives report the drome at FINSCHAFEN has been cleared but there were NO aircraft. A large enemy force is estimated to be at FINSCHAFEN and the natives are forbidden to enter the town. Patrols of 40 are active in the SATELBURG and DOREKO areas. The Japs have stated their patrols would be extended to all areas in search of our troops.

AIR OPS:

The town and drome at LAE were bombed. No aircraft on the runway of the drome. The dispersal bays and AA positions were strafed. MUBO and KOMIATUM were strafed. DEAD MANGROVE ISLAND was bombed and strafed.

Heavy bombers attacked 50/60 vessels in RABAUL harbour, including a probable aircraft carrier. Direct hits with 500 and 1000 lb. bombs were scored on at least 4 and possibly 7 vessels and numerous near misses were observed. One vessel broke in two and others were set on fire.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 204)

Intelligence Report to 1000L/7.

11 AUST. DIV.
B-17 located crashed ASASI AMPHLETT GROUP ISLANDS.

7 AUST. DIV.
Three Japs killed and one was wounded by our patrol on 5/January. One Jap was killed in the attack on an enemy position on KUROV CREEK 1500 yards east of AMBOGA RIVER mouth on 5/January. The position is strongly held.
It is estimated that there are 100 Japs located astride the main track.
On 6/January our patrol on the Line of Communication between the road block and 30 Brigade captured a bren from the Japs who exploded booby traps.
A tactical reconnaissance on 5/January reports the track for three miles South of SANANANDA POINT is under water and the enemy is attempting to repair the road.

The 55/53 Bn has arrived in the GONA area. The 2/9 Bn is in the vicinity of SOPUTA bridge on the East bank of the GIRUA RIVER.

KANGA FORCE:
Natives report KAMLOA, TAKOLEN, TIKINA, SINBANG and all villages in the vicinity of FINSCHAFEN have been occupied by the Japs and the natives have been ousted. Every house, shed, shelter or tent at FINSCHAFEN have been occupied by a force of enemy estimated at 2000. The natives have been put to work clearing the ground for aircraft.

AIR OPS:
SANANANDA POINT was bombed but the results were not observed. LAE was bombed with 1000 lb. bombs which fell near the terrace and EAST MALAHANG drome.

A convoy of four destroyers, two cruisers and four transports were sighted 75 miles ESE GASMATA at 1040L/6 January. This convoy was attacked by our reconnaissance aircraft. An unconfirmed report states the convoy to be approximately 50 miles SW GASMATA at 1700L/6 January and is protected by fighters. It is believed several of these fighters were shot down. One possible hit was made on a transport. Strike forces are operating.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1400L/7.
Number. . . . . 205)

32 U.S. DIV.

Fourteen Japs were killed and one prisoners taken as a result of mopping up of stray enemy on the 5/6 January. Our patrols are operating South from SIWORI and West from GIRUWA River to locate auxilliary tracks across to the SANANANDA - SOPUTA Road. Two Companies of the 127 Regt have been held up 500 yards from TARAKENA by MGs covering the SIWORI - TARAKENA track.

7 AUST. DIV.

Slight advance has been made from the West on the left of the SOPUTA - SANANANDA track. Mortar fire is being effected on known Jap positions. The 2/10 Bn i now in the vicinity of the SOPUTA bridge. The air movement of the 163 U.S. Regt. is continuing.

MAMBARE AREA:

The PIB reports enemy have evacuated the DUVIRA CREEK and have taken the launches with them. There are NO enemy on the mainland in the vicinity of the MAMBARE River mouth but there are some hiding on the island MAMBARE delta.

KANGA FORCE:

Some barge activity has been reported between LAE and LABU on 6/Jan.

AIR OPS:

The position of the convoy at 2150L/6 January is still just SE of GASMATA. Reports received during the night 6/7 January were conflicting but at 0904L/7 January seven ships were sighted 75 miles ESE FINSCHAFEN. A CATALINA reported a transport about 12,000 tons sank 0457L/7 with NO survivors. Another vessel was observed burning fiercely at 0603L/7 January.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)

Number. . . . . 206)

Intelligence Report to 0800L/8.

7 AUST. DIV.

Fourteen Japs were killed and eighteen wounded in the road block area on 6/January. On the morning of the 7/January 33 RABAUL natives were captured in the vicinity of CARARA. An enemy MG position has now been located left of the SANANANDA track. Lights were observed in the vicinity of CARARA on 6/January and were engaged by our artillery. Slight progress was made West of the Road and six Japs were killed on 6/January. Active patrolling and contact has been made by the 163 U.S. Regt. Relief of the 2/16 and 2/17 composite Battalion by the 36 Battalion is now complete and the relief of the 2/14 Battalion by the 55/53 Battalion is now in progress.

KANGA FORCE:

A number of enemy fighter aircraft used LAE drome on the morning of 7/January.

MADANG AREA:

Natives estimate Jap strength at 2000 troops in this area. The GUM and GOGOL Rivers have now been bridged.

AIR OPS:

At LAE the drome and grounded aircraft were bombed and strafed. One aircraft was left burning. The dispersal bays and terrace were bombed but the results were unobserved.

The enemy convoy was shadowed and bombed throughout the day of 7/January. An unidentified ship was seen to sink at 0837L/7 January. Some survivors were rescued by a cruiser. A transport was hit by a bomb at 0800L/ 7 January and was later seen burning. Several near misses and a possible hit was scored later. The convoy was seen 12 miles East of LAE at 1600L/7 January and one transport was observed to be listing badly. Bad weather conditions interrupted later strikes.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Report. . . . . 207)

Intelligence Report to 1500L/8.

32 U.S. DIV.

Artillery mortar 37mm and MG fire is now being directed on TARAKENA village.

Patrolling is being carried out to the west of the GIRUA River.

7 AUST. DIV.

Six Japs were killed in the road block area on the 7/January. The RABAUL natives captured at GARARA on 7/January, now totaling 42, state there are no Japs in that vicinity. Eight Japs were killed due to active patrolling and pressure on enemy positions in the area of the SOPUTA - SANANANDA track.

Two Jap MGs and a possible W/T set havebbeen located and engaged by our mortars. The RABAUL natives state the Japs in the SALAMAUA area are short of food and that some of them are unarmed.

From 10 to 20 Japs were in the SURIRAI village on the night of 6/7 January and were engaged by our artillery.

The 2/12 Battalion and detachment of the 2/4 Field Company arrived in SOPUTA on 7/January.

KANGA FORCE:

The LAE OP reported six enemy ships were heading towards LAE at 1300 - 1410L/7 January but changed direction at 1420L/7 to SALAMAUA. There was considerable air activity in that area. At 1615L destroyers were reported to be manouvering off LAE and BUANG River. Two large barges landed at MALAHANG.

AIR OPS:

The enemy convoy threw off seven to ten barges loaded with stores when they were opposite FINSCHAFFEN.

It was considered two cruisers, three destroyers and two transports were in and about LAE harbour at 1800L/7; two were burning. Bombs were dropped on probable unloading activity at 0540L/8 January, but the results wer not observed. An aircraft in the flight reported seven ships in the harbour, at 0845L/8. The strikes are continuing. Our reconnaissance plane sighted a cruiser and destroyer 30 miles SE GASMATA at 0840L/8.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0900L/9.
Number. . . . . 208)

7 AUST. DIV.

One RABAUL native has been captured in the GONA Area. An enemy OP reported approximately one half mile SE GONA was engaged by our mortars. The 2/14, 2/16 and 2/27 Bns. moved to SOPUTA on 8 January. Troop B Squadron of the 2/6 Armoured Regiment arrived in the HORANDA Area minus one tank which had mechanical trouble.

KUMUSI MOROBE Area:

Ground reconnaissance reports the Japs are NOT using LUARD or adjacent islands. The enemy is occupying KURENADA village at the mouth of the KUMUSI River and coast South to BUKUMBARI. The estimated strength of this force is 200. Sentries have been posted on all approaches to KURENADA.

KANGA FORCE:

LAE OP reports three enemy warships and four ships in LAE harbour on the morning 8 January.

AIR OPS:

MUBO was bombed and strafed at 1330L. Buildings were destroyed and damage done. KOMIATUM was strafed and many fires were started in the village. No movement was seen. At LAE the enemy vessels in the harbour were heavily bombed throughout the day and many hits were claimed. One transport was badly damaged and was beached. The barge activity and considerable store dumps in the harbour area were strafed causing many explosions and fires. At 1835L/ 8 January a report was received from our aircraft that three transports were off VOCO POINT with three destroyers and one cruiser patrolling. Strong enemy fighter cover suffered heavy losses. The preliminary count shows 30 reported shot down and nine more probable.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1400L/9.
Number. . . . . 209)

32 U.S. Div:

A and C Companies of the 127 Regiment supported by F and G Companies occupied TARAKENA at 2130L/8 January. They captured five LMGs and one mortar.

Tactical reconnaissance reports SANANANDA - SOPUTA road appears to be in a bad condition for four miles from SANANANDA POINT.

AIR OPS:

Aircraft in flight reported six ships in convoy 60 miles East of LAE at 0645L/9 January. This convoy was later reported to consist of two transports, three warships and one unidentified vessel. The convoy was reported 85 miles East of LAE at 0925L/9 January and was protected by fighters.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 210)

Intelligence Report to 0800I/10

11 AUST. DIV.

Six Naval dive bombers attacked ships in ORO BAY. One small vesse and two barges were holed by MG fire. Some casualties have been reported. Our fighters arrived shortly after the enemy began their attack, forcing them to jettison their remaining bombs and withdraw.

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2 Bn 163 US Regt. is moving into position West of the road block area. The forward elements are now astride the KILLERTON track. Relief of 49 Bn by the 2/9 Bn is now complete. Relief of the 39 Bn and troops of the 126 U.S. Regt by the 2/12 Bn is progressing.

AIR OPS:

Bombing attacks on LAE were carried out throughout the day and direct hits were scored on beached transport in the harbour. This transport burned fiercely and much debris was observed in the vicinity. Beaches and probable dump areas were bombed causing fires. The runway and AA positions at LAE were strafed and fragmentation bombs were dropped across the dispersal bays of the drome and also the town.

Bombs were dropped in the vicinity of ten aircraft on MALAHANG drome scoring near misses.

A convoy of one cruiser and two destroyers and three transports was attacked by heavy bombers 40 miles SE FINSCHAFEN and near misses were score on one transport. Our strike force were then unable to locate this convoy at 1 but at 2002L it was again reported about 40 miles SW GASMATA and was made up of three destroyers, two cruisers and two transports. During the day's action four enemy aircraft were destroyed and three were damaged, our losses were NIL

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . .211)

Intelligence Report to 1400L/10.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

At 0220L/10 January three unidentified vessels were reported three to four miles NW BUNA coming in. Our PT boats were sent to investigate and at 0320L/10 January two craft were seen seven miles NW and one craft 18 miles EAST of BUNA moving away.

7 AUST. DIV.

The enemy is still active and in particular to the South where MGs are used. The enemy have been reported to be moving SE. The 2 Bn 163 U.S. Regt is now in occupation of the KILLERTON track and are proceeding satisfactorily. The estimated strength of the enemy SOUTH of the road block is 500; NORTH of the road block 1500. The enemy are now occupying prepared positions with overhead dover and bunkers have been located in the whole area.

KANGA FORCE:

Five Japs were killed by our patrol and two prisoners were taken in a native garden.

AIR OPS:

Enemy convoy from LAE was bombed 50 miles EAST GASMATA. Hit claimed on 7,000 ton transport. At 0800L/10 January the convoy was observed 15 miles EAST JACQUINOT BAY and it then comprised one cruiser, four destroyers and three cargo vessels.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/10.
Number. . . . . 212)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

40 Japs killed at TARAKENA before it was occupied by our troops. Our patrols are reconnoitering tracks from GEBUWA NW towards SANANANDA Road.

Our troops now disposed as follows: 2 Bn 128 Regt and Mobile Company SUDEST to CAPE ENDAIADERE, thence 1 Bn 128 Regt to SINEMI Creek. 3 Bn 128 Regt in COCONUT GROVE south of new strip. 1 Bn 126 Regt less one company on old strip. 2 Bn 126 Regt from GIROPA POINT to BUNA village. Antitank elements are a company of the 126 Regt. are patrolling the GIRUWA River. The 3 Bn 126 Regt is in reserve on the BUNA SOPUTA track.

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2 Bn 163 Regt. has now cut the KILLERTON track and are occupying positions to the North and South. The 18 Brigade has now completed relief of the 30 Brigade.

KANGA FORCE:

There is continued barge activity from LAE to LABU and return. Four barges were seen approaching LAE from SALAMAUA at 0700L/10 January. LAE OP reports 20 to 30 barges were used to unload convoy, estimated at 5,000 troops and several thousand tons of stores landed. The beached transport is estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 tons.

AIR OPS:

Coordinated bombing and strafing attack against LAE harbour and aerodrome was carried out on 10 January. Bombs were dropped on the TERRACE area and on the town causing fires. Four apparently serviceable aircraft on the drome and AA positions were strafed. Three rafts five miles South SALAMAUA were also strafed.

The retiring convoy of six ships was attacked by heavy bombers at 0900L/10 January as it approached CAPE ORFORD. Near misses stopped transports which were still stationary 45 minutes later.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

11/January 1942.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/11.
Number. . . . . 213)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

An enemy party constructing a bunker on the TARAKENA GIRUWA track was engaged by our artillery fire. Casualties were inflicted and the bunker was destroyed. Artillery fire along the TARAKENA GIRUWA track drove several enemy into the water where they were killed by rifle and LMG fire.

7 AUST. DIV.

Our troops occupied a jap pocket astride the track. One American MG, ammunition, and many Jap rifles and grenades were captured. Additional bunkers were located on the NE flank of SOUTH area.

KANGA FORCE:

Seven to ten barges are being used in ferry service between LAE and LABU throughout the 10th January.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 12, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/11.
Number..... 214)

KANGA FORCE:

LAE OP reports four barges landed at LABU and two landed at LAE, all from the direction of SALAMAUA. Approximately one half hour later another barge from the direction of SALAMAUA landed at LABU.

AIR OPS:

The track KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA was bombed and strafed but the results are not yet known. Two bombs were dropped on the aerodrome at FINSCHHAFEN but nil activity observed. LAE drome was bombed and a string of bombs was dropped on the runway. Intense AA encountered.

At RABAUL 37 large and 24 small craft were observed in the harbour. A probable aircraft carrier and two destroyers were observed heading NE off CAPE GAZELLE.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 13, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/12.
Number. . . . . 215)

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2/9 Bn on the right, and the 2/12 Bn in the center supported by tanks attacked at 0800L/12 to reduce outstanding enemy positions on the SOPUTA-SANANANDA road SW of our road block. Strong opposition was encountered on left flanks of both Bns. The left Company of the 2/9 Bn was halted by perimeter pillboxes 75 yards short of their objective. The right Company of the 2/9 Bn is encircling these pillboxes from the north. The 2/12 Bn with three tanks advanced two companies up 70 yards overcoming strong posts west of the road. The advance astride the track is being held up. The three tanks with the 2/12 Bn were all damaged. The entire area is a quagmire due to heavy rains.

KANGA FORCE:

IAE OP reports six barges were seen arriving from the direction of SALAMAUA. Four of these barges landed at IABU and two at IAE.

AIR OPS:

The track KOMIATUM - SALAMAUA was well strafed and bombed. The bridge over the BUIRALI CREEK near KOMIATUM was probably destroyed. No activity seen in this area. A village 1500 yards south of CAPE KILLERTON was bombed and only two huts were left standing. Parachutes were observed in trees 200 yards west of the villages and others at the track junction.

Bombs were dropped among the houses at FINSCHHAFEN. The MADANG strip was again bombed and hits were observed on the end of the runway and buildings. Light sporadic AA encountered.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 14, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/13.
Number. . . . . 216)

MILNE BAY:

HQ 5 AUST. DIV. took over command from HQ 11 AUST. DIV. as from 12 January.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

Our patrol advanced 1100 yards from TARAKENA, located three pillboxes, killed three Japs and then withdrew to TARAKENA. TARAKENA crossing was fired on by enemy machine gun and snipers from the creek to the south. Three pillboxes up the creek were unoccupied.

7 AUS. DIV.

In the SOPUTA - SANANANDA track area strong enemy defensive positions on the left of the track are still holding out. Our troops progressed on the ri of the track against outposts and our foremost troops are up to 25 yards of pillboxes which are in perimeter defence. A line of pillboxes is visible for 200 yards North and 200 yards South on the west of the track. These pillboxes are of heavier construction and better camouflaged than those in the BUNA are Jap snipers who are occupying our forward disabled tank are being engaged by 2 pounder A/tank gun.

AMBOGA RIVER AREA:

The 36 Bn patrol proceeded west to two miles beyond the AMBOGA River and no enemy were sighted. Recently dug defensive positions were found but were believed NOT to have been occupied within the last four days. Holed barges containing the remains of Jap stores and a quantity of rotten clothing were also found.

KANGA FORCE:

An attack on MUBO was commenced at 1315L/11 by five parties approaching from the West, NE and SE. Our heavy MGs and mortar fire inflicted many casualties and drove the enemy from pillboxes who were engaged by LMGs. Jap mortar fire was NOT effective against our positions but the pillboxes 550 yar south-west MUBO forced the withdrawal of the party approaching from the West.

AIR OPS:

The tracks in the vicinity of SANANANDA POINT were bombed and strafed. No movement was seen. LAE wharf area was bombed which caused fires and destroyed one jetty. The track KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA was bombed and strafed and fires were started.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 14, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/14.
Number. . . . .217)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

A patrol of the 126 Regt. killed two Japs who were poorly cloth and undernourished. They were armed only with bayonets.

7 AUST. DIV.

Our 2 pound A/tank guns registered 21 hits on the disabled tank which is occupied by Japanese snipers. Two enemy pillboxes have been damaged by mortar fire.

Active patrolling is being carried out on all sides. 47 RABAUL boys surrendered to the 55/53 Bn. The 36 Bn patrol passed DANAWATUTU moving along the coast. At DANAWATUTU 20 Jap graves were observed, also a small quantity of arms and ammunition.

KUMUSI MAMBARE AREA:

The enemy are repairing barges on the KURENADA CREEK in the vicinity of the KUMUSI RIVER mouth. An enemy MG post has been located in the coconut grove south of the KUMUSI RIVER mouth. The enemy is keeping up a continuous patrol on the beach between KURENADA and BAKUMBARI. The KUMUSI - MITRE ROCK area is now clear of the enemy.

KANGA FORCE:

At the first light of 13 January, HMGs engaged enemy W/T hut and defences west of MUBO. The enemy positions are a series of strongly built 3 man pillboxes housing MGs with all round fire. In Japanese positions north of MUBO 116 Jap dead were counted, our casualties to date being one killed and four wounded.

NAVAL:

One of our aircraft in flight sighted one destroyer approximately 155 miles east of SALAMAUA.

Two enemy submarines were reported in the vicinity of CAPE WARD HUNT at 0430L/13. Later information [redacted] stated:
"Jap submarine attacked our P.T. boats approximately one mile north of CAPE WARD HUNT at 0450L/13 and fired 12 torpedoes. P.T. boats counter attacked with 4 depth charges but then lost touch." No further contact during the night."

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE:

Photo interpretation revealed the presence on the 11th January of 70 vessels, including 11 destroyers and 48 merchant ships, the latter aggregating 267000 tons; an additional 20 small harbour craft were also apparent.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 15, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0100I/15.
Number. . . . . 218)

7 AUST. DIV.

In the SANANANDA Area, the 2/12 Bn are across the road, the 2/9 Bn is closing in and the 2/10 Bn is carrying out local encirclement around left of 2/7 Cavalry. The 163 Regt. is advancing South down both routes as well as patrolling and holding the enemy on the North. The 163 Regt. is trying to encircle and trap the enemy South of the road block.

In dications that the Japs are withdrawing from the forward area are confirmed by a PW captured on the 14 January. He reports the enemy to be well armed with plenty of ammunition but short of food. The Japs have orders to withdraw to GIRUWA.

In the GONA area 50 well armed Japs proceeding WEST GONA MISSION were attacked by HQ 14 Brigade DID staff and natives. Some casualties were inflicted before the Japs escaped to the South.

Patrol activity is continuing in the AMBOGA RIVER mouth area. In the KUMUSI River area enemy are repairing barges in the vicinity of KURENADA villages. There are continuous enemy patrols on the beach between KURENADA and BAKUMBARI. An enemy MG post has been located in the coconut grove on the beach 1000 yards South of the KUMUSI RIVER. The KUMUSI - CAPE WARD HUNT Area is clear of the enemy.

KANGA:

43 Jap reinforcements arrived at MUBO from KOMIATUM on the 12 January. Jap heavy mortar posts to the North and West of MUBO bombed our positions East of the village on the 12th and 13th January. .5 MG firing explosive bullets were also used. The enemy casualties so far are heavy.

The enemy are active at LABU on defences. 10 barges were observed moving from LABU to LAE.

AIR OPS:

BAKUMBARI was bombed and straffed starting fires. No movement seen in this area. The track KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA was straffed but no movement was seen.

At LAE probable dump areas near the beach were heavily bombed causing large fires and dense smoke. Considerable AA encountered. GASMATA runway bombed but effects unobserved.

MORESBY AREA - RAID 97:

Red Warning received 2231 hours 14 January '43 of unidentified aircraft approaching from the NW.

This aircraft circled to the West and made one run over the area from the West to the East. H.1 Heavy Gun Station engaged this aircraft with barrage fire at height of 26,000 feet at 2330 hours. The length of the engagement was 20 seconds during which 16 rounds were expended. Fuze length during the engagement was 29.29

Searchlights illuminated the target for a period of 60 seconds when obscured by cloud cover. The aircraft was not identified as to type but appeared to be a twin engine plane.

Approximately three bombs were dropped in the water in the Joyce Bay Area between Manubada Island and the beach. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment was reported.

At 0010 hours 15 January '43, plots were received from RDF bearing160 degrees - 50 miles out. Night fighter was airborne to intercept. Nothing eventuated however, and white warning was issued at 0040 hours.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 15, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/15.
Number. . . . . 219)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The URBANA FORCE patrols NW from TARAKENA found that three pillboxes 400 yards NW of KONOMBI CREEK had been reoccupied and reinforced by the enemy on the night 13/14 January. The patrols killed six Japs.

7 AUST. DIV.

During the 14 January, the 18 Brigade, at slight cost, inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy forces in the area South of the road block and the whole area is now under our control and is being mopped up. Already 152 Jap bodies have been counted and six PS.W. and much equipment including one 3 inch AA gun taken.

By 1400L/14 the 2/9 Bn had broken the enemy resistance and reached the MT road from the South to the junction; the 2/12 Bn had reduced the enemy's resistance by 1215L/14 and then advanced North to the MT road with C Squadron 2/7 Cavalry controlling the rear.

Active patrolling of the 163 Regt. was made to the South and reconnaissance patrols were operating towards the enemy position astride the SANANANDA track North of the road block.

Fighting patrols of the 30 Brigade are operating towards the track GONA - JUMBORA seeking small parties believed to be escaping from the 18 Brigade Area. Ps.W. state approximately 200 Japs escaped from positions South of the road block on the night 13/14 January.

MAMBARE AREA:

A reliable source reports a large number of Japs are concentrating on the Island NW of the MAMBARE RIVER mouth.

KANGA FORCE:

A highly successful raid on MUBO has now been concluded after three days fighting during which heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and much damage was done to his installations. Our casualties were light in view of the damage done to the enemy. Our troops have now withdrawn and are preparing defensive positions forward of GUADAGASEL saddle and on LABABIA track with patrols forward. Jap Headquarters, W/T hut, stores and huts North of MUBO were destroyed. Our troops East of the village killed a number of Japs out of 100 additional reinforcements which arrived at MUBO from KOMIATUM. A total number of reinforcements that has arrived in MUBO in the daylight since 11 January totals 140 to 150 Japs.

One of our reconnaissance patrols was surprised by a strong Jap patrol East of the village, but it outflanked the enemy and withdrew.

LAE:

Barge movement between LABU and LAE is continuing.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 16, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2400L/15.
Number. . . . . 220)

5 AUST. DIV.

D Company 15 Bn relieved a company of the 2/5 Bn at WEDAU and TAUPOTA on the 14th January. Handover of Headquarters 17 Brigade to Headquarters 29 Brigade now completed.

7 AUST. DIV.

Present disposition of troops:-

18 Brigade Headquarters now established at thd southern end of the plantation.

The 2/10 Bn has passed through plantation area North along the track for 1500 yards where the track ends.

The 2/9 Bn and 2/12 Bn less one company are located in the plantation area. One company of the 2/12 Bn is moving to secure the track junction.

The 36 Bn is disposed along the GONA - JUMBORA track. A patrol operating 300 yards South of ADS killed a party of seven Japs, two of which believed to be officers. Our casualties were nil. Active patrols are being maintained.

The 49 Bn is now protecting the GONA Line of Communication against parties of stray Japs.

The 2/7 Cavalry found no enemy whilst cleaning up former Jap positions South of the road block.

1 Bn 163 Regt. is engaging an enemy pocket in the vicinity of the road junction.

KANGA FORCE:

Advanced Headquarters 17th Brigade and 2/6 Bn arrived 15th January. Advanced Headquarters 17 Brigade now Headquarters KANGA FORCE.

AIR OPS:

Tracks in the vicinity of SANANANDA POINT were bombed and strafed with nil results observed.

The MAMBARE DELTA was well strafed. Signs of activity were observed on DEAD MANGROVE ISLAND. No serviceable barges were seen from KUMUSI to SANANANDA.

IAE dumps in the TERRACE Area were bombed but the results were unobserved.

RABAUL harbour and aerodromes were bombed but damaged was not observed. At GASMATA bombs were dropped on the runway.

MORESBY RAID - NO. 98

Yellow Warning was received at approximately 2242 hours 15 January, '43, of unidentified aircraft approaching Port Moresby from the Southeast.

Red Warning was given at 2249 hours. One aircraft, probable type NELL, after shadowing B-24s in, made one run over the area from the South to the North, returning to the Southeast.

H.1, H.2 and H.6 gun stations engaged this aircraft with barrage fire at heights of 24,600 feet to 26,000 feet at approximately 2300L/15 expending a total of 38 rounds.

Approximately four bombs were dropped to the West of Wards Drome. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported. Searchlights illuminated the target for seven minutes on the way out to the Southeast when plane was out of range of the guns.

During the entire raid the B-24s continued to circle the area with navigationvlights on preparatory to landing.

White Warning was given at 2356L/15.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 17, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/16.
Number. . . . . 221)

7 AUST. DIV.

The 163 Regt. commenced [illegible] attack on an enemy pocket at 0900L/16. Two troops of artillery and 15 heavy mortars smashed the enemy resistance.

Patrols are now operating to the West and also East towards the MT Road.

In the 1st Bn, 163 Regt., A Company is be[illegible] held up by enemy MG fire short of its objective. B Company has passed through C Company and is moving eastwards to overcome MGs holding up A Company. The 2 Bn 163 Regt has advanced along the KILLERTON track SE against the enemy right flank and joined the 1 Bn 163 Regt. The 3 Bn 163 Regt. has completely surrounded and enemy pocket and broken through perimeter defense. They are now clearing the enemy pocket but heavy fire is continuing.

Seven Japs were killed in the vicinity of the ADS by the 14 Brigade. The 39 Bn is now established in the plantation area with forward troops operating in the KILLERTON area.

KANGA:

B Company of the 2/6 Bn arrived at BALLAMS approximately five miles SE WAU on the night 15/16 January.

LAE OP reports barges continuing to move from LAE to LABU.

AIR OPS:

The tracks in the vicinity of SANANANDA POINT were straffed with nil results.

The KUMUSI delta was bombed and strafed with unobserved results.

Armed coastal reconnaissances reported nil sightings from BAKUMBARI to SALAMAUA. Two possible lifeboats on the beach near DANAWATU were strafed.

LABU strafed but nil activity was seen.

B25s bombed & LAE at 1006L/16 January starting several fires.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 17, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/17.
Number. . . . . 222)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The WARREN FORCE is working on defensive positions in the BUNA Area. They are laying wire entanglements in front of the 1 Bn 128 Regt Area down the coast along SINEMI CREEK towards CAPE ENDAIADERE.

The 127 US Regt.'s advance has continued to a point on the coast 400 yards NW to TARAKENA. Continuous pressure is being exerted in this area and every effort is being made to get forward against the enemy MG fire.

7 AUST. DIV.

Our troops having advanced North to the coast have now turned EAST and are advancing on the MT road. The 2/10 Bn is operating along the coastal road, the 2/12 Bn is along the southern route and the 2/9 Bn less one company is at the village and is available as required.

The 2 Bn 163 Regt continued to advance against the enemy right flank and pressed forward to a position astride the MT road. The advance of the 1 Bn 163 Regt. is still being held up but attack is being pressed forward.

KUMUSI AREA:

Large fire and black smoke at KUMUSI delta and also BAKUMBARI were observed after our air attack.

AIR OPS:

Heavy bombers attacked RABAUL from 0040 to 0108L/17. Bombs on the harbour area and also new runway at VUNAKANAU. Near misses were seen on a medium cargo vessel, otherwise the results were unobserved.

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W.D.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 18, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
. : Intelligence Report to 2000L/17.
Number. . . . . .223)

5 AUST. DIV.

Twenty-three enemy twin engined bombers with fighter cover bombed TURNBULL strip and vicinity at 1245L/17 causing slight casualties and considerable damage. The enemy formation was intercepted by our fighters near FERGUSSON ISLAND at 1315L/17.

7 AUST. DIV.

Elements of the 2/12 Bn reached the track junction on the main MT road. Opposition was encountered in the WYE POINT area on the 17th January but the advance is progressing. Known enemy casualties 16th January 122 kille

SANANANDA:

Two barges were observed from WYE POINT moving towards SANANANDA and were engaged by our artillery. These barges appeared to be grounded at SANANANDA CREEK. Later, however, they were seen heading out to sea.

MUBO:

Three Japs were believed to have been killed at BITOI bridge, two miles North by East of MUBO on the night of 16/17 January. The enemy patrols are using native guides and alsatian dogs.

AIR OPS:

MAMBARE delta was strafed with nil sightings.

The stores area near the beach at LAE was bombed. Large explosion an several small fires were caused by the bombing. The drome was also bombed wit unobserved results.

RABAUL was bombed at 0400L/17. Explosions suggested hits on five vessels. Forty searchlights were in use during the raid.

GASMATA drome was twice bombed on 17/January.

A cruiser was observed 60 miles South of CAPE ST GEORGE on a westerly course. This cruiser was bombed by our reconnaissance aircraft but nil hits were scored. Our reconnaissance aircraft was intercepted by four covering ZEKES and one was shot down.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

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W.D.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 18, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 2200L/17.
Number. . . . . 224)

5 AUST. DIV.
Raid No. 11 in progress at 0100L/18 but no details as yet available.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:
The 127 U.S. Regt. is continuing its efforts to move forward against enemy MG fire. Direct hits were scored on bunkers with artillery fire. Fifteen enemy have been killed by our patrols.

7 AUST. DIV.
One Company of the 2/10 Bn has now secured the CAPE KILLERTON Area and all opposition has been overcome. The 2/10 Bn less one company has captured WYE POINT. Our advance SE of WYE POINT has been delayed by enemy pill boxes, some of which have been overcome.

The 2/12 Bn is now firmly established on the MT road and leading elements have reached a point of the road 1200 yards SE SANANANDA POINT. Foot track from HQ 18 Brigade at cross tracks to KILLERTON village completed.

One of the reconnaissance patrols of the 14 Brigade engaged a party of 200 Japs moving west in the DONAWATUTU Area. Two of the enemy were killed. A further three Japs were killed in the vicinity of the ADS on the GONA JUMBORA track.

The 2/7 Cavalry is now located in the plantation area to prevent the enemy from escaping westwards.

The 1 and 2 Bns. 163 US Regt. are now through the enemy perimeter; the 2 Bn was, however, met by heavy MG resistance on the left of the MT road. The 3 Bn 163 Regt. is in contact with the 2/12 Bn.

KANGA FORCE:
At MUBO, our forward patrols opened fire on enemy on the LABABIA track. The enemy returned mortar and MG fire on the main track near of our positions on the GUADAGASAL saddle. Our troops withdrew from the saddle and are now concentrated 5½ miles south of MUBO. The enemy dispositions at GUADAGASAL saddle are now strongly held with light and heavy mortars and MGs. Enemy casualties between 2030L/16 and 1100L/17 estimated at 41.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer

Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 19, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000I/18.
Number. . . . . 225)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The 126 U.S. Regt. is responsible for the protection of the SINEMI and KENDATA areas from 1700I/17 January.

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2/12 Bn's most northerly elements are on the main MT road 1,000 yards from the coast and are held up by enemy MG posts to the front and left of the front.

The 2/9 Bn's forward elements are 700 yards from SANANANDA village. The enemy barge activity at SANANANDA was engaged by our artillery throughout the night of 17/18 January.

Two Japs were killed in the 14 Brigade area.

In the 163 U.S. Regt. area, an enemy pocket immediately north of the road block area is still holding out. The 2 Bn 163 Regt. is approximately 300 yards south of the track junction.

KUMUSI RIVER AREA:

Approximately 100 enemy are occupying KURENADA camp in the bush 400 yards west of the village. Four barges are hidden in the tidal creek 200 yards west of the village.

KANGA FORCE:

At MUBO, the estimated number of enemy holding the GUADAGASEL saddle is 300.

CAPE WARD HUNT:

Three barges south of DOUGLAS HARBOUR were engaged with fire and one was seen to sink.

AIR OPS:

Thirteen beaufighters strafed the LAE drome and dump areas and caused large fires. New buildings in the vicinity were bombed by seven B25s which started further fires. There is evidence of considerable recent activity.

The KUMUSI mouth was strafed and three barges and one small boat were observed on the beach.

The MUBO area was bombed and strafed but the results were unobserved.

Bombs were dropped on KOMIATUM.

Shipping in RABAUL was attacked by heavy bombers but the effects were not observed owing to bad weather and searchlights.

At 1120I/18 our reconnaissance aircraft bombed one cargo ship of approximately 8,000 tons and escorting destroyer 110 miles WSW LAVIENG, scoring a direct hit on the cargo ship which sank.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 19, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/19.
Number. . . . . 226)

5 AUST. DIV.

Raid No. 11 by three or four enemy twin engined bombers was made at 2107L/18 January. The bombers dropped bombs in the RABI AREA and the vicinity of No. 3 strip. One slight casualty and slight damage caused by the raid.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The 127 Regt continued pressure on the enemy bunkers and finally overcame the enemy strongposts. They then reached a line 500 yards West of TARAKENA.

At 2230L/18 January enemy aircraft dropped eleven bombs in the SINEMI CREEK mouth area and the old BUNA strip. NO damage was done.

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2/9 Bn moving West of the MT road through kunai and swamps attacked and captured SANANANDA village by 1150L/18. They then turned East and captured SANANANDA POINT by 1330 hours, mopping up odd parties of the enemy as they went. The forward elements of the 2/9 Bn pushed East along the coast reaching GIRUWA at 1400L/18. At the same time the 2/12 Bn was attacking enemy pillboxes from the South, assistance was received from one company of the 2/9 Bn which had moved South from SANANANDA Village and att the enemy pillboxes from the North. Strong resistance from these pillboxe was overcome and the 2/10 Bn then advanced along the coast. 27 PWs were captured and it was stated that approximately 1,000 survivors were in the SANANANADA Area many of which were sick.

Four more Japs have been killed in the ADS areas.

WANGA FORCE:

The MUBO situation at GUADACASEL saddle is unchanged. The main body of our raiding parties and " Company 2/10 Bn are now concentrated in the area of SKINDIWAI, 10 miles South MUBO with patrols forward.

MADANG AREA:

Japanese patrols are repaorted to be approaching BAGASIN, 30 mile WSW MADANG. LMG and defences have been noted at ALEXISHAFEN and NOBANOB.

Arthur J. Cornell

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1st Lieut., CAC
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 20, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/19.
Number. . . . . 227)

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2/12 Bn overcame strongposts on the morning 19 January and pushed NE along the MT road against well dugin enemy pockets.

The 2/i9 Bn attacking down the MT road from SAIANANDA destroyed enemy MG posts on the enemy 18 January.

The 2/9 raiding party encountered armed parties of Japs of 40 and 20 strong moving to the NW. The enemy fired on our troops. NO further details yet received.

The 2/10 Bn is meeting strong opposition on the coast.

On the 19 January 5 Japs of a party of 20 were killed attempting to reach the mouth of the GIRUWA River from the direction of TARAKENA. The remainder of the party scattered. Four Japs were killed and one wounded attempting to reach the beach along the MT road.

Three enemy MG emplacements were knocked out by mortar fire. These emplacements were situated in the road block area. The enemy resistance in this area is concentrated on both sides of the MT road.

A patrolling party of the 14 Brigade killed one Jap in the vicinity of DINIWATI.

CAPE WARD HUNT:

Three barges south of DOUGLAS HARBOUR were engaged. In the ensuing action two were sunk and one left burning.

KANGA FORCE:

The number of enemy troops on the MUBO track is estimated at 600.

AIR OPS:

MANGROVE ISLAND was well strafed at 0845L/19 January. KURENADA and the KUMUSI delta were also strafed.

LAE was bombed at 0952L/19. Fires were started in suspected dump area.

Our reconnaissance aircraft over GASMATA dropped 8 x 500-lb bombs on repaired runway.

Arthur J. Cornell
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1st Lieut., CAC
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 20, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/20.
Number. . . . . 228)

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The 127 U.S. Regt. reached a line 400 yards NW KONOMBI River. Strong enemy resistance by light and HMG encountered along entire front. Nine Japs reported to have been killed.

At 1610L our artillery fire dispersed Japs who were building a bunker 700 yards NW of the KONOMBI River. 50 calibre MG fire is now concentrated on Jap positions on the West Bank of KONOMBI River.

An enemy barge 500 yards North of TARAKEN was fired on by our beach guns. This barge returned fire and then withdrew to the NW.

7 AUST. DIV.

By 1400L/19 companies of the 2/9 and 2/12 Bns had met on the West side of the MT road. All resistance on the West side of the road has been cleared and mopping up by both battalions on the East side of the road is being continued approximately 700 yards from the coast.

The 2/10 Bn attacking East on the coast is meeting strong opposition from what appears the enemy main defense position. The 2/9 Bn less two companies is continuing the attack East from GUMUWA. Two Jap flags raised in this area wer shot down and were immediately replaced by larger flags.

In the 163 Regt. area, the enemy resistance is believed to be reduced to four strong posts. These posts are being attacked in turn, preceeded by artiller and mortar concentrations. By 1715L/19 the 2 Bn 163 Regt. had avanced 250 yards and overcome an enemy post. The 2 Bn 163 Regt. then turned NW to the MT road. 18 Japs were killed in area of former Jap hospital. 11 of these Japs were in possession of a good supply of rice when killed.

2 Japs were killed by patrols of the 14 Brigade in the vicinity of the ADS.

KANGA:

No enemy have been met forward of GUADAGASEL saddle. The move of the 2/6 Bn to WAU is now completed.

The 2/5 and 2/7 Indppendent Companies NGVR are now known as FLEAY FORCE.

AIR OPS:

An enemy convoy of two transports, one light cruiser and one unidentified vessel were observed 40 miles North of WEWAK at 0930L/20. Twenty-two fighters were observed on the strip, three taking off. Our air operations restricted due to weather conditions.

Arthur J. Cornell
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 21, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/20.
Number. . . . . 229)

5 AUST. DIV.

At 1030L/20 our aircraft drove off two enemy bombers and one fighter from NORMANBY ISLAND.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

Continuous pressure is being exerted along the entire front. The right flank forward elements are along the coast 750 yards NW of KONOMBI River. Strong resistance on the left flank is retarding the progress.

One HMG and accessories were captured in excellent condition. An enemy position between the west arm of the KONOMBIE CREEK and the coast was overcome.

7 AUST. DIV.

Following artillery concentrations the 2/10 Bn launched an attack on the main defensive position along the coastal track and by 0830L/20 had narrowed the enemy line of resistance considerably. At least three pillboxes still remain. Some of the Japs escaped into the swamps. Two damaged 20 mm guns were captured.

The 2/12 Bn and a company of the 2/9 Bn commenced an attack on enemy pocket at 0700L/20 and made further progress. Three huts containing medical stores were captured.

The 2/9 Bn east of GIRUWA frustrated attempts of some Japs to escape during the night 19/20 January.

Two and possibly four barges landed east of GIRUWA during the night, purpose unknown.

The enemy pocket being engaged by 2 Bn 163 Regt. originally contained 200 fit and 200 sick Japs and is the Regimental Headquarters according to reports from Jap PW.

KANGA FORCE:

LAE OP reports barge activity from 1830 to 1930L/20 between LAE, MALAHANG, and LABU.

AIR OPS:

KURENADA was strafed by coastal reconnaissance. LAE terrace area was bombed causing several fires. MADANG wharf was bombed and buildings destroyed. Bombs were dropped on the South side of CAPE GLOUCESTER runway. Craters were still observed in the GASMATA strip. Further bombs were dropped.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 21, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/21.
Number. . . . . 230)

5 AUST. DIV.

Air Raid No. 12 was in progress at 2130L/20 January. Nine enemy bombers flying at heights 21,000 to 23,000 ft. dropped 4 x 500 lb. bombs approximately 7,000 yards North of Gurney Field. The AA engaged and turned the planes off the target. No damage or casualties were reported.

U. S. BUNA FORCE:

Our forward troops reached the edge of the coconut grove at GIRUWA 200 yards from the edge of the lagoon. Twenty-three Japs were killed and a machine gun was captured, our casualties were nil. Our patrols found one Jap in this area who had hung himself.

Barges operating along the coast near GIRUWA were engaged by artillery fire.

7 AUST. DIV.

Attacks on the enemy positions on the coastal track have further reduced the enemy resistance . Our troops are active on all sides. On the MT road, the only remaining Jap positions include some bunkers but these are completely surrounded by the 2/12 Bn. However, very stubborn resistance is being encountered from these stronghold positions.

AIR OPS:

Five B-24s shadowing the convoy observed off the coast near WEWAK were attacked by approximately 25 type ZEKES. These ZEKES attacked the B-24s individually from all angles. The first concentrated on the flight leader, followed by attacks from directly above and below, and from all four quarters in an effort to break our formation. Two ZEKES dove through the formation and all would swarm on the cripples. Our evasive action consisted of maintaining close formation. In the entire action, twelve ZEKES were destroyed and six were damaged. All of our aircraft returned to the base, all damaged from 20 MM or 7.7 MM, two had an engine shot out, but no injuries were sustained by the personnel.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 22, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/21.
Number. . . . 231)

5 AUST. DIV.

Air Raid No. 13 was carried out by an unknown number of enemy planes at 0130L/21. These aircraft dropped bombs in the vicinity of GURNEY and TURNBULL strips. One slight casualty and some damage was caused by the raid.

7 AUST. DIV.

By 1045L/21 the 2/12 Bn had liquidated very stubborn enemy resistance on the MT road. 150 enemy were killed including 50 on the morning of 21 January. The 2/12 Bn were then relieved on the MT road by the 2 Bn 163 Regt and moved forward to take over the area GIRUWA-SANANANDA POINT.

The 2/10 and 2/9 Bns are still engaging enemy defending the pocket areas.

The 1 and 3 Bns of the 163 US Regt are making satisfactory progress against strong enemy posts in the KUMUSI area.

On the 18/January a PIB patrol ambushed 50 well armed Japs at SABARI and killed 12. The enemy is expected to head down the KUMUSI River.

KANGA FORCE:

At 2310 L/20 an enemy aircraft made a reconnaissance to SALAMAUA from the NE.

AIR OPS:

SALAMAUA was bombed and hits were observed among the buildings.

The LAE dump areas were again bombed and the target was left smoking. Intense AA encountered.

RABAUL shipping was heavily bombed at 0405L/21. One vessel capsized and another was seen settling by stern. Many fragmentation bombs were dropped among the dispersal areas of LAKUNAI drome.

At 1700L/21 an aircraft in flight reported one cruiser, one destroyer and two merchantmen 50 miles EAST WIDE BAY.

At 1836L/21 an aircraft sighted two transports, three destroyers, under steam with fighter cover at WEWAK.

Arthur A. Cornell

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W.D.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 22, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/22.
Number. . . . . 232)

U. S. BUNA FORCE:

At 1315L/21 January the 127 U.S. Regt. joined the 2/9 Bn on the east bank of the lagoon at GIRUWA. The position is not in width as the left flank is 300 yards East of GIRUWA and is encountering sniper and automatic fire. The elements of the 127 Regt. on the edge of the coconut grove at GIRUWA killed six Japs and captured three Japs and one Korean.

The 128 U.S. Regt. is continuing with the construction of defensive positions.

7 AUST. DIV.

The 2/9 Bn advanced NW along the beach and joined a company of the 2/0 Bn. The remainder of the 2/10 Bn is attacking SE to complete the encirclement of enemy pockets in this area. Only a small distance now separates both battalion on the southern side. The remaining enemy defences in this area now believed to consist of weapon pits and crawl trenches with LMGs and sub MGs. Enemy dead in the area now estimated at 200 of which 100 were killed 21 January. Our casualties were slight.

Patrols are investigating a preport of a Jap hospital and HQ situated 200 to 500 yards South of GIRUWA.

There is no organized enemy resistance north of the MT road and the remains and mopping up of stragglers is in progress. Small pocket of the enemy has been located south of the road. Many enemy dead in this area, but so far only 200 counted. Much enemy equipment has been captured, including three field guns, 12 lorries, large ammunition dumps and a quantity of signal equipment.

In the 14 Brigade area, 2 PWs were captured and two Japs killed.

MADANG:

An enemy patrol estimated at 100, with 5 HMGs are moving up RAMU in the vicinity of DUMPU, south of MADANG. This patrol is preceeded by a small reconnaissance patrols which are using a missionary as a guide.

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 23, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0500L/23.
Number. . . . . 233)

7 AUST. DIV.

All organized enemy resistance has now been overcome. In the 163 U.S. Regt. Area 475 enemy dead have been counted and there are many more uncounted.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The coastal strip TARAKENA to GIRUWA is now being consolidated. A strong patrol is investigating the Jap hospital located 600 yards South of GRIUWA.

A total of 200 enemy are believed to have been killed in the operations West of KONOMBI CREEK. There are large numbers dead still uncounted, including many in the hospital area. Thirteen PWs have been taken.

KANGA:

In the MUBO Area, our reconnaissance patrol at BUIBAINING observed an enemy patrol of approximately 50 strong moving from the BITOI RIVER towards BLACK CAT track. They also observed 15 Japs bathing in the BITOI RIVER near BUIBAINING. A fighting patrol has been sent out to intercept.

MADANG:

A report for a reliable source has been received that Japs are at KUMIANG near KAINANTU, about 65 miles South of MADANG.

AIR OPS:

The shipping in the harbour of RABAUL was successfully attacked at 0740I/22. Two ships each 2,000 to 4,000 tons were sunk and direct hits were made on two others. The store dumps at LAE were attacked and fires started in the TERRACE area.

PORT MORESBY -

Raid No. 99.

Yellow Warning was received at approximately 2138 hours of unidentified aircraft approaching the area.

At 2153 hours a Red Warning was issued and G.L. began to receive indications bearing 140 degrees, 42,000 yards. One or possibly two aircraft, type unknown, made one run over the harbour from the Southeast to the West and then returning to the Southeast at heights of 14,500 feet down to 11,000 feet.

H.1, H.2, H.3, H.5, H.7 and H.8 engaged this target with barrage fire and H.6 with G.L. control, from 2238 to 2244 hours. Heights during the engagement ranged from 16,500 feet down to 11,500 feet. Period of engagement lasted from 10 seconds to three minutes during which a total of 176 rounds were expended.

It is estimated that from four to six bombs were dropped in the harbour and surrounding area. Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported.

Searchlights illuminated one plane for a short period only, through a break in the cloud. Cloud conditions during this engagement were 10 tenths, and the ceiling was 12,000 feet to 14,000 feet.

During the entire run the aircraft changed course continuously and lost height.

White Warning was issued at 2345 hours 22 January.

Raid No. 100

Red Warning was issued at 0300 hours 23 January of unidentified aircraft flying over the Port Moresby area from the Southeast to the North.

Enemy aircraft, probably two, type unknown, made a second run from the North to the West at heights of 22,000 feet to 24,000 feet.

H.2, H.4 and H.7v engaged this target with barrage fire; H.6 with G.L. control, and H.9 and H.11 with radio control from 0350 to 0353 hours.

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Heights during the engagement ranged from 21,000 feet up to 24,500 feet. Periods of engagement lasted from 20 seconds to two minutes during which a total of 213 rounds were expended.

A report received from several gun stations indicate bombs were dropped approximately 4,000 yards due South of WAIGANI.

Neither casualties nor damage to equipment has been reported.

Searchlights were unable to illuminate the target due to cloud cover. Cloud conditions were 5 to 7 tenths and ceiling on this particular raid was 15,000 feet to 18,000 feet.

When the gun stations opened fire, the target was definitely turned from its course.

White Warning was issued at 0430L/23 January.

RED ALERTS:

In addition to the above two Raids, two alerts were also received. The first red alert was received at 2359 hours 22 January. Indications were received on a bearing 20 degrees at extreme range. These indications were lost however, and a White Warning was given at 0032L/23 January.

The second Red Alert was given 0505L/23 January as RDF had indications bearing 50 degrees at extreme range. These indications faded and a White Warning was issued at 0518L/23 January.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution -.

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 23, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/23.
Number. . . . . 234)

5 AUST DIV.

Air Raid No. 14 was carried out by three enemy aircraft at 21 00L/22 January which dropped three bombs NORTH of GURNEY FIELD. No damage was done during this raid.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The hospital area SOUTH of GIRUWA is littered with bodies. 17 walking prisoners and 50 stretcher cases have already been brought out and there are probably 50 more stretcher cases to come.

7 AUST DIV.

The odd parties of remaining Japs are being mopped up. Known enemy dead in this area since 8 January totals 1201.

Following active patrols and artillery concentrations on 22 January, the 2/9 and 2/10 Bns liquidated the last remaining Jap pockets in the 18 Brigade area.

A party of 33 Japs attempted to escape from perimeter held by the 163 Regt. In the ensuing action 32 of the Japs were killed and one PW was taken.

By 1300L/23 all organized resistance NORTH of the road block had been overcome. Patrol activity in the 14 Brigade area, and ten Japs were killed.

Captured Japanese equipment includes a variety of small arms, 12 MT, ammunition dump, height finding equipment, signal equipment, two AA guns, two field guns, wireless sets, medical stores, tools and machinery and also many of our own guns were recovered.

ARTHUR J. CORNELL,
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Distribution -B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 24, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 2145L/23.
Number. . . . . 235)

5 AUST. DIV.

Air Raid No. 15 was carried out by four enemy aircraft at 2359L/ 22 January. These aircraft dropped 11 bombs from 20,000 feet, causing some casualties but no damage.

Air Raid No. 16 was carried out by fsix enemy aircraft at 0509L/23 January. These aircraft dropped bombs from 20,000 feet, causing slight casualties and damag e.

U.S. BUNA FORCE:

The 127 U.S. Regt. continues to mop up in the hospital area South of GIRUWA.

The 128 Regt. is continuing defensive work.

7 AUST. DIV.

Mopping up continues.

Elements of the 2/10 Bn engaged a small party of Japs moving from the swamp to the sea in the vicinity of WYE POINT and killed 11 Japs.

The 163 Regt. captured 7 PWs.

KANGA FORCE:

In the MUBO Area, our reconnaissance patrol reports the GUADAGASEL saddle area to still be occupied by the Japs. 30 enemy were seen in this area.

Our reconnaissance patrol at BUIBAINING observed enemy moving toward BLACKCAT. The patrol is watching for enemy movement in the direction of WAIPA

AIR OPS:

MUBO and GARRISON HILL bombed and strafed. No movement was seen along the track to SAIAMAUA.

Four barges were strafed at the mouth of the WARIA RIVER and a barge with 4 or 5 Japs was sunk off KELO POINT during the coastal reconnaissance.

RABAUL harbour and aerodromes were heavily bombed at 0400L/23 Jan. Fuel dumps at VUNAKANAU were left burning. More bombs were dropped at 1104L/23 causing 10,000 ton ship to explode.

At 1245L/23 an aircraft in flight reported one cruiser approx. 90 miles EAST of BUKA. At 1430L/23 one destroyer, one light cargo vessel of 3,000 tons and one transport of 5,000 tons were reported 28 miles West of BUKA.

Our reconnaissance aircraft bombed MADANG and FINSCHAFEN, destroying buildings.

Arthur J. Cornell

ARTHUR J. CORNELL
1st Lieut., CAC
Intelligence Officer.

Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report) January 25, 1943.
: Intelligence Report to 0430L/25.
Number. . . . . 236)

7 AUST. DIV.

The 14 Brigade is still engaging small parties of Japs endeavouring to escape westward across the JUMBORA GONA track, particularly in the vicinity of the ADS and DID.

The 3 Bn. 163 Regt. is moving to GONA on the 24th January to relieve the 14 Brigade.

Native patrols killed further three Japs on the 21st January at SAGARI. The enemy in this area are now estimated at 100.

Two enemy barges were engaged off AMBASI River by PT boats at 2200L/21 January. One was probably sunk. At 0245L/22 January two large enemy barges were engaged by native patrols from AMBASI bluff. The barges returned the fire and withdrew to the sea. PT boats attacked two barges off KUMUSI River on the morning 23rd January and one was left smoking.

KANGA FORCE:

One rifle platoon of the 2/7 Bn with attached MMG section, sigs and medical personnel completed air movement to BENA BENA on the 23rd January.

The enemy troops reported moving towards BIACK CAT are now considered to be camping in the BUIBAINING area.

AIR OPS:

SAIAMAUA was bombed and strafed causing dense smoke but the extent of the damage is NOT known.

About 100 native craft reported as lakatois are on the beach from SAIAMAUA to CAPE KUBUMI.

RABAUL aerodromes were bombed 0330L/24 January. Fires were left burning on LAKUNAI and VUNAKANAU.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 101

Red Warning was issued at 0332 hours 25th January ~~xxxxx~~. A number of enemy aircraft, possibly 3/6, following B-17s into the area, made one run over the Port Moresby Area from the South to the Northeast at a height of approximately 20,000 feet.

Approximately 20/30 bombs were dropped at the southern end of Jacksons Drome and surrounding area destroying one DC-3. Nill casualties were reported.

H.A. Gun Stations engaged the aircraft by radio control at 0334 25 January. The period of engagement lasted approximately 3 seconds during which 5 rounds were expended. Serachlights were illuminated but were unable to pick up target. White Warning was given at 0432 hours.

RED ALERTS:

In addition to the above raid, Port Moresby had three Red Alert during the period 2000 hours 24 Jan. and 0530 hours 25th January.

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Distribution B.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 26, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 0400L/26.
Number. . . . . 237)

5 AUST. DIV.

Air Raid No. 17 was carried out by approximately three enemy aircraft which dropped 6 to 8 bombs in the vicinity of TURNBULL strip. This raid tookplace at 0304L on the 25th January. No casualties reported although some damage was done.

The 41st U.S. Division has now assumed command of all troops in the ORO BAY GONA area as from 1200L/25 January.

MOROBE AREA:

A reliable source reports at least four barges full of enemy troops landed at KOBO, south of the WARIA River mouth. Jap troops and two barges were hidden on the North bank of the WARIA mouth, also Jap sentries have been posted at BAU.

KANGA FORCE:

Enemy estimated at 100 strong have been reported moving along the track HOUSE/COPPER, WANDUMI, in the direction of WANDUMI. They were later believed to have swung right towards BLACKCAT.

One platoon of the 2/6 Bn has been sent to re-inforce BALCKCAT. Our reconnaissance patrols have been patrolling from BALLAMS CAMP to the WANDUMI Area. BALLAMS is now being reinforced by two platoons of the 2/5 Bn.

AIR OPS:

Reconnaissance aircraft strafed 15 canoes on the beach near KEL KEL and sighted another 9 sheltered by undergrowth at KUI.

LAE dumps were bombed by B25s at 0932L/25 January. Fires were started.

RABAUL harbour and aerodromes were heavily bombed on the night 24/25 January. Hits were observed on two vessels.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 102

Red Warning was issued at 0237 hours of imepnding raid by enemy aircraft. Two enemy medium bombers type BETTY or SALLY made one run across the PORT MORESBY area from the WNW to the ENE at heights of 26,000 ft. down to 21,000 ft.

Approximately four bombs were dropped to the West of the 7 Mile Drome causing neither casualties nor damage.

H.2 engaged with barrage, H.3 engaged with barrage and height control, H.6 engaged with height control and G.L., H.7 engaged with barrage, H.9 engaged by Radar control and H.11 engaged with radar control and visual sighting with director. The period of engagement was from 0316 hours to0322 hours. Total number of rounds fired during the entire engagement was 325.

Searchlights illuminated the target for approximately six minutes. During the entire run, the target changed course continuously and lost height from the beginning of the run.

White Warning was given at 0332 hours 26 January.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 27, 1943.

Intelligence Report:
: Intelligence Report to 1000I/27.
Number. 238:

41 U. S. Div.

An enemy barge landing was found on the North branch of the KONOMBI CREEK 600 yards from TARAKENA. Two motor barges and motor launches were found there with charts and equipment.

The 3 Bn 163 U.S. Regt. has now completed the relief of the 14 Brigade.

KUMUSI AREA.

It is estimated that approximately 200 enemy are at DEUNIA but NO movement has been seen on the KUMUSI River in this area. An additional enemy party of approximately 200 arrived SABARI from SENANI.

MOROBE AREA.

A reliable source reports dumps at KOBO and BIBILA and that enemy troop are quartered at BAU. Air reconnaissance on 26 Jan strafed and rendered unserviceable four barges on the South bank of the WARIA River. This aircraft also observed activity in the vicinity of KOBO and some troops at ZAKA. The natives report some Japs are in the MOROBE village North of WARIA.

KANGA.

In the BLACKCAT WANDUMI area a total of 300/350 enemy were observed movin towards BLACKCAT.

One of our mortar detachments moved from WAU to BLACKCAT. Two more of our platoons are moving from BALIAMS to WANDUMI.

AIR OPS.

Our aircraft bombed and strafed MATMAT HILL and MUBO. No movement was seen from KOMIATUM to SALAMAUA. Four barges at the mouth of the WARIA RIVER were strafed and sunk.

KOBO was strafed and SALAMAUA bombed during our coastal reconnaissance. Supply dumps in the TERRACE Area at LAE were strafed then bombed with unobserved results.

B-17s attacked shipping in SIMPSON Harbour at RABAUL on the night of 24/ January. Bombs were dropped on a 2,000 ton ship causing a large explosion which li up the whole area. The ship was possible a munitions carrier. One 500 lb. bomb dropped from 200 feet on a ship tied to KOKOPO Wharf, left a large hole in the ship side. 500 and 1,000 lb. bombs were dropped on other targets, but results could not be observed.

Seven B-17s attacked shipping in SIMPSON HARBOUR on the morning of 26 Ja A fire was started close to the shore North of the MAIAGUNA Strip. Hits were scor on one unidentified ship at the extreme North end of SIMPSON harbour starting a lar fire. Our planes were attacked by night fighters and A.A but all returned safely to their base.

PORT MORESBY - Raid No. 103

Red Warning was issued at 0252 hours, 27 January of impending raid by enemy aircraft. Night fighter was airborne from JACKSON Drome to intercept.

Three enemy medium bombers, type SALLY, came in from the Southeast and were illuminated by the searchlights. These aircraft made one run in staggering formation at heights of 24,000 ft. down to 22,500 ft and went out to the Southwest.

On the second run, the aircraft came in from the Southwest in a V formati and were illuminated by searchlights. This run was made at heights of 22,000 ft. down to 19,000 ft. Approximately 15 bombs were dropped at the Northwest end of Wards Drome destroying one Beaufighter. Nil casualties have been reported. One other bomb which was evidently hung in the bomb bay, fell in the 96 Engineer Area near PITT Street causing slight damage.

Night fighter intercepted these aircraft after bombs had been released and engaged them on their way out to the East. All Clear was given at 0415 hours.

Arthur J Cornell

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to
Number. . . . . 239) 2000L/27.

January 28, 1943.

41 U. S. Div.

More than 15 Japs were killed and 3 PWs. taken in the 41st Div. Area.

KANGA.

A Reconnaissance patrol reports the enemy has established a staging camp approximately 7 hours march E[illegible] of BLACKCAT and are also cutting a new track towards BLACKCAT GAP from the track HOUSE COPPER WANUMI. Action is being taken by our forces to counter the enemy moves.

AIR OPS.

MUSO village and GARRISON HILL was bombed and strafed at 1105 L/27. Three huts were seen to explode and several fires started. An MG position was silenced.

Coastal reconnaissance aircraft strafed LABU but no barges were seen there. About 50 canoes were observed on the beach near LOKANU.

Considerable AA fire encounter from SALAMAUA. At LAE Bostons bombed VOCO POINT area causing large fire from a probable fuel dump. B 25s bombed MALAHANG but the results were unobserved. Bombs were dropped on GASMATA and FINSCHAFEN strips by our reconnaissance aircraft.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 28, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/28.
Number. . . . .240)

41 U.S. DIV.
At 1000L/27 January, the 163 U.S. Regt. despatched a patrol from the road block area to destroy a party of 20 Japs who attacked a small party of our troops at the AMBOGA crossing. The Japs are believed to be heading for the JUMBORA - GONA track, but have NOT yet been contacted.

MAMBARE RIVER AREA:
It is relia bly reported that 30 Japs are at DUVIRA Creek, and possibly 20 in MAMBATUTU gardens. Japs are also midway between mouth and mission south bank.

MOROBE AREA:
Reliable source states dumps are located at KOBO and BIBILA.

KANGA FORCE:
A Jap patrol in the RAMU VALLEY is reported at MARAWASA. Our patrol at KAINANTU has so far made no contact.

LAE - SALAMAUA AREA:
A close search by aircraft failed to locate enemy barges reported in the lagoon immediately behind LABU village.
Air reconnaissance at 1107L/27 January reports approximately five new houses along the coast near BADEN BAY, apparently not native huts, and a new settlement of huts approximately 100 yards up the coast from BUSU River. Tracks around the villages to the NW of SALAMAUA are well worn.

KIETA:
Information from reliable source indicates a Jap patrol, 100 strong, guided by a former Jap resident of BUKA, are moving by night and raiding at dawn. They have raided and captured the Chinese hidden in the vicinity of KORVANA, North of KIETA.

Arthur J. Cornell

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 29, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2250L/28.
Number. . . . . 241)

KANGA FORCE:

On January 27th our patrol fired on 12 Japs who were laying booby traps on the track one mile north of WANDUMI.

Before the first light of day on the 28th. January the company of the 2/6 Bn at WANDUMI was subjected to heavy MG and mortar fire. The enemy moved round flank of our troops and our forces then occupied a better position on the crest of a ridge 500 yards south of WANDUMI. A detachment of enemy were later observed moving past our force in the direction of CRYSTAL CREEK.

A platoon of the 2/5 Bn is moving from KAISINIK towards WANDUMI to reinforce the company at WANDUMI. This platoon encountered enemy detachments halfway between KAISINIK and WANDUMI and inflicted considerable casualties with mortars and grenades.

Our troops are now holding the BLACKCAT WANDUMI area. Enemy patrols have penetrated to the valley .

Our forces are holding the line covering the aerodrome and every effort is being made to reinforce our troops but the weather on the 28th January prevented reinforcement and the forecast for the 29th January is not promising. The 2/6 Bn and 2/5 Bn less two companies are already in the area.

AIR OPS:

One of our aircraft reported one 4,000 ton transport in WEWAK harbour and one probable gunboat three miles out of harbour.

MUBO and HARRISON HILL again bombed and strafed. The area was badly damaged.

FINSCHAFEN and CAPE GLOUCESTER were bombed by reconnaissance aircraft but the results were unobserved.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 29, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1300L/29.
Number. . . . . 242)

41 U.S. DIV.

5 Japs were killed near AMBOGA CROSSING. A total number of enemy killed in this area since 0800L/27 is 23 enemy, including two officers. One PW was also taken.

Relief of the 128 Regt. by the 186 Regt. is now completed.

KANGA FORCE:

On the 28 January the enemy heavily attacked WANDUMI, over-running one of our platoons. An immediate counter attack restored the situation. Reinforcements from WAU arrived while the enemy movement was observed moving SW towards WANDUMI about the same time.

The morning of the 29th January turned out splendidly for flying and by midday at least 23 planes had landed at WAU with a further twelve in the air and 6 more about to take off. More to follow.

BENA FORCE:

A patrol from WAU via MARILINAN GURUF ONGA KAINANTU has now arrived at BENA BENA. Grass fires were observed at KAIAPITE, but the main buildings were still intact.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 30, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000I/29.
Number. . . . . 243)

41 U.S. DIV.

During the 29 January 15 Japs were killed and three PWs. were taken in the 41st Div. Area.

The 2 Bn 163 Regt. has now relieved the 15 Aust. Inf. Brigade.

MOROBE AREA:

Our W/T set at DONA was forced to move by enemy movement in the area.

KANGA:

In the WANDUMI AREA our troops withdrew during the night of 28/29 to SLIPPERY RIDGE. This position by-passed by enemy detachments proceeding SW towards the BULOLO RIVER. The BULOLO RIVER is now in flood.

Reinforcements which arrived by plane on the 29th January have secured the aerodrome and patrols pushed forward to locate the enemy. Our patrols on the BLACKCAT TRACK have since failed to locate the enemy either along the track to the EAST or in the area to the WEST of WANDUMI. It is considered that the enemy has withdrawn and every effort is being made to cut off his retreat. One Company of the 2/6 Bn is behind the enemy at HOUSE COPTER and the 2/7 Independent Company is in its original positions in the SKINDIWAI area.

57 planes flew into WAU today completing the moves of the 2/5 and 2/7 Bns.

AIR OPS:

The MUBO Area was bombed with unobserved results.

Our aircraft on close reconnaissance in the RAMU and MARKHAM RIVER Valleys from MUSAK to GABSONKEK reported nil sightings.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 30, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1200I/30.
Number. . . . . 244)

41 U.S. DIV.

Two of our patrols each 50 strong, are moving North of AMBOGA RIVER to KUMUSI RIVER, one via coast and one via SAGARI to DEUNIA.

WARIA RIVER AREA:

A reliable source reports 200 Japanese are in the WARIA RIVER area. The enemy are carrying out patrols but apparently are NOT preparing defences.

KANGA FORCE:

Reports received of the landing of 34 planes with 243 personnel and 100,000 lbs. of stores by 1200I/30 January. One section of 25 pounders has also been landed. 23 additional planes are now en route carrying 133 personnel, rations, ammunition and stores.

During the morning of the 29th January a company of the 2/6 Bn forced the enemy to withdraw from HOUSE COPPER and moved forward to WABAINING.

During the afternoon of the 29th January one company in the WANDUMI area was forced to withdraw by superior numbers of the enemy after two counter attacks.

The enemy has now contacted the 2/7 Bn approximately one mile NW CRSYTAL CREEK.

The attack on WAU aerodrome commenced at 0630I/30 January and was still continuing at 0745I/30. Planes commenced to land at WAU at 0930I/30 and the pilots reported the situation then in hand.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 31, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 2000L/30.
Number. . . . . 245)

41 U.S. Div.

In addition th the patrols to the KUMUSI RIVER the following patrols are being maintained in the 41st Div. Area.

A - From the AMBOGA CROSSING south to SANGARA MISSION, east to JUMBORA, north to vicinity of BAREDA.
B - From the AMBOGA RIVER Mouth to MANENERIDA and ERUGATA.
C - Four standing patrols on the track JUMBORA - GONA.

Twenty-five Japs were killed to 1700 hours 30th January.

Troops, 2 IMGs and officer was flown to IONA for protective and offensive mission.

WARIA MOUTH:

All Japs are now located on the north side of the WARIA round ZAKA and DONA CREEK.

KANGA:

On the morning 30th January, the enemy with one regiment attacked and penetrated to within 400 yards of the WAU aerodrome. The enemy attack was unsuccessful and was driven back to the CRYSTAL CREEK area. Two hundred and fifty Japs were killed in the attack including the regimental commander. No prisoners were taken.

A and B Companies of the 2/7 Bn are holding the area one mile NW CRYSTAL CREEK.

One section of field artillery flown in on the morning 30th January was in action by 1345L/30 January.

469 troops and 205,830 lbs. of stores were delivered in 65 plane loads to WAU on the 30th January.

The landing strip at BULOLA is now in order and is being widened.

AIR OPS:

LAE was bombed and strafed. Fires were started in the buildings and explosions were observed in the vicinity of the docks. Two aircraft were strafed.

The MUBO area was bombed and strafed with nil results.

The enemy line of withdrawal WAU - CRYSTAL CREEK was well strafed and large explosion was observed. Grass fires were started due to the straf-ing.

RABAUL shipping was again attacked. Explosion was observed on one vessel and fires were started in dumps near TOBI wharf.

Our reconnaissance aircraft bombed suspected strip 15 miles east of UBILI.

Arthur J. Cornell

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Distribution B.

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HEADQUARTERS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

January 31, 1943.

Intelligence Report)
: Intelligence Report to 1000L/31.
Number. . . . . 246)

KANGA FORCE:

In the WAU area our artillery and direct air support has proven most effective. The enemy casualties now are estimated at least 300 including regimental commander and four officers of staff killed.

HMG fire at dusk was encountered on position occupied by our artillery but the guns were withdrawn after dark inside perimeter defences.

Indications are that the Japs are working along the BULOLO Valley in a NW direction.

WANDUMI Area:

Stragglers reports indicate A Company of the 2/6 Bn at WANDUMI were attacked on the night of 28th January and suffered heavy casualties. A composite company which was sent from WAU to counter enemy infiltration to BULOLO RIVER through reentrant one mile NW of our WANDUMI position, made contact with that position but were subsequently overwhelmed by enemy between WANDUMI and BULOLO River with only two survivors to date.

Present disposition of troops in the KANGA Area: -

2/5 Bn and 2/7 Bn less two companies - drome defence.
2 companies 2/7 Bn one mile NW CRYSTAL CREEK.
2 companies 2/6 Bn in BLACKCAT Area.
2 platoons 2/6 Bn BULWA drome.
1 platoon 2/6 Bn BULOLO.
1 company 2/6 Bn at SKINKEWAI less 1 platoon at BALLAMS (re-occupied night 30 Jan.)
7 Independent Company in the WAIPALI Area.
Detachments 5 Independent Company at BOBS.

Air Transport Situation.

Thirty aircraft landed at WAU, including air support control, detachment ground personnel flight 4 AC squadron, balance of troop of 2/1 Field Regiment, two troops 156 Aust. Lt. A.A. Bty. 12 aircraft in the air containing ammunition and rations.

BULOLO strip NOT yet serviceable but expect it to be available shortly. Report on test flight to BULWA indicates considerable delay before available.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL AWM2019.366.1971

HEADQUARTERS
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENCES
NEW GUINEA

Intelligence Report)
:
Number. . . . . 247)

February 1, 1943.

Intelligence Report to 2200L/31.

41 U.S. DIV.

12 Japs were killed and 5 captured in the SANANANDA-GONA-JUMBORA-SOPUTA Area on the 31st January.

On the 28th January a PIB patrol from SANGARA contacted 200 Japs at DIVINIKOARI. The report suggests the enemy will endeavor to get away down the KUMUSI RIVER. The patrol inflicted casualties on the enemy in the SABARI-DEUNIA Area, forcing the enemy into the swamp area between the KUMUSI and OPI Rivers. This swamp area is entirely trackless and American patrols and PIB expect to cut the enemy off at the coast. Role of the American detachment already at IOMA is to assist the PIB in forcing the Japs to river outlets already covered by patrols.

RAMU AREA.

A reliable source reports three different lines of Japanese passed through MARAWASA and are now at KAIAPIT. The Japs told the natives they will stay at KAIAPIT to await reinforcements before making for WAU.

Air Transport Situation.

For the 24 hour period to 2200L/31, 400 troops and 172623 lbs. stores and ammunition were landed at WAU in 67 plane loads.

In addition to the troops landed at WAU (Sitrep 246) the following have also been landed - 2/3 Independent Company and a small detachment of the 7 Aust MG Bn.

AIR OPS.

The MUBO Area was bombed at 0900L/31. The target areas were well covered with a possible hit on a dump. The MUBO area and the track from MUBO to KOMIATUM was heavily strafed.

The WEWAK runway and two cargo vessels and one gunboat near MUSHU ISLAND were bombed. The results were unobserved. One vessel in WEWAK harbour appeared to be damaged.

One small ship near BILBIO ISLAND was unsuccessfully bombed then strafed.

RABAUL harbour and VUNAKANAU drome was heavily bombed but the results were unobserved.

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