

AWM 54 2

(A.28)

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WAR OF 1939-45

Received from:

Department of Army

Classn. No. 577/7/35

Indexed 519/7

A.W.M. File

Notes on 4th Division Operations

Kokoda to Isoputa

by Major Parbury. January, 1943.

ALLIED LAND FORCES
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

~~SECRET~~

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS

20 Jan 43

DOWNGRADED
RESTRICTED

Dear *Colonel*.

... Major Parbury's notes on recent operations
7 AUST DIV are forwarded herewith.

Yours *sincerely*

W. Keaston

Major
GS (Ops)

Lt-Col A E Bamford,
GS (Ops)
LHQ

22 Jan

*circulate, then
return AEC*

A. G. S.

SECRET

HQ Force
15 Jan 43
G. O. 2.2

Dear Colonel.

1. I am enclosing some notes which I made from observations while with 7 Div from 3 Nov to 4 Dec 42, which I thought might be of interest to you.

2. These notes are by no means official, and are at present being passed around the various Branches at this HQ for their comments. The suggestions made are only my personal ones, but I thought you may find something of interest in these notes.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Parkinson

Lt-Col BAMFORD
Adv LHQ
AUSTRALIA

P.S.

*Jimmy Hansen is now
at Adv H.C.F. and is very well.*

PP

Subject: NOTES ON RECENT OPS 7 AUST DIV -
KOKODA TO SOPUTA.

22
SECRET

NG Force,
13 Jan 43.
G06142.

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Object:

1. The object is to produce notes on recent ops of 7 Aust Div while the events are fresh in everyone's mind. Included in these notes are some suggestions for improvements in future ops of a similar nature.

General:

2. Reports of the ops will no doubt be available later from 7 Aust Div, Bde, and units ^{reports} which will no doubt go into greater detail than will these notes.
3. This campaign has shown clearly the necessity of having well-trained and well-disciplined units and formations for ops against the JAPANESE in the jungle. Our successes and failures have been largely due to good or bad basic orthodox trg. The basic principles of fighting and trg apply in the jungle as they do in the desert.
4. The campaign was of necessity largely an improvised one and many difficult problems had to be overcome by units and formations in the jungle.
5. The use made of air tpt was the most outstanding and novel feature of the operations.

Country:

6. The country over which the advance of 7 Aust Div took place can be divided into two parts:
 - (a) OWERS CORNER to KOKODA over OWEN STANLEY RANGE;
 - (b) KOKODA to SOPUTA - GONA area.
7. In (a) the country was incredibly difficult mountain and jungle and no country as difficult for operations has been encountered in any NE campaign including ABBYSSINIA.
8. In (b) the country was flat with a better track; finally becoming a jeep track from POPONDETTA to SOPUTA with a greater proportion of open kuni grass patches as the coast was reached. It would seem that this is more typical of the country in which future fighting will take place.

Enemy tactics:

9. The enemy was for the most part in defence or withdrawing. The counter-attack staged by the enemy failed with heavy casualties to himself.
10. In defence his choice of ground was excellent, his positions well dug, camouflaged, mutually supporting and in some depth sited for all round defence. His positions varied from one man circular weapon pits with earth cleared away to dug-outs with overhead cover. His MGs and mountain guns were protected by rifle men and snipers. He frequently fired at random into the trees above the heads of our tps in order to draw their fire and disclose their positions. The cracking noise of bullets over our tps heads made it difficult at times

to discover the direction and source of his fire.

11. The Jap was an extremely tenacious fighter but when surprised, he appeared to panic and successful "bayonet" charges made him run away squealing, although at times he quickly recovered. This did not occur in his defended positions at SOPUTA and GONA where he apparently had been ordered to and did fight to the death.

Our tactics:

12. The initiative rested with our forces throughout.
13. Our tactics were:
- (a) The advance until contact
 - (b) Pin and hold the enemy
 - (c) Develop an attack (this might mean a quickly mounted attack or a bde attack taking several days to develop).
14. During the advance, which took place along tracks, some units had the leading coy sometimes 10 to 20 minutes in front of the rest of the bn, in order to prevent the bn being delayed if the scout stopped for a short period. The leading platoon had out in front a point sec who put out two scouts moving in the usual manner. Contact was made by the enemy firing on the leading scouts or sec. These scouts were frequently hit and some coys changed them at short intervals but if required there were always abundant volunteers for this unpleasant work. Generally speaking volunteering was discouraged and men were detailed in the ordinary way.
15. After contact was made the leading coy deployed to find the enemy flanks and if the enemy consisted of only one or two small posts it was able to eliminate them by getting behind them. If a stronger position the battalion would endeavour to find the flanks. It should be noted that if the enemy has tps wide out it is very easy for a bn comd to commit the whole of his bn in this operation unless he is very careful. All his coys are likely to be quickly involved. It is suggested a probing by patrols for the enemy's flanks might be a good method of finding the flanks if it is thought his defences are strong and the time factor is not important.
16. Having found the flanks the enemy was by-passed, cut off and if necessary attacked from rear or flanks. An encircling movement should go wide as instanced by 25 Bde move at GARARI (see below). However a limiting factor as to how wide the movement can go will be the supply situation for the outflanking force. It should be noted that the encircling force must be as strong as possible, it is no use sending a platoon if two coys can be spared. The platoon will NOT be able to hold ground against the counter attack by the enemy. This follows the principle of where it is decided to make your main thrust there must be your greatest possible strength.
17. The best example of this was at OIVI where the 16 Bde used two battalions plus one battalion of weak strength to hold the front while one battalion went round to attack the enemy's L of C at GARARI. This battalion after making some progress round was followed by the whole of the 25 Bde. The result was an outstanding success with heavy casualties to the enemy and the remnants of the enemy force in this area took to the hills.

18. This procedure of holding and encircling can be summed up by the words of a battalion commander "Contact your enemy, pin him, then encircle him."
19. In an attack on an enemy dug in successes were achieved by what are generally described as "bayonet" charges although in fact the Bren, Tommy Gun (both fired from the hip) and hand grenades were used more than the bayonet. However a "bayonet" charge very aptly describes this attack in that it is pushed right home in the same way as a bayonet charge in open country. Once troops are committed to the final attack they MUST keep moving until the objective is reached. The distance between men in such an attack is closer in the jungle than in an attack in open country due to the limited vision, and consequent difficulties of contact. To go to ground when fired on in the attack is generally fatal and results in higher casualties and failure to take the objective.
20. As in all offensives a large proportion of time is spent in holding defensive positions in order to:
- (a) Provide a firm base from which to attack, similar to a "pivot of manoeuvre" in Armored Divisions.
 - (b) Consolidate on objective,
 - (c) Hold the enemy in front while remainder of force attacks in rear (the same as (a)).
 - (d) Prevent surprise when halted.

At all times a perimeter defence is set up with all round defence.

21. Control is always a problem in the jungle. Good control can be obtained by clear orders, limited objective and good communications.

Supply Generally:

22. Many serious administrative risks were of necessity taken by 7 Div at certain stages due to a lack of secure L of C. Two examples of this were
- (a) When 16 and 25 Bdes were forward of EORA CK and KOKODA had not been captured:
 - (b) After KUMUSI R was crossed and L of C was broken,
23. Forward tps were for a period of some two months on bully beef and biscuits and on occasions even these were not available. Tps ate rice and acquired native vegetables where possible. After the extreme physical effort of crossing the Owen Stanley Range they had only a few days on full scale rations before pushing on.
24. It is suggested that full consideration be given to supplementing and varying this ration in future operations whenever possible. This is practicable with landings but is limited in droppings due to failure after dropping of such items as butter, jam etc.
25. The craving of all troops was for something sweet and for tobacco. It is suggested in future chocolate and tobacco be regarded as a regular issue to forward troops.

26. The main shortages suffered by troops themselves were:

- (a) Biscuits (a large proportion broke during dropping and lack of waterproof containers caused rapid deterioration):
- (b) Sugar. It would appear sugar ration will require further increase for forward troops. They were at all times short during dropping period and it is most necessary in tropic conditions, particularly when troops are sick and tired. Consumption of sugar appears to be considerable.
- (c) Matches. Generally short and are most necessary when men do individual cooking. A waterproof container is an essential part of equipment for such items as matches etc. As well as rain and excessive humidity the sweat from a man's body soaks all his equipment and anything in his pockets. Gas wallets were used effectively for carrying such items that were affected by wet.
- (d) Rifle oil and flannellette.
- (e) Salt. (Tablet form suitable).

The following rations were usually available and were satisfactory:-

- (a) Tea.
- (b) Dried milk.
- (c) Rice.
- (d)

It is suggested that rations should include abovementioned and any other items to make food more palatable such as curry, sauces, etc. Dried apples were appreciated when available.

27. It is suggested emergency rations require substitution of chocolate for the fruit slabs or alternatively issue a proportion of English chocolate ration with the emergency ration, say two present emergency to one English chocolate emergency ration. The milk tablets are hard to dissolve although they can be sucked going along the tracks. The inclusion of beef extract, tea tablets or some palatable vegetable extract is worth considering.

28. When units or formations commenced an advance the troops were issued for carrying in their haversacks two days hard (bully and biscuits) and three days emergency rations; this made the unit mobile for five days if further supplies failed. Except on a few special occasions natives were not given to battalions for carrying rations.

29. It is no use substituting a ration for bully beef and biscuits unless it has the same nourishment value for the same weight and bulk as bully and biscuits. Bulk and weight are vital factors when rations have to be carried in a haversack. The proposed new field ration is unsuitable for this reason.

Supply by Air:

30. This campaign is probably unique in warfare in that two bdes were supplied by air dropping the bulk of which was dropped without parachute.

31. The technique of dropping improved greatly in the later stages and it is a clear lesson that no planes should be sent out dropping supplies until the pilot and men pushing out are adequately trained in this work. Otherwise inordinate waste of both engine hours and supplies inevitably result.
32. The best height for the aircraft is to cross the dropping ground above tree level from 200 ft to 300 ft and on a signal from the pilot the men push out of the door ONE load only. The plane returns and this practice is repeated until plane is empty. One load will consist of as many boxes or crates as can be conveniently placed in vicinity of doorway and pushed out with one push. To attempt to push more than once generally results in boxes going into the jungle and being lost. This of course does not apply to items dropped by parachute.
33. A wireless set on the ground speaking to the plane and a standard method of marking dropping grounds seems essential in future. A No. 11 set can be used to talk to transport planes. These sets were available but 7 Div had received instructions NOT to talk to aircraft in the air. The reason for this seems obscure particularly when in many cases the aircraft dropping supplies were in full view of the enemy so that wireless silence was not a factor. Strips and grass fires or if available 2" mortar flares, would appear to be an effective method of marking dropping grounds and wireless used to call the transport plane's attention to them as they fly over.
34. When a new dropping ground is established it seems essential that an AILC briefs the pilots as to its location etc before they set out. Transport pilots do not always appear to be able to find these places off the map.
35. In the early stages 7 Div were rarely informed of what had been dropped each day so that they were unable to check the amount of recovery of dropping. It is suggested that at the end of each day's dropping a signal is sent or a message dropped giving details of what has been dropped for that day. Furthermore if it is known at the beginning of the day that certain items that have been requested cannot be dropped, the junior formation should be informed. 7 Aust Div were frequently inconvenienced through lack of this information.
36. The dropping of supplies has many disadvantages:
- (a) Rations are damaged.
 - (b) All ammunition, including every round of .303 has to be tested before being issued. Certain ammunition such as mortar fuses cannot be dropped due to danger of premature explosions.
 - (c) A large amount of man power is required for picking up e.g. at MYOLA a battalion of infantry had to be used due to a shortage of natives.
 - (d) The turn round of planes is slower than with landings.
 - (e) Percentage of recoveries is generally low and is affected by
 - (i) bad dropping:
 - (ii) bad picking up:
 - (iii) lack of supervision at dropping ground:
 - (iv) good or bad dropping ground.

When possible landing of planes with supplies is preferred.

37. When a new strip or aerodrome is opened up for landings of transport planes it is suggested that an air force officer (preferably from air transport cmd of fairly senior rank) with wireless set and operators arrive in the first few planes that land. He can then signal back state of drome, state of weather and speak to planes in the air. Information of weather and state of drome is required daily and sometimes hourly and the air force do NOT appear to rely fully on any reports except those given by their own people.
38. The 7 Div practice of setting up a station cmd as soon as the new strip was opened generally worked very well and planes were unloaded rapidly by native labour. Some such organisation is essential before the first plane lands unless troops only are being unloaded.
39. A G staff officer is required forward to co-ordinate priorities of air supply.

Ammunition:

40. Units carried approximately the following ammunition:-
- 50 rounds of SAA per man, 6 full Bren magazines, 9 to 10 magazines for TSMG, plus certain mortar ammunition. As it was seldom possible to supply sufficient natives for carrying ammunition there was no battalion or brigade reserve.
41. The replenishment of ammunition was by Div AASC which in turn relied upon air droppings or landings. The above shows that battalions might be in a serious position if after a long advance they were seriously counterattacked. As an example of this the case of the 25 Bde is interesting. This Bde advanced from WAIROPE to GONA without serious opposition until within a few miles of GONA. This opposition was cleared but the Bde was unable to continue the attack on Gona due to failure of air dropping of ammunition and rations at JUMBORA. The Commander decided he had insufficient ammunition to go ahead.
42. It would appear that the solution is to allot sufficient natives to a battalion or brigade to carry reserve ammunition. During the Div advance 40 natives were usually allotted to each battalion; there were just sufficient to carry battalion gear such as RAP stores, sig stores, field cable etc. The number available to battalions are limited by number allotted to the Div or the force for a campaign. But in future planning it is suggested the "unit natives" required should be taken as a basis for planning. 100 natives per battalion plus a brigade reserve appears to be a bare minimum.

Weapons:

43. The Bren gun, sub MG, rifle and bayonet 2-inch and 3-inch mortar, grenades and MMGs were all used. In the attack the Bren, SMG and grenades were the most effective, sometimes preceded by 3-inch mortar fire. The Bren was particularly effective due to the greater penetrative power of its bullets. This also applies to the rifles.

Communications:

44. Generally speaking signal communications which were used under difficult circumstances were a great weakness and at some stages serious delays occurred. A number of these were due to overworked cipher personnel, failure of wireless sets, insufficient wireless sets, lack of sig cable; heavy traffic.

The following suggestions are made:-

- (a) Increase of cipher personnel, who were overworked and in addition frequently had to march all day and cipher messages all night.
- (b) Sufficient wireless sets taken by the formation to have one for Q messages when the formation is being supplied by air: a rear Q link is necessary.
- (c) Sending of messages, particularly those relating to supply in some simple code mutually arranged between Q staffs. This saves delays through ciphers.
- (d) Messages to be sent in clear when situation warrants it.

45. A strain was placed on 7 Div Sigs by having to keep signal communication open to the rear for a greater part of the advance; this should normally have been the function of Corps. This made itself felt right through the formation so that battalion sigs were sometimes laying line as they advanced for communications back to brigade and then if the unit was required to attack the unit sigs had to lay lines to coys carrying out an attack. This was an undue strain on unit sig personnel particularly when difficulties of ground and weather are encountered.

46. During an attack, the only method for a battalion commander to keep proper control was for a line to be laid behind each coy as it advanced.

47. 108 sets were carried but these were useless. (108 sets fitted with key and reported to be successful).

48. 208 sets were used in the later stages with some success. It seems essential to produce a set suitable for carrying by one man and powerful enough to be used in the jungle. Although there are many technical difficulties it is an urgent necessity. It will still be necessary to have line as well as wireless communication to coys thus giving alternative means of communication. In the case of deep patrols wireless only will be practicable, for this 7 Div successfully used 208 sets on the occasions they were available. It is recommended that until another set is available 208 sets are issued to all battalions taking part in jungle warfare to replace 108 sets. Coy sigs are already trained in morse code but refresher courses are probably required for using wireless sets.

Weight carried by Man:

49. The soldier is carrying at present equipment, weapons and ammunition, haversack with personal gear and five days rations and half a blanket rolled in a ground sheet. All this adds up to from 50 to 60 lbs per man. This is really too heavy. In practice troops left their haversacks off for an attack and the problem frequently arose of getting the haversacks forward if a quick advance followed the attack. Sometimes HQ coy personnel were used for this purpose which is obviously unsatisfactory.

50. It is difficult to see how this weight can be reduced. The following are suggestions which may help:

- (a) Lighter weight equipment;
- (b) Greater allotment of natives per battalion for carrying ammunition and rations and reduce amount per man;

US jungle
equipment

- (c) Substitution for the present ground sheet and blanket of a light weight hammock, such as was demonstrated at Landops in September.

Medical:

51. The allotment of field ambulances to 7 Div was inadequate and had it not been for large scale evacuation of casualties by air the situation might have been very serious. It seems that the allotment of one fd amb per bde is essential in this type of warfare. In addition with a long L of C detachments of a CCS are necessary. The success achieved was only made possible by use of natives as stretcher bearers for whom too much praise cannot be given, and making walking wounded cases out of casualties which would normally be stretcher cases. The lot of a wounded man was a painful one.
52. Although men were at times continually wet day and night very few colds and hardly any cases of pneumonia developed.
53. Quinine for malaria prevention was not available to fwd tps until they reached GONA ^{and} SOPUTA by which time it was too late. Quinine was required when tps reached KOKODA area but for various reasons was not available.

Liaison between HQs:

54. In all campaigns the junior formation seems to regard the senior formation far less capable than themselves and has many complaints. This campaign was no exception. In fact the feeling at 7 Aust Div at times ran particularly high. It is felt this was largely due to the difficulties of communication and lack of personal contact between Corps and Div HQs particularly in the early stages. It is suggested that this can be overcome if similar conditions arise in future by constant and regular visits of liaison and staff officers between the HQs. It is felt that a liaison officer is required just as much to bring back the feeling and difficulties of the junior formation to the higher as he is to carry orders to the junior formation. For this reason IOs and staff officers should be constantly visiting forward HQs even though there are no orders to take forward. This is taught at all Staff Schools but in practice never seems to be carried out sufficiently.

Training for Jungle Warfare:

55. It is felt that the orthodox training as carried out in the ME with tps spending one or two months in the jungle before going into action is the best training for jungle warfare. A thorough basic training is essential. Many lessons learnt on the parade ground or in the camp are essential for jungle fighting. Formation training in the open country and the lessons learnt from it are applicable to jungle fighting. In other words our present AIF training if properly taught is sound. It is necessary for tps to experience living in the jungle in the later stages so that they will become used to it and not be afraid of it.
56. It is suggested the following points should be stressed in training:-

(a) Individual training:

Discipline
Physical Fitness
Thorough Weapon training and plenty of firing practice including firing from the hip with

rifle, LMG and SMG.
 Bayonet training, particularly bayonet charges.
 Camouflage.
 Holding of fire (to be taught as individual trg).
 Sniping.
 Remaining still for long periods.
 Hygiene discipline.
 Individual cooking.
 Compass work and map reading.

(b) Collective Training:

Keep moving under fire in the attack.
 All round defence.
 Control by junior commanders.
 Patrolling including patrols extending over several days carrying own rations and moving silently.
 Assault courses.
 Advance guards with emphasis on point secs and scouts moving with no rattling equipment.
 Quick Deployment.
 Battle drill.
 Clear orders (points to be noted proper sequence and admin para)
 Hygiene discipline.
 Exercises for several days with tps only eating rations carried on back.

(c) Formation Training:

Practice in formations handling their units in the field is very necessary. Properly unpiere battalion, brigade and division exercises are required, with emphasis on the training of HQs and a good battle drill. All attack exercises to practise encircling movements.

Camouflage:

57. Camouflage is relatively easy in the jungle. It is almost impossible to see troops if they remain still, and a defensive position can be quickly camouflaged so that it is invisible until within a few yards of it. The dark green uniform appeared to be satisfactory and although it may not be perfect, concealment is so easy that it is not a factor of major importance. However, improvements in camouflage of uniforms can only be of assistance.
58. Troops shaved where possible. Any advantage that might exist in the wearing of beards on camouflage grounds was outweighed by the morale effect of shaving. Sometimes a shaving kit was shared by a section.

Reinfts:

59. Casualties are heavy in jungle fighting and reinfts are required to keep units in battle. The morale effect of reinfts is considerable.
60. The following orthodox procedure for reinforcing in future operations is suggested:-
- (a) Units are sent to a campaign at full W/E plus first reinfts (to be 20% of unit strength):
 - (b) First reinfts are left at base;
 - (c) Left out of battle (LOB) personnel are sent to unit B Ech before the unit's first major battle;
 - (d) LOB personnel rejoin unit after battle and thus

help to make up casualties.

- (e) After unit's second battle first reinforcements join the unit.
- (f) The unit is then at reasonable strength for their third battle. It is not usual for one unit to have more than three major actions in one campaign.

Air Support:

- 61. It was difficult to judge the effect of indirect support along the enemy's L of C. His dumps were hidden in the jungle and so well off the track they were invisible from the air and bombing and strafing of the track would have no effect on these dumps. It is felt an occasional sortie along the track had no value. The few planes circling over his L of C for long periods and strafing or bombing anything that moved might be of value. The effect of occasional raids on native carriers seems to wear off after a time. When 7 Div HQ was bombed at SOPUTA some 20 Rabaul natives had just been captured and brought in for questioning. When the raid commenced these natives ran into the bush but surprisingly enough they had nearly all returned after 20 minutes.
- 62. Direct air support in its fullest sense was impracticable due to the old difficulty of air to ground recognition. Deliberate bombing was arranged in support of ground troops but only at GONA was an attempt made to co-ordinate it with infantry attack.
- 63. Air SC sets with brigades were not used to speak to aircraft due to some instruction 7 Div had received forbidding it. It is essential that air to ground communication as far forward as possible is established and ground to air recognition signals used. It is understood 2 Air SC are working on this problem.

Morale

- 64. The attitude of our troops to the JAP was that he was a savage and only fit for extermination. Individually our troops were superior and knew it. However, physical weakness, short rations, and sickness damage morale.
- 65. It is necessary that everything possible is done to keep up men's morale in the jungle. Adequate rations made as palatable as circumstances allow, mail, tobacco and comforts are all important. A few days rest on good rations has a marked effect. Except for a few days rest for the 25 Bde at KOKODA and one day for the 16 Bde at OMU, these two brigades were going almost continually until withdrawn from GONA and SOPUTA.

Artillery

- 66. The first Fd Arty to be used was a tp of 2/1 Fd Regt with 25 pdrs which arrived by air at POPONDETTA. They were towed to the SOPUTA area by jeeps. The effect of their shooting was considerable, observation being the gunners' greatest difficulty. The shooting of these guns by the use of Arty/R supplied by 4 AC Sqn in Wirraways was highly successful.

Handcarts

67. Handcarts would be useful to a bn if it was moving along a jeep track; when movement is on smaller tracks or tracks which can not be used by jeeps they are of little use and could not accompany a bn on the move. Many uses can be made of handcarts once the position becomes stabilised.

Clothing

68. Shirt and long trousers tucked into American type gaiters were worn by troops in battle. Long trousers in spite of discomfort appear to be necessary for troops engaged in operations. American type gaiters are essential. Shorts are equally necessary when troops are not engaged in operations. They are cooler and more comfortable. Comfort of the soldier is an important factor in the tropics when he is not in battle, and has a direct bearing on morale.

Engineers

69. There is a considerable demand for Field Engineering in this type of operation. They are required to make and maintain landing strips, build jeep tracks, bridge rivers, etc; practically none of their usual equipment is available. Native labour was used extensively.

Maps

70. Maps used were inaccurate and this was a severe handicap to unit and formation comds and could have quite easily led to a dangerous situation. Two examples of this:-
- (a) The 2/1 Bn found when they outflanked OIVI that the KBBAR track did not lead to ILIMO as shown on the map but towards ASISI. This delayed them considerably.
 - (b) The 25 Bde discovered in their attack on GONA that there were two villages not one as shown on the map. This caused confusion when one of their units reached the outskirts on one village while another unit reported the village strongly held by the enemy. It was only discovered later they were referring to two different places.

Future Operations

71. It is clear that our manpower position will not allow us to engage in a series of battles of extermination with the enemy. Such tactics would suit the enemy with his greater manpower resources.
72. It does not seem to be very difficult to surprise the JAP and when surprised his first reaction tends toward panic.
73. It would appear then that we must use every means available to retain mobility to affect surprise and we must make full use of our superior supporting arms such as artillery and tanks etc. This should reduce casualties.
74. The use of air transport has been an outstanding feature to date and in future operations with more planes its possibilities are immense. The use of paratroops and/or glider troops to precede the landing of airborne troops offers possibilities in achieving surprise and gives us mobility.

75. Combined operations appear to be another method of achieving surprise when equipment and trained troops are available. Combined operations also allow us to land heavy supporting arms, such as artillery and tanks.

76. In air operations envisaged above a better co-operation than has existed in the past and close training together of Army and Air Force is essential. It is suggested as a preliminary that Army and Air Force (preferable air transport) officers are sent to schools such as staff schools where these problems are studied. If schools are not acceptable to the AAF a committee might be formed of Army and Air Force to study the problems referred to above.

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