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A. W. M. File 422/17/8

Operations in Malaya - Notes based on an
Interview which Major General A. D. Allen and
Brigadier Brynmor - had with and officer
on 16/6/42 who had considerable experience in the
campaign both as a Battalion and Infantry
Brigade Commander 1941-1942:-.

~~File~~ ~~C. Coy~~ ~~Jungle~~ ~~Fighting~~

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SECURITY H.Q. N'ole Covering Force,
HOME FORCES.
8 April, '42.

All Units.

N.G.F. TRAINING NOTES NO. 6.

1. The following notes are to be studied by all officers and put into practice immediately.
2. Steps will be taken to ensure the security of this information.

OPERATIONS IN MALAYA.

Dec 41 - Feb 42.

These notes are based on an interview on 16 Feb. 42 between two senior Australian officers and a British officer who had considerable experience in the campaign both as a bn and as an inf bde cmd. This ofr has the BSO, OBE, MC and Bar and has the reputation of being a good trainer as well as a good fighter.

Reason for Failure.

1. Lack of experience in jungle warfare and the fact that bdes had not really manoeuvred in jungle country were two of the main reasons. Training exercises generally finished at the end of the first day instead of going on for a week. The outlook was academic and there was no sense of reality in the training, whilst prior to the operations many appreciations were divorced from all reality.

Training for Jungle Warfare.

2. Units must practice and repeatedly practice every conceivable type of operation with the eqpt available - surprise and unexpected situations must be constantly introduced and in order to attain realism there must be an enemy and not merely a skeleton enemy. The whole command must be acclimatised to local conditions, the exercise must be kept running and all ranks must live hard and carry their proper eqpt.

Japanese Tactics.

3. The Japanese are brave but not fanatical, they maintain the impetus of their attack as they will always go on and retain contact. Their tactics are always constant and are marked by encircling moves and infiltration, and when this is not possible, by penetration. Immediately contact is established encirclement by the res coys of the fwd bn commences to a depth of 1000 yds; simultaneously or shortly afterwards the res bn commences a wide encircling move of anything up to 2 miles wide and 5 miles deep. Their capacity for cross country movement is first class and they always know where they are. Their ordinary inf is no better than ours but their tactical leading is first class and their moves are marked by aggressiveness and quickness, and the men will go on and on.

Stalker snipers in considerable numbers dressed like the local natives generally form the first wave in the encircling attack. They do the guiding and are specially picked first class fighters. When they reach our rear they have a special drill for climbing trees which in the jungle gives them command of a comparatively good field of fire. The fifth column is highly organised but is not as numerous as commonly supposed because stalker snipers are often mistaken for them. Their fieldcraft is good and they frequently use local renegades to assist them. These are trained to come forward into our lines in the dark flashing a torch and shouting in Urdu or English "Where is 'A' Coy?" or "Where is Subadar 'ajor 'X'?"

On another occasion a fifth columnist entered our lines shouting "Stop fighting the war is over". They act very boldly and come through our lines by themselves in the dark. The proper answer is for our troops to keep quiet and capture them without disclosing their posn.

4. (a) The rd is generally the only tactical feature that counts and to gain control of the rd is to win the battle. The enemy has used two principal methods: On several occasions he has used AFVs followed by inf to penetrate to a depth of 20 miles down the rd. This should be easy to stop either by the use of 4 Tk guns, 4 Tk. mines or arty. He has also used tanks in the dark and at SLIP RIVER he moved the tanks nose to tail in the dark down the rd.

(b) In daylight they are very quick to follow up in a withdrawal when fresh but when ambushed and hit back they stop quickly. A number of our units were caught by the quick follow up and in one case when they were embussing. When the British tps were fresh and alert they had little difficulty in stopping Japanese attacks and one regt allowed the enemy to carry out their encircling moves on a number of occasions and to pump into a prepared ambush.

(c) The Japanese inf. has often been inactive at night in patrolling and in tactical moves. Dawn is the active period. Our night withdrawals have not been followed up but day withdrawals have been pressed very closely. After advancing throughout the day the Japanese inf have been known to concentrate and spend the night in the nearest village. The Japanese arty is not as effective as ours but the employment of their 2" mortars is effective. They rely on the noise they make rather than on their killing powers. Our mortars are not quick enough coming into action and we need a higher standard of training so as to be able to shoot more quickly.

(d) The enemy had absolute air superiority. Their fighter attacks against our tps were not effective but their bombing attacks were quite effective because they were unopposed and did it from a height of about 1000 ft. Their bombs burst instantaneously and were very effective in rubber plantations.

(e) Some enemy tanks and trucks are specially fitted to use ry line.

Our Tactics.

5. (a) Dispersion is very necessary in the woods, both to avoid casualties and to get as many sources of origin of fires as possible. Owing to restricted visibility and very short fields of fire, amounting often to point-blank range, there is a great tendency to crowd together. In plantation areas where there is no jungle a bn should be disposed in about 1000 yds square and each coy area should be about 300 yds in diameter with a distance of 300-400 yds between coy perimeters. In jungle country the bn should be disposed on a narrow front astride the rd and to a depth of about 2 miles. To gain fire effect the section should be organised into three gps in accordance with "Section Organisation" (attached).

(b) The attack is the only means of defence in this type of country - passive defence means annihilation.

Our normal defence relies on mutually supporting localities garrisoned by relatively few men with automatic weapons of great fire power. In the jungle we cannot get mutually supporting localities and the fire power from MGs is very restricted. Covered approaches exist everywhere and greatly favour attack. It is not possible to watch the flanks let alone secure them, and there is no such thing as successful static defence because the enemy just walks round and secures the rd in the rear.

(c) There are two forms of attack: encircling or deep

penetration down the rd - encircling is the better method but requires highly trained jungle tps. To be successful it must not meet interference during the approach through the jungle and it should be controlled by one commander. Hence there are two rules: (i) It must not be interfered with before launched: and (ii) The comd must get a place before the fight from which the encircling movement can be controlled and as possession of the rd sooner or later is necessary for this control, the rd becomes the vital objective.

(d) The rd is the dominating feature and depth of our defence down the rd must be great and care must be taken to safeguard the "tail". Bn depth was never less than 2 miles. No gap must be left on the rd on which the enemy can establish himself. Self-contained coy gps should be established along the rd about 1 mile apart; each gp should have 4 rad Cs or trucks with motley mountings etc., for L/Gs. As carriers make a noise they should not be used initially for patrolling but kept as mobile forts in coy localities ready to support the coy or counter-attack along the rd.

Coy localities should be about 300 yds in diameter whilst in the pl secs should be about 100 yds apart and the secs disposed in gps with about 10 yds between gps. The res pl should be held ready to counter-attack. The important principle is to get as many points of origin of fire as possible.

Everyone in the bn must be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

An inf bde gp by itself should have a depth of about 6 miles.

(e) Patrols.

In jungle warfare the side which wins the patrol encounters wins the war, consequently every patrol must fight.

Sound is the main signal between patrols and this generally consists of rifle fire. Fighting patrols must fire on the enemy and hang on to him. Special patrols known as "Tiger" patrols composed of specially trained and resolute men should be used to move through the jungle and strike the rd in the rear of the enemy. If one patrol can hit an enemy column moving through the jungle it should be able to disorganise it and cause confusion. The jungle is a very safe place for patrols to operate as there is cover everywhere. A number of "Tiger" patrols should be kept in reserve ready to move out and deal with any enemy infiltrating parties.

(f) Map Reading.

A high standard of map reading is essential and parties must be able to go from point to point through the jungle. Every sec comd and patrol should have a compass - a man can be lost in a few yds of jungle because he has only to turn round a few times to lose his sense of direction.

Counter-Attacks.

6. Counter-attacks when ordered from above were not successful because the situation had invariably changed before the counter-attack was timed to take place. The immediate counter-attacks by the res or fwd units were successful on occasions. To stage a deliberate counter-attack in retirement it is necessary to select a piece of ground well back, plan the attack, get the tps in posn and then launch the attack when the enemy has occupied the piece of ground.

Tpt. Scale of Weapons and Eqpt carried by the Man.

7. This is dealt with in Ap.x. 1 (B) - "Notes on War Experience against Japanese by 12 Ind Inf Bde".

Our Training.

8. (a) It is essential that all men should be taught to dominate

their environment and get used to the jungle and thus acquire confidence. Men can get lost in 10 yds unless they are trained. The training should be progressive, the men should be sent out in pairs to go from point to point in the jungle, gradually increasing the distances until they become accustomed to it. Field craft games should be played and the men should be taught that the jungle gives them a great measure of safety as to find anyone in the jungle is like finding a needle in a haystack.

(b) In the tropic jungle the men had small reserves of emotional and physical energy. They must get acclimatised and fight against apathy. The inefficiency of people who were efficient in temperate climate was almost incredible. The men must be lightly equipped and physically tough. Patrols and ambushes must be practised and practised. In the campaign many failed due to lack of training and physical fitness. Attack is the only means of defence but our men were generally physically exhausted by the time they arrived on the battlefield.

(c) Weapons.

Only weapons which are suitable and easily handled should be used in the jungle. MGs were too heavy and took too long to move. L's need a mounting so they can be fired against a tree. Command is necessary and to attain this men must be taught to use their arms standing up behind a tree, in addition, men must be trained to get up trees and to adopt a drill to help each other in a manner similar to that used by the enemy stalkers.

(d) Patrols.

The importance of patrol training cannot be over emphasised. It is the side which wins the patrol actions which wins the jungle war. It must be remembered that as units and tps train so they fight, this was proved in LIBYA and in SYRIA.

How to Beat the Enemy.

9. (a) Discipline, the determination to fight it out, physical toughness, domination environment and sound hard training are the basic requirements.

In 1914-18 our Australian patrols dominated the Germans and paved the way to victory in the ensuing battles. In LIBYA and SYRIA our patrols when well trained and resolutely led have beaten the German, French Foreign Legion and Italians. To beat the enemy it is essential to win the patrolling encounters. The Japanese as a rule are very inactive at night time and fwd units when advancing have been known to bunch in villages for the night without any adequate protection.

(b) The Japanese do not like concentrated arty fire and to date they have not handled their arty as effectively as we do. By using arty fire on a narrow front deep penetration is possible along the rd. If this penetration is sufficiently deep we can break the enemy's control and when his control is broken his arranged plan is bound to fail. When the Japanese junior leaders are knocked out their tps generally bunch.

(c) Mobility and speed in bringing mortars into action and concentrated arty fire to bear on the enemy are most important, in particular we require to be much quicker in bringing effective mortar fire to bear on enemy parties. All ranks must be imbued with the determination to advance and to establish and maintain contact with the enemy. All personnel on headquarters and in adn units etc. must be taught to fight in the jungle as well as against parachutists.

(d) The following diagrams are attached as a guide only: a bn in defence, and a bde gp in defence.

.....Lt-Col.

(J. MOYES.)

General Staff, Newcastle Covering Force.

OPERATIONS IN MALAYA : Dec 41 - Feb 42.

These notes are based on an interview which Maj-Gen A.S. ALLEN and Brig F. H. BERRYMAN had with an offr on 16 Feb 42 who had considerable experience in the campaign both as a bn and as an inf bde comd. This offr has the DSO, OBE, MC and Bar and has the reputation of being a good trainer as well as a good fighter. He was specially withdrawn from SINGAPORE just prior to its fall to pass on the inf lessons of the campaign.

Reason for failure

1. Lack of experience in jungle warfare and the fact that bdes had not really manoeuvred in jungle country were two of the main reasons. Tng exercises generally finished at the end of the first day instead of going on for a week. The outlook was academic and there was no sense of reality in the tng, whilst prior to the ops many appreciations were divorced from all reality.

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Tot. scale of weapons and eqpt carried by the man.

7. This is dealt with in Appx "G" - "Notes on war experience against Japanese by 12 Ind Inf Bde."

A separate instrn "Mobility of units - Production in MT in fwd areas" dated 16 Feb 42 has been issued separately.

Our training

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How to beat the enemy


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- (c) Mobility and speed in bringing mortars into action and concentrated arty fire to bear on the enemy are most important, in particular we require to be much quicker in bringing effective mortar fire to bear on enemy parties. All ranks must be imbued with the determination to advance and to establish and maintain contact with the enemy. All personnel on headquarters and in adm units etc. must be taught to fight in the jungle as well as against parachutists.
- (d) The following diagrams are att as a guide only: a bn in defence, and a bde gp in defence.

Battalion in defence along a road
in thick jungle being attacked-
Counter measures shown.

Diagram I




NOTES:-

- (1) Each coy locality has a carrier and truck with LMG to counter-attack down rd.
- (2) Tp of A Tk guns may be split between A & C Coys or B & D Coys leaving rd open at A Coy so as to ambush tanks.
- (3) Each locality must have portable rd block and a few A Tk mines to block rd when required.
- (4) Rd behind locality where it is decided to stop tanks to be kept open if necessary for movement of our carriers and trucks with LMGs

Diagram II

Dispositions 12 Ind Inf Bde at SLIM RIVER

The depth of 12 Ind Inf Bde was 8½ miles and in their rear was another inf bde which made the total depth 10 miles. After delaying enemy attack "A" Bn was to withdraw through "B" Bn but when "A" Bn withdrew "B" Bn would NOT stop and thus "C" Bn (A & SH) were left to stop the enemy



In advancing or withdrawing along a rd units will be passing through each other and good leadership, training and discipline are necessary to maintain control when pressed.

SECTION ORGANISATION

(2 A. & S.H. Tng Memo No.11 dated 26 Jun 41)

1. The Inf Section under ONE Comd is not an altogether satisfactory tactical unit, at any rate in this country.

In a crisis, when tired, when ground conditions suddenly alter, or when its Comd is otherwise engaged it will bunch. Theoretically it should not, actually it will! The reaction is a psychological one, the same that animates any "group" of animals accompanying ONE leader.

Our requirement is Dispersion - for Safety, for Fire Effect, and for Tactical Effect, so that even in a Section we get applied the principle of one part "Fixing" while the other parts "Attack by Encirclement." In practice, it is almost impossible to get this done with ONE leader unless he is far above average.

2. I am therefore introducing the "group" for TACTICAL WORK only - taken from Sir John Moore's idea for his Light Inf in the Peninsula and later copied by the Germans - of each man being paired with a friend.

The Section will be in 3 groups, which in a full War Section would be, 3, 3, 2 in strength. The Sec Comd is always part of No.2 group and carries the Tommy Gun, though he may of course attach himself temporarily to any group as the situation demands. In practice, groups will be quickly down to 2, or even 1, but THEY STILL REMAIN A GROUP.

Groups will be formed from friends according to the men's wishes. The psychological reaction will then always be for the group to hold together just like the other associations of animal friends, called herds. There would not be the same instinctive pull to herd round the Sec Leader.

The group is not married for life; it can be divorced and remarried for the day, though it is hoped that it will settle down into constancy. The Leader is elected by the Group, and can be changed at any time provided the Sec Comd is told.

3. In tactics, the Sec Leader will control 3 Groups and NOT 7 men, i.e. 7 units, which in ALL other Comds up to Field Marshal is considered impossible. He will be in exactly the same position as a Pl Comd.

Examples of tactics are:

Patrol

"No.1 gp Scouts, No.2 gp with me, No.3 gp protect the rear. All 50 yds interval" - No.1 gp will of course act in the normal scouting way, and may (on say an open strip of road) have a man 200 yds ahead.

Advancing in Extended line

"No.1 Right, No.2 Centre, No.3 Left - 50 yds interval." "Line" means a line of Groups, not NECESSARILY a line of men, for the Groups themselves may be in blobs or in file.

File

"No.3 Group leading, followed by No.2 followed by No.1. All 50 yds interval. I shall be with No.3". Here again "File" means a File of Groups, and not NECESSARILY a File of men, for the Groups themselves may be in blobs or in line or in file, whichever is most convenient.

From this can develop some coherent tactical plan. No.3 is fired on - it "Fixes" while the others manoeuvre in encircling attack. A Sec of 8 men is fired on. In theory it splits and manoeuvres.

In practice it hangs on to the Leader of the Sec. Admittedly the groups may not keep much dispersed within themselves. This is of little moment if dispersion of the Sec into 3 Groups is achieved.

The picture of a Sec is of 3 small parties advancing with very wide intervals (50 yds in rubber) between parties and moderate irregular intervals (3 or 4 paces) between men, instead of even intervals (10 paces) between each man.

Group Leaders are of course responsible for keeping touch with their Sec Comd NOT their Sec Comd with them.

(Sgd-) I. M. Stewart
Lt-Col
Comd 2nd Bn A & S.H.

HQ Southern Area

Appendix "B"

Subject: Notes on War Experience against Japanese

Reference your HQ in SF 329/2/G dated 2 Feb 42.

(A) JAPANESE TACTICS

1. There is nothing new in these. They are much the same as those we have advocated and practised since the arrival of Force EMU in MALAYA on 6 August 1939. The only difference is that they are all trained to carry them out automatically. Their methods are:-

- (a) Fix in front Not dangerous. Easy to ambush - BUT is a sure sign that encirclement or infiltration is in process.
- (b) Initial encirclement. Simultaneous with first contact and probably carried out by the same Bn. (Note that this phase has, on occasion been omitted.)
Not dangerous as it does not go "deep" enough. Usually not more than 1000 yds or so.
- (c) The Regt Comdr's Battle using a fresh bn. Generally after a few hours interval. Very well directed and goes deep. We had it up to 4 miles from posn of contact. Dangerous and can only be countered -

- (i) By the forward troops ignoring the threat and standing up to it
 - (ii) By real depth
 - (iii) By NOT repeat NOT leaving dangerous gaps between units or formations in depth.
- There are several examples that could be cited.

2. Alternatively, the Japanese are prepared to accept the risks of penetration. I was not present at either Jitra or Gurun but I do know that both positions were - in my view - most dangerously extended and that penetration was easy almost anywhere.

The resultant infiltration in a situation in which no depth was provided destroyed confidence and as we all know had disastrous results.

3. Their methods with AFVs are bold but should be unsound and costly. I know of no instance in which an AFV has left the road. The undoubted successes they have gained have been due to our lamentable defence against an obvious danger. It should be too easy - but the troops must fight - both A Tk personnel and those in "localities." I think this danger is chiefly psychological. The word 'TANK' has become a synonym for 'RETIRE.'

4. Japanese eqpt has been frequently described in Intelligence and other summaries. It is light and practical. I have nothing to add.

(B) COUNTER MEASURES

1. We MUST change our outlook and understand the implications of fighting in close country. We still talk and think in terms of static defence, positions and lines. This is nonsense. The terms should be active defence of an area.

I know lip service is given to "active" defence, but it seldom happens. I suggest this is because tactical features are wrongly appreciated in close country, and the only one which matters is the road or track. All control MUST centre on a road, and provided that the road is held in adequate depth no amount of encirclement or infiltration can give victory. This comprises the static element and the only permissible static defence.

The enemy however will NOT be defeated by static defence, however staunch. He will only be defeated by the mobile element, i.e. the reserves. Experience has shown that the enemy develops his encircling moves very quickly. So quickly indeed that I am convinced they are initiated by reserves already placed to a flank in anticipation. These reserves must be attacked and defeated in movement and this can only be done if the mobile element of our defence is also deployed in anticipation. If it has to be moved after the enemy's intentions are clear it will inevitably be too late.

2. The counter to this form of attack, and also an alternative means of defeating the enemy is a "filletting" attack on a narrow front straight down the road. Such an attack is, in effect, penetration and requires heavy support. The result of success is to disrupt "control."

The Japanese have done this, after encirclement has failed, twice to my knowledge. At GOFENG and SLIM RIVER. On each occasion they used AFVs; once with partial and once with great success. On the latter occasion admittedly our own fault. It is for consideration whether a really intense creeping barrage would not be an equally efficient and safer method. Especially in view of the weight of artillery which we can use.

3. To sum up:

- (a) Fire effect is reduced in close country, therefore encirclement or infiltration are easy.
- (b) To combat this, depth and no gaps are required.
- (c) As an offensive measure the "filletting" attack on a narrow front down the road or track will disrupt the enemy control - but it must be heavily supported.

(C) HANDLING OF FD AND A TK ARTY.

1. Field Artillery:

- (a) Apart from difficulties of finding bty positions and OPs the chief problem is "Protection."

This is largely solved by the range of the 25 pr gun. The advantages of this eqpt over the 4.5 How are incalculable. (The 48 pr is almost useless owing to its flat trajectory.)

- (b) The Japanese quite definitely hate artillery fire and we had many very pleasing minor successes with concentrations. They are very apt to lie up in kampongs and isolated covered areas.
- (c) The opportunity never arose to try the "filletting" attack behind a barrage. I am sure it would be a successful variant of our normal tactics.

A Tk

- 2. (a) Depth naturally - but our experiences were unfortunate. It is always a big test to expect small detachments to stand - and on the one real chance against AFVs the inf failed and carried the A Tk gunners with them.
- (b) Given real depth in the A Tk defences, the question of A Tk blocks requires consideration. In a real defile where tanks cannot leave the road they are obviously desirable - but in the quite common case in which the road runs through fairly open rubber the question is not so easy.

1. In examinations it is always difficult to find a R.E. task. In practice there are always too many. In my recent experience demolitions were the outstanding requirement. This should not now be necessary.

2. I feel that improvement of communications will be the main task and I am inclined to think that no detachment which is in anyway dependent on "wheels" should ever be without R.E. support.

1. (a) Visual cert is merely an encumbrance.
- (b) Line is the main standby and on the whole kept through quite well. More liaison is required between R.F. and Signals, especially where a demolition plan is being implemented. On several occasions my communications were disrupted by "preliminary" demolitions. Great care is necessary in laying lines across rds; wherever possible they should be on trees clear of traffic.
- (c) W/T variable, but a useful alternative.
- (d) DRs essential. Many more required. At least double the present number.

2. Cipher: In my view cipher is utterly and entirely useless below Div HQ. It is always quicker to send by DR. Generally the need for speed should preclude the use of cipher.

As a rule cipher officers are young, enthusiastic and inexperienced and have little appreciation of the difficulties under which a HQ in close touch with the enemy works.

(a) Use of a wrong keyword at one end or the other
(b) Use of a cipher we do not hold
(c) Mutilated messages

and finally one classic example of a cipher message which began "In confirmation of telephone conversation....."

1. Carriers are vulnerable to enemy A Tk rifles, A Tk MGs and A Tk guns, and must not therefore be exposed to accurate fire from enemy Inf A Tk weapons - i.e. Inf must protect carriers from enemy A Tk weapons, while carriers protect them from enemy inf.

2. Enemy fire can be made inaccurate by surprise, i.e. by ambush. Carriers being noisy can be used only in static ambush, and must be in position well before they are required. Subsequently they may be used for a short bounce on a disorganised enemy.

3. Carriers should be used as mobile armoured forts, on which inf can base themselves, and must in turn base themselves on rd or track, from which they can operate near the perimeter of a coy locality. The height of the carriers 10' from the ground gives increased fire effect, which is enhanced by the carrier's ability to swing its fire away from the rd.

4. Ground sited LMGs have only a limited effect in this country, and LMGs from carriers should therefore rarely be dismantled.

5. Sec of carriers should form part of a coy self-contained locality when a bn is sited in great depth down a rd.

(G) METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED CARS.

1. The main characteristics are the same as those of the carrier, with the following differences:-

(a) The Armcd C is silent and can therefore be used in a mobile surprise attack most effectively, particularly if the attack is accompanied by an arty barrage.

(b) The height of the Armcd C's MG (6 ft) gives it its outstanding characteristic of fire effect.

(c) An Armcd C should form part of a coy self-contained locality when a bn is sited in great depth down a rd and should fire from the rd at the enemy's encircling attack.

2. In withdrawal Armcd Cs should be last to go. They have been repeatedly successful at ambushing enemy "follow-ups."

3. Always have Armcd Cs facing the way they expect to have to go and never allow them to exceed 20 m.p.h. Many have been lost up country through neglect of these rules.

4. Armcd Cs and Carriers require to be used with imagination and with very careful planning. Without it they will quickly become casualties. They MUST always be kept widely dispersed and camouflaged against air attack, and should never be parked in a harbour with only one exit.

5. Armcd Cs have formed the basis of our battle tactics, and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Their presence gives great moral support. In 2 A & SH the morale of their crews remains the highest in the Bn.

(H) ANY CHANGES REQUIRED IN OUR BOPT AND CLOTHING

Gas masks and Gas capes on truck

Steel helmets

Normal eqpt - Haversack on back containing:

Emergency rations

Haversack ration for the day (i.e. Bully and Biscuits)

Cardigan (most important)

Towel

Soap

Knife, fork and spoon

Ration tin

Mess tin

50 rds SAA per rifleman

Minimum 12 magazines per LMG carried in the sec: (except in defence, Remainder in reserve in Reece Car or truck.

(I) SUGGESTED REDUCTION IN SCALE OF VEHs.

The exact scale would of course depend on the scale of weapons held by a particular bn (see my para J). The following is suggested scale for a Brit bn holding the full scale of weapons:

M/Cs		14
Cars, 4 seater		1
Trucks, 8 cwt		9
15 cwt -	Bn office	1
	3" Mortars	2
	AA LMGs	1
	Sigs	1
	Pioneers	1
	Carrier PL	1
		- 7
Trucks, water tank		- 1

Lorries, 30 cwt	Coy LMGs etc.	4)	
	Medical Offr	1)	
	Offrs Mess	1)	} - 12
	MT stores & POL	1)	
	Cooks	5)	

Lorries, 3 ton	Reserve SAA & Mortars	3
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(J) SUGGESTED REDUCTION IN ESTAB: SCALE OF WEAPONS & AMN.

No fixed scale can be laid down. It must depend entirely on the state of trng of the unit. To give large quantities of automatic weapons and Arm'd Cs etc., to a Bn of raw recruits is merely to hand valuable eqpt over to the Japanese. Such a Bn should have rifles and bayonets and an LMG per pl - nothing else.

As trng goes on, so more weapons should be issued, till the time comes when the Bn is fully trained, when the following is the suggested scale of weapons:

LMGs	50	(incl carriers)
Tommy Guns	50	(one per sec; remainder in HQ)
A Tk rifles	24	
3" Mortars	4	
2" Mortars	12	(1 per Pl)
Carriers	14	
Arm'd Cs	7	

(K) AMENDMENTS TO TACTICAL NOTES FOR MALAYA

None other than those indicated in my paras (A), (B), (C), (D), (F) and (G).

(Sgd) ...C.M. Paris
Brig
Comd

SECRET

Mobility of Units - Reduction of MT in
forward areas.

Copy No.-
16 Feb 42

1. In the M.B.I. movement is practically confined to rds which in effect are defiles. In the swamp areas of SUMATRA the rds in many places are causeways whilst in other areas they are bounded by ditches, thick woods or jungle and consequently it is very difficult to get vchs off the rd but very easy to get them bogged alongside. During the recent operations in MALAYA the Indian Corps was encumbered by its own transport with disastrous consequences.
2. Rds are of vital importance in jungle warfare and must be held in considerable depth to defeat the enemy's infiltrating tactics. Small parties have been known to infiltrate five miles into our positions with the object of establishing themselves astride the rd in our rear. To defeat such parties the rds must be kept clear to allow our small mobile columns to move up and down rapidly.
3. A Commander responsible for the defence of an area will take special measures to protect the rd and ensure that it is kept open for the movement of his own transport whilst prepared at all times to prevent any AFVs from penetrating. The defence will be based on the rd. The special measures will include:
 - (a) Recce to find:
 - (i) places where MT can be parked off the rd
 - (ii) minor traffic circuits for turning round
 - (iii) places suitable for construction of MT parking places
 - (b) Construction of MT parking places, etc. small bridges and rd blocks to block enemy AFVs.
 - (c) Traffic Control. It is vitally important to keep the rd clear so that our carriers and columns can move both up and down. Vchs must NOT be allowed to block the rd. The Comd of each bn and equivalent unit area will detail a special offr and party who will be responsible for patrolling and keeping the rd open at all times and at all costs.
 - (d) The reduction of MT in the forward area to the absolute minimum. The defence in depth will assist in reducing the MT forward but this is NOT enough and the question should be considered under two headings:
 - (i) the units required for operations in the forward area
 - (ii) the MT necessary for forward units to operate
4. The units required for operations in the forward area will be governed by recce and the local situation but the general nature of the country should give an indication of what units can be left in rear. In thick jungle country only a proportion of the fd arty may be required forward whilst the MTGs may be more effectively used distributed in considerable depth along the rd.

The normal inf bde gp consists of:

HC Inf Bde, Sig Sec, L.D and Protective Fl
Fd Regt and 1 Tr Bty
Fd Coy
Three Bns
MG Coy
AAAC Coy
Fd Amb

In thick jungle country when operating on one road NOT more than two bns would be forward and it might be advisable to have only

the following units forward:

A Tk Bty (less one tp)	-	The remainder of the fd and A Tk
One fd Bty		arty being distributed in depth
Sgt fd Coy		full advantage being taken of the
One or two Bns		range of the 25 pr.
Pl MGs		
Amb Car Post		

This would effect a big reduction in MT. Transport platoons for carrying troops should be kept in rear if possible until actually required.

5. The MT necessary for forward units will depend on the local situation but if localities are stocked up for a week the bulk of the MT can be kept in rear. In addition to "B" echelon a scale will be worked out to include the vehs that are necessary for fighting. This scale for jungle fighting will be laid down by inf bdes in their standing orders and will be practised so that it can be put into operation immediately. It will mean a big cut in the amount of stores etc. carried. In the case of an inf bn the following scale is suggested for consideration. This is based on experience in MALAYA of the A & S, Highlanders who had the full scale of weapons:

MGs		14
Cars 4 seater		1
Trucks 8 cwt		9
" 15 cwt	- Bn office 1)	
	3" Mortars 2)	
	4 LMGs 1)	
	Sigs 1)	7
	Pioneers 1)	
	Carrier Pl 1)	
Trucks water tank		1
Lorries, 30 cwt	Coy LMGs etc.)	
	Medical offtr)	
	Offrs Mess 1)	
	MT Stores & 1)	12
	POJ 1)	
	Cooks 5)	

Lorries, 3 ton Reserve SAA & Mortars - 3

The bulk of this tot was kept several miles in rear. In the forward coy area one recon car was kept forward and one tactical and one adm truck were kept in rear of the coy when required, otherwise they were sent to the rear. Every truck contained both water and am.

The above scale will require modification in accordance with the tot actually held, e.g. carriers for mortars, etc. For patrolling and use on the rd trucks with motley mountings for LMGs will be necessary.

6. kept carried by the man

Steel helmet	
Haversack on back containing -	emergency ration
	ration for the day (bully & biscuits)
	cardigan (most important)
	Towel, soap and shaving gear
	knife, fork and spoon
	ration tin
	mess tin
Water bottle	
Rifle or other weapon	
50 rds SAA per rifleman	
Minimum 12 magazines per LMG carried in sed (except in	

defence). Remainder in recon car or truck.

For mobility the load on the man was kept to the absolute minimum.

Sgt F. H. Berryman. Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

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9-10	-	War Diary.

Story of young R.A.F. offir at PALEMBANG - 15 Feb 42.

The following account shows how the personal courage and initiative of a real leader can inspire men and bring about success. It is all the more noteworthy because this young offir had no tng in inf work and his command was a mixed and scratch one.

Pilot Officer Blank landed his plane at PALEMBANG I on 14 Feb 42 and owing to engine trouble was unable to take off again. He was on the aerodrome when the Jap parachute landing took place on 15 Feb. As he could not fly his plane, he destroyed it and then joined the nearest AA guns. When their ammunition was expended the guns were destroyed by the removal of the firing pins and sights and Pilot Officer Blank took charge of a mixed party of about 12 men consisting of British AA gunners, R.A.F. ground personnel and a couple of Dutch soldiers.


With this small party armed only with rifles he proceeded to seek out and mop up Jap parachutists in the vicinity of the drome. He estimates that he accounted for some 16 Japs in this period. He states that the Jap parachutists were armed with rifles and Tommy guns, that they wore green uniforms and that on the bodies of those he examined were fifty 10 Guilder notes bearing the words "Japanese Sovereignty of the former Dutch East Indies."

With the advent of Japanese ground troops in large numbers he decided to withdraw his party to PALEMBANG Town. He succeeded in finding an undamaged lorry and made off with his party. About half way to PALEMBANG he was held up by MG fire. By recon he ascertained that Jap parachute troops each with an IMG had occupied two isolated houses, one on each side of the rd. He organised a party which worked wide around the left flank. The party rushed the left hand house and killed the three occupants and captured the IMG. Meanwhile the Japs in the opposite house had decamped and again established themselves among some trees about 200^{yds} to the right of the rd. This party proved a great nuisance but after two hours was finally mopped up - again by outflanking. Finally, as dusk was now falling, Pilot Officer Blank collected his party in the lorry and made a dash in it for PALEMBANG Town. Although sniped at, they got through safely.

During the whole day the party only suffered three casualties (wounded) whom they succeeded in bringing away with them.


Pilot Officer Blank estimates that in all they accounted for some 22 of the enemy besides taking two IMGs.

ORGANIZATION OF A JAPANESE DIVISION - JANUARY 1942.



ORGANIZATION OF A JAPANESE REGIMENT - JANUARY 1942.

REGT HQ.



WAR OF 1939-45
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