



CONCRETE MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT  
 TYPE USED IN THE LEKE-KEYEM POSITION (N. OF DIXMUDE)

FIRST FRENCH ARMY, FROM SKETCH BY A GERMAN DESERTER (SAPPEE)



PLAN.



SECTION A. B.


NOTE: Some shelters are 6'10" square instead of 7'11".  
 The depth of the shelter varies with ground.  
 Some shelters have two shelters for M.G. side by side,  
 with one shelter for personnel.

CONCRETE MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT


TYPE USED IN THE LEKE-KEYEM POSITION (N. OF DIXMUDE)

FIRST FRENCH ARMY, FROM SKETCH BY A GERMAN DESERTER (SAPPER)

9.5.76  
C81



PLAN



SECTION A.B.

NOTE: Some shelters are 6'10" square instead of 7'11"  
The depth of the shelter varies with ground.  
Some shelters have two shelters for M.G. side by side,  
with one shelter for personnel.

1st Tunn Coy. 1372

3702


GERMAN FIELD WORKS  
PLATE 63

# CONCRETE MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT


TYPE USED IN THE LEKE-KEYEM POSITION (N. OF DIXMUDE)

FIRST FRENCH ARMY, FROM SKETCH BY A GERMAN DESERTER (SAPPER)

259 6 57



PLAN.



SECTION A.B.

**NOTE:** Some shelters are 6'10" square instead of 7'11"  
 The depth of the shelter varies with ground.  
 Some shelters have two shelters for M.G. side by side,  
 with one shelter for personnel.

Drawn by E.G. Hancock,  
2nd Lt. R.E.

CONCRETE MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT


GERMAN FIELD WORKS  
 PLATE 63

TYPE USED IN THE LEKE-KEYEM POSITION (N. OF DIXMULE)


FIRST FRENCH ARMY, FROM SKETCH BY A GERMAN BATTERY (SNIPER) INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No. 7/180  
 Date 1/1/1919

ALL PARTS, 200  
 AUSTRALIA DIVISION  
 GENERAL STAFF  
 425/323



PLAN.



SECTION A B.

NOTE: Some shelters are 6'10" square instead of 7'11".  
 The depth of the shelter varies with ground.  
 Some shelters have two shelters for M.G. side by side,  
 with one shelter for personnel.

*Handwritten signature*  
 Drawn by F.C. Newman  
 2nd April 1919


320.2

**CONCRETE MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT**


(TYPE USED IN THE LEKE-KEYEM POSITION (N. OF DIXMUDE))

FIRST FRENCH ARMY, FROM SKETCH BY A GERMAN DESERTER (SAPPER)

*g.o.c.*  
*W.S. O.C.R.H.*  
*B.S. S.*  
*Operation*  
*C.E. (Sketch)*  
*W*  
*W*  
*W*



PLAN



SECTION A B.

**NOTE:** Some shelters are 6'10" square instead of 7'11".  
The depth of the shelter varies with ground.  
Some shelters have two shelters for M.G. side by side,  
with one shelter for personnel.

370-2

GERMAN FIELDWORKS  
PLATE 64.



# MINED DUGOUTS

NEAR WYTSCHAETE, JUNE 1917.


To show multiplication of entrances.

1st Tunnel Coy  
2378

NEAR THE HOSPICE, WYTSCHAETE.




PLAN



SECTION

## S.E. OF WYTSCHAETE



Drawn by F.C. Stevens  
27/6/17.

# MINED DUGOUTS


NEAR WYTSCHAETE, JUNE 1917.

To show multiplication of entrances.


GERMAN FIELDWORKS  
PLATE 64.



NEAR THE HOSPICE, WYTSCHAETE.



S.E. OF WYTSCHAETE







370.2

# TYPE OF CONCRETE SHELTER IN THE SIEGFRIED LINE

(FRENCH GROUPE D'ARMÉES DU NORD FROM RELIABLE SOURCES 30.6.17)



PLAN ON LEVEL E.F.G.H.



SECTION A.B.

SECTION C.D.

Scale 1/100.

Drawn by F.B. Newscomb,  
2nd Lt. R.E.




3595/160


101 Lums Coy. 2375

**TYPE OF CONCRETE SHELTER IN THE SIEGFRIED LINE**

(FRENCH GROUPE D'ARMÉES DU NORD FROM RELIABLE SOURCES 30-6-17)



PLAN ON LEVEL E.F.G.H.





SECTION A.B.

SECTION C.D.

Scale 1/100

Drawn by E.S. Newcomb,  
2nd Lt., R.E.

320.2

GERMAN FIELD WORKS  
PLATE 66.CONCRETE DEFENSIBLE POST (MEBU).FIRST FRENCH ARMY, 21, JULY 1917.From Statement of Prisoners.

This pattern, said to have been built in May 1917, exhibits the following new features :-

- (1) Pivots for 4 Machine Guns
- (2) The windows of the Post are made obliquely in the concrete, and have two pieces of wire netting to prevent hand grenades being thrown in
- (3) Guard rail to the Fire step.

There are periscope chimneys (not shown) and the doors both of the shelters and the recesses are plated with 5 mm. steel as in earlier patterns.




# DUGOUTS AND WIRE

FROM CAPTURED HECTOGRAPH, JULY 1917

15th A.I.B. L 629

359/5/170





## 1 DUGOUTS

Suitable arrangement of shell proof


### (a) ISOLATED SHELTER

#### SECTION A. B.

Index 359/4 PLAN




### (b) GROUPS OF SHELTERS



## 2. OBSTACLES

Suitable arrangement of continuous obstacles behind the front line; also in front of the first line of the Artillery covering position and all rearward positions.



**NOTE:** The gaps are not of fixed dimensions but should be varied to suit the requirements of the covered advance of storm troops.

1st Lt. D. B. 6  
Q 198

# DUGOUTS AND WIRE

FROM CAPTURED HECTOGRAPH, JULY 1917

HEADQUARTERS, 1st ANZAC DIVISION  
No. 177886  
9 SEP. 1917  
(German)  
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE  
PLAN



Inter  
359/41  
4/9

## 1. DUGOUTS


Suitable arrangement of shell proof

### (a) ISOLATED SHELTER

SECTION A.B.




### (b) GROUPS OF SHELTERS



## 2. OBSTACLES

Suitable arrangement of continuous obstacles behind the front line; also in front of the first line of the Artillery covering position and all rearward positions.



NOTE: The gaps are not of fixed dimensions but should be varied to suit the requirements of the covered advance of storm troops.

812

320.2

# DUGOUTS AND WIRE

FROM CAPTURED HECTOGRAPH, JULY 1917


C389

## 1. DUGOUTS


Suitable arrangement of shell proof

### (a) ISOLATED SHELTER


SECTION A.B.



PLAN




### (b) GROUPS OF SHELTERS



## 2. OBSTACLES

Suitable arrangement of continuous obstacles behind the front line; also in front of the first line of the Artillery covering position and all rearward positions.



NOTE: The gaps are not of fixed dimensions but should be varied to suit the requirements of the covered advance of storm troops.

1st Inf Bde  
Q 298.

D

3202

11/19



## GERMAN BANGALORE TORPEDOES.

Three forms of enemy's Bangalore torpedoes have recently been reported. In two of them the handle portion of the "Stick" hand grenade was used as the firing device; in the third, a friction lighter similar to the one in the "Egg" hand grenade, with a length of safety fuze, was employed.

In two, the charge consisted of 1 kilo. packets of Perdit in damp-proof cardboard boxes (in one case with the addition of a few slabs of dynamite). In each packet there were three gaines filled with wax, any one of which after being cleared with a wooden prick punch can be used for the insertion of the detonator. In the third torpedo the charge was packed in a 3-inch zinc pipe.

1. The first torpedo (reported by 3rd Div. 27-7-17, see Figs. 1 and 2) was 9 ft. 6 ins. long, and consisted of ten 1 kilo. packets of Perdit, wired to a deal plank, and covered with a sheet of zinc painted black. At one end was the handle, with detonator, of a "Stick" grenade. The other end was blocked with wood. Packets Nos. 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8 respectively were connected by a detonator.

*Method of Ignition.*—Remove screw cap from end of handle and pull the wire loop or button found in the recess under the cap. The safety fuze burns  $5\frac{1}{2}$  seconds.

*To render Useless.*—Remove the handle and extract all the detonators.

2. The second torpedo (reported by 502nd (Wessex) Field Coy. R.E., see Figs. 3 and 4) was 9 ft. 8 ins. long. This also contained ten 1 kilo. packets of Perdit, but with seven slabs of dynamite, interpolated between Nos. 1 and 2, packed in a wooden box. The bottom of the box was extended for the attachment of the firing apparatus, which consisted of two friction lighters with lengths of safety fuze connected to detonators in two of the gaines of the first packet of Perdit. As in (1), there were connecting detonators:—between packet No. 2 and the dynamite, between Nos. 5 and 6, and Nos. 8 and 9.

*Method of Ignition.*—Pull the wire loop of the friction lighter.

*To render Useless.*—Cut through the safety fuze, remove the friction lighters and the detonators.

3. The third torpedo (reported by the C.R.E. 35th Div., 22-7-17) consisted of a 7-ft. length of ordinary 3-in. zinc water-piping filled with an explosive which appeared to be Perdit.

One end of the pipe was plugged with clay, the edges of the pipe being pinched over to keep the plug in position. The other end of the pipe was closed by the firing apparatus, which consisted of an ordinary German "Stick" grenade. The lid of its tin cylinder was removed so that the charge in the grenade was in direct contact with the explosive in the torpedo. The handle of the grenade was carried separately. There were 19 lbs. of explosive in the torpedo, or about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. per foot run.

*Method of Ignition.*—In order to fire the torpedo, all that it is necessary to do is to screw in the wooden stick handle with its detonator fixed, and pull the string loop or button. The fuze burns  $5\frac{1}{2}$  seconds. The torpedo could be fired from cover by attaching a length of string to the loop or button on the grenade.

*To render Useless.*—Unscrew the handle and remove the detonator.

# GERMAN BANGALORE TORPEDOES

## TORPEDO N°1

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.





Fig. 3.

**TORPEDO N° 2.**  
with top and side of box removed.  
1-10 are packets of Perdit



ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES A-NIT-

## GERMAN FIELD WORKS. PLATE 68





Fig. 5.



Drawn by F. J. [unclear]

## GERMAN BANGALORE TORPEDOES.

Three forms of enemy's Bangalore torpedoes have recently been reported. In two of them the handle portion of the "Stick" hand grenade was used as the firing device; in the third, a friction lighter similar to the one in the "Egg" hand grenade, with a length of safety fuze, was employed.

In two, the charge consisted of 1 kilo. packets of Perdit in damp-proof cardboard boxes (in one case with the addition of a few slabs of dynamite). In each packet there were three gaines filled with wax, any one of which after being cleared with a wooden prick punch can be used for the insertion of the detonator. In the third torpedo the charge was packed in a 3-inch zinc pipe.

1. The first torpedo (reported by 3rd Div. 27-7-17, see Figs. 1 and 2) was 9 ft. 6 ins. long, and consisted of ten 1 kilo. packets of Perdit, wired to a deal plank, and covered with a sheet of zinc painted black. At one end was the handle, with detonator, of a "Stick" grenade. The other end was blocked with wood. Packets Nos. 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8 respectively were connected by a detonator.

*Method of Ignition.*—Remove screw cap from end of handle and pull the wire loop or button found in the recess under the cap. The safety fuze burns  $5\frac{1}{2}$  seconds.

*To render Useless.*—Remove the handle and extract all the detonators.

2. The second torpedo (reported by 502nd (Wessex) Field Coy. R.E., see Figs. 3 and 4) was 9 ft. 8 ins. long. This also contained ten 1 kilo. packets of Perdit, but with seven slabs of dynamite, interpolated between Nos. 1 and 2, packed in a wooden box. The bottom of the box was extended for the attachment of the firing apparatus, which consisted of two friction lighters with lengths of safety fuze connected to detonators in two of the gaines of the first packet of Perdit. As in (1), there were connecting detonators:—between packet No. 2 and the dynamite, between Nos. 5 and 6, and Nos. 8 and 9.

*Method of Ignition.*—Pull the wire loop of the friction lighter.

*To render Useless.*—Cut through the safety fuze, remove the friction lighters and the detonators.

3. The third torpedo (reported by the C.R.E. 35th Div., 22-7-17) consisted of a 7-ft. length of ordinary 3-in. zinc water-piping filled with an explosive which appeared to be Perdit.

One end of the pipe was plugged with clay, the edges of the pipe being pinched over to keep the plug in position. The other end of the pipe was closed by the firing apparatus, which consisted of an ordinary German "Stick" grenade. The lid of its tin cylinder was removed so that the charge in the grenade was in direct contact with the explosive in the torpedo. The handle of the grenade was carried separately. There were 19 lbs. of explosive in the torpedo, or about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. per foot run.

*Method of Ignition.*—In order to fire the torpedo, all that it is necessary to do is to screw in the wooden stick handle with its detonator fixed, and pull the string loop or button. The fuze burns  $5\frac{1}{2}$  seconds. The torpedo could be fired from cover by attaching a length of string to the loop or button on the grenade.

*To render Useless.*—Unscrew the handle and remove the detonator.



# GERMAN BANGALORE TORPEDOES

## TORPEDO N°1

Fig. 1.

9'6"




Fig. 2.




Fig. 3.

## TORPEDO N° 2.

with top and side of box removed.

1-10 are packets of Perdit





Fig. 4.

DETAILS OF IGNITION APPARATUS

## GERMAN FIELD WORKS. PLATE 68.




Fig. 5.




Drawn by H. H. ...



### GAPS IN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.

(From a captured memorandum issued by 293rd Inf. Div., 13-7-17.)

Gaps must be 13 to 16 feet wide and made in groups of four, spaced over a length of 90-110 yards. For the present, until required, they will be closed with a plain wire. This will prevent tracks being made through them which would reveal their presence in photographs.

- I. In single belts of wire in the open, gaps will be made on the skew. (See Fig. 1.)
- II. In double and triple belts of wire, zigzag lanes will be made. (See Fig. 2.)
- III. In wired hedges, gaps in the wire will be left as shewn in Fig. 3, and filled, behind the hedge, by a knife rest.
- IV. In gaps intended for infantry only, there should be pickets; they will not be wired, but wire will be kept ready at hand.





# HINDENBURG LINE

(Including the Quéant-Drocourt Line).

*The section East of Arras is called the Wotan position.  
The section North of St. Quentin is called the Siegfried position.  
The section South of St. Quentin is called the Alberich position.*

1. The Hindenburg line does not as a whole follow any well marked physical feature. It exhibits generally, however, a definite tendency to utilize the reverse slopes on the West side of certain marked depressions. Occasionally it is sited behind the natural obstacle of a river or canal.

2. (a) From La Fère to the Oise (at Alaincourt) it is behind (East of) the Oise.

(b) It crosses the watershed between the Oise and the Somme (St. Quentin) on reverse slopes.

(c) From St. Quentin to Vendhuile, it covers the Canal de St. Quentin, running along a reverse slope.

(d) From Vendhuile to Bantouzelle, it is for a short distance—3½ miles—in rear (East) of the Canal, though a position on the West bank appears available. This portion is low down the forward slope so that it covers a good observation line on the heights above it.

(e) From Bantouzelle to Drocourt, it covers, at varying distances, the depression in which lie the Canal de l'Escaut, the Grand Ravin, the Canal du Nord and the Canal de la Sensée, on a general reverse slope.

3. Though thus running for much of its length on a reverse slope, its general trace is too straight for full advantage to be taken of ground. It goes over hill and valley, as, for instance, may be seen between Bantouzelle and Havrincourt, where it crosses four valleys and also runs over the crest of a hill. Both front and support trenches of the front system are, however, frequently on a reverse slope. Where there is a shallow parallel depression close in front, or a considerable valley spreading out westwards with the opposite heights at some distance, the firing line is generally on the crest.

4. The siting frequently admits of direct artillery observation from heights in rear, and the attacker in his advance must generally come over ground that is under such observation. At the same time, observation from our side is denied.

5. Advanced infantry posts in shell holes or narrow trenches, frequently without any covered communication to the rear, are organized in front of the main line.

6. The principles of the construction of positions laid down in the German Manual—"General Principles of the Construction of Field Positions" of 18th November, 1916, translated as S.S. 558, and in General von Below's memorandum of 30th January, 1917, translated as S.S. 553—"Experience of the German First Army in the Somme Battle," appear to have been carried out. In the latter it is stated "the front infantry trenches are well placed if they are situated on a reverse slope out of sight of ground observation of the enemy's artillery, and are overlooked by their own artillery observers from a position at least 550 yards in rear. At the same time, these observers should be able to see well into the ground over which the enemy must attack, for at least 200 yards in front of their own wire, and it should be possible to overlook, either from the front or a flank, at least a part of the ground behind the belt over which the enemy must make the approach marches."

7. A broad defensive zone behind the front line is gradually being constructed as contemplated in the above-mentioned instructions.

8. Illustrations of the trace and profile of the trenches are given in Plate 70 (1) and (2), the general organization of a section in Plates 71 and 72, and the arrangement of wire in Plates 73, 74 and 75.

9. The following points will be noticed:—The traverses are thick, 24 to 33 feet, and the trenches wide and mostly unrevetted (some are reported to be deeper than those illustrated and to have two gangways, one at the bottom of the trench and the other on an intermediate level below the fire step). The support trench is 200 to 250 yards (but the limits are elsewhere reported to be 150 to 300 yards) from the front trench; there are plenty of communication trenches, often branching when they enter a line; the wire extends considerable distances in front of the line and is arranged so that it can be flanked by machine guns [see 11], and there are large gaps in the wire in front of the support trench through which troops can move to the counter-attack. Some wire near Bellenglise is said to be electrified.

10. **Machine Guns.**—Von Below in his memorandum lays down: "Built up machine gun emplacements are soon smashed to pieces unless they are shell proof (against heavy artillery). As a rule, the best way is to provide shell-proof shelters for the machine guns, in which they are to be kept until required for action, when they are fired over the parapet." This rule has been observed by the construction, where there has been time, of "Mebus." These are ferro-concrete dug-outs, containing shelters for men and machine guns, arrangement for periscope observation, with a banquette on the rear side from which the M.G. can be fired, the concrete building itself forming the parapet (see Plate 76. Some "Mebus" are less elaborate, being merely a concrete shelter with a plank banquette). The arrangement of "Mebus" in a parapet is shown in Plate 71.

11. The relation of the machine guns to the wire entanglement is illustrated in Plate 75. They are sited at the intersection of the edges of salients\*. The wire actually in front of them is often low or sunk.

12. No concrete or covered M.G. emplacements have been seen. Concrete emplacements have, however, been reported in the support trench and between the support and front trenches in canal banks and in hillocks, woods, etc. Open M.G. emplacements have been found situated outside the trenches, in holes, approached by underground passages, that is, they are similar to "Champagne emplacements." The approaches to them are covered for some distance, but there is usually a trench in fairly close proximity.

13. **Dug-outs.**—Deep mined dug-outs in the front line trench were "absolutely prohibited" by von Hindenburg (S.S. 544, Translation of Memo. of Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, 25th December, 1916) after the "serious and regrettable reverses" of the Autumn of 1916, but many are still to be found (see Plate 70, (1) and (2)). This is said to have been due to lack of time to construct concrete ones. Where possible, however, concrete shelters have been made every 50 to 100 yards (see Plate 77) for the garrison of the front line. (Some of these are merely "funk holes" but probably others are provided with banquettes so that they may be used as "Mebus.") It is reported that in some parts there are larger concrete dug-outs, 6 x 6 x 2 metres, at irregular intervals, while in others that there are only sufficient concrete shelters to accommodate the company and platoon commanders. Photographs of the Hindenburg line in course of construction show typical excavations in which concrete dug-outs are being made, both in front of, and behind the parapet.

14. In the support trench there are both concrete and mined "residential" dug-outs. The entrances are in the trench and also behind it in the open field. Entrances in a trench are under the parapet and are arranged so that there is only one between each pair of traverses.

15. **O.P.s.**—A special wedge-shaped pattern of O.P. (vide German Fieldworks, Plates 53 and 55) consisting of two skins of steel, built up of plates bolted together, with concrete between them, has been found. It is sometimes combined with a "Mebu" (see Plate 76), but is also erected independently of any other structure.

16. **Subways.**—Between Somme and Oise, it is reported that the front and support trenches are connected underground, and that covered communications run back for half a mile; and elsewhere that it is intended to have a complete system of underground connections and parallel tunnels. Such a tunnel has actually been found near Heninel (see Plate 70 (1)).

17. **Trench Mortar Emplacements.**—Trench Mortars are said to be mostly in the support trench, but have been noticed, in aeroplane photographs, in short lengths of trench forming loops in rear of the front trench, and in the space between front and support trenches.

18. **Tank Guns.** Field guns in concrete emplacements behind the support trench have been reported. The emplacements appear from a captured drawing to be shelters for detachment and gun, from which it can be got up by a ramp to fire over the parapet.

19. **Strong Points.** As in earlier systems, there are strong points which are easily recognizable in photographs by the continuous wire round them.

**NOTE.**—Many of the arrangements observed in the portions of the Hindenburg line that have been captured will no doubt be modified in accordance with the experience of recent fighting, as the footnote to Section 11, taken from General von Armin's report, shows. This document admits that the old rigid methods of defence have failed, and another method of constructing positions must be employed as soon as a battle commences. Supports and reserves, however, will continue to occupy continuous trenches made on reverse slopes.

\* This arrangement has been found by the enemy to be a mistake, as it leads to the detection of the machine gun emplacements. A captured document issued by General Sixt von Armin, commanding Fourth German Army, on the "Construction of Defensive Positions" (translated as S.S. 574), dated 30-6-17, lays down: "They (machine guns) must take the enemy by surprise. It is, therefore, not advisable to place them in the angles of the wire, where the enemy is bound to suspect their presence. Only dummy emplacements should be constructed at these points, while the actual machine guns are sited in concealed emplacements to a flank or in rear."

55<sup>th</sup> Division

Note attached to German  
Fieldworks, Plates 70-77.

## HINDENBURG LINE

(Including the Quéant—Drocourt Line).

*The section East of Arras is called the Wotan position.  
The section North of St. Quentin is called the Stegfried position.  
The section South of St. Quentin is called the Alberich position.*

1. The Hindenburg line does not as a whole follow any well marked physical feature. It exhibits generally, however, a definite tendency to utilize the reverse slopes on the West side of certain marked depressions. Occasionally it is sited behind the natural obstacle of a river or canal.

2. (a) From La Fère to the Oise (at Alaincourt) it is behind (East of) the Oise.

(b) It crosses the watershed between the Oise and the Somme (St. Quentin) on reverse slopes.

(c) From St. Quentin to Vendhuile, it covers the Canal de St. Quentin, running along a reverse slope.

(d) From Vendhuile to Bantouzelle, it is for a short distance— $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles—in rear (East) of the Canal, though a position on the West bank appears available. This portion is low down the forward slope so that it covers a good observation line on the heights above it.

(e) From Bantouzelle to Drocourt, it covers, at varying distances, the depression in which lie the Canal de l'Escaut, the Grand Ravin, the Canal du Nord and the Canal de la Sensée, on a general reverse slope.

3. Though thus running for much of its length on a reverse slope, its general trace is too straight for full advantage to be taken of ground. It goes over hill and valley, as, for instance, may be seen between Bantouzelle and Havrincourt, where it crosses four valleys and also runs over the crest of a hill. Both front and support trenches of the front system are, however, frequently on a reverse slope. Where there is a shallow parallel depression close in front, or a considerable valley spreading out westwards with the opposite heights at some distance, the firing line is generally on the crest.

4. The siting frequently admits of direct artillery observation from heights in rear, and the attacker in his advance must generally come over ground that is under such observation. At the same time, observation from our side is denied.

5. Advanced infantry posts in shell holes or narrow trenches, frequently without any covered communication to the rear, are organized in front of the main line.

6. The principles of the construction of positions laid down in the German Manual—"General Principles of the Construction of Field Positions" of 18th November, 1916, translated as S.S. 558, and in General von Below's memorandum of 30th January, 1917, translated as S.S. 558—"Experience of the German First Army in the Somme Battle," appear to have been carried out. In the latter it is stated "the front infantry trenches are well placed if they are situated on a reverse slope out of sight of ground observation of the enemy's artillery, and are overlooked by their own artillery observers from a position at least 550 yards in rear. At the same time, these observers should be able to see well into the ground over which the enemy must attack, for at least 200 yards in front of their own wire, and it should be possible to overlook, either from the front or a flank, at least a part of the ground behind the belt over which the enemy must make the approach marches."

7. A broad defensive zone behind the front line is gradually being constructed as contemplated in the above-mentioned instructions.

8. Illustrations of the trace and profile of the trenches are given in Plate 70 (1) and (2), the general organization of a section in Plates 71 and 72, and the arrangement of wire in Plates 73, 74 and 75.

9. The following points will be noticed:—The traverses are thick, 24 to 33 feet, and the trenches wide and mostly unrevetted (some are reported to be deeper than those illustrated and to have two gangways, one at the bottom of the trench and the other on an intermediate level below the fire step). The support trench is 200 to 250 yards (but the limits are elsewhere reported to be 150 to 300 yards) from the front trench; there are plenty of communication trenches, often branching when they enter a line; the wire extends considerable distances in front of the line and is arranged so that it can be flanked by machine guns [see 11], and there are large gaps in the wire in front of the support trench through which troops can move to the counter-attack. Some wire near Bellenglise is said to be electrified.

10. **Machine Guns.**—Von Below in his memorandum lays down: "Built up machine gun emplacements are soon smashed to pieces unless they are shell proof (against heavy artillery). As a rule, the best way is to provide shell-proof shelters for the machine guns, in which they are to be kept until required for action, when they are fired over the parapet." This rule has been observed by the construction, where there has been time, of "Mebus." These are ferro-concrete dug-outs, containing shelters for men and machine guns, arrangement for periscope observation, with a banquette on the rear side from which the M.G. can be fired, the concrete building itself forming the parapet (see Plate 76. Some "Mebus" are less elaborate, being merely a concrete shelter with a plank banquette). The arrangement of "Mebus" in a parapet is shown in Plate 71.

11. The relation of the machine guns to the wire entanglement is illustrated in Plate 75. They are sited at the intersection of the edges of salients\*. The wire actually in front of them is often low or sunk.

12. No concrete or covered M.G. emplacements have been seen. Concrete emplacements have, however, been reported in the support trench and between the support and front trenches in canal banks and in hillocks, woods, etc. Open M.G. emplacements have been found situated outside the trenches, in holes, approached by underground passages, that is, they are similar to "Champagne emplacements." The approaches to them are covered for some distance, but there is usually a trench in fairly close proximity.

13. **Dug-outs.**—Deep mined dug-outs in the front line trench were "absolutely prohibited" by von Hindenburg (S.S. 544, Translation of Memo. of Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, 25th December, 1916) after the "serious and regrettable reverses" of the Autumn of 1916, but many are still to be found (see Plate 70, (1) and (2)). This is said to have been due to lack of time to construct concrete ones. Where possible, however, concrete shelters have been made every 50 to 100 yards (see Plate 77) for the garrison of the front line. (Some of these are merely "funk holes" but probably others are provided with banquettes so that they may be used as "Mebus.") It is reported that in some parts there are larger concrete dug-outs, 6 x 6 x 2 metres, at irregular intervals, while in others that there are only sufficient concrete shelters to accommodate the company and platoon commanders. Photographs of the Hindenburg line in course of construction show typical excavations in which concrete dug-outs are being made, both in front of, and behind the parapet.

14. In the support trench there are both concrete and mined "residential" dug-outs. The entrances are in the trench and also behind it in the open field. Entrances in a trench are under the parapet and are arranged so that there is only one between each pair of traverses.

15. **O.P.s.**—A special wedge-shaped pattern of O.P. (*vide* German Fieldworks, Plates 53 and 55) consisting of two skins of steel, built up of plates bolted together, with concrete between them, has been found. It is sometimes combined with a "Mebu" (see Plate 76), but is also erected independently of any other structure.

16. **Subways.**—Between Somme and Oise, it is reported that the front and support trenches are connected underground, and that covered communications run back for half a mile; and elsewhere that it is intended to have a complete system of underground connections and parallel tunnels. Such a tunnel has actually been found near Heninel (see Plate 70 (1)).

17. **Trench Mortar Emplacements.**—Trench Mortars are said to be mostly in the support trench, but have been noticed, in aeroplane photographs, in short lengths of trench forming loops in rear of the front trench, and in the space between front and support trenches.

18. **Tank Guns.** Field guns in concrete emplacements behind the support trench have been reported. The emplacements appear from a captured drawing to be shelters for detachment and gun, from which it can be got up by a ramp to fire over the parapet.

19. **Strong Points.** As in earlier systems, there are strong points which are easily recognizable in photographs by the continuous wire round them.

NOTE.—Many of the arrangements observed in the portions of the Hindenburg line that have been captured will no doubt be modified in accordance with the experience of recent fighting, as the footnote to Section II, taken from General von Armin's report, shows. This document admits that the old rigid methods of defence have failed, and another method of constructing positions must be employed as soon as a battle commences. Supports and reserves, however, will continue to occupy continuous trenches made on reverse slopes.

\* This arrangement has been found by the enemy to be a mistake, as it leads to the detection of the machine gun emplacements. A captured document issued by General Sixt von Armin, commanding Fourth German Army, on the "Construction of Defensive Positions" (translated as S.S. 574), dated 30-6-17, lays down: "They (machine guns) must take the enemy by surprise. It is, therefore, not advisable to place them in the angles of the wire, where the enemy is bound to suspect their presence. Only dummy emplacements should be constructed at these points, while the actual machine guns are sited in concealed emplacements to a flank or in rear."

## HINDENBURG LINE

(Including the Quéant—Drocourt Line).

*The section East of Arras is called the Wotan position.*

*The section North of St. Quentin is called the Siegfried position.*

*The section South of St. Quentin is called the Alberich position.*

1. The Hindenburg line does not as a whole follow any well marked physical feature. It exhibits generally, however, a definite tendency to utilize the reverse slopes on the West side of certain marked depressions. Occasionally it is sited behind the natural obstacle of a river or canal.

2. (a) From La Fère to the Oise (at Alaincourt) it is behind (East of) the Oise.

(b) It crosses the watershed between the Oise and the Somme (St. Quentin) on reverse slopes.

(c) From St. Quentin to Vendhuile, it covers the Canal de St. Quentin, running along a reverse slope.

(d) From Vendhuile to Bantouzelle, it is for a short distance— $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles—in rear (East) of the Canal, though a position on the West bank appears available. This portion is low down the forward slope so that it covers a good observation line on the heights above it.

(e) From Bantouzelle to Drocourt, it covers, at varying distances, the depression in which lie the Canal de l'Éscaut, the Grand Ravin, the Canal du Nord and the Canal de la Sensée, on a general reverse slope.

3. Though thus running for much of its length on a reverse slope, its general trace is too straight for full advantage to be taken of ground. It goes over hill and valley, as, for instance, may be seen between Bantouzelle and Havrincourt, where it crosses four valleys and also runs over the crest of a hill. Both front and support trenches of the front system are, however, frequently on a reverse slope. Where there is a shallow parallel depression close in front, or a considerable valley spreading out westwards with the opposite heights at some distance, the firing line is generally on the crest.

4. The siting frequently admits of direct artillery observation from heights in rear, and the attacker in his advance must generally come over ground that is under such observation. At the same time, observation from our side is denied.

5. Advanced infantry posts in shell holes or narrow trenches, frequently without any covered communication to the rear, are organized in front of the main line.

6. The principles of the construction of positions laid down in the German Manual—"General Principles of the Construction of Field Positions" of 18th November, 1916, translated as S.S. 558, and in General von Below's memorandum of 30th January, 1917, translated as S.S. 558—"Experience of the German First Army in the Somme Battle," appear to have been carried out. In the latter it is stated "the front infantry trenches are well placed if they are situated on a reverse slope out of sight of ground observation of the enemy's artillery, and are overlooked by their own artillery observers from a position at least 550 yards in rear. At the same time, these observers should be able to see well into the ground over which the enemy must attack, for at least 200 yards in front of their own wire, and it should be possible to overlook, either from the front or a flank, at least a part of the ground behind the belt over which the enemy must make the approach marches."

7. A broad defensive zone behind the front line is gradually being constructed as contemplated in the above-mentioned instructions.

8. Illustrations of the trace and profile of the trenches are given in Plate 70 (1) and (2), the general organization of a section in Plates 71 and 72, and the arrangement of wire in Plates 73, 74 and 75.

9. The following points will be noticed:—The traverses are thick, 24 to 33 feet, and the trenches wide and mostly unrevetted (some are reported to be deeper than those illustrated and to have two gangways, one at the bottom of the trench and the other on an intermediate level below the fire step). The support trench is 200 to 250 yards (but the limits are elsewhere reported to be 150 to 300 yards) from the front trench; there are plenty of communication trenches, often branching when they enter a line; the wire extends considerable distances in front of the line and is arranged so that it can be flanked by machine guns [see 11], and there are large gaps in the wire in front of the support trench through which troops can move to the counter-attack. Some wire near Bellenglise is said to be electrified.



10. **Machine Guns.**—Von Below in his memorandum says down: "Built up machine gun emplacements are soon smashed to pieces unless they are shell proof (against heavy artillery). As a rule, the best way is to provide shell-proof shelters for the machine guns, in which they are to be kept until required for action, when they are fired over the parapet." This rule has been observed by the construction, where there has been time, of "Mebus." These are ferro-concrete dug-outs, containing shelters for men and machine guns, arrangement for periscope observation, with a banquette on the rear side from which the M.G. can be fired, the concrete building itself forming the parapet (see Plate 76. Some "Mebus" are less elaborate, being merely a concrete shelter with a plank banquette). The arrangement of "Mebus" in a parapet is shown in Plate 71.

11. The relation of the machine guns to the wire entanglement is illustrated in Plate 75. They are sited at the intersection of the edges of salients\*. The wire actually in front of them is often low or sunk.

12. No concrete or covered M.G. emplacements have been seen. Concrete emplacements have, however, been reported in the support trench and between the support and front trenches in canal banks and in hillocks, woods, etc. Open M.G. emplacements have been found situated outside the trenches, in holes, approached by underground passages, that is, they are similar to "Champagne emplacements." The approaches to them are covered for some distance, but there is usually a trench in fairly close proximity.

13. **Dug-outs.**—Deep mined dug-outs in the front line trench were "absolutely prohibited" by von Hindenburg (S.S. 544, Translation of Memo. of Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, 25th December, 1916) after the "serious and regrettable reverses" of the Autumn of 1916, but many are still to be found (see Plate 70, (1) and (2)). This is said to have been due to lack of time to construct concrete ones. Where possible, however, concrete shelters have been made every 50 to 100 yards (see Plate 77) for the garrison of the front line. (Some of these are merely "funk holes" but probably others are provided with banquettes so that they may be used as "Mebus.") It is reported that in some parts there are larger concrete dug-outs, 6 x 6 x 2 metres, at irregular intervals, while in others that there are only sufficient concrete shelters to accommodate the company and platoon commanders. Photographs of the Hindenburg line in course of construction show typical excavations in which concrete dug-outs are being made, both in front of, and behind the parapet.

14. In the support trench there are both concrete and mined "residential" dug-outs. The entrances are in the trench and also behind it in the open field. Entrances in a trench are under the parapet and are arranged so that there is only one between each pair of traverses.

15. **O.P.s.**—A special wedge-shaped pattern of O.P. (vide German Fieldworks, Plates 53 and 55) consisting of two skins of steel, built up of plates bolted together, with concrete between them, has been found. It is sometimes combined with a "Mebu" (see Plate 76), but is also erected independently of any other structure.

16. **Subways.**—Between Somme and Oise, it is reported that the front and support trenches are connected underground, and that covered communications run back for half a mile; and elsewhere that it is intended to have a complete system of underground connections and parallel tunnels. Such a tunnel has actually been found near Heninel (see Plate 70 (1)).

17. **Trench Mortar Emplacements.**—Trench Mortars are said to be mostly in the support trench, but have been noticed, in aeroplane photographs, in short lengths of trench forming loops in rear of the front trench, and in the space between front and support trenches.


18. **Tank Guns.** Field guns in concrete emplacements behind the support trench have been reported. The emplacements appear from a captured drawing to be shelters for detachment and gun, from which it can be got up by a ramp to fire over the parapet.

19. **Strong Points.** As in earlier systems, there are strong points which are easily recognizable in photographs by the continuous wire round them.


**NOTE.**—Many of the arrangements observed in the portions of the Hindenburg line that have been captured will no doubt be modified in accordance with the experience of recent fighting, as the footnote to Section 11, taken from General von Armin's report, shows. This document admits that the old rigid methods of defence have failed, and another method of constructing positions must be employed as soon as a battle commences. Supports and reserves, however, will continue to occupy continuous trenches made on reverse slopes.

\* This arrangement has been found by the enemy to be a mistake, as it leads to the detection of the machine gun emplacements. A captured document issued by General Sixt von Armin, commanding Fourth German Army, on the "Construction of Defensive Positions" (translated as S.S. 574), dated 30-6-17, says down: "They (machine guns) must take the enemy by surprise. It is, therefore, not advisable to place them in the angles of the wire, where the enemy is bound to suspect their presence. Only dummy emplacements should be constructed at these points, while the actual machine guns are sited in concealed emplacements to a flank or in rear."



HINDENBURG LINEbetween BULLECOURT & HÉNINEL, JULY 1917.TRACE OF FIRE TRENCHESFRONT LINESUPPORT LINE

(210 to 250 yards from Front Line.)



**HINDENBURG LINE**  
between BULLECOURT and HÉNINEL. JULY 1917.



GERMAN FIELD WORKS.

PLATE 70


N°2.

PROFILE OF TRENCHES

FRONT LINE




SUPPORT LINE



Drawn by F. G. S. [Signature]

# HINDENBURG LINE

PART OF LINE NEAR CROISILLES  
FROM CAPTURED PLAN, JULY 1917.





### REFERENCES.

- Battalion Battle H.Q.
- Regt Battle H.Q.
- Mebu (Concrete defensive post)
- ⚓ Coy. Commander's Dugout
- ⊕ Aid Post
- ⊕ Drinking Water Well
- ☉ Visual Signal Station
- Chain of Runners Posts to Regt Battle H.Q.
- ⚡ Sentry Posts in Foggy weather

Drawn by F.S. Newcomb  
2nd Qd. RE.

Conventional Signs.

(a)  Shelters; should be 

(b) "Wired M.G. Emplacement"; should be "Mined M.G. Emplacement".





# HINDENBURG LINE AT BELLICOURT.

FROM A CAPTURED MAP, JULY 1917.

GERMAN FIELD WORKS

PLATE 72.




- |                   |                        |                                    |  |
|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| □ Mined Dugout    | --- Shelters           | — M— Wired Machine Gun Emplacement | ○ Ball <sup>n</sup> HQ Dugout            |
| ■ Concrete Dugout | --- Latrines           | — Concrete                         | ○ Regimental Battle HQ Dugout            |
| ..... Wire        | --- Completed trenches | — T.M.— Trench Mortar Emplacement  | □ Concrete Observing Station for I group |
|                   |                        |                                    | ▲ Listening Post                         |


Drawn by F. G. Newsom, 2nd Lt., R.F.

**HINDENBURG LINE**  
 between BULLECOURT & HÉNINEL - JULY 1917.

WIRE ENTANGLEMENT




CROSS SECTION X.Y.



PLAN.

- Wire joining tops of pickets
- - - - - Wire from top of one picket to bottom of picket in front
- Parallel wires running along diagonals and also parallel wires on main fences.
- Main Fences
- High pickets 4 ft. } All corkscrew pickets, pointed tops.
- Low pickets 3 ft. }



ELEVATION OF PICKETS and WIRE on MAIN FENCE A.B. (all other main fences similar)

NOTE: This elevation does not show any intermediate wires between main fences.


# HINDENBURG LINE

GERMAN FIELD WORKS


PLATE 74

between BULLECOURT & HÉNINEL, JULY 1917.

## WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS




N.B. Screw Pickets used in soft ground, angle iron pickets in hard chalk.



# HINDENBURG LINE


LOCATION OF MACHINE GUNS FROM THE FORM OF THE WIRE

## I. U 22, c to U 30, A, near BULLECOURT.




## II. THEORETICAL ARRANGEMENT FROM GENERAL VON BELOW'S MEMORANDUM "EXPERIENCES OF THE FIRST ARMY IN THE SOMME BATTLE" 30<sup>th</sup> JAN 1917.

### FRONT LINE



### SUPPORT LINE







# HINDENBURG LINE

## A "MEBU" (REINFORCED CONCRETE DEFENSIBLE POST)

GERMAN FIELD WORKS  
PLATE 76.




ELEVATION LOOKING FROM TRENCH.




SECTION ON LINE A B.

Emplacements at every 100 yards interval.



PLAN LOOKING FROM ABOVE

PRINTED BY H.B. ADVANCED SECTION 4.485.3



PLAN THRU CHAMBERS

Drawn by F.E. BROWNELL  
2-11-18, P. 2.

# CONCRETE SHELTERS IN HINDENBURG LINE

near HENINEL

(446<sup>th</sup> FIELD C<sup>o</sup> R.E., July 1917.)

GERMAN FIELD WORKS.

PLATE 77

Plate 77

TYPE B.

N. 27 d. 80. 55.


Map 51<sup>st</sup> S.W.

TYPE A.

Usually covered by 12" of earth.


Enemy

Ventilator 6" x 6"




SECTION on A B


Concrete reinforced by round iron bars from 1/2" to 3/4" crossed at about 6" centres.




SECTION on C D




SECTION on A B



PLAN and PART SECTION C D



SECTION on E F




SECTION Half Size

Curved corrugated iron sheets made up in pairs, lapped one corrugation, with angle iron one end and channel the other. Pairs lapped two corrugations.

Concrete reinforced by Rolled Steel Joists placed at about 14" centres.

NOTE: From inspection of damaged shelters it appears that Type A is stronger. The joints in Type B serve to separate the concrete into blocks and when hit the mass seems to split more readily. A when hit seems to lose little more than the outer skin of concrete.




PLAN and PART SECTION C D

Ponting Section Diver (S.C. R.E. G.N.Q. 5275)

Drawn by R.G. Howard


**ANTI-TANK GUN EMPLACEMENT**  
*WITH SHELTER FOR DETACHMENT AND GUN.*  
*(FROM CAPTURED SKETCH, AUG. 1917)*

— PLAN —



A. Shelter for the Gun Detachment  
B - - - Infantry Protective Detachment

— SECTION —




Drop Door to provide protection  
against splinters

(When dropped the door is flush  
with the surface of the ramp)

# ANTI-TANK GUN EMPLACEMENT


WITH SHELTER FOR DETACHMENT AND GUN.  
(FROM CAPTURED SKETCH, AUG. 1917)

— PLAN —



A. Shelter for the Gun Detachment  
B - - - Infantry Protective Detachment

— SECTION —



Drop Door to provide protection  
against splinters

(When dropped the door is flush  
with the surface of the ramp)


1st Tunn Coy. 2372

GERMAN FIELD WORKS  
PLATE 78

**ANTI-TANK GUN EMPLACEMENT**  
**WITH SHELTER FOR DETACHMENT AND GUN.**  
*(FROM CAPTURED SKETCH, AUG. 1917)*


AUSTRALIAN WAR RECORDS SECTION  
925 3 40  
CLASSIFICATION SUB-SECTION

— PLAN —



A. Shelter for the Gun Detachment  
B - - - Infantry Protective Detachment

— SECTION —






Drop Door to provide protection  
against splinters

(When dropped the door is flush  
with the surface of the ramp)


**TRENCH MORTAR EMBACEMENTS**  
 FROM CAPTURED DRAWING DATED 9<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 1917.  
 Not to Scale.

GERMAN FIELD WORKS.  
 PLATE 79


I SHELL PROOF EMBACEMENTS



II. MINED EMBACEMENT



III. EMBACEMENT IN AN OPEN TRENCH



CRA

RECEIVED  
1942  
MAY 15 1942  
U.S. AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS  
WASHINGTON, D.C.




1st. Linn Coy 2372 370.2

**TRENCH MORTAR EMBLEMMENTS**  
 FROM CAPTURED DRAWING DATED 9<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 1917.  
 Not to Scale.


GERMAN FIELD WORKS.  
 PLATE 79

AUSTRALIAN WAR RECORDS  
 359 8 31  
 CLASSIFIED


I SHELL PROOF EMBLEMMENTS



II MINED EMBLEMMENT



III. EMBLEMMENT IN AN OPEN TRENCH





370-3

# TRENCH MORTAR EMBACEMENTS




FROM CAPTURED DRAWING DATED 9<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 1917.  
Not to Scale.

GERMAN FIELD WORKS.  
PLATE 79


52 a. J. 7.06  
574

AUSTRALIAN WAR RECORDS SECTION  
3598 31  
INSULATION  
SUB-SECTION


## I SHELL PROOF EMBACEMENTS



## II MINED EMBACEMENT




## III. EMBACEMENT IN AN OPEN TRENCH



# HASTY SHELTERS


FROM CAPTURED DRAWING OF PIONEER BATTALION 106.  
August 1917.

GERMAN FIELDWORKS.  
PLATE 80




VIEW OF COVER SITTING

FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN SITTING - TIME 2 HOURS.



Scale: 1/50

FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN LYING DOWN - TIME 4-6 HOURS



Drawn by F. G. Stewart, Cpl. R.E.

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE  
(GENERAL STAFF)

425/852

5TH X 874  
AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.  
No. 7233  
Date 29/1/17

### HASTY SHELTERS


FROM CAPTURED DRAWING OF PIONEER BATTALION 106.  
August 1917.

AUSTRALIAN WAR RECORDS SECTION  
CLASSIFICATION  
C 359 5 172  
SUB-SECTION

GERMAN FIELDWORKS  
PLATE 80

5TH  
AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE


Siegfried Frame  
Weight 13 1/4 lbs.



VIEW OF COVER SITTING


Printed by N.S. Woodcock Section, A.P. 55

FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN SITTING - TIME 2 HOURS.



Scale: 1/50

FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN LYING DOWN - TIME: 4-6 HOURS



Drawn by E. H. Woodcock, Cpl. R.E.

509/852

# HASTY SHELTERS

FROM CAPTURED DRAWING OF PIONEER BATTALION 106.  
August 1917.


GERMAN FIELDWORKS.  
PLATE 80

HEADQUARTERS,  
1ST ANZAC.


27/525.

FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN SITTING - TIME 2 HOURS.



Siegfried Frame  
Weight 13 1/4 lbs.



VIEW OF COVER SITTING



FUNK HOLE FOR 3 MEN LYING DOWN - TIME 4-6 HOURS




52 CR 2 Lib


# DEEPEMED SHELL HOLE EMBLACEMENT

FROM CAPTURED DRAWING OF PIONEER BATTALION 106.  
August 1917

GERMAN FIELDWORKS.  
PLATE 81.



VIEW FROM ABOVE





AUSTRIAN WAR INDUSTRIES  
 PATENTED  
 459 954  
 SUB-SECTION

320.2




**DEEPEMED SHELL HOLE EMBLACEMENT**  
 FROM CAPTURED DRAWING OF PIONEER BATTALION 106.  
 August 1917

GERMAN FIELDWORKS.  
 PLATE 51.



VIEW FROM ABOVE



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL  
 3599/25  
 SECTION  
 SECTION  
 SECTION

*Handwritten:*  
 3599/25  
 551