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Surrender of Japanese Forces - Interrogation
 of high ranking Japanese commanders - after
 cessation of hostilities South West Pacific Area
 Japanese Order of Battle and numerical
 strength of units in New Britain - Japanese
 Operational Information Bougainville -
 Strengths casualties Logistics and Appreciations
 - Organization and Role of Japanese Navy in
 South West Pacific Area - Japanese Appreciation
 of the Situation Rapa - New Hebrides Area 1945

2/1/82

HQ First Army (AIF)
22 Dec 45
G/9164/Int

Subject : JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE, NEW BRITAIN

GS(Int) HQ AIF - 3
GS(Int) HQ MOROTAI Force
GS(Int) BRIGADE Section AIF

Enclosed herewith is copy of Japanese Order of Battle NEW BRITAIN as at 15 Aug 45, as provided by HQ South Eastern Japanese Army and Navy, RABAU.

J. B. ...
for Lt-Col
GS First Army

*Recd
Hq
20 action taken*

ORDER OF BATTLE

NEW GUINEA

as at 15 Aug 1945

Information supplied by Senior Staff Officer
HQ South Eastern Japanese Forces

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Page</u>
HQ 8 Area Army	1
17 Div	1
38 Div	2
65 Bde	3
39 Indep Mxd Bde	4
14 Mxd Regt	4
34 Mxd Regt	4
35 Mxd Regt	4
88 Arty Unit	5
Army Sig Corps	5
Army Sanitation Corps	6
Army Ambulance Corps	6
Navy	7 - 8

ARMY

Unit	Strength		
	Combatant	Non Combatant	Total
HQ 8 ARCTA ARMY	727	123	850
HQ Bn	279		279
17 Div (total str 11429)			
HQ 17 Div	552	68	620
53 Inf Regt (total 2485)			
HQ	99	94	193
1 Bn	672		672
2 Bn	647		647
3 Bn	651		651
Arty Coy	95		95
Tk A Coy	116		116
Comm Coy	111		111
54 Inf Regt (total 2426)			
HQ	149		149
1 Bn	567		567
2 Bn	491	231	722
3 Bn	655		655
Arty Coy	124		124
Tk A Coy	108		108
Comm Coy	103		103
2 Mxd Regt (total 2054)			
HQ	98	84	182
1 Bn	688		688
2 Bn	548		548
3 Bn	534		534
Comm Coy	102		102
6 Mxd Regt (total 960)			
HQ	111		111
1 Bn	423		423
2 Bn	426		426
Div Search (recco) Unit	94		94
23 Pz Arty Regt (total 1278)			
HQ	177	110	287
1 Bn	282		282
2 Bn	300	67	367
3 Bn	313	29	342

Unit	Strength		Total
	Combatant	Non Combatant	
17 Engr Regt	445		445
Div Comm Unit	261		261
17 Tpt (Commissariat) Regt	435		435
1 Pz Hospital	210	44	254
2 Pz Hospital	173	36	209

Remarks: The ordnance staff unit is counted in
Div HQ.

38 Div (total str 13108)

HQ 38 Div	308	285	593
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228 Inf Regt (total 2993)

HQ	63		63
1 Bn	780		780
2 Bn	736		736
3 Bn	888		888
Arty Coy	113		113
Tk A Coy	88		88
Trench Mortar Coy	148		148
Comm Unit	129		129
Mounted Sec	48		48

229 Inf Regt (total 2918)

HQ	49		49
1 Bn	685		685
2 Bn	804		804
3 Bn	824		824
Arty Coy	137		137
Tk A Coy	98		98
Trench Mortar Coy	129		129
Comm Unit	150		150
Mounted Sec	42		42

Unit	Strength		
	Combatant	Non Combatant	Total
3 Mxd Regt (total 2268)			
HQ	286		286
1 Bn	578		578
2 Bn	520		520
3 Bn	551		551
Arty Coy	47		47
Tk A Coy	66		66
Trench Mortar Coy	111		111
Comm Unit	109		109
38 Mtn Arty Regt (total 2044)			
HQ	210		210
1 Bn	487		487
2 Bn	728		728
3 Bn	619		619
38 Engr Regt	607		607
Div Comm Unit	314		314
38 Tpt (Commissariat) Regt	521		521
Ordnance Staff Unit	164		164
1 Pd Hosp	271	10	281
2 Pd Hosp	263	35	318
Div Vet Hosp	72	15	87
65 Bde (total 2729)			
HQ 65 Bde	150	2	152
HQ	104		104
1 Bn	571		571
2 Bn	577		577
3 Bn	593		593
Trench Mortar Coy	171		171
Comm Unit	78		78
Bde Engr Unit	216		216
Bde Comm Unit	95		95
Bde Pd Hosp	170		170

Unit	Strength		Total
	Combatant	Non Combatant	
39 Indep Mxd Bde (total 5073)			
HQ 39 Indep Mxd Bde	134	146	280
4 Mxd Regt (total 2318)			
HQ	80	48	128
1 Bn	523	50	573
2 Bn	535	48	583
3 Bn	638	45	683
Arty Coy	115		115
Mtn Gun Coy	87	30	117
Comm Unit	85	34	119
5 Mxd Regt (total 2136)			
HQ	75	66	141
1 Bn	663		663
2 Bn	597		597
3 Bn	621		621
Arty Coy	58		58
Comm Unit	56		56
Bde Comm Unit	211	7	218
Bde Pd Hosp	61	60	121
14 Mxd Regt (total 2644)			
HQ	159		159
1 Bn	620		620
2 Bn	648		648
3 Bn	609		609
Arty Bn	259		259
Arty Coy	51		51
Comm Coy	98		98
34 Mxd Regt (total 1879)			
HQ	225		225
1 Bn	553		553
2 Bn	552		552
3 Bn	549		549
35 Mxd Regt (total 1967)			
HQ	138		138
1 Bn	470		470
2 Bn	461		461
3 Bn	448		448
4 Bn	450		450

Unit	Strength For		Total
	Combatant	Combatant	
SE Army Air Unit	246	2	248
SE Army Tank Unit	1043		1043
SE Army Amphib Unit	796		796
SE 6 Guerrilla Unit	275		275
SE 7 Guerrilla Unit	310		310
SE Army Arty Unit (total 2466)			
HQ	87		87
7 Pd Hy Arty Regt	785	100	885
3 Indep Hy Arty Bn	611		611
5 Pd Hy Arty Bn	432		432
1 Indep Mortar Bn	370	81	451
SE Army Spec Int Unit	269	9	278
Army Signal Corps (total 2229)			
HQ	287	3	290
16 Tele Regt	883		883
47 Tele Regt	894		894
8 Pnd Tele Unit	158	4	162
SE Army Fortification Corps	282	17	299
SE Army Craft Corps	935	124	1059
SE Army MR Corps	188	2	190
SE Army Motor Car Corps	561		561
SE Army Road Constr Corps	204		204
SE Army PO Corps	140	22	162
7 Imperial Cd Div Land Tpt Unit	99		99
2 Spec Land Service Coy	49		49
3 Spec Land Service Coy	50		50
4 Spec Land Service Coy	58		58
6 Spec Land Service Coy	53		53
20 Spec Sea Service Coy	40		40
27 Spec Building Coy	58		58

Unit	Strength		Total
	Combatant	Non Combatant	
Army Sanitation Corps (Total 1462)			
HQ Sanitation Unit	134	48	182
67 L of C Hosp	399	86	485
103 L of C Hosp	430	51	481
Ambulance Corps (Total 314)			
HQ Ambulance Unit	136		136
53 Ambulance Sec	50		50
65 Ambulance Sec	35		35
73 Ambulance Sec	57		57
76 Ambulance Sec	36		36
Plague Prevention Work Water Service Corps	491	3	494
SE Army Vet Hosp	263	1	264
SE Army Ord Depot	772	562	1334
SE Army Motor Car Depot	772		772
SE Army Supply Depot	951	1102	2053
Army Engr Corps	294	52	346
Kwantung Army Air Photo Corps	2	119	121
GRAND TOTAL 8 AREA ARMY		57,225	

NAVY

Unit	Strength		Total
	Combatant	Non Combatant	
82 HQ Navy	1871	360	2231
81 Def Unit	2251	388	2639
84 Def Unit	635	857	1492
85 Def Unit	1297	589	1886
86 Def Unit	1110	334	1444
958 Flying Unit	1318	129	1447
8 Yokosuka Spec Landing Unit	744	596	1340
8 Sub Base Unit	374	4	378
8 Harbour Office	317	125	442
105 Air Base Unit	4819	65	4884
8 Comm Unit	406	5	411
8 Area Army Hosp	256	308	564
108 Aviation Repair Unit	43	1312	1355
8 Supply Unit	91	2986	3077
8 Engr Unit	29	804	833
8 Constr Unit	66	3448	3514
8 Naval Office of Accounts and Supplies	16	214	230
8 Weather Observation Unit	74	192	266
2 Sanitation Unit	23	37	60
3 Sanitation Unit	25	71	96
28 Labour Unit	64	598	662
34 Labour Unit	55	150	205
101 Labour Unit	81	915	996
211 Labour Unit	56	136	192
212 Labour Unit	78	978	1056

Unit	Strength		Total
	Combatant	Non Combatant	
Part 8 Fleet	47	2	49
Part 14 Base of Operation Unit	48	2	50
Part 89 Def Unit	13	8	21
Civil Admin Dept		92	92
Court Martial	6		6
Part 7 Kure Spec Landing Unit	5		5

GRAND TOTAL NAVY FORCES 31923

2/23W
HQ First Army (AIF)

27 Dec 45
G/9162/Int

Subject : JAPANESE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOUGAIVILLE.

Ref HQ AMF MI 1779 of 22 Oct 45.

GS(Int) HQ AMF

GS(Int) MOROTAI Force

~~GS(Int) BRISBANE Section AMF~~

Herewith is a copy of information on Japanese operations in the SOLOMONS, obtained by Lt-Col E WILSON, formerly GS01 (Int) 2 Corps, through interrogation of senior Japanese officers.

W. Buckenidge was
Lt-Col
GS First Army

*Recd
26 Dec
No action taken
1946*

*1945
Capt Fuller
Capt Decker
PA misc*

SECRET

HQ 2 AUSST CORPS

POST-SURRENDER INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS

1 The undermentioned Japanese staff officers were interrogated by GSO 1 (Int) 2 Aust Corps at 2 Aust Corps Surrender Commission HQ KAMILI, SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE, between 16 Sep and 23 Sep 1945, and at TOROKINA COMPOUND on 3 Oct.

Lt-col Kiyoshi MIYAKAWA	SO for Intelligence, HQ 17 Jap Army
Lt-comd H IBARA	SO HQ 8 Jap Fleet
Col Y EJIMA	Chief of Staff 6 Jap Div
Lt-col Hachio KANDA	SO for Ops HQ 6 Jap Div
Maj Fujio SHIMODA	SO for Intelligence HQ 17 Jap Army
Col MUDA	Comd 13 Jap Inf Regt
Capt Hikichi KATO	Comd Naval Forces NORTH BOUGAINVILLE
Col Atsushi KAMEKO	Comd 81 Inf Regt
Lt-col Shinzo NAKAMURA	Comd 38 AA Bn and TAREKWA GUN

EVALUATION OF STATEMENTS

2 All information below was given from memory, and except for figures of present strengths, all figures are approximate. No documents were produced and in answer to requests for them it was stated that all records and papers had been burnt in June 1945 when 17 Army anticipated an attack on SUIN by Australians. Careful search by PS personnel of officers' belongings and unit gear when concentration on PAURO IS was in progress yielded no documents with any useful information. It is considered that none answered questions without reservations.

3 MIYAKAWA yielded most information. As his staff duties included operations work and compilation of Japanese casualties as well as normal intelligence work, his statements are considered more authoritative and reliable than the others. On request, Lt-Col MIYAKAWA on 8 Oct, forwarded to Int 2 Aust Corps an outline of 17 Army operations on BOUGAINVILLE. In the main, this appeared to be a sincere attempt to provide some of the information requested, but casualty figures quoted are far below those of his previous interrogations and are difficult to accept. This document was in all probability "vetted" by more senior officers. Information in it has been included in this report, and attributed to MIYAKAWA. Translation of complete document is attached as Appendix "A".

IBARA was alert, evasive on casualties, but otherwise fairly frank. His outline of naval operations in BOUGAINVILLE is attached as Appendix "B".

EJIMA Ready with answers, but casualty figures inconsistent with others, and suspect.

KANDA at first interview was arrogant and boastful, reckless in replica. Veracity not impressive. Later Lt-col COURT stated he became helpful and apparently reliable. His later estimates are accepted as reasonably accurate.

SHIMODA Volunteered more information of Australian forces than any of the others. Possessed less guile than the others and probably more truthful.

MUDA Hardboiled taciturn professional soldier. Lied freely and figures he gave contradicted those of Chief of Staff 6 Div. Statements of little worth.

KATO Taciturn but apparently truthful.

KAMEKO Garrulous, anxious to assist, apparently truthful.

NAKAMURA Dull and apparently poor memory and intellect

ENEMY STRENGTHS

- 3 (a) MIYAKAWA - At the time of the landing by US forces at TOROKINA in Nov 43, approximate numbers were:-

Army	40,000
Navy	20,000
TOTAL	60,000

(Comment: Army figure is 4,000 lower than that set out in Jap 17 Army Intendances Report for March 1944, captured at SAIPAN in Oct 44. Total at Nov 1943 was probably nearer 65,000)

- (b) Present strengths (census of 22 Aug 45) :-

Army	14,456
Navy	9,366
TOTAL	23,822

Order of Battle 17 Jap Army attached as appendix "C"

Order of Battle Jap Naval Forces attached as appendix "D".

ENEMY BATTLE CASUALTIES

- 4 (a) ARMY

Extreme difficulty was encountered in attempting to ascertain enemy casualties. No records were produced, and Staff Officers' estimations varied so widely that most were obviously wild and ignorant guesses or deliberate lies. Official figures supplied by 17 Army differed so radically from unit commanders' admissions that no reliance can be placed on the official figures.

During his first interrogation Lt-col MIYAKAWA was asked to provide from memory figures of casualties, and without hesitation supplied the following :-

1 Nov 43 to 22 Nov 44	Killed	3,500
	Wounded	4,000
	Died of wounds	3,500
22 Nov 44 to 15 Aug 45	Killed	3,370
	Died of wounds	3,500
	Wounded	unknown but ratio to deaths about 1:1

Total battle casualties	Killed	6,870
	Died of wounds	7,000

US

(Comment: XIV Corps claimed 9,890 enemy killed to 21 Nov 44. MIYAKAWA's figure for that period agrees with that shown in the 17 Army Intendence Report for Mar 44, and with figures quoted by Chief of Staff 6 Jap Div. Intendence Report omits wounded. The large number of deaths from sickness admitted by Japs, vide para 6, opens up the possibility that battle casualties have been falsely shown among deaths from sickness.

MIYAKAWA was asked to prepare further particulars and on 2 Oct forwarded the "Outline of 17 Army Operations on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND" attached as Appendix "A" Casualties shown in this document were:

1 Nov 43 to 22 Nov 44	Killed	3,000
	Wounded	4,000
22 Nov 44 to 15 Aug 45		
SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE	Killed	1,200
	Wounded	2,000
NUNA NUNA	Killed	400
	Wounded	150
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE	Killed	220
	Wounded	100
TOTAL	Killed	1,820
	Wounded	2,250
GRAND TOTAL	Killed	4,820
	Wounded	6,250
	Missing	435

Figures of missing were supplied in a separate document, and are incomplete.

In view of the unsatisfactory figures supplied, an attempt was made to arrive at an acceptable figure by interrogating unit and regimental commanders and selected staff officers. Lt-col COURT also requested precise figures of casualties for 6 Div, and these were supplied by Lt-col KANDA on 2 Oct. They are accepted as the most reliable estimate of 6 Div casualties as they are the only set of figures supplied that are reconcilable with 6 Div strength in December 1944 and August 1945. The only other firm date available was the census of 10 Dec 44 and 22 Aug 45 supplied by 17 Army at the time of the surrender. These showed that the strength of 17 Army declined from all causes by approximately 10,000 during the period 2 Aust Corps was in charge of operations.

Accepting the censuses and KANDA's figures as accurate and working on the basis of figures supplied by unit commanders and staff officers, the table below sets out the admitted Jap casualties :-

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>KIA and Died of wounds</u>	<u>Died of Sickness</u>	<u>Missing and Deserters</u>	<u>Total</u>
6 Div	SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE	2,250	2,514	210	4,974
17 Army Troops	SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE	200 (a)	2,500 (a)		2,700
38 IMB	MUMA MUMA	600	1,200	50	1,850
TARLENA Orn	NORTHERN BOUGAINVILLE	270	420 (b)	30	650
87 Naval 3d Force	BORIS PENIN- SULA	350			350
		3,670	6,634	290	10,574 (c)

Less prisoners of war taken by 2 Aust Corps 138

TOTAL DEATHS 10,436

Notes :

- Estimates only, reached after deducting all other admitted casualties from the total of 10,000, and arbitrarily fixing battle deaths at 200 which is considered conservative. Deaths from sickness were fixed at 2,500 because 6 Div, which was approximately the same strength as 17 Army Troops in December 1944, admitted 2,514 deaths from sickness. Furthermore 17 Army troops included very few men fit enough for duty in forward areas. They were in worse physical shape than 6 Div, and it is reasonable therefore that their sickness rate was comparable with 6 Div.
- Arbitrarily fixed after deducting admitted deaths in action from our tally of counted dead.
- Final figure includes 350 naval deaths, therefore aggregate deaths in 17 Army were 10,086.

Comment: 2 Aust Corps estimate of Japanese deaths, including unconfirmed killings, with the addition of prisoners of war, is 8,927. Of these approximately 5,600 were dead counted in combat areas, by forward troops. Approximately 400 more were found dead by our troops. On these figures alone the Japanese deaths in battle seem greatly understated. In the light of AIB claims of counted dead - 4,076 - and a further 3,000 claimed unconfirmed dead from native killings, and by our own troops and from air action, the figures become even more suspect. Possible explanation is that, in accordance with what from prisoners and documents appears to be a well established practice the Japanese classify some deaths as "wounded-died of sickness." This probably is a face saving formula used by forward commanders to disguise from higher command true losses in battle, and particularly in battles which ended adversely. From many other sources there is ample evidence that Japanese have no compunction about misleading superiors as to the true condition in their own command. It is probable, therefore, that a great number of deaths shown by Japanese as deaths from sickness should be shown as KIA or Died of Wounds.

NAVAL CASUALTIES

5 IBARA's figures :

1 Nov 43 to 15 Aug 45 Killed by bombing, strafing
surface action, etc. 2,000

TOTAL NAVAL CASUALTIES

6 Army, and Navy, 1 Nov 43 to 15 Aug 45

Killed and died of wounds 9,000

DEATHS FROM SICKNESS

7 Army - 1 Nov 43 to 22 Nov 44 16,500
22 Nov 44 to 15 Aug 45 6,600

Navy - 1 Nov 43 to 15 Aug 44 8,500

31,000

Heaviest death rate in the army was in May and June 44 when the Jap forces were recovering and re-organising after their defeat at TOROKINA and had not had time to put into operation any plan for attaining self-sufficiency in food from their own gardens. Approximately 2,000 died in each of these months. Monthly death totals tapered off gradually after June as gardens came into production and food was available in increasing quantities. By June 45, monthly death figure was down to 850.

In the Navy, SHIMODA said the food shortage was more acute so much so that until the last few months of war, the Army was supplying naval units with garden foods, and in return received weapons and ammunition. Poor soil and bad supervision were the causes of the Navy's failure to attain self-sufficiency until late in the war.

STRENGTH AND CASUALTY RECONCILIATION

8 Full strength and casualty state for the whole of the BOUGAINVILLE campaign is ther fore :-

Killed in action and Died of Wounds 9,000

Attrition deaths 31,000

Present strength 25,000

64,000

(Comment) Accepting the Intendence figure of 44,000 in early Dec 43 as more correct than MIYAKAWA's estimate, the above state would appear to be approximately correct.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

9 MIYAKAWA stated that at no time and in no area were the Japanese able to muster more than 20 per cent of their total strength for service in forward areas. This was caused

through high sickness and debility rate and need for diverting large numbers for gardening and transport duties.

Approximate division of total strength was;

Forward areas	20 per cent
Sick	30 per cent
Gardening duties	35 per cent
Transport duties	15 per cent
Salt making	few

Labour of 35 per cent of their force in gardens was not sufficient to supply adequate food for the whole force.

Gardens were mostly located in rear areas and the products transported to forward troops.

Since Jun 44, approximately 70 per cent of Japanese forces have been located in BUIN garden areas. Of those, only about half were strong enough to fight even a last ditch defense. There were very few AI troops in the rear BUIN areas, as BUIN units were regularly combed for fit men to send to forward units.

BJIMA stated that half of 6 Div personnel were diverted to gardening duties.

RATIONS

- 10 After the TOROKIMA offensive, the daily ration of rice was reduced to 50 grams for the whole of BOUGAINVILLE. Not all troops in rear areas were given this amount, but front line units received about 300 grams per day continuously. Except for front line troops, the Japanese had been living exclusively on their garden produce for many months apart from occasional small issues of rice and bean paste.

Fish was not an important ration item, because those caught sufficed usually only for officer's messes.

Copra was important only at NUNIA NUNIA, where it formed a considerable portion of Army diet.

Some cattle and pigs were killed in the first few months of occupation, but for two years, the Japanese had had no meat.

Chickens and hens eggs were an important item of diet. Fowls were of poor quality and eggs small, but they were in abundance in every unit's lines.

Garden areas in BUIN-MAINA areas were more than sufficient for the 17 Army and Navy troops. They were well tended and producing large crops of staple sweet potatoes, corn, egg fruit, beans, peanuts and green vegetables, as well as tropical fruits - paw paws, pineapples and bananas. Some small plots of rice were seen but these were not extensive and were said to be grown principally for manufacturing sake. Several home made rice winnowers were seen in use and in course of manufacture.

SUPPLY BY AIR AND SUBMARINE

- 11 IBARA said in late Oct 43, supply by cargo ship from RABAU ceased, and in mid-Nov destroyer runs with supplies and reinforcements also ceased. Between Oct 43 and Apr 44, seven naval submarines came to BUIN from RABAU and three calls were made at BUKA Passage. They carried principally rations and light automatic

axes. On their return journey they evacuated a total of 15 naval air arm pilots who had no planes left to fly and about 10 serious surgical patients. There was no evacuation of officers by submarine other than the pilots. Until the end of the war there was a regular service by naval seaplane once or twice a month at full moon periods between RABAU and KAHILI. Occasionally it made more than two flights in the full moon period, but in 1945 six trips only were made. They brought urgently needed medicines and evacuated a few officers. Bomber communication was carried out with RABAU in Apr 45 and two flying boats came down from TRUK in Jun 44 and one in Apr 45.

NAVAL OPERATIONS AND INTENTIONS

12

At the time of the surrender the vessels under command of the Navy were two barges. 8 Fleet was supreme naval organization in the SOLOMONS. In the early days of the war, TONOLEI Harbour was the major naval centre for supplying and refuelling submarines and light to medium warships.

IBARA said relations between the Navy and Army were very good. An agreement was reached between Lt-gen KANDA and Vice Admiral HAKAJIMA about Feb 45 that naval forces would fight under the direction of KANDA in the final battle for BUIN. Navy was given a sector approximately east of the SILIBAI RIVER with its northern boundary a line running east from KANAURA (Strat. NR 2636). Until the final battle naval forces were to perform guard duties only, particularly in the BUIN-SHORTLANDS Harbour area and sea approaches to BUIN. Main combat forces available were Naval Guard Units. These were formed from remnants of shipwrecked sailors, survivors of warships service units whose functions had disappeared with the lack of shipping activity, and aerodrome workers and such like. No troops were sent forward of the SILIBAI RIVER line to join army troops in fighting.

17 ARMY COMMAND

13

Lt-Gen HYAKUTAKE apparently suffered a stroke or other physical incapacitation in Feb 45. It was anticipated that he would recover, so no move was made to appoint a successor until Apr 45 when Gen KANDA assumed command, and Lt-Gen AKINAGA, Chief of Staff 17 Army assumed command of 6 Division. Since Feb 45, Gen KANDA had been administering command of 17 Army.

Medical reports showed HYAKUTAKE was suffering from paralysis of his left side. An attempt had been made to evacuate him by air but it was unsuccessful as the plane was not suitable for carrying a stretcher patient. From a few remarks by senior officers, HYAKUTAKE is apparently somewhat of a trial in the Generals' Mess.

SLATERS KNOLE BATTLE

14

MUDA was very unwilling to give information on this action. He said in the first attack on "A" Coy at a place known to the Japs as "RAIN" about 200 personnel of 13 Regt were engaged, comprising 3 Bn and 30/40 men of 1 Apt Coy. He claimed he did not know what other troops were engaged; had never known the full 6 Div plan, and had not had any conference with other commanders - if any. In that action he lost 50 killed and 50 wounded. He thought other units engaged suffered about the same casualties.

In the second attack, he was ordered to assault SLATERS KNOLL from the south and in that attack used the full strength of his regiment - 400 - plus 150 from 1 Bn 6 Div Arty and 30/40 from 1 Tpt Coy, a total of less than 600. He knew other units were engaged but did not know their identity or strength. In that attack he lost 50 killed and 100 wounded. His total officer casualties were 10 in both attacks including 1 major, 3 captains and the remainder lieutenants. He had heard that 23 Inf Regt Commander had been killed, but had not confirmed that news as he had no contact with 23 Inf Regt since the action.

(Comment:) MUDA's figures of strength used agrees with 2 Corps estimate but his casualties are understated, vide First Aust Army Topose of 4 May 45 0/8089/Int which disclosed a total of 20 officers killed in 13 Regt and 56 officers killed in the two actions.)

EFJIMA stated that in the first attack on the PURIATA RIVER positions units comprised 13, 23 Inf, 6 Engr and 6 Arty Regts with a total strength of between 950/1000.

For the second attack - on SLATERS KNOLL - the same forces were used plus 50 Arty reinforcements and 4 Med Arty Regt (strength 850/950) in reserve. This Regt was placed under command 6 Div by 17 Army for the PURIATA RIVER actions.

Both attacks were planned by 6 Div and it was thought that the first attack had been successful. 13 Regt had sent back word that they had captured HAIN and killed between 200 and 300. Acting on that information, the second attack was ordered by 6 Div.

In the first attack on the PURIATA positions, Jap casualties were 120 killed and 200 wounded. In the second attack their losses were 180 killed and 180 wounded. These included 40 officers among whom was CO 23 Regt, Lt-col KONO (KANANO ?). Japanese estimate of Australian casualties in the series of engagements centering around the PURIATA River was between 2,000 and 2,500 killed and twice that number wounded.

(Comment: EFJIMA's figures of Jap casualties are also understated. Tally of counted Jap dead was 560. Officer losses were 56. EFJIMA also omitted 6 Tpt Regt identified from captured orders, and 4 MT Branch which suffered officer casualties, as among the troops participating. If the full strength of these units was engaged it would add 1,000 to EFJIMA's figures. He probably omitted them as most of the Regt was apparently used for carrying food and ammunition and not more than 300 engaged in the fighting at KERO CREEK.

Maximum available force at 6 Div disposal in the second battle for SLATERS KNOLL would therefore appear to be:-

Committed to action	1,000
Reserve	850/900
Carrying	700
TOTAL	2,550/2,600

2 Aust Corps estimate prepared from captured documents and information from PW was that 800/1,000 troops were committed in the first battle and total used in the series of engagements was 2,500).

CONDITION OF AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES

- 15 Staff work and tables by Japanese in connection with the surrender was of a very high standard. Inspection bore out the accuracy of their figures relating to ammunition and supplies.

Principal holdings were:-

Rifles	16,000
LMG	637
MMG	180
Grenade throwers	300
Mortars	175
Inf artillery pieces	163
Hy Arty and CD Arty	53
Lt AA	328
Hy AA	65
SAA	7,300,000
Mortar bombs and rifle grenade	
Thrower projectiles	38,000
Hand grenades	18,000
Shells of all calibres	100,000
Lt AA projectiles	1,500,000
Hy AA shell	15,000

All MT was in the last stages of disintegration through rust and neglect. It was ill cared for and hundreds of abandoned vehicles littered the sides of the roads.

Workshops and repair facilities were practically non-existent, and most maintenance of any kind appeared to have been abandoned for many months. Exceptions were coast defence guns, medium and hy inf arty, and small and automatic arms.

Most optical and precision instruments had become unserviceable through rust, fungus, etc.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

- 16 On this subject, MIYAKAWA and KANDA were either purposely vague or their answers indicated an intelligence organisation of a most rudimentary nature.

Intelligence staff at 17 Army consisted of:

Lt-Col	1
Cpts	2
Lt	1
ORs	10

Duties of the Intelligence Section consisted of compiling information of the enemy, preparing and mimeographing maps, issuing meteorological information, administering native affairs and controlling the Kempei organisation which filled the roles of

Military Police
Counter Intelligence
Espionage
Organisation of native agents

One of the captains acted as under-study to the Lt-Col, and the other captain was responsible for enemy information. The Lt undertook meteorological details and control of native affairs and the Kempei.

No attempt was made to compile an Order of Battle of the Australian forces. The only information of our forces they possessed was:

Nov 44 Australians relieved US forces at TOROKINA.
Source - Broadcast speech by Gen MACARTHUR.

Australian troops comprised 3 Div and 11 Div.
Source - Broadcast from Aust Radio Station.

Identification of 24 Bn and 25 Bn
Source - Supplied by 6 Div

One map captured at FURIATA, one issue of US Marine Corps Magazine "Leatherneck"; one ACP Soldiers Handbook.

MIYAKAWA and KANDA said they had no knowledge of names of Commanders nor identification of brigades and battalions apart from the two mentioned above.

They were also emphatic that they had not captured any documents other than those mentioned above (interrogation on this point incomplete).

USE OF NATIVES

- 17 SHIMODA stated that natives were not at any time armed and used as infantry against Australian troops. No orders respecting their employment as army auxiliaries were issued by 17 Army. The Kempei organisation, however, armed a few and used them as guides and police boys. Attempts were made to use them as agents but they were not successful. The only useful information gained from natives was early in Nov 44 when a native deserter from TOROKINA reported to 38 IIB at NUMA NUMA that Australians had relieved American forces in TOROKINA. No information on which action could be taken was received from natives, and their information was generally irrelevant and discounted. Some of the reports they made were:-

There were many ships in TOROKINA Harbour
Women nurses were at the hospital
Moving pictures were shown every night

On some occasions they reported the whereabouts of Australian patrols.

ESTIMATES OF AUSTRALIAN STRENGTH

- 18 MIYAKAWA - estimated total Australian troops on BOUAINVILLE were between 50,000 and 60,000. Little was known of Australian strength and organisation beyond references to normal Div strengths and organisation contained in a handbook (apparently OOB of Allied forces) issued from TOKYO. It was considered that two Australian divisions were on the island. The figure of 50/60,000 was arrived at after adding numbers they considered would be needed in bases and Ls of C to maintain a force of two Divs.

SHIMODA's estimate was 14 divisions with a total strength of 30,000. 3 Aust Div was identified when an Australian jeep with mail bags addressed to 24 Bn and "225 Bn" was captured on the HONGORAI RIVER. These Bns were identified from a Japanese OOB chart as part of 3 Div. No other units or regts were ever identified, and neither he nor MIYAKAWA could, or would, recollect any other of the units mentioned in the chart as part of 3 Div. No identification of 11 Div was secured. Attempts were made to secure prisoners to extract information as to strength, but none was taken.

ESTIMATES OF AUSTRALIAN CASUALTIES

- 19 MIYAKAWA estimated that in the actions from the crossing of the HABA RIVER to the end of the campaign in SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE, Australian casualties were:

	Killed	2,500
	Wounded	2,500
SHIMODA's estimate for same period	Killed	5/6,000
	Wounded	5/6,000
Lt-col KANDA's estimate for same period	Killed	1,300
	Wounded	1,300
HJIMA's estimate for same period	Killed	2,000/2,500
	Wounded	4,000/5,000
Col KANEKO's estimate for Australian casualties, PEARL RIDGE area	Killed	300
	Wounded	200
Lt-col NAKAMURA's estimate for Australian casualties, NORTH BOUGAINVILLE campaign	Killed	500
	Wounded	200
Highest estimate	Killed	6,800
	Wounded	6,400
Lowest estimate	Killed	2,100
	Wounded	1,700

ESTIMATE OF AUSTRALIAN DISPOSITIONS

- 20 MIYAKAWA's estimate
- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE campaign | 3,000 |
| NUMA NUMA sector | 500 |
| NORTH BOUGAINVILLE sector | 1,000 |
- SHIMODA's estimate
- | | |
|--|---------|
| SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE sector (1 regt forward, 1 in support) | 6,000 |
| NUMA NUMA sector | One Bn |
| NORTH BOUGAINVILLE sector | Two Bns |
- KANEKO's estimate, NUMA NUMA sector
- | | |
|--|---------|
| | One Bde |
|--|---------|
- NAKAMURA's estimate, NORTH BOUGAINVILLE
- | | |
|--|--------|
| | One Bn |
|--|--------|

APPRECIATION OF AUSTRALIAN INTENTIONS

- 21 (a). SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE sector - MIYAKAWA.- The attack on PEARL RIDGE was a complete surprise because the appreciation of 17 Army was that the Australians would continue the same static role as the Americans to conserve all available forces for an attack on Japan.

The attack caused grave concern as it was thought the Australian intention was to sever communication between north and south. It was considered the attack across the JABA was a harassing move, and not until MANAKARA was reached and reinforced was it clear that the main drive was coming from that direction. It was considered this was the greatest threat, and concentration of troops in BUIN began late in December, main reinforcements coming from the SHORTLANDS and CHOISEUL. Transfer of troops from the CHOISEULS took place as transport was available between December and April.

Information received from SOMMER was so meagre that he had formed no opinion of our intentions there.

Australian difficulties in crossing the NIVO and supplying forward troops there in face of adverse weather and difficult tracks were fully appreciated. It was estimated that the Australian would assault the NIVO at the end of August or in the first week of September, that time being chosen because of Japanese estimate of the period required to assemble sufficient troops, ammunition and stores for the operation.

BUINA - It was recognized by Lt-gen KANDA that the greatest threat lay in the southern sector. Evacuation of the SHORTLAND ISLANDS was ordered in December and continued until Apr 45, when it was practically completed. Withdrawal of the KIEPA Garrison was ordered in May 45, but because of the difficult tracks it had not been completed. Most of the fit personnel however, had reached BUIN by the end of the campaign and had marched overland via the coastal track.

He confirmed that division of areas and tasks between the Naval and Army forces outlined by IMARA in para 12, and added that KANDA's intention was to keep as large a proportion of the Army as possible mobile. The role of that force was to have been to launch a heavy counter offensive from the north, starting somewhere in the vicinity of the headwaters of the MULIKO RIVER and swinging wide and deep westwards before changing direction southwards to strike the Australian left flank. That counter-offensive was to have taken place when the Australians reached the SILIBAL River and were halted by the naval forces holding that line. It was considered that the naval forces, in conjunction with the denial of the BUIN-SHORTLAND harbour area would be sufficient to hold the Australian forces that could be moved overland. It was appreciated that without a beachhead in the east of the SILIBAL River great difficulty would be encountered by the Australians in moving sufficient forces along the main BUIN Road to mount a successful assault on BUIN.

- (b) NUMA NUMA sector - KANIKO - When the Australian attack was launched on PEARL RIDGE, 81 Inf Regt was stationed at TARLEISA and approximately 2,000 troops were in and forward of

NUMA NUMA. It was thought the intention was to drive to the coast somewhere in the vicinity of NUMA NUMA and cut the east coast L or C. Regt HQ with about 300 to 400 reinforcements was immediately moved to NUMA NUMA, and orders were given for the movement of more troops to NUMA NUMA. Between Dec and May approximately 1,100 troops were moved making the total reinforcement of the NUMA NUMA garrison about 1,500. An army force considered sufficient by 38 INF to stop the rapid advance of the Australians northwards along the west coast, was left in the GEMBA RIVER area under the command of Lt-col MAKAMURA. This force, however, suffered such heavy casualties that it was decided to withdraw it to NUMA NUMA and an agreement was reached with Naval forces on BUKA and BONIS to take over the TARENA sector. About 600 remnants of MAKAMURA's force was withdrawn. After they had arrived in NUMA NUMA, orders were received from KANDA that MAKAMURA's force would return immediately to the BONIS Peninsula. This was done despite the protests of 38 INF.

When the war ended, it was considered that preparations had been completed for a large scale offensive on NUMA NUMA from the PEARL RIDGE area. It was considered that three bns would be used in the assault, the main blow being directed by a bn each along the main NUMA NUMA trail and the MAKUMAI RIVER trail.

Role of the third bn was thought to have been to strike through IBU, seize the landing strip there, and subsequently drive Japanese forces out of the RED River Valley, moving eventually to the coast at ASITAVI. There a seaborne force would land and join the bn in a drive on NUMA NUMA from the north to co-incide with a bn move northwards from the coastal end of the NUMA NUMA trail.

The NUMA NUMA garrison was in a difficult position for food and supplies. It received these about once a month by one barge from BUIH.

The dangers of being trapped in NUMA NUMA by the anticipated offensive were fully realized, but no mention was made officially of withdrawing the garrison to BUIH. The idea was canvassed secretly among officers, but the conclusion reached was that the troops were in such poor condition and the difficulties of feeding and moving at night to BUIH overland so great that successful evacuation was impossible. Their orders were to remain in NUMA NUMA and fight.

Towards the end of the war, troops opposing the Australians were considerably thinned out and brought down to NUMA NUMA to strengthen the defences of that area for the final battle.

- (c) NORTHERN DOUGAINVILLE Sector - Lt-col MAKAMURA - When the main body of 81 Inf Regt moved to NUMA NUMA, he was left with approximately 1,200 troops for the defence of SOLAKEN and BONIS Peninsula. Because of sickness and need to divert men to gardening he was at no time able to put more than 300 to 350 men in the front line. His orders when told to return to BONIS Peninsula were to launch in conjunction with the Naval forces, an

attack on the Australian forces. His role was to attack the rear. He took 105 men with him but had not launched the attack when the war ended.

- (d) BONIS - BUKA Island Sector - Capt KATO - After agreement with the Army to undertake the defence of BONIS Peninsula, he formed a force comprising approximately 1,200 men of 87 Bd Regt and 1,800 civilians. The civilians were organized into three bns each of approximately 600. Many of them were army reservists. The bns were officered by Naval officers and Petty officers. Only about one-third of the civilians had arms. 87 Bd Force was fully armed. Main objectives were to preserve the BONIS and BUKA airstrips and BUKA Passage. His force suffered greatly from shortage of food aggravated by disruption of their gardening because of the need to fight.

DISCONTENT AMONG OFFICERS

22. In confidential conversation with Lt-col COURT at BULIN several weeks after the surrender, Comd IKIGAMI, Chief of Staff 8 Fleet, stated that serious differences had occurred between Regular officers and Reserve Officers in both army and navy over the conduct of the war in BOUGAINVILLE. Discontent was principally voiced by young and militant officers who were not professional soldiers before the war. They were highly critical of the conduct of the war, blaming the senior Regular officers for the reverses suffered and demanding more vigorous and more intelligent prosecution of the campaign. They were so deeply disaffected that a great number of them were relieved of command, allotted to insignificant duties and forbidden to exercise any executive command over other ranks. This state of affairs continued until after the surrender when many of them were re-assigned to positions of responsibility because of indispensable specialized knowledge of sufficient command of English to be able to act as liaison officers and interpreters. This movement apparently did not originate from the young officer clique which was a militant and ultra-reactionary group of professional officers, but arose spontaneously in BOUGAINVILLE through dissatisfaction with the control of the campaign.

APPENDIX "A" to 2 AUSST CORPS
POST-SURRENDER INTERROGATION
OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS

To : Lt-col WILSON, Staff Officer

FROM: Staff Officer MIYAGAKI

OUTLINE OF THE 17TH ARMY'S OPERATIONS ON BOUGAINVILLE
ISLAND

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Part II Campaigns against the Australian Army

- A - Campaign in Southwest BOUGAINVILLE
1. General operational intentions
 2. Maximum effective strength
 3. Allies strength
 4. General outline of battle
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- B - Campaign in NUNU NUNU Sector
1. Maximum effective strength
 2. Allies strength
 3. General outline of battle
 4. Japanese losses
- C - Campaign in the TARLENA Sector
1. Maximum effective strength
 2. Allies strength
 3. General outline of battle
 4. Japanese losses.

PART 1 TOROKINA CAMPAIGN (Jan 44 - Apr 44)

In view of the fact that this story, in preparation for the final battle in the BUIH area, burned all its military secret documents during the latter part of July 1945, some items of the outline of the TOROKINA campaign may not be accurate. Purely from memory we have, with great effort and sincerity, compiled the following.

1 - Japanese strength

6 Div main force (approx 12,000)
36 Indep Mixed Bde - portion (approx 3,000)
150 mm how - 3; 105 mm how - 2; Mt gun - 16; Light mortar - 6
Rear echelons (approx 10,000)

2 - Allies strength

United States forces - Two Division strength
10 cm Cannon and 150 mm how - about 40 to 50
Medium mortar - about 40 to 50
Field mountain gun - about 60 to 80
Light mortar - about 150 to 200
Tank - about 30
Combined air strength, maximum at one period - about 150 planes

3 - Concentrations

A - Ammunition and rations dumps

- (1) Time : Early Jan 44 to late Feb 44
- (2) Line of communication :
SABA River sector
Main portion, by sea: ERVENA, MAWARAKA, NABOI =
Small portion, overland (trucks and carriers)
ERVENA - TAIKAI - MAWARAKA - NABOI
SIOMIPALA Area
TAKLENA - (by sea) - NUNA NUNA - (truck) - No 1
Point - (Carrier) - SIOMIPALA.
- (3) Amount
Ammunition - about 180 tons
Rations - about 250 tons

B - Concentration of troops

- (1) Period : Early Feb 44 to late Feb 44
- (2) Concentrated strength:
In SABA River area - approx 10,000
In SIOMIPALA area approx 5,000
- (3) Route of concentration:
SABA River area.
Overland: ERVENA - MOSIOTTA - JABA - NABOI -
SABA R. MAWARAKA - NABOI
SIOMIPALA Area
Overland: TAKLENA - NUNA NUNA - SIOMIPALA
KIETA

4 - Preparation for attack.

A - Period: Late Feb 44 to Early Mar 44

B - Preparations

- (1) Enemy reconnaissance
- (2) Artillery firing preparations
- (3) Disposition of infantry to line of departure
- (4) Forward ammunition concentration
- (5) Setting up communication net.

5 - Attack

A - Commenced: 8 Mar 44
B - Ended : 26 Mar 44
C - Attack

- (1) Firstly, surprise-attacked the enemy airstrip with artillery. Enemy taken by surprise and thrown into state of confusion.
- (2) Strongpoints of attacks
First phase : North of TOROKINA, Hill 800 area
Second to fourth phases : Area northwest of TOROKINA
- (3) Reasons for the attack failure.
 - (a) Air support was scheduled but plans were changed and there was no support whatsoever.
 - (b) Inferior equipment, especially no tanks and weak artillery.
 - (c) Difficulty of supply, extremely insufficient ammunition and rations. Moreover, it was impossible to accumulate more than a month's supply of ration.
 - (d) Insufficient enemy reconnaissance
 - (e) Reinforcement extremely difficult due to strong enemy artillery fire.
 - (f) Strong enemy tank counter-attacks against our front line of infantry
 - (g) because of the heavy jungle, movements of units and material difficult.

6 - Change of direction

A - Commencing of retrograde movement - 30 Mar 44
B - Route: Same as the advance at time of concentration
C - Completion of movement - Middle Apr 44

7 - Japanese Losses

Killed in action - approximately 3,000
Wounded - " 4,000

PART II CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY (Dec 44 - Aug 45)

Campaign in Southwest BOUGAINVILLE

- 1 - General operational intentions
Cause the Australian army to bleed, through the defensive delaying action by a portion of 6 Division in the area between JABA and NIYO River, and through the counter-attack delaying action in the area between NIYO River and SILIBAI; construct a strong position east of SILIBAI and carry out the final decisive battle.
- 2 - Effective strength (Dec 44 - Aug 45)
 - A - Strength of 6 Div in the MOSIGETTA area - Approx 1,500
 - B - strength of 6 Div in the vicinity of FURUATA River - Approx 3,100
 - C - NIYO River banks
 - (1) Front line combat troop strength
 - Portion of 6 Div (incl rear transport unit)
 - 3,000

Portion of units under direct command of Army
(4 S.S. Grn Unit) Approx 50
150 mm Howitzer - 4; Pd Mtn Gun - 7 (Arty battle-12
guns, for tank-attacks - 4 guns)

- (2) Strength of rear supply troops
Portion of troops under direct command of Army -
approx 50
- (3) Other strengths
Troops and patients (incl Navy) engaged in food
production to supply the front line troops, and
those preparing for the final battle to be fought
in BUIN - approx 13,000

3 - Allies strength
3 Aust Div : 150mm How - 2 to 3; 120mm how-8 to 12;
medium mortar - 16 to 24; Pd Mtn Gun - 8 to 12; light
mortar - 24 (7); tanks - approx 15.
Maximum combined air strength - 40 planes.

4 - General outline of battle.

- (A) - Battle west of MOSIGETTA
 - (1) Period of battle - Dec 44 to Feb 45
 - (2) Strength of front line troops - approx 1,500
 - (3) Principle of combat instructions
Strive to stop the enemy's advances and inflict
as great a loss as possible.
- (B) - Battle in the vicinity of PURIATA River.
 - (1) Period of battle - Mar 45 to Apr 45
 - (2) Strength of front line troops - approx 3,100
 - (3) Object of combat instructions
Concentrate the necessary strength on an
important line, stage counter-attacks, frustrate
the enemy plans to advance, and inflict a
heavy damage and loss to the enemy.
- (C) - Battle in the HONGORAI R - MOBIAT R area.
 - (1) Period of battle - late Apr 45 to late Jun 45
 - (2) Strength of front line troops - approx 2,500
 - (3) Object of combat instructions
Through defensive delaying action tactics,
obtain the margin of time necessary to prepare
for the campaign east of NIWO RIVER.
- (D) - Subsequent battles
 - (1) Period of battle - Late Jun 45 to 16 Aug 45
 - (2) Strength of front line troops - approx 3,000
 - (3) Object of combat instructions
Throw several sufficiently large units deep
into the rear of the enemy and interfere
with their supply lines, and at the same time,
attack the tanks which are the nucleus of
the Australian army land warfare, and thus
prepare for the final battle east of the
NIWO RIVER by ever decreasing the Australian
army strength (especially tanks)
- (E) - Since May 45 prepared for the decisive battle in
the BUIN area, and completed in early August,
when the war ended.

5 - Japanese losses.

Killed in action - approx 1,200
Wounded - approx 2,000

Campaign in the NUNIA NUNIA sector

1 - Maximum effective strength (Dec 44 to Aug 45)

- A - Front line combat strength
 - Portion of 38 Indep Mixed Bde - approx 600
 - Light mortars - 2
- B - Ammunition and ration carriers strength - approx 500
- C - Patients, and troops engaged in food production and preparations for the final battle in the mountains west of NUMA NUMA - approx 2,000
- 2 - Allies strength
 - One Australian infantry regiment as nucleus. 10 cm cannon - 4, medium mortar - 4; Fd mtn arty - 4 to 6; light mortar - 20 to 30.
 - Maximum combined air strength - approx 20 planes.
- 3 - General outline of battle.
 - A - Battle in the vicinity of TOROKINA HILL.
 - (1) Period of battle - Dec 44 to Apr 45.
 - (2) Front line strength (includes subsequent reinforcement) approx 350
 - (3) Object of combat instructions.
 - Capture the defiles, strengthen our positions, and stop the enemy's advance, and at the same time inflict heavy personnel losses to the enemy during their dawn attacks.
 - B - Battle in the vicinity of No 3 Base Point.
 - (1) Period of battle - May 45 to Aug 45
 - (2) Front line strength (including subsequent reinforcements) (?? Blank)
 - (3) Object of combat instructions.
 - Actively use many defiles and essential points and strengthen the positions; at the same time cause heavy losses to the enemy by conducting diversion tactics and laying in ambush until the enemy closed in on our positions.

4 - Japanese Losses

Killed in action - approx 400
Wounded - approx 150

Campaign in the TARLENA sector.

- 1 - Maximum effective strength (Jan 45 to early May 45)
 - A - Front line combat troops - approx 500
 - 150 mm how - 1; mts gun - 6; AA gun - 8
 - B - Rear supply troops and patients - approx 500
- 2 - Allies strength
 - One Australian infantry regiment as nucleus. Fd mtn gun - 6 to 8; medium mortar - 4; light mortar - 20 to 30; Maximum combined air strength - 20 planes.
- 3 - General outline of battle.
 - A - Battle in the SUN - GONGA area.
 - (1) Period of battle - Jan 45 to Mar 45.
 - (2) Front line strength (including subsequent reinforcement) approx 300
 - (3) Object of combat instructions.
 - Grab the opportunity, carry out a counter-attack and frustrate the enemy's intention of advancing into the TARLENA strategic area; at the same time inflict heavy troop losses on the enemy.
 - B - Battle in the TARLENA Peninsula Area
 - (1) Period of battle - Apr 45 to early May 45

(2) Front line strength - approx 250

(3) Object of combat instructions.

Capture the defiles, and while delaying the enemy advancing from the KUNAPOFO area, evacuate the war materials from TARUWA to NUMA NUMA. At an appropriate time, concentrate the troops in NUMA NUMA and prepare for the decisive battle there.

Japanese losses:

Killed in action - approx 220

Wounded - approx 100

(Translator's Notes : * Following place names are transliteration of the Japanese characters.)

APPENDIX "B" to 2 AUST CORPS
POST-SURRENDER INTERROGATION
OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS

OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE NAVY
IN THE NORTHERN SOLOMONS AREA

From: July 1943 (when 8 Fleet made its appearance in BOUGAINVILLE
ISLAND waters)

To : August 1945

- 6 Jul 43 - 8 Fleet HQ embarked from RABOUL aboard the cruiser TORIUMI and proceeded towards BUN, main objective being to preserve the line of communications for the MUNDIA and KOLONBANGARA ISLANDS campaigns.
- 12 Jul 43 - Japanese destroyer squadron (1 lt cruiser and 4 destroyers) engaged in battle and US cruiser division (JINTSU sunk).
- 17 Jul 43 - While anchored in SHORTLAND BAY the destroyer HATSUTSUKI was sunk by US aircraft.
- 22 Jul 43 - Warship NISSEIN sunk by US aircraft near KOROMIRA BAY
- 2 Oct 43 - Using 4 destroyers and about 50 barges making two trips, the approximately 12,500 Japanese Army and Navy troops in MUNDIA and KOLONBANGARA ISLANDS were evacuated; the greater portion of which going to BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND and the remainder to RABOUL.
- 6 Oct 43 - Employing destroyers and barges the approximately 500 army and navy troops on VELALAVELA ISLAND were concentrated to BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND. During this operation the Japanese destroyer escorts (3 destroyers) engaged a US destroyer flotilla (destroyer YUUGUMO sunk).
- 22 Oct 43 - The Naval Air Force on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND transferred to RABOUL.
- 26 Oct 43 - American troops landed on MONO ISLAND. Japanese garrison troops (approximately 150 men) annihilated.
- 1 Nov 43 - American forces landed on TOROKINA. US cruiser divisions and destroyer flotilla shelled SHORTLAND and BUKA ISLANDS.
- 2 Nov 43 - A Japanese destroyer squadron engaged a US cruiser division in a night encounter in the waters off TOROKINA. (Lt cruiser KAWAUCHI and destroyer HATSUKAZE sunk).

From hereon, as far as the 8th Fleet is concerned, there is nothing of operational value to report.

REFERENCES:

- 1 - In late October 1943, merchant ship communication with RABOUL was cut off. In middle November of the same year, destroyer communication with RABOUL was also cut off. From November of the same year, daylight air transport was discontinued.
- 2 - During the period from Oct 43 to Apr 44, submarine communications with TRUK and RABOUL were carried out from SHORTLAND BAY, 7 times; and from BUKA STRAIT, 3 times.

During 1944, night traffic by seaplane with RABAU was carried out at the rate of one or two trips per month.

During 1945, up to August, six trips were made.

Bomber communication with RABAU carried out in April 45.

Flying boat communications with TRUK carried out twice in June 44 and once in April 45.

NOTE: Further details are not available since all records were burned on 1 Jul 45, in preparation for the final battle in the BUIK area.

(Translator's Note: "following place names are transliteration of the Japanese characters)

12/12
P.M.

ALLIED LAND FORCES
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS

G/171.21/Int

Dec 45

Subject: ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

GS (Int)
BRISBANE Section HQ ALF

... Attached hereto is a report prepared by the Japanese and received from First Aust Army covering the operations of the Air and Ground Forces of the Japanese Navy in NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS and SOLOMONS for the period Jan 42 to Aug 45.

- ① Lt-Col Hutton
② Capt Hallion
to P/A

1.0

Skinner Capt
for Colonel,
Deputy Director of Military Intelligence.

III. LAND OPERATIONS IN NEW BRITAIN, NEW GUINEA AND THE SOLOMONS
CARRIED OUT BY NAVY

A. Land Operations in NEW BRITAIN

(1) RABAU

Navy forces landed with the Army 23rd Jan 1942. Afterwards the Navy established a naval base at RABAU HARBOUR, and constructed airfield in the vicinity. Since Feb 44 the navy was responsible for the defence of RABAU PENINSULA, SIMPSON BAY, VUNAKANAU and TOBERA airfields.

(2) SURUMI (GASMATA)

Naval forces occupied SURUMI Feb 42 and repaired and used the airfield. They were called back to RABAU Jan 44. (Army units were also stationed there but the date of stationing unknown).

(3) MERKUS

Naval forces occupied MERKUS in the latter part of Dec 42 and established a watchout station there. Army troops advanced into the area Oct 1943. Allies landed on 15 Dec 1943 and the Japanese forces retreated by land after fighting till Feb 1944.

(4) GAROE

The Navy forces with the army occupied the islands in April 1943 and put up a base for barges. They evacuated the area by barges in the latter part of March 1944.

(5) IROKI

May 1943 a minor naval unit occupied the area and put up a base for barges and evacuated the area Feb 1944.

(6) SAVUVU

August 1943 navy forces occupied the area to construct an airfield but retreated by land in the middle of March 1944 without ever using the strip.

(7) Others

Watchout stations in NEW BRITAIN other than those mentioned above are:-

ZINGEN, JACQUINOT, DAMPIER, HOWE, LAMBERT, TORIU,
TARASEA, TURUBU (Cape GLOUCESTER)

B. Land operation in NEW GUINEA

(1) LAE

This operation was carried out on March 1942 solely by navy forces (BASEBO 5th Landing Corps). SALAMAU was subsequently occupied. The Army forces landed on March 1943 and the defence of the place was undertaken by the two forces. At the latter part of Sep the army and navy forces evacuated LAE and SALAMAU for SIO by land.

(2) BUNA

At the middle part of Jul 1942 the cooperating troops of the navy and army occupied the place. The main object of the navy was to establish a landing base there. The navy dispatched the contact party to keep in touch with the army troops marching on STANLEY mountains.

On January 1943 our troops at BUNA were completely destroyed.

(3) RABI (MILNE BAY)

On May 26th the navy forces landed intending to occupy the airdrome. But this operation was unsuccessful owing to strong resistance and the muddiness of the battlefield. Then we withdrew our troops from there.

(4) FINSCHHAVEN

The Allied forces began to attack FINSCHHAVEN toward the latter part of September 1943. The 85th Defence Corps was stationed there and the army and navy cooperated in fighting the Allies, and gradually retreated to the west.

(5) WEWAK

Jan 23rd 1943 the army corps landed at WEWAK under the cover of navy units. The navy has established the 2nd Base Corps in WEWAK, which has afterwards called the 27th Base Corps.

G. Land Operations in SOLOMONS Area

(1) BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

(a) Japanese navy forces alone attacked and occupied KIETA, BUKA IS, SHORTLAND IS, etc in March 1942 and afterwards established air base at BUIN and BUKA IS, anchorage for warships and merchantmen at BUIN anchorage, which served as a forward base for operations in SOLOMONS area. Since the commencement of GUADALCANAL operations, army forces too, advanced to this island, and at present the main force of land forces there consists of army.

(b) In land battle at TOROKINA navy detached part of its forces to cooperate.

(2) TULAGI and GUADALCANAL IS

On May 1st 1942 navy forces landed on TULAGI and GUADALCANAL, IS set up a sea plane base at TULAGI, sent flying boats there, and on GUADALCANAL IS started constructing an airfield. As the United States forces landed GUADALCANAL and TULAGI IS on August 8th, TULAGI forces were wiped out and on GUADALCANAL IS naval garrison fought together with reinforced army forces till the rest of the defending forces evacuated from island January 1943.

(3) REKATA (ISABELLE IS)

Since the commencement of GUADALCANAL IS operations Japanese naval forces set up a seaplane base at REKATA and sent landing forces there, which moved to MUNDA in August 43.

(4) MUNDA (NEW GEORGIA IS) and ^KCOLONBANGARA IS

Oct 42 Japanese Navy constructed the airfield at MUNDA as was necessitated by the GUADALCANAL IS operations and later the airfield on COLONBANGARA IS of which use was commenced in Dec 42. It was decided that Army forces should advance to defend this area and on June 1st 43 the commanding officer of the Army forces was in command of the whole defending troops there. They continued fighting as the US forces landed on the RENDOVA IS June 30th 43 and evacuated from COLONBANGARA and VELLA LA VELLA IS during last part of Sep to first part of Oct.

^{UL}
(5) CHOISEULE IS

At several points on this island observation and signal stations and barge bases were set up, but were evacuated successively in the latter half of 1944.

1. ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE NAVY IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA

Japanese Southeastern Fleet	Forces under direct command	
	The 11th Air Fleet	RABAU
	The 14th Base Forces	NEW IRELAND
	The 8th Fleet	BOUGAINVILLE
	The 27th Base Forces	NEW GUINEA

2. ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE NAVY IN RABAU AND THEIR DUTIES

A. Headquarters Japanese Southeastern Fleet

B. Defence Corps

The 81st Defence Corps	- defence of east side of Crater Peninsula
The 84th " "	- defence of RABAU township
The 86th " "	- defence of north side of Crater Peninsula
The 85th " "	- defence of southeast side of Crater Peninsula

The 8th YOKOSUKA Special Landing Corps	- mobile forces
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C. Air Corps

The 958th Flying Corps	- seaplane operations and defence of MARAGUNA district
The 105th Air Base Corps Main Force	- land plane operations and defence of VUNAKANAU airdrome
Tobera Force	- defence of TOBERA airdrome

D. Forces Afloat

The 8th Harbour Office	-patrolling of Bay entrance
The 8th Sub-Base Corps	- torpedo attack by small crafts for a surprise attack

E. Communication Corps

The 8th Communication Corps	- wireless communication
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F. Weather Observation Corps

The 8th Weather Observation Corps	- weather observation
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G. Engineering Corps

The 8th Engineering Corps	- repairing of ships and boats
The 108th Aviation Repairing Corps	- repairing of airplanes

H. Billeting Corps

The 8th Construction Corps	
The 28th Labour Corps	
The 211th Labour Corps	... billeting of airdrome and general billeting work
The 212th Labour Corps	
The 101st Labour Corps	
The 34th Labour Corps	

I. Administration Corps

The 8th Supply Corps	- storage and supply of Ordnance and general munitions
The 8th Naval Office of Account	- account works

J. Hospital and others

The 8th Naval Hospital	
The 2nd Sanitation Corps	- prevention works to MALARIA
The 3rd Sanitation Corps	

K. Others

Remainder, the 8th Fleet	
" the 14th Base Forces	- connecting works
Court-Martial Office	
Civil Administration Office	- administration of natives

(3) February to April 1944

The 25th and 26th Air Group were transferred to the inner Pacific to meet the situation there. The aircraft remaining at RABAUl were seaplanes and a few land planes and transport planes.

(4) 25th March 1944

The 9th Fleet was removed from this command to that of the Southwestern Fleet.

(5) 1st December 1944

- (a) The 8th Base Force was disbanded and its HQ incorporated in the Southeastern Fleet HQ.
- (b) A reorganization of troops remaining in RABAUl was carried out to strengthen the defence, and the 84th Defence Corps and the 85th Defence Corps were newly organized.

SUGGESTED LIST OF JAPANESE OFFICERS FOR INTERROGATION

9 Div Area

Lt Gen BABA, Masao	: Comd 37 Army in BORNEO.
Maj Gen KURODA	: C of S 37 Army.
Maj Gen AKASHI	: Comd 56 IMB in the BRUNEI - JESSELTON Area.
Maj Gen YAMAMURA	: Comd 71 IMB at KUCHING.

7 Div Area

Vice Admiral KAMADA	: Comd 22 Base Force at BALIKPAPAN.
Capt TSUJIMASHI	: Senior Naval Staff Officer 22 Base Force.
Maj YAMADA	: CO 454 Indep Inf Bn.
Maj Gen UNO	: Comd BANJERNASIN Defence Force.

MAKASSAR Force Area

Lt Gen TESHIMA, Fusataro	: Comd 2 Army. This officer originally had his HQ at MANOKWARI in Jun 44. It successively withdrew to IDORE, KOKAS, PIRCE and then to SOUTH CELEBES. A statement by him on the operations from HOLLANDIA to MOROTAI should be of interest.
Vice Admiral OSUGI	: Comd 23 Base Force at MAKASSAR.

TIMOR Force Area

Lt Gen YAMADA, Kunitaro	: Comd 48 Div at BIMA. 48 Div was originally in TIMOR but from Dec 44, it commenced withdrawing westwards with the ultimate object of moving all except two Bns of the Div west of BALI. This withdrawal was apparently operating satisfactorily on 15 Aug 45.
Maj Gen TANAKA, Toru	: Comd 2 Formosan Inf Regt, 48 Div. This officer has been in the area for a long time and should have worthwhile comments to make on conditions and plans of 48 Div.
Col KAIDO, Tatsuchi	: Comd 4 Tank Regt, TIMOR.

AMBON Force Area

Maj Gen KOGORI, Kinji	: Comd 5 Div. This officer was only recently appointed to this formation. However, he will be able to name one of his senior officers who has been with the division since early 42. This offr may be able to give an indication as to whether or not it was planned to use 5 Div offensively in the area NW of AUSTRALIA in late 42.
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AMBOEN Force Area (Contd)

Vice Admiral ICHISE,
Shinichi

: Comd 25 Base Force at AMBOEN.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Lt Gen TANOUÉ

: Comd 36 Div at SARMI.

Lt Gen IKEDA

: Comd 36 Div at SORONG.

INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE OFFICERS

MUSCHU ISLAND - 4 NOV 45

DISPOSITIONS OF JAP FORCES

Aug 44 - At AITAPE, Jap forces opposing the Allies totalled 30,000.

Nov 44 -

Elements of 41 Div (approx strength 1,000) were disposed in coastal sector between BANMAP and ANUMB Rivers.

20 Div, GOC Lt Gen NAKAI, was disposed BUT-DAGUA area south to area east of TONG sector. Total strength 8,000 troops of whom 2700/2800 were on coastal sector.

TONG sector was responsibility of Maj-Gen MANO with strength of 1,400 troops.

NAKAI's command in Nov 44 included as far as EAST as BOIKEN, but in Dec 44, Lt-Gen ADACHI took over command of BOIKEN area.

East of 24 vertical grid was area of responsibility for 51 Div (Lt-Gen NAKANO) with total strength of 9,000 troops.

MUSCHU and KAIRIEU Islands were garrisoned with approximately 1,500 troops.

PLAN

It was thought the Allies would attack along the coast with two divisions, object WEWAK, an element of these being used in amphibious assaults, whilst another element would swing south through TONG and then drive eastwards through MAPRIK-KIARIVU. It was not thought the Allies would use more than two divisions and therefore, it was assumed we would not drive down into the SEPIK area until after WEWAK had been secured.

It was anticipated our plan would be as follows:-

1st Phase: Capture and fortify WEWAK.

2nd Phase: Drive inland and then eastwards along the PRINCE ALEXANDER Mountains. (Both drives to be coordinated).

3rd Phase: Attack along SEPIK River.

On the above assumptions, Japanese troops were disposed accordingly. 41 Div troops between the BANMAP and ANUMB Rivers were disposed to hold up the Allies' advance until the main body had withdrawn to the BUT-DAGUA area. When main withdrawal completed the rearguard would also also withdraw to that area which was to be strongly defended to deny the Allies the use of the airfields. Gen NAKAI was to command that area. It was anticipated that we would coordinate amphibious landings with our land drive to secure these airfields.

However, the plan to defend the BUT-DAGUA area could not be fully implemented due to lack of food, all food being drawn from the inland sector. It was then decided to concentrate in the MAPRIK area which was to be made their strong point of resistance. SEPIK area was left with a garrison army only. Although the actual order to move inland was not issued until 12 Jan 45, it had been contemplated since Nov 44 as from that date, elements of 41 Div were gradually moved inland.

In Nov 44, Maj Gen MANO commanded troops in the TONG area to

counter our inland drive. The area behind MANO controlled by Maj Gen MIYAKE whose forces was part of Lt Gen MAKAI's command. MAKAI was responsible for the area BUT-DAGUA incl SOUTH to MAPRIK.

20 Div (Lt-Gen MAKAI) commenced to move inland to the MAPRIK area on 5 Jan, move being completed by the middle of February.

Round 6 Feb 45, Maj Gen MANO reported to Gen ADACHI that the position on his front was deteriorating. ADACHI then conferred with MAKAI at ORANDEN (?). As a result of this conference MAKAI assumed overall command of the inland sector.

ADACHI returned to his HQ and then went to NUMBUKO. On 3 Mar he again conferred with MAKAI at WAIGAKUM. In Mar 45 YOSHIWORA FORCE was formed to strengthen resistance in the inland sector. Preparations were also in hand to meet 17 Bde's attack on MAPRIK.

Physical Condition of Troops

End of Jul 44, food supplies became exhausted and troops had to subsist on sac sac and potatoes. After the AITAPE operation only one-third were able to walk, and nearly two-thirds were patients. From 6 Aug 44, due to lack of food and nourishment, 15,000 troops were lost out of 40,000.

Arms and Ammunition

In accordance with original plan to defend BUT-DAGUA, heavy weapons were placed along the coastal sector, but with the change in plan to defend the MAPRIK area, the Japs were not able to carry inland any heavy weapons due to physical condition of troops. Only supporting weapons available in the inland sector were machine guns and a few mortars.

The main deficiency was rifle ammunition. For approx 17,000 rifles only 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle were available. Another deficiency was hand grenades, one to every three men. They had to use makeshift hand grenades.

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Major-General MANO (41 Division)

After AITAPE operation on the DRININOUR River, 41 Div was disposed between the DANMAP and ANUMB Rivers to protect withdrawals of main forces to the BUT-DAGUA area. Elements were disposed further SOUTH to defend TONG. As food supplies were exhausted, coconuts were main items of diet on coast. During Sep 44, two amphibious landings were made in SUAIN area by Aust troops. At that time MANO'S HQ was on mountain between DANMAP and DANINUL Rivers where he stayed until 1 Oct.

By 30 Oct, his force had moved to HAMBINI under orders from Gen MAKAI as no food available in coastal area.

236 Regt was force in TONG area. Jap Intelligence reported that there was an element of Aust troops at TONG and Regt was ordered to attack TONG on 8 Oct. As MANO was still in coastal area, this order was passed through his staff office at HAMBINI to the Regt.

1 Nov - Main line of defence occupied by forces under cmd was PEREMBIL - NEW SANIK - YASUM.

28 Dec - Since position became untenable, main position was moved to LUWAITE Villages and SALATA.

No positions were occupied at SEINI Villages. SEINI was

only a staging post for troops passing south from the coast sector plus a few medical and foraging troops, (Aust troops captured orders saying one bn of 239 Regt was to establish positions in this area but this order was not received by HANO from ADACHI - probably elements of Regt were sent to this area for foraging from time to time).

Jan 45 - 41 Div HQ were at LUHAITE Villages with main strength disposed in front of these villages.
On 20 Jan, HQ moved to BALIP.

After HQ moved to BALIP, troops under command were :-

238 Regt plus elements of 239 Regt - SALATA
Remainder 239 Regt and 54 L of C
Garrison Unit - BULANITA

Elements of 239 Regt at SALATA (approximate strength 300) were ordered to attack the rear of Aust troops. These troops moved off from SALATA on 23 Jan but due to marching only at night and losing way with consequent shortage of rations, mission was abandoned and troops returned to SALATA on 15 Feb.

54 L of C Garrison Unit then moved to BALIP.

Due to heavy air bombardment, HQ moved to BARANGABANDAN and at same time 239 Regt was ordered to move round from SALATA to attack BALIP. In conjunction with this attack, 239 Regt also attacked NUNAHOO.

At this time, an Australian patrol intercepted a message from 18th Army HQ ordering HANO to move to AUPIK No 2 on 12 March. He left on 11 Mar and an Australian patrol which went to raid his HQ missed him by one day, the only Jap troops there being a staff officer and 10/12 men.

When HQ moved to AUPIK No 2, main strength was also concentrated there. Whilst there, reinforcements of one company of 4 Bn of 239 Regt were received from the SEPIK area. This company was equal to a battalion as all men were fit and well, rations being in good supply in SEPIK area. This battalion in the SEPIK area had been there for almost two years having been sent there from WENAK at the time of the heavy raids on WENAK. Middle of March MIYAKE took command of part of front.

1 Apr - From AUPIK, 41 Div retreated to NW of WORA. Australian troops occupied WORA thus boxing his force up. However, HANO waited until these troops moved on and then moved his force south behind the Australian troops and escaped the encirclement.

End of July- Jap troops retreated to WINGE where HQ 41 Div was established, with main strength at GUALIP. Whilst at WINGE, a strong attack was launched by 80 Australian troops on this position. At time of attack HANO was having a meal undressed. If attack had been maintained a little longer, HANO would have been captured.

22 Jul - When HQ moved to east of CHIGAU (?), troops remained at GUALIP and WINGE. When Australian troops attacked GUALIP, their patrols moved round to attack his HQ and our patrols were operating between HQ and his front line. All staff officers were used to man the defences of his HQ. Attacks on WINGE were maintained from 26 Jul to 12 Aug and the fight there was very furious. HANO was really surprised at the tenacity with which the Australian troops fought.

Major-General MIYAKE

12 Feb - Strength of MIYAKE FORCE was approx 800, comprising -
78 Regiment, 20 Division
KAKURICHI Marine Force
One company of 51 Division

Location - concentrated at JAMIE, EAST of MAPRIK.

Force was to make a strong point round YAMIL area, then from there to attack MILAK and then when attack successful to push WEST towards AMAUANEK.

Whilst attack on MILAK was in progress, report was received from Jap patrols that Aust troops were coming in from NORTH, so orders were issued from 18th Army to hold his position at MILAK. From then on, Aust troops started to attack MAPRIK and plan for Jap advance was abandoned.

30 Apr - Main line of resistance : IMBIA-MELIGUM-KUMBUNGUA-BAINYIK

First week of May -

Main line of resistance : LOAMIN-KAMIS-KUMBUNGUA-BAINYIK

Orders were then received to hold line running NORTH-SOUTH through KAMEUK until 31 May but he succeeded in holding line until 30 June, when force proceeded to UUPU arriving there about 30 June, then on to OANIRU in first part of July.

On 1 May MIYAKE FORCE came under command of General YOSHIWORO and MIYAKE was in charge of defence of YAMIL area.

On 5 June, came under command of Lt Gen NAKAI and General YOSHIWORO returned to 18 Army HQ.

After coming under command of NAKAI for about two weeks, he was under General MANO to assist him in GWALIP operations.

- - - - -

NAKAI

5 Jun - Came inland. At that time MIYAKE had his main line at YAMIL and KARAMBU. YOSHIWORO had under command force at WINGAM also. From 18th Army orders were received to hold KAPOIBUS until the end (the final stand). Orders were then received to hold KAPOIBUS until end of August. Then another order came to hold KIARIVU until end of September. (KIARIVU selected as area of final stand as country further EAST could not support troops).

HAYASHITA FORCE (79 Regt) came down from NIMBUN towards KAPOIBUS and with transport units comprised holding force at KAPOIBUS a total of approx 450 troops.

80 Regt were at WINGAM
MIYAKE controlled 78 and 80 Regts in area in front of KAPOIBUS.

3/1/50
ALLIED LAND FORCES
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS

0/174.2/Int

24 Dec 45

Subject: JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS - INTERROGATION
OF JAPANESE COMMANDERS AND STAFF

7 Div
9 Div
MAKASAR Force
TINOR Force
AMBON Force
MOBOKAI Force Surveillance Party.

Copy to:

HQ ANZ
HIS COMMAND Section HQ ANZ.

It is considered that the views and appreciations of Japanese commanders opposing Aust forces during operations in the SWPA, would be of considerable historical and intelligence value. To some extent this information has already been gained from captured documents, but it is thought that interrogation of selected commanders and senior staff officers now in concentration areas under our control would give greater insight into enemy thought and tactics.

2. It is felt that this information could best be obtained from Japanese commanders and senior staff officers by a written "self-analysis" for which they should have ample time at present. Attached as Appendix A is a statement of the general form which it is suggested should be used in this "self-analysis".

3. It is requested, therefore, that forces under command take this matter up with and endeavour to obtain such a "self-analysis" from those Japanese commanders and senior staff officers when they consider suitable and who are in areas under their control. As a guide in this selection a list of Japanese officers who might be used for this purpose is attached as Appendix B. Others should be added if they took part in operations of special interest, for example the COs of Independent Infantry Battalions at BALIKAPAN. In view of the possibility of this task overlapping the handover to British and FHIA forces in certain areas, a list of the Japanese officers who agree to carry out this work will be compiled and two copies of the list forwarded to this HQ. Subsequent additions to this list will be notified.

4. These lists of Japanese officers should show rank, name and appointment and will be forwarded to this HQ by 14 Jan 46. Papers prepared by Japanese officers will be forwarded as soon as possible but in any case not later than 31 Jan 46. Handover files will include a copy of this instruction, showing reports outstanding, lists of Japanese officers contacted and any subsequent correspondence.

J. Landis Jones Col.
for (S J MILFORD) Major-General,
for Commander, MOBOKAI Force.

APPENDIX "C" to 2 ANST CORP
POST-SURRENDER INTERVIEW
OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS

ORDER OF BATTLE 17 JAP ARMY

	OFF	WO	Soldiers		TOTAL	Civil-ians
			NO	OR		
<u>BUIN SECTOR</u>						
Units under direct control of Army:						
Army HQ	58	22	155	206	441	17
4 S.S. Grn	82	49	334	531	996	
4 Med Arty	54	21	341	405	821	
59 AA	54	20	423	268	765	
19 Indep Bnqr	35	23	293	353	704	1
2 Shipp Bnqr	41	25	345	346	757	21
32 Sig Coy	16	6	147	157	326	
212 MT Depot	6	2	57	83	148	
76 L of C Hosp	39	6	165	164	374	
17 Water Purif	6	2	35	26	69	
Bn Pd Ord Depot	8	4	58	42	112	
Bn Pd MT Depot	3	3	35	8	49	
Bn Pd Goods Dep	12	4	82	88	186	17
MP	4	4	8	1	17	1
Volant Unit						176
Labour Unit						496
Prisoners						
TOTALS	418	191	2,478	2,710	5,797	731
<u>6 DIV</u>						
Div HQ	63		139	90	292	3
13 Inf Regt	55		272	117	444	
23 Inf Regt	55		285	85	423	
45 Inf Regt	103		540	195	858	
6 Cav Regt	22		80	34	136	
6 Pd Arty	113		734	556	1,403	
6 Bnqr Regt	28		188	61	257	
Div Sig Unit	9		71	48	128	
6 Transport	57		451	444	922	
CCS	85		462	306	853	1
TOTALS	431	157	3,202	1,936	5,726	4
<u>BOHIS SECTOR</u>						
38 AA	12	1	40	43	96	
TOTALS	12	1	40	43	96	
<u>NUMA NUMA SECTOR</u>						
38 Indep Mxd Bde						
Inf Bde HQ	25	9	50	86	170	2
81 Inf Regt	87	33	183	387	690	
Pd Arty	25	3	62	135	225	
Engineers	10	2	26	57	95	
Sig Unit	5		17	57	79	
CCS	9	2	12	27	50	
94 L of C Hosp	29	5	91	135	260	
Sp 5 ?	5		7	9	21	
32 Sig Unit	1		7	21	29	
MP	2	1	10	1	14	
TOTALS	198	55	465	915	1,633	2
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>						
	1,059	404	6,185	5,604	13,252	
	1,463			11,789		737

IV. THE CHANGES IN NAVAL ORGANIZATION OWING TO THE SITUATION AFTER JAN 42

A. From Jan to July 1942

C-in-C 4th Fleet (Truk) ^K		
8th Base Corps	7th Base Corps	Surface Units
	(Inaugurated June 1942)	
81st Defence Corps		24th Air Group
8th Communication Corps		
82nd Defence Corps	5th SASSEB Special Landing Corps	

- B. From the middle of July to middle of August 1942: On 14th July the 8th Fleet was inaugurated and the C-in-C 8th Fleet stationing his HQ at RABAU took over command of the forces in this area in place of the C-in-C 4th Fleet.

C. From the middle of August to December 1942

With the opening of the GUADALCANAL operations the C-in-C 11th Air Fleet moved his HQ to RABAU and commanded all navy forces in this area, the 8th Fleet included.

D. December 1942 to October 1943

- (1) In order to strengthen the HQ to meet the growing importance of the situation in the Southeastern area, the office of C-in-C was inaugurated in RABAU 24th Dec 1942 and the C-in-C 11th Air Fleet was appointed C-in-C Southeastern Fleet.

C-in-C SE Fleet		
8th Fleet	11th Air Fleet	Units temporarily att from the Combined Fleet

(2) November 1943

- (a) The 9th Fleet was organized to facilitate naval operations in NEW GUINEA

C-in-C 9th Fleet		
2nd Base Corps (WZKAK)	7th Base Corps (MADANG)	Surface Units

- (b) The 14th Base Corps was organized and stationed in NEW IRELAND.

Australian Liaison Office

22nd October, 1945

Subject: REGARDING THE 85TH DEFENCE CORPS

1. The 85th Defence Corps that was stationed in New Guinea was reorganised into the 9th Fleet in March or April of 1944. The records at that time stated that a comparatively short time later, the 9th Fleet was disbanded in New Guinea and the command was distributed during April of the same period, but due to the records being destroyed the exact date is uncertain.

2. The present 85th Defence Corps was organised on the 1st of December 1944. It consists of riggers from part of the following corps: The 151st Air Corps, 204th Air Corps, 251st Air Corps, 501st Air Corps, 582nd Air Corps, personnel from the 8th Base Corps, (The 8th Base Corps was disbanded on the 1st December 1944) 2nd Transport Unit and also from part of several anti-aircraft units.

Japanese Liaison Office

(Sgt) H. OGASAWARA

Lt-Comm

REALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL OF DISBANDED UNITS (GROUND UNITS)

Name of Units disbanded (Place)	Date disbanded	Strength at date of disbandment	Units to which personnel transferred (Place)		Number of personnel transferred to each unit (Place)	Are these persons located with these units at present
MAIZURU 2nd Special Landing Corps (RABAU)	10 April 42	About 1200	8th Base Corps (RABAU)	81 Defence Corps (RABAU) 82 Defence Corps (LAE)	1000 200	With the 81 D.C. Later incorporated in the 7th Base Corps
MAIZURU 2nd Special Landing Corps (GUADALCANAL)	Nov 42	About 1000	8th Combined Landing Corps (NEW GEORGIA)		About 100	See 8th C-L-C
84th Defence Corps (TULAGI)	8 Aug 42	Unknown	Annihilated			
88th Defence Corps (ADMIRALTY)	Feb 43	850	Annihilated			
7th Base Corps (WEMAK)	Aug 44	Unknown	27 Base Corps (WEMAK or KAIKURU)		Unknown	With 27 B.C.
8th Combined Landing Corps (MUMBA)	30 Nov 43	About 3000	1st Base Corps (SUIN) 14th Base Corps (NEW IRELAND)		900 2000	With their units
7th Combined Landing Corps (YABEL)	Aug 43	About 1500	KURE 7th Special Landing Corps (CHOISELLE) 1st Base Corps (SUIN)		500 1000	
HQ 8th Base Corps (RABAU)	1 Dec 44	About 900	HQ SE Fleet 8th Communication Corps 89th Defence Corps YOKOSUGA 8th Special Landing Corps		100 50 450 180	" " " "
2nd Transport Corps RABAU Transport Office	1 Dec 44	About 4200	105th Air Base Corps 81st Defence Corps 84th " " 85th " "		100 500 1500 1500	" " " "
9 AA Units			HQ 8th Base Corps		600	"
3 AA Units	1 Dec 44	900	83rd Defence Corps		900	"

REALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL OF DISBANDED (AIR UNITS)

Name of units disbanded (Place)	Date disbanded	Strength at date of disbandment	Unit to which personnel transferred (Place)	Number of personnel transferred to each unit	Are these persons located with these units at present
GENLAN Air Corps	1 Nov 42	Unknown	751st Air Corps	Unknown	Disbanded in the PHILIPPINES 4th March 44 Ground personnel remain at BARANGAL
KISARAZU Air Corps	1 Dec 42	"	Unknown	"	Unknown
TAIHAN Air Corps	1 Nov 42	"	251st Air Corps	"	Disbanded at TRUK 4 March 44
702nd Air Corps	1 Dec 43	"	751st Air Corps	"	Disbanded in the PHILIPPINES 4 March 44
151st Air Corps } 204th " } 201st " } 501st " }	10 July 44	1400	105th Air Base Corps (Not yet organized)	Details unavailable	with the 105 A.B.C.
582nd " }					
751st " }					
251st " }					
253rd "		1300			
938th Air Corps	10 Dec 44	About 200	958th Air Corps	200	with the 958 A.C.

APPENDIX "D" to 2 AUST CORPS
POST-SURRENDER INTERROGATION
OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS

ORDER OF BATTLE JAP NAVY BOUGAINVILLE

	<u>ADMIRALS</u>	<u>OFFERS & WOs</u>	<u>POs & MMH</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
8 Squadron Headquarters	2	32	80	85	199	BUIN area	
1 Naval Base Brigade							
Headquarters	1	47	194	91	333	BUIN area	
82 Garrison		68	708	116	892	BUIN area	
87 Garrison		215	974	1,768	2,957	BUKA area	
88 Garrison		64	391	2	457	TEHOIKI area	
6 Landing Party of the SASEBO Naval Station		218	1,465		1,683	(KINZA area (BUIN area	175 1,508
7 Landing Party of the KURE Naval Station		146	1,028		1,174	(BUIN area (SHOETLAND (BALLAIN	719 303 152
Communication Party		27	113		140	BUIN	
26 Billeting Party		13	45	341	399	BUIN area	
34 Billeting Party		6	36	180	222	BUIN area	
121 Billeting Party		19	88	413	522	BUIN area	
131 Billeting Party		18	43	386	447	BUIN area	
 TOTAL	 3	 873	 5,165	 3,384	 9,425		

References:

<u>Census Dates</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Loss</u>	<u>Monthly Average Deaths</u>
10 December 1944	24,333		
31 March 1945	20,849	3,484	} 950
22 August 1945	14,436	6,339	
31 August 1945	13,989	467	
			10,290 } 1,320
			1,560

Monthly Average Deaths : 1,173

Attrition Rate (average) 8.4%

APPENDIX

Name of units disbanded (Place)	Date disbanded	Strength at date of disbandment	Units to which personnel transferred (Place)	Number of personnel transferred to each unit	Area these persons located with these units at present
The SASEHO 5th Special Landing Corps (FINSCH and SALAMAU)	1943-9-15 Units at FINSCH	About a company	The 85th Defence Corps (FINSCH)	About a company	Refer to former the 85th Defence Corps
	1944-1-1 Units at SALAMAU	Unknown	The 81st Defence Corps (RABAUL) The 82nd Defence Corps (MADANG area) The 85th Defence Corps (MADANG area) Some were sent back to JAPAN	About 80 men of the 81st Defence Corps others are unknown	Some members were transferred to the 81st defence Corps and some of them were transferred again to another unit in RABAUL. The 82nd and 85th Defence Corps are in NEW GUINEA as the corps under the command of the 27th Special Base Corps.
Former the 82nd Defence Corps (LAE)	Unknown	Unknown	The 27th Special Base Corps	Details unknown	WENAK area and KAILILU IS
Former the 85th Defence Corps (FINSCH)	Unknown	Unknown			

The Headquarters of
Southeastern Japanese Fleet
RABOUL
22 Oct 45

The Headquarters of the 11th Australian Division

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

The answers to the questions put by Capt O'KIRK, when a Japanese navy administration officer according to your 08310 reported to your Headquarters, are as follows :-

1. Concerning to BASMO 5th Special Landing Corps:

This unit advanced to the LAE - SALAMUA area in July 1942 and was put under the command of the 7th Base Corps. It was moved off to SIO by land after fighting in LAE and was disbanded 1st January 1944. Some of the members were sent back to JAPAN, some were transferred to the 81st Defence Corps (RABOUL) and others were transferred to the 82nd and the 85th Defence Corps (both NEW GUINEA).

2. The form of the 7th Base Corps in the list showing the reallocation of personnel should be corrected as the list appended.

3. Concerning Labour Corps:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Date of Stationing</u>	<u>Date of Returning</u>
131 Labour Corps	BUTIN	May 43	Existing
10	"	RABOUL	May 42
14	"	LAE	June 42
			June 43

We think that the 2nd and the 181st Labour Corps are not related with this area.

4. Concerning the request put by Capt COULTER, there are some members in RABOUL who were members of the BASMO 5th Special Landing Corps and have fought at LAE, and they shall report at your office at any time you require.

(Sgd) S SATOJI Capt

Senior Staff Officer
Southeastern Japanese Fleet