

CENTRAL REGISTRY.

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SUBJECT, AND OFFICE OF ORIGIN.

Gen! Sir Ian Hamilton.

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
|-------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|
| | | | | P. A. | Date |
| | | | | | |



G.H.P.

26-5-15

My dear Birdie -

I am cabling home,
tonight, a small list
for higher honours. I

need not say your

name will top this tiny

list. They will appear

on 3^d June. A



higher honour means, in
my estimation, a

C. B. ; anything with
a K ; or promotion

to Brevet Colonel or

upwards. Besides

yourself I want three



other names although
I think, actually, this
number will have to
be limited to three in
all (including yourself).

By all means though
give me alternatives



for each class if

you like -

All goes well here -

Walter Doran + 50

Officers have arrived -

I believe they are going

to give me de Lisle -

3



Cose has made another
advance of 150
yards - My hopes
of getting him 2
more Swathka
Balks are rising -



Wishing you luck
to do in to the German
Submarines
Misses
Lambert

DONATED RECORDS LIST
3376
ITEM 45
3rd Series

General Headquarters,
Medtn. Expeditionary Force,
30th June 1915

Dictated.

My dear Birdie,

Do take the wishes of your men as to the expenditure of this ten pounds, and I will take necessary action.

I will see the Admiral tonight about getting permission to let the destroyer leave here after dark, which is the difficulty involved in carrying out your delightful little plan of spending a quiet day here.

I have only just grasped the full significance and importance of the splendid loyal co-operation you gave us during our attack. We are all deeply grateful. Further, we congratulate you most sincerely on your repulse of the enemy's big attack last night.

I try not to let myself be over-sanguine, but I do really think there are signs here that the enemy is becoming demoralised. That the French should take the famous 'Quadrilateral' with only 75 casualties is astonishing indeed. Also, a cable has just this moment come in from the 42nd Division to say that they have seen some Turks rushing out of the trenches without rifles and holding their hands up towards the French trenches. ✕

Yours ever,

Jonathan

✕ Lavin: Saw the French shot mostly these men. JH

3388
RECORDED
JUN 30 1915

1, Hyde Park Gardens, W.

Jan. 6th 1916.

Dear Birdie,

Your two epistles dated respectively the 12th and 20th December came together, and were indeed most thrilling to read. After all, amidst a good lot of bad luck, neither of us can deny that on the whole God has been pretty good to us and has given us one or two pretty fat streaks of good luck to compensate.

I happened to be dining last night immediately after the receipt of the papers with Raymond Asquith and Herbert and I read them out some passages which greatly enthused them. You have drawn such a life like picture of the whole proceeding that I should venture to suggest you do not change it too much in your formal dispatch, and if you are able to do this I am pretty sure it will become an historical document. I feel very keen about this because the dispatches on this expedition have, (more owing to the picturesque incident than the ^{skill} ~~sketch~~ of the historian) each in its own way made a mark, and this one of yours will, if told through the officials as you have told it to me, be the best of the lot.

My present dispatch is being hung up, I do not exactly know why. I was a long time writing it because when I got to England I found that Stopford had not even begun his dispatch to me, and by the time I got to work on his it was about the middle of November.

DONATED RECORDS LIST
3388

Then I found it so meagre I had to write for all sorts of subsidiary information as you know. This took a long time coming to hand, so I did not really get it off my chest until the 11th December. Since then, the War Office, by which I think it is rather a matter of the A.G. than of Lord K. have wanted me to modify certain things and tone them down. Such toning down, of course, merely means that the campaign will look better from their point of view and worse from mine. However, I have got to a point now where I am sticking my toes in the ground, and I won't change any more.

I entirely understand now your attitude as regard to the evacuation. I will not pretend to forecast how history will look at the whole of this affair, but I have a feeling that it will not be too hard on those who did the best they could with what was given them and that the attitude of those who wished to see the thing through will gain some sympathy.

As for shutting ourselves up in Egypt with a big army, on the defensive, I think that is a very poor notion. It means that the Turks will be free to hold where they like and strike where they like, whether against the Caucasus, Bagdad, Salonika or Egypt.

I hope Aspinall will get something good out of this evacuation. I have paved the way for him at any rate by telling them at the War Office of his good service and how hardly I think they have treated him in three times ignoring my recommendations on

his behalf. Give him my best salaams and tell him this.

Well, dear boy, goodbye for the present and God be with you.

Yours ever,


Sam Houston

P.S. (1) I saw French on Tuesday. He was very bitter about his treatment, and I do not feel bitter at all, which is rather strange. Still, there it is, a difference of temperament I suppose. He was very nice to me.

P.S. (2) I have wracked my brains to try and discern some conceivable motive for Monro's refusal to permit your splendid order to be published to the ~~Turks~~ ^{Troops}. It was very touching, very true, and would have appealed to the heart of everyone quite irrespective of whether he thought the withdrawal a sound or unsound piece of military tactics.

No, as I began by saying, I cannot pretend to be able to conceive the motive underlying so strange a prohibition.

I rather wonder why you consulted him. I think you must be more frightened of Monro than you were of me. Certainly, I do not




think it would have ever entered my head to interfere in such a matter between a Corps Commander and his well-tried troops, even if I did not entirely hold with his sentiments.

P.S. (3)

One more of these absurd after thoughts. You are too modest where you say that your opinion would have carried no weight in any case. Thanks to the fine service you have rendered and the way that the accounts thereof have penetrated into the public mind I can honestly assure you that your opinion would have weighed more than anyones - more than that of K. himself. ^{Don't} ~~Do not~~ make any mistakes; this is a positive fact and I congratulate you upon it.

Jan 11



1, Hyde Park Gardens,

London, W.

Jan. 13th '16.

Dear Birdie,

I ought to write this with my own hand, but I am being so marvelously hustled over this dispatch, being patted on the back on one side and kicked on the other, that I hardly know where to turn.


Well, my dear boy, I only want to say this, that whatever my views about the strategical wisdom of the step that has been taken, I am filled with the deepest admiration both of your tactical arrangements and of the way the fine fellows ~~under your~~ ^{under your} ~~command~~ ^{Command} must have behaved up to the very last.

God bless you my dear boy and may you go on and prosper.

I foresee possibilities of trouble and complication in Egypt under the latest approved arrangement for the division of command. Let us hope you will be out of it leading your troops to victory, and not sitting behind the defences of Egypt waiting for a grand attack, which will never, in my humble opinion come off, although, here, I admit, I have many formidable opinions against me.

Yours ever,

Jack Hamilton



Telephone
Paddington 2108.


1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

Feb. 16th '16

My dear Birdie,

Yours of Jan. 29th has been really a joy to me. You are truly a past master in the art of delighting your friends.

I think a good deal of what occurred during the eventful week when the fate of the near East was decided has, in one way or another, found its way round military and political circles. Out of these numerous, rather vague stories an impression is crystalising into a belief that you played the beau role.¹ The only criticism I have ever heard launched against you by any living soul is, that you were too modest in your estimate of your own importance. As everyone must be criticised for something, I do not think you could hope for anything less damaging than that!



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Paddington 2108.

1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

-2-

I met Monro at the War Office when he came to report. He was going hobbling along with a stick and had his foot in a sort of a bag. I went up and shook hands with him and congratulated him in all sincerity, for I think he is a straight, good fellow, but, dear me, how old he looked! I confess he did not give me the impression of a man sent out specially to be the saviour of a situation at a moment of fateful emergency.

I have kept away from the War Office and have not bothered K. who has worries enough of his own without my adding to them. But I have seen Robertson and French several times. Robertson is big, burly, and self-confident. He seems very pleased with his solution of the dual command business in Egypt; but for my part I confess it seems to me fantastic to make a division of territory instead of a
division

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1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

-3-

division of functions.

French came back here very disappointed and very bitter against the man~~s~~ who he thought (quite erroneously I believe) to have been mainly instrumental in his recall. Now, however, he ~~is~~ has quite pulled himself together and is taking ~~great~~ interest in his work and beginning to enjoy life again.

I am greatly pleased to hear you like the dispatch. I value no one's opinion so much as yours, and it is a relief to hear you say this.

I note what you say about the Honours Gazette of the 14th. The War Office have made a distinction between a list for "immediate reward" and "rewards". I gather that I am later on to be allowed to intercede for some more of my officers getting something


2588
25th Dec 1918

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1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

-4-

Tomorrow as ever is, I am to see Robb and I am going to have yet one more try to get Aspinall put in. He has been recommended by me for a French honour, but that, I think, should be considered quite separate. As for Godley I have done all that man can do to get him his K.C.B. I can't conceive where the hitches are, although the excuse now is that he must look to an evacuation gazette. I am given to understand in fact that they want to save up a good number of names to swell the evacuation rewards list. Still, there is such a thing as slipping between two stools and I am sorry I have not secured more mentions and rewards. But I think it may ease hurt feelings if you let your staff know that they are not



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1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

-5-

being forgotten anyway. ✕

I need not tell you how very much I hope there will be no hitch in the formation of your army. Once that comes off you will be at the head of a force nulli secundus.


Good bye for the present my dear Birdie and God be with you.

Now my wife has come back from Scotland I hope we shall be able to see something of Lady Birdie again.

Yours always,

Smitham Mrs

Out of my very meagre list they cut out some 20 rewards!



Smitham Mrs

1 HYDE PARK GARDENS, W.

8th December 1916.

My dear Birdie,

Best thanks for yours of 4th December duly received.

I note all you say and am in full agreement, and also I thank you very heartily for the friendly sentiments which, now as ever, you disclose. I feel the same towards you, my dear Birdie, and it would be strange and sad after all these years were it otherwise. As one result you may feel quite at ease and confident about the whole of this Commission. Not a word shall I say which will in any tiniest respect reflect on you or your views or actions. No matter how cunningly questions may be framed, you may feel quite safe of my replies.

Now as to your proposed line of evidence. I should say you were quite right to avoid details at the present stage, but I should prepare myself as well as possible to be able to reply when they eventually ask you questions. If you have Cunliffe Owen's details up your sleeve that will make you fairly safe, especially if you have in addition one or two notes regarding the great value of trench mortars; the good services rendered by the six Japanese mortars, and could give some idea of what the effect would have been had we had forty or fifty of these, instead of six (with lots of bombs) *with only a few bombs!*

I think they will probably ask you about the small craft. My own idea is that you ought to have had just about half as much again, but this is, of course, a matter for your own judgment and experience. In the paper I sent you I touched on the

*My words
evidence.*

(2)

subject very lightly for fear of hurting the feelings of the Navy. But very probably in examination I shall bring out this more strongly.

One more point; as to refusing to discuss the general conduct of the operations, you must discriminate between your position when first I arrived and later on when I had fairly got into the saddle. I mean, I think you are quite justified in saying you accepted my guidance without any misgiving or criticism once we had landed. On the other hand, I think you will be bound to say what your ideas were originally before I arrived on the scene, and also make some reference to your opinion in March that it might be better to land at once. I think I am right in saying that you did think so and, as a matter of fact, I would have agreed with you had only the 29th Division been on the spot. But, as you know, my ^(from Lord K.) orders were explicit not to land without them and, looking back, I must say I think it was wisest not to do so. *Still, there is always the other point of view.*

I fear it must be pretty rough work for the men in France. These changes here are very interesting. If Lord Derby becomes War Secretary I have, at any rate, one of my greatest personal friends in that high capacity, which may sometime prove useful. ✕

Yours ever,

Jan Hamilton

⊕ (1) P.S. Also, if you are tackled about it your change of mind in your last appreciation when you negatived

✕ (2) P.S. I think you had better send back my papers now you have digested them.

Jan H.

*Bulair
went
to Asia.*

Telephone
Paddington 2108.

13-1-17-
1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

My dear Birdie -

I had 3 quilts up
half the night - so as to
let you have this. As
far as I am concerned
- what is said is said.
But - I felt - it would be
a great help to you
to see the line of country
they would lead you

over & that is why I had it done.

The only one who will
try in any way to
trip you up is old
Nick. You must look
out for him. ~~A~~

Lawyer soldier is much
worse than a pukka
lawyer. He will seek
by quotations from

Cables etc to make
you say the whole
thing was too difficult
and will then put it
to you that by want of
thought and ability
we sacrificed human
lives. Of course Nick
himself would always
play for safety and

He hates Lord K. and
would like to convict
him — through our
mouths — of having
been a ~~reckless~~ reckless,
haphazard creature,
~~reckless~~ except
on this point he is
fair enough — and —
strange as it may appear —
I can't help liking him.

3
DRL

3376

When you get back;
if you see de Lothburière,
you might put it to him
that whatever the indifference
of naval or others to
his water lighters & water
inventions and suggestions
generally, I at least
was personally & vitally
interested. My anxiety

It is not to
 about what I
 and the reasons why
 will do
 that I said
 with that
 all kinds
 wishes
 everything
 everything
 everything

is promoted + ~~executed~~
 pushed on de Lottiniers
 by every means in my
 power was just because
 of my admiration for his
 work to which you will
 see I testified in the
 evidence I send you now.

3
 DRL
3376

Telephone
Paddington 2108.

1, Hyde Park Gardens,
W.

P.S.

If there is anything in
the evidence I have
given which you
doubt or think incorrect,
let me know and I
will try and put it
right -
Lunt

1 HYDE PARK GARDENS, W.

19th January 1917.

My dear Birdie,

Thanks for your line of 15th January. Don't hurry about returning evidence; I have another copy. As to the second day's evidence which is more important, perhaps, and certainly longer than the first day's, I do not feel I can risk sending it through the post. When they send for you here there is bound to be some little margin of time before you go up, and the evidence shall be at your disposal. Besides the fact of this being so very secret a matter, I think it would very likely miss you were I to start it off now as you will be coming before the Commission, I expect, sometime within the next fortnight.

As to de Lothbinière, I have been thinking the matter over.

He is a very nice fellow but all things to all men as I know pretty well /from some of my naval friends. If his plans went wrong as in his famous attempt to pump water up the Anzac Hills, then it was the fault of those who had to carry the thing out. As for nobody seeming to care a damn when the first water lighters sank - what was the good when the bally things were at the bottom of the sea? Anyway, I am not worrying about him any more.

In his statement ~~cececece~~ he speaks as if the whole merit for purchasing gear etc etc was his. But he could not have done it without your and my encouragement & support. As to his suggestion that the whole of the Anzac water personnel should have been shifted to Suva, as I

Said to the Commission "How
would Birdwood & Godley have
managed them; their water
difficulties were even more formidable
than those of Stöppard" or
words to that effect -

J. W. G. S.
Lambton.

P.S.

My own feeling is that I've
come pretty well through the
ordeal; but I may be quite
wrong; there is no point a
man is so apt to be mistaken
upon as the impression he
produces on others.

J. W. G. S.

3
DRL

3376

ITEM 45

1 HYDE PARK GARDENS, W.

26th January 1917.

My dear Birdie,

Thank you so much for yours of 23rd January. No, you are quite right. This evidence is not a thing one can scurry through in five minutes. Still, if you have a margin of an hour or two when you arrive in England you will at least get the points fresh in your mind by running over the course of my ordeal just before you go up. The second day's reading is both lengthier and more difficult than ^{the} first day. But I believe I knew my lesson and gave correct answers although it never does to be too sure upon such points seeing that "know thyself" is about the most difficult precept in the world.

Braithwaite was up yesterday and thought he would have finished with them by now, but, poor fellow, he has been caught for a second day of it to-day and is in with the Commission now. So far I do not think anything whatever ugly or troublesome has turned up with regard to yourself. My expectation is they will be very nice indeed to you and will not try to trip you up - not at least with putting yourself in the cart!

What you say about Maucorps and the secret memorandum makes it quite a plain sailing matter. You have simply to say that my hypothesis as to the genesis of your change in favour of an Asiatic landing was (mistaken: that the said change of mind was) not in any way due to this secret memorandum which you never saw, but that it emanated from your own brain as a result of pondering over the subject. Yes, d'Amade was in favour of landing at Alexandretta and although he never gave

(2)

me any formal proposal or suggestion to that effect, he had spoken in that sense and I was quite aware of his opinion.

Thank you very much for your action as regards de Lothbinière. If I may say so, you have handled the matter with much wisdom. Be careful, though, about showing my evidence to anyone, or about showing any knowledge of what my evidence was. Strictly speaking I have only been warned to treat as secret such evidences ~~of other witnesses~~ as may be shown me by the Commission. Still, I doubt if I am not skating on rather thin ice in having kept a record as I suddenly resolved to do that afternoon when I found you had not time to read the proofs through.

I think there is no harm in your appearance before the Commission being postponed. The later you come the better chance you will have of dealing with all malicious and unfounded criticism in one blow.


Yes, Keyes has refused so far to attend on grounds of military necessity, but I happen to know that his greatest friend and a man in whose judgment he places implicit reliance, has just written him advising him to come down.

You may notice in this morning's papers how Murdoch now stands at the right hand of the P.M. in great glory.

May you have the best of luck with your new piece of line.

Yours ever,

Sam Hamilton



1 HYDE PARK GARDENS, W.

27th January 1917.

My dear Birdie,

After sleeping over the matter I have made up my mind to open my heart quite freely to you on the subject of your coming examination. Let me at once put your mind at ease as regards myself. What I am going to put forward in this letter is not tinged by selfishness. I write on your own behalf and to help you, and the reason I am doing so is because during the last day or two I have got a much better inside knowledge of things that happened after I left than I ever had until now. First as to the evacuation: speaking as one who thinks he can see how opinion is shaping, I can give you no better advice than to stick clearly to the lines of the letter you wrote me on the 27th November '15. *My advice is you should bring out:-*

That you did not hold with the evacuation when it was put to you as a simple question of holding on or clearing out.

~~concern~~ That you think Munro allowed himself to be hustled into making a report before he had made any close inspection of the situation or had gauged the spirit of the troops.

~~eat~~ That Munro visited the Peninsula once; doing the three beaches in one day, and that Lynden-Bell never visited the Peninsula at all. Be sure you say this.

Explain your protest against taking over command of M.E.F.

Say, as you said in your letter to me, that you had all the responsibility of carrying out the evacuation and of seeing through a thing you (absolutely) hated doing.

(2)

So underlined in your - Jant.

~~So~~ That the reason, and the only reason, ^{you} /with your long knowledge of the East, gave your adherence to such retreat in the face of Orientals was that you were definitely tied to certain premises (a) the Germans and Turks undoubtedly meant to send large reinforcements to Bagdhad and a really big force to ~~at-~~ tack Egypt very seriously.

(b) they would still possess troops sufficient to contain the Dardanelles Expedition on the Peninsula.

(c) They were bringing a "very great amount of German artillery and ammunition" to exterminate the troops on the Peninsula whilst their move was being made on Egypt.

Being tied to these premises, which you were not called upon to discuss, there was no escape from the conclusion that evacuation was a necessity.

Now, for ^(my) ~~the~~ reasons ^(seeming to be officious and for) for begging you to be entirely bold and open with the Commissioners on these points. There is no General serving in France whose career I am more interested in than your own. ^(From what I have lately learned I firmly believe) ~~you would either be commanding an Army now or else have been Commander-in-Chief in India had it not been that Munro and Lynden-Bell were incapable of understanding your magnanimous attitude towards them. Their idea was that it was sheer fear of responsibility that made you hesitate to take over command after Munro had recommended evacuation. Afterwards when you were on the "Lord Nelson" with K. and they were on the "Chatham" with Maxwell and McMahon they were convinced that you were working and intriguing against them with the S. of S. for War. By exploiting these ideas ~~and~~ a ridiculous Honours List was brought about ^(whereby) ~~concern~~ the man who sat in Egypt and had about as much to~~

(3)

do with the evacuation as I had ^{was} ~~it~~ rewarded for it, whereas you, who ran the business, got nothing.

Now, this Commission is your last chance. The Commission is going to make history. It is up to you to tell them not only the truth but the whole truth. It is your duty, in my (of personal knowledge or experience) opinion, to let them know the very slender basis, on which **Munro's** advice for evacuation was based. If you fail to do this there will be a miscarriage of justice, and a miscarriage of justice in a historical affair like this is a very dreadful thing. Whilst on this subject show them every cable "private", "personal" and "decipher yourself", which passed between you and K. One reason why I advise you to do this is that I am very much inclined to think they have got them all.

Good-bye for the present, my dear boy, and may you be well advised in this matter.

Yours ever,

Luft

R.S.

You would have the warm sympathy of Fisher and Mackenzie if you brought out that refusal to let you address an evacuation order to your own Corps — Luft

1, Hyde Park Gardens, W.

3 - 2- 17.

My dear Borchers


Yours of the 31st ult. wherein you express your objections to the Commission on the Dardanelles, in itself, and also open your mind to me as to your personal position; your dread of injuring anyone and your desire to stand by Lord Kitchener.

Now whilst you have been quite absorbed in fighting for our Country I have been fated to have to fight for an idea - for a might-have-been. I have been forced in fact to fight before this Commission in vindication of what you and I achieved with our brave troops and also in proving how much more we might have achieved had we been properly supported. On this ground, and on this ground only, do I presume to offer you my advice.

As to the appointment of the Commission, what you say is quite true, but the thing is done; it has to be faced and if you try to run away from it or to defy it, you will be trampled upon - that's all.

As to your dread of injuring or your desire to defend, these are considerations which should be secondary to the great object of revealing the truth to the Commissioners. Don't think I am laying down the law; I am only warning you in advance of what will be expected from you.

Coming now to particulars, I would like entirely to reassure you as regards Lord K. I thoroughly understand and sympathize with your feeling here and largely share it myself. Subject to what I have said in the previous para, I at least have no thought of influencing you, or wishing you to say, one word that would harm Lord K. Only, if you decide to hold back from the Commissioners information already in their possession about Lord K. then you will certainly do more harm than good both to K. and to yourself. When you come to read my evidence, you will see that I myself have been most careful to shelter K. as far as I could consistently with disclosing the truth.




Turning to Monro, I have already shown you the personal side of that question. This Commission has thrown side lights upon many matters until now obscure. I tell you now again, your magnanimity has been misrepresented. But that is a personal matter. The real issue is whether you stand for Monro's views or mine. Monro stands for evacuation. I stand for Lord K.'s order, several times repeated, that once we landed there was to be no withdrawal. So soon as K. changed his own mind and set fresh premises to the problem (German attack on Egypt etc.) that was a new issue. Until then, on my theory, the idea of evacuation was unthinkable; in Monro's theory it was the only thinkable thing. Between these two issues there is no room for compromise.

Well dear boy I have inflicted too much upon you I fear.
All good luck.

Yours ever,

Sam Hamilton.



1 HYDE PARK GARDENS, W.

14th February 1917.

My dear Birdie,

One tiny line written in great haste to acknowledge your return of my evidence. As to what you say about sending you copies of any other letters you wrote about that time, I did dispatch a copy of one letter to you yesterday. My Secretary tells me in the copy there was no date, but the original bears the date 12th December 1915.

They are showing me all the evidences now, and I will have a neat little digest made for you of any points on which they are likely to harry you, so that you can quite quickly get the hang of the matter before you go up if you just look in here directly you arrive.

Do take care of yourself, my dear boy, and get quite fit again before you think of going back. I should have imagined that, from the health point of view, it would have been best to have come right across here as soon as you are fit from the South of France, instead of first rejoining as that will mean double travelling. However this may be, all good fortune attend you. I think everything goes well although Nick is a bit nasty.

Yours ever,

John A. Hunter

