

GENERAL STAFF REGISTRY.

**SECRET**

G.S. Registry No. and Date.

Attached Files.

*S.A.*  
*L. 2004.*  
*Nov. 1915*

*No 13*

SUBJECT.

*Private correspondence of Lt. General  
Sir W. Birdwood, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., &c.*

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<i>File originally held by Major Wraystaff.</i>					
<i>1</i>		<i>Letters to &amp; from General. Davie's " Gooley " Byng</i>		<i>re operations for evacuation</i>	
<i>2</i>		<i>Correspondence with G.H.Q. M.C.F. re <sup>reports</sup> conference with Admiral without Sanction of C-in-C.</i>			
				P.A.	Date




No. Date From To Précis.





PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL



Headquarters,  
8th Army Corps,  
19/11/15.

*My dear Birdwood,*


The position as regards the harbour here is very serious; at present it cannot be used at all and the small amount of stuff we are able to land we do by the courtesy of the French.

Nor is it possible at present for us to give any idea as to when our position will be better, because until we are protected against the next gale, not only may our work be constantly interrupted but all we do may be swept away in a few hours. This protection depends on what the Navy will do for us. The N.T.O. here has urged that two more ships should be sunk with the least possible delay and a representative of P.N.T.O., who was here to-day, entirely agrees and has promised to put this in strongly to the naval authorities when he reaches Mudros to-morrow.

The final decision, however, rests with V.A., and it was for this reason that I telegraphed suggesting that a representative of the naval authorities should come over here with a representative of the D. of W. so that he could report on the situation at first hand. From a wire received from the Engineer-in-Chief, M.F.E.751, 19th instant, Admiral Christian does not agree to sending anyone over and I am afraid he may be a little roughed up by my proposal.

If I may suggest, the matter is not one which should be handled departmentally; the important thing is to get hold of the headman direct as soon as possible and I am sure it would help matters enormously if you could see your way to taking it up as personal matter between yourself and the V.A., or if he is still absent, the S.N.O. and impress upon him the vital importance of immediate action.

*Yours truly*  
*James Davis*





20  
/



H.Q. 8<sup>th</sup> Corps

Personal

19.11.18

Dear Birdwood,

You will have no doubt

realised how the wants of

the country have affected the

position which we are discussing.

It is impossible to say when

the States will be put ahead,

and I presume therefore that anything





in nature of the monument  
proposed by Munro is absolutely  
in promise as at present it is  
in promise only how soon it will be  
possible.

As we cannot also think of  
light as what delay may occur  
→ the future results of which  
cannot be an obvious

Johnston  
Munro



Secret



8. Copy

25.11.15

My dear Birdwood,

I do not know yet what the future policy is to be, but reading between the lines of Secret telegram No. 4/547 of the 23rd it appears probable that it may be in contemplation to withdraw from the place as to remain here.

If my reading is wrong you can let tear up this letter. N. however, I am right I will bring the following to your notice.

1. Materials - working - working and all that is necessary for the ~~defence~~ defence and for the comfort and health of the troops. There should be no discrimination of the quantities now on hand. We can use as much as we require all that can be landed here.

2. Strength (as has pointed out in my memo to you <sup>0/264 of 23/10</sup> ~~formation~~ <sup>consider</sup> another division will be essential. I feel very strongly as to the absolute necessity of this: also there must be a proportion of regular infantry always on the Peninsula.

3388  
34 2000





6) Division must be made up to strength & maintained.

3. Guns None as will be required especially howitzers. I have already reported that I can find frontiers for following howitzer batteries.

- 2 6-inch batteries
- 5 4.5" "

and we shall work them.

4. Ammunition I have already in my 0/328 of 22.11.15 given my view on the quantity necessary, but it is hard to know the whole amount that will require consideration. I may mention that the General has 2,000 rounds per gun for the 75s.

5. Trench mortars All we can lay our hands on as plenty of ammunition.

6. Brands We can take as the has hitherto been sent to other branches.

We

DONATED RECORDS LIST

3376

3rd Series





We used 28,000 last week, although  
we only made one bombing attack.

7. Tennelly Corporation - At least one  
~~more~~ more in addition to what  
is now on the water: this will require  
keeping up to strength. We must  
keep the upper hand in the matter of  
mining.

8. Supplies I consider that we should  
have 60 days of essentials.

I have also read again my memo  
O/264 of 23.11.15. in answer to your  
telegram when Lord K. asked for your views  
with regard to the possibility of the Turkish  
ammunition being used.

I send you these rough notes now as I  
do not know how fast events may be  
moving: a receipt of instructions a  
detailed report can be rendered.

Yours truly

Frankston







Itices Land Nelson

Saturday

To

From

Rear Admiral, WEMYSS,

OH  
Please file  
top

My dear Birdwood. De Robel has just gone off on leave + left me temporarily in command. - I should much like to see you + propose coming over on Monday. Do you think you could get Byers + Davis to come over - We must have a talk about matters.

J. W. Sincerely  
A. W. Keese




From Mr. Birdwood  
To Mr. Sydney Ayres

---

When not available join me and most  
unwilling deprive you of your staff and with  
only contemplation doing so if not inconvenient  
to you and it would be no advantage to  
Wagstaff indeed possibly the opposite so he might  
not like it but if he would and you can  
spare him I would like him as a sub. and  
but could you replace him and I had intended  
considering McGlinch as a sub. if another vacancy  
occurred and in any case I should not  
want Wagstaff immediately.

28-11-15

1845





Secret

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army,

29th November, 1915.

My dear General,


(Monro)

As I have informed you officially, I went over to "Anzac" and Helles the two following days after I left you at Mudros, and it was very fortunate that I did so, as since then we have been cut off from all communications. I did "Anzac" and Suvla on the 25th, and Helles on the 26th. I started to go over again on the 27th, but had to turn back on account of the weather, which was lucky, as if I had got over there, I should have been marooned and unable to come back. At "Anzac" I first had a long talk with Godley concerning all details, and then took him with me over to see Byng, when we all three went into all details regarding any combined movement, and all came to the conclusion that we hoped it would be feasible to carry out our orders very satisfactorily provided entirely that we are not given away by the weather.

This was not quite the conclusion at which I arrived from my talk with Davies, whose piers have gone, and who consequently has much enhanced difficulties.

All three commanders promised to send me their full ideas and recommendations the day after I left them, but having been cut off in this way I have so far been able to receive nothing, so am not much "forrader." Officers have actually, as a matter of fact, come across here with letters, and have had to return to the beaches, being unable to land.

Here, I am sorry to say, things have suddenly become to some extent rather serious. The big ship, which you remember the Admiral sank to form part of a breakwater,



Gen Monro




has remained all right, but the smaller ships between it and the shore have disappeared. The consequence is that the waves have come tearing in with the result that last night every picket boat and lighter was blown ashore, and I fear an enormous amount of damage has been done, while you will see how this might possibly affect the future, unless the Navy can sink another big ship so as to make good the breakwater again, it must be very doubtful whether this place can ever be used for disembarking troops, which I am most anxious to do, if we bring over large numbers to rest from the peninsula. As soon as the big Northerly blow came on, all the big ships sailed round and took refuge in Aliko Bay to the South, but left behind all the small craft, which have as I say now been washed ashore.

I had very cheery telegrams last night from both "Anzac" and Helles, regarding their men after all this bitter weather, but Suvla I am sorry to say seem very despondent, and of course I realise they have some beastly ground there. I am urging that everything possible shall be done to evacuate the sick from there, and if this is in any way possible it will be got through today.

I do hope that your ankle is much better, and that you may be about soon.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sg) W R Burdwood





IN YOUR REPLY  
PLEASE QUOTE THIS  
No. G.S./Z/1.

Confidential.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1<sup>st</sup> December, 1915.

Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood,  
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

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From a communication which the Commander-in-Chief has received from Rear-Admiral Wemyss it appears that a conference took place yesterday between him, yourself, and the Corps Commanders at Helles and Anzac. The Commander-in-Chief has written to the Rear-Admiral on the subject, and it seems that the latter acted under the misapprehension that Sir Charles Monro had agreed to the conference taking place. The Commander-in-Chief has of course gladly accepted the Rear-Admiral's explanation, but he wishes me to point out that he has the strongest objection to you or your Corps Commanders holding conferences, formal or informal, or discussing military matters with the Naval authorities except by his permission.

Please inform your Corps Commanders.

*Alfred B. Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.





Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army,

1st December, 1915.

Copy

Lt-General the Hon. J. Byng,  
K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.

Looking out from the destroyer as we left Suvla this evening, it seemed to me that there still is a good deal of the Northern slope of Lala Baba, which can be tunnelled into for protection from rain and shells. The soil may, however, I fancy be rather friable, and necessitate the use of props to be much good against heavy shelling, though Gilman seemed to think from what he knew of it from his former experience, that a good deal of it would stand tunnelling all right, and should this be the case, it really looks as if a considerable body of men might be put into safe quarters there, if you have to withdraw them from your right and right front - but of course you know much more about the details of this than I do.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.

While I am writing, there is one other thing that has been bothering me all night, and that is the idea of the big German guns, which are likely to come down and bombard you. It seems to me that if they do so, the place which would probably suit their range best, and on which they could really concentrate fire, so as to plaster every yard of it, would be the small triangle covering a part of "Square 116." Here you are in full view of them, with all your massed transport, and more valuable still Corps Headquarters.

Could you not make alternative positions for these in "Square 135", on the nearest bits available on the Northern

slopes/





- 2 -

slopes of Kiretch Tepe. I quite realise that there you would be exposed to the North winds, but protecting walls should do a lot to keep these off animals etc., and the Indians are very good at making these, while it seems to me that you should be out of observation, and might build your place free from their fire.


Do please think of this, and see if it is not in any way feasible, as I feel so sure otherwise you will get a tremendous doing in the small area I have mentioned, (at all events, in the most Western part of it where you are) and I presume there will be little warning, as once having registered, they will plaster it until everything is wiped out, and that we cannot afford when you are concerned.

I am getting the aeroplane people to go over and see if they can locate these guns, and, if so, we will get the ships on to them.

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.

2/12/15.

Lt-General Sir J. Byng, K.C.M.G, C.B., M.V.O.





Headquarters, Dardanelles Army.

3rd. December, 1915.

To,

The Chief of the General Staff,


Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

In reply to your GS/Z/I dated 1st December, 1915, I enclose copies of the correspondence which passed between Admiral WEMYSS, myself, and my Corps Commanders with regard to his recent visit.

As Admiral WEMYSS' letter came from MUDROS, I took it for granted that his proposed visit had been arranged with the Commander in Chief's consent, and, as I had just been informed that all arrangements for the forthcoming evacuation were to be left entirely in my hands, I naturally imagined that it was this matter which the Admiral wished to discuss.

The Commander in Chief's wishes regarding avoidance of discussion of military matters with the naval authorities will be communicated to Corps Commanders today.

(Sol.) *W.R. Bidwood* Lieutenant General  
Commanding Dardanelles Army.





I.-Copy of a letter from Rear Admiral R.WEMYSS to  
Lieut.General Sir W.R.BIRDWOOD.

-----  
H.M.S.LORD NELSON. 27.II.15 (Saturday)

My dear BIRDWOOD,

DE ROBECK has just gone off on leave and  
left me temporarily in command. I should much like to  
see you and propose coming over on Monday. Do you think  
you could get BYNG and DAVIES to come over. We must  
have a talk about matters.

Yours very sincerely

(Sd.) R.A.WEMYSS  
-----

II.- Copy of a telegram from Lieut.General Sir W.R.  
BIRDWOOD to Rear Admiral R.WEMYSS.

-----  
O.575. 27.II.15. (Priority)

Your letter of today. Will of course arrange meet-  
ing. What time would suit you best. You will under-  
stand meeting will not be possible unless weather  
permits.

-----  
III.-Copy of a telegram from Army Headquarters, DARDAN-  
ELLES Army, to Corps Commanders.

-----  
O.579. 28.II.15. (Priority)

Vice Admiral WEMYSS who is temporarily commanding  
fleet is anxious to meet Corps Commanders here tomo r-  
row if weather permits. I will let you know time of  
meeting later. Will General BYNG arrange for destroyer  
to come over in and will he call for General GODLEY en  
route. Corps Commanders should bring with them defin-  
ite proposals based on outline scheme shown them last  
week. /

-----  
IV.- Copy of a telegram from Rear Admiral 'SWIFTSURE'  
to General BIRDWOOD.


-----  
O700 30.II.15.

Admiral WEMYSS is coming to KEPHALO today in 'CHEL-  
MER' about 11 a.m.

-----  
V.- Copy of a telegram from Army Hqrs., DARDANELLES  
Army, to Gen.BYNG, SUVLA, and Gen.GODLEY, ANZAC.

-----  
O.589 30.II.15 (Priority)

V.A. arrives about 11 a.m. today. Can you arrange to  
be here about that time calling for General GODLEY on  
the way. H.T.O.SUVLA and H.T.O.ANZAC are being asked  
to accompany you. Addressed Gen.BYNG, repeated Gen.  
GODLEY.






VI.- Copy of a telegram from Army Headquarters, DARDANELLES  
Army, to General DAVIES, HELLES.  
-----

O.590. 30.II.15.  
V.A. arrives here 11 a.m. Have asked for destroyer to fetch  
you about 10 a.m. Please bring your N.T.O.  
-----

VII.- Copy of a telegram from General BYNG, SUVLA, to Army  
Headquarters, DARDANELLES Army.  
-----

BB.110 30.II.15.  
Impossible for me to come over today unless very urgent.  
-----





G.S.R. 2.2004.

HEADQUARTERS,

DARDANELLES ARMY.

5<sup>th</sup> December, 1915.

TO

General officer commanding,

8th, 9th, A. & N.Z. Army Corps.


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The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, has directed that questions relating to military policy and operations are not to be discussed with the naval authorities without his express permission. This does not, of course, apply to the discussion of purely local matters, such as those dealing with the co-operation of naval gun fire with the Army.

*Ed. A. Spinnall*

Lieut-Colonel,

G.S.







H. Q. S. Corp

6.12.15

My dear Birdwood,

I am writing officially

about the situation regarding our  
taking over a portion of the New  
Line. You will see that these  
demands have increased as  
now beyond what can be met  
by the troops at present here.

I really think that some limits  
should be put on the New demands,





they seem to think that they can  
solve these questions here to their  
heart's content & that we will  
always supply the deficiency  
as a matter of course. My head  
perfectly well that I completely  
as was I Indians cannot stand to  
work as yet they have made  
no preparation to meet this  
contingency. I wish they would be  
told that they must look after  
their own interests & take it that  
we are not a million men to supply



these deficiencies.

According to Rowland's statement  
to-day the House first saw but  
the House British first has  
agreed to refer to the House, if this  
is to be a party the first will  
concern the people in the year before  
making any such promise into House  
first.

The reduction of the working  
hours in the house is a serious  
matter. They are permanent  
hours and for the speedy completion of



the work it is essential that the  
should be permanent. At first they  
were merely civilian & untrained  
at all. But now they are many of  
them become very skillful & we know  
they do their work. The last crisis &  
was put into position by the fact that  
and so much of the pilot driving  
under R. I. supervision. 912  
cannot return their permanent  
position the permanent of progress in  
the pilot cannot be maintained,  
as we shall not take full advantage  
of the fine weather.

Yours very  
sincerely  
J. H. G. G. G.

I have understood at my discussion  
with Douglas has been most amiable.

ITEM 52

3DRK 3376



Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M. E. F.,

6th December, 1915.

My dear Davies,

Many thanks for your letter about the withdrawal of the French, and I quite realise the great difficulties there are in the matter. We however are quite helpless in the matter. A wire came out from the War Office simply telling us that the Senegalese troops were to be withdrawn, and the Chief here ordered me to take over their portion of the line. At the same time, he presumed that the French were making their own arrangements for sea transport for them.

Brulard now tells us that the Creoles are also to be withdrawn, and says he understands that the British Government are arranging the sea transport. I also understand that a French brigade is under orders to come out here to replace their black troops, but I fancy it will be a long time before they arrive. At the same time, also, it will be a long time before any sea transport is available if the French cannot produce this themselves, for, as you will know, with the contingencies I mentioned to you the other day, the chances are that we are not likely to have anything in the way of troopships to spare for the French for a considerable time. Should this prove to be the case, things will have to remain in statu quo for the present.

In the meantime, I have urged G.H.Q. to send you all the reinforcements that can be raised, as well as working parties to relieve your fighting men on the beaches. You will have seen from a telegram we sent you today that some 1,200 men are being sent you in these two categories, and I hope that still more may be sent you later on - especially sufficient working parties to release all your 400 on the beaches. But even this I fear does not give you the totals you want to take up to the point, which Brulard suggests you should do. I am

afraid/




afraid, too, that it is difficult to controvert Brulard's contention in this respect, as he will be left so weak, as it will only mean him having three men per yard for his little bit.

As a matter of fact, I now do see my way to give you some more troops, and if the departure of the French is postponed for some little time, you can have them, but I should be sorry to have to send them to you immediately. Two Brigades of the 54th Division, under Inglefield, were sent back from "Anzac" yesterday to Mudros to rest, and will shortly be followed by their third Brigade. After they have had some rest, one or two Brigades, as you might want, could be sent to you, but as I have said, I should be sorry to have to send them across immediately, as it is such a pity for troops to be told that they are being sent off to rest, only to be hustled off to another sphere of trenches at once. However, in the meantime, I think the only thing you can do is to have all preparations ready to take over from Brulard when the time comes, and if so necessary, I must then arrange to send you more troops - but with the French not likely to be able to push off immediately, there seems to be no hurry. I am of course sure that you will carry on all your discussions with Brulard most amiably.

I so fully sympathise with you in the break of continuity all this means, not only in your fighting line, but in all your pier work, but I don't see how we can well help it.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.







8' Copier

7.12.15

My dear Birdwood,

Many thanks for your

sympathetic letter. I was sure

you would understand that I was

not making difficulties

I have written to Brinsford &

have suggested taking over on

Saturday next. As regards relief





for the workers, it is fighting men  
we want not labourers. It is  
of great importance that the present  
men who were understood their  
work as free-builders and craftsmen  
should not be changed until  
the work is finished. If new men  
take over the work we shall have to  
begin all over again and the work  
will be more or less done.  
Nothing is further from my wishes




than to release the parent back portion  
I need to avoid the necessity of sending them to the trenches.  
I quite understand that the boys find

men must have their rest.

Yr sincerely

Francis Davis







8<sup>th</sup> Corps

8. 12. 15.

My dear Birdwood,

I wrote the other day

impressing on you the importance of

my being able to keep ~~them~~ the

present base working parties at

their jobs, but I hope this will

not be counteracted into my

meaning that Indian labour will





will not be welcome. They will be  
 most welcome and will be a  
 valuable addition. The I wrote  
 I was afraid that we should be  
 sent D. men and Garrison Batt<sup>n</sup>  
 men to take the place of the  
 present working parties. The Indian  
 are quite another pair of shoes  
 and we shall probably be able to  
 utilize some of the fighting men  
 presently. Anyhow there  
 will be plenty of work for them



character of the work done, &  
these persons will be most valuable.

for his  
francesca.

Dec 4 2. Dr. died very well  
last night. It was done entirely  
on their own; & the rise of the  
American spirit to work for trying.

Work has begun on the new  
piece at V. Beach.



*CPM*  
*John Pearce*  
*CPM*

Copy

Lt-General Sir F. L. Davies,  
K.C.B.,

Cape Helles.

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M. E. F.

8th December, 1915.

My dear Davies,

I had hoped to come over and see you tomorrow, but have some people coming over now for a committee from Mudros, so cannot manage it. I will give you our news when I see you, and in the meantime only write to say "Go on digging hard" to provide yourselves with all the shelter you possibly can from the big artillery.

I have just asked G.H.Q. to at once send you up the two 9.2" howitzers from Egypt, and I do hope that they will agree to this - I also trust that it may be possible to give you the balance of the 29th Division in due course, which will give you a hint of the direction of the wind at present.

I quite realised that you wanted to keep your present fighting men on the beach to go on with their good work, and it is only in the event of it not being possible to give you more fighting men that I thought it would be better than nothing to give you beach parties and release the men now there.

I hear that one of the Punjab Coolie Corps has now arrived at Mudros, and I understand that some of them are likely to be sent to you almost immediately. They are organized in corps of 1,000 strong, with I think two or three officers apiece and mostly R.E's. They are strong, hard-working fellows, so should be quite invaluable for your work if you get good officers, which I hope you may do.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.

RECORDED  
INDEXED

P.S. If I can get over on Friday, I will come at about 11 o'clock if that suits you, and will be very grateful if you will take me round anywhere you will, to see some of your troops, officers and positions.



Headquarters,  
8th Army Corps,  
9th December, 1915.

*Frederick Brown*

There one or two points I have very much on my mind with regard to the future here which I should like to mention to you as I am sure that a word from you in the right quarter would do a great deal to improve matters and guard against difficulties which otherwise may, I foresee, very probably arise and seriously affect our position.

First, as regards the French Artillery. As you know they have here a very large number of guns compared to their strength in infantry, and these guns with their ample supply of ammunition (they have well over 2000 per gun for field guns, 1000 per howitzer and others in proportion) form one of the most powerful factors in the strength of our position here for either offence or defence.

Any reduction in this force of artillery, and one cannot help seeing the obvious temptation to the French to reduce it, will weaken us in a way which I well know cannot be compensated for by any substitute we can provide. It is unpleasant that it should be so, but the fact remains. I have already put forward the minimum of ammunition that I think we should have here for our guns, for safety sake (roughly 1500 per gun for field guns and 1000 per howitzer) and, while I am aware that at present this cannot be reached, I hope it will be kept in view and worked up to. This, however, is based on our guns covering what they do at present, and the shortage only emphasizes the importance of the presence of the French.

I think a warning from you to the C.-in-C. would do much good to fend off an attempted weakening in this way which we could  
not




not make good, and which I already have some apprehension of.

Secondly, as regards relief for the troops here. I made some time ago an attempt to establish a system which I hoped would grow to such a size that all would get a proportion of rest, commencing with those weakly ones who need it most. Owing to the way things have turned out, this has had to be closed down. I see from your letter of a few days ago, that Anzac were able to send away a complete division to rest, and I am glad that this should be possible.

I am not in any way asking for relief now, or suggesting that the troops here seriously need it at the present time. The Corps is full of fighting spirit and we all look to one thing only, that, slow or fast, according as opportunity and the provision of the necessary power allow - we go forward and break the Turk in front. At the same time, these divisions have been at it without a spell nearly all through and, for the good of the whole, they will want each a really good spell somewhere during the winter, if we are just going to hold on. Going forward would be better than a rest.

Thirdly, as regards communications. Something really is very badly needed, for we are steadily but slowly going backward instead of forward as regards stores etc. I know that transport is at the bottom of it and transport must be tackled or we cannot hope to have the provision which is absolutely necessary. Both ordnance and engineer stores are hopelessly behind hand, and the only reply to demands is that I can have some things if I give up others. It is really essential that in our periods of calm such as the present we get here as much shipping as we can handle, working overtime.

I know Altham is doing what he can with what is given him but







we must have more and both D. of W. and D.O.S. must be told to carry on with our current demands over and above making up the arrears of many months. The present plan of sending a small ship load of engineer stores from Alexandria direct to us is quite inadequate and we must in addition have regular provision from an intermediate base.

I feel sure that a strong representation from you to the C.-in-C., making known the present state of backwardness would get this put right, and the time of year only accentuates the urgency which, even if continuous fair weather were assured, is extreme. I still hope that larger reserves of supplies will be put in at once.

Fourthly, as regards reinforcements for the Territorial Divisions. I do hope the C.-in-C. will take as strong a line as possible on this point and insist that the Home people squeeze them out of those who hold on to them, as they undoubtedly do. I am always hearing of those at home, be they commanding officers or higher, who at least do not encourage the best men nor the greatest number possible being taken for drafts. It is this evil which has, in being allowed to flourish, reduced the divisions here to their present state of weakness.

If constant drafts and a proportion of good officers - if necessary at the expense of formations of other classes - are insisted on, we shall get greater value as a whole, and far less waste of staff and organization. I need not emphasize the difference it would make here, nor the difficulties of relief etc. which such an improvement would overcome.

I have written you officially on two further points of detail - trench mortars and mining personnel - but I wanted to put before you these ~~three~~<sup>four</sup> larger issues, as I know it is only by looking ahead we can carry on through the time immediately before us.

Next May will, I trust, see the result here of what we do now in all ways.

*What has happened about the anti-aircraft gun. The officers were & perhaps were selected but now the officers have been taken away for long.*  
*Frederick*



No. *G.S.R. 2.2004*  
.....

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M. E. F.,

10th December, 1915.

W

General Headquarters,

Mediterranean Expeditionary

Force.

Memorandum.


In continuation of my telegram informing you that Admiral Weymss had intimated his intention of seeing me, I now report that he duly arrived after I had received your telegram on the subject. I immediately informed him that, in view of the orders I had received from the Commander-in-Chief not to hold any conference with the Naval Authorities, both I and my Corps Commanders were unable to meet him in any official conference, and he at once accepted this.

In accordance with the suggestion contained in your telegram, I shewed Admiral Weymss the correspondence referred to, and he shewed me <sup>the</sup> privately correspondence he had had on the subject with the Admiralty.

We then discussed certain details in connection with the forthcoming operations.

*(Lga) W. R. Bidwood*

Lt-General,  
Commanding Dardanelles Army, M.E.F.





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix *113* Code *22* Words *20*

Received *Geo*

Sent, or sent out

Office Stamp.

Charges to collect

From *Geo*


At *22*

m.

By *Geo*

To

By



Handed in at *Geo*

Office *2139*

m.

Received *214*

m.

TO

*General Beadwood.  
A & Q Imbro*

\*Sender's Number *131*

Day of Month *13*

In reply to Number

AAA

*Would prefer you not coming  
over as am rather full  
of work*

*This was reply to telegram from  
Army Commander suggesting going  
9<sup>th</sup> Corps tomorrow*

*C.H.*

*Byng*

FROM

PLACE & TIME

\*This line should be erased if not required.



D 64-

Army Commander  
wishes this telegram  
preserved on our  
file.

C. H.



SP. 111



13/12/15

My dear General

would it be possible for us to get 3 more motor lighters for use from now till the end of the intermediate stage to take away more of our stuff as we are very behind hand in getting it away owing to lack of transport for it?

I am sorry we have not sent more accurate statements of exactly what has been vacated but Knox & everyone have been so very hard at work actually at the job that they have not perhaps gone into quite so much detail in this respect as they should. We will endeavour to repair this. The 34 guns are exactly as shown in Chart 11 -



Owen's list of which he has  
a copy, & as White had told  
him we were sticking exactly  
to this, we thought he would  
tell everyone concerned.

In haste Y<sup>r</sup> man

Alex Rodley

Everything is going well  
as regards evacuation of  
troops but not as fast (for  
transport reasons only) as  
~~we could wish~~ as regards  
materiel. To-day our  
lighters all had to go to  
Kephalos as it looked like  
bad weather. But we will  
be ready on 18<sup>th</sup>.



IN YOUR REPLY  
PLEASE QUOTE THIS  
No. G.S./Z/1

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

14th December, 1915.

To Lt. General Sir W. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., etc.,  
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

---

With reference to my G.S./Z/1 of December 1st,  
and your reply G.S.R./Z/2004 of December 3rd, the  
Commander-in-Chief now fully understands what took place  
at the Conference in question and realises that he was  
led to form an erroneous impression of the circumstances  
by the account which he received from the Vice-Admiral.

The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, desires you  
to cancel both letters in question.

*Alfred Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

*CSH*

3588



Bear Bards

I would to put you off today as I am so busy getting my emergency piers into working order & testing them

So far our evacuation has been good but the heavy nights are to come.

I hope they wont bring the Troop Carriers in by day light on Saturday & Sunday.

I did not want to embark any of our own but Godley asked us to do so to help him and Reed was told we were to do it ~~ditto~~ by Aspinall at a conference

I hope there is no idea of sending the 13<sup>th</sup> Div to Helles. they want a little time to get together and get trained.

W. J. M. Jones

Pango.

14/xii/15

Spare steam boats  
lost in port.

DELETED RECORDS LIST  
where  
treats of  
All treated



Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M. E. F.

Copy.

15th December, 1915.

Lt-General Sir J. Byng,  
K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.,

9th Corps.

Many thanks for yours of the 14th.

Very glad to hear that your evacuation has been going on so satisfactorily, and hope you will get through these very hard nights well. If you cannot get away your transport carts and waggons, please remember that wheels are not only of value to us wherever we go, but if left behind will be of the greatest value to the enemy, who are hard up for transport. The bodies of carts are easily made, so need not be bothered about to the same extent, while of course they take up a lot of room on transports, and wheels are easily packed, so I hope you will be able to get off nearly all these. I hope, too, that most of your animals you will be able to get away, and I dare say that at the last you may be able to embark a few more guns than we originally thought. Though we cannot of course expect to get away all of these, yet I am hoping we shall be able to report eventually that very few have been left, and those only in tiny pieces.

I hope it is now satisfactorily fixed up about your embarking the 400 men only of "Anzac" as part of your force upon your extreme right. I cut it down to 400, as this is one lighter load, which would seem to make things much more simple, and I hope it will not throw out your arrangements. Godley apparently thought you could manage 1,000 each night, and I am very glad that this has not been necessary.

I am afraid the 13th Division will have to go to Helles, and from what Bell said to Aspinall the other day, I understand that Monro has at the back of his head an idea of probably sending the 11th there also later on, but movements of all descriptions are so completely kaleidoscopic, that it is impossible to foresee where any one of us or our troops may be  
ten/



ten days hence. I am quite sure that the 13th would be all the better for being able to be got away by themselves for a time, but every other Division is in the same state, and someone has to go to Helles, if only to relieve the 42nd Division, who have been there since May, and have got down to nearly the same strength as other Territorial Divisions, while Shaw I remember told us, when the 13th came out here, that it was as well trained a Division as there was in the British Army! I fear, however, that the great majority of those, who came out with it, and who got any considerable training with the Division at Home, are no longer with it.

I will again warn the Navy about not bringing in troop carriers by daylight on Saturday or Sunday.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.





Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M. E. F.

15th December, 1915.

Copy.

Lt-General Sir A. J. Godley,  
K.C.M.G., C.B.

My dear Godley,

I have been thinking over the mines you are going to blow up on the Neck in front of Russell's Top. As these will be the only ones you now intend to blow, I cannot help thinking it would be best not to blow them up while the men are in the trenches, but to do so only after we are sure the Turks have found that we have evacuated those front trenches, and are coming forward, or if they do not discover this quickly, when the last party is leaving. To effect this it will of course be necessary to fire the mines by electricity from the shore, and I fancy there will be no difficulty in arranging this. To ensure success, I hope however that each mine will have two separate lines laid to it, and I am sure it will be worth this. Should the Turks discover we have left the trenches, and come streaming across the Neck, which would be a very natural line of approach for them, it would shake their confidence very severely if these three mines were to burst in their rear, and as large bodies might be coming across at intervals of say a minute of each other, would possibly cause any of them who are already in front to double back, thinking they were cut off, i.e. if the explosions are really big ones, as I hope they will be.

I have not heard exactly what you got last night in the way of motor lighters. I know, however, that three were sent from here, which would have made you up to ten, and I am much hoping that three also may have gone to you direct from Mudros, which would have given you thirteen. Should the latter be the case, I hope there will be no difficulty in getting off a large number of mules and guns, about which we shall hear presently, but I have not yet seen the reports. If you feel confident about getting off nearly all your mules with the extra lighters now at your disposal, well and good; but, if not, will you/




you send me a wire on receipt of this saying what more you can do with, when I will see if more can be sent from the reserves here. I tried to get this done last night, but Weymss had not got his reserves up from Mudros, and was afraid of risking the few he had here, and in any case I know would only consent to sending up anything from his reserves if it were perfectly calm, as he is naturally averse to taking risks before the final nights.

I hope, too, that you will be able to get off a really large number of wheels. They pack easily, and will not only be valuable to us, but I fancy of the greatest value to the enemy, who must be hard up for transport, so do please see that every wagon and cart wheel available is sent over, or, if it is not possible to send all, that the balance is disposed of by burning.

Then again, as regards the mountain guns. Nearly all of these, if I remember right, are in pairs, so I cannot help thinking that it should be possible to withdraw one of each immediately. They take up extremely little room on transports, and are easily brought down to the beach, so I hope you may be able to get away more of them and of guns generally than originally thought.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix Code Words

Received

Sent, or sent out

Office Stamp.

£ s. d.

From

At

Charges to collect

By

To

Service Instructions.

By

Handed in at Office m. Received m.

TO

General Birdwood

at HQ Imbro

\*Sender's Number

Day of Month

In reply to Number

AAA

at 629

16

The	number	of	mules	given
1300	did	not	include	mountain
arty	aaa	Total	left	is
now	only	about	1800	of
which	we	hope	to	embark
about	1000	by	tomorrow night	
if	lighters	are	sent	back
quickly	aaa	we	were	ordered
to	send	transport	mules	first
but	will	now	send	or
as	directed	aaa	all	efforts
are	now	being	concentrated	on
despatching	as	many	mules	as
possible	and	full	use	will
	be	made	of	dund
and	gangways	between	stalls	and
packing	will	be	as	tight

FROM

PLACE & TIME

See 5.9.15 at 6.15

See 5.9.15 at 6.15

\*This line should be erased if not required.



**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.**


No. of Message.....

Charges to Pay.

Office Stamp.

£ s. d.

DA-16.VI.15.-



Service Instructions.

Handed in at..... Office 2/52 m. Received 2/05 m.

TO

*General Dunderd  
A HQ Intro*

Sender's Number

Day of Month

In reply to Number

**AAA**

*as possible as we could  
send some to you if  
they can be embarked there*

FROM

PLACE & TIME

*General Dunderd*



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix _____ Code _____ m.	Words _____ Charge _____	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin _____ and Service Instructions.	Sent _____		Date _____
	At _____ m.	Service.	From _____
	To _____		By _____
	By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO { General Godley ANZAC.

Sender's Number * Q.S. 66	Day of Month 16th	In reply to Number	AAA
------------------------------	----------------------	--------------------	-----

your wire saying you have  
 1990 animals comes as a  
 great shock as I was  
 told when at ANZAC two  
 days ago that there were  
 only 1300 AAA fear cannot  
 possibly save what have  
 been led to expect unless  
 dates postponed AAA hope you  
 will see mules packed as  
 tight as possible AAA give  
 preference to ordnance  
 mules all of which must  
 be saved AAA do not  
 delay ~~to look for~~ lighter for  
 wheels or anything else

From \_\_\_\_\_  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time \_\_\_\_\_

*O. J. M. for info.*

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
 Censor. \_\_\_\_\_ Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name \_\_\_\_\_

\* This line should be erased if not required.



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____ Service. _____	Recd. at _____	m. _____	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Date _____		
			At _____	m. _____		From _____		
			To _____			By _____		
			By _____		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")			

TO { \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

* Sender's Number _____	Day of Month _____	In reply to Number _____	AAA
-------------------------	--------------------	--------------------------	-----

AAA if you are expedition  
 lighter will do two trips  
 AAA please hustle for all  
 you are worth AAA

Dundrennan has room for  
 230 more ensure this number  
 is filled up & in  
 addition gangways between  
 stalls AAA shall unload  
 them here tomorrow AAA

From Gen. Burdwood  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time 18.15.

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) Lt. Col. A. G. M. J.  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message 3

Prefi: Code: Words: £ s. d.

Received 27

Sent, or sent out

Office Stamp.

Charges to collect

Service Instructions.


From

By

At DA-16 m. 11.15.

To

By



Handed in at Office 0945 m. Received 0951 m.

TO

Send Bidwood Att

Sender's Number

Day of Month 15

In reply to Number

AAA

many thanks for you LB206  
and all satisfactory at present  
if I want anything will  
let you know  
LPA

FROM

PLACE & TIME

Gen Byng 0945

\*This line should be erased if not required.



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message.....

Prefix..... Code *76* Words *37*

Received

Sent, or sent out

Office Stamp.

£ s. d.

From.....

At..... m.

Charges to collect

By.....

To.....

Service Instructions.

By.....

Handed in at *At*

Office *0945* m. Received *0930* m.

TO

\*Sender's Number

Day of Month

In reply to Number

AAA

*Thank you very much everything*  
*going on well now and*  
*your wishes of yesterday's letter*  
*being carried out and will*  
*certainly ask you to come*  
*over if any difficulties*  
*arise and I would be*  
*glad if Russell may be*  
*granted temporary higher rank*

FROM

PLACE & TIME

*CPH*

\*This line should be erased if not required.



Prefix ..... Code ..... Words .....  
£ s. d.

From .....  
By .....

At .....  
To .....  
By .....



Charges to collect  
Service Instructions.

Handed in at ..... Office ..... m. Received ..... m.

TO

*General Burtwood*

\*Sender's Number

Day of Month

In reply to Number

AAA

*immediately not only on account  
of reasons already mentioned but  
also because Hodgson is senior  
to him both as colonel  
and brigadier no need for  
reference etc*

FROM

PLACE & TIME

*General Godley*

• This line should be erased if not required.

W.9668/1672. 50,000 Pads. 12/14 A. W. & Co. Forms/C.2123.



Copy.

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M.E.F.

21st December, 1915.

Lt-General Sir F. L. Davies, K.C.B.

My dear Davies,

I had meant to write to you yesterday, but as you will probably realise I felt just a little done up then, after the certain amount of anxiety one has been in these last few days pending the evacuation, and as I was out all night for the last two nights, I had had no sleep for 48 hours.

However, I merely wanted to write to thank you so much for the really successful co-operation you gave in your attack on the afternoon of the 19th. I happened to be at "Anzac" at the time your artillery bombardment took place, and all my boys there were absolutely delighted with it. The roar of the guns, and seeing the whole of the slopes of Achi Baba churned up with the shells pleased them immensely, and they were all speculating on the number of Turks being sent to glory. Also, I think it must undoubtedly have had the effect of pinning down a good many Turks there, who would otherwise have been likely to come up and join in any attack, when they certainly ought to have had no difficulty in realising what our intentions were - though I suppose they could not tell when we actually meant to leave finally, and I fancy they could not have believed we could do it quite so quickly. In any case your show was a complete success, though it is always tiresome to be looking back, and realising that one cannot hope to make more rapid strides in advancing. Still I quite believe that you will eventually be able to do a lot more by sticking to it as you do.

In my wildest dreams I never thought it possible that we should have evacuated with the complete immunity we did. Given good weather I had felt quite confident that we should get off everything to the last few hundred men, and I feared there might have been difficulties about them being fired heavily into as they were actually embarking, but we were lucky/



lucky the Turks never really finding this out.

A big mines on the top of Russell's Top, loaded with about a ton of ammonal, were a huge success, and for the moment almost looked like an eruption of Vesuvius! I fancy they must have accounted for a good many Turks, and certainly made them think that a big attack was imminent, as the whole of their trenches round "Anzac" was at once lined, and continued to pour a regular roll of rifle fire into our evacuated trenches for about an hour and a half.

Both Bungo and Godley were first class, and did everything to ensure the success of their Corps, leaving me nothing whatever to do.

I must come over to see you again as soon as I can. I fear you are having worries about the relief of those Frenchmen, and I only wish we had some really new troops to send you, instead of those just pulled out from Suvla, for I am sure what you want is a really good, regular division of fresh men, but, alas, these I am afraid do not exist for us.

I think there is no doubt about it but that the Turks have got those new heavy guns, as the day before yesterday, when I was ashore at "Anzac," they put in fifty brand new, heavy howitzer shells - something about 10". They were far better made, bright steel shells than we have seen before, and it seems certain that these will of course now be brought down to have a whack at you, and I am so afraid your people may have a baddish time with the heavy pounding you are sure to get. This makes me all the more anxious about what you may think I am rather unnecessarily insistent, viz., safe shelters for all your supports, reserves, etc. I know that you cannot get these anywhere about your centre owing to the water, but I was wondering if it would not be possible to increase enormously the number of dugouts in the hilly bits on both flanks, and to run diagonal communicating trenches from them towards your centre? This would probably enable you to get more men under good cover than in any other way, while they could get up to the front pretty quickly from the flanks if they had direct routes. However, it is only a suggestion which you will very likely already have got in hand. Again many thanks for your great help on the 19th.



Headquarters,  
8th Army Corps,  
22nd December, 1915.

---

*My dear ~~Bushwood~~,*

Very many thanks for your letter.

I need hardly say how delighted we all are at the marvellous success of the evacuation ; it was a near shave though, you had not even one night to spare.

I am glad you think that our effort here was of some use to operations elsewhere. I was very pleased with my men; the H.L.I. who attacked G.11.a. were first rate. I could see them through my glass going forward right well and they had a really hard bit of bomb fighting.

The men of the Manchesters at FUSILIER BLUFF were unlucky as for once the mine did not make a suitable crater so that when they got forward to occupy the crater they found themselves fully exposed to fire; Douglas says they went in well but could not remain on the bare ground.

The storm yesterday did some damage to the unfinished portions of Nos. 1 & 3 piers, but the finished portions were undamaged. Nos. 2 & 4 piers were undamaged, likewise the new pier at 'V' beach.

The shelling of the beach is a nuisance but so far no more than a nuisance.

I quite realise the importance of pushing on with the deep dug-outs in the few places where they are possible and I make myself a perpetual nuisance to divisional commanders on the subject. Now that we are getting more troops I hope progress will be faster. By the way is there any news of the Punjabis?.

I wish G.H.Q. would not skin us of staff officers quite so much; they really ought not to take people away until their places are filled.

3188  
CORPS HQ





I hope you will urge G.H.Q. to fill us up with ammunition and supplies with the least possible delay while the weather is fine and before the shelling of the beach gets worse. As I have already said, I want 1500 rounds per 18 pr., but I have under 800, and as regards howitzers instead of the 1000 I want I have only an average of under 300. Nothing has yet been done to replace the expenditure of 19th and it is probable that a counter-attack on some scale will have to be met shortly as was the case after 15th November. I also want 60 days supplies but I have only 40.

The lack of material for shelter & for working is equally serious. I am continually pressing for it but nothing happens and the precious time is going. The "Middleton" which should have been here on the 15<sup>th</sup> of this month has not arrived and I can get no news of her. I really am beginning to lose patience with the failure to keep us supplied with the bare necessities. We are an army of men without shelter & on the sea side in for want of movement. I pointed out the necessity for early supplies of all these things as long ago as August.

Yours truly  
 J. M. D. [Signature]

8588



Copy.

Lt-Genl Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B.,  
8th Corps.


Headquarters,  
Dardanelles Army, M.E.F.  
26th December, 1915.

My dear Davies,

With reference to our conversation yesterday, it has struck me that you may possibly have on shore a certain amount of surplus things, which in any case will not be required by the troops during the winter. I know that this was the case both at Suvla and "Anzac," and they were each able to get rid of two or three ship loads of all sorts of stores etc., which were just as well out of the way, so if you have anything of this sort ashore at Helles, I am sure that you will be wise to start getting it away now. Also, I think you may take it for granted that the 42nd Division will be relieved almost at once, as I made such a strong representation about this to G.H.Q. If they have any sort of surplus heavy stuff which could be got rid of in advance, you might perhaps send this also off now, and if you want anything more in the way of lighters etc. for this, you will of course let me know.

You were asking for officers to be sent to you who had experience of the Suvla and "Anzac" evacuations, and I will later on certainly ask Bradshaw to go over with some of his people - but, in the meantime, you already have the 29th Division, many of whom have had the experience, and almost immediately will be getting Maude and the 13th Division, who will of course know all about it, and from whom you will naturally get all you can.

At "Anzac," where the trenches were very close, and also with a hard surface, we made all our men on the last night wrapped their feet up in old blankets and sacking, and this is a tip which will doubtless be of great use to you, as I know down on the trench right, where I was in the front trenches the other day, I noticed there was a good deal of stone surface, on which the tramp of our ammunition boots would be heard over long distances.



If/


*C. J. D.*



If you can arrange some really good mines with long leads, I am sure they will be useful. I think that the long leads in your case will be essential, and this they were not able to arrange at "Anzac." Later on, you will of course fix up checks everywhere along all obvious routes which the enemy would follow, etc., etc.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.






(P.S. to letter to Lt-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B.,  
dated 26/12/15.)

P.S. I am sure it will be wise to cut as many pathways as you can at suitable places from the high ground along your Northeast coast down to the beaches, and presumably the further North you can safely make these for embarkation places the better, i.e., in the vicinity of Gully Beach. We must remember, however, that the prevalent winds now are likely to be from the N.E., and I presume that the whole of that bit of coast would be unusable in such a wind?

With a strong N.E. wind, however, I fancy that you could carry on the work anywhere between "W" beach and Seddell Bahr, when the only thing that would stop work would be heavy shelling. The Turkish guns are I believe registered on to "W" and "V" beaches. Are there intermediate places where it would be possible to arrange embarkations on to motor lighters?

We were able to work on this plan up at "Anzac," where the Turkish guns were registered on "Anzac" Cove itself, but not on the coast to the South of it towards Gaba Tepe, and we were consequently able to bring tow in quietly at one or two places between "Anzac" Cove and their guns, when all their shells were "overs."

I only suggest these different points for consideration, as I know you will like to examine them while you have the time to do so.





Copy.

Lt-Genl Sir F.L.Davies, K.C.B.,  
8th Corps.

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army, M.E.F.,

27th December, 1915.

My dear Davies,

I have just been over to see Monro, and write to let you know the result of our interview, which I think will be of interest.

(1). To begin with, I may mention that nothing whatever is settled about evacuation or not - in fact, Monro is rather now under the impression that it will be decided to hang on, as the Admiral thinks we should do from a Naval point of view. While there, however, I got Monro to wire home, saying that it is essential that a definite decision should be arrived at immediately, as after the middle of next month, the weather must in all probability be so bad, as to put out the question anything like big movements of troops, whether we wish this or not, so I trust we shall get a definite order one way or another in the course of a day or so.

(2). The French apparently got a message last night telling them that they were to evacuate, lock, stock and barrel, and asked me if I could give a date when they could do this. I have told them they can arrange to evacuate the whole of their infantry as soon as we can relieve them, and that this will be done as fast as we can manage it. I have, however, got Monro to wire Home, saying that under no circumstances can we be prepared to allow their artillery to go, as I find that we have apparently no 18 pr. left to replace the 75's, which I had originally told Brulard he could take away. This I hope will also help to make them arrive at a definite decision at Home.

(3). You will have seen Maude by now who will tell you all about his Division, and it will continue to be sent up to you daily, as fast as Pinto can manage this. I originally meant to send up 3,000 men a night, but he tells me for the

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


next day or so he cannot manage more than 2,000, as some of his trawlers etc. are under repair. As however men come up, you will be able to relieve the 42nd Division, and having done that, will go on with the 29th Division and the French. In case of evacuation, I have arranged that you are to retain the 87th Brigade, so in any case you keep that till the last, and, as we must I think have got definite orders before their term will have come for leaving, we shall know where we stand in sufficient time.

(4). I am sending this letter by Fanshawe, who will take over two of his best staff officers to leave with you to start going in-to matters in case of evacuation, and later on I hope I may be able to let you have two more. I had hoped to have been able to send you 9th Corps officers for this, but unfortunately they have all been whisked off practically without reference to me, and cannot consequently be got at.

(5). A small boat - the "Spinnel" - arrived here yesterday with wood and corrugated iron for Imbros, which I at once diverted to you, and I hear you will have got her today, so I hope that will help to some extent. I find that the "Midlothian" was prevented coming up from Egypt from fear of submarines, as no escort was then available. She is, however, I hear due at Mudros tomorrow, and I have ordered that she is to come on to you at once, so I do hope you will begin now really to get "ferrader," though I feel once you have started on this, orders to pack up may arrive!

I left your long letter of requirements with Campbell, who has promised to go into every detail as regards your wants, and deal with them at once, and they have promised to send you sandbags and wire as expeditiously as possible. I may mention that Monro did not at all like your "insubordinate" representation, but when I explained matters to him, I think he understood that we had all been rather highly tried, but said he would not have insubordination from anyone, though he realises that none of us here ever got half/





half we wanted in the way of requirements.


Most unfortunately the Vice Admiral had gone to Salonika, so I was not able to talk to him about your N.T.O. I left word however on the subject, and I hope it may be possible to replace him by Captain Staveley, who was our N.T.O. at "Anzac," and is now in the same capacity here. I understand that your man will be asked to take three weeks' leave or so, and I trust he may agree. If not, we shall have to see if the Admiral will move him on compulsorily.

As Fanshawe will tell you, the 11th Division is already here to follow on after the 13th, and they stand about 12,000 strong. They will be at your call when the 13th are completed, but in any case I fancy you will not want any of them until the 42nd, 29th and French have all been got rid of, and then I fancy you will not want more than one or perhaps two Brigades.

I hope that this covers most of the points you raise, and, if not, do please let me know, and in any case I shall hope to be going over and seeing you in the course of the next day or so.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.





i) GSR /2/2004/1

ii) GSR /2/2004/2

WRN D) 9. 12. 15

are in separate envelope

i) Deals with mention of  
GSR /2/49

ii) Deals with mention of  
Special file

~~also in~~

1 copy of each has been

placed on GSR /2/54

"maintenance of files  
during winter months"

WJ