

Cover for Documents.

4.

Nature of Enclosures.

OPERATIONS DURING AUGUST.

- A. Appreciation (with supplement) of plans for attack.
- B. Notes on water supply for August offensive.
- C. Landing of additional troops, and best method of their employment.
- D. Selected officers and n.c.o.'s of new units to see organization of trenches.
- E. Special Order to troops re operations.
- F. Letter to Sir J. Maxwell, describing:
 - (1) The general operations.
 - (2) Landing at Suvla.
 - X (3) Interview with Sir Ian Hamilton urging employment of reserve division.
- G. Letter to Sir Ian Hamilton re withdrawal from Chunuk Bair.
- H & K. D/O letters regarding August operations. *Missing up at Chunuk Bair*
- L. Letter to Lord Kitchener regarding:
 - (1) the general operations.
 - X (2) Interview with General Stopford prior to Suvla landing.
- M. Orders for the operations.

Notes, or Letters written.

- N. Letter to Captain Boyle, R.N., re report of our gun fire falling short on Chunuk Bair .

30th May, 1915.

A. ✓

A

Memorandum.

The situation here in view of the eventual? difficulties to carry out the desired objective strikes me as follows:

We now occupy a semi-circular position with both its flanks resting on the sea (Squares 237 W. 224. C.I.M.R.). The enemy are entrenched all round this position, and have been daily making their defences stronger. In my place they have four and five rows of trenches round us, which must make any breaking out on our part exceedingly difficult, more especially as round a considerable portion of the position the enemy have the command of us. Also, in this hilly country they are able to arrange that their trenches are covered at various points which may necessitate a considerable amount of sweeping. I am therefore in hopes that I may be able to turn a good deal of their positions by making a big sweeping movement round my left flank on to the 971 ridge. The country here is most difficult, - far more so even than any we have occupied so far. It is broken up by many and deep ravines. There are a large number of precipices, and there is thick scrub everywhere. The enemy have entrenched this part also, but so far not to such an extent as they have entrenched elsewhere.

I hope that by attacking ~~exing~~ over this area by night on a really broad front we may be able to rattle the Turks, as we did when first effecting our landing here. For this a certain element of surprise is necessary, as they hold interior lines, and would reinforce the crest line before we could reach it. I realise that owing to the difficulties of the country a night attack will involve a certain number of troops losing their way. This, however, is not a matter of consequence, as all fully know they have to press upwards, and matters will be rectified in this respect in the morning.

I should like to think - - the left of my attack was first
to/

to envelope the actual point 971. From personal reconnaissance, however, made as far as one could see on shore, and from a destroyer on Suvla Bay, from where it is possible to look into the rear of 971, I found that that point is entirely cut off by precipices from the main ridge, and no assault on it could therefore form part of an attack on the main position without being itself completely isolated.

My plan would be to attack the ridge with three brigades and a total of about 8,000 men, and occupy the position as far as 238 Q. to 224 F. Having done this, the position taken would have to be secured and consolidated. I anticipate that this at all events would be strongly opposed, as the enemy would realise what it meant, and after taking it, it would certainly be heavily attacked, and probably subjected to severe artillery fire from big guns inland. Digging in immediately would therefore be absolutely essential.

When secured, I should hope to move down the ridge with at least one brigade in the hopes of taking the enemy trenches facing my present position in rear. As this brigade approached the North-East corner of my present position, the brigade at present occupying that position would move forward to meet it, and I would propose to carry out a combined movement with the troops going down the ridge and in defence of the force now holding Plateau 400. 224 N., the whole force breaking forward with the idea of occupying the "Low Scrub" Spur running from 224 F. towards Gaba Tepe.

To carry out these objectives, the following troops would I consider be necessary.

The present position - or rather an extended one with its right on Gaba Tepe must be held. The enveloping movement, which is to swing round from the left ^{dividing} -? of Walker's Ridge. On that ridge I consider there must be retained one brigade or, say, 2,000 men. From the dividing point to the right of Gaba Tepe I consider that some 12,500 men will be necessary, which can be

met/

met from 4 Australian Infantry Brigades and 2 Light Horse Brigades. This leaves me with a force of 4,000 men only to make an enveloping attack, for which the New Zealand Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Rifle Brigade would probably be used.

To make this attack, I consider that three brigades or between 7,000 and 8,000 men will be necessary. My present force is about 19,000 rifles, which have been accounted for above, and in addition to these I require another brigade of, say, 3,000 men. Without these numbers I do not advocate any advance, as though I have only incidentally referred to extending my line to Gaba Tepe, yet I would recommend the seizing of that place at the same time as an enveloping movement is made on to the 971 ridge. I do not know if the two movements can be done with less than the numbers given, for as I have already stated, the enemy is entrenched everywhere, and hard fighting on both flanks is anticipated.


Having secured the position from the 971 ridge downwards to Gaba Tepe, I consider the next move should be made as soon as possible - I hope within two days or so of taking the ridge and Gaba Tepe to the ridge running down the intersection of Squares 238 - 224 along the top of the ridge to 212 C. For this move I consider the troops here should be reinforced by another division, which I would push through from my present right front in the direction of 224 Y. in conjunction with a move due East across the 400 Plateau, and a movement South down to 971 ridge by the troops who would have just occupied that position.

It must be remembered that the valley which occupies a great ~~is~~ part of 224 is a very big one. It is covered with trenches, and at present is full of enemy reserves, and it may well be even with reinforcements of an extra division I may not be able to make much progress there. At present it is hard to say what real help the Turks on the 971 ridge will be able to

give/

give in holding this valley, and it is doubtful if I will be able to get artillery up there.

It will be seen from the above that the troops I consider necessary in addition to what I now have are one brigade for the first sweeping, enveloping attack, and one division for the further advance.



X

10th July, 1915.

G.H.Q.

With reference to the appreciation which I recently sent in on the subject of a move from my present position, I shall be grateful if I may attach a supplement to it.

In course of conversation with one of the headquarters' staff, I gathered that there may be a possibility of an even stronger force of three divisions being available to reinforce the troops here.

Should this be the case I would still adhere to the proposals I have already made, and strongly recommend that a force of two divisions should be shoved through as quickly as possible behind and in direct conjunction with the force attacking point 971, and the hills North of Kuchuk Anafarta - to pass through the gap between the two Anafartas, and to make for and seize this high ground of 820 in Square 252. With that point strongly held, as well as 971, and the rear secured by the holding of the ridge in Squares 265 and 280, I feel that we should have a complete domination over the Turkish Forces.

From the persistent way in which the Turks have dug themselves in around my present position, and from the way in which they are now entrenching as fast as they can along the spur running from F. to Y. in Square 224 and on through C. and H. in Square 212., it has been more than ever impressed on me the fact they are sure to again endeavour to at once entrench around whatever position we may take up.

In our attacks on the 971 ridge - on the guns in 250, and the ridge above Kuchuk Anafarta, we may (and I think especially on the firstnamed) lose very heavily, which may prevent us from continuing to shove straight on, as I feel we must do. If, however, a new force is landed immediately in rear of this attack, and shoved right through the Anafarta valley to seize

820/

820 before the Turks have time to start entrenching, I feel convinced that a great victory will be within our grasp, for we should be in a position to cut off the Turks in Khalid Bahr almost entirely from their base in Bulair, Gallipoli or Turkey.

We must anticipate that the whole of the 971 ridge, and probably 820, will be subjected to a very heavy bombardment directly we have got it, but the former is so steep, that I trust it may be possible to occupy it without loss in this respect, while both hills provide so much cover that we should well be able to look after ourselves.

There is another proposal I would wish to submit for consideration, though I feel it may perhaps be considered in the nature of a wild cat scheme, in which ~~the~~ case the G.O.C. in Chief will doubtless at once dismiss it, and in any case the difficulty of getting horses up here and disembarked in time for use, may in all probability rule out its feasibility.

I fancy it is probable that when the time comes for advancing, we shall be having bright moonlight nights. It has struck me that on the night of our main attack, we might possibly contemplate a raid of light horse right round the enemy's position.

The light horsemen of my army corps are men who are accustomed to finding their way about country a good deal at night, and to undertake rough work over broken country.

Such a raid with small numbers would I think most probably have an extremely demoralising effect upon the Turks, for they would absolutely have no idea what was intended, while in the moonlight ~~and~~ the noise of galloping horses would probably exaggerate the numbers enormously.


The route to be taken by such a raid as I have in contemplation would be that roughly following the road from Fisherman's Hut - Inam Chai - Biyuk Anafarta - Boghali - Kojadere - Kilia Ovasi, and back in again under my right to the North of Gaba Tepe. The distance to be covered would be some 17 miles, which is not great, and could of course easily be done during/

during the night. The moral damage to the enemy would I fancy be considerable, as also should be the material damage, as the Light Horse ~~would~~ might in all probability be able to account for small Turkish encampments, or small bodies of men, while there would be little chance of large bodies forming up to beat them.

The country, however, is no doubt difficult - it would be impossible I think to obtain guides, and serious obstacles would be encountered which might hold them up badly, especially when they get down South of Kojadere, between which and Gaba Tepe we know the country to be so much entrenched, though there is I believe but little or no wire. We would therefore have to contemplate the possible loss of most of the force we might send out, though on the advance of the infantry the next morning, it should be possible to pick up a good many of these again.

The difficulty of landing horses, for more than one ^{must} regiment/I fear restrict the force to one of that strength.

A less ambitious scheme of the same nature would be to launch a raid of this sort by Inam Chai, and then, after passing between the two Anafartas, to wheel round to the left towards Tursht en Keui, where there are believed to be practically no ^{Being} enemy. If there, however, they would be in the rear of the position to be attacked by the infantry divisions landed at Suvla Bay, and would consequently be a considerable help to them, while the following morning, when it got light, they might advance South to cooperate with any troops moving in the direction of Biyuk Anafarta. This latter scheme would I think entail but small risks.



ASA AD

NOTES ON WATER SUPPLY FOR ANZAC OFFENSIVE ON 6th AUGUST 1915.

The plan for the offensive on the 6th August 1915 included three separate attacks .

- (i) The attack on Lone Pine.
- (ii) The attack on The Neck
- (iii) The main attack on SARI BAHR.

Special water arrangements had to be made for each of these operations, and the supply for the troops holding the remainder of the line had also to be provided for.

The drinking water for the troops at ANZAC had to be brought by water ships from EGYPT and transferred to water barges from which it was pumped up to the main reservoir under PLUGGE'S PLATEAU and distributed by pipe lines to the tanks conveniently extended along the ANZAC position. The supply was only sufficient for the needs of the garrison and the only reserve was contained in the main reservoir which held about one day's supply.

Animals were watered from small surface local wells. It was considered necessary to provide a three day's water supply at one gallon per man per diem for the troops engaged in the operations , and it was also necessary to provide water for the additional troops landed at ANZAC during the week preceding the 6th August who were concentrated in VICTORIA GULLY, WHITE VALLEY BRIDGES ROAD, MONASH RESERVE, and MULE GULLIES where we had water tanks on the pipe line. These additional troops consisted of the 13th British Division and one Indian Brigade. By dint of great economy and care we managed to accumulate a certain amount of water in tins and dumped them with units in the trenches so as to place the bulk of the water from the tanks at the disposal of these additional troops camped in the valleys. This scheme for the preparatory period worked satisfactorily .

For the operations themselves our plan was to make dumps of tins and fantasses to provide a supply for the troops engaged. For this we got twenty thousand tins and fantasses from EGYPT.

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I do not remember the quantity in gallons but our aim was to provide a three day's supply at one gallon per head. A dump was formed at BROWN'S DIP for the Lone Pine force, to be carried forward by hand. For the attack on THE NECK another dump was formed supplementing the tanks at RUSSELL'S TOP. For the main attack on SARI BAHR a dump was formed at No 2 Post, and mules were provided to form water convoys accompanying the various columns. I do not think it was possible to provide a full three day's supply for the SARI BAHR force, but we could count on the well between No 2 Post and the sea, where an engine with pipe connection to the three large tanks at the Post was installed, and we hoped to find a certain amount of water in the AGYLL DERE and other valleys on the north face of SARI BAHR. Units were provided with canvas tanks to carry up the hillsides and form reservoirs as far forward as possible to which mule convoys could carry water and from which the men could fill their water bottles. Parties of Engineers were told off to search for water in the valleys and to dig surface wells, and a water officer with a special party was detailed to superintend water distribution at the tanks at No 2 Post.

This was the scheme, and under the circumstances it is difficult to see what more could have been done. The men suffered a good deal from thirst for the first forty eight hours of the fighting in SARI BAHR, but the heat was great, and the demand for water very heavy. The wells in the valleys and the search for water proved disappointing, and the water distribution at No 2 Post was not organised as well as it might have been. The engine at the No 2 Post well also gave a lot of trouble, but after the first forty eight hours, when the confusion inseparable from the nature of the operation began to subside, and when water began to come forward from the reserve and MULE GULLY tanks, the situation became easier, and there was a sufficient supply, though of course the ration was a scanty one as it always was at ANZAC.

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At both LONE PINE and THE NECK the arrangements proved as satisfactory as it was possible to hope for, and certainly up to our expectations.

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B ✓

13th May, 1915.

Sir Ian Hamilton.

C

Many thanks for saying I am to get back my Australian brigade tomorrow, and I trust it will be followed the next day by the New Zealand. I much hope that I may, too, later on, get the Indian Brigade, which I know you originally intended I should have, and which would, I cannot help thinking, be of special use in this very hilly and broken country. I know of course that since I was to have the Indian Brigade to complete my 2nd Division, I have got my two mounted brigades from Egypt. These, however, are only by way of reinforcements to existing infantry brigades, and as such I would have much preferred to use them, but as they have been sent with brigade staffs etc. this is now impossible. They have, however, had no real infantry training, and the two brigades between them number only about $\frac{3}{4}$ of an infantry brigade, viz., 2,900 men.

I feel I want more troops to get into a better ~~position~~ position than I now occupy, as what I hold is by no means satisfactory on the lower slopes of this big hill. I am absolutely blind where I am, as it is impossible to scout through this thick scrub - the seaplanes can never give me any movements of troops in this scrub, and I am overlooked all round. We have necessarily had to sit tight all this time, as we have not been strong enough to advance, and I have only been able to consolidate myself and dig in.

In the meantime, the Turks have been digging in all round me, and now have two and three continuous rows of trenches right away round everywhere, excepting my left flank, and I anticipate the greatest difficulty in breaking through these.


With the Indian Brigade I should hope to be able to make a sweeping movement round my left in the direction of Biyuk Anafarta, and its right to point 971 (234); if I could take this and hold my left on 971 with a position running down the top of
that/

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MAY 1915

that ridge, I should feel in a satisfactory position, as I should overlook the whole of the valley towards the straits.

It is quite possible, even with the Indian Brigade, I may not be able to effect all I want, as, though it looks a tiny bit on the map, when you come to look at it from the coast, you realise what a great long stretch of mountain it is, and even if I get it, it may be almost more than I can hold, for I fancy it would be sure to be attacked heavily. If, however, I could get at it, I should hope to be able to take some of the enemy's guns, which I fancy are located somewhere about 238 Q. and V. There is always one point to remember about it that on the 971 ridge we might be subjected to heavy gun fire from the straits. That however we should have to face, and dig ourselves in.

I do not know if you have any definite plans after you get Achi Baba position, which I much hope may be taken before long. It strikes me, however, that using my force as a bridge-head here, it might be advantageous to land a really large force under its cover, and get a position covering Kilia Bay. If we could get big guns on to such a position, we ought with luck be able to cut off communications, certainly by land, and probably by sea, though to do that we should want to fix up a searchlight, which I fear would be a great target to the enemy's big guns.



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2
16th May, 1915. ✓

Sir Ian Hamilton.

Many thanks for yours of the 17th - brought last night by Aspinall. I quite understand the situation. When you came to see me on Sunday, I am afraid I could not on the spur of the moment give you any detailed recommendation of what I would do if a new division were sent me, but I thought I generally said that, should you send it here, I would utilise it in taking this Sari Bari hill, but that you were rather doubtful if I should be able to provide them with food, water etc. in this hill country.

Directly you left, I sat down and worked out details a little more fully, and write to you at once in the hopes that my letter will reach you before you wire to Lord K., though I know you told me you would be probably sending that off the same evening.

Now that you tell me I must carry on with the troops I have, I really think that the best, and indeed the only course open to me is to continue as I am doing, viz., to go on improving my position, and worry the Turks locally in any way I can without attempting important actions likely to lead to heavy losses. I do not think I could take or hold the considerably larger area which will be necessary when we make a move. This being the case, there is no scheme to put forward, for I shall just be carrying on.

I need hardly say that I do not of course in any way cavil at this, as I am only anxious to do everything we can here to help, and I am so afraid we may not possibly be taking our full share in all you have to do. If you are satisfied that we really are doing our part for the best in furtherance of your general schemes, then we are all quite happy, for, as you know, that is our one wish.

P.S. The 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade arrived yesterday, and I went round them in the afternoon. All very cheery and happy, though they tell me that they are now just under 1,900 strong.

The/

The New Zealand Infantry Brigade has not yet arrived.


(I have a note here thus:

Numbers of Brigades.

1st Brigade	2,700
2nd "	1,800
3rd "	2,900
4th "	2,500

apparently the strength of ~~the~~ brigades on
16th May 1915.

Latw.]



B✓

27th June, 1915.

Colonel O. Fitzgerald.

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his large

I am hoping too that when Sir Ian gets/reinforcements he may put them in here and not down South. As you know, I was originally very keen on that Cape Helles landing, and working our way up the Narrows alongside the Fleet. I had, however hoped then that I should be able to take the Khââid Bahr Plateau within two or three days of landing, and this I think I could have done had we been able to land a month earlier than we did. Now, however, that it is so terribly strongly entrenched, and is causing such heavy losses to take, I don't think there is any great object connected with it. Having started that in this determined way, I suppose we must go on with it, but having got the Achi Baba position I really do not see that we are very much "forrader," as Khalid Bahr is still before us, which is still a tougher nut to crack. If, however, a really strong force is brought here, and we can stretch across from here to Maidos, we should to a great extent be able to cut off supplies, and I hope compel the Turks either to come out to fight or capitulate. This has of course only been possible since our submarines have been able to play about the Sea of Marmora.

A big force across the Bulair Lines would of course be better, as they could provide a submarine base, but unless Bulgaria comes in to do that, it hardly seems feasible. I have urged these views on Sir Ian more than once, and I think that he is beginning to come round to them, though Braithwaite is I fancy still terribly keen upon Achi Baba.

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
1st July, 1915.

It is difficult at present to state how a third division, if available, could best be employed. In view, however of our eventual objective in the direction of Mal Tepe and Maidosse as to completely command the country between here and the Narrows, I think it is very much for consideration as to whether the present Anzac base is sufficient for the troops which may have to be employed. I doubt if we could land a third division at Anzac Cove with any comfort until we can see how the fighting is likely to go for the possession of 971 hill. If we succeed in obtaining that position, then I think it is very much for consideration as to whether a third division~~x~~ should not be landed ~~xxxxx~~ at Anzac - on the coast North of it in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut, or at Suvla Bay, as the Navy may think more suitable, and for this division to advance and occupy the ridge in Squares 280 and 265, when its left would be safe on the sea at Edgelmere Bay, and with its right covering Kuchuk Anafarta. This should give us the command of the valley between the two Anafartas, which would be invaluable and possibly essential for supply purposes. It would give us a broad and comparatively speaking secure base for supplies for a large force in the vicinity of Suvla Bay, while wheeled transport of all sorts could be also used.

It is impossible at present to say what strength of force would be required to hold this line, which would practically run from Edgelmere Bay to the vicinity of Gaba Tepe. I trust that it would not in any way be necessary to have a complete line of trenches along this, as I hope that a ridge like that in squares 265/280 guarding our left could be held by strongly entrenched detachments, permitting of a strong striking force to be organised to move out against the position~~x~~ 820 in square 252, or down towards Kojadere and Bogali from 971 and Biyuk Anafarta. I trust that it will

be possible to hold this position with three divisions, leaving two as a mobile, fighting force.

I know nothing about the possibility of any co-operation of the Greek Army in this Peninsula, but should there be a chance of such being landed anywhere in this vicinity, then I would strongly suggest the occupation of the line now recommended, so as to give us a sure base for a large force in Suvla Bay.




4th August, 1915.

Draft Special Order.

While it is essential that the new arrivals once in their new areas shall not move about the position, the Army Corps Commander wishes selected officers and N.C.O.'s to be given an opportunity of seeing the organisation of the trenches now held by our troops. He will be glad if the Australian Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division will assist in this by sending selected officers to report to the various brigade headquarters located within their areas, to take over and conduct these parties round selected portions of the trenches. The Australian Division will arrange for the 39th Brigade quartered in Victoria Gully, for the 3 battalions of the 40th Brigade quartered on Maclagan's Hill, White Gully and Bridge's Road. The New Zealand and Australian Division will similarly arrange for troops quartered in Rest Gully and on Russel's Top.

New troops with whom it is proposed to garrison trenches such as those on Russel's Top, should have the position shown to them as early as possible, and all officers arriving in this sector should be given ample opportunities of viewing the task in front of them. Great care must be taken that these parties are kept within reasonable limits -- say, 1 officer and 2 N.C.O.'s per company, and that they confine their tour to inspecting the organisation of the trenches, and not the examination of the enemy's position, for this may give away the fact that there are new troops here and serve no useful purpose, as except in the case of Russel's Top they will not be required to act in that direction.



C. ✓

Dictated 14th July, 1917.

Draft Order.

When we landed the place of honour was given to the Australian Division in leading our attack. On this occasion, too, that division will have its full share of fighting, but the honour of accomplishing the task which we set before us on the 25th April, viz., the taking of hill 971, will now fall to the New Zealand and Australian Division. They will have a hard and difficult time of it, but I well know that nothing will stop them, and that they will prove to the world that there are no Turks who can stop them from ~~xx~~ taking a position once they have made up their minds to do so. E.


Remember, men, the order of the day must be "Shove on" and keep shoving on until we are in possession of the heights above us, when we hope we shall have the Turks at our mercy.

Remember, too, that there will be new divisions of Lord Kitchener's Army operating in conjunction with us, who will be watching us carefully, and whose success will be entirely dependent upon our being able to shew them the way first - and this I know you will do.

Remember, too, to do all you can to conserve your ammunition ^{during} ~~during~~ the beginning of your advance, i.e., while on the flat and in the lower hills. It will then be dark, so that the greater portion of any ammunition that might be fired will probably be wasted, while you might hope to get at the enemy with the bayonet, and either capture or kill him at once, and failing this get him on the run. Later on, when we get to the top of the hill, all the ammunition we can possibly carry will be wanted, as we may be sure that the enemy will not give up his strong position without a struggle, and when we have taken it, he will very likely counter-attack to drive us out. Every effort will be made to bring up ammunition and water as quickly

as/

as possible, but you all know as well as I do that there will be difficulties in getting these up quickly enough, so keep what you can for shooting purposes when it is light enough to see and destroy the Turks in front of you.



D

9th August, 1915.

General Sir John Maxwell.

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As we have had such tremendous casualties these last few days, I have suggested to G.H.Q. that, at least, one brigade of Legge's divisions should come on here, and that the two dismounted regiments of the 4th Light Horse Brigade should also come with the idea of being broken up and used as reinforcements to existing Light Horse Regiments. I trust that this may be confirmed, as we want men badly, though you will already have realised this from the terrible stream of wounded which we have been sending you. We have been fighting hard without any pause since the evening of the 6th, and though I have occupied twice the area which I held formerly, yet I am sorry to say I have no very great results which I can ~~claim~~ regard as likely in any definite way, to conclude this show, except perhaps the fact that we have killed an enormous number of Turks.


I began with an attack on the evening of the 6th on my right front, making a dash for the big Turkish works which we call Lone Pine, on plateau 400. This was carried out most admirably by the 1st Australian Brigade who took the whole position, and who have held it since in spite of insistent, day and night counter-attacks. I began this attack in order to let the Turks think our main objective was to break out from my right in the direction of Gaba Tepe. Then at 9 p.m. I moved the whole of Godley's division round from my left flank along the shore, up past Fisherman's Hut, and as far north as Damak Jelik Bair. Then they wheeled to their right, and made an attack on the main Sari Bair

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3rd Series

ridge. It was a dark night, and the country was most astoundingly difficult -- far more so than anything we have yet taken, being a mass of precipices and ravines, with small islands everywhere, which had been entrenched by the Turks. It was, however, the very difficulties of the ground which I regarded as our best friend, for I felt that the Turks would not be expecting us there anything like so much as they would be in all their different entrenched positions. The first position we had to take was a strong Turkish post between Cheilak Dere and Saxly Beit Dere which we got by a nice ruse. Realising that this move would come off, I had for a whole month made a destroyer go through a regular programme of throwing her searchlight on the Turkish trenches and then bombarding them. The Turks got quite accustomed to this, and when the bombardment began, they would either lie down or leave the trenches. I stuck to the same programme on the night of the attack, and during the bombardment, a mounted rifle regiment crept right up in the dark behind the searchlight to the crest of the Turkish position, which they rushed the moment the bombardment ceased, almost without loss.

The next post we also captured fairly easily, as it was more or less an isolated plateau, ^{which} and we were able to pound with howitzers. The troops then continued their march, and got right up to, and around the Chanak Bair portion of Sari Bair, the New Zealand infantry establishing themselves on the crest over a short bit of it, towards the southern end. The remainder of the troops were, however, in rather more difficult ground, and I am sorry to say failed to reach the crest before daylight, and have been hung up since. Monash attacked up the Abdel Rahman Dere, and if he had only been a little quicker, would certainly have got up, but some unaccountable delay took place, and he attempted to go up in broad daylight and was driven back. I tried another assault in daybreak the following day, after tremendous artillery bombardment, and I had great hopes that this would have succeeded, as indeed I think it would with troops who had had proper hill training. I had particularly insisted



on the necessity of the troops all advancing right up the crest line while the bombardment was taking place, so as to be able to rush in the very second the guns ceased. I later heard that two of the brigades were a good mile off when the bombardment ended, with the result that the Turks were, of course, all ready again on the crest line, and drove them back.

We are now in the most difficult position, for though I hold the crest, it is only a small portion of it, and constant counter-attacks are being delivered against it, while men coming up to support come under heavy enfilade fire, and suffer terribly. The worst of it is, with any delay the Turks at once begin to dig in all round us, and in a few days will have an impregnable position. I have exhorted all my boys to hold on for all they are worth, and to push on whenever an opportunity occurs, and I still hope I may get the crest, but I think it must be by night attack.

Cox's Brigade has unfortunately lost nearly all its remaining officers, and indeed one British Regiment has no British Officers at all. I am giving them some Australians and New Zealanders who will, of course, lead them straight, but equally, of course, have no knowledge of the language. Among the killed I am sorry to say, are some really excellent C.O.'s in Malone of the Wellingtons, Beauchop of the Otago Mounted Rifles, and Scrobie and Brown of the 3rd Australian Infantry. The only satisfaction to be felt is, that from reports from all sides we have apparently killed a tremendous number of Turks -- far outnumbering our own, and I have now got close on 700 prisoners (including 3 Germans), two newly arrived German trench mortars, 9 Maxims, and one Nordenfeldt, as well as a large number of rifles and live ammunition.

The spirit and dash of the men was beyond all praise, and if you could only see the country they attacked through, I think you would be astonished that such a thing was in any way possible.

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They are by now, of course, terribly fatigued and so reduced in numbers that it is practically impossible to relieve them, and I have told them we have just got to stick it out, and prove that we are better men than the Turks, who after all are probably far more done than we are.

To the north of us Stopford has effected his landing, and is pushing forward to Kuchuk Anafarta. Whether he will actually succeed in making good the necessary ground there between that village and Ejelmere Bay, I am not quite certain, as I am a little afraid ^{that} the time has been lost, and that he is not moving with the dash which is absolutely essential to success there. He came over to see me some days ago to have a look at the position from here, when I implored him to go on the same lines as we did on landing here, namely, to attack without a second's delay the moment he landed, on as broad a front as possible, disregarding and sweeping any opposition he might meet, for we knew that there would not be anything great against him. I advised him not to wait for anything more than one brigade, but to shove on with them straight to his front. I gathered that there were difficulties about landing, which was opposed, though not to any very great extent, and practically little, or no, progress had been made until well on in the morning of the 7th, and consequently he had not yet been able to make good the high ground between Anafarta and Ejelmere Bay, which is, I consider, essential for the safety of a base at Suvla Bay. I have just seen Sir Ian (first time for a very long time), and implored him to shove ~~hi~~ in any troops he had immediately to support Stopford, and go for this high ground without a moment's delay for a ll he is worth. He at once consented to put in his reserve division (5~~3~~rd, I think), and I do trust they will make a dash for it to-night, but I am a little afraid they may be late, as the Turks have, of course, rushed reinforcements up there.


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You will see that this is not all quite so satisfactory as I could have wished to write to you, but you will realise what difficulties we have had to meet, and the Turks seem to have inexhaustible supplies of men, so I can only hope that the numbers we have certainly killed and wounded in front of us here, may have some effect in damping their ardour.

The performance of the men has, I think, been every bit as fine as it was on the day we landed, but, of course, there is not the same glamour around it! Naturally too, the men certainly are getting stale, though they are perfectly wonderful in never grumbling in spite of all the real hard work they have had in all this heat in the trenches.

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


10th August, 1915.

Sir Ian Hamilton.

I cannot tell you, though I am sure you yourself know, how exceedingly unhappy I was to have to wire you this morning to the effect that our troops had been driven out of their footing on the Chunuk Bair, having hung on all night and entrenched themselves to some extent, I had every hope that they would be able to hold out against anything brought against them. The New Zealanders, who were worn out, had been relieved by two comparatively fresh regiments, the North Lincs. and Wilks of, I fancy, a combined strength of about then 800, which was all we thought could be profitably employed to occupy the extent of the position held. The Turks, however, seemed to have come on in overwhelming numbers, and they say they were driven back by weight. I so thoroughly realised the extreme importance of the ridge and the necessity of retaking it as soon as we can, while I also know how very much harder it will be to do this, now the Turks are entrenching^{ed} themselves than it originally was.

I had so much hope that we might get the whole of the Chunuk Bair ridge by the morning of the 7th, and apparently we were extraordinarily close to it all along, but the desperately difficult country to the north prevented headway being made there. The New Zealand infantry to the south, who had not so far to go, as you know, effected their footing. The following morning I had again much hoped for success from our early morning attack, about which I have only heard some details to-day. I told you yesterday that Baldwin's Brigade had been a long way behind when the bombardment ceased, but I find now that that was not correct, as actually one of his battalions on the left of



the New Zealanders, and one of Cox's battalions on its left again, both approached the crest at the same time, and had they both made good their footings (and though the rest of their brigades were some little way behind, yet I hoped they might have been up in time), we would have been, I think, in a capital position. However, one of those horrible incidents occurred which one can never sufficiently regret. It was a very dull morning, and probably very difficult to see, and some of the ships landed some of their fire just too low, namely on our side of the crest line, and I think, probably, a few minutes later, this was intended, though it is always difficult to be certain about such details. The result was, however, that the battalions of both brigades suffered severely from this gun fire and retired! On such a piece of bad luck you will see we have lost so much, though, of course, if the Turks were very strong up there they might still have held back the leading battalions, but I doubt it. It naturally makes one feel very sad, and I know that you too will feel it so much.

I have spent the whole morning with Godley and Shaw, examining the position and seeing what we can do. I had hoped to have been able to arrange a night attack for to-night, but they are both emphatic that this would be absolutely disastrous, as their troops are not fit for it, having lost so heavily, including officers, and are much mixed up. They have promised me to do all they can to re-organise as quickly as possible, and to establish a really strong line round their present position, and then organise a striking force for another attack which I think we must do this time at night, on as broad a front as possible.

The only redeeming feature I can see at present is the fact that all seem to agree that an enormous number of Turks have been killed on both the right and left flank, but they seem to have wonderful powers of replacing them.

Shaw, who arrived here, after all our plans were made, remarked only this morning that he had been trying to pick holes in them, but had come to the conclusion that they were as conducive

to success as anything as he could see, which, perhaps, makes our failure all the more to be regretted.

For your sake I do feel this very much, as I know all that it means to you, and I can only promise that we will all continue to do our best for you.

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
15th August, 1915.

Sir Ian Hamilton.

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I have been a little comforted since by seeing the commanders of one of the destroyers, who told me that when the Turks made their counter-attack on our party on the top of the hill, though he has been here since the day we landed, he had never seen anything like the numbers which then appeared, which he estimated at 20,000! This is, of course, an exaggeration, but he says that the whole length of the ridge was lined with men shoulder to shoulder, and several rows deep. This quite corresponds with what the Adjutant of the North Lincs. told me they had seen. He said the Turks came at them in four solid rows -- that they wiped out the first two of these, but were then overwhelmed by the last two. This all looks as if the Turks had definitely made up their minds that they would drive off any force we might get up there. The commander of the "Chelmer" tells me that all the naval guns were in action as hard as they could go on these solid ranks, and that they saw whole groups of dozens and twenty men being blown high in the air by them, but there was no wavering whatever on the part of the Turks. There is no doubt about their being real brave fellows, and I can only hope that we have killed a sufficient number of them to make some real good impression.


I am glad to say that water does look more promising to-day, as we have now found what looks to be a promising well in the Aghyl Dere, and another good one near, which is beyond our old 202 post. It is not water lighters that we have been short of but the means of getting the water out of them up to anywhere near the troops, owing to pumping difficulties, etc. The latter now shows decided signs of improvement, and I am asking Lotbiniere for more piping to carry our water supplies right on to where



you saw Godley's headquarters, and this would help a good deal. I am glad to say that a Turkish prisoner who has just given himself up says that he has had no water for five days, so they are evidently worse off than we are.

I am holding Rhodendron Spurb with a New Zealand Infantry Brigade who originally took it, and I think that is the best we can do in that direction. I am only sorry it was ever necessary to relieve them from the top of the hill, but they had been at it ^{three} for ~~two~~ days and nights, without any rest, and were so absolutely worn out that it became essential to carry out the relief.

I looked too much for the change of command further north which I am so delighted to hear, for whatever men may say against him, he has all the driving power that is wanted, and will, I sincerely trust, shove things through.



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Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
10th August, 1915.

Our big move was started on the evening of the 6th, when I attacked a big Turkish work and labyrinth of trenches known as "Lone Pine" on my right front. I put an Australian Brigade at it who dashed forward in the most gallant style possible, and though under a very heavy rifle and shrapnel fire went clean across and fought their way through from trench to trench completely expelling and routing the Turks. Ever since then the Turks have been counter-attacking, but our boys have held on for all they are worth, and have accounted for a really enormous number of Turks. I am sorry to say though that our own losses have been heavy, and I have lost two of my best commanding officers.

This attack to the right front was purposely made to let the Turks think we meant to make a big advance from there, and I think it had the desired result, as they at once moved down all their local reserves for their counter-attacks.

As soon as it was dark I launched out the New Zealand and Australian Division supported by Shaw's Division of the New Army, marching them round to the left flank and along the shore as far as Aghil Dere. From there they wheeled to their right, and made a night attack on the Sari Bair range.

The country we had to go through was far worse than anything we had to negotiate the day we effected our landing, and must be seen to be realised. It is a mass of most broken country with practically precipitous islands joined by necks of land to each other running through it everywhere, and finishing up with most difficult spurs and precipices leading to the high ground, the whole being covered with scrub. As, however, I told my troops before starting, it was the very

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difficulties of the country which we must regard as our best friends, for had the country not been so broken, the Turks would have had continuous lines of trenches to meet us everywhere, as indeed they have on every side but this.

The first obstacle met was a very strongly entrenched but rather isolated hill. Having made up my mind a good month ago that we should attack over this particular country, I started a ruse which I am glad to say proved most successful. I made a destroyer regularly shell this position every night for about ten minutes, then cease firing but keeping her search light upon it, and again a second heavy burst of shelling for another ten minutes. The Turks had got quite accustomed to this, and I knew used either to lie down at the bottom of the trenches or vacate them when shelling commenced.

On the night of the attack I carried out the exact ordinary programme, and during the half hour the searchlight was on the Turkish post, my men were creeping up all round it, and the second the light was off they were able to make a rush for it and seize the whole place almost without opposition. As there were some 500 Turks in it, and the place was very carefully entrenched and prepared, this was I think a capital performance.

The next obstacle met was a flat tabletop, which the Turks had also entrenched very carefully. I had carried out the same programme with the destroyer on this, but I quite realised it would be impossible to effect a surprise after our capture of the first post, so I had had that registered and well pounded by 5" howitzers while we advanced up to it, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles again stormed it with comparatively speaking small loss.

I had given orders that the whole attack was to be on as broad a front as possible, men scattering up every spur, and if any particular company found themselves stopped by trenches or precipices, those on the right and left were to keep shoving forward, as I knew if men once got in rear of any trench the Turks would vacate it. This is exactly what happened, and

throughout the night the small columns continued to make progress through the ravines and along the steep spurs.

I had every hope that we would have been able to reach the crest line of the Sari Bair ridge which was our objective, and I cannot even yet get over my grief at the fact that they failed to do so. I am wrong in saying that they failed to do so, as one Brigade - the New Zealand Infantry - did get up and make a lodgment on the Southernmost part of the crest. The Brigades on the left had, however, further to go, and rather more difficult country, and dawn found them still at the foot of the main ridge, even though we had made our start immediately it was dark enough to do so. Such a lot of the country had to be traversed in single file that columns naturally spread out, hence the delay.

All I know did their real best, for I had told them all just before we started how absolutely important it was to shove along and let nothing stop us. By daylight the Turks of course had manned the crest line and made further movement then almost impossible, though the troops gradually moved forward to better positions on some of the lower spurs. At dawn the following day I ordered an attack on the main ridge, the other Brigades pivoting on the New Zealand Infantry who still hold the Southern crest.

Here again I am sorry to say it was a case of "so near and yet so far." I had a tremendous Military and Naval bombardment of the whole of the crest from 4.30 a.m. to 5.15 a.m. when the assault was to be made. At this time the leading regiments of two Brigades were just creeping up to the positions we wanted, and we had every hope that in a few moments we would have got the crest, and that the leading regiments would have been supported in time by the rest of their Brigades "to make it good." Most unfortunately, however, it proved to be a very cloudy morning (about the only one we have had) and it was very hard for the heavy guns who were doing a big bombardment to see exactly where troops had reached, and by the worst of luck two

or three of the last big shells happened to fall in right among both regiments as they were nearing the crest, and I fear temporarily demoralised^{them,} with the result that the Turks rushed in and drove them down the hill.

Again it was a case of trying to consolidate ourselves before a further advance. The New Zealand Infantry were much exhausted, and were relieved by two battalions of the New Army who have all been doing splendidly. In the early morning the Turks apparently attacked these battalions in very great strength, and as they say by sheer numbers drove them down the hill.

It was impossible to put a stronger force than that on the hill, as the amount of ground they held did not permit of it, but you can imagine how deeply regretful I am that we should not have been able to hold on. We have now had to withdraw to the lower spurs, and the troops have to rest, as they have been continuously fighting for nearly four days without a breather. It has only been possible to get water to them in small quantities with the greatest difficulty, and I am sorry to say casualties have been very heavy - in all I suppose about 10,000 men, but I am glad to say this includes a large number of slightly wounded. At the same time I have lost a great many really valuable officers, whom I hardly know how to replace, and I am now consolidating the position, and trying to reorganize regiments who have got much split up. When this is done I hope we may be able to get together a good fighting force again to make another determined attack on the ridge, the capture of which is I feel essential to ensure the safety of any base in Suvla Bay.

Up to the one small point of failing to get the crest I feel we really were meeting with success, for from every direction reports come to me of the enormous number of Turks who have been killed, and from all I can hear I think they must amount to several thousands - but they seem to have a marvellous way of replacing them. We have captured 700 prisoners, two new German trench mortars, one Nordenfeldt and nine maxims, as well of course as a great many rifles and a large amount of ammunition.

We have "made good" a lot of new country, but alas I feel that none of this is of any great value unless we can also get the crest line on the hill and look down on the Dardanelles.


All the boys are however, I am glad to say, in capital spirits, and as I told them we are still going to knock these Turks out, and if it comes to a case of which of us is going to see the other through and stick it out longest, there can be no doubt it will be us, and they must remember that for every one of us they have killed, we have got half a dozen Turks.

As well as my anxiety about all fighting operations, I am kept I am sorry to say in a most terrible state of anxiety about water which is most serious, for we are only just able to hang on, living from hand to mouth day by day. Early in the season we sank many wells which kept us going comfortably, but lately these have nearly all dried up, so we have to rely on distilled water, which we pump to different parts of our position. The pumps for this are however old and cranky, and can never be relied on to play up for me for 24 hours at a time, while water lighters always have to run the gauntlet of shells, and several have been holed.

Such a state had this got to a few days ago, that I had most seriously to consider the question of saying no reinforcements could be sent here, while even the troops I had must be considerably diminished.

We have however just managed to hang on on rather reduced rations, but any serious breakdown of my engine, and I honestly do not know what I shall do.

The heat here is great, and it is quite impossible to expect men to fight in the trenches without water, and you can imagine how constant and great trouble like this adds to, or indeed I might almost say is quite one of the greatest anxieties which I have before me day and night.



AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

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Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,

19th August, 1915.

I am a little afraid that the very fine work of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade in taking the "Lone Pine" position of the Turks may perhaps be overlooked in the bigger operations performed by the New Zealand and Australian Division. Had the former position been taken as an operation by itself, I think it would probably have formed the subject of special reports by Sir Ian, while, as it is, it is rather overshadowed by the bigger move.

It was though a magnificent sight to see. The whole of this Brigade got out of our trenches and charged across the open under heavy rifle, machine and shrapnel fire, and without hesitating for a second dashed at and seized the enemy's trenches. It was not as if merely a line of trenches had to be taken, but it was a whole labyrinth of complicated and connected works which we had to occupy. Every detail regarding the attack had been carefully worked out a month before hand - galleries had been run out in three places to within a few yards of enemy's trenches. These were exploded, and communicating trenches etc. established within a few minutes of our entering the works. The boys went right through these Turkish works, and had regular hand to hand fights every yard. To shew you the nature of the fighting I may mention that in one corner we came across eight Turks and six Australians, all dead, who had evidently fought it out man to man to the last. Having taken it from the Turks, they were by no means for giving it up without a struggle, and for three days and nights kept up a constant series of counter-attacks, which prevented us clearing up the place and getting things straight. When this somewhat abated, we dragged a thousand corpses out of the actual trenches which gives some idea of the

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fighting, and was irrespective of the large numbers lying about outside, and of the greater numbers still of Turkish killed whom our guns got when they were coming up in mass along the reverse slopes of their positions. Of the thousand killed, I am sorry to say that nearly half were our own, and at the end of four days the Brigade which had gone in some 2,900 strong, was reduced to 900, but they succeeded in completely establishing themselves in the Turkish positions.

The spirit actuating the whole men of the force is indeed simply grand, and every day I feel prouder at being in command of them. I have of course done everything possible to try to relieve tired men, but for want of numbers this simply has not been feasible, and when going through these Turkish trenches a day or two ago, some of the men asked me if there was any hope of being relieved there. I replied - "Certainly;" and when they asked when this was likely to be, I could only say - "When you have killed lots more Turks." They were most awfully nice about it, and said - "Yes Sir! We are quite ready "to do lots more of that, and anything else you want, but we "really are tired and feeling weak as cats," and I fear there is little disguising from one's self that this is the case.

The climate has been terribly enervating all this last couple of months, and nearly all have suffered from more or less severe stomach troubles, which has pulled them down terribly. Then, too, they are naturally very big eaters in Australia, while here they say they simply do not eat - not because the rations are not good or plentiful, but because of their sameness which gives them no appetite. The evacuations of my sick from my Army Corps has now I am sorry to say recently risen to 400 a day. Nothing however daunts their spirits, and I have never come across a more cheery, willing, ~~hard~~ hard-working, brave set of men that I have with me here, and no one could wish for better.

But I have rather wandered from my story, as I just wanted to say again what wonderful work the New Zealand and Australian Division had done in the big move round the left flank.

I forget if I mentioned when I last wrote that General Shaw, who with his 13th Division came to me two days before the movement, said to me after we had finished it - "After seeing the country we have fought over, I did not "imagine it possible that you would have dared to undertake "such an attack, and further I did not think there were any "troops in the world who could have carried it through with "the complete success your fellows have done."

Well, it was just because I knew the troops so thoroughly, and realised exactly of what they were capable, that I ordered the attack as I did, for I knew well that with fixed bayonets and determination they would attack whatever was in front of them, and that nothing would stop them while they had the physical health to go through - and this is exactly what they did. Several officers who have been out more recently and seen the positions taken, have I think been as surprised as General Shaw was at what had been done.

I may mention that General Shaw's Division actually took part in the movement, but as they were new troops, I purposely had them in support, and they followed as formed bodies the New Zealanders and Australians, who cleared the country in front of them. Later on they came in for a lot of hard fighting in the daylight, and I am sorry to say they lost very heavily. A good deal of this was naturally unavoidable, but I am afraid a good deal of their casualties was also the result of what must always happen to new troops who have not learned how to fight, in that they would bunch themselves together in untenable positions, and allow themselves to be shot down before they had realised or made up their minds where to take cover - then again when it came to entrenching themselves they were satisfied with mere scratchings, while the Australians in the same time would almost have disappeared in the earth in excellent trenches.

Now, whenever I can spare one of these new regiments, I absolutely mix it up in the trenches with my Australians - two Australians to one of the New Army, and I have told my boys I

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hold them responsible for teaching the new hands, who themselves say they are delighted at finding themselves taken in tow in this manner by the Australians. I only wish there was an opportunity to pass through a whole Division in this way, for in a month's time I would have them as very different men.

I still cannot get over my mortification in having been unable to hold on to the top of the Chunuk Bair ridge once we had got it. Allanson, who is in command of the 6th Gurkhas, led a most gallant charge up there, and tells me not only did he get on top, but was actually chasing the Turks over the other side, when those disastrous big shells fell among his men. Some of the men were literally blown to pieces, and this seems to have so panic-stricken the poor little Gurkhas that for a moment they had no idea what they were doing, and actually started bayonetting each other, and then fled back down the ridge, when of course the Turks again rushed up. There was Allanson, able to look down on the Dardanelles, and to see the German and Turkish motor cars moving about - the very position for which I had been so pining as a place not only for our own heavy guns, but as a spotting position from which I had hoped to be able to put all the ships' heavy guns on to the forts and any shipping passing the Dardanelles, which I trusted would have completely cut off the Turks on Khalid Bahr from all supplies etc. - however, we have still got to do this, though it is now going to be very much harder, as we can no longer bring into it the element of surprise on which I had counted, and the Turks have been hard at work ever since in making tremendous series of trenches all along the Northern slopes of the hills.

However, in any case, I am not sure that we should have been able to retain our foothold up there, for, as you probably know, the movement of the 9th Corps on my left had not progressed, and left the Turks still in possession of some low hills known as Ismail Oglu Tepe, where they have many guns, and from where they would have been able completely to pound in my back on the top of the ridge. As it was, and as I think I told you before, my right attacking force, which had established

itself on the South Western corner of Chunuk Bair for 24 hours, was driven off by overwhelming numbers. The New Zealanders originally took this, but after three days fighting being completely worn out, were relieved by the North Lancs and Wilts, and it was these who were driven off.

From the sea one could get a better view, and the Captain of the "Colne" told me that he estimated the number of Turks who attacked them at 20,000! This is of course exaggerated, but it may well have been half that number, for he said they were absolutely shoulder to shoulder, and at least six ranks deep. This corresponds with what the Adjutant of the North Lancs also told me, as he said they came on to them in solid lines, the first two of which they wiped out before they were themselves overwhelmed and driven down the hills. As some slight satisfaction Allanson told me that when the Turks came down the hill and counter-attacked his Gurkhas the same night, they killed at least 600 of them who were pouring down a nullah and were caught with no chance of getting away.

That the total number of Turks we have killed is enormous is I think quite certain. I had fortunately been given six extra howitzer batteries, and I had three 6" howitzers in addition to my one 4.5" Battery, and seven 18 pr batteries. All these were hard at it for about 24 hours, and by swinging those on my right flank as far forward as possible, I was able to get into large masses of Turkish reinforcements and supports as they came swarming up the Southern slopes of the Chunuk Bair. That they did tremendous execution there was proved by a prisoner we caught a few days later, who said that the getting over the ground there was difficult owing to the piles of corpses "who were lying in rows like newly mown corn." Wallingford, who used to be the great Hythe expert, and is now machine gun officer with the New Zealanders, asserts he got 5,000!!! When I laugh at this he assures me he had the day he has dreamed of, and he had ten guns on them for half an hour at short range, when they swarmed over the hills to attack us in solid ranks, and not more than a dozen got back. We know that twelve battalions took part

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3rd Series

in this counter-attack. A prisoner told us only two or three hundred got back, but the New Zealanders say only a few dozen did so! The Turks have since acknowledged to a loss of 6,000 killed and 20,000 wounded before me.

I much hope that these tremendous losses may have some real effect upon the Turks, but it is perfectly extraordinary how they seem to be able to renew their numbers, and now that they can comfortably deplete Constantinople and even Adrianople of troops, I suppose that the numbers who can face us must be at least 120,000.


That Sir Ian was thoroughly satisfied with the work of my boys is I think proved by the very nice telegram he sent me before we got on to Chunuk Bair, saying whatever happened nothing could take away from them their magnificent performance, and if we only made good the heights, our work would go down in history coupled with Quebec! I wired him the next morning that we had "made good" the heights, but alas, as you know, to our great grief we could not retain them.

I am now very much hoping that the strong force on our left will really shove on and take the high ground North of Anafarta, which should make Suvla Bay very fairly comfortable and safe, and do a great deal to consolidate the position here.

I must say, and everybody agrees, that the Turks have fought with a most astonishing bravery, and even though mown down by our guns have never flinched for a second. Also, as far as we know, they have fought fairly. So far there has been no talk of gas, though we have had one or two of what we presume to be liquid fire bombs sent at us. These however have apparently only been cylinders containing petrol, which have been put out with very little trouble by our men.


I much wish we could get some more authentic news of what is happening in Russia. Yesterday we were all elated by the rumour that the Russians had turned and rent the Germans badly near Warsaw. Today we are gloomy (if we let ourselves be so) at the reports of a big German success further North.

I have not said much about Cox's Indian Brigade who are



now with me, except to mention the 6th Gurkhas. All I am sorry to say have lost heavily, more especially in British officers, one regiment being left with none, and I believe that the Subadar-Major brought the 6th out of action when all their officers were wounded. Cox was I think rather inclined to send me alarmist accounts about the state of his regiments, saying they were no longer fit for offensive action etc. Before coming to me the 14th Sikhs were so reduced in numbers that a certain number of the Patiala infantry were incorporated with them from the canal. Here again they have lost a number of their old men, and I am told that now thirty six only of the original 14th Sikhs are with the regiment, the balance being Patiala men, men from the Burmah Military Police, and all sorts of drafts and recruits. However, I was out yesterday spending a long day with them all, for they now hold trenches on my extreme left stretching out towards the 9th Corps to the North. I found them all quite cheery and happy, and I quite discounted Cox's gloomy reports concerning them. The men were all working away - "tugra", and saying they were quite ready to take on more Turks. It so happens that they have quite the nicest bit of country we have yet been working in, and to me it is a perfect pleasure to be able to walk over nice fields and grass after having been practically "killa-bund" within our trenches for so long here. There where we are, is a country of olive groves, mulberry trees, figs and blackberries (not that there is any fruit we get ~~th~~ off them at present) and I was chaffing the men about their extraordinarily good luck in now being quartered in such a beautiful "Sirkari Baghicha." I told them I thought it highly probable when the war was over that the "Sirkar" might be prepared to consider the granting to them of "Jagirs" in this part of the country, and asked how they would like to settle down here. The old Sikhs did not know quite what to say, but looked at each other and then said they did not know how they would like living among so many Turks. I told them that would be all right, as it was a matter they could easily settle for themselves by killing off all the Turks now, to which they said, though rather doubtfully, "Be-shuk."

I realise that I cannot now call on them for very




much, but they are going on all right, and I have been able to get hold of a few officers for them in curious, different ways, e.g. I found among the Australian gunners a man who had been for twelve years in the Indian Forest Department, so he has now become a 2nd Lieutenant, and is attached to the 14th Sikhs. But of all curious things, I found a "pucca" Gurkha as a full blown Australian private! He had gone over there and settled, and had enlisted for the war; he is now proving himself most useful as an interpreter for his own people.

I am so thankful to say that the water question has decidedly improved during the last few days, as my engines have been playing up, and I have been able to get water out everywhere. For a day or two it really was a case of absolute nightmare to me, for if there is one thing the Australian soldier cannot and will not do, it is to fight without water, and I was assured that unless I could get some out to them quickly when they were out on the tops of the hills after the heavy fighting, they could not hang on for more than another hour or two; so you can imagine what was the state of my feelings until we had managed to get things right by the most strenuous exertions on the part of everyone.

You would hardly believe how extraordinarily keen the men here get on sniping, and it becomes a regular competition with them. I was yesterday going round the trenches of one of the Light Horse regiments, and was pointed out a man whom they told me was a half-breed, and who sat for three weeks in the same place with a man beside him with a telescope who was relieved from time to time always keeping a lookout on the Turkish trenches and loopholes for any movement. They assured me that during this time he has actually accounted for 91 Turks, and though this number is probably exaggerated, yet his squadron commander was prepared to say he thought it pretty near the mark, as it was corroborated by the men who spotted for him from time to time.

* Before we left -



22nd August, 1915.

Lord Kitchener.

I was writing to Fitz last week, and gave him an account of our recent fighting, which he will have doubtless shown to you, and I have just heard from Wigram, and was sending him an addition to this, I think you may care to see a copy of what I wrote, so enclose it.

Sir Ian sent for me yesterday to meet him at Suvla for a conversation on future operations, and I now write rather at his request, as he asked me to tell you all that had been happening, and about things and people here generally. ~~xxxx~~

I am sure you will know how bitterly disappointed I feel at our now apparently having again to take up a defensive attitude. I personally had such a complete hope and confidence in our recent move round my left flank, for I really had thought that we were strong enough to make good the ground we wanted, namely, the high ground over Ejelmere Bay to Chunuk Bair, from which we should have been able to dominate the ^{isthmus} ~~army~~ across to Maidos. I honestly think that my own troops did their full share, and all that was expected of us, for even had we been able to remain longer on Chunuk Bair, I do not think we could, in any ~~case~~, have possibly remained there, while Ismail Oglu Tepe was not in our possession, for the whole of our back~~s~~ would have been subjected to complete reverse fire from there, while we should, of course, have been heavily shelled from our front and left flank. For the latter, I was, of course, prepared, and meant to ^{dig} bring in on the reverse slopes of the hill, but these trenches would all have been fully exposed to Ismail Oglu Tepe. If only the 9th Corps on the left had shoved along, all would have been well.

About ten days before the attack, Stopford came to see me,

when I took him up to the highest point on my left, from which a view is obtained of all the country round Suvla Bay, over which his corps had to advance. I urged upon him that his one chance of success was to follow the tactics I had done on landing here, which I again mean to try in the advance from here, namely, to rattle the Turks without giving them a moment in which to concentrate, and to advance against them with boldness on a really broad front, before they had time to make a continuous line of trenches to oppose one. I urged him to shove forward his first brigade as soon as ever it could land, and to take Yilghin Bernu Hills in rear, ~~and~~ that brigade, to be immediately followed by his other brigades at Ismail Oglu Tepe. I told him that I thought he was certain to be opposed in his landing, but that we had pretty good information here as to the numbers in front, and that I could assure him that he would not meet more than 2,000 men altogether over the whole advance, while on the promontories of Suvla Bay there would not be more than could be dealt with by a company on each side from his leading battalion. He said he did not quite like advancing with one brigade only, until he had the others on shore to support, but as I ~~told~~ said to him, he would, in any case, have their moral support, as he knew that they were landing immediately after, while his leading brigade could not get into difficulties against superior numbers before their arrival. He naturally, too, pointed out that his men had done very little night work, and that there were many difficulties in it in this strange country. I therefore suggested that as he had still a short time before him, he should have them practising every night while at Imbros, which he agreed was a good idea, and said he would carry it out, as I believe he did.

Had he actually gone on these lines, I honestly believe that he would have made good the whole of the high ground north of Anafarta Sagir within his first 24 hours. There may have been


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some landing difficulties, of which I have not heard, and, of course, I well know with ~~km~~ new troops what an enormous number of difficulties do appear, which one could so easily brush aside with seasoned and well trained troops.

However, there it is, I am afraid we have now lost the opportunity, and once having given up the element of surprise, it becomes a slow old business, I am afraid, of siege warfare. I had much hoped that De Lisle might have been able to do the trick and shove the troops forward, but, personally, I think he could only have done this by night, and as we have been having lovely moonlight I cannot help thinking that this would have been feasible. He, however, decided upon a day attack, which, I must say, the troops struck me as carrying out in a most magnificent manner, but it was open country, and they suffered very heavily from shrapnel fire, before they got near their objective, and then they came in for rifle fire as well, so they were much done up before there was any chance of getting what they wanted, and now, I understand, he means to try to get the Ismail Oglu Tepe Hills by sapping forward, which we know must be a long and tedious business, especially in that rather difficult bit of country.

I know how you will feel this and I feel most awfully sorry for Sir Ian, who naturally, also, feels it very much indeed, as we all do, for I think now we are hardly any for'rarder as regards the main objective, namely, the Dardanelles and Constantinople. With all this high ground in our possession, we should not only have been able to cut off the Turks on Khalid Bair, but would have been able to spot for the Navy, and enable them, I hoped, to sink practically everything in the Straits. Now it rather looks like a winter in this parts, unless the Turks shows signs of weakening anywhere, and giving us the chance to slip through. With all these attacks on my left, I had hoped they would have been weaker on my right and down to-wards Gaba Tepe, so have made a couple of efforts there during the last few days, but only to find all their trenches apparently fully manned, and any advance




strongly opposed.

I have, as you know, had Shaw with his 13th Division with me for these last operations. I am sorry to say he has just had to be invalided with dysentery, and I have no idea when he will return. I knew him very little before, but like him very much, and found him always most sound and of good judgement, upon which I always felt able to rely. There is, however, no disguising the fact that he really hardly professed the physical activity for a job of this sort in these hills. I find that he was badly wounded in the leg in France, which alone prevents him getting about very much, but, in addition, he is very stout, and the combination of the two quite prevented his climbing around actively, and seeing the brigadiers kept carrying out exactly what he wanted done in a way which is really necessary, if one is to get the best work done.

Please do not think that I am in any way grouching, or finding fault with others, but I really write on this subject at Sir Ian request, for it was when he was discussing things with me yesterday, that he asked me to write to you now, and specially to mention what I have done.

I do hope that all is right with you, and I so much wish I saw a prospect of our being able to finish this up and seeing you again before so very long.



Please V.P.R. +
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Orders for the attacks of August 6th and 7th.

The Army Corps issued one General Order covering all the attacks which were to be made between the afternoon of the 6th and the early morning of the 7th. These included Lone Pine in the afternoon, German Officer's Trench by the 2nd Brigade during the night; the attack of the Light Horse on the Chess Board and Baby 700 and the main attacks on the main ridge including the attack on Baby 700 from the North by General Godley's troops.

In addition to the General Order very detailed instructions were issued to the 1st Division regarding Lone Pine and German Officer's Trench and also to General ~~Godley~~ Godley concerning the rest.

Under the instructions to General Godley the detail was given him as to how his columns should be formed. For the turning movement, General Godley had his own Division, completed by the Indian Brigade and, if I remember right, two brigades of the 13th Division. The 3rd Brigade of the latter division, and one brigade of the 10th Division, were kept in the old Anzac position as the general reserve. One of the chief points in the orders was the synchronisation of the attacks on Baby 700 which I think were fixed for 5 a.m.

Another point about the orders was the communication with the Suvla landing. General Travers's column was intended to clear and safeguard the right flank of the force landing at Suvla. General Travers reached his objective in good time and opened up the lamp communication from the Damakjelic Bair ~~xx~~ with Suvla about the time which had been expected. We also sent a cable detachment towards Lala Baba as soon as it was dark, and actually established communication with Lala Baba at, I believe, about 10.30 p.m. Both these connections with the Suvla landing had been agreed upon with General Stopford some days before.


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As far as the Suvla landing is concerned, General Godley's force did its work in clearing the right flank during and after the actual landing, and there was nothing to prevent the force from Suvla coming up into line, and moving up towards 971. General Travers could get no response from the Suvla Force, which after occupying Lala Baba, dug itself in on the line of Salt Lake.



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
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1st September, 1915.


Captain The Hon. A. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O., R.N.

I am so sorry that you should have been distressed, as I know you will have been, on the subject about which you write to me, namely, the report you tell me you have heard that our men were driven off by the ships' gun fire on the morning of the 10th.

I need hardly tell you that your letter was the very first rumour I had heard of this in any way, and on receipt of this, I at once wrote to Godley whose reply I enclose, which I think speaks for itself. I, also, send you a copy of my report to Headquarters on the action that day, which, I think, speaks for itself as regards the actions of your ships, whose support, as you know, everyone in this Army Corps has always most fully appreciated and been grateful for -- I think you know that "Bacchante" has always been looked upon by us as our special Anzac patron protector and friend.

There must, of course, be misapprehension somewhere on the subject, and what I fancy must be the rumour which you mention is in regard to what happened on the morning of the 9th, to which Godley refers in his letter, and about which I also wrote to you at the time, namely, the shells which fell among the Gurkhas that morning. As I mentioned when writing, the light was very bad, and as Godley says it was one of those unfortunate incidents which invariably occur when the guns have to give close support to infantry, and I know that both here and in France many casualties have been caused in that way, and are regarded as inevitable.

The little Gurkhas, among whom one or two shells unfortunately fell, were, I am afraid, quite panic stricken at the time, and ran



down the hill in a state of terror, from which they took some time to recover, and I fear they almost certainly started the report that they had been driven down by our gunfire.

I do not think I can say more on the subject than what Godley has already written in his letter, and which, as you already know, I so fully endorse as regards not only our gratitude for your invariable help, but my knowledge that any success we may have attained here has been so enormously due to your help, which none of us are ever likely to forget.

I trust that this will put matters right, and show what the feelings of Anzac are towards you, and your ships.

