

Cover for Documents.

Nature of Enclosures.

Extracts from
ANZAC - SUVLA Evacuation File.

Notes, or Letters written.

S E C R E T.

1st December 1917.

From
G.O.C., Dardanelles Army.


To
C.G.S., G.H.Q.

Sir,

In reply to your letters G.S./Z/1, dated 25th and 26th November, I have the honour to inform you that my plans for the evacuation of the whole Peninsular are now assuming definite shape, and that I am ready to begin the Intermediate period at SUVLA and ANZAC immediately your orders are received and the necessary sea-transport collected.

2. I was in the first instance of opinion that the evacuation of SUVLA, ANZAC and HELLES should be simultaneous. Further consideration, however, has convinced me that such a scheme is impossible with existing Naval resources, and that the withdrawal from HELLES should not be started until the evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC is complete. Captains Mitchell, R.N., Captain Lambert, R.N., and the Naval Transport Officers at the various beaches who were yesterday consulted by them, are all unanimous in this opinion, and the two officers first mentioned consider that an attempt to evacuate all three beaches simultaneously might seriously jeopardise our chances of success, and there would be absolutely no reserve of sea-transport in hand.

3. Lieut.-General Davies, 8th Corps, is of opinion that owing to the recent damage to "W" beach, he could not commence the withdrawal of his troops until this damage was made good. The time required for these repairs naturally depends on the weather, but it is estimated that if work could be continuous, the beach would probably be restored to approximately its old condition in from 6 to 8 weeks.



I attach a copy of General Davies' remarks on this point, but should point out that, since receiving it, I have learnt that he is not supported in his opinion by the Naval Transport Officer at HELLES (Captain Eyres, R.N.R.), who considers that given the necessary sea transport, "W" beach could be used for an embarkation in its present state, at the rate of some 3000 men a night.

4. As regards the embarkation at SUVLA and ANZAC, both the Corps Commanders and myself are sanguine that, given ample boats and fine weather, the whole of the troops and the greater part of our guns can be embarked successfully with very little loss, and it is only in regard to the Naval difficulties that I have any apprehension.

5. As regards HELLES, it is obvious that the previous evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC will greatly increase the difficulties of evacuating the Southern Zone. Moreover, owing to the daily increasing chances of bad weather as the season progresses, we must be prepared to find it necessary to postpone the evacuation of that area for an indefinite period.

While, therefore, making all plans for the withdrawal from HELLES as soon as the evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC is completed, I consider that there should, in the meanwhile, be no diminution in the strength of the 8th Corps and no cessation of landing ammunition and supplies at Cape Helles. It will, indeed, be necessary, in the first instance, to augment the HELLES garrison by two Infantry Brigades. Owing to the greater distance of the front line trenches from the beach, compared with SUVLA and ANZAC, it will be impossible to withdraw men straight from their present positions to the boats, and the evacuation at HELLES will have to be carried out in two stages - first a contraction of our front by retiring to the ESKI line, and then the

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Final Stage, the rearmost troops eventually holding a covering position guarding Lancashire Landing and "V" beach. It is for the necessary improvements to the Eski line and the final covering position that these two Brigades are required, there being no troops available at HELLES for this work at the present time.

6. As regards the Corps Expeditionnaire des Dardanelles, I am strongly of the opinion that with the exception of a few heavy guns, the whole French force should be evacuated before the Final Stage is begun. In this way only can unity of command and absence of confusion be ensured. I would propose, therefore, to withdraw the French immediately after our retirement to the Eski Line had been effected and our position there made good.


7. With reference to para. 3 of your G.S./Z/1 of 25th ulto.

(a) A system of defensive mines is in existence at Cape Helles, and can be adapted for the required purpose in a short time. There is no such system on the second line which would have to be occupied during a withdrawal. The mining personnel is at present fully occupied in contact with the enemy.

At ANZAC the Corps Commander is hopeful that, owing to the peculiarities of the terrain, the front line may be held until the last, and that, provided the normal conditions are undisturbed, the withdrawal of the greater part of the troops may be effected without the enemy's knowledge. In certain carefully selected positions, however, the explosion of mines will be utilized to impose caution on the enemy.

At SUVLA a defensive mining system is now being organized.

(b) As regards the possibility of adopting an active offensive, a similar operation to that carried out by the 52nd Division on the 15th November is now in course



of

of preparation at CAPE HELLES. Another fortnight will be required to complete these preparations. An increase in artillery ammunition and reinforcements to replace the casualties which will be incurred will be needed. This action together with continued bombing activity, will not be inconsistent with the methods employed by the 8th Corps in the last few ~~days~~ weeks.

At ANZAC on the other hand, small advances have not been practicable, and our offensive has been confined to periodic bursts of fire activity. The Corps Commander is now attempting to accustom the enemy to spells of total quiescence followed by periods of violent fire action, in the hope that a sudden cessation of activity in the final stage will not then arouse suspicion.

The G.O.C. 9th Corps is of opinion, and I agree, that an attack on the PIMPLE, without very full artillery support, would be of greater difficulty now than formerly, and that the heavy losses incurred would not only be unjustified by the results but might embarrass the subsequent embarkation. Artillery bombardments of various portions of the enemy's line are being arranged to occupy his attention and simulate offensive preparations.

8. I attach a copy of the recommendations as regards sea transport required, which have been drawn up by my staff with the assistance of the Naval Officers you placed at my disposal and the N.T.O's at the various beaches.

9. A detailed scheme for the military side of the withdrawal, which in the case of SUVLA and ANZAC will be carried out as a combined operation under my immediate orders, will be forwarded to you later.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) W.R. BIRDWOOD,

Commanding Dardanelles Army



G.S.R./Z/48.


INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING 9th CORPS
AND AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
DANDANELLES ARMY,
10th December 1918.

1. The Cabinet has ordered the evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC to be commenced immediately.
2. The evacuation will be carried out in two stages:-
 - (a) The INTERMEDIATE STAGE, which has already commenced. This will consist of a gradual and methodical evacuation of all men, guns, and animals not required for the tactical defence of our positions during a period which it is hoped will not exceed two days, but which may, in the event of bad weather supervening, be extended to a week, or even more. As much material, stores and supplies as possible will be evacuated during the INTERMEDIATE STAGE.
 - (b) The FINAL STAGE. This will consist of the embarkation of men and guns only, and must be completed in two nights. The only personnel kept for this stage will be fighting men and medical personnel.
3. The decision as to the number of men and guns to be embarked during each stage is left to the discretion of Corps Commanders, subject only to the proviso that the number of men kept for the final stage must not exceed 20,000 at each place, this being the maximum number that can be dealt with by the Navy in two nights.
4. The allotment of ships and lighters to each corps for the INTERMEDIATE STAGE is given in Appendix "A",

This stage must be completed not later than daybreak
on the 19th December.

Afterwards
amended
to 18th
December.



Guns, war-like stores, and other material of value must be evacuated as early as possible in this stage, in order that, should the tactical situation necessitate the curtailment of this stage, the losses of valuable equipment may be by so much reduced.

The relative order of importance in which, subject to tactical considerations, guns are to be evacuated is, howitzers, heavy guns, 18 pounders, 15 pounders, 10 pounders and smaller pieces. The Commander-in-Chief directs that, if possible, all howitzers and heavy guns should be saved.


The programme of embarkation will be left entirely to Corps Commanders, who will make all necessary arrangements with their respective Naval Transport Officers. Naval Transport officers will be responsible for the allotment of troops, guns and stores to the craft at their disposal.

Corps Commanders will report daily to Army Headquarters the number of personnel, animals, guns and vehicles evacuated during the preceding night, and the units to which the personnel ~~belong~~ and guns belong.

Subsequently altered to 5. 18th & 19th.

The FINAL STAGE will take place on the 19th and 20th December. Combined Naval and Military Orders for this stage will be issued shortly.

The closest co-operation between Corps Commanders will be of the utmost importance. To assist in this object it is suggested that each Corps Commander should attach to the other Corps Headquarters a Staff Officer fully conversant with his plans. It is essential that the final withdrawal from the front line trenches at the junction of Corps should be simultaneous, at an hour to be mutually arranged by Corps Commanders.



and large mines placed ready for explosion when our rear parties are evacuating their trenches. Several such large explosions may well prevent the enemy from following up.

(d) The necessity for complete silence, especially during the final stages of the operation, must be impressed on all ranks.

(e) During daylight, lighters and small craft should ply off the beaches in the normal manner.

(f) The early evacuation of documents, records, etc.


(g) The possibility of the Turks commencing an attack and the necessity for guarding against it. Such attacks will become more and more likely as the evacuation progresses. Should the enemy develop an attack across the open, offering opportunities for the infliction of heavy casualties, a counter attack should be launched with vigour.

(h) Any small detachments of reinforcements which may be sent up in the near future should be landed in daylight, in order to give the Turks the impression that we are still landing troops.

(i) The possibility of deceiving the enemy by restricting movements by daylight on the beaches and in the open for the next few days, followed by alternate periods of activity and quiescence.

The adoption of similar methods of alternate activity and inactivity as regards night firing.

9. The Vice Admiral is arranging to have boats off the shore throughout the course of the FINAL STAGE at points where wounded or stragglers may come down to the beach.



10. Owing to damage to lighters or other unavoidable causes, a certain number of men may possibly still be on shore at daybreak after the LAST Night of the FINAL STAGE. A "KEEP" must therefore be prepared in each area, as near as possible to a practicable landing place, in which such men could maintain themselves until embarked later. This "Keep" must be provided with supplies of food, water and S.A. ammunition. It must not be used, however, until it is clear that there are no means of immediate embarkation.

11. The troops from ANZAC will be concentrated in the first instance at MUDROS and MITYLENE; those from SUVLA at MUDROS, except 15,000 for the FINAL STAGE, who will be sent to IMBROS.

9th Corps Headquarters to IMBROS; A and N Z Corps Headquarters to MUDROS.

12. The eventual distribution of troops will probably be as follows:-


11th Division)	
13th Division)	IMBROS and MUDROS
Mounted Division)	
1st Australian Div.)	
2nd Australian Div.)	MITYLENE and MUDROS
N.Z. & Australian Div.)	
1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th)	EGYPT
Aust.Lt.Horse Brigades)	
29th Division	HELLES
53rd Division)	
29th Indian Inf. Brigade)	EGYPT
Eastern Mounted Brigade)	

13. A suggested programme of evacuation of artillery has been drawn up, and is attached as Appendix "B". This programme is for guidance only, and may be varied or altered by Corps Commanders at their discretion.

14. MEDICAL. During the INTERMEDIATE STAGE the arrangements for evacuation of sick and wounded will be normal.

During the FINAL STAGE slightly wounded cases must

embark



embark with fighting troops.

Two Hospital Lighters will be provided at each beach for conveyance of badly wounded cases to hospital ships, of which there will be two at each beach.

A proportion of medical personnel, with accommodation for badly wounded cases, must remain on the Peninsular until after the evacuation has been completed, to tend such wounded as cannot embark.


Permission will be asked the following day for the medical personnel and wounded to be embarked on hospital ships.

(Sgd.) C.F. ASPINALL,

Lieut.-Colonel.

G. S.

Dardanelles Army.



S E C R E T.

Copy No. 19.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS?


12th December 1915.

DARDANELLES ARMY ORDER No. 1.

1. The FINAL STAGE of the evacuation will be carried out simultaneously at SUVLA and ANZAC on the 18th and 19th December. If unfavourable weather intervenes, further orders as to the dates will be issued by Army Headquarters.
2. The necessity for the closest co-operation between Corps on the last night has already been impressed on Corps Commanders. All the front line trenches must be held until nightfall on the last night, and the trenches at the point of junction between the two Corps must only be evacuated at an hour to be mutually arranged between Corps Commanders.

Subject to this stipulation, and to Naval considerations contained in the following paragraphs, Corps Commanders are given a free hand in their scheme of evacuation.
3. Two Captains, R.N., are being appointed to SUVLA and ANZAC respectively, to be in Naval charge of the evacuation at those places. The names of these officers will be notified later.

Commanders KITSON and MARRYAT, R.N., are appointed temporarily to the Staff of G.O.C., 9th Corps and G.O.C., A. & N. Z. Army Corps respectively.
4. The craft shown in appendix I will be assembled at the beaches, or at KEPHALOS, and will be available in time to commence operations shortly after dark on 18th December. Special steps are being taken by the Navy to ensure that no craft beyond the number usually present off the beaches are visible before nightfall.
5. At SUVLA the following beaches will be used:- "A" WEST, LITTLE WEST, KANGAROO, SOUTH PIER, and "C" BEACH.



The craft for working all these beaches will be distributed by Captain UNWIN, R.N., N.T.O., SUVLA, in consultation with Corps Commanders.

A Commander, R.N. will be appointed N.T.O. at "C" beach.

6. At ANZAC evacuation will take place from -

The beach near ASMAK DERE	MILO PIER
No. 8 Pier	WATSON'S PIER
WILLIAMS PIER	BRIGHTON BEACH

Craft for the various places will be distributed by Captain Staveley, R.N. N.T.O., ANZAC, in consultation with the Corps Commander.

G.O.C., A. & N.Z. A. Corps will arrange for shaded lights to mark the places near ASMAK DERE and BRIGHTON BEACH at which tows of boats are required.

7. The necessary additions to Military beach personnel and the necessary beach working parties will be detailed by Corps Commanders.


8. Motor Lighters, as soon as loaded with their complement of troops will be despatched to the Troop Carriers by the N.T.O's. Each Troop Carrier will proceed to her destination without further orders as soon as she has received her allotted number of men.

9. On arrival of troops at their destinations ^{on} the night 18/19th December, the Carriers must be cleared immediately as they will be required to return to the beaches for the final night.

10. All troops embarking at ANZAC during the Final Stage will be sent direct to MUDROS in the first instance.

Troops from SUVLA will be sent to IMBROS and MUDROS in the following numbers:-

1st Night	5000 to IMBROS
	5000 to MUDROS
2nd Night	10000 to IMBROS



11. The eventual distribution of the 9th and ANZAC Corps will be as follows:-

H.Q., 9th Corps)	
11th Division)	IMBROS
Mtd. Division)	
S.W. Mtd. Bde.)	
13th Division)	
29th Division)	
Suvla Details)	
H.Q., ANZAC)	MUDROS
1st Aust. Divn.)	
2nd Aust. Divn.)	
N.Z. & Aust. Divn.))	
ANZAC Details)	
53rd Division))
54th Division))
3rd Aust. Light Horse Bdes.)) EGYPT
Div. Lt. Horse & Div. Mtd. Rifle Regts.)) via
N.Z. Mounted Rifle Bde.)) MUDROS
Eastern Mtd. Bde.))
29th Indian Inf. Bde.))
Indian Mtn. Artillery Bde.))

Representatives of Divisions should at once be sent to IMBROS and MUDROS to make arrangements for their camps. This will not be necessary in the case of formations going to EGYPT.

12. It is recognized that it will be impossible to avoid sending a certain number of units and individuals, intended for IMBROS to MUDROS, and vice versa, during the Final stage. In addition to those referred to in Para. 11, representatives of divisions detailed for IMBROS must consequently be sent beforehand to MUDROS, and representatives of 9th Corps divisions detailed for Mudros must be sent to IMBROS, to arrange for the reception of these men. The necessary resorting will be carried out after the evacuation has been completed.

13. The troops embarking during the Final Stage must carry two Iron Rations, and on the first night of the Final Stage all men should embark with packs, blankets and water-proof sheets. The packs, blankets and waterproof-sheets of men embarking on the last night should be loaded into lighters during the day to be transferred to the Troop Carriers as soon as they arrive, greatcoats only being kept back. Stores of blankets are being accumulated at the ports of disembarkation, but available

numbers are necessarily insufficient for all ranks and every possible blanket must be saved.

14. A special H.M. ship (name to be given later) will be placed at the disposal of each Corps Commander on the first night of the Final Stage, and will remain at his disposal, for the accommodation of himself and necessary staff, till the end of the operation. The necessary military signal personnel to maintain independent visual communication with the shore must be detailed for these two ships by the Corps concerned.

15. The Vice Admiral, Commanding ^{Eastern} Mediterranean Squadron is arranging for the maximum Naval support to the Military operation. Details of ships allotted will be published in Naval Orders.

Requests for covering fire from these ships will only be made by the senior military officer on shore at ANZAC and SUVLA respectively, to the Senior Officer of the covering ships in his area.

Each Corps Commander should detail an officer conversant with every feature of the ground to accompany the Senior Naval officer of the supporting ships in his area to assist him in directing fire on the particular points required.


16. The following signal communications must be arranged at ANZAC and SUVLA by the corps concerned:-

(a) Senior Military officer on shore to Officer Commanding Covering Squadron.

(b) Senior Officer on shore to Corps Commander.

Every effort must be made to save all telegraph and telephonic instruments including wireless gear. Such instruments as cannot be saved must be rendered useless.

Sea cable communications must be maintained to the last possible moment. The shore end should be cut by the last signal party to embark and the traces removed, so that as much cable as possible may afterwards be salvaged.



17. Hospital accommodation for 2000 patients, together with the medical personnel required for their care, will be organized both at SUVLA and ANZAC to receive such cases as cannot be evacuated during the Final Stage.

Arrangements will be made to store in selected areas 14 days rations and water with due proportion of medical comforts, for the above number of patients.

On the last night Corps Commanders may, at their discretion withdraw such medical personnel as they consider to be in excess of requirements, should the above preparation prove to be excessive.

(Sgd.) C.F.ASPINALL,

Lieutenant-Colonel.

Issued to:-


G.O.C. 9th Corps
G.O.C. A & N Z A Corps.
Vice Admiral, E.M.S.

G.S.

Dardanelles Army.

At

2200.



GSR/Z/48.

To,
The General Officer Commanding,
9th Corps,
ANZAC.

The Army Commander wishes Corps Commanders to consider the advisability of -

(a) Arranging for chevaux-de-frise to be placed across paths along which Turks might follow up retiring troops on the final withdrawal. These could be placed at one side of the path beforehand, secured at one end, and could be fixed in position after the last troops had retired by selected men detailed to remain behind for this duty.

(b) Having packets of ammunition at various convenient places in the trenches on the last night, so that a few men might, by frequent fire from various points, create the appearance of a fully manned trench.

(c) That for two or three days together the use of periscopes in the trenches should be restricted, followed by a normal use of them for the next 48 hours.

(Sgd.) B.R. MOBERLY, Major.

for Lieut.-Colonel.


General Staff.

Army Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army.

Dardanelles Army,

13th December 1915.



S E C R E T.

G. S. R./Z/54/

Army H. Q.

14.12.15.

From the General Officer Commanding,

Dardanelles Army,

To the Chief of the General Staff,

General H. Q.

Mediterranean Force.


I have been carefully considering the requirements of the Helles garrison in the event of the Government deciding to maintain our positions there throughout the winter.

2. First as regards the immediate present, I have, as I informed you in my G. S. R./Z/49 of yesterday, agreed to take over the French line up to and including A.20 on or before the 21st December. To enable Gen. Davies to do this, I have arranged to send him the 86th Brigade of the 29th Division as soon as possible after it reaches MUDROS.

I am also anxious to form a third Brigade (of 5 battalions) for the Royal Naval Division, by brigading the Newfoundland battalion and the 4 City of London Battalions, two of which are already with the Royal Naval Division, and one each with the 86th and 87th Brigades. The City of London Battalion with the 86th Brigade will accompany that Brigade to HELLES, and a new Brigade of 3 battalions could then be formed immediately, the two remaining battalions joining up after the evacuation of Suvla has been completed. If you concur in this proposal, I would ask that Col. W. deL. Williams may be appointed to command the brigade, and that he may be sent to Helles as soon as possible. A new Brigade Major and Staff Captain will also be required.

I also propose to send the 88th Brigade to Helles as soon as it can be spared from Suvla, and this Brigade to be followed later by the 12th Division, in order to release the 42nd Division, who are greatly in need of rest.

3.




2.

3. As regards Artillery, I am of the opinion that further support will be required, in addition to retaining all the French guns and am arranging to send to Helles two batteries of 4.5 howitzers from Suvla and No. 17 6" battery and 4 inch Naval guns from Anzac, and to replace all the 15 pounder batteries by 18 pounder batteries of the 11th and 13th Divisions as soon as these become available. I hope, also, that the 9.2 howitzers may be available for the 8th Corps.

4. I am of the opinion that the only way to maintain our position, and to keep up the moral of the garrison, will be by continually acting on the offensive, and endeavouring whenever possible to gain ground from the Turks. If, therefore, the troops at Helles are to remain there throughout the winter, or even if their departure is to be delayed for some weeks, I would urge that in view of the above considerations, and in view also of the chances of bad weather, and the amount of ammunition which will be required even in a defensive role, the reserves of ammunition on the Peninsular should, with the exception of that for the heavier pieces be immediately be brought up to 1500 rounds per gun and 1000 rounds per howitzer. A statement showing the amount of ammunition required to complete this total is attached. I would also urge that very large supplies^s of bombs and grenades of all natures should be placed on the Peninsular and that the War Office be again asked to expedite the arrival of the "Stokes" mortar and trench howitzers promised in October last.

5. I understand, that, in the event of our remaining in occupation of Cape Helles, it is probable that the remaining 4000 French Infantry will be withdrawn. The total frontage of trenches to be held by our troops in these circumstances will be about 8000 yards.



Having regard to the great strength of the Turks, to the necessity of our keeping the initiative, and the equal necessity of giving our men ample rest off the Peninsular, I am of the opinion that the garrison should consist of not less than 3.25 effective rifles per yard of trench, plus 8000 effective rifles resting on the islands, and the numbers should never be allowed to drop below this figure.

I understand that the Commander-in-Chief wishes the 11th Division as well as the 13th Division eventually to form part of this garrison, and is anxious for the 29th and some of the Territorials to be withdrawn. I agree as to the necessity for this, but I think that the 29th Division should be available to return there when rested, unless its place can be taken by another Division. The Corps Commander considers that at least one Division of regular troops is essential, and I agree ~~with~~ ^{with} him.

The Territorial Division at Helles must in need of a thorough rest is the 42nd Division, and I should like to withdraw this Division for a month at the earliest possible date. The 52nd Division also needs a rest, but is in far better fettle than the 42nd, and can afford to wait. The same remark applies to the R.N.D.

6. I would propose, therefore, that in the event of our retaining Helles the garrison should be as follows:-

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Present effective strength</u>
11th Division	9500 rifles
13th "	8500 "
52nd " (one Bde. resting)	5000 "
R.N. " " "	5000 "
City of London Bde, & Newfoundland Battn.	1700 "
42nd Division (resting)	4100 "
Drafts now available for 11th, & 13th Divisions.	<u>5000</u> "
	<u>38,800</u> "



This total is slightly larger than necessary, but does not allow for casualties during the forthcoming operations.

7. I would point out that the increase to the garrison of Cape Helles will necessitate an increase of transport, which has lately been cut down to meet present needs.


8. It will also be advisable to land large quantities of supplies and I would recommend that an endeavour should be made to build up a reserve for 60 days for the number of troops and animals authorised. An increase of Turkish artillery may be expected to mean increased difficulties in landing and we must anticipate many days and nights in the future when work on the beaches will be impossible.

9. There will be an increased necessity for mining, and further tunnelling companies will be required. I have to-day written to you on this subject on another file, asking for 2 more companies, so as to make up a total of one per division at present on the Helles front here. If and when we take over the remaining French trenches, a fourth company may possibly be required.

10. In conclusion I would again urge that if we are to maintain our position at Helles we must do everything to maintain an offensive role, and that the three essentials for this course are a regular flow of drafts, regular periods of rest for the troops and a plentiful supply of ammunition.

(Sgd.) W.R. BIRDWOOD,
Lt.-General.

Commanding Dardanelles Army.



S E C R E T.

G. S. R. Z/48.

Army Headquarters.

17th December 1916.

From
THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
DARDANELLES ARMY


To
THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

1. In continuation of my instructions to Corps Commanders dated 10th December and my Army Order No. 1 dated 12th December, copies of which have already been sent to you, I now beg to enclose copies of further written instructions which I have sent to the General Officers Commanding at SUVLA and ANZAC. I also enclose copies of 9th Corps and ANZAC operation orders, together with my comments thereon, and a copy of instructions issued by the O.C., R.N.A.S. at my request.

2. In addition to the orders and instructions issued to Corps Commanders, I have, in the course of my daily visits to ANZAC and SUVLA, discussed and given orders regarding numerous details in connection with the tactical and administrative sides of the evacuation. In particular I have laid down the principle that the withdrawal of guns should be carried out by removing first a section, leaving with the remaining section a double supply of ammunition, and then by withdrawing one gun from each section, allowing four times the normal number of rounds to the last gun.

I have ordered cover to be placed over all emplacements unoccupied, so that the withdrawal of guns may not be

noticed



noticed by hostile aeroplanes, and have given special instructions with regard to devices for deceiving the enemy and for hindering his advance, should he endeavour to follow up our retirement, by means of mines, wiring, and chevaux-de-frises.

3. The general plan on which the withdrawal is to be carried out is as follows:-

If the weather remains favourable the Intermediate Stage will have been completed by daybreak on the 18th December. At this time there will remain on the Peninsular -

At SUVLA	20,500 men	34 guns
At ANZAC	19,940 men	"

Each Corps will embark half the above number of men, and, if possible, a proportion of the guns, on the first night of the Final Stage. On both nights the withdrawal will be effected by a gradual reduction of strength all along the line, the troops left behind spreading out to cover the whole of the present front occupied by their units and all existing communications being maintained till the last. The guiding principle is that the front line trenches must continue to be held until the last night, and particular stress has been laid on the necessity for the final evacuation of the trenches at the point of junction between Corps being simultaneous, at an hour to be mutually arranged between Corps Commanders. Corps Commanders have arranged that the hour should be 0130 on 20th inst.

The withdrawal of troops at ANZAC will be carried out in one movement, direct from the trenches to the boats, with the exception that the embarkation of the final parties on the last night will be covered by selected men holding intermediate positions covering the beach.

At SUVLA, owing to the greater distance of the trenches from the piers the procedure will be slightly


3358 different

different, and two distinct second line defensive areas have been arranged, one extending from through Hill 10 to the SALT Lake, and the other from the SLAT LAKE to the sea at point , and including the LALA BABA defences. The first mentioned area (Reserve area "A") has been placed under command of Major-General FANSHAW and the second area (Reserve Area "B") under Major-General MAUDE.

The troops from the front line trenches will gradually be withdrawn into these areas and thence to Forming Up Places, and though the front line trenches are ^{till} to be held/~~to~~ the last moment, the second line positions will be available for a strong defence, covering the beaches, in the event of the Final Retirement being followed up. It is hoped, however, that by keeping a few men in the front trenches till the last, and by continuing the normal routine of sniping and bombing, the enemy will not become aware of our intentions in time to organize a strong attack.

4. Arrangements have been made for saving as many as possible of the guns left for the final stage, but this will only be attempted when it is found that it can be done without jepordising the embarkation of troops.

I should point out that the Naval Orders have now been brought into line with the Military Orders in this respect. When the Naval and Military Orders were being drafted here they were identical on this point, but the Naval Orders were subsequently taken to MUDROS to be printed, and the paragraph relating to the embarkation of guns in the Final Stage was cancelled without reference to me. On the matter being pointed out to the Admiral, however, he at once gave orders for the missing paragraph to be reinserted.



5. The Vice Admiral has arranged for the maximum possible naval support to the operations, vide Naval General Orders, copies of which have been sent to you direct.

6. I have already informed you in another communication steps have been taken to prevent the leakage of information in IMBROS and the Vice Admiral ~~ga~~ has arranged to prevent any neutral craft arriving at or leaving the island until the conclusion of the operations.

7. In order to distract attention from the Northern Zone, and at the same time to improve slightly the situation at HELLES, I have arranged for a small offensive operation to be undertaken by the 8th Corps, in the "G" trenches, in the area now occupied by the 52nd Division. This operation will take place on the 19th, and I enclose for your information a letter which I have addressed to the Vice Admiral on this subject.

8. I propose to be at SUVLA during the day of the 18th and at ANZAC during the day of the 19th, night of 18-19th on board a destroyer off the coast, and on the night 19-20th I shall be with the Vice Admiral on board H.M.S. "CHATHAM".

Reports during the last night will be sent to me via my headquarters at IMBROS.

(Sgd.) W. R. BIRDWOOD,

Lieutenant-General.

Commanding Dardanelles Army.



Special precautions at IMBROS to prevent leakage of information.

1. On morning of 14th G.S.O.(I) spoke to Capt, Mitchell, R.N. (Naval Adviser) suggesting a special watch should be kept on the coast of IMBROS to prevent the unauthorised passage of boats to and from the island.

A wire was also sent to G.H.Q. suggesting the steamer due that night at CASTRO should be prevented calling (small pox proposed as a reason) during week 14th to 21st.

On the afternoon of 14th V.A. telegraphed that, until further orders, no steamers or sailing boats belonging to Neutral Countries were to be permitted to leave or approach the island of IMBROS.

2. On 14th orders were issued by O.C. Advanced Base prohibiting all persons passing in or out of the Military Zone, on account of an outbreak of small pox in the interior of the island.

3. In view of the above the civil guards in various posts in the interior were reinforced.

4. An Intelligence Officer was sent to supervise matters at S.PYRGOS.

5. Extra secret agents both inside the Military Zone and in the island have been employed.

6. The Sub-Governor of IMBROS has been told that, owing to repairs to the telephone, it is impossible to telephone to MUDROS for a few days.

The above are the measures that have been taken.

With no form of barrier between the Military Zone and the rest of the island, although the cordon may be strengthened, yet it is impossible to make certain that no person passes through.

A.H.Q.,
Dardanelles Army.

(Sgd.) S. S. BUTLER,
Major.
G.S.O. (I).

