

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/6/6 Part 7

Title: General Staff, General
Headquarters, Egyptian
Expeditionary Force

September 1916



AWM4-1/6/6PART7

From Egypforce.
To Troopers.

app B

A.M. 1057 cipher. 21/9/16. Desp. 1020.

Your 13806 Code Q.M.G.S. H. of 14th.

Cannot possibly spare the 5 Railway Transport Officers in
EGYPT on SALONICA Establishment. Urge nevertheless that the
two remaining traffic officers from ENGLAND be sent to SALONICA.

Copies to :-

O.(a).

O.(b).

C.G.S.

A.

Q.

A.M.S.


Filed G.S. 81/1.

G.S. Cables.

W.D.



WJ
amp C
Officer Commanding,
Imperial Camel Corps.



242

With reference to your 1136/16 of 17th September, the proposed provisional formation of the Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, Imperial Camel Corps, is noted. It is not, however, proposed to proceed with the formation of this battalion for the present.

With regard to your telegram G.487 of 20th September, recommending Sergt. Steight to succeed Lieut. Pople as signalling officer with headquarters No. 1 Battalion, Imperial Camel Corps, owing to the time which it will take for this N.C.O. to get his commission, this appointment is not considered suitable. You should therefore forward a further recommendation of an officer who can take up the appointment forthwith.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.,
21/9/16.

Sgt C.F. Perkins
major
for Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

Copy to D.A.B.

SECRET.

G.S.Z/58.



21st September 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 2. Section.

With reference to your G.Z/75 of 14th September, the attached paper from General Officer Commanding No. 3. Section, together with reply thereto from this office, is forwarded for your information.

Any further correspondence with No. 3. Section on this subject, which may arise from time to time, will of course be passed to you.

(sdy) H. Lynden-Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.



244
O/119.

No. 3 Section, Canal Defences,

15th September, 1916.

O.G.S.,
G.H.Q.

1. In view of the possibility of an enemy advance against the Canal by either the northern or the central route, and in order to facilitate co-operation between No.3 Section and No.2 Section in the event of our assumption of the offensive, it would appear desirable to consider measures which would facilitate combined action in these Sections.
2. An enemy offensive would probably be directed either against No. 3 Section and No. 2 Section simultaneously, or against one of these Sections in strength while a containing force operated against the other.
3. This would involve either the movement of a considerable force from No. 3 Section to attack the northern flank of an enemy advancing against ISMAILIA, or the movement of, say, the equivalent of a Division north-eastward from No.2 Section, against the southern flank of an enemy advancing against our force in No. 3 Section.
4. In the first case, assuming a simultaneous advance by the enemy on the northern and central lines, with his main strength on the latter, it might be necessary to despatch a considerable force southwards from No.3 Section. To hold the enemy's secondary force on the EL ARISH or MAGHARA - QATIA roads would almost certainly necessitate leaving in No. 3 Section at least a Division with one or two Light Horse Brigades. In certain circumstances, however, it might be necessary and possible to send south a division with two or three Light Horse Brigades, and camelry.
5. (a) The most suitable line of bases from which to operate southward from No. 3 Section would seem clearly indicated as MAGEIBRA, HOD ABU SIMARA, BIR EL MAHADAT, EL FERDAN railhead.
MAGEIBRA has a good supply of water. SIMARA has good water, and the HOD EL ARAS pipeline is now within 4 miles; this pipeline should, it is suggested, be carried on to SIMARA. BIR EL MAHADAT is 7 miles distance from EL FERDAN railhead, and a pipe could presumably be run out to this point.
(b) From MAGEIBRA the mounted troops could operate directly south-west, changing their base as might be necessary from MAGEIBRA to SIMARA or MAHADAT. Preparations should therefore be made for watering 3 Light Horse Brigades, and perhaps Camel Corps units, at MAGEIBRA at any time - up to say, 7,500 gallons a day for men, assuming that the water is fit for men to drink, and 75,000 gallons for horses. Facilities should be installed and maintained for watering a large mounted force quickly.
(c) Otherwise the mounted troops might be required to move west from MAGEIBRA, and to operate from SIMARA. From SIMARA to EL TASSA on the ISMAILIA Road is 20 miles. Water for at least three days would have to be available, with water convoys working from SIMARA. The infantry would more conveniently operate from MAHADAT (only 13 miles from EL TASSA) but one brigade might be required in support of the mounted troops at SIMARA, and one or two brigades might have to pass through SIMARA (on their way to MAHADAT) while the mounted troops were there. Thus there should be a piped water delivery of 20,000 gallons a day for men; storage for 3 days,

/say

say, 60,000 gallons; and it should be made possible to supply with water up to 8,000 animals for three days in succession.

(d) At MAHADAT it might be necessary to base a whole Division or a Division less one Brigade ~~with~~ and with Light Horse Brigade. There should therefore be a piped water delivery of 25,000 gallons a day; storage for three days' water for men, i.e. 75,000 gallons; and it should be made possible to supply with water horses for three days in succession up to 4,000.

(e) If the above provision were made, and provided that sufficient camel transport were available, it would be possible, should the occasion arise and should the situation in No.3 Section permit, to bring a complete Division with a considerable mounted force on to the flank of an enemy attacking No.2 Section. This force could operate from bases at MAHADAT and EL FERDAN railhead, up to a line 15 to 18 miles south or south-east of the line BIR EL MAHADAT - BIR EL HUDA.

6. To facilitate the movement of troops preparatory to such an operation as is outlined above, it would be of the utmost advantage to mark beforehand certain routes, and to improve them by laying brushwood tracks where necessary - or at least in all the worst stretches.

The routes suggested (in addition to the GILBAN - ROMANI - NEGILIAT - EL ABD road and the DUEIDAR - NUSS - ROMANI road, already under construction or arranged for) are

- (1) NEGILIAT - MAGEIBRA - SIMARA - MAHADAT.
- (2) NUSS - SIMARA.
- (3) NUSS - HAMISAH - railway about RABAH.
- (4) DUEIDAR - SIMARA.

The total length of these four roads is 60 miles.

These routes will form a system of main roads. In addition, it will be necessary to construct lateral and radial communications over the BIR EL ABD position in order to enable a system of mobile offensive-defence to be organised.

7. Assuming the enemy's main strength to be on the northern line of operation, the above arrangements would greatly facilitate cooperation with No.3 Section from No.2 Section, if - as has already happened - it became necessary to reinforce No.3 Section by moving up a division or its equivalent. The movement of troops direct to MAHADAT - SIMARA - MAGEIBRA, or MAHADAT - SIMARA - ROMANI, would be practicable. From SIMARA - MAGEIBRA (either or both) it would be possible to operate most effectively against the flank of an enemy aiming via the southern flank of No.3 Section or from MAGHARA, against our communications anywhere between QANTARA and RAILHRAD.

8. It is suggested, therefore, that the question of putting in hand arrangements to ensure the water-supply required at MAHADAT, SIMARA and MAGEIBRA should now be taken up; and that the necessary reconnaissances should be made with a view to marking out the routes roughly shown on the attached plan and reporting what would be required to facilitate to a reasonable extent the movement of troops by those routes.

(Signed) H.A. Lawrence.

Lieutenant-General,
Commanding No. 3. Section.

SECRET

W.D.

246

G.S.Z/58.

20th. September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,

No. 3 Section.



1. With reference to your O/119 of September 15th., the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs in the preparation of a series of alternative bases on the lines you suggest, with a view to facilitating co-operation between Nos. 2 and 3 Sections.

In this connection a copy of a paper submitted by the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section, showing the progress in water development already made (or anticipated in the near future) is forwarded for your information.

2. As regards MAGHIBRA, at present a supply of 60,000 gallons per day is obtainable, and when this has been increased, as contemplated in General Dallas' scheme, to 100,000 gallons, the requirements estimated in your proposals (82,500 gallons per day) should be fully met.

3. As regards HOD ABU SIMARA, it will be seen that the water resources at BADA and JEFFEIR have already been developed to produce a daily supply of 136,000 and 92,000 gallons respectively, and as both these localities are within 3-4 miles of ABU SIMARA (and South of that place), it is considered that they offer at least equally, if not more, favourable bases than would the latter, which it would therefore appear unnecessary to develop. It might, however, still be desirable to extend the pipe line from EL ARAIS to HOD ABU SIMARA in order to create a supplementary fresh water supply at that place in the event of prolonged operations, but this point may, for the present, be regarded as of secondary importance and the decision may be left till later.

4. BIR MAHADAT (19,000 gallons) still calls for considerable further development, but when this has reached a daily supply

/or

of 50,000 gallons it will come near to your estimate of 65,000, and could probably be worked up to that amount without difficulty. Failing this, it could be supplemented by an extension of the pipe line from FERDAN Railhead.

5. In addition to the above, it will be seen that the wells at BAYOUD have now been developed to produce approximately 50,000 gallons per day, and that the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section anticipates shortly doubling this amount.

6. The quality of the water obtained from sources referred to in paras. 2, 3, 4 and 5 appears to be entirely satisfactory. Troops drinking it show an average daily sick rate of less than 2% - and even this small percentage is in no way traceable to the quality of the water.

7. As regards improvement of internal communications in No. 3 Section to facilitate the movement of troops preparatory to such an operation as that outlined in your paper, the Commander-in-Chief approves of the construction of light brush-wood roads on the lines you suggest, though some slight modification will, of course, be necessary in order to bring BADA and JAFFEIR into the system, if the substitution of these places for ABU SIMARA is agreed to. In view of the stage already arrived at in the development of water resources, improvement in road communications should be taken in hand without delay.

8. Will you accordingly reconsider your suggestions in the light of the work already carried out, and state what further development of water supply, if any, beyond that already contemplated by the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section, you consider necessary, in order that steps may be taken to put in hand the necessary work without delay.

Copies of your paper and of this letter have been forwarded to G.O.C. No. 2 Section

Edw. Lynden Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.

Headquarters, 248
No.2.Section.
No. G. Z. 73.

General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

In accordance with instructions received in General Headquarters memorandum No. G.S. Z/58 dated 14th August and G.S. 517/8 dated 22nd August and 3rd September 1916, the development of the water supply on the line MAHADAT - BADA - JAFFEIR - MAGEIBRA - BAYOUD has been pushed on as quickly as possible and the situation is now as follows :-

	Number of wells completed	Yield in gallons per 24 hours	Additional wells in hand	Depth at which water is obtained.
MAHADAT.	7.	19,000		
BADA.	16.	136,000	1.	9' 6".
JAFFEIR.	7.	92,000	1.	15'
MAGEIBRA	10.	60,000	2.	
BAYOUD.	15.	46,000	3.	14' 6"

It is intended to still further develop the MAHADAT supply but it was left for the moment as not of such great importance as the remainder.

A report received on the 12th instant is to the effect that a new well just completed at BAYOUD has given better water than the others which have been constructed. The water from this group is slightly sulphurous but camels and horses drink it freely. Very good drinking water is, however, obtainable from a well at GAMAL which yields 500 gallons an hour. The troops at BAYOUD have been using this supply for some time.

2. (a) It is proposed to aim at minimum of 100,000 gallons for JAFFEIR, MAGEIBRA and BAYOUD.
- (b) BADA is already sufficiently developed.
- (c) 50,000 gallons should be sufficient for MAHADAT owing to its proximity to FERDAN.
- (d) Although my instructions did not include the development of the supply at GAMAL, I propose to work on it as soon as possible up to a limit of 50,000 gallons which should be ample if BAYOUD water is used for animals.

3. General Headquarters instructions to the effect that "Well Units" will provide their own pumps and troughs are understood but it has been necessary to provide a certain number of both as this Division has as yet no "Water Units," and the water had to be stored for the use of the Mobile Column and convoys.

Some storage is also essential if a large force is to be watered quickly.

Each group of wells is therefore fitted or being fitted out with a minimum of 100 feet run of troughing and with two pumps of the "Dando" pattern or "Becks Trench Pump".

Troops arriving at the wells will supplement both with the equipment of their "Water Units".

4. Will you please inform me if these proposals are approved.

ISMAILIA.

14/9/16.

(Signed) A.G. Dallas,

Major-General,

Commanding, No. 2 Section, Canal Defence

W D A

From :- A.H.Q. - SALONICA.

To :- LONDON, repeated G.H.Q. EGYPT.

SECRET

G.O. 778. cipher.

21/9/16.
22/9/16.Desp. 2320.
Recd. 0615.
Decd. 0645.

DOIRAN Front. Enemy trenches bombarded and were cut at points to-day. Enemy's artillery retaliated with vigour.

STRUMA Front. Air reconnaissances report normal movement. Navy shelled enemy near NBOHORI with satisfactory results.

On FLORINA Front. Fighting continues on line of river BROD to West of FLORINA.

Copies to :-

O(a).
O(b).
C-in-C.
C.G.S.
I.
A.Q.
M.G.R.A.
E-in-C.
D.A.E.
Filed G.S. Z/c.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.

WD B
SECRET

From :- Troopers.

To :- Eypforce, repeated Salonica,

251

23088. cipher.

21/9/16.
22/9/16.

Desp. 2140.
Recd. 0615.
Decd. 0630.

In view of the operations now in progress in MACEDONIA, it has been decided that the army in SALONICA shall not in future be under the control of the G.O.C.-in-C. EGYPT for administrative purposes. ALEXANDRIA will, however, remain the principle base for all forces in the MEDITERRANEAN and Near East, and all demands for the SALONICA Army will be made through G.H.Q. EGYPT so as to avoid reference to War Office in cases where they can be met from ALEXANDRIA. Reinforcements, munitions and stores provided for the SALONICA Army from sources outside EGYPT will be sent direct to SALONICA ^{So} as far as shipping arrangements permit. G.O.C. SALONICA to report what additional staff and administrative personnel if any are required for the SALONICA Base.

Copies to :-
O(a).
O(b).
C-in-C.
G.G.S.
I.
A.
Q.
M.G.R .A.
E-in-C.
D.A.S.
A.M.S.

Filed G.S. Z/s.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



From:- General Staff, DAR ES SALAAM.

To :- EGYPTFORGE, SUEZ.

G.O.F. 1203

22nd
22/9/16.

Desp. 1650.
Recd. 2215.

Reference your A.M.910 of 26th August.

Distribution R.F.C. units as follows:-

Naval Wing: No. 7. Squadron headquarters KILOSSA, Aircraft
Park DAR ES SALAAM.

Military Wing: Aircraft Park MNUYUNI, Advanced Aircraft Park
KOROGWE in route to MOROGORO. A.B. and C. Flights and Head-
quarters MOROGORO. Preparing for movement Aircraft Park to
DAR ES SALAAM.

Copies to:- O(a)
O(b)
C.G.S.
I
R.F.C.
Filed:- G.E.Z/64
" Cables
W.D.

WD

App A

From A.H.Q., SALONIKA.
To LONDON, repeated EGYPT.

SECRET

G.O. 786 cipher.

22/9/18.
23/9/18.

Desp. 2230.
Recd. 0615.
Decd. 0655.

DOIRAN front: We raided and bombed enemy's trenches at 3 points last night. They were all found strongly held.

STRUMA front: Today strong patrol raided enemy's trenches near KOMARJAN, killing 6 Bulgarians and wounding several more. Weather conditions unfavourable to aircraft.

In FLORINA region fighting continues.

Yesterday Naval aircraft successfully bombed enemy transport near DRAMA.

Copies to :-

O.(a).
O.(b).
C.-in-C.
C.G.S.
I.
A.

Q.
M.G.R.A.
E.-in-C.
D.A.S.
Filed G.S. Z/s.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



From General Milne, SALONIKA.
Addressed LONDON, repeated EGYPT.

Am B.

254

G.C. 782 cipher.

22/9/18.
23/9/18.

Desp. 1900.
Recd. 0615.
Decd. 0645.

Your 23088

Since assuming command of this Army I have furnished G.H.Q. E.E.F. EGYPT with monthly report of operations and am now preparing in addition despatches with list of recommendations for period since General Mahon left to end of September. Please inform me whether this report should be sent direct to you and whether previous despatches of General Mahon and my recommendations which have been forwarded to EGYPT on June 7th last will appear in Gazette, as their early publication would naturally assist me in my recommendations.

Copies to :-

O.(a).
O.(b).
G.-in-C.
G.G.S.

A.M.S.
I.
Filed G.S. Z/62/5.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



NP
From :- G.H.Q.

To :- H o. 3 Section.
Camels, ABBASSIA.

O.A.B. 151.

23/9/16.

255
Desp. 1250.

Section Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery will move from KANTARA to ABBASSIA as soon as train arrangements can be made. Please wire marching-out states to D.Q.H.Q., G.H.Q., who will communicate all details of move. Addressed H o. 3 Section repeated ABBASSIA.

Copies to :- O(a).
O(b).
C.G.S.
Q.
A.
M.G.R.A.
I.
D.A.S.

Filed G.S. 223.
G.S. Cables.
W.D.



WA
From:- Ho. 3. Section.

To :- G.H.Q.

H.Q. 1766

23/9/16

Desp. 1523.
Recd. 1535.

Bikanir Camel Corps of this section move to ISMAILIA by march route, leaving KANTARA 1600 on 24th instant. Marching out state as follows:- 1 British Officer, 6 Indian Officers, 225 Other Ranks, 53 Followers, 280 Riding Camels. Addressed G.H.Q. repeated O.C. Bikanir FERRY POST.

Copies to:- O(a)
O(b)

Filed:- Q
A
G.S. 137/1
Cables
W.D.



SECRET.

SECRET



From:- EGYPTFORCE.

To :- TROOPERS.

A.M.1066 cipher

23/9/16.

Desp. 1955.

Your 21158 cipher A.O.1. Weekly returns R.F.C :-

(a) EGYPT. 5th Wing 29.
20th Reserve Wing 14.
X Aircraft Depot Nil.

SALONICA. 14.

EAST AFRICA. 11.

MESOPOTAMIA. 16.

(b) EGYPT. 5th Wing 10.
20th Reserve Wing 3.
X Aircraft Depot Nil.

SALONICA. 3.

EAST AFRICA. 4.

MESOPOTAMIA. 2.

(c) EGYPT. Serviceable. Unserviceable. Not Erected.
(including not erected)

5th Wing.

B.E.2.C.	11.	23.	nil.
Bristol Scouts	2.	5.	nil.
De Havilland	1.	3.	nil.
Martinsyde	nil.	5.	4.

20th Reserve Wing.

Martinsyde	nil.	1.	nil.
Maurice Farman	3.	3.	nil.
Avro	3.	6.	5.
B.E.2.C.	2.	5.	4.
bCaudron	3.	3.	3.
Bristol Scouts	nil.	1.	nil.
Curtis	nil.	4.	4.

X Aircraft Depot.

B.E.2.C.	nil.	12.	10.
Maurice Farman	nil.	4.	4.
Avro	nil.	4.	4.

SALONICA.

B.E.2.C.	9.	3.	6. (*)
Bristol Scouts	2.	1.	nil. (4)
De Havilland	nil.	2.	nil. (*)

EAST AFRICA.

B.E.2.C.	3.	3.	nil.
Steel Henri Farman	4.	3.	3.

MESOPOTAMIA

B.E.2.C.	15.	11.	7.
Maurice Farman	2.	5.	nil.
Voisin	nil.	2.	nil.
Henri Farman	4.	1.	2.
Martinsyde	nil.	3.	3.

Copies to:- O(a) A.

O(b)

C.G.S.

I.

Filed:- G.S.104/3

W.D. cables

(*) excludes 2 Betucis in transit from X.A.D. for 17 squadrons

257

SECRET

From:- CHIEF EGYPTFORC.

To:- CHIEF LONDON.

A.M. 1067. cipher.

23/9/18

Despd. 2135.
2135.

EVENING REPORT. All well. One of our Motor Car Patrols operating 150 miles from WADI WATHUN has captured a party of the enemy with camels 30 miles North of BAHARIA Oasis. On the camels were found a number of bombs and Mauser pistols and some gelignite. A large quantity of correspondence addressed to various persons in EGYPT was also discovered and is now being examined.

Copies to:-
O(a). I.
O(b). A.
C.-in-C. Q.
C.G.S. M.C.E.A.
E.-in-C.
D.A.S.
A.M.S.
Col. Vitale.
Filed G.S. Z/29. G.S. Cables W.D.

GENERAL STAFF (OPERATIONS)
Q.H.Q. EGYPTIAN EXPED. FORCE

WAD
G
amp
258
GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS
O.S. 8/10/
1
2
3
4
5
6
EGYPTIAN EXPED. FORCE

General Officer Commanding,

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Sections,
Western Frontier Force,
School of Instruction,
Inspector General of Communications.

A question has recently arisen regarding the application of Army Order 167, of 1916, to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. In view of the latitude allowed in the amendment to the "Instructions for Signalling between the Navy and Army", issued with Army Orders of the 1st August, 1915, which states "The use of the semaphore as a system of inter-communication between the Navy and Army may be retained, if desired by the local Naval and Military Authorities, where this system is now in vogue.", the Commander-in-Chief has decided that the units of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force will continue to be instructed in semaphore signalling as heretofore.

G.H.Q.,
23/9/16.

Sgt C.F. Perkins
major
Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to D.A.S.



RD

apv H

259

Secretary,
War Office,
LONDON. S.W.

23rd
22nd September 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit for the approval of the Army Council a proposed Establishment (attached) for the Carrier Pigeon Service in EGYPT and SALONIKA.

This branch of the Signal Service, which has been rapidly developed, is proving of much value.

There are at present 11 lofts in EGYPT and 4 in SALONIKA, but no establishment has yet been provided for their management (except that of the Western Frontier Force....Vide 121/Mediterranean/944) and I consider it desirable that this Service should now be placed on an authorized footing.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Sgd A. Lynden Bell

M. C. C. S.

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to:-

*A
DAS*

PIGEON SECTION. (11 lofts.)

(EGYPT)

War Establishment.

DETAIL.	Staff Sergts. and Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Total.	Remarks.
Sergeants	2	-	2	
Corporals	-	7	7	
Pioneers or Privates	-	14*	14	* Includes 2 Lance- Corporals.
TOTAL.	2	21	23	

NOTE : In the event of more lofts being found necessary, the above establishment may be increased by 1 Corporal and 1 Pioneer for each additional loft.

PIGEON SECTION. (4 lofts).
(SALONICA.)

War Establishment.

DETAIL.	Staff Sergts. and Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Total.	Remarks.
Sergeants	1	-	1	
Corporals	-	4	4	
Pioneers or Privates	-	4*	4	* Includes 1 Lance- Corporal.
TOTAL.	1	8	9	

NOTE : In the event of more lofts being found necessary, the above establishment may be increased by 1 Corporal and 1 Pioneer for each additional loft.

W.D.

App

I



General Officer Commanding,

New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade.

It has been decided to increase the Imperial Camel Corps by the formation of one more company.

With a view to ensuring a thoroughly reliable and efficient unit, and, on the strong recommendation of the Commandant, Imperial Camel Corps, which he fully endorses, the Commander-in-Chief is particularly anxious that this company should be formed from available reinforcement personnel of your Brigade.

The Commander-in-Chief would be glad to hear your views on the feasibility of this suggestion.

(Signed) A. Lynden Bell.

G. H. Q.
23/9/16.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to:-

No. 3. Section,
Anzac Mounted Division
A



263

No. 997.259.
=====

20th September 1916.

General Sir A.J.Murray, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.,
Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
General Headquarters,
I S M A I L I A.

Sir,

EXTENSION OF THE KARGEH OASES RAILWAY.

I have the honour to report that the main reasons for not prolonging the railway beyond a point 30 kilometres west of KARGEH to a point 70 kilometres west of KARGEH are :-

- (1) That it cannot be done in a reasonable time.
- (2) That the weak link in the chain, the section between the Nile Valley and the Kargeh Oasis, will be overstrained by it. In my opinion, a 2' 6" gauge railway which is by no means new, which is 195 kilometres long with only 4 engines and 24 wagons cannot be relied upon with any security to feed a force in Kargeh using 300 tons a week, carry three miles of railway material weekly, accumulate a reserve of supplies for a much larger force, and carry a considerable number of troops backwards and forwards all at once. The rolling stock is getting worn, there are not many spare parts left in the country and such things are becoming hard to get elsewhere. The Kargeh Oasis presumably must be held, even after the Dakhla expedition, so that it would be as well not to risk crippling the line entirely. This is the main reason for not trying to get more work out of the existing material trains by unloading them immediately on arrival at Kargeh instead of letting them wait while their load of rails etc., is laid.

More rolling stock of this pattern does not exist in Egypt, nor does its air brake. Quotations for rolling stock from outside Egypt are very vague: firms object to giving any guarantee of time of delivery, but about ten months seems to be the average.

/The

The necessity for better rolling stock than ordinary light lines use and the continuous brake arises from the steep and crooked section of the line on the escarpment leading down to Kargeh Oasis. It is possible that if really first rate engine-drivers and heavier engines were available, something might be done in the way of running some extra smaller trains trusting to the engine brake only but, with Egyptian drivers, I think this would be certain to cause accidents: they are quite unused to heavy gradients and are very bad at negotiating them.

There is one engine that I know of in Egypt which might be used to work a train down the escarpment with the engine brake only if an Englishman is put on it. It belongs to the Fayoum Light Railway and they say they cannot spare it without upsetting their arrangements for troops in the Fayoum Province. If these troops could be reduced in numbers, perhaps they could spare it. If this engine was obtained and some more wagons to go with it, another 1000 metres of line could be laid weekly and perhaps even 1,500. This would mean that, if the existing stock is still worked at full pressure and nothing fails, the extension of 70 kilometres west of Kargeh could be finished in 75 days' time from the date of completion of repairs to the stock damaged in the recent accident, say, by December 12th. We might finish a little earlier, but it is not safe to rely on it.

I do not advise continuing to run the existing stock at full pressure for the reasons given above: the future requires consideration.

The point 30 kilometres west of Kargeh could be reached in about 20 days from the date of completion of repairs to rolling stock if there are no further accidents.

There are several minor reasons against continuing the extension west of Kargeh. The difficulty of laying two

/ lines

lines at a considerable distance from any base and with old materials is perhaps greater than is generally appreciated.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) G.V.Macauley.

SECRET *W.D. amp L.*

G.S. 2428/2.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.



With reference to your S.R. 20/8 of September 18th, the attached copy of a further report from Sir G. Macaulay is forwarded for your information. Under the circumstances it has been decided not to attempt an extension of the line beyond Kilometre 30, west of KHARGA, at all events for the present.

(sdy A. J. Widen Bell)

G.H.Q.,
22/9/16.
27

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



M
W.D.

269

23rd September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.

In continuation of G.S. Z/28/2 of 23rd inst., in view of the fact that Railhead cannot, in present circumstances, be carried beyond Kilometre 30 west of KHARGA, it seems worth considering whether it would be possible to supply water beyond that point to an advanced base by pipe-line, provided that the necessary plant and pipes could be made available. This ^{scheme} will, of course, largely depend upon the success or otherwise of water boring tests in the neighbourhood of Railhead, but the Commander-in-Chief would like you to consider the proposal and forward your views as to its feasibility as soon as possible.

(s) A. Lyden Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

WD
SECRET
From Chief, Egyptforce.

To Chief, LONDON.

268
SECRET

A.M. 1068 cipher.

23/9/16.

Desp. 2220.

EL MAZAR has been evacuated as the result of our successful attack on the 17th.

It is evident that the enemy dare not push forward any detachments within striking distance of our mounted troops in the SINAI peninsula. This does not imply any lessening of the enemy's forces available for an attack on the Canal, but rather to a concentration at EL ARISH, which he is now strongly fortifying, apparently as a pivot of manoeuvre for stronger forces. It was in anticipation of such a move on the part of the enemy that I asked for heavy howitzers in my G.S. Z/58/5 dated September 11th. I should be grateful for an assurance that I may have these howitzers early in December, as early in January I hope, if all goes well with pipes and railway, to be within striking distance of EL ARISH.

Copies to :-

O.(a)

O.(b).

O.-in-C.

C.G.S.

Q.

I.

M.G.R.A.

Filed G.S. Z/58.

" G.S. Cables.

W.D.



From :- A.H.Q. SALONICA.

To :- LONDON, repeated EGYPT.

SECRET

G.C. 790. cipher.

23/9/16.
24/9/16.

Desp. 2530.
Recd. 0815.
Deed. 0830.

DOIRAN Front. Our patrols active. Artillery work interfered with by mist.

STRUMA Front. Our troops crossed the river at 3 points and drove enemy out of JENIMAH South of BEMANLI South of ORMANI which was set on fire and attacked KARADZKOJ BALA found to be strongly held. Counter-attack from NEVOLJEN was broken up by our artillery. Naval and Field artillery carried out bombardment on enemy trenches East of NECHORI.

Copies to :-

O(a).
O(b).
G-in-C.
C.G.S.
I.

A.
Q.
M.G.R.A.
E-in-C.
D.A.S.

A.M.S.
Filed G.S. Z/6.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.





370

24th. September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
L. of C. Defences.

The General Officer Commanding, Western Frontier Force, reports that the Light Armoured Motor Battery, recently presented by the Australian Commonwealth Government, has been found unsuitable for desert work by reason of the construction of the cars, and of an insufficiency of spare parts required for repairs; due to heavy desert work.

It is suggested, therefore, that this battery might be more usefully employed upon patrol work on the Lines of Communication, between ZAGAZIG and ISMAILIA, where good roads exist. Moreover, it should be possible by this means to reduce considerably the patrol duties at present performed by mounted troops and cyclists.

The battery consists of 2 officers and 12 other ranks,

2 Armoured Cars (50 h.p. Daimler and 60 h.p. Mercedes),
1 Touring Car, (60 h.p. Minerva),
1 Motor Cycle with side car (New Hudson)
Also one Precision Motor Cycle (the latter at present out of repair).

Each Armoured Car is fitted with a Colt gun, for which 2,000 rounds of ammunition are available.

The Commander-in-Chief wishes you to consider the feasibility of this proposal, and to forward your remarks as early as possible, with special reference to the possibility of releasing thereby some part, if not the whole, of the 53rd. Divisional Cyclist Company for return to their formation.

Sgt. A. Pynden Bell
Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



291

24th September 1916.

General Officer Commanding,

Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Sections.
Western Frontier Force.

1. The first course at the Imperial School of Instruction ZKITOUN, for mounted units will commence on Monday, October 9th.
2. Duration of course - Three weeks.
3. Candidates must report at the School on Sunday, October 8th, before 5 p.m. Nominal Rolls should be rendered to reach the School by Thursday, October 5th.
4. The first course will consist of officers only, who must not be below the rank of second in command of squadrons.
5. Subsequent courses will include a proportion of non-commissioned officers.
6. If it is found necessary to make any alteration of names from those sent in on the Nominal Roll, such alteration need not be notified by letter or telegram, but should be reported on arrival at the School by the officer in charge.
7. All officers must return to their units on the completion of the course, under the train arrangements made by the Commandant of the School. In the case of officers being granted leave by their Commanding Officers immediately upon expiration of the course, the fact must be notified to the Commandant at least one week before the expiration of the course.

7. (a). Candidates should bring field glasses, compasses, manuals and notebooks. Horses and Saddlery will be supplied at the School.

(b) Officers, if they wish, may bring their own saddles.

(c) Officers will not bring servants; these will be provided at the School. Bedding and full camp kit will be required.

8. The following vacancies are allotted to the Mounted Troops in the Section under your command :-

ø

#

Ego C. F. Perkins
for Major-General

Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

(ø)	No.1 Section	6.
	No.2 "	9.
	No.3 " Yeomanry	10.
	Anzac Mounted Div.	35.
	Western Frontier Force.	20.

(*) Note added in the case of Nos. 1 and 3 Sections re special allotment of vacancies for 1/1st City of London Yeomanry (No.1 Section) and 11th and 12th Light Horse (No.3 Section).



273

24th September 1916.

App D

General Officer Commanding,
No. 3. Section.

Reference your O/27/55 of September 15th.

The suggestions put forward are approved with the exception of the Veterinary Officer and Sergeant mentioned in 1(b) who cannot be provided.

As regards the two extra mules per Brigade Machine Gun Company. These should be found for the present as suggested, but the question of retention of horses with ambulance convoys will be decided later when the whole establishment is definitely fixed and the surplus of animals is known.

Eggs C. F. Perkins

Major-General
Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



274

amp E
24th. September, 1916.

Inspector General of Communications.

With reference to G.S. 137 dated 19/8/16, the water at MAHSUMAH having been found satisfactory, the Officer Commanding, Bikanir Camel Corps has been instructed to get into communication with the Works Officer, MOASCAR, with regard to the move to MAHSUMAH at an early date.

(Ed.)

J.A.H. Gammell.

Capt
for GS

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.

From A.H.Q., SALONICA.

To G.H.Q., EGYPT. (Addressed LONDON, repeated EGYPT).



G.C. cipher.

25/9/16.
26/9/16.Desp. 2315.
Recd. 0650.
Deed. 0710.

DOIRAN front: Last night our patrols active capturing one German and wounding several others. Air reconnaissance to HUDOVO discloses considerable circulation of transport by road and rail in area between DOIRAN and VARDAR but no movement of troops. Hostile artillery and aircraft active. Our aircraft drove off hostile machines on three occasions today.

STRUMA front: French artillery successfully shelled KARAKASKA today causing enemy to move one of their camps.

FLORINA region: Fighting continues.

Copies to :-

O.	Q.
O.(a).	M.O.R.A.
O.(b).	E.-in-C.
C.-in-C.	D.A.S.
G.G.S.	Filed G.S. Z/c.
I.	" G.S. Cables.
A.	W.D.

SECRET

From:- General, BASRA.

To :- HYPFORCE.



O.12254 cipher

25/9/15.
26/9/15.Desp. 1800.
Recd. 1130.
Deed. 1135.

General Situation remains unchanged. During past week desultory trench warfare continued at SANNAIYAT. Turks have resumed damming operations at mouth of HAI CHANNEL of TIGRIS between right bank and sand bank in centre of river completely closed by jetties.

Two successful aeroplane raids on HEMHAY aerodrome. First at night, - Bombs close to enemy machine, appeared to damage it. Second at dawn from height of 100 feet, damaged hangar, bombs bursting within few yards of enemy Albatross. Our machines heavily fired on but returned safely. Since defeat of Fokker (), enemy aeroplanes not active. Single machines occasionally up.

Copies to:- O.

O(a)

O(b)

C-in-C.

C.G.S.

I.

R.F.C.

Col. Vitale,

Filed:-

O.S. 2/85

* Cables

W.D.

SECRET.

From :- Chief, EGYPTFORC.

To :- Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 1074 cipher

23/9/16.

Deep. 1450.

In continuation of my A.M. 1963 of 22nd, it will take me about ten days to embark the troops mentioned, as the Brigade will have to be withdrawn from an advanced position near KHARGA. In the circumstances shall I withdraw this Brigade now in case it should be required?... I am reluctant to do so unless there is a possibility of its being sent to RABEH as its withdrawal would put a stop to my arrangements for an advance on DAKELA. At the same time I realise that should orders come for the Brigade to move to RABEH the 10 days delay in sending it might not be convenient.

Copies to:-

O
O(a)
O(b)
C.G.S.
C-in-C.

Filed:-

I
C.S. Z/TS/1.
" Cables
W.D.



From Chief, Egyptforce.
To Chief, LONDON.

W.D.
app. D.

A.M. 1075 cipher. 28/9/16. Desp. 2135.

Evening report. All well.

Copies to :-

O.
O.(a).
O.(b).
C.-in-C.
C.G.S.
I.
A.
Q.
M.G.R.A.
E.-in-C.
D.A.S.
A.M.S.
Col. Vitale.
Filed G.S. 2/39.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



WD

SECRET.

279

From A.H.Q., SALONICA.
To G.H.Q., Egyptforce.

AMP A

G.C. 793 cipher.

24/9/16.
25/9/16.

Desp. 2210.
Recd. 0615.
Decd. 0625.

Enemy aircraft unusually active on DOIRAN front.

On STRUMA front river has risen 3 feet. French detachment captured 16 prisoners during yesterdays operation. Situation otherwise unchanged.

Copies to :-

O.
O.(a).
O.(b).
C.-in-C.
G.C.S.
I.
A.

Q.
M.G.R.A.
E.-in-C.
D.A.S.
Filed G.S. Z/6.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



WD

From Chief, Egyptforce.
To Chief, LONDON.

AMP B

A.M. 1975 cipher.

25/9/16.

Desp. 2130.

Evening report. All well.

Copies to :-

O.
O.(a).
O.(b).
C.-in-C.
G.C.S.
I.
A.


Q.
M.G.R.A.
E.-in-C.
D.A.S.
A.M.S.
Col. Vitale.

Filed G.S. Z/29.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



280
W.D.
app C
25th September 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.



1. With reference to your S.R. 28/6 of September 23rd, it is proposed to place No. 13. Company Imperial Camel Corps at your disposal for the BAHARIA operation as soon as it becomes available.

This company is at present in course of training at ABBASSIA, and should be ready to take the field in about a fortnight.

Please say whether this will be soon enough? Otherwise the temporary transfer of a company from this side will have to be considered, but this is at present undesirable if it can be avoided.

2. The question of providing Battalion Headquarters for the three companies Imperial Camel Corps taking part in the BAHARIA operation is under consideration, and you will receive further information on this point shortly.

3. The Camel Section, Hong Kong & Singapore Mountain Battery is at present under orders to rejoin its unit at ABBASSIA, where certain minor refitting will have to be carried out to enable it again to take the field. This should, however, take only a few days, and as soon as it has been completed, the ^{section} Battery will be placed at your disposal and moved to SHUSHA as you request.

(sd) A. J. Yarden Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

WD
app. A.

581

SECRET

From : Sirdar, Arkowit.
To : Chief, Egyptforce.

355 cipher, 27th. September. Desp. 1747, 27/9/16.
Reed. 1830, 27/9/16.
Decd. 1940, 27/9/16.

I have received following from Chief, War Office, London, begins :-

35321 cipher. what is earliest date on which you could have brigade ready to embark for RABEUM if this brigade was replaced by Murray. Ends.

I have replied, begins :-

352, Sept. 27th. Your telegram No. 35321 of Sept. 26th. My telegram 345 Sept. 26th in reply to Foreign Office telegram 771 gives the details of the Egyptian troops I am prepared to send from KHARATUM if replaced by equivalent British troops from SUYET. It would suit me best to send them in detachments to PORT SUDAN for embarkation to RABEUM as transport becomes available. The first shipment, say 500 men, could be at PORT SUDAN about October 10th. If this course of action is adopted it is desirable that the first detachments of British troops should begin to arrive at KHARATUM about the same time as the first detachments of Egyptian troops begin to leave for PORT SUDAN. Ends.

I presume you have seen my telegram 345 of Sept. 26th to High Commissioner in reply to Foreign Office telegram 771.

Copies to :
G.
C(a).
C(b).
C.-in-C.
C.G.S.
I. }
D.A.G. } Personal.
D.Q.M.G. }

Filed G.S. 2/UB/1.

GENERAL STAFF
No. 1
EGYPTIAN EXPED. FORCE

WD

App. B.

SECRET

From : Chief, London.

To : Chief, Egypt.

Sg258, cipher, 27th.

Your A.M. 1074.

Desp. 1448, 27/9/18.
Recd. 1948, 27/9/18.
Desd. 8000, 27/9/18.

Do not move troops at present as question of expedition to HADRAM is still under consideration. If a brigade is sent it will probably come from SOUDAN and you will be asked to replace it. War Committee think collapse of Sherref might have very serious effect in INDIA and throughout EAST, and High Commissioner is being directed to confer with you and report what addition to the troops now in EGYPT would be required in event of the collapse. Let me know result of conference. I am opposed to expedition for the reasons you yourself have expressed and also for others.

Copies to :
 O.
 O(a).
 O(b).
 C.-in-C.
 C.G.S.
 I.
 D.A.G. } Personal.
 D.Q.M.G. }

Filed C.S. 2/88/1.





283

WD
The Secretary,
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

26th September, 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in order to avoid confusion, the late 9th Corps Signal Company was in June last renamed the Suez Corps Signal Company, and as such, employed with No. 1 Section, Canal Defences.

Since then, this unit has been transferred to No. 3 Section, where the inclusion of the word "Suez" in its title is somewhat misleading. With a view to obviating this difficulty, it is proposed that in future this unit shall be known as the SINAI Corps Signal Company.

This title, while preserving the "Corps" nomenclature, which is considered desirable, is suitable for any part of the Eastern front in which the Company may be required to serve in the future.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sd) Alynnaen Bee MG.
for. C.S.
General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

A
Q
DAS

284

apv D

WD



General Officer Commanding,
Middle East Brigade,
Royal Flying Corps.

The attached copy of War Office letter No.87/R.F.C./37
(A.O.1.a.), dated 8th September, 1916, is forwarded for
your information.

Gen A Lynden Bell

G.H.Q.,
26/9/16.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :-

A.
Q.

87/R.F.C./37 (A.O.1.a.)



285
War Office,
Adastral House,
Victoria Embankment,
E.C.

8th September, 1916.

Sir,

In continuation of War Office letter, No. 87/6028 (A.O.1), dated 1st June, 1916, forwarding copies of War Establishments of an 18-Aeroplane Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, on the Higher or Lower establishment, I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that approval has been given for the number of qualified Observers to be increased from twelve to eighteen in each squadron equipped with 2-seater machines (such being fighters proper, or those liable while on duty to be obliged to fight). Of this total not more than twelve will be Officers, the remainder to be Serjeants.

It should be noted that these Non-commissioned Officer Observers are intended primarily to perform the duties of aerial gunners.

I am to add that, if necessary, Non-commissioned Officer Observers may be substituted for Flying Officer Observers, when the latter are not available.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) B.B.Cubitt.

The General Officer,
Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :-

A.
Q.
R.F.C.

WD

App A



From:- Troopers, LONDON.

To :- Chief H.Q. FORCE, repeated SALONIKA.

23293 cipher A.G.S.A.

27/9/18
28/9/18

Desp. 2350.
Recd. 0915.
Decd. 0915.

Your C.M.Q.T. 2152 of Sept 25th and our 23088 cipher of Sept 21st. It has been decided to form separate 3rd Echelon office for SALONIKA. Demands for personnel will be sent from SALONIKA direct to WAR Office and not through EGYPT. Please arrange accordingly and submit proposed establishment for 3rd Echelon SALONIKA and revised establishment for 3rd Echelon EGYPT. In view of reduced establishment of latter it should now be under A.A.G. as should also 3rd Echelon SALONIKA.

Copies to:- A(S) for action. C-in-C. M.G.R.A. Filed: G.S. 358
O) " " C.G.S. E-in-C " Cables
O(a) I D.A.S. W.D.
O(b) Q A.M.S.

287
WD
B.
C.M.P.
SECRET

From : G.H.Q.
To : G.O.C., Alexandria.

O.A.B.160. 28th September. Despatched 1615.

Most secret and urgent.

Please transmit by special despatch rider following message to Commander-in-Chief at the Residency, begins :-

Commander-in-Chief, Residency.

In case I did not make myself clear on the telephone my view regarding the situation in case of the Sherif's collapse is as follows. I am not of course in a position to say authoritatively what effect the Sherif's collapse might have on the Moslem world but my opinion for what it is worth is that such an event would have as little effect as the evacuation of Gallipoli or the surrender at KUT. If however there should be an upheaval I anticipate that it would be of a formidable nature. As the strategic reserve of the Empire we ought to be reinforced by three divisions at least, if the experts think there is likely to be an upheaval. Personally I should certainly take any risks here until the offensive in FRANCE had come to a definite standstill for the winter. After that let them send as many troops as can be spared to EGYPT. It would greatly benefit the troops themselves and make EGYPT ARABIA and INDIA quite safe. C.G.S. Ends.

Copies to : O.
O(a).
O(b).
C.-in-C.
C.G.S.
I. (Personal)

Filed C.S. 2/58/1.



SECRET.

SECRET

From : Egyptforce.

To : Troopers, London.

A.M. 1001 cipher.

28/5/16.

Desp. 2130.

Your 13088 cipher H.D.S.

Following incorporated in EGYPT. No. 14 Australian
General Hospital. BALOWIKA. 777 and 778 companies A.S.C., M.T.
Following cease to belong to H.E.F. No. 5 Australian General
Hospital.

Copies to:-
O.
O(a).
O(b).
C-in-C.
C.S.S.
I.
A.
Q.

Filed G.S. 100.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



WD 289
SECRET

28th September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 1 Section.



Owing to the urgent requirements on the Western Frontier, 'G' Camel Transport Company is being withdrawn from your section, and will be despatched to SHUSHA at an early date. This company will, however, be relieved partly by the 70th Indian Company from No. 3 Section and partly by 'N' Company - a new formation which has recently been formed from camels sent from Somaliland.

These camels may not, for some little time, be able to perform the same amount of work as 'G' Company, but it is regretted that the urgent requirements of the Western Frontier Force have rendered this exchange imperative.

Col. H. G. Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

290

W.D.
From :- Troopers.

To :- G.H.Q. EGYPT.

15308. cipher. S.D.S.

28/3/18.
29/3/18.

Desp. 1720.
Recd. 0618.
Deed. 0700.

New Zealand Government are anxious to send to EGYPT for winter 125 men native Rarotonga on account of climate in FRANCE being too cold. Can you attach them to an Infantry unit for pioneer duties? They are intended to join New Zealand Pioneer Battalion next March as reinforcements. They are due to leave New Zealand in November.

Copies to :-
O.
O(a).
O(b).
C-in-C.
C.S.S.
A.
Q.

Filed O.S. 303.
" O.S. Cables.
W.D.

WD
SECRET

Egypt B



From : Chief, Egyptforce.

To : C-in-C. EAST INDIES.

A.M. 1084 cipher. 29/9/16.

Desp. 1515.

Reference your wire of 26th September kindly saying you will protect flight aeroplanes, it has been decided in event of Parker's report being favourable to send immediately flight aeroplanes to RABEEN accompanied by one company infantry and one mounted Field Ambulance. The heavy stores to be landed will consist of four cars each three tons, four cases aeroplanes each two tons, in addition to various vehicles, stores and supplies, aggregating approximately 150 tons. I will inform you of date of embarkation as soon as known. Should be grateful if you would let me know whether you anticipate any difficulties in landing the above.

Copies to:- O. C-in-C. A. Filed G.S. Z/58/1.
O(a). G.G.S. I. " G.S. Cables.
O(b). Q. R.F.C. W.D.

Egypt C
SECRET

WD
From : Chief, Egyptforce.

To : C-in-C. EAST INDIES.

A.M. 1086 cipher.

29/9/16.

Desp. 1445.

Reference my A.M. 1084 to-day. Only ship immediately available is "Georgian", but she is a big ship and will draw about 24 feet. I should like to use her for aeroplane flight and escort if she is not too large to approach near enough the shore for lighter work. I would be grateful if you will advise me as to this. If this ship cannot be used it will entail a delay of at least 3 days which I am anxious to avoid.

Copies to:- O. Filed G.S. Z/58/1.
O(a). " G.S. Cables.
O(b). W.D.
C-in-C.
G.G.S.
Q.
A.
I.

WD
8/10
I hear the line.
From Chief Egyptforce
To Chief London.

292
SECRET

A.M. 1088

Cipher

39/9/16

Desp. 2140

Your 83255 Cipher.

I have been staying with the High Commissioner for the last three days and with reference to Foreign Office No: 744 have given him my views as follows on the question raised:- Begins

"I am not of course in a position to say authoritatively what effect the Sherif's collapse might have on the Moslem world but my opinion for what it is worth is that such an event might have as little effect as the evacuation of Gallipoli or the surrender at KUT. If however there should be an upheaval I anticipate that it would be of a formidable nature. As the strategic reserve of the Empire is held in Egypt that country ought to be reinforced by three divisions at least, if the experts think there is likely to be an upheaval. Personally I should certainly take any risks in the East until the offensive in France had come to a definite period perhaps for the winter. After that as many troops as can be spared might be sent to Egypt. It would greatly benefit the troops themselves and make Egypt, Arabia, and India quite safe, and facilitate my operations acting from Sinai Peninsula against the Turks". Ends.

I do not think the necessity has yet arisen to send either white or black troops to RABEGH. Aeroplane Flight leaves at once.

Copies to O

O(a)

O(b)

C-in-C

C.G.S.

I

D.A.G.

D.Q.M.G.

} personal

Filed G.S.Z/58/1



1.22

WB

PRIORITY.

From : G. H. Q.

copy E

SECRET

To : No. 1 Section.

G. S.

20/5/15.

Desp.

Reference telephone conversation to-day, concentrate one company infantry at SUEZ to be prepared to embark to-morrow night. Tents to be taken, also 300 rounds E.A.A. per rifle, and 20,000 rounds per Lewis gun. R.E. stores for erection of defence posts to be provided by you on liberal scale, these will be replaced by E-in-C. Acknowledge stating deficiencies in stores if any.

Copies to :-

G.
G(a).
G(b).
C-in-C.
G.S.S.

Q.

A.

E

in c

Filed G.S. Z/20/1.

* G.S. Cable.

W.D.



294



29th September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 2 Section.

With reference to G.S. 104/2, dated 22/8/16, it has been decided to establish once more the W/T stations which were formerly maintained for reporting hostile aircraft: W/T equipment will be provided under arrangements made by the Director of Army Signals, and personnel will be supplied by the Royal Flying Corps.

For the present only one of the two stations will be established, and it is considered that this should be placed at TURKISH CAMP in "C" Subsection. Will you therefore please arrange that an officer is detailed to carry out the duties specified in para. 2 of the above-quoted letter.

When additional W/T equipment is available the second station will be established in "A" Subsection at HABEITA.

The Director of Army Signals has been asked to notify you direct when the station is in working order and when the observing officer will be required to commence his duties.

(Sd) A Lynden Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :-
R.F.C.
D.A.S.

SECRET.

app A

SECRET

295

From : EGYPTFORCE.

To : TROOPERS.

A.M. 1089 cipher.

30/9/16.

Desp. 1145.

Your 21153 and 23226 cipher A.O.I. Weekly return R.F.G.

(a) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 51.
20th Res:Wing. 11.
X Aircraft Depot. nil.

SALONIKA. 28.

EAST AFRICA. 10.

MESOPOTAMIA. 16.

(b) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 7.
20th Res:Wing. 5.
X Aircraft Depot. nil.

SALONIKA. 7.

EAST AFRICA. 5.

MESOPOTAMIA. 2.

(c) Service- Unser- Not
able. viceable. Expected.

EGYPT.
5th Wing.

B.E.S.c.	17	15	7
Bristol Scouts.	4	5	nil
De Havilland.	1	3	nil
Martinsyde.	2	1	2

20th Reserve Wing.

Martinsyde.	nil	nil	1
Maurice Farman.	2	3	5
Avro.	4	5	2
B.E.S.c.	6	2	nil
Caudron.	2	1	3
Bristol Scouts.	nil	nil	1
Curtiss.	nil	nil	4

X Aircraft Depot.

B.E.S.c.	nil	1	4
Martinsyde.	nil	nil	1.
Avro.	nil	nil	2.

SALONIKA.

B.E.S.c.	12	2	4)Excludes 2)Detached in)transit from 'X' A.D. for 17 Squadron.
Bristol Scouts.	2	1	nil	
De Havilland.	1	1	nil	

EAST AFRICA.

B.E.S.c.	3	3	nil
Steel Henri Farman.	4	nil	3

	Service -able.	Unser- viceable.	Not erected.
<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>			
B.H.Sec.	15	5	6
Maurice Farman.	1	6	nil
Voisin.	nil	8	nil
Henri Farman.	4	nil	1
Martinsyde.	nil	nil	* 6

*This number is cabled, but believe correct number is, as last week, 3.

Copies to:-
 O.
 O(a).
 O(b).
 C.G.S.
 I.
 A.
 G.
 Filed G.S. 104/5.
 " G.S.Cables.
 W.D.



SECRET

Cypp B.

297
SECRET

From Chief, Egyptforce.

To Troopers, LONDON.

A.M. 1000 cipher.

30/6/16.

Desp. 1800.

Your 23225 cipher S.D.S. of 28th.

I consider it essential that SALONIKA should retain administrative responsibility for islands. MUDEOS is 8 hours by ship from SALONIKA and 5 days from here. It is, in my opinion, a suitable place to send prisoners of war and refugees up to about 10,000, of whom half might be prisoners of war. If a total of 10,000 were exceeded, I think there might be water difficulties, and I do not recommend that the present garrison of MUDEOS should be called on to guard more than 5,000 prisoners.


Copies to :-

O.
O.(a).
O.(b).
O.-in-C.
G.D.S.
I.
A.
Q.

Filed G.S. 86.

" G.S. Cables.

W.D.



2, 28

From :- Egyptforce.
To :- Troopers.

app^c

A.M. 1092. cipher 30/9/16. Desp. 2145.

Reference draft War Establishments for G.H.Q. and other Headquarters in EGYPT forwarded with my letter G.S. 11/1 of 18th May, and my subsequent letters G.S. 11/2 and G.S. 11/2/1 of 18th. August. May the establishments therein given be sanctioned as least as a temporary measure in order to regularise pay and promotion and obviate increasing difficulties of 3rd Echelon in dealing with these establishments. Matter is particularly urgent as regards clerks and considerable hardship to individuals is caused by present uncertainty.

Copies to :-

O.
O(a).
O(b).
O.G.S.
I.
A.

Q.
A.M.S.
Filed G.S. 11/2.
" G.S. Cables.
W.D.



WD
D
45370

Officer Commanding,
Imperial Camel Corps.

The attached copy of a minute to Director of Supplies and Transport is forwarded for your information.

Will you please arrange to take over the fit camels ^{As the} with 191st Transport Company on arrival at ABBASSIA.

G.H.Q.
30/9/16.

Lieutenant-Colonel,
G.S.

Lt. Col. Robertson

W.D.
300
370
GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS
370
GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS
D. S. T.

(Through Q.)

191st Coy. Indian Transport Corps has been inspected by Col. Smith and all the Camels have been found suitable for transference to the Imperial Camel Corps. Will you therefore please arrange for this company complete to move by march route to ABBASSIA.

It is understood that 200 of the 191st Company are suffering from mange. Will you, therefore, please arrange ~~that~~ on the arrival of the company at ABBASSIA

- (1) To hand over all fit camels direct to the Imperial Camel Corps.
- (2) To hand over such camels as are suffering from mange to No. 2. Veterinary Hospital.

It is understood that, when the handing over has been completed, the Indian personnel at present serving with the Company will be concentrated and sent back to INDIA under arrangements which shall be made by you.

A copy of these instructions is being sent by us to Officer Commanding Imperial Camel Corps, and he is being instructed to arrange for the transfer direct with you.

(Sd) Jaffar

"O(a)."
30/9/16.

Captain,
G.S.

1711
G.S.327.

201
30th September 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 3. Section.

With reference to your O/27/56 of the 16th instant, approval is given to the alterations to the mobile establishment of a Mounted Division suggested therein - i.e., the addition of

1 Corporal
1 Lance Corporal
8 Sappers
10 Riding Horses
2 Pack Horses

to each Brigade Signal Troop, and arrangements are being made for the issue of the additional equipment necessary; also for the issue of 2 telephones and 4 miles of D.I. cable per squadron, as recommended in para. 4. of your letter under reply.

Sd/ G.F. Perkins,
Major G.F.
Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



The Secretary,

War Office, LONDON, S.W.

30
29th September, 1916.

Sir,

With reference to the printed War Establishment, Imperial Camel Corps, dated 8th September, 1916, I have the honour to point out that, since this does not contain the recent increases made in the establishment of the Corps and needs certain amendments in other respects, no distribution of it at present has been considered advisable. Attached hereto is the complete War Establishment to which the Corps is now working and for which I request sanction. I would draw special attention to the following points :-

- (a) In Headquarters of the Corps, a Sergeant Cook is included. A non-commissioned officer has always been employed in this capacity and it is necessary that he should be included in the established personnel. I also request that the senior of the three saddlers allowed for Corps Headquarters be given the rank of Saddler Sergeant. The increase in the personnel of the Corps has very greatly increased the amount of Saddlers' work, so that the inclusion of a Saddler Sergeant in Corps Headquarters is now highly advisable. The horses for officers of Corps Headquarters have already been sanctioned as a local measure. They are necessary for work at ABBASSIA.

- (b) As regards Headquarters of a Camel Battalion, the printed War Establishment seems to have been compiled

/under

under a misapprehension. The personnel asked for in my telegram A.M. 952 of 24th August was always intended to form the Headquarters of one battalion, and two such battalion Headquarters are to be formed in all. Since these battalions will be working in quite different parts of the front, it is clearly desirable that the headquarters of each should be distinct. Here again a Sergeant Cook has been included. Sanction for this appointment was not asked for in my telegram A.M. 952.

- (c) The company now amounts to 201 in all with 4 sections of 8 groups each and a Lewis Gun Section. The increase by 12 other ranks to form the 8th group in each section was sanctioned by War Office telegram 21993 cipher, dated 25th August, 1916.
- (d) As regards the Base Depots, I recommend that, in addition to the reinforcements at the rate of one officer and 20 other ranks per company, sanction be given for the permanent appointment of two officers to command the British and Australasian depots respectively, since officers passing through the depots as reinforcements will not be able to deal satisfactorily with the considerable amount of administrative detail that will require attention.
- (e) In the total numbers allowance has been made for 16 companies since it is hoped to raise a 16th company from New Zealand personnel.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Ed)

A. R. Gordon Ball
Major-General

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS.

EGYPT.

War Establishment.

Detail.	PERSONNEL.						ANIMALS.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Serpts. & Serpts.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Horses.	
Camel Corps H.Q. (including attached.)	4	2	6	5	19	36	52	4	5	
Camel Corps H.Q. (attached)	2	-	1	1	-	4	4	-	2	
Two H.Q. of Battalion (excluding attached)	8	4	6	2	54	54	62	8	-	
Two H.Q. of Battalion (attached)	4	-	-	2	-	6	6	2	-	
16 Companies (excluding attached)	96	16	128	-	2688	2920	5200	224	-	
16 Companies (attached)	-	-	16	-	-	16	16	-	-	
Total Corps (excluding attached)	108	22	140	5	2741	3016	5294	236	7	
Total Corps (including attached)	114	22	157	8	2741	3042	5320	238	7	

HEADQUARTERS CAMEL CORPS.

305

Composition in detail.

DETAIL.	Personnel.						Animals.			REMARKS.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Serpts. & Serpts.	Artificers.	Rank & file.	TOTAL.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Horses.	
<u>Headquarters of Corps.</u>										
Commanding Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	
2nd in Command (Major)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	
Adjutant.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	
Quartermaster.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	
Regtl. Sergt. Major.	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Q.M. Sergt.	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Orderly Room Sergt.	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Sergeant Cook.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Serpt. Instructors.	-	-	4	-	-	4	4	-	-	
Saddler Sergeant.	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	
Saddlers.	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	-	
Provost Corporal.	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Storemen.	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	
M.O.'s Orderly.	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Clerks.	-	-	-	-	9(a)	9	4	-	-	(a) Includes 2 Corp's. with H.Q. and 5 clerks, including 2 Corp's, with D.A.G.'s office at the Base.
Batmen.	-	-	-	-	6	6	6	-	-	
Spare camels 10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	
Total (excluding attached)	4	2	6	3	19	34	32	4	5	
<u>Attached -</u>										
Medical Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	
Veterinary Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	
Veterinary Sergeant.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Armourer Sergeant.	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	
Total including attached	6	2	7	4	19	38	36	4	7	

HEADQUARTERS CAMEL BATTALION.

366

DETAIL.	P e r s o n n e l.						A n i m a l s.			REMARKS.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Artificers.	Rank & file.	TOTAL.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Horses.	
<u>Headquarters of a Battalion.</u>										
Commanding Officer (Major)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	
Adjutant.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	
Quartermaster.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	2(a)	-	
Signalling Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1		-	(a) 1 for Stationery, Signalling gear and stores.
Regtl. Sergt. Major.	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Q.M. Sergeant.	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Orderly Room Sergt.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Orderly Room Clerk.	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Sergeant Cook.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Saddler Sergeant.	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	
Signallers.	-	-	1	-	8	9	9	-	-	
Storeman.	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
M.O's Orderly.	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Batmen.	-	-	-	-	6	6	6	-	-	
Spare camels 10%.	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	
Total (excluding attached)	4	2	3	1	17	27	31	4	-	
<u>Attached -</u>										
Medical Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	
Veterinary Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1		-	
Armourer Sergeant.	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	
Total (including attached)	6	2	5	2	17	30	34	5	-	

A COMPANY.

307

Detail.	PERSONNEL.						ANIMALS.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts & Sergts.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Horses.	
Company Commander	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	(a) One of these camels also serves for the Lewis gun officer.
Section Commanders	4	-	-	-	-	4	4	2a	-	
Company Sergt. Major	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Company Q.M. Sergt.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Sergeants	-	-	6	-	-	6	6	-	-	
Corporals	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	-	-	(b) includes batman to Lewis Gun Officer. (c) 7 for ammunition, 2 for Lewis Guns. (d) includes one corporal
Signallers	-	-	-	-	8	8	8	-	-	
Batman	-	-	-	-	6b	6	6	9c	-	
Privates	-	-	-	-	156	156	156	-	-	
<u>Lewis Gun Section.</u>										
Commander	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	(d) includes one corporal
Sergeant	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Privates	-	-	-	-	15d	15	15	-	-	
Spare Camels 10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	2	-	
Total (excluding attached)	6	1	8	-	168	183	200	14	-	
<u>Attached</u> Veterinary Sergt.	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Total (including attached)	6	1	9	-	168	184	201	14	-	

- NOTES.** (1). The company consists of headquarters, 4 sections, and Lewis Gun Section. Each section consists of 1 subaltern, 1 section sergeant, 1 sergeant or corporal and 8 groups of 4 men each.
- (2) Nos 3 are camel holders: batmen lead baggage camels.
- (3) Each man carries on his camel 5 days' food and 5 days' water for himself and 5 days' forage for his camel.
- (4) The above establishment includes 16 lance corporals.

BASE DEPOTS.

Detail	PERSONNEL.						ANIMALS.			Remarks.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts & Sergts.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Horses,	
<u>British (6 Companies)</u>										
Commanding Officer (a)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	(a) Captain or Subaltern Permanently employed.
Batman	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Reinforcements	6	-	-	-	120	126	126	6	-	
Total	7	-	-	-	121	128	128	6	-	
<u>Australian & New Zealand(10 Companies)</u>										
Commanding Officer (a)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
Batman	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	
Reinforcements	10	-	-	-	200	210	210	10	-	
Total	11	-	-	-	201	212	212	10	-	

W.D.
SECRET

309

C.S. Z/58/9/1

SS. Z/58/9/1

App Ct.

30th September, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,

No. ²/₃ Section.



1. In conformity with general policy on the eastern front, the boundary between Nos. 2 and 3 Sections will, from Monday October 9th inclusive, be a line drawn due east from the Canal at Kilometre 56, 8 miles south of BALLAH.
2. By this delimitation of boundary the following localities - HOD EL BAYUD, BIR EL MASEIBRA, BIR EL JEFFEIR, and HOD EL BADA - will be brought within the area of No. 3 Section. BIR EL MAHADAT will remain as at present within the area of No. 2 Section.
3. In connection with this re-organisation, the Mobile Column from No. 2 Section will be broken up as under -
 - (a) No. 1 Imperial Camel Battalion, less No. 5 Company which will remain at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, No. 2 Section, will be transferred to No. 3 Section (No. 5 Company being replaced in the battalion by No. 7).
 - In accordance, however, with the policy of retaining Imperial Camel Corps Companies as far as possible for service in the same area as their parent formations, No. 6 Company will ultimately be returned to No. 2 Section when its relief by a fresh Australian Company can be arranged, though no definite date for this relief can at present be given.
 - (b) 1/1st City of London Yeomanry will be returned to No. 1 Section. Separate instructions regarding this move will be issued in due course.


/(c)

(c) The 12th Australian Light Horse will remain at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, No. 2 Section.

4. The above re-organisation will come into operation from 6 a.m. on Monday, October 9th. All details regarding the transfer of units involved should be arranged in consultation between General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section and General Officer Commanding No. 3 Section with a view to the completion of such moves as may be necessary by that date.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



311

apm H

The Secretary,
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

20
29th September, 1916.

Sir,

In reply to your letter 121/Fin/752 (S.D.3.c.),
dated 14th August -

1. I have the honour to inform you that the lines on which the Cadet School, ZEITOUN, is at present conducted are practically the same as those obtaining at the School in FRANCE, with the following exceptions :-

- (a). Duration of course - 3 weeks.
- (b). Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 23 and 26 of the syllabus adopted at the Blendesques School are not included in that of ZEITOUN.
- (c). Cadets do not in all cases work as separate classes, but are combined for certain subjects with those of the current officers' course.

2. As regards para. 3 of your letter :-

- (a). Arrangements have already been made to extend the duration of the course from 3 to 6 weeks.
- (b). The subjects enumerated in 1(b) above will in future be included in the syllabus with the exception of No.8.
- (c). The general lines of the system obtaining at the Blendesques School will be closely adhered to so far as local conditions allow.
- (d). The number of Cadets which can be turned out every six weeks will be 100 Infantry and 30 Artillery.

3. In order to carry out the above, a small increase in the Instructional Staff will be necessary.

4. In accordance with the War Establishment for the Imperial School of Instruction, ZEITOUN, 121/Overseas/2052,

/dated

FINIS.

312
end

dated June 30th. the present allowance of Officer Instructors, calculated on a five Division basis, is 20. To this number, however, it has already been found necessary to add four additional officers who are attached for instructional purposes.

5. Moreover a new wing for the Instruction of Mounted Troops has just been formed at the Imperial School which will deal with about 160 officers and N.C.O's every three weeks and will necessitate a further increase of instructors.

6. To summarize :-

Number of Instructional Officers employed at the School (including 4 additional to War Establishment).	24.
Increase required for Cadet School.	4.
Increase required for Mounted troops Wing.	8.
Total.	<u>36.</u>

7. It is requested that the above increase of officers and a like proportion of N.C.O's may be found in the following way :-

- (a). That, for the purposes of calculating the Instructional Staff, the 4 Mounted and 3 Dismounted Yeomanry Brigades may be reckoned as one Division giving a total of 6 Divisions with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
- (b). That the scale per division may be raised to 6 officers and 18 N.C.O's, thus giving a total of 36 officers and 108 N.C.O's. This is the minimum necessary for the efficient working of the School, which will in future deal with upwards of 1,700 officers and other ranks in the various classes at one time.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Ed) H. L. G. B. Ball
M. G. Gen.
167024.

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.