

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/9/2 Part 2

Title: Intelligence Summaries, General
Headquarters, Egyptian
Expeditionary Force

April 1916



AWM4-1/9/2PART2

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 66.68.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

12th April, 1916.

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.
2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY.
3. GENERAL NEWS - TURKEY.

.....○○○.....

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.(i) Situation in Armenia.

There has been severe fighting in ARMENTIA during the past week, especially along the coast and in the CHORUKH Valley. There have been heavy losses on both sides.

The Russians have advanced to the KARA River within 20 miles of TREBIZOND and after having thrown back the Turks over this river, have defeated several violent attempts on their part to re-cross it.

The "Breslau" appears to have attempted to co-operate in the fighting along the coast, but was driven off by a Russian battleship.

In the CHURUKH Valley the Turks have been cleared out of several strong positions and the Russian army is slowly advancing westwards.

We can now give a fairly complete distribution of the Turkish forces on this front (see attached sketch map).

Elements of thirteen divisions have been located in the line. These are 5, 10, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, (34), 36, (37). On the way are divisions 12, 13, 14, 15, 43, 49.

Of the thirteen divisions enumerated above, two, the 34th and 37th have practically ceased to exist while four, the 17th, 28th, 29th, and 33rd are very much reduced in strength.

It is therefore difficult to arrive at the exact strength of the army now in the field, but we can form a fair estimate by assuming weak Divisions to average 6 Battalions and remnants of Regiments to average 1 Battalion.

This gives the following figures :-

P. T. O.

Already in the line.

Coastal Sector and TREBIZOND	13	btns.
CHORUKH Valloy.	20	"
KOP to KARGIN (covering ERZINGAN)	? 43	"
W. of MUSH and KHINIS	? 5	"
MUDUS to SAIRT (covering DIARBEKR)	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	"

say 92.

Available for immediate reinforcement.

At ERZINGAN

Balance of 10th Division	7	btns.
Whole of 13th Division	9	"

At DIARBEKR

Balance of 5th Division (6 or 8 Battalions)	7
------------------------------------------------	---

say 23.

En route.

4 Division,	say	36	btns.
-------------	-----	----	-------

TOTAL 151.

Reinforcements are taking just under 6 weeks from CONSTANTINOPLE to the front near TREBIZOND (4 days rail and 36 days march). This works out at about 22 kilometres a day on the road, whether they are sent by ANGORA and SIVAS, or KAISARIYEH and SIVAS, a very good average considering the difficulties of the country.

We may therefore estimate that by the end of April the Turks may have a force of 150 battalions (or 150,000 men) on this front which might be increased to 200,000 men if they were able to bring all Divisions up to strength.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY.

The following Distribution of the Turkish army by Divisions has been compiled by Cairo:-

SYRIA, Probably	3, 23, 44.	3	Division.
IRAK, "	2, 35, (38), ?41, 45, 51, 52,	?7	"
CAUCASUS Front	5, 10, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, (34) 33, (37)	13	"
En route for above front.	12, 13, ?14, 15, 43, ?49	5 or 6	"
ARABIA	21, 22, 30, 40	4	"
SMYRNA to KUM-KALE	42, 46, 47, 48	4	"
G'PLE, THRACE etc., with GALL. Pon.	1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, ?11, 16 19, 20, 24, 26, 50	13	"
EREGLI	?25	?1	"
CHANAK	27	1	"

General result 15 or 16 in the MARMARA Region, plus EREGLI 3 in SYRIA (perhaps four) 7 (perhaps 8) in IRAK, 4 in ARABIA, 13 (all weak except 5th and two viz., 34 & 37 down to nothing) in CAUCASUS 5 or 6 more coming up to reinforce CAUCASUS. 4 on Anatolian sea-board.

There are still perhaps enough odd battalions, vide summary of April 5th (Cairo) to make one weak division to replace one of the two that have gone under in the East.

3. GENERAL NEWS - TURKEY.

It is reported from CONSTANTINOPLE on good authority that disaffection is spreading in the Turkish army.

German soldiers who go about the city are always in groups of 8 or 10 and are armed.

The Germans are anxious to keep a preponderance of German and Austrian troops in Constantinople and LIMAN VON SANDERS is said to have been much annoyed when the Turks insisted on garrisoning their own forts in the BOSPHORUS with Turkish troops. He has cabled to BERLIN for 3,000 German troops for this duty.

VON MACKENSEN arrived in CONSTANTINOPLE on 23rd March. He was not received with enthusiasm by the inhabitants.

On 28th March there was a big fete in CONSTANTINOPLE. Turkish, Austrian and German flags were placed on the mosque. It was said that there had been a great victory in Europe, that VERDUN had fallen, that 200,000 prisoners had been taken and that 80,000 had been killed. On 1st April it was discovered that this information was false and the people started cursing the Germans, openly insulting them in the streets.

That there is no ^{great} keenness among the rank and file of the Turkish army to get to the front CAUCASUS front, is evidenced by the ^{mutiny} ~~unity~~ of 1,600 soldiers who were on their way there from DAMASCUS. One German officer was wounded in this affair.

JEMAL PASHA is reported to have visited CONSTANTINOPLE lately and to have asked for more troops for SYRIA which were refused.

In the SMYRNA district extensive preparations are still being made to repel the expected attack by the Allies. LIMAN and his Staff arrived in SMYRNA at the end of March and have been busy organizing the defences.

8 Austrian guns with gunners have arrived in SMYRNA since 24th March.

There is a new aerodrome at KASIMIR, eight miles south of SMYRNA.


ANGORA and KHARPUT have been fortified. Ammunition and food are being constantly sent to the Caucasus. The Turkish army have been instructed to destroy communications (bridges etc.,) in case of a retreat.

The fall of TREBIZOND is anticipated in well informed circles in CONSTANTINOPLE.

Some Turkish troops have been sent to the front by the BLACK SEA route, but this route is not considered quite safe.

DISPOSITION OF TURKISH FORCES IN ARMENIA.

Parts of Divisions are estimated at 6 Battalions
Remnants of Regts " 1 Battalion
Gâie = Gendarmerie



CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 69.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

13th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

SITUATION IN THE BALKAN THEATRE.

1. GREECE.
2. ALBANIA.
3. MILITARY SITUATION - ENEMY DISLOCATION.

-----OOO-----

SITUATION IN THE BALKAN THEATRE.1. GREECE.

The Entente Powers have undertaken certain operations in the IONIAN islands to counter the activities of the enemy submarines. The port of ARGOSTOLI, in the island of CEPHALONIA, is being used as a base for these operations by Allied Warships. The entrance to the Gulf of CORINTH is thus safeguarded, and the port of PATRAS, with its facilities of the Greek railway system, will be guaranteed for the possible use of the Allies should occasion arise.

For some time it has been well known that while the enemy submarines are based on CATTARO they are accustomed to rely upon Greek aid to assist them in the direction of their operations, and for the supply of perishable stores. In spite of frequent representations by the Entente Ministers at Athens, the Greek Government has proved unequal to the task of preventing the enemy submarines making full use of the peculiar advantages of the coastline of Greece. The continued menace to the shipping of the Allies, and the need of ensuring the safe arrival and departure of transports and supply ships at Salonika made it imperative that some drastic action should be taken.

The days of the present Greek administration are numbered. The Minister of Finance, DRAGOUMIS, has resigned, but the country continues its course towards total financial ruin. In the Press and outside, the VENEZELIST Party are making the most of the present bankrupt and unstable condition of the country, and there is some evidence that M. VENEZELOS may be willing to again re-enter public life. In this event the position of the Crown would become most difficult. There could be no rapprochement between the

King and Venozelos unless one or the other completely altered his policy. The King has been counting upon a definite change in the international situation that would enable him to come down, with some degree of certainty, on one side of the fence or the other. His Majesty, for a foreigner, probably had an overrated opinion of the efficiency of the army that he himself led in the last Balkan Wars, but he has never made the mistake that caused the fall of VENEZELOS, in over estimating the martial ardour of the Greek people whose chief desire was to remain, at any cost, un-involved in the war. The Greek has few convictions and has little courage of even those few.

King Constantino has considered that as King his duty lay in making as much capital as he could for his Kingdom out of the situation, bearing in mind the characteristics of his subjects. Had events moved with greater rapidity in the Balkans it is possible that his policy might have been more successful. Time has been against Greece as well as the Central Powers.

The German Staff being unable to send further troops to the Balkans may be unable to restrain the Bulgarians should they decide to occupy CAVALLA. Partly perhaps to keep Greece in her present condition of armed but impotent uncertainty, and partly to attempt to overawe Rumania, the Germans have succeeded in prevailing upon the Bulgarians to send five, or possibly six, Divisions to the Danube, after having placed the Greek frontier in a very strong condition of defence. The disposition of the Greek army at the present time can hardly be considered of any help to the Allies even should the morale of the troops permit of their co-operation being of much value.

Unless the Bulgarians determine upon an attack on KAVALLA, which would by no means be altogether detrimental to the Allies, the employment of the Greek Army is remote. The Venezelist Party is said to be in favour of the demobilization of the Army and its re-organization for employment with the Allies.

It is hoped that Serbian troops may soon be ready to co-operate with the Allies at SALONIKA. It is of great importance that the Greek Government, allied formally to Serbia by an offensive and defensive treaty against Bulgaria, should adopt a clearly defined policy compatible with the exigencies of the existing situation. M. VENEZELOS is by now probably aware of the true condition to which the Greek army has been reduced, but should he be returned to power it is safe to assume that he would whole-heartedly pursue a policy by which Greece in common with the Allies, Serbia and Rumania would profit by the declining influence of the Central Powers to unite in common action against Bulgaria.

2. ALBANIA.

The Bulgarians appear to view with grave suspicion the policy pursued by the Central Powers regarding the future settlement of the country. The Austrians have lost the co-operation of the Bulgarian troops who have been withdrawn to the VELES - PERLEPE district. The Germans have induced the Turks to send a mission to Albania with the object of obtaining for the Austrians the support of the Albanian Turks. The Bulgarians, anxious to safeguard their newly acquired territory in the neighbourhood of OCHRIDA have established a zone of influence as far as

EL BASAN, in opposition to the views of the pro-Austrian party.

The Austrians are employing six divisions for the operations in the coast area, and continue to bring up guns and supplies for the investment of VALONA. No fighting has yet been reported.

3. MILITARY SITUATION - ENEMY DISLOCATION.

At the end of the first week of April the following was the approximate distribution of the enemy forces.

GREEK FRONTIER - WEST to EAST.

LEFT. MONASTIR - KENALI DISTRICT.

8th Bulgarian Division - 6 Regiments.
5th German Dragoon Regiment.
6th Bulgarian Cavalry Regiment.

RIGHT CENTRE. W. of HUMA to PETRICH.

101st German Reconstituted Division.
103rd " " " and 4 Regt. of 105th Div.
5th Bulgarian Division (GEVGELI & HUMA).
7th " " (STRUMNITSA - PETRICH).
One " New Reserve " - VALEDOVO.
23rd German Dragoon Regiment.
3rd Bulgarian Cavalry Regiment - MIROVCA.
5th " " " - W. Lake DOIRAN.
8th " " " - PETRICH.
9th " " " - GEVGELI.

Besides these units there are heavy artillery batteries of all types established at BOGDANCI, HUDOVO, KONSKO, GEVGELI, PETRICH and on all the high ground commanding the approaches to the VARDAR VALLEY.

LEFT CENTRE - PETRICH to E. of NEVROCOP.

11th Bulgarian Division (Macedonian).
2nd " " (moved from GEVGELI being relieved by the 101st German).
8th " Cavalry Regt.
2 Regts. (62nd and 63rd) of a New Bulgarian Division.

LEFT - N.E. FRONTIER. XANTHI DISTRICT.

10th Bulgarian Division (overstrength)
One (whole or part of a) New Division.

German and Austrian heavy batteries commanding the approaches of the DRAMA - XANTHI road and railway. Batteries for coast defence established at MAKRI and other points.

TOTAL. Rifles - 195,000 Bulgarians - 8 to 9 Divisions.

" 25,000 Germans - 7 to 9 Regiments, and
8 Cavalry Regiments.

220,000 Rifles.

ROUMANIAN FRONTIER.

105th German Reconstituted Division (loss 1 Regt).

4th Bulgarian Division.

12th " (Now) " (loss possibly 2 Regts)

9th " " "

1st " " (now arriving)

5th " " "

NOTE. Reports from Roumania state that German troops have been withdrawn from the Balkans recently who had previously been on the Roumanian Frontier. For a long time there has been no reason to believe that beyond the 105th Division and some artillery and engineer units, there have been any other German troops in the CHUMLA - VARNA District. In January and February the Roumanian G.S. reported two German Divisions in that district.

INTERIOR - and TROOPS HELD IN RESERVE.

German Alpino Corps - USKUB - MONASTIR.

3rd Bulgarian Division - PERLEPE - VELES.

(This Division has been withdrawn from ALBANIA and may be moving to the DANUBE Front).

Guard Cavalry Regiment	(unlocated)
1st " "	(SOFIA)
2nd " "	(probably DANUBE front)
10th " "	(SOFIA or DANUBE front)

There is an unconfirmed report that 10 or 11 new Divisions have been raised from the old Divisional recruiting Districts. Of these the 12th, possibly the first New Division to be formed, has long been in position on the Roumanian Front. One other new Division is reported in the centre of VALEDOVO, another on the left enemy flank and a third was thought to be operating in ALBANIA with

the 3rd Division, formed partly by the 8th Division. The numerals of these Divisions might possibly be 13, 14 and 15, there would thus be six other Divisions which may be now ready to occupy the defended line, thus releasing the Divisions assembled on the Northern Frontier. The German Staff pushed this re-organization forward with a view to the employment of these troops on the Western front. This the Bulgarian Government refused to agree to having however first obtained the necessary armament from the Germans to complete these new formations.

Division and was...
 in January...
 German Division in first...
 Division - and...
 German...
 3rd...
 (This Division has been...)
 and may be...
 (General...)
 (...)
 (PROBABLY...)
 (...)
 There is an...
 in...
 Division...
 Division to be...
 Division is...
 of...
 and a third...

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 70.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

14th April 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE.

1. STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN THE CAUCASUS.
2. SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA

1. STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN THE CAUCASUS.

Since the estimate given on page 396, Intelligence Summary for 12th April, further information has been received which indicates that the Turks, having very likely come to some secret understanding with BULGARIA, have despatched several divisions to the CAUCASUS which were previously believed to have remained in THRACE.

A reliable CONSTANTINOPLE informant gives 250,000 as the strength of the force which the Turks intend to maintain in the Caucasus, and adds that it is proposed to reinforce it by 40,000 fresh troops at the end of April.

Apart from the question as to whether even a total force of 250,000 could be maintained on this front or not, it is interesting to note that if the weak Divisions already in the line, are brought up to strength by drafts and if the odd regiments reported to be on the way represent anything like the complete Divisions to which they normally belong, the total force might almost reach this figure by the end of April.

The latest information is given below :-

TIFLIS reports. The following Turkish Regiments have been definitely located by the General Staff in the Caucasus early in April.

4th Regiment.	Near ERZINJAN.
13th "	" BITLIS.
14th "	Between DIARBEEKIR and MUSE.
28th and 29th.	" TREBIZOND and BAIBURT.
One company 42nd.	" " " "

Also reported on the way to the CAUCASUS, Regts. Nos. 2, 11, 16, 17, 33. Destination of No. 57 doubtful.

Later wire from TIFLIS states :- The prisoners of the 42nd Regiment state that their company was taken from the regiment at CONSTANTINOPLE in the later half of February and transported by sea to TREBIZOND. RUSHDI Bey is O.C. 28th Division.

NOTE BY CAIRO.

The regiments definitely located in the CAUCASUS were allotted to Divisions as follows :-

5th Division,	Nos.	13, 14.
10th	"	28, 29.
13th	No.	4.
14th	No.	42.

It does not however follow that the 14th Division is going as a whole to the CAUCASUS, though this has been reported from other sources. The 13th Division was reported as approaching ERZIJAN by TIFLIS on 30th March. The 4th Regiment is presumably the advance guard. The regiments reported on the way to the CAUCASUS used to be allotted as follows :-

2nd Regiment	to	24th Division.
11th	"	to 4th
16th	"	to 6th
17th	"	to 6th
33rd	"	to 11th

The 4th and 6th Divisions were believed to have remained in THRACE. If the above information is accurate it would seem that they are being sent to the CAUCASUS Front or that they have been drawn upon for units. In the latter case there will have been some reallotment of regiments to divisions. It should be noted in this connection that information from a good CONSTANTINOPLE source says that 10,000 troops (i.e. about 3 regiments) have been sent (date unspecified) to the CAUCASUS Front from ADRIANOPLE. This may not refer to the 5th Division of the IIInd ADRIANOPLE Army Corps, which has not been at ADRIANOPLE for a long time, and quite possibly was allotted for the Egyptian campaign. It is likely that it entered SYRIA and was then diverted to DIABEKIR via RAS EL AIN.

2. OPERATIONS IN GERMAN E. AFRICA.

It is estimated that the strength of the enemy opposed to the British force in the recent operations in the KILIMANJARO Area was approximately 600 Europeans and 5000 native troops with 8 guns and 30 machine guns.

The enemy casualties during the operations were as follows :

Known to be killed or captured	9 Europeans,	103 native
		Soldiers.

Estimated number of wounded	30	"	600	"
-----------------------------	----	---	-----	---

During the night of March 22/23rd the enemy evacuated the whole of the ROWU Forest line, and retreated southwards

along the TANGA Railway. The dense bush prevents an effective pursuit. One 4.2 inch gun which had been salvaged from the "Königsberg" fell into our hands.

The enemy's retreat was due to a threatened attack against his flank by General Van de Venter's Mounted Brigade. The enemy has now been compelled to evacuate the whole of the KILIMANJARO Area which, with its network of rivers, mountains, swamps and forests, was so admirably suited for defensive warfare.

During the last few days the occupation of KARONGA by the Portuguese has been reported.

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 71.

Comp

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

15th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

GERMAN POLICY.

1. GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.
2. VERDUN OFFENSIVE.
3. MILITARY POSITION.
4. FRENCH LOSSES AT VERDUN.

Please initial ~~pass~~ ~~quarterly~~ return to IG

*G.O.C. from
S. Comp*

Go. seen.

IG noted.

*Adm. Qu. [unclear]
Adm. Qu. [unclear]
S. [unclear]*

GERMAN POLICY.1. GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.

The trend of German Policy can to a certain extent be traced in the attitude of the European Press that has come under the influence of the German Government. Within the last few weeks the Germans have been supplying editors of papers in different neutral countries with inspired versions of the results of the VERDUN offensive, and the dissension that they claim exists between the various Entente Governments. Distorted "telegrams" of unrest in British protectorates and dependencies continue to appear. But it is chiefly interesting to note that the editors of some papers ~~formally~~^{erly} strongly pro-German, and in countries allied to Germany, are now freely expressing opinions that are certainly anything but complimentary to the Central Powers. For instance the Bulgarian Press lays stress upon the declarations of Dr. RADOSLAVOFF, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, that the relationship between Bulgaria and her neutral neighbours was excellent, and that an agreement based upon mutual trust had been arrived at between Turkey and Bulgaria. It is well known that the policy of Germany is directed towards making herself the arbiter of the affairs of her Allies, and there is good reason to believe that this Turko-Bulgarian agreement is in opposition to German policy. The resentment of both Turks and Bulgars to the German administration has produced a common bond of sympathy between these two countries.

The Turks have taken troops from THRACE to reinforce their hard-pressed divisions in the CAUCASUS, and the Bulgarian troops hurried to the Roumanian Frontier are on arrival deserting in large numbers. There is a wide-spread feeling of discontent against King Ferdinand and his German

policy. The triumphal arches that were set up in anticipation of his return, with the promised reinforcements of German troops, have been taken down; and rumour persists in reporting that King Ferdinand, fearful that the failure of the Germans to carry out their promises may result in an attempt on his life, is content to remain in Germany, while Bulgarian troops are employed in furthering the ambitions and policy of the Central Powers.

2. VERDUN OFFENSIVE.

The German Press Bureau, fully aware of the change of feeling, and the ill effects of the failure of the VERDUN offensive, have issued a semi-official appreciation of the situation. In this it is stated that the operations at VERDUN should be judged on broad principles and not so much by the extent of the ground gained in France. The following is an extract :-

"The Allies hoped by a common offensive on all
 "fronts, delivered at the same time, to be able to
 "neutralize our advantage of fighting on the inner line.
 "This advantage lies in the fact that we are in a
 "position, due to the alterations and improvements of
 "railway communication, to move troops over a relatively
 "short distance, and therefore in a relatively short
 "time, to wherever we seek a decision, or with the
 "object of preventing the enemy obtaining a decision
 "where he wishes. Our own strategy of surprise offen-
 "sives on the one hand, and the slight danger of being
 "surprised on the other, are the undoubted advantages
 "of our central position. These advantages become less,
 "indeed they may disappear, when a distinction no
 "longer exists between threatened and unthreatened

"positions on our front, that is to say, if all parts
 "are attacked at the same time. But now the General
 "Staff by its offensive at VERDEN has anticipated
 "this. The enemy's plan has been destroyed by
 "dictating this strategic law to them. All the
 "French reserves, the very troops set aside for the
 "offensive, have been rushed to VERDUN, not with
 "theatrical
 "the thought of "à BERLIN", but with the much more
 "prosaic hope of saving what is left to save. The
 "strategic offensive in preparation has been trans-
 "formed into a tactical defensive".

Thus is the failure of the German offensive to
 gain its objective explained. It is then pointed out
 how the Russian attacks over a front of 200 miles have been
 resisted by HINDENBURG, and how the British have been
 forced to take over more line to release the French troops
 needed to reinforce the threatened area. These "facts"
 have some influence, but the failure of the Germans to
 capture VERDUN, even at the sacrifice of troops she can
 now ill spare, remains unexplained.

How utterly untrue is this German version is fully
 understood when the actual state of affairs is appreciated.
 The enemy attempt to seize the initiative has failed. The
 French troops have withstood the most carefully prepared
 offensive on a narrow front by the employment of only local
 reserves. Neither the French nor any of the Allies were
 forced to alter or deflect their settled plans, and the
 lengthening of the British line was but the fulfilment of
 developments already agreed upon. It is said that the
 Germans on renewing the attack on the 1st of April
 employed 450,000 troops and were prepared to sacrifice up

to 200,000 men to gain VERDUN. The obvious difficulty that the enemy now finds in carrying out his plans in the Balkan Theatre proves that he has not sufficient troops to enable him to face with equanimity the fearful losses that he has suffered at VERDUN. There is evidence to show that troops have been moved from Belgium to reinforce the left bank of the MEUSE (11th Bavarian Division recently in the Balkans) and altogether some 22 German Divisions have been employed, 5 on the left and 17 on the right bank of the river. Of these divisions 13 had not fought since December 1915, showing how long prepared has been this offensive, and there now appears to be only the 7th Reserve Division (10 battalions) and the 192nd Brigade (8 battalions) of fresh troops remaining in the VERDUN area. Prisoners have been captured by the French who belong to the classes most recently called up. And from Belgium and Holland it is reported that the Landwehr and Landsturm troops guarding the lines of communication were hurriedly sent to Flanders to replace troops rushed south.

3. MILITARY POSITION.

From the foregoing it should not be assumed that the enemy are now incapable of again striking a blow, in the words of the German Press Bureau "to obtain a decision, or with the object of preventing the enemy obtaining a decision". The tremendous force and penetrating power of the German method of attack on a narrow front makes it possible for the enemy to still intimidate countries like Roumania and possibly Holland. And the length of the Russian line and the difficulties of lateral communication in rear might make it difficult to counter such an operation by Hindenburg. The probability however seems that the enemy will, when making these offensives, endeavour to have for his objective some town, or position of

importance that can be gained as a result of a comparatively short advance. The closing of the Roumanian-Hungarian frontier, and the concentration of Bulgarian troops, has led the Roumanian Ministry to fear that the Germans have in preparation such an offensive against them. The importance of Roumania at this time is such that the Central Powers may consider that it is essential to delay any alteration of Roumanian policy. The fact that so far the enemy has failed to obtain any decision at VERDUN does not prevent him endeavouring to gain a decision on the Eastern front or against Roumania. The enemy cannot afford to relapse from the strategic offensive to the tactical defensive without suffering the final collapse of his prestige, and with it possibly the adherence of both Turks and Bulgarians.

That the German Staff consider that the time in which to gain decisions is limited is shown by his continued attacks on VERDUN, and that he is recalling his troops from these subsidiary theatres where no decision can easily be obtained.

Since the nine German Regiments still remaining in Macedonia are not capable of employment in any arduous operations and their presence has a moral value on the Bulgarian Army, they may not be recalled. On the other hand it is now reported that the ALPINE CORPS, that has been specially organised and equipped for service in the Balkans, and recently identified in the MONASTIR area, has been recalled and is moving North through SILESIA. For some days intelligence reports from Roumania have notified German troops being transported up the Danube in ships and barges. This information as yet lacks ^{full} confirmation, but if it be true, affords an indication for the first time that the enemy is now forced to concentrate his attention upon operations in the main

theatres, leaving the Turks and Bulgarians to continue their operations only assisted by German and Austrian artillery and technical troops and a few infantry units of indifforent value. At the same time it has been confirmed from many sources that the enemy positions in Macodonia have been made exceedingly strong, and can be hold by a comparatively small force. The Gorman Staff undoubtodly desire to neutralize Roumanian action, as far as possible, should she join the Allies. For this purpose they wish to divert her attention from her Austrian frontier to the Danube. The Bulgarian troops now assembling on their northern frontier will never willingly embark on a new campaign and the need for the enemy to re-establish his military prestige becomos daily more pressing.

4. FRENCH LOSSES AT VERDUN.

G.Q.G. FRANCE, 12th April 1916.

In an official communique the Gormans claim to have captured 35,876 unwounded prisoners in the VERDUN operations during the period 21st February - 10th April.

This figure exceeds our gross losses comprising killed, wounded and prisoners.

By a simple calculation since we know,

(A) What our total loss is exactly - and

(B) The number of wounded that we have evacuated to our hospitals & dressing stations and by estimating the number of men killed on the basis of previous calculations, verified since the commencement of the war, it is possible to arrive at the approximate detail of our losses. This gives a total of not more than 17,000 wounded and unwounded prisoners, the majority being probably wounded, which is less than half the number of unwounded prisoners claimed to have been captured by the Gormans.

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 72.

Cent/v

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

16th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.
2. USE OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHS FOR MAKING
ROUGH PLANS OF LOCALITIES.

(A plan of NEHEL is attached)

-----OOO-----
Please initial, pass quickly return to I.G.

GOC *June*

G.

Ga

I.G. notes

~~Daas Dms.~~

Daas Dms.

1. R. F. C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.

RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS, April 9th - 14th
1916.

CANAL FRONT.

Regular frontal reconnaissances of the near vicinity of the Canal found all apparently clear throughout the week.

In the Northern Section, reconnaissance of the 9th located a party of the enemy about 100 strong at BIR EL ABD and the machine came under fire. Further along the North road at BIR EL MAZAR, a party of approximately the same strength was observed.

By the 10th reinforcements appeared to have arrived at BIR EL ABD; 300 camels were observed and 6 short trenches had been dug to face West; several bell tents were observed pitched, and others lying on the ground. At BIR EL MAZAR were some 30 tents, a large white oblong building, 70 camels and several small groups of men.

Earlier in the same flight FAGAIA and the MAGHARA area were reconnoitred; a large number of wells were observed N. of the hills at FAGAIA; at MAGHARA were 9 tents, ⁶ well-built huts about 20 ft. square, and what appeared to be the concrete bed of a reservoir. The course of the road reported by the R.F.C. on the 6th was confirmed; also the curious square cleared patch (some 100 yards square) at BIR UM WERIB. The machine came under fire at MAGHARA.

On the 11th, 16 bell tents and 2 camel lines and about 100 men busy ontrenching, were reported at BIR EL ABD. The road previously reported leading S.W. from BIR BAYUD towards ZAGADAN was followed for seven miles and was apparently clear.

On the 13th BIR EL ABD and BIR EL MAZAR were revisited and photographs taken; there was some activity at both

places and a slight increase in the number of men and camels; there was also apparently some movement towards BIR EL ABD from BIR EL MAZAR. Fresh trenches had been dug at BIR EL MAZAR, but the number of tents was much the same.

Messages to our posts in the neighbourhood of KATIA were dropped on all these reconnaissances.

In the central section, besides the usual reconnaissances of No. 2 Section, RODH SALEM and JIFJAFFA were visited on the 9th. Both these places showed no change since previous reports.

On the 12th a flight was made to MOIYA HARAB; all was apparently clear except for the peaceful party of ARABS reported from SUEZ on the 11th. A message to this effect was dropped to our column in WADI MUKSHEIB. In the afternoon it was found impossible to complete a second reconnaissance owing to the weather conditions.

On the 15th the country round JIFJAFFA was reconnoitred and wireless communication with our column now at Pt. 1032 was established; and a confirmatory message dropped.

The weather had grown steadily worse since the afternoon of the 12th, when there was a bad sand-storm a few miles East of the Canal, and observation was difficult. The pilot was compelled to make a forced descent a few miles beyond the Canal, but within our lines.

In the Southern Section reconnaissance during the week from SUEZ found the immediate front apparently clear with a few minor exceptions. There was a certain amount of water in one or two of the Wadi beds on the 9th; and in the neighbourhood of BIR ABU TIF numerous horse and camel tracks. One drum was fired into the

trees, but no movement detected.

On the 11th three reconnaissances were carried out, the first in connection with a party which had gone in search of a Lewis Gun buried by the pilot and observer after a forced landing on 9/5/16 (the gun was successfully recovered) the other two to investigate a party of ARABS encamped near MOIYA HARAB. The second of these reconnaissances established that these were a peaceful party; two photographs were taken at from 100-200 feet, and messages dropped to our posts and patrols in WADI EL HAJ and WADI EL GIDDI and HALF WAY HOUSE.

Photographic reconnaissances were carried out from ISMAILIA on the 8th and 11th.

Weather conditions since the 12th have been extremely adverse, strong winds blowing during the day and resulting in bad sand-storms accompanied by brief spells of rain on the 12th and 14th.

SOUTH WESTERN FRONT.

FAYOUM and ASSIUT detachments R.F.C. *

FAYOUM.

A reconnaissance was carried out to BAHARIA (120 miles from ABU GANDIR) on April 8th. At MENDISHA, 2 bull tents and 10 BEDUIN tents were observed, otherwise the villages were apparently clear, and also the tracks leading into the oasis from the north.

ASSIUT.

Two reconnaissances were carried out on the 8th by the ASSIUT detachment. Two machines flew to MINIA and from there a reconnaissance was carried out as far North as MAGHAGHA. Both machines then returned to MINIA and a second reconnaissance of the front between MINIA and ASSIUT was carried out en route, (ASSIUT - MAGHAGHA direct is slightly over 100 miles). Both reconnaissances found all apparently clear.

* Included are two reconnaissances received too late for last week's resume.

ASSIUT.

On the 10th a reconnaissance was carried out over KHARGA oasis; all was apparently clear. The pilot was in the air 5 hours and 20 minutes.

FAYOUM.

On the 11th a reconnaissance was made over a radius of 30 miles S. & W. from ABU GANDIR. All was again clear.

No further reports on the work of these two detachments have as yet been received.

NORTH WESTERN FRONT.

SOLLUM and MERSA MATRUH detachments R.F.C. *

MERSA MATRUH.

No reconnaissances were carried out from the 7th-9th April, as a machine was being flown to CAIRO on the 7th-8th; and on the 9th a new machine was flown back the 250 miles to MATRUH.

On the 10th a reconnaissance was made to SOLLUM via BIR STASI, and on the 11th back again to SOLLUM along the coast line which was apparently clear (SOLLUM-MATRUH = 125 miles)

On the 12th a reconnaissance was carried out to the South and West of MATRUH.

SOLLUM.

On the same day (12th) a reconnaissance was carried out to the South and West of SOLLUM.

Fuller reports on the work carried out by these detachments during the week have not yet come in.

* Including reports too late for inclusion in last week's resume.

2. USE OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHS FOR MAKING ROUGH PLANS OF LOCALITIES.

A marked feature of the valuable reconnaissance work

carried out during the present operations on the Canal by the R.F.C. and R.N.A.S., has been the large number of excellent photographs secured. These photographs confirm and supplement the information brought back by the observers and may provide additional points of interest.

Much of this information is at once apparent on taking up the photographs and more is soon disclosed to the trained eyes; but it is possible to make further use of these photographs when they have yielded up their information of immediate value. One such means is to use them in the preparation of maps and rough plans (e.g. rough plan of MEKHL distributed with today's Bulletin).

For the preparation of accurate maps it is necessary that the photographs should overlap one another and be taken vertically and from a uniform height; these conditions will not in general be secured unless the flight has been made with this end in view. It is, however, possible to produce plans less accurate, but very useful from photographs taken during the ordinary reconnaissance flights. Accuracy not being of first importance, any photograph which has ^{nearly} been taken vertically can be traced direct and in the case of a compilation from several photographs taken at different times differences in scale are adjusted by eye or, if necessary, by squaring.

With oblique photographs the difficulties are much greater. The distortion has to be corrected mainly by eye with the help of photographs taken from different directions, and the result can only be very rough but if an accurate small scale map exists it may be possible to enlarge this and so provide a controlling framework for the detail.

The main outlines of the plan having been laid down and

the principal objects inserted, their nature, where doubtful can be determined in various ways. Other photographs taken under varying conditions of light, distance, direction, etc., often provide evidence. Shadows are a most valuable clue. Reports from observers, from officers with previous knowledge of the district, and from native agents form another important source of information. Incidentally the photographs provide a most valuable check on the statements of the latter, whose estimates of numbers of tents, etc., frequently betray a tendency to megalomania.

Such plans have been found useful in several ways. They combine several sources of information and can be reproduced with far greater ease than the original photographs. They epitomise the information already obtained and are therefore useful to new observers and eliminate repetition of facts already known, they are convenient for recording and for communicating the results of further reconnaissance, and in the case of combined flights simplify the allotment of targets or special objectives among the several machines.



CONFIDENTIAL.
1973.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

18th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.
2. THE SUPPLY OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT VERDUN.

Note by G.Q.G. France.

000

AM

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

There continues a steady concentration of Bulgarian troops in the KULA - MELNIK district. It is thought that this may be preparatory to departure of still more units to the ROUMANIAN Frontier. Reports continue to be received that Austrian heavy guns are being mounted both for coast defence and to protect the approaches to Bulgarian Thrace.

On the enemy right flank there are reported to be 20,000 troops billeted at MONASTIR and in the villages to the south and south west.

Further to the west on the Albanian border the enemy are employing the services of various irregular bands who continue to harry and threaten the Greeks of Northern EPIRUS. There is considerable evidence to show that the Bulgarians have been highly successful in obtaining large supplies of food stuffs from the Greek Prefect in the FLORINA district. It was to a great extent due to this source of supply that the enemy have been able to maintain so large a force.

From the evidence available there seems to be but little likelihood of any German or Austrian troops being again in the Monastir District, and the 8th Bulgarian Division that was in this neighbourhood is also being withdrawn.

The interest in this area of the Balkan Theatre is now more centred upon the Albanian coast at VALONA. In a telegram from COMANDO SUPREMO dated the 15th April, the Italian General Staff confirm the intelligence received from other sources, and express the utmost confidence that the Italian Force now at VALONA will be ample to meet any eventuality. The withdrawal of the Bulgarian regular troops from Albania has increased the difficulties that will beset the Austrians in their advance; the four divisions that are approaching VALONA are making but

slow progress, and the Italian troops have been able to profit by this delay to make their defensive works thoroughly secure. The great obstacles that the country offers to the transport for a force of even four divisions has had the identical effect on the Austrians as the Germans and Bulgarians experienced, under far worse weather conditions, during their advance to the Greek Frontier.

In the centre of the enemy line the German 101st and 103rd Divisions continue to improve their defensive positions. The Allies have pushed troops out some distance in front of the SALONIKA positions on the VARDAR flank, and work is proceeding in the construction of advanced works. The cavalry patrols succeed in drawing the enemy's gun fire and there is now daily mutual artillery activity, but no close fighting.

In short the situation appears to be developing into the enemy attempting to contain as many Allied troops as possible by holding only the salient points of his position in strength, and releasing as many Bulgarian Divisions as possible to proceed at once to the Danube. Under these circumstances trench warfare will become general as soon as one side or the other determines to advance to the neutral zone on the frontier. It is difficult to believe that the enemy will advance, because he is equally gaining his object by remaining immobile behind his lines.

Germany has no wish to increase her obligations on enterprises that have little prospect of reaching a decision in the near future. The report that the ALPINE CORPS has been withdrawn still lacks confirmation, but if the 105th German Division be excluded (being on the Danube Front) there are only seven German infantry regiments actually in the line, with the possibility of the four regiments

of the ALPINE CORPS being still in the Balkan Theatre, and within distance of recall.

The Bulgarian Divisions remaining on the Greek Frontier have had attached special German machine gun detachments, and the artillery is under the sole control of either Austrian or German officers.

The proposed arrival of Serbian troops at SALONIKA offers special advantages and the plans of the Allies are already causing the Greeks, under German influence, to betray signs of extreme, but impotent, displeasure. The power of Greece to act may be slight, but the possibilities of diplomatic procedure are considerable and will serve the German purpose equally well.

2. THE SUPPLY OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT VERDUN. Note by G.Q.G. Franco.

The French General Staff have supplied for information the following details of the method employed in the supply of the firing line during the operations in the Verdun salient.

16th April, 1916.

The French General Staff did not wait for the Germans to launch their attack upon Verdun to organize in the district a service of transportation which would be capable of guaranteeing the supplies of all kinds that were required by the troops holding the position.

It was evident that the traffic on the VERDUN- STENNEBOULD Railway might be seriously overburdened and disorganized, and possibly stopped altogether from the commencement of the operations. It was therefore all the more important to supplement the railway service by a system that would ensure handling the great volume of traffic with the utmost rapidity.

The General Staff decided that motor transport alone could fulfil this requirement.

From the first days of February it had been decided to set up in the neighbourhood of Verdun an organisation, to be named "The Board of Control of Motor Traffic" which with other important functions was entrusted with the duty of taking all necessary steps to ensure that the transport requirements of the Staff should be fully met.

In order to carry out these duties 200 sections of automobiles, comprising 300 officers, 8,500 men and about 4,000 vehicles were placed under the orders of the Board.

In motor supplies alone, (the daily figures for an average trip of 70 kilometres, per vehicle) amounted to over 44,000 gallons of petrol, 4,400 gallons of oil, and about 4,000 lbs of grease.

Organization adopted.

It was obvious that for any service to be effective it would be necessary to work on a very definite system.

It was first of all laid down that the full capacity of the railway system of the Meuse Valley should be utilized to transport everything possible in the way of Commissariat supplies, whilst the motor transport would be responsible for the movements of troops, & the transport of munitions, and engineering material, and such supplies of food etc., that it might be necessary to make in special depots in the advanced lines as the situation demanded.

But this mere division of labour was not sufficient. It was also most necessary that the circulation of the motor transport should be as easy and rapid as possible and to accomplish this, the Board decided :-

- (1) That the main Verdun Road should be exclusively reserved for motor transport.

- (2) That motor lorries should not transfer their loads to horse-drawn vehicles, (since this would involve the loss of time in unloading) but in every case motor transport vehicles would discharge to special supply depots or ammunition dumps, which were established at certain convenient spots.
- (3) It was decided to establish a special Inspection Service, and to arrange for piloting, in order that there should be an even flow of traffic on the road.
- (4) A definite organization was also set up to ensure that the road should be kept in thorough repair.

The importance of this repair service, and of the piloting and inspection was insured by dividing the 75 kilometres of the journey into districts; each district being placed under the control of an officer. These services were in operation night and day, and were performed by 19 officers, 13 "conductors", and 225 men.

RESULTS.

This organization was inaugurated on mid-day of the 22nd February. The systems of control, piloting and road repair came into immediate operation.

In less than four hours the road was clear, and there has been no cessation in the work since that time, the traffic on this section being restricted solely to motor transport.

(A) During the period from the 22nd February to the 7th March only, that is to say, 15 days, 22,500 tons of munitions have been carried and discharged at particular points.

The average daily trip of each motor lorry has been about 135 kilometres. Motor lorries employed in the transport of munitions alone have covered about 1,200,000 kilometres in 15 days.

(B) During the same period 190 groups of motors have moved about 250 battalions, which is roughly equal to a total of

190,000 men. These vehicles have traversed about 900,000 kilometres

empty and 800,000 kilometres loaded.

(C) The groups of motor transport that were told off for various special duties, such as supplies, of food, medical stores, and engineering material, the evacuation of the slightly wounded and the civil population has amounted in these 15 days to about 2,500 tons of material and 10,000 persons.

In short this experience has shown that the supply of ammunition required by a great army and the capacity to mass reinforcements rapidly at required positions, can be effectively undertaken by the employment of mechanical transport from the advanced ^{base} depots ^{direct} to the firing line even while heavy fighting is in progress.

During this period under review, from the 22nd Feb. to the 7th March, the motor transport has performed duties that would otherwise have necessitated the employment of 15 trains of all kinds per day.

The circulation in the reserved area for motor transport has been at the average of 1,700 lorries of all types per day, which is equivalent to one lorry for every 25 seconds.

At some places on the route this rate of traffic has been actually doubled.

In spite of this volume of traffic, and in spite of the most adverse weather conditions (snow, frost etc.,) the regularity of the supply has never ceased, and has been continuously maintained throughout, and at the same time the road has been continuously kept in good order.

It is only right to mention that the whole of the personnel, Officers, Conductors and men have shown throughout the most remarkable zeal and efficiency, amidst conditions of the greatest difficulty and of the most exhausting kind. All have understood and carried out their task most satisfactorily which has been a factor of the greatest value for ensuring the success of our operations.

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 74.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

19th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.

(a) Seaplane reconnaissances in the ADEN
Hinterland.
(With sketch Map).

(b) General News, Turkey.

2. VERDUN. Telegram from G.Q.G. France.

----- ○ ○ ○ -----

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.(a) ADEN HINTERLAND. Seaplane reconnaissance of the enemy's positions.

The enemy's forces opposed to the British garrison at ADEN consist of about 2,500 mixed Turks and Arabs. The enemy's position is concave and runs along the line WAHT - SUBAR - FIYUSH. The centre of the British position is SHEIKH OTHMAN. The enemy's line of communication is the coast road from JEDDA and MECCA passing via TALIZ. The hostility of the IDRISSEI, who inhabit country lying directly across the line makes the Turkish position precarious.

The country between our position and that of the enemy is fairly open, with patches of sand and thick scrub.

In the vicinity of WAHT and LAHEJ there is a good deal of cultivation, the country being cut up into numerous fields, separated by "kunds" and irrigation channels.

There are many tracks through the fields but very few suitable for wheeled traffic, except in the neighbourhood of LAHEJ where there are bridges of wood or stone across numerous deep nullahs.

The villages are generally surrounded by trees, mostly palms and scrub. Mosques and a few isolated towers are the principal landmarks.

H.M.S. "Raven II" of the East Indies and Egypt Seaplane Squadron, proceeded to ADEN on March 30th to locate and bomb the enemy camps by means of seaplanes. On Friday, March 31st, a reconnaissance was made at dawn and despite low clouds, the enemy's principal camp was located near SUBAR. The seaplane was attacked with rifle and machine-gun fire. Recently dug wells were observed at AD DARB, WAHT and FIYUSH. The camp and the cavalry camp South of ABDULLAH BIN AHMED were active.

Immediately on returning from the reconnaissance, a bombing flight took place, and five Seaplanes went up, dropping in all 20 bombs (16 and 20 lb) the object being the camp. There was considerable rifle and machine gun fire on this occasion also.

In the afternoon of the same day, five machines proceeded to bomb SUBAR, 16 bombs being dropped. The atmospheric conditions were extremely bad.

A further bombing attack was directed against the camp at dawn on 1st April; four seaplanes were employed and 19 bombs and 250 flechettes were released. The camp appeared to have been vacated on account of the attack of the day before. There was no firing at the machines.

Later the same morning, a reconnaissance was undertaken of SHAREJ - WAHT - SUBAR and FIYUSH. Gun emplacement were observed at SHAREJ - MAKHAYA ALI QBED - SUBAR and on SUBAR HILL. At FIYUSH a position for 2 guns was observed S.E. of the town, and W. of the town was a position for 4 guns and a possible machine gun emplacement for 6 guns. SUBAR was found to be entrenched to the S. and FIYUSH has a semi circle of trenches 200 yards, from the village with a

line of outpost trenches about 1½ miles from village.

Early on April 2nd, four Scaplanes were sent to bomb FIYUSH. They used in all 10 bombs and 500 flechottes.

Immediately following this bombing flight, a reconnaissance was made of part of the enemy line WANT - SUBAR - ABDULLA BIN AHMED and FIYUSH. Owing to engine trouble the reconnaissance was considerably shortened. Gun emplacements were newly observed at SHAREJ, SUBAR and ABDULLA BIN AHMED. Entrenchments were seen at SHAREJ, E. of WANT, SUBAR and ABDULLA BIN AHMED. The huts at SUBAR Camp were observed damaged from our bombs. Pamphlets were distributed at the chief places passed over.

Agents returning from LAHEJ on April 1st reported 12 persons and 6 mules killed and many wounded by bombs between WANT and BIN AHMED; 6 other persons had been killed and many wounded in WANT and the houses had been damaged. Since the appearance of the Scaplanes, the inhabitants of LAHEJ and the surrounding villages had fled to the Desert, leaving the Turks alone to defend the positions. The Turks fired at the aeroplanes without success. The Turks had told the Arabs that they would invent an object "to stop the Scaplanes dropping bombs and make them stand still"

A second report stated that bombs dropped in LAHEJ had caused fatalities and material damage; a bomb was dropped between two guns at SUBAR, killing several men. The Scaplane attack has caused the Turks to anticipate a military attack on FIYUSH.

Other Arabs who came in later reported with reference to the Scaplane attack on Turkish positions at ADEH that 20 Turks, 6 Arabs, 29 Mullahs, 7 guns, 1 camel and many military huts had been destroyed.

(b) TURKEY (GENERAL NEWS)

Armonia.

The Russians have driven the Turks out of a strong position, 16 miles East of TREBIZOND, after severe fighting. In the vicinity of BITLIS they have routed a Turkish Division which had recently arrived from CONSTANTINOPLE.

Smyrna District.

There is great activity in the coast defences on both shores of the GULF of SMYRNA. These have been thoroughly reorganised under the direction of LIMAN von SANDERS and his Staff. A large number of Austrian guns and gunners have been imported, and a new aerodrome has been constructed.

The Turks still maintain three complete Divisions in the SMYRNA District (46, 47, and 48) and obviously expect an Allied landing in the vicinity.

On 21st March an alarm reached SMYRNA that the British were landing at KIMITURIA, 14 miles S.S.E. of the

DEVELIKEUI (the Wireless Station near SMYRNA)

Troops were hurriedly ordered to the spot. But the landing turned out to be a raiding party who carried off a flock of sheep and a few coast guards.

PERSIA.

Russian Forces are in touch with the Turks near KARINS a about 150 miles by road from BAGHDAD.

SYRIA.

KRESS von KRESSENSTEIN, Chief of Staff to DJEMAL PASHA is reported to be at JERUSALEM. He holds the title of "Director of Operations", Army of Egypt and is reported on good authority to be displeased with the situation.

The morale of the Turkish Army in Syria is bad, and service is extremely unpopular.

Three or four German aeroplanes are reported to have arrived at BIR SABA and the Turks have issued a warning to their troops in SINAI not to fire upon them. They will be painted white and marked with the Iron Cross. H.M.S. "Anno" reports that she was unsuccessfully attacked by 2 aeroplanes off GAZA on the 16th instant.

In addition to the troops previously known, parts of the 27th Division have been located in Syria. The 79th Regt. which belongs to this Division are now supplying the garrisons of posts in SINAI.

SINAI.

The Turkish efforts to obtain a water supply at JIFJAJA have failed, and the enemy is now short of proper drilling plant. A German "water diviner" was employed for many months at a very large salary. He is now said to have been court-martialled and relieved of his duties. The pipes for the "conduit" leading westward from EL KUSSAIMA were taken partly from an aqueduct in the LEBANON, partly from an orange grove at EL ARISH and the remainder from a steamer going to Japan which was requisitioned at JAFFA.

The new roads made by the Turks in SINAI are reported on good authority to be not as good as they appear on the air photographs. They have little or no foundation and simply consist of cleared surfaces. They are not suitable for heavy motor traffic.

The Turkish General Staff has not contradicted its statement to the troops in SINAI that the attack on the Canal will take place at the end of April when the German Auxiliary Corps is reported to arrive. Work on the roads and wells is therefore being rapidly pushed on in anticipation of this event.

to be
due

2. VERDUN. Telegram from G.Q.G. Franco.

The following telegram has been received from G.Q.G.

Francis, dated 15th April, dealing with operations at Verdun

from the 9th to the 15th April :-

From the 9th to the 15th April, the German Army has developed an attack in the neighbourhood of VERDUN on both banks of the River MEUSE.

The enemy occupied MALANCOURT on the 20th of March and BETHINCOURT, voluntarily evacuated by our troops, on the night of the 8/9th April, thus commanding the approaches of the FORGES Stream from which quarter attacks could develop.

On the 9th April the enemy made a general offensive on the whole length of the front between HAUCOURT and CUMIERES and at the same time further to the west he attacked to the North of AVOCOURT and against the wood at MALANCOURT; on the right bank of the Meuse his attacks developed as far as the wood and farm at HAUDROMONT. Everywhere the German troops were repulsed ^{except} to the south of BETHINCOURT, where they succeeded in entering one of our advanced works which had been first completely destroyed by heavy artillery fire. Also on POIVRE Hill they gained a footing in one of our trenches situated to the east of VACHERAUVILLE.

On the 10th the fighting continued at BETHINCOURT and in the direction of MORT HOMME.

On the 12th a strongly developed local attack was made by the enemy on CAURETTES wood to the west of CUMIERES. Large enemy forces were engaged in this action. Indeed between HAUCOURT and the Meuse we have taken prisoners belonging to 12 different regiments and different divisions, two of which appear to have been engaged for the first time.

On the 10th in the sector between DOUAUMONT and VAUX, the enemy made another attack against the CAILLETTE wood.

On the 11th, in order to check the progress which our troops had made during the previous days, the enemy reinforced his line by two divisions, which we succeeded in beating off, and in inflicting heavy losses. At one point only did the enemy succeed in gaining our trenches from which he was immediately expelled, leaving prisoners in our hands.

It seems to be certain that the enemy will renew his attacks. The Kaiser, when inspecting one of the German Divisions detailed to assault our lines between DOUAUMONT and VAUX a few days later, announced that if it were true to say that the decision of the war in 1870 had been decided at Paris it was as certain that the decision of the present war would be fought out at VERDUN.

G.H.Q. NOTE.


With reference to the telegram from G.Q.G. France regarding the German estimate of the French losses at VERDUN published in the Bulletin of 15th April, it is necessary to make the following correction:

The enemy have stated that they have captured 35,876 unwounded prisoners: The French General Staff in disclaiming this, point out that this figure exceeds the total of the "missing", that is to say men either killed, wounded or injured who were left on that part of the battlefield that was occupied subsequently by the enemy. Line 4 of this telegram (G.Q.G. Summary No. 71, page 416) should therefore read: "This figure exceeds the grand total of our missing (killed, wounded or prisoners)".

-----OOO-----

PART OF ADEN PROTECTORATE.

Scale 1 inch = 4 miles



CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 75.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

20th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.
2. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

-----○○○-----

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.

ARMENIA.

The news of the fall of TREBIZOND announced by PETROGRAD yesterday, comes partly as a surprise, not because it was unexpected, but because it was hardly expected so soon, owing to the difficulties of the country. On the 18th instant, the Russians were twelve miles away and the final stage must have been a Turkish rout. It was believed even in Russian circles that the decisive effort would not be made until the 23rd April which is a great religious festival in Russia.

The capture of this most important Turkish seaport on the BLACK SEA coast of ASIA MINOR will undoubtedly have a great moral, as well as strategical, effect on the situation.

It has long been expected by well informed circles in CONSTANTINOPLE, who regard it as another nail driven into the coffin of the Young Turk.

SIFYRMA DISTRICT.

Two Deserters belonging to the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Depot Regiment, 4th Army Corps at MAGNESIA, who escaped from there about the 10th March, gave the following information.

The troops remaining when the Allies evacuated the Dardanelles, were sent to their depots to be reformed. 100 soldiers who ate provisions abandoned by the Allies on the Peninsula have died of poison. At MAGNESIA there is only one regiment which contains 8,000 men. 3,000 are recruits under instruction; 4,000 are old soldiers; the remainder peasants. They are armed with old Martini rifles, and even with farmers' guns. An old German officer is in command, the remaining officers are

Turkish. The troops are in a lamentable condition. During three months many died at MAGNESIA of fatigue, hunger, vermin, and the lack of drugs. There are, however, no diseases. Men only receive meat once a week - generally camel's meat. Their staple diet is haricot beans and bad olive oil. 20 French and English prisoners taken from merchant steamers are confined at MAGNESIA. They are allowed to go about with an escort. Movements of troops towards ERZERUM have been numerous and precipitous during the last few weeks.

At EPHEBUS the large railway bridge was lately bombarded by Allied warships. Five large calibre shells did no damage but two shells struck a military train which happened to be arriving. Three wagons were destroyed. The train carried 800 soldiers coming from AIDIN and many were killed or wounded.

At AIDIN there are said to be no troops at all. Close to the town a wireless telegraph station is being constructed upon a hill. The large bridge over the MEANDER was carried away by a flood last year.

Locusts are reported to have made their appearance in the SMYRNA and AIDIN districts. There has been insufficient rain and the harvest is not more than ^{one third of} that of last year.

The following general news is circulating in ANATOLIA:

The junction of the Russians and the English in the BAGHDAD region is about to be effected.

Armonian massacres have taken place in ANGORA.

Christian soldiers who came from that place three months ago report that 7,000 men are employed on the construction of new roads.

The troops who were in garrison in MAGNESIA received an order a month ago to join the formations operating on the SUEZ CANAL.

After the fall of ERZERUM their destination was changed to TREDIZOND via ANGORA. The massacre of Armonians at ADANA three months ago is confirmed. Part of the Armonian population fled to the interior so precipitately that the children who were left behind died of hunger in the streets. Some of them were collected by the Turks. The houses were pillaged and the spoils divided among the soldiers joining in the massacre. At SMYRNA the Armonians were not touched.

SYRIA.

Information from several sources indicates that the Turkish army is committing every kind of excess in Northern Syria. This is said to be due to the lack of food and clothing.

The behaviour of the Germans in Syria has been very bad. With the exception of KRESS von KRESSENSTEIN, who is stated on good authority to be an extremely capable man and a gentleman. The German officers employed with the army of Egypt appear to be of the lowest class.

The Chief of the Lines of Communication at DAMASCUS

is Lt. Col. Count WOLFSKEHL.

SINAI.

Great importance is attached by the Turks to the development of the HASSANA - MAGHARA Road, and its extension on through the dunes to the Coastal region. This is due to the failure to find water at JIFJAJA

The following tolograph lines are reported to exist :-

- (1) From BIR SABA through AUJA, KOSSAIMA and HASSANA to RODH SALEM.
- (2) RODH SALEM to HAMMA.
- (3) HAMMA to EL ARISH via IBNI (the cross roads north of GEBEL LIBNI).
- (4) IBNI to AUJA via the WADI EL ARISH.
- (5) IBNI to HASSANA.
- (c) HASSANA to MEHEL.

2. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G FRANCE, dated 18th April.

The 22nd Reserve Corps which had been withdrawn from the Balkans was engaged in front of VERDUN on the 9th April, having until that date remained in reserve north of the OISE.

The 1st Division of the 1st Army Corps together with another Division, so far not identified, have been brought from the Russian front to the WOEVRE District.

In addition considerable calls have been made on the divisions that were allotted for operations in MACEDONIA.

Thus the wastage inflicted upon the German troops before VERDUN has made it necessary for the German General Staff to modify their plan of operations in the other theatres subordinating everything to the fighting at VERDUN.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 76.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

21st April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST.
2. ENEMY ACTIVITY ON THE GREEK FRONTIER.

SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST.

In Greece the Government are faced with a situation of extreme difficulty both from outside and within. The Central Powers have now become aware of the Allied intention of transporting the Serbian Army from CORFU to SALONIKA across Greek territory. The Allies were anxious to obtain the consent of the Greek Government to use the CORINTH CANAL as the quickest and safest route. To this proposal the Greek Prime Minister returned a flat refusal. The occupation of ARGOSTOLI in the island of CEPHALONIA as a base for naval operations in the IONIAN SEA made the protection of the Allied transports a matter of far less difficulty should the route by the CANAL be adopted since the short open sea passage southwards from CORFU and Northwards in the Eastern Aegean to SALONIKA could be well patrolled by the Allied Fleets. The Ministers of the Entente Powers pointed out to the Greek Prime Minister that it was as important to Greece as to the Allies that the situation at SALONIKA should be cleared up as soon as possible.

The Allies having had their first proposal refused them, then suggested that the Serbian troops should be transported by the Greek Railway from PATRAS to LARISSA covering the whole distance by rail to SALONIKA, with the exception of that uncompleted section of the new railway, south-east of VERRIA which would be negotiated by march route. As the lesser of two evils the Greek Government promised to reconsider their decision regarding the possible use of the Canal Route. It was pointed out that the railway from PATRAS is of very small capacity and involved a compulsory break of the journey in ATHENS. There the matter, for the time being, rests as far as the Entente Powers are concerned. But in order possibly to influence the final decision further steps have been taken to make use of SUDA BAY in CRETE in order to have a Naval Base of operations for the adequate control of the Southern Greek Coast, where the activities of the enemy submarines have always been most noticeable.

The Central Powers on learning of this project at once warned the Greek Government that any use of the railways from PATRAS by Serbian Troops would be regarded as an unfriendly act by Greece against the Central Powers. The German wireless has been making all the capital possible out of the situation, pointing out that the Allies' plan is a flagrant breach against the Laws of Neutral States, and claiming the right to take similar action elsewhere should the Greek Government give its consent. The enemy ignores the fact that there is ample proof of how largely he has used Greek territory as his bases for active submarine operations. The veiled threats that the enemy will act in a similar manner, will have little effect on ROUMANIA and on HOLLAND (for whose consumption they are doubtless intended) since both those nations are ready to meet such an eventuality. But it will bear no comparison with the point in question, as the suggested rail passage is far removed from all active operations, and the Serbian Troops are being moved to SALONIKA with the express purpose of assisting in the defence of Greek Territory.

This is the line also adopted by the Venezelist Party, who daily grow in strength and public confidence despite all the stratagems of the present Government. It is understood that, the Allies would prefer to use the Canal rather than the Railways, and this is also more popular with M. VENEZELOS.

Besides this a sudden internal crisis has arisen over the action of a Greek Cabinet Minister, who, without the knowledge of the King, exported 100,000 flour sacks to Bulgaria that were the property of the Russian Government. The whole affair came to light by the discovery of a telegram which acknowledged that the enemy required these sacks for Military purposes, and explained the method to be adopted in concealing the transaction from the Allied Ministers. As is frequently the case when a

cabinet is in a most precarious condition the smallest matters assume a position of importance somewhat beyond their true value; and this affair of the sacks has seemingly turned Public opinion strongly against the Government.

The fall of TREBIZOND will have a considerable influence on Greek policy, since it is a generally accepted fact among the more responsible Greeks that the Germans cannot keep Turkey in Alliance should Enver be displaced, and Enver's position is distinctly weakened now that both ERZERUM and TREBIZOND have fallen to the Russians. In Roumania also there is a prevailing impression that the Russians will consolidate their position and now concentrate their whole attention upon the operations on the Eastern Front. The Roumanian Cabinet has now the support of the pro-Ally Party and with the exception of a few Extremists the whole country appears to be ready to join the Allies, and to co-operate with the Russians. So far Roumania has not been impressed by the Bulgarian and Austrian concentration, and the better informed Bulgarian papers consider that Bulgaria, having come to some form of agreement with Turkey, is not likely to embark on any offensive north of the Danube.

From the latest intelligence it is confirmed that the Austrians are withdrawing troops from ALBANIA: but at present it is not clear whether these troops will be moved to the Italian or Eastern Fronts. The Central Powers are undoubtedly anxious to induce both Greece and Roumania, as well as their Allies Bulgaria and Turkey, to believe that Austrian Troops will be employed in the Macedonian Area. But the causes that have led to withdrawal of ^{the} German troops to the main theatres are equally applicable to Austria, and the change of events in Albania, will not make an attack by the enemy on SALONIKA any more probable.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY ON THE GREEK FRONTIER.

On the morning of the 17th of April German Cavalry and small parties of infantry crossed the frontier N.E. of LAKE DOIRAN and destroyed the Greek Railway from SALONIKA to DEDEAGATCH, between DOIRAN Station and DOVA TEPE. The Greek Civil and Military Forces had previously withdrawn to POROJ and DEMIR HISSAR, which confirms the view that there is the closest understanding between the enemy and the Greek Government.

This section of the line was already commanded by the enemy's heavy artillery and was, in any case, of little value to the Allies since the destruction of the bridges at KIL INDER and DEMIR-HISSAR, undertaken at the orders of General Sarrail. The line on the other hand would have been of value to the enemy had he any intention of making an advance across the frontier on SALONIKA. The German Engineers have now completed an alternative line to the North of the frontier in the STRUMNITSA - PETRICH area, which is reported to be of normal gauge and this will provide through circulation of traffic from the VARDAR Railway system to the Bulgarian State railways. The Greeks are hurriedly withdrawing both their heavy artillery and advanced infantry detachments so recently sent up to protect the frontier. The Germans have made no subsequent move to indicate any change from their strictly defensive attitude, but, on the contrary, the Bulgarian Troops are now granted leave to sow their crops - whether with, or without the consent of the German Staff is not clear.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 77.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

22nd April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. EXPLOITATION BY GERMANY OF TURKISH COPPER.
2. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
 (Extract from Foreign Press.)

1. EXPLOITATION BY GERMANY OF TURKISH COPPER.

The news that has generally been received of the conditions now prevailing in SYRIA and ANATOLIA reflect some of the reasons which Germany had in mind in wishing to procure 'a place in the Sun'.

It was only realised after the commencement of the war how completely Germany had cornered the copper market of the world. With the exception of a very few Australian firms, who had resolutely refused to admit the German element, practically every firm trading in metals, either in England, France, or America, whatever its trade name might be, was indirectly in the hands of the Enemy.

Whether this had been done with 'malice aforethought'

or purely as a lucrative business proposition with a market that could be easily rigged, it is impossible to say. But the enormous power it gave to the Enemy in the early days of the war is obvious.

With the blockade of the seas becoming closer, and other modes of import becoming gradually closed, Germany felt that the East was a great possibility for the collection of metal.

Turkey and Syria have always used an enormous lot of copper. From the days of the Arabian Nights, when the cauldron and the cooking pot, and 'the genie' played their part, to the present, Turkish villages have been full of copper utensils of all kinds. Now that paper money, both of Germany and Turkey is daily becoming more discredited, the villager is finding his mortar and pestle, his coffee pot, and cauldron, the most acceptable medium for barter. All this finds its way to Germany.

This is not the only new supply which Germany has discovered in Turkey. Lately Germany has restarted the working of the ARGHANA Mines, near DIABEK. These mines are perhaps some of the richest ^{the world} in ~~Europe~~ and till now Turkey has kept a most careful watch that this potential wealth was not exploited, but she has never worked them on modern scientific lines herself. It is only a further sign how completely she has handed herself over to her Ally.

But lately there have not been signs lacking that Turkey is beginning to realize that her Ally is not entirely moved by Altruistic motives:- Even such commodities as sugar, which Austria and Germany have in abundance are not allowed to be exported to her Allies, who are in dire need of it. In the meantime the country is being drained of copper and foodstuffs as far as they can get hold of them. But the latter they are finding increasingly difficult to procure. Thrace and the Bosphorus littoral are probably pretty well drained, but in the Lebanon and Syria mutton can be bought as low as 1½ pt. a lb, or 5 lbs of meat could be exchanged for 1 lb. of corn.

Owners are forced to sell for the lack of food on which to keep their animals. At present it is impossible for Germany to get these supplies owing to lack of facilities of communication. The railways are blocked with troops and war material, and the shortage of fuel would make transport almost prohibitive.

But nevertheless the exploitation of the country has been thorough. Men have been taken for the armies even after paying the exemption tax several times over.

Turkey is cut off from any means of expressing her misery, but its inhabitants doubtless would express their feelings like many others in Turkey by saying, as a paper lately expressed it, "qu'ils préfèrent au paradis des Allemands l'enfer des Russes".

GERMANS AND AUSTRIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, (Extracts from Foreign Press.

It is not easy to appreciate ^{what is} the actual internal condition of either Germany or Austria Hungary. There recently appeared an article in the German "DEUTSCHE SPORT" urging that the Government should follow the example of Austria where all jockeys advertised to ride in this seasons' races are exempted from Military Service and the racing programme is to be fully carried out in the interest of horse breeding. The German paper claims that

as racing must be of equal value to horse breeding everywhere it is only to be expected that the Berlin Authorities will make similar concessions. This seems far from probable as all recent reports show that lads of 16 are now being trained, and the rejected of various classes are being re-examined on far less stringent conditions and sent to training centres if they are in any way capable of performing garrison or other light duties.

Some interesting facts regarding the labour market in Germany have been disclosed by a Trades Union Leader. It should be remembered that the German Government have for many years done everything possible to discourage and to restrict the Labour and Socialist Organizations, whose rising power was one of the contributing causes that induced Germany to strike in 1914, since the Socialist Party was becoming a serious menace to the military schemes of the Prussian War Party. In the middle of 1914 there were 2,510,000 "free trades unionists" and a year later this figure had fallen to 1,180,500 (1,061,400 had then been called to the colours) there had been no new members joining the Unions and the membership showed a decrease of over 500,000 members from non-military causes. The German Government appreciating the dangerous power of the Trades Unions in promoting strikes have evidently found means to prevent munition workers remaining members of Trades Unions.

Some interesting casualty figures have been published. The lists numbered from 480 to 489 (up to March 25th) contain 26,081 names of killed, wounded and missing. This, according to the paper brings the total of the Prussian casualties alone up to 2,483,639. In addition there are 256 Bavarian, 265 Saxon, 362 Wurttemberg, and 68 Naval Casualty lists.

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 78.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

23rd April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. WORK OF THE WEEK.
2. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.
 - (a) INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
 - (b) SPAIN.
 - (c) MEXICO.

Page 150

1. R.F.C. WORK OF THE WEEK.

Resume of operations of the R.F.C. April 15th - 21st, 1916.

CANAL FRONT.

During the week regular frontal reconnaissances were made daily and the immediate vicinity was found clear of the enemy.

In the northern section the hods in the neighbourhood of the KATIA - BIR EL ABD - EL ARISH road were regularly reconnoitred and, as last week, some activity was reported, particularly in the digging of trenches.

Small trenches dug to face west were reported at HOD EL HASSANIA on the 15th, and reconnaissance to BIR EL ABD of the 16th reported "about 90 holes each able to hold one man". At BIR EL ABD few men were actually seen, but there was a large increase in the number of camels.

BIR EL ABD was revisited on the 18th, and there seemed a decrease in the number of both men and camels. The trenches and man-holes were reported as stretching for about 500 yards, facing west. There were about 15 long tents, and 5 bell tents. Several photographs were taken. At HOD EL KHIRBA, between KATIA and BIR EL ABD, there were camel tracks leading west; otherwise all was apparently clear as far east as BIR EL ABD.

On the 20th BIR EL ABD appeared to have been reinforced; about 300 men were seen occupying the trenches and the machine was heavily fired on.

Messages reporting any observations of importance were dropped to our posts at KATIA on those reconnaissances.

In the Central Section no enemy activity was observed during the week. Daily reconnaissance of the WADI MUKSHEIB found considerable pools of standing water left after the recent spate, in particular about 6 miles N.W. of MOIYA HARAB and at the Western end of the WADI where it is lost in the sand. On the 16th a considerable quantity of water was observed held up by a dam across a branch of the WADI EL HEGAIIB;

~~WADI ABUR RUMMA~~ had also apparently been in flood.

In the Southern Section on the 15th the road up the MITLAP PASS was examined, from the air, and the bulk of it appeared fit for wheeled traffic to SUDR EL HEITAN, though of course the gradients may be impossible.

Odd trenches appeared to have been dug at points near the road in one or two places at long intervals.

Between GEBEL EL RABBA and the NEKHL road a small enemy encampment was observed. This was revisited in the afternoon and reconnoitred at a height of 350 feet. To the West of the camp was a line of one man sangars running from North to South; the camp itself consisted of 2 bell tents, and 2 huts. There were heaps of telegraph poles lying on the ground, and indications that a branch telegraph line was being constructed to the south. The machine came under heavy rifle fire from about half a dozen men in khaki uniform. Two photographs were taken of this enemy post.

WADI EL GEBAB was apparently under cultivation in several places.

On the 17th some observations were made on the state of the road from ABU GARAD up the WADI SUDR. The going appeared very bad shortly after HENAİK.

The enemy post at AIN SUDR had increased by 2 bell tents, making in all 9 bell tents, 1 marquee, and 4 Arab shelters. There was a heap of telegraph poles East of the Camp. The machine came under fire while circling over the camp, though several men in khaki were observed to run and conceal themselves in a cave shelter.

AIN SUDR was revisited on the 18th; the pilot was again fired at and dropped eight 20 lb bombs, of which four apparently took effect.

On the 20th a pool of water about 50 yards square was observed in WADI GIDDI.

The ~~SUEZ detachment~~ has now left for the SUDAN, and the station has been taken over by a detachment from ISMAILIA, after having been temporarily reinforced by air from HELIOPOLIS on the 16th.

In addition to the photographs taken on the above reconnaissances the usual photographic work has proceeded during the week.

On the 18th and 20th the KANTARA detachment carried out co-operation with artillery.

During the week enemy aircraft have made their appearance on the front; steps have accordingly been taken to meet them.

SOUTH - WESTERN FRONT.

FAYOUM AND ASSIUT detachments, R.F.C.

FAYOUM.

On the 15th a reconnaissance to the BAHARIA Oasis was carried out. N.W. of EL ZABU 2 white tents and a few Beduin tents were observed. At BAWITI some 40 horses were seen and a few yards off a small party of men in Khaki. As the pilot then came under heavy rifle fire he dropped 4 bombs, 3 of which took effect and killed 14 horses. It was not possible to see whether the men suffered any casualties. (ABU GANDIR - BAWITI = 120 miles.)

ASSIUT.

On the 15th two machines flew out to the advance-ground at KILO.145. and KHARGA oasis and the tracks to DAKHLA were reconnoitred; observation was difficult but all was apparently clear, and there were no signs of the enemy. The night was spent at KILO. 145.

On the 16th KHARGA oasis was again reconnoitred as far South as BERIS; there were no signs of enemy occupation, and the DAKHLA - KHARGA tracks were again apparently clear.

On the same day (15th) DAKHLA Oasis was reconnoitred. At BELAT, TENIDA, and DUMERIA proclamations in ARABIC were dropped. These villages were apparently clear, also AQABA and the Northern

as well as the Southern routes from KHARGA to DAKELA (cf. supra). In the neighbourhood of AIN SHAQLA (Eastern edge of the oasis) the pilot was fired at; accordingly he came down to 150 feet and opened fire on a party of 5 men with camels, who fled; one man and one camel were wounded. 5 miles E. of AIN SHAQLA were 2 large tents, 20 camels and some 15 men. These fired at the machine, and their fire was returned, but it was impossible to observe with what effect.

Later in the day both machines flew back to ASSIUT.

On the 20th two reconnaissances were carried out by the use of the landing-ground at MINIA, one of the front to the North of MINIA, the other of the front between MINIA and ASSIUT.

Detailed reports of these reconnaissances have not yet been received, nor of any further work carried out by this detachment.

FAYOUM.

On the 21st a reconnaissance was carried out some 30 miles South and West of ABU GANDIR; all was apparently clear.

NORTH - WESTERN FRONT.

SOLLUM AND MERSA MATRUH detachments, R.F.C.

SOLLUM.

On the 15th a machine flew from SOLLUM to MERSA MATRUH and a reconnaissance was carried out en route. Numerous camps, most of them small, were observed in WADI EL ABDIYA and the WADIS in the vicinity.

MERSA MATRUH.

On the 15th a machine was flown to Cairo (250 miles) the pilot landing at DABAA en route.

On the 17th a machine flew from MATRUH to SOLLUM along the coast-line. Numerous small camps were again reported between RAS ABU LAHU and SIDI BARRAMI, and in the neighbourhood of the latter place. Otherwise all was apparently clear.

SOLLUM.

On the same day (17th) the machine which had flown to MATRUH on the 15th returned to SOLLUM taking an inland route (BIR TUNIS - BIR GEFEIRA - BIR MELLA). Refugees were observed trekking East at BIR SHOLA; and a few small camps reported at intervals along the TAREF MOUNTAINS.

On the 18th a submarine reconnaissance was carried out along the coast N. of SOLLUM past BARDIA and MERSA MATRUH to RAS EK MELH. All was apparently clear, except for an encampment of 50 BEDUIN tents 5 miles W. of Bardia. 6 miles S.W. by W. of RAS EL MELH the observer reported an apparently fertile valley and in it a village with gardens, 2 BEDUIN tents, but no one was seen.

Both machines flew back to MATRUH in the afternoon.

During the early part of the week a bad sand-storm set in and hampered operations.

No further reports have as yet been received.

2. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.(a) INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

All is quiet on the North West frontier except two small raids which took place at PESHAWAR district and three in the neighbourhood of BANNU. The KHOST Border is all quiet. There is some evidence that fighting may shortly take place between the SWATIS and the NAWAB of DIR.

(b) SPAIN.

The German Government have been endeavouring to negotiate with Spain for the use of Spanish Harbours. It is well known that many of the Spanish copper mines are controlled by German capital and consequently the commercial situation can be made very critical for Spain. There is evidence that Spanish commercial houses and Bankers are supporting the claim of the German Government

The failure of the "Invincible German Army" before VERDUN has had a marked effect on public opinion in Spain. The leading

Germanophile paper in MADRID, the "A.B.C." has modified its tone very considerably and dismissed its principal military correspondent, who has since been appointed an Assistant Military Attache to the German Army.

The Prime Minister in addressing the Liberal Party declared Spain's unalterable intention of remaining neutral however powerful may be the pressure brought to alter this resolve. Reports add that this statement of policy has been received with the greatest enthusiasm throughout the country.

(c) MEXICO AND THE U.S.A.

A force of General Villa's followers numbering about 400 were severely defeated on 29/3/13 on the TEXAS - MEXICAN Border. They were taken by surprise in the midst of celebrating the previous defeat of the Carranzistas at the same spot.

The United States Expeditionary Force arrived 90 miles south of COLUMBUS in TEXAS at a place called CASAS GRANDES, on the 18th March, and the advance base has been established for the expedition. From here an American Force under General Pershing moved South in three columns in the direction of CHIHUAHUA. It has been reported that General HERRERA at the head of 2,000 men has deserted from Carranza's party and joined General Villa. (G.H.Q. Note:-on the 17th April a press report stated that General Villa was dead.)

Well informed opinion in the United States is apprehensive that there may be a general rising of Mexicans uniting the two rival parties to oppose the American Troops. This would render the position of General Pershing extremely grave.

The Americans have now 25,000 men on duty along the American border which extends for two thousand miles, thus leaving only 5,000 mobile troops as reserve in the whole of the United States exclusive of the coast artillery.

(G.H.Q. Note) Under these conditions it is easy to understand in what a difficult position the UNITED STATES Govt. might find itself should war with Germany ensue. The plot to destroy the WELLAND CANAL & other outrages prove to what lengths German Agents are prepared to go to destroy American Industries employed in work for the Allies.

CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 79.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

24th April, 1913.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. EASTERN FRONT, GENERAL SITUATION.
2. OUTLINE MAP OF EASTERN FRONT,
 DETAIL OF FIGHTING LINE.

EASTERN FRONT, GENERAL SITUATION.

The recent operations of the Russians have been confined to obtaining possession of tactical points that will be open to attack by the enemy, when the thaw is over, making offensive movement again possible. The Russian General Staff are fully aware that the Germans will probably attempt to renew their offensive as soon as the weather conditions permit.

The command of the northern group of Russian Armies having now devolved on General KUROPATKIN, it is unlikely that anything will be left undone to take full advantage of the open weather in the RIGA district to maintain the existing line that still denies the railway junction at JAKOBSTADT to the enemy. For the last three weeks the Germans have been assembling troops at MITAU and it is thought the 8th German Army under von BUELOW may attempt a strong offensive against RIGA in conjunction with part of the High Sea Fleet who will attempt to seize the Gulf of Riga. As the German Staff will expect the Russians to endeavour to re-capture MITAU at the earliest opportunity it is possible that the 8th Army is being reinforced with troops of higher quality than those of which it is composed - namely:-

- 2½ Cavalry Divisions.
- 2½ Reserve Divisions.
- 3 Landwehr Brigades - and
various Landsturm Regiments.

The main German strength is in the section opposite DVINSK, consisting of the detachment commanded by von Scholtz and the 10th German Army commanded by von EICHHORN, in all about 20 Divisions, of all kinds, and five and a half Cavalry Divisions.

During the latter end of March and early in April the Russians made a series of successful attacks from JAKOBSTADT to South of DVINSK. The fighting has been very heavy, the trenches being

taken and retaken with varying success, but on the whole the Russians have gained ground and being now possessed of sufficient ammunition the enemy has suffered very heavy loss.

The fighting in the NAROCH LAKE district has been also very costly to the Germans who have made desperate efforts to force the narrow passages between the lakes and various marshes with which that part of the line abounds. The enemy's objective appears to be the VILNA - POSTAVI and VILNA - SMORGEN railways. The Russian position here is exceedingly strong; the intervals between the lakes are all protected with barbed wire entanglements, and the enemy is compelled to advance on a very narrow front, where he comes under the fire of the Russian heavy guns, situated on the higher ground eastward of the present line. Following their plan of rushing the enemy on the first sign of a break in the weather, the Russians have regained some of the ground lost in the autumn of last year and have forced the Germans to fall back from their positions held throughout the winter.

The 12th German Army, General von FABECK, continues the line south between VILNA & LIDA, completing with his seven Divisions the German northern group of Armies.

There has been little change in this section of the line, the fighting being chiefly confined to mutual artillery bombardment.

The centre of the line is somewhat lightly held by the 2th (mixed) Army under General von WOYRSCH, composed of eight German and two Austrian Infantry Divisions, and further south as far as the PRIPET the line is held by a 'group' made up of the Guard and one other Cavalry Division, and three German Infantry Divisions. This section from opposite LIDA to the PRIPET is commanded by Prince Leopold,

BARANAVITSI is a most important railway junction and has been the centre of severe fighting. The country here is heavily wooded and the line varies as the Russians succeed in clearing one wood after another. It appears that neither side has employed gunfire to destroy the woods since it would use up infinitely more ammunition than the practice involves in France. The employment of aircraft of both sides has been especially active in this district, as it is from the air alone that timely warning can be obtained of reinforcements arriving in this forest area.

The PRIPET River forms the junction of the German and Austrian Armies.

The 4th Austrian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, holds the line as far as CHARTORISK, and consists of the POLISH LEGION, (mainly Germans and Polish Jews), 2 Landwehr Divisions, and three Cavalry Divisions.

Until recently the 22nd German Division and the 1st German Division of the 1st Corps were held in reserve in this area. Recent intelligence from the French G.O.C. announces that the 1st Division and one other has been hurried to the Western Front. It is possible that the other Division may be the 22nd.

South of the 4th Austrian Army lies the 1st under the Command of PUHALLO U BRLOG, consisting of 9½ Divisions, with 2½ Cavalry Divisions in reserve. This group of two armies has been under the supreme Command of the German General von LINSINGEN, but whether he will still retain command now that the German troops have been withdrawn seems doubtful. The right of this section is at DUBNO.

South of DUBNO is the group of Galician Armies commanded by the Archduke Frederick. The 2nd Austrian Army holds the front from DUBNO to the point where the line intersects the Austro-Russian

Frontier, and consists of 7½ Divisions and one Cavalry Division commanded by von BÖHM - ERMOLLI.

The centre of the Galician front is held by von BOTHMER (a German) who besides the 3rd German Guards Division and another German Reserve Division has under his orders 8 Austrian Divisions. The right of this section is at BUCZACZ.

The right section of the line is commanded by von PFLANZER - BALTIN of the 7th Austrian Army, comprised of 11 Divisions of infantry and 4½ Cavalry Divisions.

It is in this southern half of the line that the heavy fighting is chiefly anticipated. On the STRYPA, not far from TARNOPOL, and near the confluence of the STRYPA and the DNIESTER strong enemy attacks have been lately repulsed with heavy loss. In the CERNOWITZ district the Russians continue to make slow, but steady, progress and have advanced their line so as to render CERNOWITZ of small military value to the enemy, who have evacuated it and now only hold the high ground S.W. of the PRUTH, but retain their hold of the railway to ZALESZCZSKI.

The mountainous nature of the country and the conditions to which the thaw and heavy traffic have reduced the roads makes any active offensive very improbable for another fortnight.

These particulars have been gone into somewhat fully since it is only possible to appreciate the anxiety that the enemy must feel about the possible entrance of Roumania into the war at an early date in conjunction with the Russian offensive, when the situation on the Eastern Front is understood. The Austrians will have to be prepared for the Italians resuming their operations when weather permits, and with the line that has to be held on both fronts it seems very improbable that Austrian Troops can remain much longer, either in Albania, or in the Balkans. Should Roumania declare war the Austrian Front in Galicia would be more than doubled. The passes are strongly

held by Roumanian frontier troops and the greater part of the army would be free to operate against the Austrian communications. It is important however that we should endeavour to get the policy of Bulgaria declared as soon as possible, since Roumanian action must be hampered by any threat on BUCHAREST which lies so near the frontier.

2. OUTLINE MAP OF EASTERN FRONT - DETAILS OF FIGHTING LINE.

With this copy of the summary is issued a sketch map of the Eastern front.

The present line is approximately as follows :-

SEA - COAST directly N. of MITAU - following the river for 20 miles South - then running N.E. and joining the DVINA river at a point between the ^{2nd} 'R' of River, and the 'D' of DVINA - Through FRIDICKHSHTAD - Point 15 ^{miles} W. of JAKOBSTADT, Eastward to LIVENHOF, SOUTH TO ILIUKST, Point 15 miles S.W. of DVINSK, Through PRISVYATI LAKE, POINT 5 miles W. of POSTAVI Through NAROCH & SVIR LAKES, Through SMORGEN, Through KREVO, Through YICHNEV, Through DELIATITCHI, Just E. of BARANAVITSI, Through LIPSK. 5 miles W. of LOGISHIN. Through PINSK along River STYR to CHARTORISK, Through OLIKA. Through DUBNO. Point 10 miles N.W. of TARNOPOL. Along River STYRPA. Through ZALESZCZSKI, East of CERNOWITZ.
Direct line to ROUMANIAN FRONT.

Page 462.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 80.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

25th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. VERDUN (TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE).
2. OPERATIONS QATIA DISTRICT.

1. VERDUN, (TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE).

Situation around Verdun from the 16th to the 22nd of April 1916.

On the left Bank of the Meuse the enemy has contented himself until the 21st with a series of artillery actions, the bad weather having made transport arrangements extremely difficult in the Valley of the FORGES stream.

On the 20th we succeeded in capturing from the enemy the slopes to the North of MORT HOMME, and also some trenches that we had lost on the 10th to the north of the Wood of CAURETTES.

During the night of the 21/22nd, the Germans attempted to retake the ground captured by us in this district. Although they gained a footing in our trenches at MORT HOMME for a moment, they were immediately driven out; to the North of the Wood of CAURETTES in spite of a liberal employment of liquid flame, the enemy were driven back with very serious loss.

On the 22nd, the enemy made two successive attacks on our position between the stream at BETHINCOURT and MORT HOMME, both of which were stopped, the enemy suffering very heavy losses.

A new German Division has been brought up to relieve these troops, who have had such a trying time.

On the right Bank of the MEUSE, fighting has been continuous, and has been maintained without any break.

On the 17th April the enemy endeavoured to make a double attack between the MEUSE and DOUAUMONT Fort. The fighting was especially heavy on POIVRE HILL, and to the East of the Village of DOUAUMONT. The Germans endeavoured to capture the salient made by our line to the South of CHAUFFOUR WOOD, but they were driven off at all points suffering very heavy losses. Troops of five different Divisions were identified taking part in this attack.

On the 19th of April we succeeded in capturing a fortified enemy position North West of the pond at Vaux, and in doing so captured 560 prisoners, 10 of whom were officers. We also repulsed three

enemy attacks delivered against the EPARGES Section of the line.

On the 20th we recaptured a flat, open piece of ground situated 500 metres South of HAUDROMONT Farm, where the enemy had established himself on the 17th.

On this date also to the South of the Village and the Fort at DOUAUMONT, we were able to defeat a particularly violent attack of the enemy on our trenches, which was delivered on a front of from 2 to 3 kilometres.

On the 21st the enemy bombardment was especially violent throughout the whole length of the front from the MEUSE to VAUX, but our counter artillery fire made it impossible for the Germans to develop their offensive.

The 22nd was notable chiefly for an intense artillery bombardment, there being no other event of importance.

Up to the 22nd thirty German Divisions have been employed in front of VERDUN. It is noteworthy that the German Command attempts to gain a success with as few formations as possible, and continues to attack with them until they are almost annihilated.

In proportion as losses are suffered the enemy reinforces his divisions up to strength until they are practically reconstituted. They are then again put into the attack. So it may be said that certain Divisions have re-appeared three and four times on our front.

2. OPERATIONS, KATIA DISTRICT.

Severe fighting occurred in the KATIA District on Sunday the 23rd April.

Early in the morning a force, estimated at about 500 Turks attacked our post at DUELDAR, which was held by a Company of the 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers, under Capt. Roberts. A most gallant defence was made, in the course of which 2 Companies

of the 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had been ordered up from Hill 70, and had marched 7 miles across the desert in two hours, arrived on the scene and without any pause charged the enemy with fixed bayonets. The Turks were completely routed and retreated in a S.E. direction, leaving 70 dead and 30 prisoners, 80 rifles, and a quantity of ammunition in our hands. The enemy was pursued by the 5th Australian Light Horse, and further casualties were inflicted on them and more prisoners taken. The retreating enemy was also attacked by our aeroplanes who caused them yet further losses with bombs and machine gun fire.

Meanwhile an attack on KATIA Village, by about 3,000 men, including 1000 Germans and 4 field guns, had developed: This village was held by two squadrons of the Worcester Yeomanry. On hearing the sound of the firing, General Wiggin, Commanding the 1st Mounted Brigade, who had just arrived at HAMISAH after a successful raid on MAFELISA, where he had burnt the enemy's camp and taken some prisoners, moved with 1 squadron of the Worcester Yeomanry and 2 squadrons of the Warwick Yeomanry on KATIA Village. Col. Coventry, with one squadron Worcester Yeomanry was sent to the village to assist in withdrawing the two squadrons, Worcester Yeomanry already there, whilst General Wiggin operated to the South of the village, and Col. Yorke, with the Gloucester Hussars operated to the north. General Wiggin and Col. Yorke were successful in driving back the enemy about two miles, but in face of greatly superior numbers gradually withdrew westwards. The Worcester Yeomanry in the village of KATIA had meanwhile unfortunately had the bulk of their horses killed by the enemy's shell fire, and being unable to withdraw rapidly suffered very heavy losses.

A force of about 500 of the enemy which bivouacked on the evening of the 23rd near KATIA Village was most successfully attacked by our aeroplanes early in the morning of the 24th. Eight machines took part in the attack, and dropped 71 bombs

on the enemy's camp, which was completely obliterated. The enemy who were apparently taken completely by surprise suffered about 250 casualties. By the evening of the 24th the enemy had been cleared from the KATIA District, with the exception of a force of about 1,000 men, near BIR EL ABD.

From prisoners and documents captured it is learnt that the Forces which attacked at DUEIDAR were formed in 3 columns.

A. FORCE.

4 Mountain Guns, 65 gunners, 300 men, of the Light Camel Corps, 1st Squadron.

Route.

BIR SABA - BIR HAZAR - BIR EL ABD (a place with 5 good wells).

They marched only at night and rested in the day, hidden under palm trees. They had plenty of food and water. All gunners are Turks from European Turkey, have been in Gallipoli at CHANAK KALI. Some of them had been through the 1st and 2nd Balkan wars and fought round Adrianople. On their left wing was the Austro-German Force. There was no cholera at BIR SABA, but the Arabs die because they are dirty. They belong to 3rd Division, 9 Regiment.

- HANSEN ASHAR BEY (MIRALAI) Colonel.
- AZMY BEY (KAIM MAHAM) Lieut. Colonel.
- IHSAN BEY (YUZUMASHI) Captain.
- BEDI-EL-DIN Lieutenant.

B. FORCE.

Austro-German - about 1,000 - Infantry. Light grey uniforms - caps with blue band. No Turks amongst them.

O.C. VON GROSS BEY.

Route - BIR SABA - BIR EL ABD.

C. FORCE.

140 men of the Light Camel Corps, 2nd Squadron, followed by 800 Arabs.

Route. - BIR SABA - EL ARISH - BIR MAZAR - EL DEBABIS - BIR EL ABYAD - BIR HASSAIA.

The prisoners taken were from the advanced party on a scouting duty. They marched only at night. They had plenty of food and water.

Amongst this force there were two Arabs from MEDINA. They stated that they were ordered to go and fight for the Sultan, or their camels would be confiscated.

O.C. KHALID BEY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No 81.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

26th April 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN TURKEY.
2. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CAPTURED
AT DUEIDAR ON 24/4/16.

SITUATION IN TURKEY.DISTRIBUTION OF THE TURKISH FORCES.

Recent reports from the Russian General Staff give the following estimate of troops reserved for operations in the CAUCASUS Theatre:-

In Action.

Divisions 5, 10, 13, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, (34),
33, (37). = 14 Divisions.

(NOTE) Of these we know that 34 and 37 are practically non-existent, having been badly cut up and it is unlikely that drafts could have reached them which would bring them up to strength.

En route.

(Stated to be reliable information).

Divisions 1, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24. = 8 Divisions.

En route.

(doubtful information.)

Divisions, 3, 9, 19, 20. = 4 Divisions.

NOTE (19 and 20 are very doubtful as what little evidence there is about them is conflicting).

Under Orders.

Divisions 16, 42 and possibly four others (numbers unknown: belonging to XIX & XX Army Corps) = 6 Divisions.

NOTE. We have not yet sufficient evidence to justify the assumption that these Corps (XIX and XX) exist.

Total 32 Divisions.

Thus, on this basis, out of the 52 Divisions whose titular numbers are known, only 24 would be available for action in all other theatres in the Turkish Empire.

It is possible, however, that other divisions have been formed from the recruits who have been called to the colours since November 1915, when the 50th Division was first reported, and that these may be found in the Constantinople and Thraee areas.

Of the 24 Divisions left for action in Thrace, Dardanelles, Asia Minor Coast, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, the following can be fairly definitely located:-

MESOPOTAMIA Divisions	2, 35, 38, 45, 51, 52,	= 6 Divisions.
ARABIA	" 21, 22, 39, 40.	= 4 "
SINAI or S. SYRIA. Divs.	3, 27 (79 Regt)	= 2 "
SMYRNA	" 46, 47, 48.	= 3 "
DARDANELLES,	" 26, 42.	= 2 "

NOTE. Prisoners of the 4th Battalion of the 79th Regt, 27 Div. were taken at JIF JAFFA (SINAI) on 14th April. The regimental H.Q. of the regiment was stated to be NAZARETH, but there is no clear proof that the whole Divisions should be located in SYRIA.

The location of the remaining seven divisions is uncertain.

The 7th and 8th Divisions were at KIRK KILISSE in early March, reported under orders for CONSTANTINOPLE, and a report of uncertain value stated that the 7th Regiment (probably the 7th Division was meant) had left for ASIA before 6th March.

The 23rd Division is generally located in SYRIA.

The 41st and 43rd Divisions may ^{be} alternatively either in NORTHERN SYRIA, or have been sent towards BITLIS or more probably KARIND. An uncertain report was received of the movement of the 43rd Division under JEMAL BEY from SYRIA to SIVAS towards the end of February, but the non-appearance of the Division on the CAUCASUS Front by this date discredits the value of the report.

No definite report of the 44th Division has been received since November 1915 when located by an Agent at ALEXANDRETTA, in which district it may have remained. Alternative positions given above for the 41st and 43rd Divisions apply equally to the 44th Division. Any of these Division may also be identified with the new troops reported in the BAGDAD area in G.H.Q. E.E.F. Summary of the 30th March and in the Cairo W.O. Summary of 15th April, the latter as from a French source of information.

One regiment at least of the 49th Division appears to have been sent to SMYRNA (probably from MAKRIKEUI) and regiments 153, 154, 155, 156 have been more than once reported in the district, the first three in natural sequence belonging to the 49th Division. A later report, however, states that only one regiment of the Division was in the SMYRNA neighbourhood and that that had left for an unknown destination on the 22nd March. There appears to be no evidence to show that this movement was towards the CAUCASUS, and it is more likely in view of the rumours of an intended landing on the ALEXANDRETTA Coast, that the regiment, or perhaps the division, may have been moved south towards the Southern Asia Minor Coast and be supplying the various garrisons, which according to French Intelligence, recently appear to have been strengthened, viz. DENIZLI 6,000 depot troops in training. ADANA VILAYET 3,000: ADALIA District 2,000 (only 300 properly trained).

The 50th Division is generally believed to be in the CONSTANTINOPLE area, but no definite reports to that effect have been received.

Of the two divisions 16th and 42nd, reported by the Russian General Staff to be under orders for the CAUCASUS, the 16th Division was located in the GALLIPOLI or THRACE area in February and the 42nd Division at CHANAK as late as the 6th April.

Of those Divisions doubtfully reported on route for the CAUCASUS, the 3rd Div. (or part) has been definitely identified by contact in SINAI on 22 April, and a Russian report under the same date locates the 4th Division at UZUN KEUPRU, but in the case of this latter there is some indication that a movement east has already commenced.

No recent reports of the 19th and 20th have been received.

Excluding the 26 Divisions given in the Russian estimate, either on route for, or at the front, and such others as are definitely known to be on other fronts, a very small force is left for the defence of the DARDANELLES, THRACE and CONSTANTINOPLE areas, viz:- Divs. 7, 8, 16, 25, 26, 42, and 50 and in view of the uncertainty displayed by the Turkish Military Authorities with reference to the attitude of

Bulgaria as evidenced by the reported construction of defences in the KIRK KILISSE and PETRA districts, it seems improbable that such a large proportion of the Army can have been detached for action in ASIA, leaving the Capital with only a few Divisions, to meet the possibility of an Allied landing from the AEGEAN, a Russian landing on the BLACK SEA Littoral, or any change of attitude on the part of BULGARIA.

Such new Divisions as may have been formed would probably be retained in the European area where the need of men who have already seen active service would not be so immediate or pressing as in the IRAK or CAUCASUS theatres, and possibly the 4 Divisions whose titular numbers are unknown but belonging to the XIX and XX Army Corps, as referred to above, may come into this category. To these perhaps may be added, the 9th Division (reported at KIRK KILISSE with the 7th and 8th divisions in early March) the 19th (twice reported at ANAFARTA at the end of February) and the 20th (perhaps extending from KOUMKALE towards EDREMIT), giving a total in all of 14 Divisions in the MARMARA and THRACE districts.

On this basis the following may be a possible distribution:-

CAUCASUS:

In action, divisions, 5, 10, 13, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, (34), 36, (37) = 14 Divisions.

En route, divisions, 1, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24, (? 41
or 43) = 9 "

MESOPOTAMIA.

Divisions, 2, 35, 38, 45, 51, 52 (? 41 or 43) = 7 "

NOTE. There is some evidence that 41 has gone to IRAK and it may be that it is north of BAGHDAD and that troops opposing the Russians near KARIND and elsewhere on the Russian frontier may belong to this Division.

ARABIA.

Divisions 21, 22, 39, 40, = 4 Divisions.

SYRIA.

Divisions, 3, 23, 27, ? 44. = 4 "

SMYRNA AND SOUTH ASIA COAST.

Divisions 46, 47, 48, 49. = 4 Divisions.

THRACE (Including DARDANELLES AND CONSTANTINOPLE).

Divisions 7, 8, 9, 16, 19, 20, 25, 26, 42, 50,
and 4 new Divisions. = 14 Divisions.

Total. 56 "

2. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CAPTURED AT DUEIDAR.

The interrogation of prisoners captured at BIR DEUIDAR has revealed that the attacking force on this latter place consisted of 120 men of the Camel Corps, and 600 - 800 Arabs from MEDINA, mounted on camels, besides 60 gunners with two mountain guns, (7.5 mm. Q.F.) and one machine gun.

The force started from ~~BIS~~^{BIR} SABA about a week ago and followed the northern route via SHELLAL and EL ARISH. Von Kress Pasha led the force as far as EL ARISH.

A battalion or possibly a regiment of Austro-Germans arrived at BIR SABA about a month ago. There are three aeroplanes at BIR SABA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 82.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

27th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.
2. SKETCH MAP OF THE BALKAN STATES.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

With this copy of the summary there is issued a sketch map of the BALKAN STATES.

The line held by the German - Bulgarian troops follows the length of the frontier at a distance of about 400 yards north of the actual boundary. Hills, bridgeheads and all strong places for tactical defence, in proximity to the frontier, are in enemy occupation.

There is a report that an Austrian Division, the 57th, has arrived in the MONASTIR District, but this so far lacks proof. On this extreme right wing the enemy have mounted a number of heavy guns notably upon the hills North and North West of MONASTIR.

Near KENALI ten heavy guns are in position, besides anti-aircraft guns which have been located at the points of a triangle from KENALI N. and due W. of MONASTIR.

The 3rd Bulgarian Division relieved the 8th in this area about a month ago on its return from operations in Albania. The 8th Division moved to the rear and was reported to be re-organizing near VELES. Now it is identified on the ROUMANIAN Frontier. The last reports indicate that the 3rd Division has also been withdrawn from the right, and is in the centre somewhere between SMOKVICHA & DOIRAN.

The frontier from MONASTIR to 6 miles W. of GEVGHELLI is guarded by either 2nd BAN OPOLCHENIE or some troops of the new Reserve Divisional Formations. West of GEVGHELLI are two Brigades of the 5th Division, the third being in reserve just behind.

The German Divisions 101 and 103 here take over the centre section of the front guarding the approaches to the VARDAR Valley.

This part of the line has been most carefully prepared for defence. For some distance north of the frontier elaborate steps have been taken, and it is said that the enemy would welcome the Allies attempting to open up the plain N. of GEVGHELLI since the high ground that rises on either side of the steep ravine, where the river emerges on to the plain has been made as nearly impregnable

as modern practice permits. The whole of the country ^{Pam 301.} ~~where the~~ foothills meet the plain, from DAVIDOVO northwards and stretching east and west is not unlike the terrain of the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA, but behind rise the ranges of the Balkans which are at many places devoid of all roads and altogether impassable for the military transport of a Western Army.

For this VARDAR district forts have been made and alternative concrete positions have been constructed. Twelve 210 mm. guns, seven 210 mm. howitzers and four or more batteries of 150 mm. guns are located along the frontier between the DOIRAN Lake and GEVGHELLI. There are in addition, at other parts of the centre, that is to the West of PETRICH, two batteries of 12 c.m. guns and over thirty other pieces have been located over and above the artillery of the Divisions. Since the successful air-raids of the French the enemy have established a very large number of anti-aircraft guns on the high tops, making the work of the French aviators exceedingly difficult.

It may here be mentioned that on the 21st a French aeroplane made a bold and successful reconnaissance from SALONIKA to SOFIA, via the STRUMA Valley to JUMAIA and DUPNICA. For a distance of 50 kilometres north of PETRICH defensive works were noted on all the crests and plateaux in the STRUMA District. Arrived at SOFIA four bombs were dropped but with what effect is not known. The length of the flight and the altitude required made it impossible to carry many bombs.

Two dirigible sheds for Zeppolins were seen $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles N.W. of SOFIA.

To the left of the German troops units of the 2nd Bulgarian Division have been identified North of Lake DOIRAN, and there is evidence that the 7th Division which has been for some time withdrawn from the front line is again on the move and may shortly appear upon the left flank of the 2nd. It is probable that this 7th Division has been used to stiffen up one of the new Reserve Divisions with old soldiers and N.C.O's. In this case it is

~~possible that identifications of men of the 7th Division, doing~~
duty with a new Reserve Divisional Formation may be very
misleading, if taken to indicate the presence of the whole 7th
Division.

The 11th Macedonian Division is in the neighbourhood of
PETRICH, where a junction with the 2nd (or 7th) is made.

The 10th Division, with probably a new Reserve Division,
holds the left section of the enemy's line. And further
north in the STRUMA Valley two brigades of the 6th Division are
identified. Large encampments for troops held in reserve have
been reported by air reconnaissance to be situated near MELNIK
and JUMAJA.

N.E. of DEMIRHISSAR the country is so mountainous and difficult
that it makes an offensive by the Allies almost impossible. The
long distance that this part of the enemy line is situated from
SALONIKA ensures the enemy of ample warning.

The enemy has now very good lateral communication enabling
him to mass troops at threatened points rapidly, and all the possible
lines of advance are protected by guns of all calibres. This is
especially true of the STRUMA Defile and the pass at OKJILAR where
the SALONIKA - DEDEAGATCH Railway enters Bulgaria.

Probably because the enemy fully appreciate the difficulties
attending an offensive on their line, no pains have been spared in
placing the Bulgarian coast line on the AEGEAN in a very thorough
state of defence. The German Staff have evidently for long been
uneasy that the Allies would attempt a landing near DEDEAGATCH or
PORTO LAGOS.

Such is the situation along the southern enemy line, which although
of great length, offers so many advantages to the defence that having
made elaborate trenches and vast dug-outs, constructed forts, and
railways, the enemy can now afford to devote some of his attention
to the Danube. There are located the 8th, 4th, and 12th, and
the whole or part of the 1st and 9th Divisions, certainly one brigade

of the 3th Division which may have joined up and become part of a new Reserve Division. One such formation, the 13th, is mentioned for the first time this week as being near NISH.

The other new Reserve Divisions are also for the most part in the interior; that one so long located in the XANTHI District is now said to bear the numeral '20'. The Bulgarian Army is thus fairly equally divided on a northern and southern line. RUSTCHUK is reported to be full of troops, and SOFIA to be almost denuded of soldiers.

Although the Bulgarians are said to be well supplied with food, their morale is mentioned as being bad. Bulgarians deserters have come in wearing German uniforms, and it is probable that a considerable proportion of the Mounted Troops on the frontier are Bulgarian troopers disguised as German Cavalry.

For the time being the elderly men of the 9 German Regiments on the Macdonian Front will probably remain in their newly made trenches. The enemy is kept fully informed by the Greeks of the Allied plans, and with the force now assembled of about 220,000 men, the German Staff has every confidence of being able to resist an Allied offensive.

2. SKETCH MAP OF BALKAN STATES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 83.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

28th April, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE.
2. SITUATION IN IRELAND.

1. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE.

At the Allied Conference held in Paris the Allies arrived at a complete understanding regarding several outstanding questions of policy. The shipping question was reviewed in all its aspects, and it was determined that Allied shipping should be pooled as far as possible, and that the high cost of living, especially in Italy, should be met by diverting grain ships to Italian Ports and by sending consignments of coal from England. Already improvement has been achieved and the maximum value is being obtained from the available shipping.

The Serbian representatives attending the Conference were assured that neither Great Britain, France or Russia had any intention of concluding a separate peace with Bulgaria.

The French Government have agreed to take immediate action in transporting the Serbian Troops to Salonika, rather than to wait until the British Government can detail ships which would necessitate some delay since all the available tonnage is now fully occupied.

The Allied Governments have had to refuse the proposed relief for the Serbian peasantry as regards food supply. But there is no objection to a medical and Sanitation Mission, composed of neutrals going up country to attend to the needs of the civil population. Suffering is known to be great, but the policy of the Central Powers in denuding the country of all supplies holds out no prospect of the food consigned to the Serbians peasantry being distributed to them.

With the knowledge of the Allied Governments the Roumanians have been exporting no less than 120,000 tons per month of grain and vegetables to enemy countries. For the present Roumania feels herself unable to resist the demands of the Central Powers, but she has refused to allow her rolling stock to leave the country. An organization named "Central Purchase Association" has been set up in Germany, and this is charged with the duty of procuring food supplies by the easiest route. The grain from Roumania is brought

up the Danube in barges and is conveyed direct to N.W. Germany by the LUDWIG - DANUBE - MAIN Canal. River barges have been collected from every part of Germany and this Canal, which in peace time was of but local importance, for the NURNBERG - BAMBERG traffic, is now used to relieve the railways, and its present traffic is tremendous. In order to keep on good terms with ROUMANIA, GERMANY has granted special concessions in supplying necessary metals and manufactured goods; the German Minister has promised that in proportion to the grain exported his Government will allow the import to ROUMANIA of German Manufactures. Thirty locomotives, to quote but one instance, are to be delivered this month.

The Roumanian Customs' Officials at GIORGIO on the DANUBE have discovered that barrels supposed to contain sugar, consigned from Germany, to Turkey, contained large calibre howitzer shells, Since the Roumanian Government have suspended all transit of war material, these shells have been confiscated.

It should be remembered that Roumania is at present entirely cut off from all communication with the Entente Powers except Russia, and when the large calls on rolling stock and the congestion at the only open ports of ARCHANGEL and VLADIVOSTOCK (the former being only just free of ice) ^{are considered} the difficulties of the Roumanian Ministry in maintaining the trade of the country may be appreciated. It is hardly possible to expect that ROUMANIA should not continue to trade with the Central Powers, and in her favour it should be remembered that more than once she has incurred the anger of Germany by refusing to deliver foodstuffs. The purchase by the British Government of last year's harvest was very popular in ROUMANIA, and prevented far more grain going to Germany than now is the case.

The Allied Powers intend to declare the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean a war zone for all shipping. Neutral ships must

therefore submit to search and examination by Allied war ships and mails will be removed for examination. It has been repeatedly found that the Germans use the post as a medium for obtaining material such as rubber etc: and it ^{is} to make the blockade more effective that ^{these} the precautionary steps are to be taken. Private correspondence will be forwarded as soon as possible to its destination, but all parcels will be retained for examination.

Some interesting facts have come to light regarding the recent military action of the Netherland's Government at the end of March. The Dutch Press has been full of articles on the subject, and it appears to be clearly established that the underlying causes were inspired by POTSDAM. The German Emperor is said to have also sent a letter to the Queen of Holland, in which he said that his Staff had reason to believe that a general Allied offensive had been decided upon at the Paris Conference, and that the plan involved the infringement of Dutch Territory. The letter went on to point out that it did not appear that the Dutch fully appreciated the danger and imminence of the situation as no extra military precautions had been taken. Since the position of Holland was of such supreme importance to the German Army it would be necessary for the German Staff to take action in order to secure the safety of their lines of communication: the German Government therefore desired that either the Netherlands Government should act promptly or else German Troops would be forced to adopt the necessary precautionary measures.

On receiving this and similar communications the Dutch Ministry at once recalled officers and men from leave and brought up the units on the Coast Defence ^{Duty} to full strength. Ammunition and transport was moved, and everything pointed to the Dutch Government being prepared to meet any eventuality.

The German Agents took advantage of all this movement and excitement to spread reports that Great Britain on behalf of the Allies

had presented Holland with an ultimatum demanding the disembarkation and passage of troops from the ports to the frontier. It is interesting to learn that the German Consulate General at AMSTERDAM to assist in the work of publishing false information used the telephone to the large hotels giving the information to all the hall porters. It was therefore soon made common property and believed to be the view held by the Netherlands Government.

The British Minister was consulted by the Prime Minister and was able to assure him that there was nothing decided by the Allies in Paris that in any way concerned the position of Holland. The whole incident is interesting as showing that the Germans have every intention, should the need arise, of using Dutch territory on the plea that otherwise the Allies will be able to threaten their flank and rear; and it is also proof of how strong is the influence that Germany still has over neutral countries.

In Germany the Press by a series of inspired articles is endeavouring to prove how great will be the advantages to Japan should she now desert the Allies and join Germany. Thereby it is pointed out she will be able to rely with certainty on obtaining that increase of territory in Australasia and Asia that she so much desires for her surplus population. There is some reason to believe that the German Government have made several attempts to approach the Japanese Government with certain definite proposals.

Germany continues to obtain mining concessions in Turkey and Bulgaria. Chrome is very important to Germany and KRUUP has bought two chromium mines and rented two others in Turkey, and in the vilayet of AIDIN alone 90 mining concessions of all kinds have been obtained, and 70 concessions in silver lead have been granted. In Bulgaria the rights to mine over the rich mineral districts of PERNIK and BOBOV DOL have been secured by

the German Government. Operations are to be begun after the war and with the object of preventing Allied capital in Roumanian and or Russian mines having the monopoly.

2. SITUATION IN IRELAND.

The German wireless of the 26th gave particulars of the outbreak of considerable disorder in Dublin and its neighbourhood. It now appears to be in fact true that the SINN FEIN Organization on the 24th April appeared in a large armed body at STEPHENS GREEN and seized the Post Office cutting all telegraphic and telephonic communication. On the first alarm troops were ordered ^{up} from the CURRAGH to reinforce the Dublin Garrison. In the meantime the armed mob had occupied the principal thoroughfares and the quays and until 7 pm. were in occupation of four or five districts of the city. Later in the evening with the arrival of troops the situation was again well in hand, but not until considerable alarm had been caused to the inhabitants and some fighting had taken place.

The capture of the notorious SIR ROGER CASEMENT and two German officers (on the very day when the disturbances broke out) whilst being landed off the Irish Coast from a disguised German Auxiliary cruiser has probably robbed the rebellion of all direction. The cruiser was ~~sunk~~ blown up by her crew after capture and the papers and documents she probably carried, besides arms and munitions, are unfortunately lost.

From the Intelligence so far received there is no reason to believe that disturbances on any scale have taken place outside the Dublin area. In the House of Commons the Chief Secretary for Ireland said that the full casualties had not been received, but the authorities considered that the situation was well in hand.

The German wireless is using the facts to cause alarm both in Allied & Neutral countries. Inspired articles have already appeared in the Dutch and Italian papers which show clearly that this rebellion

has been organized in Germany to co-incide with the approach of the spring when an Allied offensive was to be expected, and also relied to find in Ireland (excused from the Military Service Act) many men of military age who could be used to further the designs of the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No 84.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

29th April 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.
2. SITUATION IN IRELAND.

1. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.

Resume of operations of the Royal Flying Corps. April 22nd-28th
1916.

CANAL FRONT.

Frontal reconnaissance carried out from day to day in the Central and Southern Sections found no trace of enemy activity during the early half of the week; but events have marched rapidly in the Northern Section.

During the last three weeks R.F.C. reconnaissance had reported some activity along the Northern coast road from BIR EL MAZAR Westwards, signs of movement from BIR EL MAZAR to BIR EL ABD, and generally an increase in the number of men and camels at both these places (vide E.E.F. Intelligence Summaries Nos. 66 and 72 pp. 385 and 418-9); and bomb attacks had been delivered on 5 of the HODS in the neighbourhood of the coast road, that appeared occupied, as early as April 1st, 2nd and 3rd (vide E.E.F. Intelligence Summary No 66 p. 385).

By the 20th this move Westwards seemed to be developing; BIR EL ABD was found by R.F.C. reconnaissance to have been re-inforced; 300 men were seen occupying the trenches there and the machine was heavily fired on (vide E.E.F. Intelligence Summary No 78 p. 450).

On the 22nd reconnaissance located enemy movement from a fresh direction; at BIR EL MAGEIBRA 200 men were observed, mostly in khaki. The machine came down to 700 feet to examine them; no sign of hostility was made until, obviously at a given signal, heavy fire was opened. Three bell tents were erected and others lying on the ground. Heavy and well-defined tracks led from BIR EL MAGEIBRA to BIR EL BAYUD, where were 100 men and 30 camels at the Well.

The presence of a disciplined force at MAGEIBRA and the tracks connecting this force with another at BIR BAYUD, taken in conjunction with the re-inforcement of BIR EL ABD observed two days previously, and the repeated reconnaissances of enemy aeroplanes over the KATIA district during the preceding days pointed to the conclusion that an advance on KATIA itself was impending; and a report was accordingly made to this effect on the evening of the 22nd.

On the morning of the 23rd an attack on KATIA and DUEIDAR took place.

The R.F.C. from KANTARA and ISMAILIA took an active part in the operations that ensued during the 23rd, 24th and 25th; and machines from these detachments were in the air in all for 68 hours on these three days, covering a total distance of some 4000 miles.

During the early morning of the 23rd a thick fog lay over the KATIA district making air reconnaissance of this area

impossible. It was under cover of this fog that the attack on OGHRAINA and KATIA took place.

An attack upon DUEIDAR developed at 5 a.m. During the later stages of this attack and subsequently during the enemy's retreat on MAGEIBRA and HASSAIA, attacks by bombing and machine-gun were delivered, and great confusion ensued; many casualties were observed. For three quarters of an hour the machine patrolled along the line of the enemy's retreat between DUEIDAR and HASSAIA, hampering their movements with machine-gun fire. Reports and messages were repeatedly dropped on a detachment of our troops at HAMISAH and on DUEIDAR explaining the situation.

Later in the morning when the enemy had left HASSAIA for MAGEIBRA they were attacked by a second aeroplane with machine-gun fire.

In the early afternoon the enemy were again attacked both with bombs and machine-gun in the vicinity of BIR EL JEFER. Messages were dropped at HAMISAH and on the Australian Cavalry following up the enemy's retreat East of DUEIDAR.

Reconnaissance later in the day reported the air situation as follows:-

1. At KATIA about 1000 men and 400 camels.
2. At BIR EL ABD 300 men.
3. At BIR EL MAGEIBRA 300 men, in retreat.

Accordingly it was resolved to take action against the principal concentration at KATIA and at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 24th eight machines from ISMAILIA and KANTARA combined in a successful bomb-attack. The troops (now only numbering some 400, the remainder, as heavy tracks showed, having withdrawn to BIR EL ABD) were caught in bivouac, and suffered heavy casualties from the bombs at 400 feet, the pilots later descending to 200 feet and attacking with machine-guns.

After the bomb attack two pilots proceeded to carry out further reconnaissances before returning; and as a result 1000-1500 men were observed at BIR EL ABD and bombed, while at BIR BAYUD were some 100, and a few miles off 3-400 more, clearly the enemy routed at DUEIDAR on the preceding morning.

These two parties were attacked with machine-gun fire and thrown into great confusion.

During the day other reconnaissances of the ROMANI-KATIA area were made and in the evening a long flight carried out over the whole area to BIR EL ABD; the pilot found that the enemy had apparently fled from KATIA; at BIR EL ABD were about 1000, and at BIR BAYUD about 800. These were the only forces of any size West of BIR EL ABD.

A reconnaissance was sent out in the early morning of the 25th to reconnoitre these places and report any changes of moment; the numbers of men appeared much the same; although there were fewer horses and camels at BIR EL ABD.

Acting on this information it was resolved to attack the enemy at these two places. Accordingly 8 machines from KANTARA and ISMAILIA left KANTARA aerodrome at 7 a.m. and attacked BIR EL ABD first with bombs, and subsequently with machine-guns, inflicting much damage. An enemy aeroplane appeared and attacked one of our machines, which was hit. Our machine turned to attack and engaged him with machine-gun fire, upon which, in spite of his superior speed, the enemy broke off the fight.

Another pilot was wounded by a rifle bullet from the ground but successfully flew his machine back to KANTARA after dropping the last of his bombs.

All machines returned safely to KANTARA after this raid, and, after an hour's rest, four pilots left again to attack BIR BAYUD; 26 bombs were dropped and much damage done; in addition the LEWIS guns wrought great havoc among the loaded pack camels.

All four pilots again returned safely to KANTARA.

Meantime it remained to clear up the situation in the Central Section; and accordingly on the afternoon of this same day (25th) a machine from KANTARA carried out a reconnaissance as far as JIFJAFFA, returning afterwards to ISMAILIA.

At JIFJAFFA, $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile to the N.W. of the old camp, on a hill, were 4 tents and about 20 men; but the old camp site was deserted. There were no movements of importance in the neighbourhood.

On the 26th a reconnaissance was carried out to BIR EL ABD and MAGHARA. KATIA and BIR BAYUD were apparently clear, and at BIR EL ABD only 1 bell tent was observed and the tracks of about 20 men leading East. At MAGHARA were 20 tents and 6 huts; only 6 men were seen. Otherwise the place was unchanged since previous reports.

On the 27th KATIA and BIR BAYUD were again apparently clear of the enemy; at BIR EL ABD the trenches were occupied by about 50-100 men who kept up rapid fire for several minutes on the aeroplane, and there were a few bell tents which did not appear occupied.

On the 28th a reconnaissance was again carried out to BIR EL ABD.

BIR EL JEFLEIR, MAGEIBRA, BIR BAYUD and KATIA were apparently clear; a single man on camel back was observed on the BAYUD-MAGHARA track, while in the neighbourhood of BIR EL ABD were 7 bell tents, 6 long shelters, about 50 men, and 40 camels. Messages were dropped on our posts to this effect.

In the Central Section early in the week the large water pools still remained in the bed of the WADI MUKSHEIB near EL ASHUBI and further up the wadi, but by the 27th they were reported to be rapidly diminishing.

In the Southern Section there was nothing of note to report during the early days of the week. On the 22nd reconnaissance observed considerable patches of cultivation in WADI EL GEBAB, and judging by the tracks there appeared to be water in one water-hole at least in the bed of WADI MABEIUK.

On the 23rd a party of four Arabs on fast trotting camels were attacked with machine-gun fire whilst proceeding to AIN SUDR. As usual they immediately took cover in the scrub.

On the same day (23rd) SUEZ was reinforced by air from CAIRO.

On the 24th reconnaissance discovered that trenches and rifle-pits had been dug at various points to command the NEKHL road in the neighbourhood of SUDR EL HEITAN; messages and a rough sketch of these trenches were accordingly dropped on our column in WADI EL HAJ.

On the 25th AIN SUDR was reconnoitred. There were 7 bell tents, 1 large white tent and 3 black tents; and about 50 men were seen. Four bombs were dropped. A message was dropped to our column in the MITLA PASS.

During the reconnaissance in connection with the operations in the KATIA district several photographs were taken of MAGEIBRA, BIR BAYUD, KATIA and BIR EL ABD, and on the 25th of the new camp at JIFJAFFA.

No other photography has been carried out in the Central and Northern Sections during the week, as all other claims had to give way before these pressing demands, but in the Southern Section photographs were taken at SUDR EL HEITAN and in WADI MABEIUK.

SOUTH WESTERN FRONT.

FAYOUM and ASSIUT detachments R.F.C.

FAYOUM.

No reports have been received of the work carried out by this detachment since the 23rd, when a reconnaissance of 3 hours 40 minutes was made to the South and West of the FAYOUM; all was apparently clear except for our own patrols.

ASSIUT.

On the 23rd a machine proceeded to MEHERIQ in KHARGA oasis, where one machine had been stationed since the 20th.

On the 24th a third machine flew to MEHERIQ, and replaced one of the machines there, which was flown back to ASSIUT.

A 5 hour reconnaissance of this date from MEHERIQ found BELAT and TENIDA apparently clear, but 3 miles East of TENIDA were two square tents, 2 bell tents and 2 lines of shelters. These the pilot attacked with bombs and machine-gun fire.

On the 28th a pilot had a forced landing 20 miles from MEHERIQ. The pilot and observer were unhurt, and the machine undamaged.

Fuller reports of the work of this detachment during the week have not yet come in.

NORTH WESTERN FRONT.

MERSA MATRUH Detachment R.F.C.

No reports of the work of this detachment, which is awaiting reinforcement by air from CAIRO, have as yet been received this week.

2. SITUATION IN IRELAND.

The Official Gazette on the 26th of April published a proclamation establishing Martial Law throughout Ireland. In the House of Lords, Lord Lansdowne made a statement from which it appears that 2 German Officers and SIR ROGER CASEMENT were landed from a German auxiliary cruiser which was at about the same time challenged by a British warship, who gave orders she was her prize and was to proceed to QUEENSTOWN forthwith. The British cruiser was loading, and had gone a certain distance when the captured ship hoisted the German ensign; at the same time a violent explosion took place, the German ship sinking immediately. Owing to the rough weather it had been impossible for the British ship to put a prize crew on board. The entire crew of the German vessel were saved. It is presumed that the German ship contained warlike material, but there are no traces on the Irish coast to shew that previous preparations had been made for the distribution of this material.

Lord Lansdowne continued that his Majesty's Government had received no previous warning, and that the only information regarding the outbreak had been received from an external source on the very day it took place. The Government are of opinion that the rebellion is destined to an ignominious end, but in order to prevent the spreading of disorder a complete cordon of troops now surround DUBLIN, on the North side of the river.

Later in the day the Prime minister in the House of Commons stated that the situation still possessed serious features, and there were certain indications that the movement is spreading especially in the West.

Martial Law having been proclaimed throughout IRELAND, General Sir JOHN MAXWELL left LONDON on the night of the 27th to take over command, being endowed with plenary powers.

Mr JOHN REDMOND and SIR EDWARD CARSON joined in denouncing the rebel movement, Sir Edward saying that he would gladly join Mr Redmond in any measure to arrest the spread of the disorder. Mr Redmond, on behalf of the Nationalist Party and an overwhelming majority of the Irish population expressed his horror and detestation of the proceedings of the rebels.
