

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/9/3

**Title:** Intelligence Summaries, General  
Headquarters, Egyptian  
Expeditionary Force

May 1916



AWM4-1/9/3



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 85.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

1st May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. Operations in MESOPOTAMIA.  
(With Sketch Map.)
2. Telegram from G.Q.G., FRANCE.

=====

50c from  
5  
5  
Ig  
Rising  
Rising  
Rising.



OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA.

17th March to 23rd April.

(With Sketch Map).  
-----

On 17th March General TOWNSHEND stated that his supplies would last until April 15th. The enemy bombarded KUT-EL-AMARA on 22nd and 23rd March, we suffered only slight casualties. Floods interfered with sapping operations by General GORRINGE against the HANNA position on the left bank, but on the 17th he seized the enemy's position on the mounds on the right bank opposite the HANNA position with only four casualties.

By March 25th the whole of the infantry of the 13th Division were concentrated at the front. Floods had again increased and swamped parts of the enemy's position at HANNA on the left bank, also his trenches on the right bank of the SANNAIYA position. General TOWNSHEND reported that both his own and the Turkish front line trenches at KUT-EL-AMARA, were flooded. The river overflowed the right bank in the band immediately down stream off KUT.

South-east of the FILAHYAH position we had to withdraw our advanced troops about 1,000 yards on 27th March, owing to the flooding of our advanced trenches on the right bank. The situation remained quiet until the end of March, the floods increasing and the weather stormy.

On 1st April General GORRINGE reported that the bonds on the right bank of the river had been cut, flooding



the country south of HAIRIJAH, in order to protect the enemy's right flank.

On 5th April the 13th Division attacked and carried the HANNA position, afterwards advancing against the line of trenches which run roughly due north from the apex of the FALAHIYAH bend. On 6th April the FALAHIYAH position was captured at about 8 p.m. It was a pitch dark night. Our casualties on both banks up to 8.30 p.m. on 6th were estimated at 3,000 by General GORRINGE. The enemy's trenches at SUNNAIYET and the 7th Division trenches opposing them were partly flooded from the SUWAIKIYEH marsh on the night of the 7th/8th. The 7th Division pushed forward their line on the left bank; the 3rd Division also advanced on the right bank into a position from which they could enfilade SUNNAIYET position on the left bank. The water continued to rise up to this date, curtailing the frontage available for the attack by one third. At dawn on the 9th the 13th Division, supported by the 7th Division, assaulted the SUNNAIYET position on the left bank but were unable to get through. Our casualties were estimated to be about 2,000. On the 10th our line was advanced by day and night in preparation for another assault. Heavy rain fell during the morning. On 11th General GORRINGE reported that the capture of SUNNAIYET must be a matter of several days, owing to the water-logged condition of the ground in front of the position, and to the moonlight nights which necessitated approach chiefly by saps. Up to the 12th although delayed by bad weather, operations were proceeding satisfactorily.

On the afternoon of April 12th the 3rd (Lahore) Division advanced on the right bank, a distance varying from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 miles, driving in the enemy's advanced lines.



On the left bank the water from the marshes was driven by a north-west gale into both our own and the enemy's trenches at SUNNAIYET.

The enemy were heavily punished as they took refuge from the flood in new positions. Our casualties on the 12th were about 400. From 5th to 13th April <sup>inclusive</sup> our total casualties were 311 Officers and 6,078 other ranks.

The 14th was spent in making causeways across the inundation on the right bank, between the TIGRIS and UMM-EL-BRAHM, so as to permit guns to be brought into position. Owing to the heavy gale all day aeroplanes were unable to fly. Heavy rain fell during the night.

On the 15th gradual but steady progress was made by the 3rd (LAHORE) Division on the right bank, driving in the enemy's advanced lines and occupying them. The enemy left many dead, and a considerable number of prisoners in the captured trenches.

The 16th was spent in preparing for a further advance on the next day on the right bank. This took place in the morning (17th). Supported by the Corps Artillery, the 3rd (LAHORE) Division captured the enemy's trenches at BEIT AIEESA, thus completing an advance of 4,000 yards since the 15th April. The enemy left between 200 and 300 dead in the captured trenches. We took 180 prisoners including 8 officers, 2 field guns and 5 machine guns. Our casualties were only 200.

On the same day the 7th (MEIRUT) Division



pushed forward by saps, against the SANNAIYET position. During the afternoon a causoway fit for wheeled traffic was compiled across the inundations between MASONS MOUND and ABU ROMAN MOUND.

During the night of the 17th/18th, the 3rd (LAHORE) Division were heavily and continuously counter-attacked and their line forced back in places from 500 to 800 yards.

These counter-attacks were pushed home with great determination, 12 attacks between dark and dawn being received and repulsed by the 8th Brigade, 80 prisoners in addition to those reported on 17th April were brought in. In these counter-attacks the Turks employed 10,000 men from the 2nd, 35th, and 45th Divisions. They lost 3,000 dead. Describing the fighting the Turks say that it lasted 7 hours and that 3 British Brigades attempted to surprise and turn their flank: they claim 2,000 dead, and that the British retreated on the 19th, leaving one machine-gun in their hands.

On 21st April, according to Turkish official reports TOWNSHEND'S position was critical, as the inhabitants had been ordered to leave KUT. Bags of flour were expected by aeroplane.

The floods on the TIGRIS continued, rendering any forward movement most difficult owing to the narrow frontage available for attack. On the morning of the 23rd the SANNAIYET position was attacked by one brigade. The attack succeeded in penetrating the first and second lines of the position: our troops had to advance across a bog, and on account of the difficulty of sending forward supports to the firing line across this marshy ground swept by machine gun fire, the brigade had to withdraw from the ground captured. On the right bank also the flooded nature of the country prevented much progress from being made.



TELEGRAMS FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE. (28th and 29th April 1916.)  
-----

(1) Situation in the VERDUN Sector from 23rd to 29th April.  
-----

No important operations undertaken by the enemy. Our positions between AVOCOURT and the MEUSE were subjected to continuous and violent bombardments. On the 23rd we took a trench to the North of MORT HOMME, thus consolidating our gains of the 20th inst. A certain number of prisoners were also taken. On the 24th inst. the enemy endeavoured to retake the captured trenches: three violent attacks were repulsed, in one of which the enemy used liquid fire.

On the East of the MEUSE on the 27th inst. an attack was initiated between the river bank and VAUX, but it was broken up by our Artillery. A small attack on one of our trenches near the fort of VAUX was also stopped.

In front of DOUAUMONT we have located the III German Army Corps. This Corps, having been engaged in the fighting from 21st February - 15th March, was withdrawn from the front after losing more than three quarters of its effectives, and was sent back into LORRAINE to rest.

Prisoners recently taken say that the III Corps has been brought up to strength and now contains 60% of men of 1916 Class.

(ii) SITUATION in the AISNE SECTOR.

To the North of the AISNE on the 25th inst. we captured from the enemy a small wood near VILLE-ANX - BOIS, making 158 prisoners, on the same day an attack made by 3 battalions of Germans on the CHAPEL-COTE Salient - to the North of SAINT-DIE was driven back with great loss to the enemy.



TELEGRAMS FROM G.O.G. FRANCE.

A wireloss message received here from MAUEN contains the following fantastic information about the battle of VERDUN, published in the "BERLINER TAGEBLATT".

(1) Major Moraht says that the French are actually bringing up to strength at once their divisions already in the line, and sending them straight back into the firing line.

This says the German Military Critic is a sure sign of very heavy losses and insufficient reserves. As a matter of fact, this procedure has been resorted to by the certain German Corps but never by the French.

No French Division, once having been engaged has re-appeared in the firing line, until it has had at least 3 weeks rest, and if it has been thought fit to bring back certain divisions into the firing line after such a relatively short time, it is simply, that having been kept there for such a short period, they had suffered very little.

(2) The Correspondent of the "Berliner Tagblatt, on the VERDUN Front states that 'Black troops and Algerian sharpshooters have been mixed with white troops because they cannot be relied on. No mixture of this kind has ever been made.


(3) The same correspondent gives out that recruits of the 1916 class have been hastily incorporated in our regiments with a reduced training of two or three months. The German Higher Command is perfectly well aware that the 1916 class in France for the last year has received a complete military training, first in barracks and afterwards in training battalions behind the front line.

If the Berlin correspondent considers the training of our young soldiers insufficient, the German troops who have opposed them have a very different opinion.

\*\*\*\*\*



# KUT EL AMARA



Printed by the Survey of Egypt 1916 (379.2)



9503

Page 498.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 86.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

May 2nd, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA.
2. SITUATION IN TURKEY.
3. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI.

\*\*\*\*\*

Isoc. pum  
Is. Sun  
G.  
Ig Sun.  
Aastme  
Daastme  
Daame



## 1. OPERATIONS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

After the action at KAHE, (Summary 9th April) the Mounted Brigade of South African Horse moved to ARUSHA, followed by GENERAL VAN DER VENTER'S Infantry Division. On 3rd April GENERAL VAN DER VENTERS moved south with the mounted Brigade with the object of seizing the plateau lying between MBULA (80 m. W. by S. of ARUSHA) and KONDOA - IRANGI (70 m. S. of MBULU). The Brigade reached LOLKISSALE Mountain 35 m. S.W. of ARUSHA on the evening of 3rd April and captured it. 17 Europeans and 404 native soldiers were captured besides two machine guns and a large amount of ammunition; the German Officer in Command was wounded and is missing.

On the 17th April GENERAL VAN DER VENTER'S Mounted Troops continued to advance and occupied UMBUGWE, SALANGA, and KOANDA - IRANGI, the enemy retreating towards the railway.

Portuguese Troops are reported to have occupied KIONGA -(10 m. N. of PALMA, 3 m. inside GERMAN EAST AFRICA, and near the coast).

## 2. SITUATION IN TURKEY.

### SMYRNA.

A telegraphic report from SMYRNA dated 25th April states that a considerable number of Bulgarian Troops have arrived at MANISA, and that a few have arrived at SMYRNA. It is known that the Turks must have entered into some secret agreement with BULGARIA, otherwise they would not have dared to take away so many troops from THRACE.

If this report be true it is most probable that those Bulgarian Troops are destined for garrison duty in the SMYRNA District, and to release Turkish troops for the CAUCASUS, or the other fronts.

Separate reports from SMYRNA and MITYLENE confirm the despatch of troops from the SMYRNA District, and it is said that they are being replaced by recruits, and by old men.

Meanwhile activity continues in the SMYRNA Coast defences.



The batteries have been re-organized and equipped, and a large number of new guns have arrived, some of which are said to be Bulgarian.

Aerodromes are under construction at MENEMEN and VURLA. The German machines there are of the ALBATROSS type, but only one or two of them are in good condition.

An agent's reports state that in the bombardment of 19th April, 12 Austrian and German gunners were killed, and 120 Turkish soldiers killed and wounded.

#### CONSTANTINOPLE.

There were reported to be about 10,000 Austro-Germans in CONSTANTINOPLE in the middle of April, and practically no Turkish troops at all except the 'Home Defence Corps', which consists of men of over 50 years of age.

ENVER continues to keep a strong hold on the general position. LIMAN VON SANDERS spends most of his time in SMYRNA but returns to CONSTANTINOPLE at intervals.

Every month about 70,000 tons of coal are said to be transported to the capital from EREGLI and ZUNGULDAK for the Arsenals and Dockyards.

#### CAUCASUS.

VEHIB PAHA is in command of the 3rd Army and has been previously reported. He is supposed to be anti-German, and is said to have approved of the killing of British prisoners, on the ground that they were mercenaries, and therefore unworthy of honorable usage.

According to AMSTERDAM it is officially announced in BERLIN that VON DER GOLTZ died from spotted fever on April 19th.



### 3. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE SINAI FRONT.

The following is the disposition of the enemy forces according to the last information received:-

Place.	Reference map 1/250,000	Number of Enemy.	Guns.	Aero-planes.	Remarks.
Between BIR ABD & ARISH.	P.S.- E.3.	2,800			
ARISH.	P.S.- J.3.	2,000	14 guns.		
A			2 a.a.guns.	1.	
MAZAR.	P.S.- H.3.	200			
MAGHARA	P.S.- H.5.	250			
ROD SALEM.	P.S.- H.6.	600	6 guns.		(Agents rep.
BIR GIDDI.	S. - F.8.	250			(R.F.C. reper
AIN SUDR.	S. - F.11.				(clear 30/4
JIF JAFFA	S. - G.7.	small post			( 1916.
SUDR HEITAN,	S. - G.9.				
HASSANA.	S. - J.7.	4,000	11 guns.		
		1,000 camel	3 heavy		
		irregulars.	guns.		
			1 A.A. gun.		
NEKHL.	S. - J.10.	1,200	3 guns.		
KOSSAIMA.	R. - N.6.	3,000			
AUJA.	R. - N.4.	1,500	1 A.A. gun.		
SABA.	R. - P.2.	1,500			
		400 camel	4 heavy		
		irregulars.	guns.	Three.	
			3 A.A.guns.		
ASLUJ.	R. - P.3.	4,000 railway			
		workmen.			
GAZA.	R. - N.1.	2,000	3 guns.		
KHAN YUNIS?	R. - M.1.	700			
SHERIA.	R. - O.1.	3,000			
RAFA.	R. - M.2.	200			
KHULIL	North of				
(HEBRON)	R. - R.1.	2,000			
SHELLAL.	R. - N.2.	Large convales-			
		cent camp.			
BIR LAH FAN	P.S. K.3.	Well sinking			
		party.			
MAGHABA.	R. - L.4.	Well sinking			
		party.			
MUNSLINI.	near AKABA.	Small Post.			
TABA.	A. - Q.12.	" "			

Note. These figures may be slightly exaggerated, but not to any great extent.



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 87.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

May 3rd, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1.    Situation in MACEDONIA.
2.    Situation in IRELAND.

= = = = =



SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

General SARRAIL has again brought up the question of the advisability of declaring SALONIKA by proclamation to be in a state of siege. It is pointed out that from the military point of view it will not be possible to cope with the espionage and the hostility of the local Greek authorities until the town and its district are under Allied control. The French staff report that during the night signals have been exchanged with the enemy from the various heights in the neighbourhood. The French Government are in favour of General SARRAIL's proposal but suggest that the Greek Government should be given previous warning, and that it should be pointed out that on account of the inability of the Greek administration to curb the enemy agents it has been found necessary to take this action irrespective of the fact of whether or not the enemy have crossed the frontier. It will be remembered that it has long been understood that the Greek Government have acknowledged the necessity of the Allies assuming responsibility for the administration of the town when the enemy began an offensive. To assist the Allies the Greek Government had on their part agreed to leave gendarmes and police officials to work under the orders of the Entente authorities, who might otherwise be unable to handle the civil population. In spite of the fact that it is suggested that the proclamation of a state of siege at SALONIKA should be made under the direction of the Greek Minister of the Interior and the local Greek authority, the British Minister in ATHENS considers that such an act would be thought in GREECE to be a "grievous infraction of Greek sovereignty".

The political situation in GREECE is charged with electricity and VENEZELOS has had to limit his programme in



face of the organised opposition of the pro-German element and the Military League. The King appears to have himself checked the proposed violent action of the Military League against the VENEZELISTS since recent demonstrations in ATHENS have clearly shown that they have <sup>again</sup> the support of a large body of public opinion.

On the 27th a British Yeomanry patrol held up a train containing the German Consul at DRAMA between that place and SERRES. This Official is a German Reserve Officer and is at the head of the enemy Secret Service Organisation established at DRAMA, SERRES and KAVALLA, which transmits all information to the headquarters of the enemy intelligence at XANTHI. This organisation has been most active, and has obtained much detailed information concerning the Allies and their policy, and no protests have availed to induce the Greek Government to take effective action. This indeed is not surprising since it is difficult to see what the Greeks could do as many of their local officials were implicated with the tacit consent of the Government itself.

The Officer in charge of the Yeomanry detachment made the German Consul his prisoner in spite of the vehement protests of a party of Greek Officers who were also passengers on the train. The senior Greek Officer in the end ordered the Greek soldiers to form up and cover the British detachment with their rifles. In the meanwhile the O.C. Yeomanry detachment had the Consul in arrest, and informed the Greek Officers that his orders were to the effect that he was not to become involved with Greek troops and he did not therefore propose to order his men to reply should the Greek soldiers open fire.



Finally the Greek Officer gave way and the British detachment removed their prisoner without further incident.

Since the last Summary of MACEDONIAN Intelligence was issued, it has been established on reliable evidence that the 103rd German Division has been withdrawn from the GEVGELI section and is now on route for FRANCE. While from VERDUN it is reported that the 129th Regiment of the 105th Division recently on the DANUBE has been identified. Thus only the 101st Division remains, if indeed that also is not in process of withdrawal. By cavalry reconnaissance in the DOIRAN district and from GREEK Frontier Guard reports it appears that the Germans have been replaced in that Sector of the line by BULGARIANS. This news is of great importance proving as it does the great difficulty the Germans are finding in prosecuting their offensive in FRANCE and maintaining their troops in subsidiary theatres. The Bulgarians, forced to take over the ground vacated by the Germans will have to employ Divisions either in the interior or on the Danube front. The entrenchments on the ROUMANIAN frontier are probably completed and that front can in the meantime be held by three Divisions, the 4th, 12th and another new Division. The 1st, 6th and the 8th Bulgarian Divisions have been in the interior, and in common with the 9th, have been freed as far as possible for work on the farms in SERBIA and BULGARIA. There being no immediate prospect of hostilities on the DANUBE front it is probable that the 9th will take over the front occupied by the 103rd German Division, and the 6th and 8th will both be again allocated to the MACEDONIAN front either in the place of the 101st, should that Division be withdrawn, or else held in reserve in rear of the GEVGELI - STRUMNITZA area.

In a report from SOFIA which may be accepted as reliable, it is stated that new Battalions of the Bulgarian Army are continually being trained at the depots and sent



sent as drafts to replace casualties caused by sickness and desertion in the active regiments. Mutinies are reported to have broken out in regiments of the 2nd, 7th and 11th Divisions.

The 146th Regiment of the 101st German Division has left MONASTIR; and there are stories of AUSTRIAN - TRANSYLVANIAN troops being North of DOIRAN. Austrian organised comitadji bands are reported in the STRUMNITZA area.

It is probable that the entrance of ROUMANIA into the war would have the effect of causing large desertions from the ranks of the HUNGARIAN Regiments composed of ROUMANIAN - TRANSYLVANIANS, and the German staff will be anxious to use these troops where their services will be unaffected by their national sentiments. For the past twelve or fourteen months the Germans have been busy re-organising the Austro-Hungarian Army, but maintaining the battalion basis, and taking care to remove the SLOVENES, CROATS, ROUMANIAN - TRANSYLVANIANS, and POLES from operations where they would be a danger to their 'own' side. It is certain that should the German Staff decide that the MACEDONIAN front demands the presence of troops of the Central Powers it will be Hungarian troops who will be used rather than German.

There is no evidence that any of the German and Austrian heavy artillery has been removed from this theatre. Indeed from latest reports it appears that the 103rd Division have left their artillery and machine guns behind. The withdrawal of the German Divisions cannot be said to have in any way weakened the enemy's defensive capacity.



SITUATION IN IRELAND.

The rebellion of the SINN-FEINERS in IRELAND is practically at an end.

After the burning of some more buildings in the neighbourhood of SACKVILLE STREET the rebel leader PEARSE hoisted the white flag and entered on negotiations with the Officer Commanding the troops - finally surrendering unconditionally.

Orders to the rebels to surrender were placarded over IRELAND, and arms are now being handed in at CORK, LIMERICK, KERRY, and other places.

The firebrand Countess MARKIEWICZ has also been captured.

-----



CONFIDENTIAL.

No.88.

I N T E L L I G E N C E     S U M M A R Y .

May 4th, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1.    GERMAN INTELLIGENCE.
2.    AUSTRIAN TROOPS IN ALBANIA.

= = = = =



GERMAN INTELLIGENCE.1. TROOPS FROM THE BALKANS.

The 22nd Reserve Corps after taking part in the Servian Campaign was moved to the Western Theatre arriving in BELGIUM during the first half of February, and went into billets in the VALENCIENNES - ST. QUENTIN Area. According to a prisoner the 43rd Reserve Division was moved from VALENCIENNES to STENAY on the 25th of March.

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS - VERDUN.

The 43rd Reserve Division, 22nd Reserve Corps, was identified by the capture of prisoners in the MALANCOURT Area on the Left bank of the MEUSE on the 10th of April. It is also probable that the 44th Reserve Division of the same Corps may be in support as the Divisional Commander and his Aide de Camp were both killed by shell fire whilst inspecting a position on the 30th of March; the former died of his wounds two days later, the Aide de Camp being killed outright.

The number of German Divisions that have taken part in the attack on VERDUN between AVOCOURT and FRESNES now amounts to 23 of which 6½ have attacked on the Left bank of the MEUSE and 16½ on the Right bank.

The 7th Reserve Division of the 10th Reserve Corps still remain in reserve in company possibly as stated above, with the 44th Reserve Division.

3. STRENGTH IN FRANCE & BELGIUM.

In the Western theatre the number of Divisions now held in reserve appear to be as follows :--  
Of /-



Of the 15 Divisions that are resting 8 are in reserve on the British front and 6 opposite the VERDUN salient. The equivalent of 2 more divisions have been observed entering BELGIUM from GERMANY between the 25th of March and the 9th of April, moving by way of DINANT towards GIVET. By the arrival of these two Divisions the total number in the Western Theatre is increased to  $120\frac{1}{2}$  and the number of Divisions in reserve from 15 to 17.

4. SHIPPING.

Intelligence has been received from a reliable source that there has recently been a heavy fall in the shares of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American Line. The reason is that <sup>German</sup> the authorities are chartering all sea-going ships in addition to those already placed on the list of auxiliary cruisers. This information confirms reports from other sources of the enemy's intention to take up available shipping for embarkation of troops for operations either in the BALTIC as is most probable or possibly with a view to creating an alarm in Great Britain of an impending invasion.

5. MEASURES OF ECONOMY IN FODDER.

Reliable information has been received that the Germans are selling all horses which are not required for military or breeding purposes, such as geldings, barren mares, and animals which have been unsuccessful on the turf. Horses in training are reported to be receiving a ration of 12 pounds of oats and other classes of privately owned horses a ration of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  pounds of oats. There is apparently no shortage in hay.



AUSTRIAN TROOPS IN ALBANIA.

The Austrian advance southwards has progressed in a leisurely fashion during the last two months. The main body of Austrian regular troops <sup>at</sup> on the end of February were still located North of the SKUMBI river, but early in March considerable detachments were at ELBASSAN, and some reached a point N.N.E. of VALONA.

Throughout the advance detachments of Albanian irregulars were formed as a screen, and moved forward well ahead of the Austrian main body. The majority of those troops could not be trusted with the local troops in Southern ALBANIA, and the Austrians are now trying to raise local forces in Southern ALBANIA, but so far the population have shown but little enthusiasm for the Austrians.

Three Bulgarian battalions have arrived in the neighbourhood of BARAT in March, but with those exceptions, Bulgarian regular troops have not moved any great distance west of LAKE OCHRIDA. There is some reason to believe that both the reluctance of the Bulgarians and the slowness of the Austrian advance was to a great extent due to the prevalence of cholera at ELBASSAN. The enemy's advanced line now extends along the right bank of the VOYUSA river and the MALACASTRA Hills, where strong defensive works are being prepared under Austrian direction.

Aerial reconnaissances show that Austro-Hungarian troops in ALBANIA have apparently been reduced. This is confirmed by the identification on both the Russian and Italian fronts of units that were previously reported in the BALKANS. At present it is impossible to estimate the number of troops that have been withdrawn.

\* \* \* \* \*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 89.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

May 5th, 1916.

*Army 95*  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. THE SITUATION IN TURKEY.
2. GERMANY AND IRISH DISORDER.  
(extracts from Gorman Wireloss).

=   =   =   =   =   =



SECRET

SITUATION IN TURKEY.

SMYRNA.

It is reported from ATHENS dated 3rd May that several thousand Austrian troops with heavy artillery have arrived at SMYRNA.

G.H.Q. Note :-- This is improbable and should be treated with reserve.

It is also reported from other sources that the defences along the Coast from SMYRNA southwards to KADE KALESSI (opposite the island of KOS) have been considerably strengthened by the mounting of heavy calibre guns, some of which have been brought from Bulgaria and Austria.

A recent Turkish communique states that :---

- " A hostile cruiser and a guard ship escorting more than
- " 20 sailing ships on the morning of the 1st May, in
- " SMYRNA waters bombarded the region of Cape PLAKA and
- " TOMATIA - S.W. of the Village of SUKEH. They also
- " landed several hundred robbers who had been on board
- " the above mentioned sailing ships. Those however, in
- " consequence of the resistance made by our troops sta-
- " tioned in the neighbourhood, saw that they would be
- " unable to maintain themselves on land, and fled to
- " their boats - suffering heavy losses in doing so.
- " Our airmen who promptly appeared on the scene of
- " the fight throw bombs with good effect on these
- " robbers, and also throw a bomb on the cruiser. "

CYPRUS.

A traveller arriving in ATHENS about the 3rd May reports that a concentration of British troops in CYPRUS is taking place, and that the local opinion is that these troops are intended for a landing at SMYRNA.



SECRET

It is learnt from a reliable source in CYPRUS that a submarine was seen 3 miles off the Coast of FAMAGUSTA on the 3rd May, also that suspicious signalling from the coast has been observed on many nights lately.

#### TURKEY GENERAL NEWS.

A report from Greek Official sources states that the 13th Division has been broken up. This seems quite possible as we have for a long time had no definite information as to its whereabouts.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### GERMANY & IRISH DISORDER.

That the Germans are thoroughly disappointed that order has again been restored in IRELAND goes without saying. Since the SINN FEIN disturbances began in DUBLIN the Gorman Wireless News has been spreading the wildest reports to all neutral and allied countries. No mention has ever been made of SIR ROGER CASEMENT, nor has the fact that Mr. REDMOND and the Nationalist party have expressed their detestation of all that has happened over been reported. The movement was on the contrary said to have spread until the whole of IRELAND was in open rebellion.

At present it is not possible to appreciate how deeply implicated ~~have~~ <sup>have</sup> the German agents been in organising this outbreak, carefully timed to have the maximum influence on the Military situation in FRANCE.

Both English and foreign newspapers are freely quoted which is a favourite trick of the Gormans to give colour to their grossly exaggerated statements. The following extracts are both instructive and amusing, as showing the profound desire of the enemy to distract



attention from his own condition, and if possible to cause alarm among the Allies of Great Britain. Up to a point it may possibly represent what would have happened had the German organisers not been made prisoner with Casement.

30th April. The English Field Marshall French reports from the new theatre of war in Ireland that the fighting continues. The clearing of the town of DUBLIN is much hampered by snipers and will take time. He also reports that besides in DUBLIN there are serious disturbances in the provinces. According to a report Kitchener has been made Dictator in Ireland. The Berlin papers refer to Kitchener's nick-name "the Butcher of Omdurman". The leader of the Irish revolution is the well known syndicalist and Labour Leader Larkin. According to other reports 30,000 Irish are embattled against England, with arms in their hands. English spies discovered and betrayed the Irish organisation with the result that the members of the Committee were arrested; whereupon the revolution broke out. The greater part of the Irish troops mutinied on being led against the revolutionaries. An eye-witness reports on the desperate fighting which took place in the neighbourhood of the Castle of Dublin. The green Irish flag with the words "The Irish Republic" is waving over the Post Office at Dublin. About a thousand telegraph wires leading from the G.P.O. have been cut, and the streets are blocked with barbed wire. The "Corriere della Sera" reports that the suppression of the revolutionary movement will be a long business. Many superior English Officials have been captured by the Revolutionaries, and it is impossible to hear the full truth about the situation in Ireland as the English censorship is very strict.



The Dutch paper "Nieuwe Courant" writes : "The first report of the English Government that it was master of the situation was at least premature".

1st May. General Sir John Maxwell (~~will~~) has left LONDON in order to direct the battle against Erin in her fight for freedom. The revolution has spread to many Irish counties where regular battles are taking place. According to the London "Daily Chronicle" a bloody massacre took place in Killarney. It is reported from Holland that the English government is pessimistic about the situation in Ireland. This is confirmed by the fact that a state of siege has been forbidden in Ireland.

The English censorship has ordered the suspension of news for all reports in Ireland. In Holland the view prevails that all Ireland is in a state of revolution. The Paris censorship has also suspended news from Ireland since Thursday. The "Libre Parole" demands that France should be told the truth, as the Irish revolution may damage the whole future of the war. The Paris Socialist describes the events in Ireland not as a mutiny but as a great revolution. The trouble began on Easter Monday in the historic Phoenix Park in Dublin, where the Irish National Guard were holding a review. The National Guard had fixed bayonets and loaded their rifles when, on their way back to the town, they met English Government troops in front of the Vice-Royal Palace. With these troops a fight began of itself, which developed into a desperate fight for the G.P.O. The pavement was torn up; tramcars, motorcars, and other vehicles were used for barricades. During the fight two Catholic priests showed the greatest courage and helped the wounded on the barricades. One fell, hit by a bullet, whereupon the second came to the help of the dying priest and also met his death from a bullet.



000000 000000 3  
-----

3rd May. According to English Official Reports the Irish Revolution appears to have been suppressed by the employment of machine guns and artillery. If reports are true, then Ireland is again given the peace of a great cemetery. The Irish revolution has furnished new proof of how much English domination rests upon brutal force not only in India and in Egypt, and how much England maintains the possession of the greater part of her Empire by a reign of terror and guns.

The neutral "ZURCHERPOST" writes that the revolution in Ireland teaches two things. Firstly, that England's policy of pacification and colonisation, so brilliantly exhibited in all parts of the world has entirely failed up to the present day in Ireland, and secondly, that England, in her anxiety to free suppressed people from foreign domination had no necessity to go far from home, as a good opportunity lay so close at hand.

\* \* \* \* \*



Page 519.

CONFIDENTIAL,

No. 90.

I N T E L L I G E N C E      S U M M A R Y .

May 6th. 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.
2. SALONIKA ARMY INTELLIGENCE.

\* \* \* \* \*

6200  
G  
G  
Tg.

Camp *Turn*



May 1916

1. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY.

Resume of Operations of the Royal Flying Corps April 29th to May 5th 1916.

CANAL FRONT.

KANTARA, ISMAILIA, and SUEZ Detachments, R.F.C.

Frontal reconnaissance has found the immediate vicinity of the canal clear of the enemy during the week.

In the Northern section reconnaissance to BIR EL ABD on the 29th observed only some 20 men there, who, as usual, directed rifle fire on the machine. MAGEIBRA and BAYUD and the KATIA Area, scenes of great enemy activity last week, were apparently clear, and at MAGEIBRA and BAYUD the wells had been left uncovered. 3 miles East of SALMANA were 40 camels and 3 horsemen proceeding East.

On the 30th, while BAYUD was still clear, 2 men and a camel and a few fresh tracks were observed at MAGEIBRA, but this was all; and MAGEIBRA has for long been visited on occasions by independent enemy patrols. At BIR EL ABD were one bell tent and 6 shelters, and perhaps 30 men and camels. At BIR EL HAZAR 16 bell tents, 1 long tent, and three long shelters, and about 50 camels. There was a short trench west of the camp.

The bulk of the enemy force, which attacked KATIA last week had apparently withdrawn well east of BIR EL HAZAR towards EL ARISH.

Reconnaissance of the 1st found MAGEIBRA, BAYUD and the KATIA Area apparently clear, and a post of much the same strength at BIR EL ABD, where a pile of poles, perhaps the telegraph poles of the KATIA - BIR EL ABD Line were lying among the shelters.

On the 2nd there were again 3 men at MAGEIBRA, but BAYUD was clear; BIR EL ABD had undergone no change; the only activity shown being in the clearing of old trenches.

There were no signs of enemy movement on the BARDAWIL Peninsula Road, though a curious white "L" shaped mark, much like a ground signal, was observed at one point.

On the 3rd a reconnaissance was undertaken to EL ARISH to determine the strength of the enemy forces there. Two pilots left KANTARA and



reached EL ARISH successfully. The number of troops there was estimated at about 3,000. South and East of the town were about 200 tents. South-East were 35-40 gun-pits, of which 15 at least appeared occupied. 2 companies of infantry were drilling on the level sand east of the town.

An aerodrome was observed on the West side of the Wadi (which lies East of EL ARISH) about 1 mile south of the town, where was a long shed with a dark roof on the Eastern side of a high dune, on the West Side of the aerodrome.

1 aeroplane was on the ground in front of the shed, and behind it 2 anti-aircraft guns in gun pits. The machine came under heavy fire from rifles and the A.A. guns.

The general disposition of the troops and gun-pits was under the lee of high dunes on the South Eastern side of the town.

About 600 yards South of the town were many water-holes, and just East of them 3 large store-sheds. Heavy tracks led from EL ARISH Westwards turning South towards MAZAR at GOZ SALHA. No change was observed at BIR EL ABD, except that the old trenches had by now been re-dug.

Soon after turning West, the machines lost touch with each other; and one, for some cause at present unknown, failed to return. Three reconnaissances left during the day in search of the missing pilot and the whole area between KANTARA and the Eastern corner of Lake BARDAWIL was thoroughly searched, one pilot again proceeding almost to EL ARISH in his quest. But an exhaustive examination of the whole area, including the BARDAWIL Peninsula Road revealed no trace of the lost machine.

There were however suspiciously heavy tracks leading from EL FLUSIAT to BIR EL MAZAR.

It was observed that the BARDAWIL Peninsula Road is in use, though only a small party of three Arabs with



camels was seen upon it. The post at BIR EL MAZAR appeared to have been strengthened. There were 2 A.A. guns which opened fire on the machine, and 2 - 300 men.

Two patrols were sighted between BIR EL ABD and BIR SALMANA. There were also observed large gun emplacements N. of MESHALFAT linked by tracks to the northern EL ARISH Road.

Reconnaissance of May 4th observed about 10 men at the wells at SALMANA, but at BIR EL ABD only some 15 men: while the trenches and man-holes were nearly filled up. MAGEIBRA, BAYUD and the KATIA Area were apparently clear of the enemy.

By the 5th however there were 1 bell tent and 3 canvas shelters at BAYUD and approximately 20 men, who had arrived that morning, for three hours previously they were not there; whether they had come from the direction of MAGEIBRA or MAGHARA could not be determined. At BIR EL ABD two bell tents, and 6 shelters and about 50 men, some of whom had probably concealed themselves the previous day were observed. The KATIA Area and OGHRAHINA were again clear.

Reconnaissance of the same date (5th) reported two camps at MAGHARA containing between them some 26 tents and 20 shelters. The enemy's numbers were put at 300 - 400. The water tank was empty.

Messages were regularly dropped on these reconnaissances to our posts at ROMANI and HILL 40.

In the central section RODH SALEM was twice reconnoitred on the 29th. There were about 600 men and some 49 tents and shelters: heavy fire from rifles and two guns was directed on the machines on both occasions. The big trough previously reported appeared to contain water. Two black tarpaulins were observed, which probably concealed guns.

At JIF JAFFA was a small camp of five tents, and trenches had been dug to face west.



RODH SALEM was again reconnoitred on the 2nd May; also MAGHARA. At RODH SALEM observation and photography were difficult. Only about 30 tents were counted, but there was Entrenchments were observed on the Western side of the Camp. probably little change since the 29th. On this occasion no A.A. guns fired at the machine. At MAGHARA there were still

two small camps, much the same as reported on the 29th, though apparently rather smaller in size. The water in the WADI MUKSHEIB has been steadily diminishing during the week.

In the Southern Section the immediate neighbourhood of our lines has been continuously found clear with one possible exception.

On the 30th a reconnaissance was carried out to NEKHL. At AIN SUDR there was still a small post of 8 bell tents and three black shelters. At NEKHL a new group of 14 tents was observed on the N.W. side of the town, and there were numerous trenches to the N.W., W., and S.W. The Garrison was estimated at about 1,200. Though the pilot descended to 200 feet, as observation was difficult, there were no signs of the A.A. guns previously reported. At SUDR EL HEITAN, two miles S.E. of point 1455, was another small post of 2 tents and 3 black shelters, where was a well and also a pile of telephone poles. This post apparently links up with the telephone line to NEKHL,

At AIN ABU REGUM, and in WADI GIDDI, there were a few pools of water, but the water in the latter had almost dried up by the 4th May.

Reconnaissance of the 5th found the front clear as far North as MOIYA HARAB, and the MUKSHEIB with the exception of the tracks of (apparently) an enemy patrol which entered the WADI GIDDI from the S.W. and continued until close to our posts. These tracks were followed up East, and



ultimately at Pt. 1940 48 camels were found grazing, but only two men were observed.

Numerous photographs have been taken on reconnaissance during the week (for example at MAGHARA, RODH SALEM, and EL ARISH) from which further information has been derived.

Practice artillery co-operation was carried out from KANTARA on May 4th.

#### SOUTH WESTERN FRONT.

##### FAYOUM, ASSIUT, AND MEHERIQ Detachments, R.F. C.

No detailed reports of the work carried out by those detachments from April 29th to May 5th have as yet been received, but on the 1st, 3rd and 4th May reconnaissances were made of KHARGA and the Eastern Edge of DAKHLA Oases, KHARGA being found clear, though the vicinity of TENIDA in DAKHLA is still occupied by enemy forces. Five miles S.E. of BARABI on the 1st a small enemy post of 4 tents, and 1 E.P. tent was reported; the enemy scattered on approach of the aeroplane. Scattered about the cultivation at TENIDA were 25 tents. A gun using shrapnel fired twice at the machine but the shots went far wide, although the pilot was only at 2,000 feet. Flights between ASSIUT and MEHERIQ for purposes of reinforcement &c, have taken place also every day.

#### NORTH WESTERN FRONT.

##### MERSA MATRUH Detachment, R.F. C.

From this front also no detailed reports have been received, but on May. 1st practice artillery co-operation was carried out with H.M.S. M. 31. and on the 2nd with H.M.S. M.31 and MATRUH FORT.

\* \* \* \* \*



2. SALONIKA ARMY INTELLIGENCE.

A Zeppelin attempting a raid on Salonika in the early hours of the morning of the 5th of May was brought down by Naval gun fire in the marshes near the mouth of the VARDAR.

Twelve of the crew were captured by the French detachments near the spot where the airship fell. From the available evidence to be obtained from the debris the Zeppelin apparently bore the number L.Z.55. The examination of the crew has not yet been telegraphed, but it may be assumed that this air-ship came from SOFIA, where a recent French air reconnaissance located two sheds.

Several hundred enemy cavalry have crossed the frontier and established posts east of Lake DOIRAN, between BREST and SVETA. With this exception the Allied advanced troops report no other enemy movement on the centre section of the front.

\* \* \* \* \*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 91.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

May 8th, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. POSSIBLE ENEMY LINES OF ADVANCE THROUGH SINAI.
2. OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA. (from 19 - 25th April)

\* \* \* \* \*

*hpc. Jan*

*h  
h  
Iq*

*APR  
Evans*



1. POSSIBLE ENEMY LINES OF ADVANCE THROUGH SINAI.

There are three main lines of approach from SYRIA into EGYPT, although South of the northern sand-dune area, it is unnecessary to march by any defined track, as the ground is generally hard lime-stone with small flints scattered on the surface, and the wadis are not sufficiently deep to merit consideration.

The situation of the water supply and the main wells is the only determining factor in the choice of routes.

To take these lines of approach in turn.

- (1) The North Road, GAZA - ARISH - KATIA. The Darb el Sultani as it is called, has been the main road from SYRIA into EGYPT from time immemorial.

From GAZA to EL ARISH wells with ample water are dotted along the coast at frequent intervals.

From EL ARISH to BIR EL ABD, the driest stretch, there are at least 5 good wells in 50 miles.

The water supply has been increased very considerably by digging other wells in close proximity to these 5 principal wells.

From BIR EL ABD to BIR EL DUELDAR, water can be obtained practically anywhere by digging a few feet. This water is unpleasant and bitter in any newly dug well until the salt in the adjoining soil is used up, but it can be drunk at a pinch and Turks are not particular.

The objections to the route are its proximity to the sea and that it lies over undulating sand-dunes, which though fairly hard most of the route, would not stand the transport of heavy guns and waggons.

- (2) THE CENTRE ROAD, (BIR ES SABA - AUJA - KOSSAIMA - HASSANA - RODEH SALEM.)

From BIR ES SABA (BEERSHEBA) the south Palestine Railway has been continued to south of ASLUJ where railhead now is and the embankment has been carried past AUJA to ABU GREYAN on the direct road to HASSANA.



~~SECRET~~  
*Hosani to*

A pipeline has been laid from KOSSAIMA to Wadi Hossani to provide water about half way between AUJA and HASSANA. A motor road has also been made via ASLUJ, AUJA, KOSSAIMA and HASSANA to Wadi Rodh Salem, about 60 miles East of the Canal. At AUJA and HASSANA there is a very large supply of water from wells, while at KOSSAIMA there is an inexhaustible supply from running springs.

HASSANA is the Turks advanced Base in the centre line of approach.

West of HASSANA the first supply is at BIR RODH SALEM, some 25 miles W. of HASSANA, where there are 10 wells and a large tank, capable of supplying a large force.

14 miles further West is BIR JIF JAFFA, where no water has been found.

25 miles west of BIR ROD SALEM there is now owing to recent rain a large amount of water stored in the ancient rock cistern and pools of GEBEL UM MUKSHEIB.

From the most westerly pool to SERAPEUM or TUSSUM is roughly 23 miles.

The route from JIF JAFFA via BIR EL GEDDI is not feasible for wheeled traffic unless a road is made over the pass from Wadi Baha into Wadi Giddi. This has not yet been done.

(3) THE SOUTHERN ROAD, 'A' (KOSSAIMA - NEKHL - AIN SUDR.)

This road leaves the BIR SABA - HASSANA motor road at KOSSAIMA, where there is unlimited water, and leads to NEKHL along a road which motors were using in the early part of 1915.

The NEKHL Well gives 20,000 gallons of water daily, and this supply could be increased.

The road between NEKHL and AIN SUDR requires very little labour to make it practicable for motors as it is all hard limestone.

As AIN SUDR is approached there are one or two cliffs down which a road would have to be cut.

At AIN SUDR there is a spring giving 150,000 gallons daily.



From AIN SUDR down Wadi Sudr, to the maritime plain on the Gulf of SUEZ, a great deal of labour would have to be expended to make it possible for wheeled traffic.

There is water to be obtained at different wells in Wadi Sudr and also at AYUN MUSA and BIR MABEIUK opposite SUEZ, if not denied to the enemy.

This route was traversed by Saladin with a large army in the 12th century.

THE SOUTHERN ROAD 'B' (KOSSAIMA - HASSANA - THEMADA - AIN SUDR or SUDR HEITAN.)

From HASSANA the going is good all the way to either AIN SUDR or SUDR HEITAN.

At THEMADA there is now very little water.

From SUDR HEITAN, the old Pilgrim Road (Darb el Haj) would require clearing, a work of no great difficulty.

This debouches at KUBRI, north of SUEZ.

There are no wells on this route west of BIR EL THEMADA, but after the recent rain there is a certain amount of water to be got by digging at the junction of Wadi El Haj and Wadi el Gabab.

\* \* \* \* \*

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA FROM 19th April to 25th April.

On the 19th April General Lake reported that he had been prevented by floods from re-occupying the ground from which the 7th and 9th Brigades had been pushed back on the night of the 17/18th, but that the 13th Division were engaged in working all round it from the South. The Turkish killed alone on the night of the 17/18th were estimated by General Gorrings at more than 3,000, while our total casualties were only about 2,000.

At this time small quantities of supplies were being put into KUT daily by aeroplane. The floods still continue to prevent much progress.

During the night of the 20/21st the 39th Brigade repulsed a



counter-attack. On the following day the enemy's position on the left bank was systematically bombarded.

On April 22nd the attack by the 7th (MEERUT) Division on the SANNA-I-YAT position on the left bank failed. It was found that owing to the floods the front was so contracted that it was only possible for one brigade to attack at a time.

The leading troops advanced with great gallantry and penetrated the enemy's first and second lines through bog and submerged trenches and a few got into the 3rd line. The Brigade however was unable to maintain itself under the enemy's counter-attacks and the two brigades rushed up on the right and left to reinforce were unable to reach their objective across flooded and boggy ground, under heavy machine gun fire. Nor was it possible for the 3rd (Lahore) and 13th Divisions to make much progress on the right bank.

On April 23rd the bombardment of the SANNA-I-YAT position continued. General Lake, in conjunction with the Naval C.-in-C. arranged to attempt to run a ship loaded with one month's supplies into KUT. The venture took place on the night of the 24/25th, but was unsuccessful, and the ship remained in the enemy's hands at MAGASIS. It was not known whether she ran aground or was injured by shell fire.

\*\*\*\*\*



Page 531.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 92.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

May 9th, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.
2. EL ARISH (R.F.C. Reconnaissance).
3. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

\* \* \* \* \*

*h Q C. seen  
is. Cmt  
h Q  
I g.*



SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

It is reported that the Bulgarians have made a formal request to the Greek local authorities, who have telegraphed to Athens for instructions, for permission to occupy the southern crests of the Hills south of Lake DOIRAN. The enemy are anxious to construct defensive works that would undoubtedly render an Allied offensive directed against the centre considerably more difficult. So far it is not known what reply has been sent by the Greek Government, but in any event the German-Bulgarian artillery may be expected to make use of this commanding position should the enemy consider its retention necessary.

There have been renewed reports of German and Austrian Units appearing on this front. So far the intelligence has been vague, and the numerals of these regiments are very difficult to recognise as belonging to units that could be in this theatre. One is said to be the 88th Infantry Regiment, having King Constantine of Greece as its Colonel. This Regiment belongs to a "reconstituted" German Division, the 36th, and might be employed in the Balkans. There are also the 205th and 208th Regiments of the 44th Reserve Division, formerly in the Balkans during the operations in SERBIA, which have been identified in various recent reports. But the information from FRANCE confirms the presence of troops on the Western front who have until recently been in the Balkans, and it may therefore be assumed that the quality of these German Troops in the Balkans if these reports prove true, does not permit their services being of much value elsewhere, or else that these reports are due to the confusion resulting from the issue of German uniforms to the Bulgarian troops. For instance the 9th German



Regiment was recently stated to have arrived in this area, it has since been proved that it concerned the 9th Bulgarian Regiment of the 2nd Bulgarian Division, who have been issued with German clothing. It is not however clear whether the correct Bulgarian numbers appear on the German issued uniforms, and in any event should the numbering be adjusted to Bulgarian characters and numerals, as was apparently the case in the instance quoted above, high numerals could only refer to German Units. Some weeks ago there were frequent accounts of the Bulgarian soldiers indignant rejection of an issue of German uniforms. There being no stock of Bulgarian uniforms, it has no doubt become a matter of necessity that they should wear them.

From Greek sources it is reported that two German Infantry regiments have arrived on the enemy left flank in the XANTHI district. One of these is said to belong to the 101st Division, and this movement is possibly due to the enemy's desire to improve the defences of that part of the front and to give moral support to the Bulgarian troops who are liable to come in contact with Greek troops in the event of any alteration in the situation.

The Greek Command have now only one Battalion of the 27th Regiment on the frontier between DOIRAN Lake and the STRUMA Valley. The 8th and 9th Greek Divisions are moving to the East of the STRUMA, leaving only one Battalion of the 9th at NIGRITA. The 15th Greek Division remains in the HUMKOS district. In the opinion of the Greek Staff the enemy are expected very shortly to seize the fort at DOVA TEPE, and that the Greeks do not intend to resist is proved by the fact that the breach blocks and ammunition for the guns have been removed to SERRES. It is interesting to note that since the fort is



constructed to repel an attack by Bulgaria on Greece the occupation of the fort by the enemy will necessitate a good deal of work in reversing the construction of the various gun positions: had the Greeks decided to dispute the enemy's offensive at all they would hardly abandon this important work. The Greek Gendarmerie are being withdrawn from this section of the frontier, but in the FLORINA section, West of the VARDAR, the Greek Detachments on outpost duty induced some Bulgarian infantry and Cavalry patrols that had entered one or two villages to withdraw across the border.

A French Infantry battalion entered FLORINA on the 1st of May and there arrested many undesirable persons engaged on espionage work and in organising supplies of food for the enemy. Amongst these are NOURI BEY, Secretary to the Ex-MPRET - Prince William of WIED, and the Secretary of the Austrian Consulate at MONASTIR. The German Wireless is full of this incident and states that the Greek local authorities demanded the release of these prisoners: it is added that the Greek Government are to enter a protest at once.

The German Wireless also enters very fully into the question of the transportation of Serbian Troops from CORFU to SALONIKA. It says :---

" The Serbian Crown Prince is against using again in this  
" War the SERBIAN ARMY, which represents the last support  
" of the Dynasty. The VENEZELIST paper "NEA HELLAS" de-  
" :clares that "The Allies should refrain from a useless  
" and dangerous stretching of the bow, as the Greek Govern-  
" :ment cannot possibly accede". So far the French and  
" English have hitherto carried out the transport of Serbia  
" Troops exclusively in hospital ships, in violation of the  
" Red Cross Flag, in order to protect them against the  
" attacks of submarines. "



Very often similar false statements have preceded attacks by enemy submarines on Hospital Ships. The anxiety of the enemy to belittle the Serbian Army is only exceeded by his desire to prevent Serbian Troops being employed at SALONIKA in the near future.

EL ARISH (R.F.C. Reconnaissance).

G.H.Q. NOTE:--

In the R.F.C. Summary for the week ending May 3th page 521, it is stated one pilot did not return from the reconnaissance of EL ARISH undertaken on the 3rd of May, and that in spite of special search reconnaissances no trace of the pilot and his machine could be discovered. In the Turkish communique received on the 8th by wireless the following information is given :---

" On the morning of the 3rd of May a hostile aeroplane  
" appeared over BIR-ES-SABA (sic). It was brought down to  
" the North of the town. The Pilot was captured. He  
" offered Boduins, who hurried up to help, a sum of money  
" to assist him in escaping. "

TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

Situation 29th April - 6th May.

1. In the neighbourhood of VERDUN fighting has been incessant on the left bank of the MEUSE. During a series of actions lasting from 29th April till 3rd May, in which we repulsed all enemy counter attacks, we have extended and consolidated our position on the MORTHOMME and to the North of CUMIÈRES.

On the 4th and 5th May, after a very violent bombardment, the enemy reinforced by a Division, brought from another point of the line, succeeded in occupying a part of our trenches on the Northern slopes of Hill 304.



On the right bank of the MEUSE there were violent artillery duels - no infantry action except an attack made by us on the 1st May on a trench, which we have now occupied, close to the DOUAUMONT Fort. We have identified a new German Division in this Section.

2. On the rest of the front various attempts on our trenches in the VOSGES (30th April), in the ARGONNE (3rd May) and to the South of the SOMME (5th May) have been easily repulsed. On our side we have had several small successes - notably the 5th May near LASSIGNY in the ARGONNE where we captured several prisoners.

\* \* \* \* \*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No: 93.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

10th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1.    SITUATION IN SYRIA.
2.    G.H.Q. SUMMARY - N O T I C E.

\*\*\*\*\*



1. SITUATION IN SYRIA.

Apart from the force located on the SINAI frontier, the bulk of the troops seem to be concentrated in and around BEIRUT and DAMASCUS, at which latter place DJEMAL Pasha and his Staff have their headquarters.

DJEMAL Pasha himself seldom leaves the town except very occasionally to visit BEIRUT or JERUSALEM. There are indications that the army is settling down for the summer, and many men, called up for service, are now said to have been sent back to their homes.

There are still, however, apprehensions of an Allied landing and the Government are removing from the coast all families suspected of having French sympathies or who would be likely to assist the enemy in the case of a landing in SYRIA.

The LEBANON militia has also been transferred to the interior, probably for the same cause. The harvest this year promises to be extremely good and in consequence the price of grain is going down. In spite of this the distress among the people is very real, and, with wheat and barley at 8 and 5 piastres per lb., respectively, few of the poorer people can afford to buy.

\*\*\*\*\*

2. G.H.Q. SUMMARY NOTICE.

In future the general articles on TURKEY, the BALKANS, and other theatres of war, which form part of the G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary, will only be issued three days a week.

The Ismailia Intelligence Report will continue to be issued daily.

-----0000000000000000-----



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 94.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

13th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. -- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
2. MESOPOTAMIA :-- OPERATIONS AT KUT.
3. SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA.
4. DISTRIBUTION ENEMY FORCES - SINAI FRONT.

\* \* \* \* \*



ROYAL FLYING CORPS - WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

(May 6th to May 12th 1916.)

CANAL FRONT.

Reconnaissance of the immediate front during the week has not brought to light any marked enemy activity.

In the Northern Section on the 6th there were no fresh tracks at MAGEIBRA, but at BIR EL BAYUD were about 20-30 men on top of a sand dune and 3 or 4 horses. There was 1 bell tent; and a small party were proceeding S.W. At BIR SALMANA there were 30-40 men round the wells; at HOD SALMANA a few Arabs with a herd of goats. At BIR EL ABD were 30-50 men and about 8 horses and 1 bell tent. The trenches appeared almost filled in, though apparently one of them was again in process of excavation.

Thus West of BIR EL MAZAR the enemy seemed to have only a few weak posts and patrols. BIR EL MAZAR itself however was held by 200-300 men and there were 100-150 camels, 1 E.P. tent, 12 bell tents, 1 large hut and a few shelters. Some lengths of bright metal piping were observed lying on the ground.

On the 7th two reconnaissances were made. JEFFER and MAGEIBRA were again apparently clear, and at BAYUD only 4 men were seen; at BIR SALMANA was 1 tent and 2 or 3 men, and a small excavation was being made. At BIR EL ABD again the trenches appeared full of sand except for one short stretch which seemed occupied. There was 1 tent, and 6 shelters and a few tracks leading N.

But the second reconnaissance brought news that BIR EL ABD had been deserted; only 1 Arab was seen there and except for a patrol of about 50 at HOD SALMANA, nothing was seen of the enemy until BIR EL MAZAR, which was held



by a force of much the same size as previously reported; but there was an increase in the number of tents and shelters probably accounted for by the troops from BIR EL ABD. The metal piping was again reported, and may well have been water-troughs; the appearance of these has generally indicated that the enemy intend to maintain a more or less permanent post of some size.

By the 8th BIR EL ABD was in the hands of our cavalry. In the SALMANA neighbourhood some activity was observed and 9 or 10 new wells were being dug, an indication that our advance on EL ABD was probably not yet known. BIR EL MAZAR shewed no real change, though the number of tents had slightly decreased. HOD BAYUD was apparently clear, but an enemy patrol of 4 was sighted at MAGEIBRA. The wells here are visited by such small patrols with fair regularity. JEFFEIR was apparently clear.

On the 9th MAGHARA was reconnoitred; there were two camps containing in all 9 tents, 15 shelters and a storehouse. The water tank was not complete. This post appears to have been slightly reduced in strength. At GEBEL BARGA were 11 shelters; possibly some of these had come from MAGHARA.

The MAGHARA - ZAGADAN - BAYUD track showed signs of use near ZAGADAN, but BAYUD itself appeared clear. As during the last few days there was nothing to report at KATIA.

On the 10th there were a few tracks at JEFFEIR, MAGEIBRA, and HOD EL BAYUD, in general leading from East to West. There were again a few of the enemy in the SALMANA area. BIR EL MAZAR shewed no change of note from previous reports; one fresh well had been dug.

Reconnaissances of May 11th and 12th found little change. BIR EL ABD has remained deserted. In the SALMANA Area well digging



is still apparently in process, although on the 12th no men were actually seen at HOD SALMANA, and the only movement observed at BIR SALMANA was a party of 20 Camels proceeding North.

On the 11th tracks were reported at MAGEIBRA, JEFEIR, and BAYUD; on the 12th at JEFEIR, MAHADAT, and BADA. But they were only the tracks of small patrols, and, though it is not common for these to penetrate so far West as MAHADAT, their presence has been reported several times previously.

Throughout the week messages were dropped at ROMANI and Hill 40 to keep our posts there in touch with the situation.

In the Central Section RODH SALEM was visited on the 6th. Observation was hampered by a ground mist, but 40 bell tents were seen. 50 men were visible and the machine came under rifle-fire. 7 "Clumps of black material" were reported, also a red cylinder near the long trough previously reported. There were 6 bell tents at JIFJAFFA. Near EL FAGAIA were some 200 sheep and goats.

On the 9th RODH SALEM was again reconnoitred. The Camp was estimated at about 50 tents; about 200 men and 100 camels were seen. One gun fired on the machine. The camp previously at JIFJAFFA had been removed; but just South of point 1401 (about 5 miles N.E. of JIFJAFFA) was a camp of 6 white tents and 1 black tent, and a mile N.W. of this again a Beduin encampment of 4 shelters.

In WADI MUKSHEIB nothing of importance has been reported save the occasional tracks of small enemy patrols at points between its western outlet and MOIYA HARAB and



the hills, which recur from week to week; the water in the various pools continues steadily to diminish.

In the Southern Section an exchange of stations has taken place, and 3 machines flew from HELIOPOLIS to SUEZ on the 10th. No changes of note have been observed in the enemy posts on the front.

On the 6th the post at AIN SUDR (7 bell tents, 1 white E.P. tent and 3 black shelters) was bombed - also the post on the NEMHIL road S.E. of SUDR EL HEITAN, where about 25 men were observed and a number of camels which were hurriedly driven off on the approach of the aeroplane. At BIR EL THEMADA were several new wells South of the old group.

On the 7th there was an increase of 1 bell tent at AIN SUDR, which was bombed. The post at SUDR EL HEITAN still consisted of 2 bell tents and 1 Beduin shelter, but the heavy camel tracks, freshly made, were observed leading East, and there were many tracks all round the Camp.

AIN SUDR was bombed again on the 9th and 11th; there was still no change here or at SUDR EL HEITAN.

BIR EL GIDDI has been consistently reported clear throughout the week, and the enemy have shown no signs of activity in this Section again with the exception of the movements of small patrols, whose tracks were observed (e.g.) near BIR TAWAL on the 10th.

The usual photography has been carried out during the week,  
SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT.

Little news has been received during the week.

#### ASSIUT & MEHERIQ.

Reconnaissances of DAKHLA to QASR DAKHL were carried out on the 11th and 12th from MEHERIQ by the use of an advance landing-ground. Apparently the enemy are concentrated in the neighbourhood of TENIDA, with Outposts towards KHARGA, as previously reported, but no full reports are as yet available. Reinforcement by air between ASSIUT and MEHERIQ has been a regular occurrence.

#### FAYOUM.

On the 6th B AHARIA was reconnoitred; all the principal villages (EL ZABU, MENDISHA, EL HARPA, BAWITE) were apparently clear of troops though 1 bell tent and 1 native tent were observed East of EL ZABU.

\* \* \* \* \*



MESOPOTAMIA: OPERATIONS AT KUT.

On the 3rd December when General TOWNSHEND arrived at KUT after his retreat from CTESIPHON, the Force opposing him consisted of 4 Infantry Divisions totalling some fifteen thousand rifles, 1,000 camelry, 400 cavalry, 31 mobile and 7 heavy guns, also some thousand of tribesmen.

On 4th December he reported that he was on the point of being invested. The enemy's advance guard was 10 miles off with the main body 5 miles behind them. The position he held was a peninsula formed by a loop of the TIGRIS, about 3,200 yards long, from North to South and 1,700 yards wide. On the right bank he also held the liquorice factory, and a village which was fortified and garrisoned by two battalions. He was invested on all sides except <sup>from</sup> the West, and his troops were worn out with their long march from CTESIPHON. He began, however, to form a strong entrenched camp and prepared to defend KUT as he had defended CHITRAL in 1895. The main body of troops was kept in reserve, while each avenue of approach was kept under observation with the smallest force consistent with safety. He sent the steamers and barges down stream and most of the Mahalas, retaining one steamer only the 'SUMAVA' for use as a ferry.

On the 6th December he sent off the Cavalry Brigade less one squadron to ALI GHARBI. This brigade fought a rear-guard action all the way, but got through with trifling casualties.

By the 7th December one Turkish Division had moved round his flank, 4 miles to the South and on the opposite bank of the river, and two other Divisions had taken up a position on the left bank West of KUT.



On December 9th Nur El Din sent in a letter demanding General Townshend's surrender. The refusal was followed by a heavy bombardment from north, west, and south-east and the camp was attacked from all points of the compass. Shelling was continued all day and eventually the bridge-head detachment was driven in. During the night the bridge was demolished by Lieut. Matthews, R.E.

On the 10th and 11th attacks were pressed severely all day, our casualties on the 10th being 120 and on the 11th 212. By this date the enemy had dug up to within 600 yards and was strengthening his works with sand bags and timbers. In the artillery duels the garrison suffered from the disadvantage of concentrated hostile fire from all sides, while our gun-fire, being directed from the centre to the circumference, was necessarily divergent and disseminated.

On the 14th the casualties dropped to 77: on the 15th to 72. It seemed that the Turks were becoming tired of these ineffectual attacks, and on the 16th a general apathy set in. They lost at least 1,000 men killed and wounded in their attacks of the 11th and 12th.

During all this time the garrisons made repeated sorties. On the 14th the small force in the liquorice Factory drove the enemy out of their trenches 250 yards away. On the 17th during two small sorties 300 Turks were bayoneted, our casualties being only one man slightly wounded.

At this time General Townshend estimated that his garrison was being contained by 10,000 men, but on the 24th, increased boldness in attack indicated that reinforcements had arrived, including the 52nd Division from the CAUCASUS.



On that day the fort was heavily shelled and large breaches made in the first-line defences and the fort wall, and the Turks attacked but were repulsed by counter-attack. In another fierce attack at midnight the enemy again effected a lodgement in the northern bastion, but were again driven out; but although ejected they came on again and again at the breaches in the walls, bombing at close quarters. At daylight they retired from the bastion to trenches some 500 yards from the fort. Our casualties on the 24/25th were 315.

Prisoners state that the enemy believed that Townshend's ammunition was giving out and that the garrison must fall if the attack was pressed, hence the fury of the Turkish assault. One prisoner described our fort as a cemetery of Turkish dead, and said that the 52nd Division had been decimated.

On the 29th December the Turks asked for an armistice to bury their dead and to remove the wounded who lay in large numbers in front of the fort.

Our casualties during the first month of the siege amounted to 1,740 killed and wounded, while it is estimated that the enemy lost 4,000.

During all this time the civil population, amounting to about 6,000 had remained in KUT. Those who had left the town in the early days had been caught by the enemy, tied up and shot, and the Turks had made it clear that they would execute any who tried to escape. Thus to expel them would result in the wholesale murder of the entire Arab population of the town. The question of supplies on this account became doubly serious.

However, discovery on January 25th of considerable stores of grain hidden away in the houses and mostly underground greatly relieved the situation. All foodstuffs found in this way were commandeered and paid for. Sufficient was found to ration the garrison and also the civil population for three months on a gradually reduced scale.



KUT thus held out to the very verge of starvation. From April 17th its garrison had been reduced to a ration of 4 ozs. of flour daily and a small allowance of horse flesh.

The last communication from General Townshend was received <sup>on</sup> Saturday, April 29th, at 10-40 am. when he sent the following wireless message :-

"I have destroyed my guns and am destroying most of my munitions. I have sent out officers to Khalil to

"say I am ready to surrender. Khalil is at Maduq. I

"am unable to hold on any more and must have some food here.

"I have told this to Khalil to-day and have sent Lynch with

"a deputation to bring some food from Julnar. (Note this

"was the ship sent by General Gorringe on the night of April

"24th to carry supplies to the garrison of Kut, but which had

"been captured by the Turks.) A Turkish regiment is approaching

"the fort to take over the guards in KUT. I have hoisted

"the white flag over the town and fort and my troops will

"commence going into camp near SHAMRAN at 2 pm. I shall

"shortly destroy wireless".

At 1 pm. a pre-arranged signal from the wireless indicated that Townshend's last message had gone through.

On the same day the Turkish General, Khalil Pasha, received the parlementaires from the relieving force. He

said that the garrison should be well rationed, and the

General Townshend especially, for whom he professed a most profound admiration, should receive every possible comfort

after the privations he had endured so gallantly, and he

welcomed the proposal to send them stores, and regretted that

the supplies at his command were not more plentiful. On

the 2nd of May two barges loaded with 1½ days iron rations

left General Gorringe's camp for the captured garrison.



Negotiations regarding exchange of prisoners of war were so far satisfactory that a hospital ship, together with another ship of ours and two big barges laden with food and canteen stores were admitted to KUT, and on the 3rd inst, were on their way down stream again with 777 sick and wounded, and it was expected that the remainder 770 would follow.

Another point touched on by our parlementaires was the immunity of the civil population of KUT, who, it was explained, were retained there by 'force majeure'. The Pasha said that he contemplated no reprisals. Their future treatment would depend on their future conduct. He could give no pledge, but he did not intend to hang or to persecute.

General Townshend is believed to be proceeding direct to CONSTANTINOPLE with one A.D.C. and his servant.

\* \* \* \* \*

### 3. SITUATION IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

In continuation of the operations reported in the Summary of the 2nd May, General VAN DER VENTER'S Mounted Force moved South-West from LOIKISSALE in two columns on 9th April. - one column occupied UFIOME (47 Miles N.E. of KONDOA IRANGI) on the 12th April, after a fight, in which 30 of the enemy were captured.

The other column occupied KOTHEERSHEIM (60 Miles W. by S. of ARUSHE) on the 11th April after an action in which the enemy lost 11 killed and 1 prisoner, in addition to the wounded which he succeeded in removing.

During both these actions the main body of the enemy was in the mountainous country towards KONDOA - IRANGI. SAALANGE (31 Miles North of KONDOA - IRANGI) was occupied on 14th April, and KONDOA - IRANGI was occupied on 19th April.



The enemy retired southwards towards the Central Railway leaving many killed and 4 white and 30 native soldiers in our hands. There were no British casualties.

The enemy's force is thought to have consisted of 8 companies in addition to the garrison of UFIOME and KONDOA - IRANGI.

KONDOA -IRANGI is an important military centre in well-watered mountains. The following roads radiate from it :--

To TABARA (220 Miles West.)

MUANZA (300 Miles North West.)

HANDENI (150 Miles S.E.)

MPAPUA. (110 Miles S.E.) and

KILIMATINDE (100 Miles S.W.).

It would seem that the bulk of the enemy's force in EAST AFRICA is in the PARE - USAMBARA Area where the difficult nature of the country will be of considerable assistance to him.

The enemy is apparently arranging for an independent command in the Western Area with Headquarters at UJIJI should his communications along the central railway be cut.

The Belgians are said to have advanced at LAKE MOHASI. The enemy withdrew.

\* \* \* \* \*



Page.

4 DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE SINAI FRONT.

The following is the disposition of the enemy forces according to the last information received.

This shows the Northern Road practically evacuated and a general reduction of about 5,000 in the advance garrisons.

Place.	Ref. Map.	Number of Enemy.	Guns.	Aero-planes.	Remarks.
BIR SALMANIL.	P.S.-H.3.	small post.			improving wells.
BIR EL MAZAR.	P. S.-H.3.	200 - 300			
EL ARISH.	P.S.-E.3.	3,000	8 2 A.A.	3	These aeroplanes may be at BIR SABA.
JIF JAFFA.	S. - G.7.	small post.			Camp is really about 5 m. N.E. of JIF JAFFA.
RODH SALEM.	P.S.-H.6.	200			
MAGHARA.	P.S.-H.5.	350	4		Mountain guns.
HASSANA.	S. -J.7.	700	8.		Aerodrome in course of construction.
		1,000 Irreg.	3 Heavy. 1 A.A.		
KOSSAIMA.	R. - N.6.	800 200 Irreg.			
SUDR HEITAN.	S. - G.9.	small post.			
AIN SUDR.	S.-F.11.	small post.			
NEKHL.		500	3.		R.F.C. reports no sign of A.A. guns.
GAZA.	R. - N.1.	2,000	3.		
KHAN YUNIS.	R. - M.1.	700			
RAFA.	R. - M.2.	200			
SHERIA.	R. - O.1.	3,000			
SHELLAL,	R. - N.2.				Large convalescent Camp.
EL AUJA.	R. - N.4.	3,500 1,150 Irreg.	4 heavy. 1 A.A.		
BIR ASLUG.	R. - P.3.	4,000			Railway labourers.
BIR SABA.	R. - P.2.	1,600 400 Irreg.	4 heavy. 3 A.A.		
KHULIL.	S. -J.10.	2,000			
TABA.	A. - Q.12.	small post.			
MUNSLINI.	Near AKABA.	" "			



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 95.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

16th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION ON SALONIKA FRONT.
2. NOTES FROM FRENCH G.Q.G.: OPERATIONS AT VERDUN.
3. SITUATION AT KUT DURING THE SIEGE.

\* \* \* \* \*



SITUATION ON SALONIKA FRONT.

The following information is extracted from prisoners of Zeppelin L.Z.85.

Total crew: 4 Officers, 5 Mechanics, 2 Pilots, 1 W.T. Operator, Total 12.

This forms the full complement that can be borne for lengthy voyages.

Airship constructed at POTSDAM, September 1915.

Note:-- Construction Yards for Zeppelins, FRIEDERIK-HAVEN and POTSDAM; repair yard FRANKFURT.

Cost of each Zeppelin 1,000,000 Marks; time required for construction, 3 Months.

On the Western Front sheds established at MAUBERGE, BRUSSELS, NAMUR and GHENT. Depot Schools for Naval Service at DRESDEN; and for the Army at RAINICKENDORF, near BERLIN.

Reported no sheds in Balkans. This statement is possibly false owing to fear of reprisals by Allies. There is reason to believe that two sheds are in existence at SOFIA, possibly one at ADRIANOPLE, and certainly at TEMESVAR.

Dimensions	-	570 foot in length. Cubic capacity of gas-bags - 32,000 metres.
Engines	-	4 Maybach, water cooled, 6 cylinder 210 HP motors. Average speed obtained 44 m.p.h.
Fuel Consumption	-	12½ gallons per motor per hour.
Capacity & load	-	950 gallons of petrol. 80 gallons of oil. 3,300 lbs. weight of explosives. 1,685 gallons of water ballast. 62 gallons of water used for radiators. 1,950 lbs. weight allowed for crew. 693 lbs. weight in protective sand bags.
Armament	-	10 bombs of sizes varying from 128 lbs. in weight to 660 lbs. weight. 5 machine guns.

(In the case of L.Z. 85 only one gun has so far been found.)



**Life.** - The above figures work out roughly to over 12 tons dead weight. On her last voyage at an average height of 3,050 metres the journey from TEMESVAR was made in 9 hours - distance 360 miles.

L.Z. 81 and L.Z. 86 are sister-airships.

Previous History of L.Z. 85.

Moved from POTSDAM to ALLENSTEIN October 1915.

From this base carried out three raids on DUNABERG, MINSK, and RIGA.

Left ALLENSTEIN for LIEGNITZ January 1916, and arrived TEMESVAR a little later.

From this Base made three raids on SALONIKA :--

First Raid: In January when bombs were thrown on the town.

Second Raid: In February when unable to proceed further than NISH.

Third Raid: Early in March, when the outer line of defences only were reached, the airship being driven off by gun fire and French aircraft. Returned to TEMESVAR after a halt at SOFIA.

Fourth and last Raid: Terminated by the crew becoming bewildered by the beams of the searchlights and by gun-fire. The envelope was ruptured and the equilibrium disturbed which resulted in the whole ship assuming an almost perpendicular angle, causing the motors to stop (probably due to lack of petrol for the motors). The officer states entire destruction of ship was caused by a means that he refuses to indicate.

\* \* \* \* \*



The enemy continues to strengthen his position along the frontier. The advanced British patrols at PATAROS were under shell fire from a Bulgarian 10.5 battery. The 9th Bulgarian Division is in the DOIRAN Sector, and the 6th Division has moved to the PETRICH Section. 40 heavy guns were noticed by deserters to be in position between HUDOVA and GEVGELLI early in April. There are reports that a German Division from MACEDONIA has gone to TURKEY. This is very doubtful, but if true can only refer to the 101st Division.

10 extra machine guns have been issued to the 2nd Bulgarian Division, and it is said that other Bulgarian Divisions will receive a similar number also from AUSTRIA.

Austrian Infantry Regiment is again reported on Macedonian Front May 2nd and on the 14th.

DOVATEPE has been occupied by the French troops; the Greek detachment has been withdrawn.

Italian General Staff claim to have identified the 57th and 59th Austrian Divisions, and the 10th Austrian Mountain Brigade from ALBANIA in the TRENTINO.

These two Divisions are now said to form an 8th Corps.

47th Austrian Division probably remains keeping order in MONTENEGRO.

53rd Division, together with the 10th, 14th and 17th Mountain Brigades, 2 of which may be incorporated in the 62nd Division (if still in existence) remain in ALBANIA.

A second howitzer battery of the 10th Austrian Mountain Artillery probably remains with the other Austrian Units on the Macedonian Front.

\* \* \* \* \*



2. NOTES FROM FRENCH G.Q.G. : OPERATIONS AT VERDUN.

Continuation of French notes.

The Germans used relatively small forces, though sufficient to carry the objective selected.

Attacks were undertaken by successive lines.

The first line contained a large number of bombers, accompanied by wire-cutters and pioneers, with flame projectors.

During the attack in its initial stages every effort was made by the enemy to outflank points, creep round the rear, deploy etc. to act, in other words, calmly and in an orderly manner.

Especially interesting is the method of infiltration, (i.e. of advancing by dribblets), by which means the enemy are able to introduce themselves into all the interstices of the French defensive works.

The enemy constructed in all their debouching positions numerous subterranean shelters, proof against our heavy artillery, which were used to form depots for reserves. Parapets are from 25 to 30 metres in thickness. There their infantry waited in safety until the end of the bombardment when the attack would be opened.

Reconnaissances were carried out by Officers' reconnoitring parties (50 men and 2 Officers), whose object was to ascertain whether the artillery preparation had been sufficient. In cases where it was insufficient the artillery had to resume fire, and in all cases the reconnoitring parties had to remain where they were.

The enemy constructed no approach works, although at certain points the distance between the lines was between 600 and 800 metres, which could only be explained by assuming that the



object of the enemy was surprise, which, considering the wooded nature of the country, offered particular facilities. It was also clear that he wished to bombard the advanced trenches with the heaviest guns without the danger of firing into his own lines; he certainly counted on the first two lines of defences being shattered entirely by his bombardment.

As a general rule, it may be laid down that in the organization of the defences, the following three points must be adhered to.

- (a) The defences must be organized in depth and successive positions, each shall include several lines.
- (b) Any Unit charged with the defence of part of the ground never abandons it whatever happens.
- (c) All lost ground must be re-taken by a counter-attack, carried out by troops reserved for this purpose. These troops must, on no pretext, be broken up, but must go forward as a formed body, should the need for assistance to the front line be imperative.

In order to successfully withstand an attack it is essential that:-

- (1) The construction of shelters, shell proof and deep trenches for the troops, with Command and Observation posts adjoining should be sufficient for all emergencies.
- (2) The construction of an adequate system of the necessary communication trenches should be made irrespective of what appear to be concealed roads and approaches.
- (3) Freedom of movement being of the greatest importance, as many exits from shelters as possible should be provided and communication trenches should permit of large numbers being rapidly moved from the rear and front.



(4) An adequate system of look-outs, observation posts, should be established in all three lines of the defence, to ensure that ample warning be given the troops of the enemy's advance, and the progress of the fight.

Experience of VERDUN has shown that, in spite of the heaviest bombardment, troops are nevertheless able at the moment of attack to occupy the remains of the trenches, and to hold up the enemy.

The result of offensive artillery action on the defence is therefore chiefly to cause a diminution of the material means of defending the force, and the wearing down of its morale. It does not destroy the defenders.

The enemy's artillery adopted the following system:-

- (a) Guns of every calibre were turned on the infantry trenches, including those in the first line.
- (b) Searching fire was directed, not only against all the works of the front position (including front line, supports, shelters, observation posts, Field Headquarters, approaches), but also against the second position.
- (c) Fire in zones with short bracket rather than exact ranged fire.
- (d) Before an attack a great concentration of fire on the front defences to be attacked by the infantry, and barrage fire to the rear of them.
- (e) During the attack, continuation of the barrage fire.
- (f) On account of the numerous batteries employed, the enemy was able to develop his preparatory fire on the infantry



positions, and to maintain at the same time, an artillery duel with the defending batteries and concentrated fire of H.E. and Lachrymose shells.

The duties of the defending artillery are severe, and the reinforcing batteries sometimes have only arrived during the course of the battle, and will be provided with little or no cover. Its duties at certain times will probably lead to nothing but sacrifice.

The artillery which ceases fire altogether, or breaks off during a battle because it is being itself shelled, or considers it is being observed by enemy air-craft, deserts its infantry and fails to fulfil its military duty.

The mobility of artillery is the result of intellectual activity by its Commanding Officers, who must, whenever possible, know the ground, and be able to carry out their duties in any emergency, having previously made suitable arrangements regarding observation posts, gun platforms etc.

The result of the enemy bombardment at VERDUN was to destroy all forms of communication between the front and the rear. Visual signalling and despatch bearers had, in the majority of cases, to be employed. Supplying the Command with sketches and diagrams illustrating the situation at a particular point, and at a given moment, are of the greatest value, and can only be carried personally.

More attention should therefore be given to the instruction of men for these duties, either in relays or singly, who must know alternative routes for arriving at their destination, and a method must be devised locally for ensuring that the papers entrusted to them, at all costs, reach their destination, should the bearer be wounded or killed.



The whole situation is summed up in the following conclusion:-

The moral factor is of greater importance than ever. In proportion as mechanical means of destruction increases, the power of resistance of the true soldier develops. The mind remains, in spite of all, superior to matter. Sections of the lines that did not afford natural defensive facilities and were subjected to a terrible bombardment and to furious and repeated onslaughts, have been held victoriously, whilst others particularly well constructed, fell prematurely because their defenders had not the necessary confidence in themselves, their leaders, their neighbours, and in victory.

The Battle of VERDUN has, up to the present, taught no lesson in respect of Command which was not already known, but each man should have the following truth impressed upon his mind more deeply than ever:-

"That no inch of ground should be voluntarily  
"abandoned, whatever the circumstances, and that  
"a body of men, even though surrounded, should  
"resist to the last man, without giving ground,  
"the sacrifice of each man being the very  
"condition of victory"

\*\*\*\*\*



5. SITUATION AT KUT DURING THE SIEGE.Further details.

The failure of the attack on December 24th, 25th, and the approach of the relieving force, introduced a new phase. The Turks now turned their siege into a blockade investment, confining their chief activities to shelling the garrison at night by big guns. The daily routine of the besieged was now directed towards fighting hunger, and towards the postponement of the date, which was given from time to time as being the last day on which the garrison could hold out, and which meant in every case a reduction in the scale of rations.

Horsemeat at first was plentiful, but some of the Indian troops were unwilling to eat it, and, although General Townshend obtained rulings from the leaders of the chief religious communities in India that there was no objection to their doing so, he hesitated to coerce them. The discovery on January 24th of a large amount of grain was very welcome, but it could not be utilised at once owing to the difficulty of grinding for so large a garrison. Millstones, however, were dropped by aeroplanes and the mill engine was fed with oil which had been stored in Naval barges.

By this time the stench in KUT was becoming intolerable, and it was feared that an epidemic would arise from the frightful smell. By February 5th scurvy had set in, but the vegetable seeds planted by Townshend at the end of January, bore welcome fruit before the garrison capitulated.

On February 5th British soldiers were receiving a 12 oz. loaf which was made from a compound of barley, atta and wheat flour - 1 lb of horse meat - a few groceries and a small supply of dates. Indian rations were 1 lb of flour, half barley, half atta, and half rations tea, turmeric, chillies, ginger



and a small supply of dates. Groceries - both British and Indian - lasted on this small scale till March 5th.

By first week of February the garrison had run out of rice, sugar, dhall, goon (i.e. Indian sugar), and vegetables, and there was only milk in the hospital sufficient for 10 days. For animals there was three-quarters barley ration, but no fodder to last those which it was necessary to keep for meat for the next 40 days.

On the 3rd of March, owing to shortage of fuel for the mill, the barley meal rations of the Indian troops were reduced from 1 lb to  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb, but 6 ozs. were issued for parching. On March 9th, after our unsuccessful attack on DUJAILAH, the British ration loaf was reduced from 12 to 10 ozs., and the Indian troops ration of flour for parching from 6 to 4 ozs. On March 21st rations were again reduced. On April 9th the mill stopped working for want of fuel, but enough flour had been ground to last until April 14th. On April 16th rations were reduced to 4 ozs. flour to both British and Indian troops.

During this last phase, while the relieving force was being held up on the narrow flooded front at SUNHAIYET, stores were dropped into KUT by aeroplane, chiefly salt, atta, flour, ghi, and tea. This air service probably gave the garrison another 4 days, but the carriage of such heavy weights was too great a task for the machines. Previously aeroplanes had been employed for dropping light articles into the camp, such as rifle cleaners, spare parts for wireless, seine nets for fishing, and at one time cigarettes and tobacco, but, as it was impossible to supply all, Townshend



~~ruled out these luxuries as introducing a form of privilege.~~

He himself shared every privation.

After April 20th, many of the Arabs, feeling the pinch of hunger, made attempts to escape by river from KUT. These men are splendid swimmers, and two of them got through to General Gorringo's Camp by the help of the strong current. One supported by skin bladders made the journey by night in 8 hours; another, hiding himself during the day, arrived on the second night; and the third, the sole survivor of a party of 18, came through on a raft with a bullet in his leg. The Turks had fired on them from the bank, several being killed, and others, many of them wounded, dived into the water, and it is doubtful if any escaped. These Arabs spoke of the cheerfulness of the garrison, who, they said, looked thin but well and strong. The inhabitants of KUT were still confident that the place would be relieved. Their respect for Townshend, based on his personality, and the achievements of the troops under his command amounted to something like superstition. They abandoned the town out of sheer hunger. They spoke of cigarettes being sold at 8d each and a loaf of sugar,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lbs weight, at 50 rupees.

---

It seems that over 90% of the sick at KUT are Indians. Their abstention from mulo flesh had lowered their vitality and recuperative powers, and had rendered them more subject to scurvy. Owing to their exhausted condition the Indians are being cleared off before the British. The first batch of 177 consisted of three British Officers and 174 Indians: all are stretcher-cases - mostly scurvy and dysentery - and they are reported not strong enough yet



for the journey down stream to the base hospital. The Turks have left 12 British medical Officers and 3 chaplains to attend the sick. The doctors described KUT as considerably battered by shell fire, only the Mosque being untouched.

Leaving the hospital ship "SIKKIM" behind to evacuate the sick, one Doctor proceeded up stream with provisions for the prisoners' camp at SHUMRAN. A tug with two lighters went up carrying about 500 tons of food-stuffs including large boxes of mess stores. The British soldiers were looking very thin and wasted. Some of them and some Indians were bathing, a luxury which had not been enjoyed for many months, as the river at KUT was exposed to snipers. As soon as the British soldiers had realised that the tug was conveying provisions they shouted for tobacco, and 100 lbs of plug was thrown to them over the heads of the scatrios.

It is hoped that the lime-juice, potatoes, onions, groceries, and medical comforts will greatly help to restore vitality to the garrison. There are now 25 tons of letters and parcels waiting to go through if the Turks will give permission.

Between Gorringo's camp and KUT the s/s "JUNAR" was seen. It was the crew of this ship who made the gallant attempt to force the blockade on the night of the 24/25th April. Her funnels were perforated with bullet-holes, but she was floating on her own keel, her steel plates were intact, but her propeller damaged.

The "SIKKIM" made the return journey during the armistice. While passing the trenches at BEIT ASESA and SUNMAIYET, she was hailed by groups of Turks, Indians and British who had all availed themselves of this welcome



opportunity of a swim.

So far the only members of the KUT garrison that have arrived at BASRA are "Spot", General Townshend's fox-terrier, "Boggy", and "Diamond", the two terriers belonging to General MELLISS. "Spot" bears the inscription on his collar in Townshend's handwriting giving his record of service from the Battle of KURNAH to the defence of KUT.

\*\*\*\*\*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 96.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

18th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. GENERAL NEWS - TURKEY & SINAI.
2. GERMAN OPERATIONS AT VERDUN - INTELLIGENCE  
FROM G.C.G. FRANCE.

\* \* \* \* \*



GENERAL NEWS - TURKEY & SINAI.

On the Caucasus front the Russians seem to have had somewhat of a set-back west of RUSH in consequence of the arrival of Turkish Reinforcements. They have however, gained some ground near TREBIZOND, and have maintained their positions between ERZERUM and ERZINGAN in spite of powerful Turkish attacks. Later telegrams report that they have occupied MAMAKHATUN (30 miles N.E. of ERZINGAN, and are advancing towards DIARBEKR and MOSUL.

There are further reports of the arrival of Austrian troops in CONSTANTINOPLE, and of some of them being sent to ASIA MINOR.

It is fairly certain that something like 25,000 troops were despatched from DAMASCUS to MESOPOTAMIA between the 12th and 30th of April. These troops were mostly recruits whose ages varied between 15 and 55, and were a mixture of Christians and Moslems. They were well-armed but badly equipped, and their morale is stated to have been bad. The force was accompanied by artillery in proportion but said to be short of ammunition.

As regards SINAI, the truth appears to be that DJEMAL PASHA intends to keep a sufficient force at BIR SABA and other places in SOUTHERN SYRIA to prevent us from withdrawing troops from the Canal Zone. The vacillating movements of Turkish forces in SINAI are calculated to have this effect and also to persuade the Arabs that the attack on the Canal will really take place. All the Arab sheikhs have actually



~~order to assemble their forces for an attack on the~~  
Canal during this month. This is the ~~method~~ employed by the enemy to maintain his irregular troops in SINAI. They still hope to share in the spoils of the conquest of EGYPT. Arab rumour, however, which on several occasions has shown itself remarkably well-founded, is that the Turks will not attack at all this year unless themselves attacked, but will confine themselves to making raids on our advanced posts and to improving their communications.

All reports received during the last few days shew a diminution in the garrisons of the enemy's advanced posts. Even RODH SALEM, where there were quite lately about a thousand men is now reported by the R.F.C. to be practically evacuated, and JIFJAFFA appears to be deserted. This may be due to the intense heat (115° in the shade) which has prevailed during the past week. No more has been heard of the 20 water-buffalos which were said to have arrived at RODH SALEM, and it is more than probable that the pools of water which have lately been standing in the WADI UM MUKHSHEIB, have evaporated.

\* \* \* \* \*

## 2. GERMAN OPERATIONS AT VERDUN - INTELLIGENCE FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

Recently the Germans have given up making attacks over a front of five, ten or even 15 kilometres, and have reverted to their earlier practice of confining their attacks to a narrow front which enables them to use the bulk of their heavy artillery. On the 3rd and 9th of May in the course of his attack upon Hill 304 no less than 80 batteries of heavy artillery were engaged. This form of attack on the other hand necessitates the employment of his infantry in massed



formation, which exposes them to enormous losses. Four Divisions were put into the attack on Hill 304, and failed to reach their objective, although they obtained a footing in some advanced works on the northern slopes.

On the 7th of May on the right bank of the MEUSE 3 Divisions carried out an attack to the right and left of THIAUMONT farm; they gained 500 metres of our trenches from which, however, they were entirely driven out in the course of the following days.

In the MORTHOMEE sector the enemy is showing every signs of fatigue, and as a result of our attacks on the 3rd, 4th and 10th May we have been able to extend our positions considerably to the North and West of MORTHOMEE.

Up to the 10th of May we have identified  $31\frac{1}{2}$  German Divisions on the VERDUN front. Eight of these Divisions (3rd and 18th Active Corps, and the 5th and 7th Reserve Corps) have been withdrawn out of the line, and after a long rest and re-thorough/organisation they have been sent back to the front for the second time. Besides these, five Divisions after re-forming have been sent back for the third time; so that it may be said that the enemy have employed  $44\frac{1}{2}$  Divisions. The German Staff by establishing Depots for the supplying of Divisions with drafts in proportion to their losses in close proximity to the line, have been able to maintain formations in position up to the last possible moment. It is very difficult to form an estimate of the extent of the German losses although it is certain that the enemy has suffered far more heavily than we have.

\* \* \* \* \*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 97.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

20th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. --- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

\* \* \* \* \*

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI &  
SOUTHERN SYRIA.

\*\*\*\*\*



~~RESULT OF OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS.~~

May 13th to May 19th 1916.

---

CANAL FRONT.

Daily frontal reconnaissances throughout the week have found all clear in the vicinity of the Canal.

In the Northern Section MAGHARA was reconnoitred on the 13th; the camps consisted of 8 wooden sheds, and 10 bell tents; and 1 low canvas shelter; very little movement was seen. The BAYUD - MAGHARA track was apparently clear.

On the 14th the neighbourhood of the EL ARISH road was reconnoitred to BIRLOSEIFIG. West of BIR EL MAZAR there still seemed to be no activity except by small patrols. BIR EL ABD remained apparently clear, and the presence of the well-diggers at SALMANA was only indicated by two small tracks to the North.

On the 15th BIR EL MAZAR was reconnoitred. There were 13 bell tents, 2 E.P. tents and a long canvas shelter; 9 other shelters, and 1 long building. Work was going on at new wells about  $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile South of the main wells. 2 A.A. Guns opened heavy fire on the aeroplane. BIR EL ABD was still apparently clear; in the SALMANA area about 50 men were seen altogether, and fire was opened on the machine. There was a big flock of goats and 10-15 men at BIR EL GEISI, and at HOD BAYUD another flock of goats and about 8 men, otherwise there seemed no signs of activity in this area, beyond the tracks of a patrol of 5-10 running South-east from BIR EL JEFEIR.

On the 16th MAGHARA was revisited. 1 large white building, 6 wooden sheds, 10 bell tents and a low canvas shelter were reported; and the reservoir as before. About 50 men were seen scattered along the road about 1 mile West of the



South Camp. The Camps thus show little change. The MAGHARA - G.BARGA - ZAGADAN - BAYUD track was apparently clear. At HOD EL BAYUD about 300 of our own mounted patrol were sighted proceeding East.

On the 17th BIR EL ABD was reported still clear; about 20 well-diggers were observed at HOD SALMANA. At MAGEIBRA and HOD EL BADA small patrols were seen, and tracks linked HOD EL BADA to HOD ABU SIMARA; from BADA tracks led South-East.

On the 18th a reconnaissance and bomb-attack were carried out in co-operation with the Royal Navy and the R.N.A.S. Six machines from ISMAILIA and KANTARA were assembled at KANTARA and ready to start at 3.45 a.m. Owing to the extremely moist air and haze their departure was postponed until dawn, and the first machine left at 4.3 a.m. All machines were in the air by 4.12 a.m. By 5.55 a.m. the first machine was over EL ARISH.

No signs of enemy aircraft were observed; and accordingly the town and camps were taken as objective and were effectively bombed; also a body of troops about 1,000 strong moving West in close formation.

The Camps were reported to be smaller than when last visited on 3/5/13; the aeroplane hanger had been removed; and the total force of the enemy was estimated at about 2,000. 20 photographs were taken.

The North Road was reconnoitred by one machine on the return journey. Only 3 bell tents and 1 large shed were reported at BIR EL MAZAR and no men were seen. At BIR SALMANA 5-6 men were observed near the wells; otherwise the vicinity of the road was apparently clear to MATIA.



Reconnaissance of the 19th reported BIR EL ABD still clear of the enemy; there were fresh tracks at BIR SALMANA; and at HOD BAYUD 5 men and 3 camels; otherwise there was nothing of note to report.

In the Central Section there has been little to report nearer than RODH SALEM.

Reconnaissance of the 13th found 2 tents and 2 huts at BIR EL MELHI, and apparently a cleared road from here to G. EL URF in good condition. The tent on the cleared patch of ground at BIR UM WERIB had gone. At BIR EL HAMMA were 22 tents and one big hut; the enemy force there was estimated at 600. Two bombs were dropped. At HAMMET EL RAIL were 10 laden camels going towards HASSANA. The bulk of the enemy post previously at RODH SALEM had thus apparently moved East to HAMMA; for at the former only 7 tents were observed. The water-tank was  $\frac{1}{2}$ -full. About 100 men were observed and small scattered parties kept up rifle fire on the aeroplane.

JIFJAFFA and the vicinity of Point 1401 were apparently clear.

On the 14th reconnaissances were carried out up WADI UM MUKSHEIB. A few tracks were observed at the Western end of the Wadi and further down a herd of about 50 camels grazing; only 1 ARAB was seen with them. In a valley East of GEBEL UM MAKHASSA were 2 flocks of sheep and 70 camels in scattered herds going N.W. in the charge of about 8 men. Otherwise the whole area was apparently clear.

Two reconnaissances were again carried out on the 15th, but nothing noteworthy was observed. There were newish tracks from about Point 525 leading North of the Pools at the Western outlet of WADI UM MUKSHEIB.



On the 18th RODH SALEM was again reconnoitred. JIFJAFFA and Point 1401 were still apparently clear. At G. EL KHUTHIA 2 men with three camels were observed making in the direction of JIFJAFFA. RODH SALEM itself appeared even more deserted; only 3 tents were seen, and no signs of movement, but it is necessary to point out that the enemy is adopting a system of concealed dug-outs in order to escape observation from the air.

On the 19th WADI UM MUKSHEIB was still apparently clear, and the pools near EL ASHUBI appeared to be rapidly drying up.

In the Southern Section too, there is little to report this week; reconnaissance from day to day has found no activity near our lines.

NEKHL was reconnoitred on the 13th. South-west of the town were 9 bell tents; North-east 21 bell tents and 2 huts; and 1 bell tent to the South. In the barracks North-east of the town 30 Camels were observed, and fresh tracks led N.E. from the Camel stables and barracks. 3 effective bombs were dropped. An A.A. Gun fired at the machine all the time it was over the town - some 30 shots in all. The posts at SUDR EL HEITAN and AIN SUDR showed no change. At the former were 2 bell tents, and 1 native tent; at the latter 8 bell tents and 2 native tents, and 1 native tent a mile to the North-east. At AIN ABU REGUM a good deal of water was reported.

On the 14th AIN SUDR was again visited; and the machine came under fire from the post. 1 drum was fired from the LEWIS gun. Further South the hills in the neighbourhood of WADI LAHTA were reported to be covered with tracks in every direction.



On the 15th BIR EL GIDDI was apparently clear, though there were 2 flocks of goats in the neighbourhood and it has remained clear throughout the week, though on the 17th there were some fresh-looking tracks from the mountains and W. EL B AHA.

On the 16th it was reported that there was much cultivation in the Wadi beds in the mountains in the vicinity of W. EL RAHA, but no signs of habitation.

On the 18th AIN SUDR and SUDR EL HEITAN shewed no change; and nothing of importance was observed beyond a few isolated tracks. There were some large water-pools in the neighbourhood of WADI UM HAMATHA at the edge of the mountains.

On the 19th reconnaissance found all again apparently clear, with the exception of two small enemy patrols (2 and 4) in WADIS UM SEIALA and EL BAHIA, who fled at the approach of the aeroplane.

The usual photography has been carried out during the week.

\* \* \* \* \*



DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report.				R.F.C. Report				Remarks.
	MEN	GUNS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	TENTS	DATE	
ADVANCED TROOPS.	<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>								
	BIR EL ABD.								{ Cleared Cavalry Reconnaissance 16/5/18. Very small post. Enemy probably hiding. 5 Barrack sheds.
	BIR EL BAYUD.								
	SALIANA.	150	2	27	11/5	20	-	-	
	BIR EL MAZAR.	1800	10+8AA	400	13/5	-	-	3	
	EL ARISH.	1700	2	200	7/5	2000	?	50	18/5
	<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>								
	LAGHARA.	300	-	40	3/5	50	-	10	13/5
	JIFJAFFA.	350	-	30	10/5	-	-	-	13/5
	RODH SALEH.	1000	5+1AA	70	3/5	-	-	3	13/5
	EL HALMA.								No recent reports.
	HASSANA.	3000	8+1AA	180	15/5				
	<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>								
	BIR EL GIDDI.	24	-	-	8/5	-	( all clear )	8/5	Post hides by day.
	SUDR EL HEITAN.	70	(visiting patrol)		4/5	-	-	13/5	Small post Arabs.
BASE TROOPS.	AIN SUDR.	40	1AA	12	30/4	-	1 m.g	11	13/5
	NEHEL.	500	5	90	7/5	-	1AA	35	13/5
	KOSSALIA.	350	-	100	5/5				Railway workers. 3 Aeroplanes 31/4.
	AUJA.	2000	-	400	5/5				
	ASLUJ.	4000	-	-	6/4				
	BIR SABA.	2200	4+3AA	3000	25/4				
	SHERIA.	100	-	50	27/4				Convalescent Camp. Unreliable.
	SHELLAL.	?	-	700	30/4				
	KHAN YUNIS.	200	-	1000	2/5				Armed Arabs.
	GAZA.	4/5000	-	300	29/4				
	MUNSLINI, (near AKABA)	100	-	20	21/4				



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 98

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

22nd May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.
2. DISLOCATION OF THE BULGARIAN FORCES.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*

Seen Cmt.  
23/5



1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

Drafts of men of 42 to 45 years of age of the OPPOLCHENIE, <sup>or</sup> militia, are being drafted into the active Bulgarian Regiments. Recruits of 18 and 19 years of age are in training, and all other available classes are already serving in the Army.

There are still reports that the Bulgarian Army is thoroughly discontented with the war, and large numbers are only waiting a favourable opportunity to desert. This is said to be one of the contributing causes that prevents the German Staff releasing German Infantry from this theatre. German troops are said to be incorporated with some Bulgarian Units to assist in maintaining discipline. The Bulgarian Army are still reported to be badly fed, chiefly due to the fact that GERMANY has depleted the BALKANS of most of the available food supplies. The spring crops promise well and will be harvested in July when the food supply question will probably be solved. In order to attend to their farms, leave has been granted to the Bulgarian troops at the rate of 8 men per Company for a period of from 20 to 25 days. This leave has however been stopped, and the men are continuously engaged on improving the roads in rear of the position, and in still further strengthening the defensive line. Consignments of heavy artillery and machine guns continue to reach the Bulgarians from GERMANY, and the whole length of the front is very strongly protected by wire.



Possibly fearing raids by Allied aircraft, the enemy aeroplanes have withdrawn from XANTHI, and the air station at HUDOVA has been very much reduced in strength. On account of the heavy traffic, the roads in the DOIRAN district have suffered severe damage, and that from DOIRAN to HUDOVA is practicable only for carts and automobiles with light loads. These deserters' statements are not always reliable, and no reports from French aeroplanes have been recently received on the general condition of the enemy communications.

There are said to be 400 Turks serving in a Regiment of the 7th Division who are anxious to desert, and a whole company, officers included, of a regiment in the 11th MACEDONIAN Division are reported to have 'disappeared'. These reports probably refer to the conscript inhabitants of MACEDONIA who are mostly of Turkish extraction and who have no love for the Bulgars. The inaction of the past months, and the hard work involved in the preparations for defence, coupled with bad food and a great longing to return to their farms and families, have undoubtedly seriously affected the morale of the Bulgarian Army. There is no reason to believe, however, that the majority would be unwilling to fight in defence of the territory they have occupied, and would most strenuously resist any Allied advance.

On fairly reliable evidence it is increasingly clear that the general military situation on the Western Front, in Germany and in Austria, as well as in Turkey, is causing the German Staff very considerable anxiety. The few German troops who still remain on the Macedonian Front, in formed Units, have been moved from place to place, and



it is difficult to locate their position with great accuracy. Reports from CONSTANTINOPLE mention the arrivals of troops of the Central Powers, but not in very large numbers. Several Bulgarian deserters on the 14th declared that a German Division had left for TURKEY; and one man ~~then~~ on leave, stated he had seen 4 trains full of German Troops pass through PHILIPP-:OPOLIS in one day early in April. This if true, may indicate the transfer of the 101st German Division, (or even the 103rd which has undoubtedly left the Balkan front but has so far not been located elsewhere), east-wards. From other sources news has been received that the enemy fears an Allied expedition on the ASIA MINOR Coast and the Turkish Staff, fully occupied with the Russian advance from the East, and having to maintain troops both in MESOPOTAMIA, and in SYRIA, have made urgent requests to the German Staff for help. Turkish troops and military stores have, since the 10th of the month, been rapidly concentrated in the MERSINA district west of ALEXANDRETTA, and a display of German Force might do much to hearten the Turkish Troops, who are reported to be in not a very high condition of morale.

Added to this the enemy view with apprehension the arrival of Serbian Troops at SALONIKA, which is an event of daily occurrence. The enemy no longer fears the immediate ontry of ROUMANIA, and will adopt a strictly defensive attitude all along the frontier, using German and Austrian Infantry as sparingly as possible, relying on his artillery to prevent any Allied Offensive obtaining a success. Yet the anxiety of the Central Powers lest the Serbian Army should soon be concentrated at SALONIKA proves that their presence



is likely to have a damaging effect on the prestige of the German and Austrian Staff. The promises made to the Bulgarians "of driving the Allies into the sea" and of proving to GREECE the invincibility of German arms have not been made good. The enemy is well aware that the SALONIKA position of the Allies could not be captured by the Forces at his disposal, and he is equally aware that each week that passes without a decision favourable to himself still further reduces his hold upon his Turkish and Bulgarian Allies, and brings nearer the day when German influence can no longer induce both Turks and Bulgars to sacrifice themselves for the sake of German policy. "Masterly inactivity" may have been good for the Allies, but it has certainly damaged the Central Powers position in the BALKANS.

\*\*\*\*\*

## 2. DISLOCATION OF THE BULGARIAN FORCES.

The following are the general dispositions of the Bulgarian forces :---

1st Division	-	Moving down towards PETRICH.
2nd "	-	Scattered between DOIRAN and MELNIK.
3rd "	-	Scattered KAVARDAR - DEMIR - KAPU and on West of VARDAR river.
4th "	-	DANUBE and ROUMANIAN Front.
5th "	-	GEVGHILI - HUDOVA.
6th "	-	PETRICH District.
7th "	-	DOIRAN - NEGOCHANI.
8th "	-	MONASTIR District.
9th "	-	North of DOIRAN.
10th "	-	XANTHI - GUMULJINA.
11th "	-	DOIRAN - PETRICH.
12th "	-	ROUMANIAN Front - possibly loss one Brigade at NEVROCOP.

Remaining Divisions of Reserve Formations too uncertain to locate.



The Cavalry are identified as follows :---

1st Regiment	-	SOFIA.
2nd	"	- Unidentified.
3rd	"	- VALANDOVA - DOIRAN.
4th	"	- GEVGHELI.
5th	"	- Uncertain possibly SMOKVICA.
6th	"	- Part MONASTIR, Part DIBRA.
7th	"	- KAVARDAR.
8th	"	- DEMIROCAPU.
9th	"	- North of DOIRAN.
10th	"	- Believed SOFIA.

# ARTILLERY.

The German and Austrian heavy artillery are in position on all commanding ground throughout the length of the frontier. The Bulgarian Artillery is therefore in many cases separated from the Division to which it properly belongs, and is employed independently according to the German Scheme of Defence. According to Districts the following appears to be the general distribution :---

MONASTIR	-	-	- 8th F.A. Regiment.	
"	-	-	- 18th M.A.	"
GEVGHELI & Centro.	-	-	- 1st F.A.	"
"	"	-	- 11th M.A.	"
"	"	-	- 6th F.A.	"
"	"	-	- 16th M.A.	"
DOIRAN - PETRICH-	-	-	- 4th F.A.	" (doubtful)
"	"	-	- 14th M.A.	"
"	"	-	- 7th F.A.	"
"	"	-	- 17th M.A.	"
"	"	-	- 2nd F.A.	"
"	"	-	- 12th M.A.	"
XANTHI	-	-	- 10th F.A.	"
"	-	-	- 20th M.A.	"
ROUMANIAN	-	-	- 5th F.A.	"
"	-	-	- 15th M.A.	"
Uncertain	-	-	- 3rd F.A.	"
"	-	-	- 13th M.A.	"

- and location of all new howitzer batteries supplied by the Germans and Austrians. It is probable that the majority of these are in the GEVGHELI, DOIRAN and XANTHI sections of the line.

Machine Gun batteries are being added to each Division, besides the machine gun sections already attached to each regiment. The Bulgarians are amply supplied with ammunition both for their own guns and for those captured from the Serbians, which have been organised into special batteries.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 99.

I N T E L L I G E N C E   S U M M A R Y .

25th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1.    TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.
2.    SITUATION VERDUN SECTION - 14/5/16 to 20/5/16:  
TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*

*John*



1. TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

The appointment of General LILIAN VON SANDERS as successor to VON DER GOLTZ is now confirmed. He has a reputation as an energetic and hard-working thruster with considerable powers of organisation.

While G.O.C. of the 5th DARDANELLES Army he was much criticised by the Turks for his excessive addiction to counter attacks. During the first stages of this war he was disliked by them on account of his domineering manner, but he is now said to be handling them with more deference and, as a result, with more success. He has English kinsfolk through his mother, but he speaks no English. He is a man of sturdy physique, and is a typical good class Prussian Officer in appearance.

While his own manners are often rough, he is absurdly touchy over questions of precedence and imaginary slights to his dignity, and being ill tempered, is capable of making violent scenes. He is reputed quite honest in money matters.

-----

The Turkish energies now seem to be mainly directed to the neighbourhood of BAIBURT, where the counter-offensive to the Russian advance is said to have been directed by ENVER Pasha in person.

They have been operating with some degree of success, and have undoubtedly delayed the Russian centre.



The Russian left, however, is steadily fighting its way forward and, further to the South, the junction of the Cossacks with our troops on the TIGRIS will without doubt have a considerable effect on the attitude of the Arab tribes in the TIGRIS and EUPHRATES valleys.

The report from BUKHAREST of the expected arrival of 4,000 German troops at BAGHDAD and a big concentration at MARASH should only be accepted with caution pending confirmation from a more reliable source.

The Turks are displaying considerable nervousness as to the AEGEAN seaboard and are still busy perfecting their trenches and gun positions - covering likely points of attack. Three Divisions are now located in the SMYRNA area and appear to be distributed at intervals along the coast. These troops are supported by a number of heavy guns brought from AUSTRIA and manned by Austrian gunners.

The Turks seem to be most apprehensive of an Allied descent on MAKRI, a small seaport opposite the island of RHODES, and have been hastening troops, guns, and aeroplanes down there in the last few days. In any case a concentration here puts them in a good central position as being about midway between SMYRNA and MERSINA.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*



2. SITUATION VERDUN SECTION — 14/5/16 to 20/5/16.  
TELEGRAM FROM C.Q.G. FRANCE.  
-----

Heavy enemy bombardments were directed between the 15th and 17th of May on our positions at AVOCOURT, HILL 304 and DOUAUMONT. Towards MALANCOURT we identified two new German Divisions.

On the night of the 17th/18th two enemy attacks on AVOCOURT Wood were repulsed, and on the N.E. slopes of HILL 304 we were successful in occupying an enemy trench fort. On the evening of the 18th the enemy made an attack along the whole length of front contained between AVOCOURT Wood and the Valley south of BETHINCOURT; although he managed to occupy a small defended work situated to the South of HILL 287 he was everywhere else defeated with heavy loss.

On the 19th there was a very heavy artillery bombardment on the left bank of the MEUSE.

On the 20th a formidable German attack developed in the neighbourhood of MORTHOMME. We still occupy the trenches captured in April, and the enemy has been checked; but on the slopes West of MORTHOMME the enemy managed to capture 1,200 metres of our front-line trenches. The German Communique of the 21st of May claims the capture of French guns in the course of this attack; this is altogether untrue, guns are not placed in position in the front-line trenches, and trench mortars only were taken by the enemy.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*



CONFIDENTIAL.

No.100.

I N T E L L I G E N C E      S U M M A R Y .

27th May, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. GENERAL SITUATION IN SINAI.
2. R.F.C. --- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
3. REPORT ON DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN  
SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*

*John*



# 1. GENERAL SITUATION IN SINAI.

There is no further news from SYRIA, and we may safely assume that the tendency of Turkish troop movements is Northwards through ALEPPO. There are some indications that Turkish troops are being partly replaced by Germans in Southern SYRIA and SINAI. While it is probable that no serious attack will be made on the Canal at present, the Turks will almost certainly attempt further raids on our advanced posts, and air attacks on our stations on the Canal. It is also probable that they will considerably augment their air service, and frequently carry out air raids, as by this means they hope to attain their object, which is to morally impress the natives of EGYPT, and at the same time make us keep a large force in the Canal Zone with the least possible expenditure of their own military resources.

The direction of this policy will no doubt be in the hands of Germans, and in the meantime the railway will be pushed through KOSSAIMA to HASSANA, and the motor roads improved.

The Arabs are reported to be most discontented and to be leaving the Turks as they say they were made to bear the brunt of the fighting at KATIA and DUEIDAR, while the regulars were kept in the rear.

The enemy's advanced posts in SINAI are still occupied by small bodies of troops, who are concealed as far as possible from our aircraft. They spend the day in holes in the ground covered with brushwood, and do not use tents. For this reason it is difficult to estimate their strengths from the air.

- - - - -



RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS.

May 20th - May 26th, 1916.  
 - - - - -

CANAL FRONT.

No enemy activity has been reported during the week in the near neighbourhood of our lines.

In the Northern Section on the 20th a reconnaissance was carried out along the North Road to BIR EL MAZAR. At JEFEIR and MAGEIBRA were tracks leading South, also at BAYUD.  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the S.E. of the BIR a post of 30-100 ARABS, with about 10 men in khaki, were seen.

There were a number of shelters covered with brushwood, and consequently invisible from any height over 1,000 feet; thus the Turks are pursuing here the policy that experience has taught them elsewhere in the Peninsula - and those shelters, like the concealed dugouts referred to last week, are expressly contrived to escape observation from the air.

The pilot came down to 100 feet, when heavy rifle fire was opened upon him, which was effectively returned with the LEWIS gun, several casualties being observed. At BIR EL MAZAR were 2 E.P. tents, 12 bell tents erected and 3 others lying flat on the ground, a large shed and two mountain guns dug in. The enemy force there was estimated at 400-500, of whom many were in khaki. The pilot attacked with bombs and LEWIS gun and one gun crew was driven from their gun which did not come into action again. At SALMANA were 100-150 men, (though no tents or shelters were visible) and 50-40 camels. The machine again came under fire, which was returned.



BIR EL ABD was still apparently clear. Our patrols were observed at KATIA firing the shelters there.

Reconnaissance of the 21st found no signs of men either at SALMANA or BAYUD and the machine was not fired on. The brushwood shelters were still S.E. of BAYUD and many tracks led to the BIR, but there was no sign of movement. BIR EL ABD was still apparently clear, also MAGEIBRA; but at BIR EL AWEIDIA were the tracks of about 20 men. The shelters at KATIA had been destroyed.

On the night of 20th/21st PORT SAID was bombed by enemy aeroplanes. In reply to this 4 machines of the R.F.C. delivered a bomb attack in the Northern and Central Sections upon the following places where enemy troops had previously been located in some force :---

RODH SALEM.  
EL HAMMA.  
BIR SALMANA.  
BIR BAYUD.  
BIR EL HAZAR.

2 machines from KANTARA attacked the last three of these localities, while RODH SALEM and EL HAMMA were bombed by machines from ISMAILIA.

At BIR EL HAZAR 8 bombs were dropped successfully. Heavy anti-aircraft, rifle, and machine gun fire was directed on the aeroplanes, and the garrison appeared to have increased to 500-700 while some new trenches had been dug. At BIR GEISI (1 mile N.E.) were 30-40 brushwood shelters, and many tracks led to the BIR, which seemed to be extensively used. Near SALMANA two parties each of 20-30 mounted men were observed, and many heavy tracks leading in all directions; 6 bombs were dropped.



At BIR BAYUD again were many fresh tracks. Only a few people were actually visible at the wells, where the remaining bombs were dropped. 3 pack camels and 1 man were observed on the BAYUD - MAGHARA track. There were no fresh tracks at MAGEIBRA or JEFER, and only one single ARAB was observed at the former.

On the 23rd a reconnaissance observed 100-150 men hidden in the scrub to the East of the Wells at BIR SALMANA, while 1 mile West a small party on camel-back were proceeding towards BIR EL MAZAR. At BIR EL MAZAR there were still 400-500 men, 12 bell tents and 2 E.P. tents, and the shed. Tracks of wheeled transport were observed on the road leading to SALMANA. At BIR CANIDIL were 30-40 men in the scrub, and tracks led N.E. to the road. BIR BAYUD and the remains of the camp reported on the 20th were apparently clear with the exception of 2 unarmed Arabs.

Our troops were observed at HOD EL GEDAIDIA and a message dropped to them reporting the results of the reconnaissance. There were no fresh tracks at MAGEIBRA.

On the 24th a reconnaissance was carried out as far East as BIR SALMANA, but no fresh tracks were anywhere observed.

On the 25th JEFER, MAGEIBRA and BAYUD were still apparently clear, but some of the enemy from BIR EL MAZAR had apparently made a move westwards; for at BIR SALMANA, just North of the road were 300 men in 3 columns, apparently drilling, and 40-50 camels.

A second reconnaissance in the afternoon, however, found only 50-100 men at HOD SALMANA, whence tracks led from BIR SALMANA, while at BIR EL ABD was a small post of 10-20 and tracks leading from HOD SALMANA. At BIR EL MAZAR were 3 white bell tents, and 10 dark green tents (bell), a large hut and 5-6 small shelters, with perhaps 200-300 men.



The E.P. tents had gone. \*

On the 26th there was no sign of movement at JEFFER, MAGHIBRA, or SALHANA, and at HOD EL BAYUD nothing was observed beyond 2 or 3 camels, nor were any tracks seen in these areas; but it must be borne in mind that the enemy is now making it his main effort to escape detection from the air by the various means already mentioned as well as by refraining from all movement as soon as the first sound of an approaching aeroplane is heard (c.f. SUDR EL HEITAN where men were actually observed hiding in the rifle-pits but made no movement at all even when the pilot descended to a low altitude).

Little change has been noted in the central section from the air.

On the 20th at JIFJAFFA about 20 camels were seen, but there was still no sign of men or tents. At RODH SALEM were 7 bell tents and 3 large black shelters together with an iron-roofed building, and a red cylindrical cistern connected with the water-trough. 50 men were lying on a sand-dune N. of the camp, and about 20 camels were seen. This was all that was visible. A line of telegraph poles runs for 5 miles towards JIFJAFFA. At Pt. 1401 were 2 green huts apparently made of scrub.

On the 21st reconnaissance of the WADI MUKSHEIB to the mountains found all apparently clear.

On the 22nd in co-operation with 2 machines from KANTARA which carried out a bomb raid in the Northern section

---

\* Thus (with the 10 dark green bell tents) there were 13 bell tents in all on the 25th; on the 23rd 12 were reported. Possibly some of these had meantime been painted dark green as an attempt to disguise them, as seen from the air.



(c.f.supra) two pilots left ISMAILIA and delivered an attack on RODH SALEM and EL HAMMA.

JIFJAFPA was still apparently clear, and there was no change at Pt.1401 or RODH SALEM, while at EL HAMMA the Camp was much the same as reported on the 15th. Well marked tracks showed a regular traffic between RODH SALEM and HAMMA and thence S.E. towards HASSANA.

RODH SALEM was bombed successfully on both the outward and return journeys, and on the second occasion the Reservoir was hit. At EL HAMMA 12 bombs were dropped, and both camp and buildings were damaged. Here a bullet cut the petrol pipe of one machine, and the engine stopped completely and did not recover until the pilot was only 100 feet above the ground.

In consequence the pilot found it necessary to land, and turned off South to WADI MUKSHEIB where he landed (encountering one of our yeomanry patrols) effected repairs to his engine, and later flew back to ISMAILIA.

Owing to his failure to return a further reconnaissance left in search of him. The pilot visited the scenes of the bomb-raid, and observed that much damage had been done. At BIR UM WERIB 6 men were observed building a stone wall (apparently) at one end of the cleared ground previously reported there. S.E. of RODH SALEM on the HASSANA road two parties were observed proceeding towards HASSANA, one of 7 and one of 18. At BIR EL MAGHARA were 10 Beduin shelters, 12 bell tents, 1 large white-cornored structure, and about 100 men.

Daily reconnaissance of the front throughout the remainder of the week found no signs of enemy activity. The water-pools near ASHUBI are not yet dry.



In the Southern Section also there is little to report. Reconnaissances have been carried out daily but the situation remains practically unchanged. The posts at AIN SUDR and <sup>near</sup> SUDR EL HEITAN remain constant in strength. At the former are still 7 bell tents, 1 long white tent and 3 native shelters; near SUDR EL HEITAN 3 bell tents, 1 native tent, 1 mus hut, and 1 small mat hut.

On the 20th the pilot came down to 20 feet over this latter post, and though men hiding in the rifle pits on the western side of the camp were clearly visible, they did not stir and not a shot was fired; the post here, as elsewhere, in pursuance of the general policy of concealment, has presumably received instructions to hide and refrain from all movement if possible so soon as the presence of an aeroplane is detected.

On the 21st South of BIR EL GIDDI about 20 unladen camels with 2 men were observed who fired on the machine. Otherwise there was nothing of note to report.

On the 23rd there was no change at AIN SUDR or SUDR EL HEITAN, though on this occasion about 30 men were seen running to a cave East of the camp, and, by the time the machine was over the post, they were invisible.

There was no change observed in the post until <sup>S.W.</sup> the 23th, when fresh tracks were observed leading from BIR EL GIDDI, where plenty of water was reported. 3 miles N.E. of BIR EL TAWAL were 5 native shelters. In the neighbourhood 5 men, 20 camels, a horse and some goats were seen; the men appeared friendly. Near the ruined chapel in WADI EL GEBAB were 15 camels and 1 man. Otherwise all was apparently clear.



The usual photography has been carried out during the week.

On the 20th artillery co-operation by wireless was carried out with the FRENCH NAVY from ISMAILIA; and on the same date a practice at KANTARA.

SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT.

No detailed reports have been received during the week.

On the 22nd a pilot, while returning from ASSIUT to MEHERIQ was compelled to descend in the desert about 50 miles to the North of the latter place. He spent the night at the scene of his landing, but was picked up by a search machine on the following day (23rd) and brought back to MEHERIQ.

ADDENDUM.

SUDAN.

During the operations in the SUDAN a flight of No. 17 Squadron R.F.C. has been co-operating with the frontier force against DARFUR.

On the 24th a pilot when over EL FASHER, the capital of DARFUR (EL FASHER lies some 335 miles from RAHAD railhead, as the crow flies) located 2,000 mounted troops and opened fire with his machine gun with great effect, dispersing them in all directions. He was wounded in the thigh but returned safely to ABIAD WELLS, the advance depot from which the flight was operating.

Detailed reports of the final operations leading up to the defeat of ALI DINAR and the capture of EL FASHER, in which the R.F.C. successfully co-operated, are not yet to hand.

\*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*    \*\*\*



DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report.				R.F.C. Report.				Remarks.
	MEN	GUNS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	TENTS	DATE	
ADVANCED TROOPS	NORTHERN ROAD.								
	BIR EL ABD.								
	BIR EL BAYUD.								
	SALMAHA	50	-	5	19/5	300	-	-	25/5
	BIR EL MAZAR	300	-	90	18/5	500	2	17	23/5
	EL ARISH	3000	4	1000	17/5	2000	-	50	18/5
	BIR EL GEISI.	250	-	-		30-40 shelters		21/5	
	BIR EL JALEIL.	100	-	10	15/5				
	CENTRAL ROAD								
	MAGHARA.	100	1	-	13/5	100	-	25	22/5
	JIFJAFFA.								Clear 13/5.
	RODH SALEM.	50	-	3	7/5	-	-	10	22/5
	EL HANNA.					300	-	22	13/5
	HASSANA.	3000	3	-	15/5				
	SOUTHERN ROAD.								
BASE TROOPS	BIR EL GIDDI.					---clear---		24/5	
	SUDR EL HEITAN.	---no post---		17/5	-	-	3	23/5	
	AIN SUDR.				-	-	8	20/5	
	NEKHL.	1500	6	160	21/5				Numbers include workmen.
	KOSSAIMA.	1000	5	90	20/5				1 A.A. Gun.
	AUJA.	3000	7	-	19/5				2 Hangars.
	ASLUJ.								No reports.
	BIR SABA.	1500	-	500	17/5				1 German Battalion.
	CHERIA.								No reports.
	KHAN TUNIS.								No reports.
	BEHLAL.								No reports.
	GAZA.								No reports.