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CONFIDENTIAL.

No.102.

SECRET

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

1st June, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SUMMARY OF SEAPLANE RECONNAISSANCES.

13th to 27th May, 1916.

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SUMMARY OF SEAPLANE RECONNAISSANCES:

18th to 27th May, 1913.

During the week reconnaissances were carried out of KHAN YUNIS, GAZA, JAFFA and RALEH, and seaplanes were utilized to spot for monitors bombarding EL ARISH.

On 18/5/13 at KHAN YUNIS nothing of military importance was noticed, but four 20 lb. bombs were dropped also certain pamphlets supplied by the Military Intelligence Office.

On 25/5/13 an attempt was made to reconnoitre JAFFA, but owing to the roughness of the sea, one of the floats of the seaplane was damaged before she left the water and the machine sank. The observer and pilot were however rescued.

On 27/5/13 the reconnaissance was renewed with two machines. Two military posts were observed some distance to the South of JAFFA, and on these two 35 lb. bombs were dropped, and the soldiers fired on from the Lewis gun. An encampment near RALEH was also bombed. It was noticed that this camp was considerably smaller than previously reported.


A sketch map is attached showing localities visited.

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MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS
OF SEAPLANE SQUADRON.

MAY 18 - 27th 1918

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA



S U M M A R Y

TOWN	BOMBS DROPPED		TRENCHES	GUNS	TENTS	OBSERVATION
	WEIGHT	No				
JAFFA	65 lbs 20 "	2 4	South of Town	None observed	One S. of Town	LONG RECTANGULAR BUILDING NEAR STATION
RAMLEH	-	-	-	-	Few West of town	CAMP APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MOVED
TEL EL TIRA	Incendiary	1	-	-	-	-
GAZA	65 lbs Incendiary	2 2	-	-	Scattered camp S. & W. of Town	-
KHAN YUNUS	-	-	N.E., E. & S. of Town	-	-	-
RAFA	20 lbs	4	-	-	Few huts S. of Town	-
EL ARISH	65 lbs 16 " Petrol Thornite	2 1 6	1 long trench East of Town at right angles to wadi	1 A.A. N.E. of Town	-	Hangars appeared damaged by our bombardment

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 103.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

3rd June, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. TELEGRAMS RECEIVED FROM G.O.G. FRANCE
Dated 31st May and 2nd June 1916.
2. R.F.C. -- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
3. REPORT ON DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN
SINAI AND SOUTHERN SERIA.

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1. TELEGRAMS RECEIVED FROM G.O.G. FRANCE.31st May, 1916.

During the last few days the enemy bureaux for Wireless Propaganda have exploited an appreciation made by an English Journalist in which he maintained it was possible that GERMANY could still dispose of two millions of first class soldiers ready for launching on the enemy to give the "coup de grâce".

An assertion of this sort, so plainly erroneous, scarcely needs contradiction.

If the Germans had two million men ready to their hands they would not be reduced to deplete their RUSSIAN and BALKAN fronts to feed the attack at VERDUN. As a matter of fact the Germans have not had for some time any material with which to form new Units. As to their resources existing at their depots, in order to feed the Units at the front they are reduced :---

- (1) To a fraction of the 1913 Class, already heavily drawn on;
- (2) To a certain number of men now recovered who had previously been adjudged unfit for military service;
- (3) To the wounded who have been cured;
- (4) And in the end to the 1917 class which is under instruction; -----

a total of less than nine hundred thousand men.

- (i) The interrogation of prisoners gives us reliable information on the state of the German effectives and on the manner in which they have been built up since the beginning of 1913.

Actually the 1913 Class appeared at the front as early as December 1915. We find portions of it successively incorporated in the VI Reserve Corps, and in the 10th, 11th and 56th Divisions.

From the month of February 1913 the proportion increases in a marked way even in some Corps amounting to the total of the reinforcements.

(ii). Statements of prisoners belonging to III Corps make it clear that reinforcements sent to the front up till the 10th March 1916, only contained 25% of men from the 1913 class. After that date, on account of the enormous losses suffered in front of VERDUN, the percentage increased very rapidly; thus, in the 24th Regiment of Infantry, where the losses between the 21st February and 25th April varied between 250 and 230 men per company after the 10th March only youths born in 1893 were received; ---In the 6th Guard Regiment (Guard Ersatz Brigade) the reinforcements consisted of 75% of men of the 1913 Class, and on the 10th March the 64th Regiment (III Corps) had, as 60% of its effectives, recruits of the same class.

(iii) It would be easy to show by the evidence of our enemies themselves that in our ranks the young men of the 1913 Class made their appearance much later.

It was on the 8th April only that the Germans announced that amongst the French prisoners made on that day were some recruits of this class. Our enemies at once tried to exploit this fact, but a document, the authenticity of which they could not contest, supplied the contradiction. This document was the "procès verbal" of the interrogation of a French soldier taken the 9th May North-East of the THIAUMONT FARM. Questioned by an Officer of the 5th German Army as to the presence of the 1913 Class in the French front line effectives the prisoner answered: "The Class 1913 has not been brought up into its Units" and the German 'procès verbal' concluded: "The prisoner made a good impression".

(iv.) It is established by innumerable witnesses that the Germans have dipped largely into the reservoir made up of the recruits of the 1913 Class. We have strong reason to believe that this reservoir is very nearly exhausted. A correspondent writing from INGOLSTADT says on 19th April: "The reservoir is emptying itself; up till now every departure for the front has been followed by the arrival of an equal number of men for instruction. 3,000 men have just gone since last week, and not one has come in to fill up the gaps; also the morale is lowered."

2nd June, 1916.

The whole German Press has reproduced an article by General Von BLUME in the Official Gazette of North GERMANY. This publication is attempting to spread the idea that the Battle of VERDUN will end in a complete victory, and that the Germans will in any case attain their principal objective, which is the progressive destruction of the French Army, whose reserves should be nearly exhausted. Also the fact that the German Command should have forestalled and upset the Allied Offensive is itself represented as a success. This version is yet another subterfuge to keep up the illusions and calm the spirits of the German people.

Firstly: Our plans have not been upset by the German^{offensive}; neither have our British Allies been forced to change their dispositions. We remain masters of our actions. Our plans are intact, and we are keeping them so.

Secondly: If the Germans are consuming the French Army, which after all is natural in a battle where they are making hitherto unheard of efforts, the French Army is wearing down even to a greater degree the German Army. All the evidence, all the questionings of prisoners prove that the enemy's losses are enormous.

It is stated that the 1916 Class, the broken Units now reformed, and those wounded who have recovered, constitute the only resources left to the Germans to fill the gaps in their effectives.

Thirdly :--- It stands out very plainly that if the slow German progression in front of VERDUN is presented to the public as the execution of their methodical plan, the execution of this plan has entailed for the German Army a wastage so rapid that any benefits derived from the operations become negatived.

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2. R.F.C. --- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

CANAL FRONT.

As last week, the northern section remains the centre of interest.

A reconnaissance carried out on the 27th of May as far as SALMANA disclosed 40 to 50 men at HOD SALMANA with tracks between that place and BIR SALMANA.

On the 30th, MAGHARA in the Central Section was visited from KANTARA. 12 tents and 3 shelters, as well as a large heap of stores were seen in the Northern Camp, and 9 tents, 1 hut, and 4 black shelters in the southern, with an uncompleted reservoir between the two camps. The Camp appeared to be slightly larger than on the last visit, May 15th, when only 10 tents were seen in the two camps. On this occasion a small post of 8 men was discovered at BIR EL ROWGI. 25 men were seen at BIR EL ABD where fire was opened on the machine which returned along the North Road, and reached KANTARA after a flight of $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

In the afternoon the North Road was again visited. At BIR EL MAZAR 9 tents, 1 building and 13 shelters were seen, and the aeroplane was engaged by an anti-aircraft gun. Nothing was seen at BIR EL ABD, but a force of 20-30 men was located at HOD SALMANA.

On the following morning, the Detachment at KANTARA acted in co-operation with the New Zealand Mounted Division which carried out an attack on the enemy's post at SALMANA at dawn. An enemy force of about 150-200 men was located one mile N. and N.W. of BIR EL GANADIL also 30-50 camels and several small trenches. Another body of between 30 and 50 was seen due N. of BIR GANADIL on the main road. This was at once reported to our troops 3 miles East of HOD SALMANA by dropped message. The aeroplane then circled round MESHALFAT and GEDAIDIA finding them clear and dropped a further message on our troops about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles E. of BIR SALMANA, informing them of the enemy's post on the SALMANA - MAZAR road. Proceeding Eastward, the pilot found ROSEIFIG clear, and MAZAR, with little change from the preceding day; then after making a circle 3 miles E. and S. of MAZAR he returned to GANADIL, where the enemy's forces were first bombed and then attacked with machine gun fire from a height of about 500 feet with apparently good effect, the enemy appearing demoralized. During this attack, the pilot received a bullet graze on the face.

A message was dropped on our troops at SALMANA and again at ROANI on the return journey, the pilot reaching KANTARA after a flight of just under 4 hours.

In order to keep in touch with the situation and co-operate with our troops, another reconnaissance over the same area left KANTARA shortly afterwards. A force of some 500 troops (apparently the main body of the enemy) was

discovered near MUSTABIG retreating N.E. They were again bombed with success; and small parties of the enemy were seen at BIR SALMANA and at GANADIL, 50 men at BIR MOSEIFIG, and a patrol of some 25 men on camels proceeding northwards from a point 5 miles N.E. by E. of MOSEIFIG. In all about 410 men were seen between SALMANA and MAZAR. A message was dropped on our own troops at BIR EL ABD.

On June 1st, our troops at ROMANI were bombed by an enemy aeroplane, which returned without visiting PORT SAID. The following morning this attack was answered by a raid upon MAGHARA. Three machines from KANTARA dropped 24 bombs upon the Camp; the attack lasting half-an-hour. One hour after this 2 aeroplanes from No.14 squadron, ISMAILIA, arrived over MAGHARA and again attacked the camp. They remained for half-an-hour during which 16 bombs were dropped. Thus, as a result of the enemy's attack on ROMANI, he had on the following day to suffer an aerial bombardment lasting for one hour, in which a total of 40 bombs were dropped, a great many of which exploded amongst the tents themselves. Our aeroplanes were replied to by rifle fire from the hills, but no guns were in action. No change was seen in the camp.

In the central section, apart from the raid on MAGHARA reported above, a reconnaissance carried out on the 27/5/16 from ISMAILIA over JIF JAFFA and RODH SALEM showed JIF JAFFA to be free of the enemy, and the Camp at RODH SALEM to consist of 13 tents as against 7 on the occasion of the former visit on 22/5/16. The two buildings at the Eastern end of the percolation trench, the foundations of which had only been laid on the occasion of the last photograph, were shown by the photograph taken on this reconnaissance to be nearing completion. On the approach of the aeroplane 4 tents were hastily pulled down. This

reconnaissance was carried out in the afternoon, and the above action on the part of the enemy seems to show that it is now their habit to lower the tents on the expected approach of our aircraft, with a view to escaping detection, and that, had the reconnaissance taken place at the usual hour, a far smaller camp would have been visible.

The road between RODE SALEM and the head of the WADI MUKHSHEIB showed many recent tracks.

On the 31st HASSANA - which had not been visited since the bombing raid of the 24th of March - was reconnoitred from ISMAILIA. It was found that of the two large buildings to the North of the tank, one was completed and the other nearing completion, and that the long building South of the Power Station had advanced considerably. Buildings not hitherto observed were disclosed by a photo of the WADI about a $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile east of the Power Station in close proximity to the large dam. They may possibly be new waterworks. About 400 or 500 men and over 100 tents were seen. JIF JAFFA and the Western end of the MUKHSHEIB was apparently clear.

The HAG HASSAN MEHSIN and MUBASHIA cisterns were found to be free of the enemy on 1st June, but well-used tracks were seen crossing the foothills between these two places.

The pools in the MUKHSHEIB have dried far less rapidly than was originally expected. They may be divided into two groups each containing one important pool of about 60 yards by 60, the most westerly group being situated over a mile and a half to the West of the extreme limit of the WADI MUKHSHEIB as shown on the maps, and the most easterly about $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the MUBASHIA cisterns.

In the southern section, there is little of interest to report. The usual daily reconnaissances were carried out from SUEZ. No change was observed in the garrisons at AIN SUDR and SUDR EL HEBITAN during the period; 7 bell tents, 1 E.P.

tent and 5 native shelters were visible at the former place and 2 bell tents, 1 native hut, and 1 hut at the latter. On the 29th 7 native shelters were seen 3 miles N.E. of BIR EL TAWAL and 4 Arab tents were seen in the RAHA Pass at a point 1 mile South of the "E" in EL RAHA.

On the preceding day 1 native hut and 4 shelters were located in the WADI EL RAHA, from which 12 men in uniform issued, who fired on the machine with rifles.

SOUTH WESTERN FRONT.

No detailed reports have been received during the week.

WESTERN FRONT.

SOLLUM was occupied by air on the 31st, a half flight of No.14 Squadron flying direct from CAIRO.

SUDAN.

The flight of the Royal Flying Corps that recently co-operated with the Force operating against ALI DINAR is now concentrated at NAHAD, 150 miles from RAILHEAD preparatory to its return to EGYPT.

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CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 105.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

10th June 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE.

1. R.F.C. -- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
2. REPORT ON DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY FORCES
IN SINAI AND SOUTHERN SYRIA.

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R.F.C --- WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.CANAL FRONT.

The week that has just elapsed has been comparatively uneventful. On the 4th a reconnaissance was carried as far as BIR EL MAZAR where 10 green bell tents, 4 white bell tents, 1 hut and 12 to 15 shelters were seen, an increase of 3 in the number of tents since the last visit, which took place on May 30th. A flagstaff, flying a white flag with a red crescent, was observed. The force was estimated at from 500 to 600 men. About 3 miles west of BIR EL MUGHIBRA, 3 men on camels were seen proceeding West. Fresh tracks were seen leading S.E. from HOD BAYUD, and a small group of men at the BIR. At BIR EL GEISI, three men and camels were observed proceeding S.E., and at BIR EL HALHA, three to five Arabs with a few camels and a flock of goats, otherwise no fresh tracks were seen on the whole route followed by the machine, which went outwards along the southern line of wells, via JEBELIR, BAYUD, GEISI, ZOABATIA, etc., and returned along the northern line by MAZAR, SALMANA, BIR EL ABD, ROMANI and HILL 40, reaching KAITERA after a flight of three hours and twenty five minutes. The following day, the southern of wells was followed from MAHADAT as far as GANADIL, a few tracks being observed at HOD EL BAYUD leading eastwards, and heavy tracks in a cluster near BIR EL JAMBIL. Thence the aeroplane went N.E. to ROSEIFIG and turned westwards following a zig-zag course over HOD, SALMANA, GADAIDA, North of which camel tracks going westward between SALMANA and BIR EL ABD were seen, HOD RAHA, HILLALI, MUGHILIAT, ROMANI, HILL 40 and home. On the following day the pilot proceeded straight to BAYUD, and turned back thence to reconnoitre the district between HILLALI, GEDIADIA, and BIR EL ABD. This was found free and a message to that

effect was dropped on our troops at BIR ABU EL AFIMH. From here reconnaissance was pushed East as far as HAZAR, where no change was observed, and the aeroplane returned home passing over ROMANI and HILL 40 (a flight of 5 hours and 22 minutes).

On the 7th, 5 men were seen at BIR EL MAGSIBRA; AWEIDA, BAYUD, GANADIL & MOSEIFIG were traversed and found clear; 2 miles East of SALIANA tracks were observed running North from the road; and the machine was fired on here, and again at BIR EL ABD, though no tracks could be seen. Tracks were seen at RAHA and 2 miles East of ROMANI, otherwise the country appeared clear, but observation in the neighbourhood of MOSEIFIG and SALIANA was difficult owing to clouds and mist.

On the 8th, tracks of about 45 men were seen at MAGSIBRA, of about 5 men west of HOD EL BAYUD and of about 25 leading in various directions from the wells, at JAMEIL six to eight Arabs and three or four brushwood shelters were seen, with heavy tracks leading East & West, S.E. and N.W; fresh tracks were seen at KASSEIBA and at MALHA (west well) the tracks of about 60 men leading North and South, seven men were seen at the West well and four at the East well. At AFUSSI there were many tracks in all directions and one mile West of HOD, 20 to 30 brushwood shelters and 150 to 200 Bedouins with 45 camels and many goats were seen. At GERERAT again there were many tracks and about 10 brushwood shelters and one mile to the west. HAZAR was found unchanged since the 4th and the white flag with red crescent was again observed pointing to the existence of a field hospital at that place.

On the 9th, after a reconnaissance into the central area, HOD BAYUD and HILLALI were visited; a small group of men were seen at HOD BAYUD. The return journey on all these reconnaissances was made over ROMANI, over which a message was dropped and acknowledged on every occasion.

In the centre section the WADI UM MUKSHIB, HARABA GUMIA SALAMA, ABDULLA and GEBEL UM MUKSHIB were regularly patrolled from ISMAILIA and SUEZ. The smaller pools appear to be rapidly drying up, and all have diminished considerably. On the 7th, a native shelter and small flock of goats were observed at HARABA HAG HASSAN MEHSIN. It was clear on the following day; this day a party of 7 Bedouins (men, women and children) with donkeys and camels were observed at MUBASHIA, and 2 men and 2 camels were observed there on the 9th.

An attempt to reconnoitre BODH SALEH on the 4th had to be abandoned when over EL FAGAIA owing to the rapid approach of a severe sandstorm from the N.E. It was, however, visited on the 6th; 7 bell tents and 2 Arab shelters were seen as against 13 tents and 1 Arab tent on 27/5/18. The building 30 yards south of the tank is still unroofed, but a large heap of mortar lying beside it seems to show that work is still going on. The tracks towards JIFJAFFA appeared to be well used. Two black Arab shelters and one white bell tent were seen on the track between GEBEL EL URF and UM MURIB about 2 miles East of the point where it bifurcates from the GEBEL EL URF - MAGHARA track. BIR EL JIFJAFFA was apparently clear.

On the 9th, MAGHARA was visited from KATTARA, 6 bell tents and one large white hut were seen in the North Camp and 12 bell tents and four black shelters in the South Camp as against 7 bell tents and 2 huts in the North Camp and 9 bell tents, 2 large tents and 5 huts in the South Camp observed on 2/6/18.

In the southern section, AIN SUDR and SUDR EL HEITAN were each visited four times during the week. The garrison at AIN SUDR has apparently not changed. Seven bell tents and 3 shelters were observed there on the 8th as against 7 bell tents, 1 E.P. tent and 4 shelters on the 3rd.

A stack of telegraph poles was observed at SUDR EL HEITAN on the 3rd. On the 3th, this was no longer seen but on that date SUDR EL HEITAN and AIN SUDR were observed to be connected by telephone.

The number of tents and shelters at SUDR EL HEITAN has not changed, viz: 2 bell tents, 1 hut, and 2 shelters on the 8th as against 2 bell tents, 1 native tent and 1 hut on the 3rd, but 14 rifle pits (not noticed hitherto) were observed on the 4th; the pilot descended to observe them; they were found occupied and an attack was made with the Lewis gun, which was answered with heavy rifle fire, during which the pilot was slightly wounded in two places.

Other observations carried out from SUEZ may be noted in their order of sequence, as follows:- The East end of the RAHA PASS was found clear on the 3rd; on the 4th, a new track was observed leading from the exit of the RAHA PASS to AIN SUDR; on the 5th WADI EL HAJ was clear; on the 6th, a reconnaissance was carried further south, BIR ABU GARAD, BIR UM GURF and WADI HEIKAIK were found clear, water was seen in the WADIS at the two latter places, WADI EL HAJ was clear. On the 7th, the RUINED CHAPEL was clear, 6 native shelters were seen at BIR EL TAWAL, GEBEL EL GIDDI and the track East of the mountains were clear, as also WADI EL BAHA, 2 camps of 4 and 5 native shelters and a large quantity of goats were observed 2 miles south of BIR EL GIDDI. On the 8th, the RAHA was clear, a party of 4 men and camels were seen proceeding from AIN SUDR to WADI EL RAHA, WADI EL HAJ and the MITLA PASS were clear. On the 9th, it was observed that the 4 shelters reported SOUTH of BIR EL GIDDI on the 7th had been burnt, two men were seen in the WADI ABU SHAR and a few camel tracks leading North from BIR EL TAWAL.

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT.

No detailed reports have been received during the week. The aeroplane which was left in the desert 50 miles North of MARIQUE after a forced landing on 22-5-16 has unfortunately become a total wreck. The South West Force undertook a salvage expedition but on the return journey the party encountered a fierce sandstorm which capized the machine. The engine and all available parts were brought in separately on camels, the machine itself being burnt.

WESTERN FRONT.

The country round SOULU has been regularly reconnoitred during the week and is apparently clear.

DISTRIBUTION OF LINE FORCES IN NEBAT & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report				R.F.C. Report.				Remarks.
	MEN.	GUNS.	TENTS.	DATE.	MEN.	GUNS.	TENTS.	DATE.	
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>									
SALMIANA.					-	small post		7/6.	
BIR EL NAZAR.	800	-	-	25/5.	300	-	25	6/6.	
EL ARISH.	4000	Prisoner's statement.		27/5.	- 78	additional tents.		7/6.	Seaplane report.
BIR LAHFEN.	200	-	-	30/5.					
MAGHDABA.	130	-	22	31/5.					
ES SIER.	15	-	5	22/5.					
MELHA.					50	-	-	8/3.	
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>									
MAGHARA.	300	4	20	23/5.	400.	-	30.	50/5.	
RODH SALEH.	25.	2	12	24/5.			13	6/6.	
EL HAMIA.	40.	-	30	24/5.	600	-	24	13/5.	
HASSANA.	400.	5 & 1	200	30/5.	500	1 A.A.	100	31/5.	No aeroplanes.
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>									
BIR EL GIDDI.						-	small post	7/6.	
SUDR EL HEITAN.						do.	8		
AIN SUDR.						do.	5.	6/3.	} Now connected by telephone.
NEKHL.	350	8	50	5/6.		do.	12	6/3.	
<u>BASE TROOPS.</u>									
KOSSAIMA.	None	-	5	29/5.					
AUJA.	3500	4		27/5.					1 aeroplane.
BIR SABA.	6500	11	900	2/3					5 " "
RAFA.	1000	4	100	1/6					Including Germans.
SHEIKH ZUWEID.	100		30	2/6.					" "

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 106.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

15th June, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE.

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2. THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN FRONT.

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Situation at VERDUN from 4th, to 10th June, 1916.

The action which has been in progress since 1st June on a front of 5 kilometres from the THIAUMONT FARM to the village of DAMBOUP has been carried on with extreme violence during the whole week. The Germans have employed more than 3 Divisions, of whom 2 are newcomers to this region, one from the BALSANG and the other transferred from the Eastern Front.

During the night 3rd/4th June and the day of the 4th, the enemy tried to advance from the South of the VAUX FORT. They were stopped on our parapets. After being twice thrown back by our counter attacks, they entered the Village of DAMBOUP, of which in the end they remained the masters. Several attacks were stopped by our fire North of the VAUX FORT on the borders of the FULM WOOD.

On the 5th June we repulsed 2 attacks which were initiated, one from DAMBOUP and the other from the North-West of VAUX FORT.

On the 5th June a violent assault on our trenches close to the approaches to VAUX FORT failed. On the same day the Fort itself, in which since the 3rd June a sanguinary combat had been going on, fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 6th June the enemy renewed their attacks all day long from the North of the THIAUMONT FARM to the ravine of VAUX and they succeeded in taking a few trenches bordering on the farm, and near to LA CAILLETTE WOOD.

On the Left Bank of the MEUSE on the 4th June all attacks in the region of HILL 304 were repulsed, ^{and} again during the night of the 8th/9th June and the day of the 9th, when the enemy made strong attempts to capture the position by the aid of "LINE INFANTRY".

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2. THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN FRONT.

The first indication of the Russian Offensive appeared in the Austrian Communique of the 4th June wherein it was stated that a Russian Offensive appeared to be commencing along the entire front of the group of armies commanded by the Arch Duke Joseph Ferdinand.

On the 5th June the Austrians announced that a big battle was in progress on the whole of their front and that the Russians had succeeded in penetrating to the north west of TARNOPOL.

From that time on, the Austrian communiques have shown increasing anxiety and they have been obliged to admit the penetration of their front at LUTSK, TARNOPOL, BUCZACZ and finally on the Bessarabian front near CZERNOWITZ.

The Russian attack on the Bessarabian frontier developed later than elsewhere as during the early days the Austrian communiques reported all calm in Bessarabia. The first admission of an attack in this sector was in the German wireless of the 10th instant, but by the 13th instant the Austrians were obliged to admit that they had "succeeded by heavy rear-guard actions in getting clear of the enemy".

The Russian claims, which have been more or less confirmed by Austrian admissions, show that the Austrian front has been penetrated at four principal points along a front of 200 miles.

First, in the north at the triangle formed by the towns of KOLKI, LUTSK and DUBNO, where they succeeded in reaching a point 25 miles inside the original front.

Secondly, north-west of TARNOPOL, where the Russian columns have broken across near the head waters of the STRIPA and ZLOTA LIPA rivers, close by the railway junction of ZLOTA (or ZLOCZOW) on the main line: TARNOPOL - LEMBERG line. The Russian cavalry are now reported to be 25 miles south-east of LEMBERG.

At the same time, in the neighbourhood of TARNOPOL itself, heavy fighting is still in progress for the heights near the town which have already changed hands several times.

Thirdly, on the STRIPA near ²BUCACZ.

Fourthly on the Bessarabian front where the Russians have reached the suburbs of CZERNOWITZ.

As regards the Austrian's attempts to counter attack, they seem to have brought up reinforcements and to be trying to recover their positions near KILMI and also to the north-west of BUCZACZ. Minor successes have been gained by them at the latter place, and this is admitted by the Russians, but they have not succeeded in driving the Russians across the STRIPA.

It seems that the furthest point that the Russian cavalry have reached inside the Austrian front is PRZEMISLANI nearly 50 miles west from TARNOPOL.

The total captures reported by the Russians up to date are 114,500 men, 2 Generals, several hundreds of guns, some supply trains, munition depots etc., etc., while the enemy only claim the capture of 1500 Russians.

S I N A I
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PERIOD 6th JUNE
to 18th JUNE 1916. INCLUSIVE.

There is not much news to comment on during the past week and the meagreness of Syrian news as to troop movements makes it difficult to appreciate the Sinai situation.

The report of 10,000 Germans at Damascus has not been confirmed. A threat against the Canal in order to hold up British troops would be infinitely more effective if such troops were concentrated at Bir El Saba rather than at Damascus. A sudden serious attack on the Canal on the completion of the railway to Hassana by such a body railed swiftly down from Damascus would surely be preceded by a massing of considerable numbers of Turkish troops in or near the Sinai border to assist the movement. This does not appear to be in progress. If the 10,000 men reported therefore exist, it is more likely that they are intended either for keeping internal order, or for repelling a landing in Syria.

At present the most important point on the northern line is El Arish, where, according to Agents' reports, there is a garrison of about 2,000 including 700 Germans - Agents report reinforcements to El Arish as having come in along the Magdhaba road and the Rafa road - At the latter place are said to be 1,000 men. Mazar is strongly held as an advance post by at least 600 men, with some small posts, probably of mobile Arabs, west of it. 600 is the Flying Corps estimate (8-6-16) but the last Agent to visit the place (6-6-16) gave the number as 1,500 with 900 baggage camels, the latter item, if true, being most significant of the mobility of the force and its readiness to raid westwards given a vulnerable object.

On the centre line, along the railway, Agents give the numbers as 6,500 at Bir El Saba including 1,500 Germans and Austrians and 3,500 at Auja of which 600 German or Austrian.

These numbers may be fairly correct.

Hassana is said to have 4 to 500 men and is not likely to be again increased until the railway is brought there.

Rodh Salom is held by a small Turkish post and the water supply is being improved - How far the supply can be increased or how long it will last cannot be estimated. It is an important factor in a Turkish Advance.

Maghara, between the northern and Centre roads is held by a post of 3 to 400 men and its duty is obviously to assist any Turkish raid along the northern road by a flank attack on Katia.

The southern road is lightly held with 350 men at Nokhl and small posts at Sudr El Heitan and Ain Sudr.

The number of hostile aeroplanes is reported to be 5 with hangars at Bir El Saba and El Arish - There is a report that one fell while flying from El Arish to Bir El Saba on 28-5-16.

There is nothing to remark in Southern Sinai except that the Officer in charge of the small Turkish post there is endeavouring to prevent Arabs going to TBR or Abu Zenima to sell charcoal and get grain - If successful it will not affect the situation except to make the Arabs more miserable.