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I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y

8th July 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

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1. TELEGRAMS FROM G.O.G. FRANCE:(a) FRANCO BRITISH OFFENSIVE.

The French attacking front on the SOMME measured about 15 kilometres. It was held before the attack by 27 German battalions, viz.:--- the 121st Division and 6 Regiments of the 6th Army Corps. Between the 1st and 5th July the Germans sent into this sector as reinforcements the 11th, 12th, 22nd and 44th Reserve Divisions (the last mentioned belonging to the 22nd Reserve Corps). The 11th and 22nd Reserve Divisions, 2 Regiments of the 12th and 1 of the 44th were already engaged on the French front; one of the 12th was engaged on the British front. In addition to these Units representing 36 battalions the Germans put into the line 20 odd battalions taken from the local reserves from the front between the SOMME and RHEIMS. Some of the battalions had been hastily formed by joining together companies belonging to different battalions. This was notably the case with a battalion of the Guards annihilated South of the SOMME.

The Germans felt no less acutely the pressure exerted on the 25 kilometres front on which the British attacked. From the 1st to the 5th July they had to send 28 other battalions to reinforce the 49 which held this part of the line.

(b) GERMAN ATTACKS AT VERDUN.

The attacks carried out by the Germans on the 23rd June on the right bank of the MEUSE cost them enormous losses: from 30 to 50 per cent of the effectives engaged.

The first line Regiments were so severely handled that they had to be withdrawn on the night of the 23rd June. They were relieved by the whole of the reserve Regiments; at a given moment the 12 regiments in the main attack were mixed together on a front of hardly 1,500 metres. The offensive having failed to attain its object the German Commander seems to have hesitated some days before resigning himself to a defensive attitude. On the 26th June on the front BOIS NAVE - FLEURY - BOIS DE VAUX CHAPITRE, 3 fresh regiments were identified which seemed to have been brought up in view of a fresh attack, but on 29th May on the same front only four of them were found. The threat of the Allies on the SOMME had materialized during the interval.

The intention of the German Staff was obvious. Their reason for employing such powerful artillery and infantry in the June 23rd attack in a manner which exposed the troops engaged to enormous losses was that they hoped thereby to bring about a decisive result. From various documents and the evidence of prisoners it has transpired that the German Commanders had thought they would be able to advance their battalions in two or three days at the most right under the walls of VERDUN, and thus terminate this terrible battle before the combined Allied offensive could develop at other points. Once more the enemy has been mistaken in his calculations and has paid for his mistake by the heaviest sacrifices.

2. TELEGRAM FROM PARIS ON SITUATION TUNISIAN FRONTIER.

On the Tunisian frontier REMADA has been freed from the enemy. Otherwise all is quiet. MAHDI ES SENNI and KHALIFA ben ASKER are said to have 3,000 to 4,000 troops and abundant munitions. MOHAMMED EL ABD has

announced that after RAMADAM he is going to attack DEHBAT with 3,000 men, 10 cannons and 4 machine guns.

In a letter to KHALIFA ben ASKER, KAIMAKAM MESRATA announces that the French will soon be attacked from all sides; that NURI has won great victories over the British and that 170,000 Turks with 500 guns have crossed the Canal.

3. R.F.C. WEEKLY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.

THE CANAL FRONT.

The work of patrolling the Canal Front during the past week has not been marked by any incidents of particular interest. Only one enemy aeroplane has crossed our lines, and that for only a short period and without penetrating to any distance. Observations of the preceding week had pointed to MAZAR and MAEHARA as the two distant points requiring special attention from the air service. They were therefore both visited, the former twice and the latter once. A certain concentration appears to be in progress at MAZAR: this is supported by the reports of Intelligence Agents. Reconnaissance of the Centre Section has lost importance since the diminution of the water supply along the central route.

THE NORTHERN SECTION.

MAZAR was again visited on the 1st instant. The camp appeared not to have undergone any change since the previous visit. No movements of troops were seen though there were very heavy tracks visible all through the camp. Tracks were seen between MAZAR and MOSEIFIG, and at GEISI 10-15 brushwood shelters to the South-West of the well. At GANADIL there were about 8 brushwood shelters and tracks from the road to BIR IL GEISI. At SALLANA there were 25 Camels and drivers and one horse saddled resting.

On the afternoon of the 2nd, a reconnaissance was carried out over JEFER, MAGEIBRA, BAYUD and SALMANA, BIR EL ABD and the UM AISHA district. The southern line of wells between JEFER and SALMANA was apparently clear, but at the first of these places over 100 camels were seen and about 50 men, and at SALMANA well there were visible 4 camels and what appeared to be 20 Turkish infantry. Nothing of interest was noticeable in the UM AISHA district except heavy tracks to all the hods, which had apparently been made by our own troops. It was thought that the camels seen at JEFER were possibly laden with ammunition brought with the intention of burying it in the neighbourhood of our lines, and accordingly a body of Australian Light Horse was at the well next morning at 4.30 and an aeroplane from KANTARA was over them at the same time. The machine flew South, located the camels withdrawing at a distance of some 2 miles from the Hod, and signalled their position to our troops, who were thus able, with the help of the aeroplane which rounded up the fugitives with machine gun fire and bombs from the South, to effect the capture of the whole herd and the Bedouins accompanying them. Upon investigation it was not established that these Camels were being used for the purpose which had been surmised, but the whole operation was interesting as showing the immense possibilities of aeroplane co-operation in this country. On the afternoon of this day the normal reconnaissance of the front found many tracks (*) running N.W. and S.E. from MAGEIBRA and many

* N.B. In reporting observations from the air, observers often make use of the expression "tracks running" following by a compass bearing. Misunderstandings having occurred as to the meaning of this expression it may be as well to point out that it must not be taken to imply that the observer is able to detect from the air the direction in which those who made the tracks were proceeding. This is obviously impossible. The expression merely indicates that from a certain place a line of track was observed running in a particular direction; e.g. "Tracks running N.E., E. and N from X" might either imply a distribution from or a concentration at X.

tracks to the East from BAYUD; at GANADIL were 10 men and 30 camels; at SALMANA were tracks N.E. and W.; at BIR EL ABD were many tracks running westwards. On the 4th, the afternoon reconnaissance of the front disclosed nothing of particular interest. On the 5th, MAZAR was again reconnoitred and photographs were taken of the camp. The tents and shelters did not appear to have increased, but a large number of camels (some 250) were seen, as also a large flock of goats. Subsequent examination of the photographs has revealed at least three large E.P. tents covered with brushwood and a very definite line of tracks running to the N.E. in addition to the tracks running eastwards. On this occasion the southern line from JEFER to AWEIDIA was found apparently free from the enemy.

A patrol of 50 men and camels was seen round the well at EL GSISI, nothing was reported from SALMANA, BIR EL ABD, and ABU HAMRA. An afternoon reconnaissance of the 6th carried along the southern line as far as SALMANA showed tracks at JEFER running N.E., at MAGEIBRA running N. and E., at AWEIDIA running E. and W., and at BAYUD running N.W. The lines of tracks from all these places appearing to converge on UM AISHA, special attention was paid to that district next day, when two reconnaissances were ordered. In the morning no fresh tracks were seen on the southern line before JAMEIL where tracks were seen running N.E., E. and S.E. At BIR GSISI were 6 men in khaki and very heavy tracks in all directions, the brushwood shelters reported on the 1st at GSISI and GANADIL were again observed and a camel patrol of about 45 men at the latter place. At SALMANA were tracks from the E. into the HOD and at BIR SALMANA there were two camel patrols numbering in all about 180, which left in a northwesterly direction on seeing the machine.

At HOU DIAKAR in the UM AISHA district, there was a track into the HOD from the BAYUD direction, and the sand around the well showed heavy tracks; the sand between the palm trees, where observation was possible, showed traces of having been disturbed. In the afternoon of this day (the 7th), the Hods in the neighbourhood of ABU DAREM were well searched, i.e. to the N. and N.W. of MAGEIBRA and to the N.E. of JEFFEIR. At JEFFEIR heavy fresh looking tracks were seen running N. and N.E. In five small Hods in the Central district, about 25 men and 35 camels were observed altogether; to each of these Hods unimportant tracks could be seen leading from the direction of HILLALI. At HILLALI nothing was found; MAGEIBRA was clear, and 9 men and 14 camels were seen at AWEIDIA with tracks also coming from the HILLALI District.

THE CENTRAL SECTION.

In this Section a reconnaissance made on the 1st discovered a Bedouin encampment of 7 shelters near Hill 1390 N.W. of the opening of the WADI SHELAIL. This was again observed on the 6th and tracks between it and the Eastern pool of the MUKHSHEIB were seen. BIR EL MAGHARA was visited on the 6th. The camp was smaller than when last seen on the 25th, viz.: 5 bell tents and 8 shelters, as against 15 bell tents and 12 shelters. 30 Camels were seen on the BARGA ROAD West of the Camp accompanied by 4 men marching towards MAGHARA. One bomb of 100 lbs. was dropped on the camp without doing any apparent damage. 5 camels and 8 men were seen on the BARGA ROAD about four miles to the W. of MAGHARA. The Camp at BIR EL MELHI was seen to have been reduced to one shelter. During the week the immediate front was regularly patrolled from ISMAILIA; and the WADI UM MUKHSHEIB from SUEZ and ISMAILIA alternately. A certain quantity of water still lingers in

the pools but in such small quantities and so stagnant that it can hardly any longer be considered a serious source of enemy supply along this road.

THE SOUTHERN SECTION.

From SUEZ, the usual reconnaissances of the Southern front and of AIN SUDR and SUDR HEITAN have been carried out, and both these places, as well as the SUDR EL HEITAN Camp, have been photographed. Little change was seen in either camp during the week, but this morning comes the news of a slight increase in the AIN SUDR garrison, which, it may be noted, coincides with the rumoured reinforcement of NEKHL brought to us by Intelligence Agents. At SUDR EL HEITAN on the 1st a tripod was observed erected over a large white excavation, but this had again disappeared on the 4th. The junction of the telegraph line from NEKHL with the AIN SUDR - SUDR EL HEITAN line was definitely located on the 4th about 2 Miles North of the RAS EL GINDI. The tracks between this spot and SUDR EL HEITAN appear to be well used.

THE WESTERN FRONT.

On this front reconnaissances were carried out from SOLLUM on the 27th and 28th June. The country on a radius of 30 Miles W. and S. was reconnoitred without anything of interest being discovered. A reconnaissance of the 30th June was carried out to within a few miles of SHEQQA, the country being apparently clear, and one on the 3rd instant in an easterly direction as far as BAQBAQ but of this latter no detailed report has been received.

THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONT.

On the 30th ultimo TENIDA in the KHARGA OASIS, the AIN AMUR, DARB EL TAWIL and DARB EL GUBARI roads were reconnoitred. An outpost consisting of 1 bell tent and 2 rows of palm leaf sholtors (six huts in each row) was seen at a spot previously reported on the DARB EL GUBARI road, the 12 huts being an increase since the last visit. Two bombs were dropped on the post. No outpost could be found on the DARB EL TAWIL. There was nothing new to report at TENIDA.

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THE WESTERN FRONT.

On this front reconnoissances were carried out from 20 miles on the 27th and 28th June. The country on a radius of 20 miles N. and S. was reconnoitred without anything of interest being discovered. A reconnaissance of the 28th June was carried out to within a few miles of SUDQA, the country being especially clear, and one of the 2nd lieutenant in an aircraft discovered a few machine guns at this location. A detailed report has been received.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report.				R.F.C. Report.				Remarks.	
	MEN.	GUNS	TANKS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	TANKS	DATE		
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>										
BIR EL BAYUD. ✓	80	-	12	2/7				3/7	Many tracks East. 50 Germans. 3 machine guns. 500 Germans. R.F.C. include 200 shelters. 400 Germans. 2 Hangars.	
SALMANA. ✓	290	-	28	3/7						
BIR EL MAZAR.	2,500	4	270	3/7			250	5/7		
EL ARISH.	2,000	22	800	30/6						
MAGDHABA.	250	-	-	2/7						
BIR LAHFAN.			20	24/6						
ABU AWEIGLA.	130	-	7	18/6						
BIR GERERAT.	40	-	4	4/7						
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>										
MAGHARA.	40	-	17	2/7						
RODH SALEM.	90	-	12	29/6						
EL HAMMA.	35	-	16	1/7						
HASSANA.	170	-	75	30/6						
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>										
SUDR EL HEITAN.	35	-	5	26/6			4	29/6		
AIN SUDR.	90	-	-	8/6			8	4/7		
NEKHL.	600	8	-	25/6						
<u>ADVANCED TROOPS.</u>										
KOSSAIMA.	400	-	-	29/6						
AUJA.	7,000	6	500	22/6						
BIR SABA.	7,300	16	615	27/6						
SHELLAL.	10,000	12	950	26/6						
RAFA.	1,000	4	100	1/6						
<u>BASE TROOPS</u>										