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August 1916



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SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No 128.

Summary
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

6th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MOROCCO DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 1916.
2. ACCOUNT OF A JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN FROM SAMSUN TO AMERICA EARLIER IN THE YEAR.

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1. SITUATION IN MOROCCO DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 1916.

The situation in Morocco has remained as it was during the month of May. There has been perfect quiet in the occupied zone, including the plains which extend from the sea to the Atlas Range. There have been signs of unrest, not yet followed by any open rebellion, in the mountains which attach the Spanish Frontier. There have been several sharp encounters on the outskirts of the Atlas Mountains, and in these our Mobile Columns have driven back vigorously the rebel tribes into their mountains. Lastly the Spanish have exhibited in their zone military activity, which by making imprudent use of the assistance of the agitator Raissouli, has increased the resources and prestige of that individual, who is the declared enemy of France.

2. ACCOUNT OF A JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN FROM SAMSUN TO AMERICA EARLIER IN THE YEAR.

(The following account may be taken to be fairly reliable.)

It is interesting to note that on his return journey with an American friend last month, he was unable to obtain permission from the German authorities to proceed to Turkey).

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A member of an American Tobacco Co. left SAMSUN (Black Sea) and travelled via CHORUM, JUZGAT, ANGORA and ESKI SHEHR to CONSTANTINOPLE, taking 15 days over the journey.

SAMSUN. At the time of leaving SAMSUN, wheat, of which the pre-war price was 80 piastres per sack, had reached 200 piastres and was advancing at the rate of about 10 piastres per sack per/

week. The price of bread had increased by about 600%. The Government had commandeered and stored in the village 75% of the 1915 crop of grain, and, on the way to ANGORA, hundreds of wagons that were taking in the last reserves of this commandeered grain were encountered.

The region traversed between MERZIFUN and ANGORA is a part of one of the largest grain growing belts in Turkey, (ERZINJAN-ANGORA) and the traveller observed that only about 10% of the usual amount of land was being cultivated. He was told that this was due not only to want of cultivators but also to lack of seed.

ANGORA. At ANGORA there were about 400/500 British prisoners of war, amongst them being two submarine and some other Officers.

All were clothed and fed as well as the country could afford.

The train service was very irregular owing to lack of coal and at ADA BAZAR, engines that had arrived from CONSTANTINOPLE burning coal were attached to wagon loads of wood that was consumed on the journey ADA BAZAR - ESKI-SHEHR.

CONSTANTINOPLE. In CONSTANTINOPLE there were not many Turkish troops, those present being mostly German and Austrian with some Bulgars.

Hotel prices had advanced by about 50% and food prices by about 100% on pre-war prices, while the quality and quantity of the food were much inferior to those prevailing before the war.

Sugar was almost non-existent and coal, burning-oil, olive and similar oils, butter, meat except lamb, fish, bread, rice and beans were very scarce.

In November last most of the rice and cereals in CONSTANTINOPLE were bought up and sent to Germany.

75% of the wholesale businesses were closed down and the stocks in retail shops of all kinds very small.

There were no amusements except a few cabarets and cinemas.

The people were despondent and even the Young Turks seemed to fear the Germans rather than to respect them. It was generally understood that Turkey was lost even if Germany should win. An Officer, late sub-editor of the "TANIN" said that while he did not dislike Germany, he would cut off his right hand rather than give it in friendship to a German Officer.

The behaviour of Turkish officials was very good, and at the frontier, the usual 10 francs smoothed over all difficulties.

JOURNEY FROM TURKEY TO AUSTRIA AND BERLIN.

Informant, on leaving Turkey, travelled via Bulgaria and Austria to BERLIN. Germans had charge of the train throughout the journey from CONSTANTINOPLE and other officials only entered it at the respective frontiers.

The bread in Bulgaria was better than in all other places and the steward bought bread there to carry into Germany.

In Austria and Germany, in most of the towns and even in BERLIN, many closed factories, some with grass growing in the factory yards, were remarked.

BERLIN. The people here were very quiet but seemed certain of winning the war. There were few amusements except cabarets. Dancing was forbidden.

The behaviour of officials was bad and there was a very bitter feeling against the Americans.

Rubber was scarce. Most of the automobiles in the streets had iron tyres and all of those exposed for sale had the same sort of tyre.

The prices at the Hotel Bristol were 40 marks a day, and an average day's meals were as follows:-
Breakfast: Coffee and Jam, 2 pieces of sugar, weak milk (no butter or cream). Lunch: Potato soup, fish and potatoes, other vegetables, sweet, (coffee extra).
Tea: Extra Dinner: Similar to lunch. Four small rolls of very bad bread, each three inches long and 3/4 inch diameter were allowed each person per day. Meat was given three times a week.

ENGLAND. In England, where informant remained two days, he found everything up to pre-war standard, no noticeable scarcity of anything, prices very slightly increased, more amusements and life than before the war, behaviour of officials and facilities for travellers excellent, and the news in the papers regarding conditions in Germany and Austria only slightly exaggerated.

Informant, later, accompanied by a colleague, returned to Germany via Holland.

HOLLAND. A Dutchman remarked that while they disliked the English who had restricted their trade, they hated the Germans who would like to take their country.

GERMANY.(return journey) Conditions were very similar to those prevailing on the former visit, but the people were not so sanguine and the question "When is it thought that the war will end"? was frequently asked. A feeling of unrest was apparent, not from actual things seen or heard, but in informant's own words, "like the feeling in the air when a thunderstorm is approaching".

Meat was scarcer, being given only twice a week.

A Bavarian mentioned that there was a general feeling of dissatisfaction with Prussia.

Finding it impossible to get to Turkey from Germany, the American Ambassador in BERLIN said that it was not possible to obtain permission for Americans to travel in that direction - the two Americans decided to try to get there via Greece and proceeded to BERNE.

Permission to pass through Italy was difficult to obtain on account of the German visas on the passports but ultimately they left Italy and arrived in ATHENS on July 19th, whence they hope to pass into Turkey.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents report.					R.F.C. Report.					Remarks.	
	MEN	GUNS	SHEL-TERS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	SHEL-TERS	TENTS	DATE		
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>												
TROOPS.	EL ARISH.	1500	25	-	600	26/7	-	-	-	-	-	All available gone West. Many tents empty. Only small garrison. Only small garrison. Camp quiet No numbers given. Probably most of troops moved forward. Three long water troughs. Aerodrome. Arrived from MAGHARA. Probably moved on. Trenches & redoubts mostly filled in with sand. This estimate is based on reports from all sources and not exclusively R.F.C. reports. GUNS: (12 Mountain in centre (prisoner). 8 heavy (prisoner) 5" howitzers actually 3 guns near ABU DAREM (R.F.C.) reported 2 " " RESHAFAT (R.F.C.) R.F.C. have been fired at by A.A. guns from 9 points. 11 guns were seen by agent on road from MAGDHABA to ARISH 29/7 & 30/7.
	LAHFAN.	-	-	-	200	29/7	-	-	-	-	-	
	MAGDHABA.	-	-	16	250	30/7	-	-	-	-	-	
	AWEIGLIA.	200	-	-	30	30/7	-	-	-	-	-	
	MAZAR.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SALMANA.	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	3/8	
	BIR EL ABD.	1000	estimate	-	-	4/8	500	-	50	10	2/8	
	1 1/2 miles North	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	30	-	1/8	
	ABU EL AFEIN.	1000	ditto	-	-	-	800	-	30	-	2/8	
	HOD EL BAYUD.	800	-	-	-	27/7	-	-	25	-	31/7	
ADVANCED	MAGEIBRA.	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	20	-	3/8	
	NEGILIAT to QASAB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3/8	
	UMMUGBA to BADIEH.	-	-	-	-	-	10000	estimated	-	-	4/8	
KATIA District and in front.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		

Locality	Agents report.					R.F.C. report.					Remarks.
	MEN	GUNS	SHEL- TERS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	SHEL- TERS	TENTS	DATE	
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>											
ADVANCED TROOPS. MAGHARA.	80	-	11	16	30/7	50	-	-	-	2/8	R.F.C. reports no change.
RODH SALEM.	80	4	13	30	1/8	-	-	13	14	25/7	
EL HAMMA.	200	2	5	26	24/7	80	3	5	16	2/8	
HASSANA.	1400	4	9	100	25/7	600	-	-	-		R.F.C. includes 30 men and 3 gurs seen on road from HASSANA. R.F.C. report camp unchanged. 1 A.A
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>											
SUDR EL HEITAN	40	-	-	-	23/7	-	-	1	1	28/7	
AIN SUDR.	130	2	3	13	26/7	-	-	5	13	1/8	
NEKHL.	1000	10	3	80	25/7	-	-	-	-	-	
AKABA.	180	1	-	20	8/7	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>BASE TROOPS.</u>											
KOSSAIMA.	800	6	13	60	21/7	-	-	-	-	-	5 Barracks.
AUJA.	3350	4	16	300	17/7	-	-	-	-	-	4 hangars. Probably many are Labour Corps.
BIR SABA.	Nil	-	-	-	15/7	-	-	-	-	-	
SHELLAL.	-	-	-	-	-	Nil	-	-	-	23/7	R.N.A.S. camp evacuated.
KHAN YUNIS.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23/7	R.N.A.S. No troops on road.
GAZA.	20	9	-	-	15/7	-	-	-	-	-	
RAFA.	400	6	-	300	25/7	-	-	-	-	-	Tents mostly empty. All available troops gone to KATIA.

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Army G.S.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

7th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.,
EGYPTIAN RECONSTITUTIONARY FORCE.

1. NOTES etc. FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

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1. NOTES etc. FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Amongst documents captured on 6th inst was found a map of a German Officer (our 1/125,000) marked up with the latest Turkish dispositions in blue and British in red. From this it appears that the Turks had three regiments in line stretching South from NEGILLAT and one regiment North of the road in the ZUGBA sand-hills. No reserves East of BIR EL AED are shown.

The position ascribed to us is considerably out, as our trench line is shown as extending from MAHEMDIA on the sea Southwards to a point midway between ABU HAMRA and ROMANI and thence back West under the ETMALER sand-hill to a point North of BIR EL ARAIS. He does not seem to have been aware of our works encircling KATIB GANNIT. We are also shown as occupying ABU DIUK and HOD BIKRA.

The successive positions of Turkish trenches are very accurately marked and the progressive line of advance of the attacking force is shown by the series of arrows as coming from ABU DAREM to ABU THEILU, thence to BIR HAMISAH, BIR ABU RAMAL, HOD EMNA and then on a curve to attack ETMAIER from the rear.

The owner of the map is reported by some of our German prisoners to have left the fight early in the day for reasons unexpressed.

The following is a pencilled report in a diary of an encouraging speech made by Djemal Pasha at BIR SABA on 1st July :-

"Good soldiers. You are going to the desert.

"I ask you to have patience and perseverance.

"You will return bearing your arms in victory

"or you will leave your bones in the desert!"

Everything is bad in the desert.

"Hunger, nakedness, dirt, every privation,

" consequently I ask you to have courage and

"perseverance, OH! my soldiers."

The following entries were made by a Turkish Officer in his notebook:-

The men will not remain in their tents between the hours of 4 and 7 a.m. and 5 and 7 p.m. but will be extended in an area of some hundreds of metres. Without orders no one is to fire at aeroplanes. In order to deceive hostile aeroplanes we will form another encampment near the first.

After BIR MAZAR the men must not smoke.

Every man who brings in a rifle will get one Medjidie. Any one bringing in important information, £ 5.

For every prisoner £5.

At about 7.30 p.m. on the 6th we were able to tap the Turkish telephone line and the following scraps of conversation were overheard:-

I. W.O. speaking to a Sergeant (Ismail).

"the enemy seem to be in every part" (?)

II. Officer of 3rd Division speaking to Stania Bey.

"By their conversation they appear to be short of
"rations. They are also angry at their German Officers
"who appear to use the telephone much to the disadvantage
"of Turkish officers who are blamed for their carelessness
"in their duties". -----

III. "Stores sent to Mancasiri" (?)

"I have heard they are returning".

"Cant you relieve?"

"No. impossible now".

"You are right. I think you are too tired".

IV. From MAZAR.

"We send you some stores. A bed will certainly come."

"We are moving."

(KRESS.) "VON GROSS congratulates the soldiers on their
"behaviour at the battle of KATIA and assures them
"that God will always be with them".

Corporal's comment on above:-

"Though we have many men we can't face the enemy".

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Summary

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

8th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. DIARY OF TEWFIK EFFENDI, Engineer Lieutenant.
(from 17th July 1916 to 1st August 1916.)

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1. DIARY OF TEWFIK EFFENDI, Engineer Lieutenant.

From 17th July 1916 to 1st August 1916.

.....
17th July 1916. MAZAR.

Marching orders of left wing.

Advance Guard:- Mounted Dromedaries (Bedouins).

Wing of Infantry.

3rd Company in advance.

39th Regiment.

4th Coy. 2nd Coy.

1st Battalion.

3rd Company of machine guns.

3rd Mountain Battery.

1st Company of Engineers.

1/2 Platoon - Signals.

1 Detachment: water finders
(Artesian experts.)

1 Company Infantry.

(This might mean, in cases where where 3rd's are indicated,
3 Companies etc.)

(1). The troops will concentrate on the road at 6.30.

(2). The Bedouins will always be at the head of the troops
for reconnaissance purposes.

(3). The mounted troops will send one man per Company as
Despatch Riders.

After a march of an hour out of MAZAR, the men
found the ground hard and marching was easier. The O.C.
of the Advance Guard was IHSAN BEY, commanding the 1st
Battalion of 39th Regiment. We were marching all night.
Towards 1 a.m. we rested and then went on again. The heat
was great. At 9 a.m. we again halted in the plains.- This
halt lasted up till 3 p.m.

We resumed our march, but as we got no water before resuming our march, the men suffered a great deal. At 7 p.m. we saw about 10 horsemen. We thought they were the enemy and we hesitated. Our rear-guard started out to reconnoitre. At last the question was solved. Marching was resumed and we arrived at midnight. The men were very done up this time. We camped in the rear of the hills which are South of the BAYOUD wells. Near these wells, there are 5 or 6 wells which have been destroyed. We detailed some men to repair these wells.

18th July 1916.

We cleaned three wells but the water was very salty. MAZAR to BAYOUD is 50 kilos. We did it in 28 hours. At BAYOUD there are 6 wells and 30 trees.
Fortifications of BAYOUD.

We fired on an enemy aeroplane but were unsuccessful.

19th July 1916.

We remained at BAYOUD till about 7 p.m. The Engineer Company made some fortifications. After having cleaned the wells, we fixed pumps.

Visited by enemy aeroplane. We fired on it without effect. An infantry man was wounded by machine gun fire from aeroplane.

At 7.30 we left BAYOUD for MAGEIERA. (20 Kilos) and did it in about 11 hours. We arrived at 6 a.m. We did 2½ kilos per hour, owing to the ground being very sandy and secondly owing to scarcity of water. The troops are suffering from the want of water. Here the issue of water is 5 litres per day but as this is not regular and we

are not allowed to rest for any length of time, the troops suffer. (Here writer expresses his opinion that a man ought to have 10 minutes rest per hour's march). We remained the night on the road. From the time we left BIR ES SABA we have done all the marching at night. These night marches tire the troops because they do not sleep regularly. This night, as has always been the case, I marched in the rear. I have taken precautions that no one should remain behind. It is nice walking by moonlight, but sleep is sweeter. At last.

20th July 1916. About 5 a.m. we arrived at the MAGEIBRA hills. We saw two enemy aeroplanes, but these aeroplanes left without spotting us.

We camped in the rear of the MAGEIBRA hills. We heard that the reports of rifle fire had been heard. After a short time the enemy's advance guard took two of our poor men. We do not know how this happened. Perhaps when our advance guard saw enemy patrols, they retired without notifying these two men, and thus they were taken prisoners. The Commander of the Company called all the Platoon Commanders to the spot where trenches were to be dug, and gave us orders. I asked some information. He replied "Dont interfere". I answered him. We had a quarrel. I was very annoyed. (Note:- It appears this Officer is a nephew of the Commandant of Police at DAMASCUS and a relative of the Deputy for BEIRUT, and in the course of the quarrel, he seems to have pointed out to the Company Commander that he had a considerable amount of influence).:

At that moment an aeroplane came over. We fired without result. On the hills opposite to us we could distinguish the enemy Helio, also their Cavalry and Infantry. At midnight ("20th) we came out to dig trenches. At 4.30 a.m. we stopped working.

21st July 1916. During the night while I was searching for my quarters I was challenged by one of our sentries who asked me for the pass-word. I could not answer him. At last I saved myself after a thousand difficulties.

This morning Major BALMANN, O.C. Engineers, arrived at MAGEIBRA. After inspecting the works he left for BIR EL AWEIDIA at 2 p.m. To-day I went off to look for suitable places for our reserves. Enemy aeroplanes again made reconnaissances.

22nd July 1916. To-day we went out with IHSAN BEY, ex-O.C. of the left wing and we chose the positions for our reserves which he approved of. In the evening we received orders to change our ^{encampment}. We worked on trenches during the night. We worked on Nos. 6, 7, 8, ^{9 & 10.} I went out for a walk tonight and, not knowing the locality, I lost my way and had great difficulty.

23rd July 1916. About mid-day my tent was transferred to the new camp. During the pitching of my tent I sat with Ibrahim Eff. Cadet Officer, who gave me cocoa, biscuits and wine. I invited him round to lunch and we lunched together. To-day, my colleague on reconnaissance work, MEHMED EFF. received orders to go in the direction of HOD EL SAGIA. He left with 35 Infantry, 15 Engineers. etc. Total - 100. 4 hours out of MAGEIBRA they encountered 4 enemy horsemen. On seeing our men, the enemy retired to some date groves. We ascertained that in these date plantations there was a force of three companies of Infantry and one company of Cavalry. To-day KIAMIL BEY arrived at our left wing as O.C. of the group. KIAMIL BEY stated that we were not to advance further, because

the enemy was distant about from 3-4 hours, that enemy patrols approached within 1 to 1½ hours distance, that the ground would be favourable to the enemy if we advanced. KIAMIL BEY stated that our position was fairly suitable, because beyond, there was no water, that there we would suffer from thirst. This was KIAMIL BEY'S first criticism- (2). As the road to KANTARA is on our left it would not be right to leave it and advance as our forces are weak. If we were stronger part of the force would remain at MAGEIBRA and the rest could be sent in advance in the desired direction. We have arranged to take turns as regards our visiting the trenches.

25th July 1916. KIAMIL BEY went with some Bedouins to HOD EL SAGIA to make a reconnaissance and returned. To-day it is rumoured that Von KRESS arrived at our group. Enemy aeroplanes visited us once or twice. This night also we worked at our reserve works, (which never seem to finish) We threw all the earth which had been collected before our positions. I worked at Nos. 6 and 2.

26th July 1916. To-day I heard that one of our Platoons fled from the enemy. It made a bad impression on me. A Platoon of Machine gunners was to have gone with the reconnaissance detachment, but having heard of the flight of the said platoon, we hesitated sending them as we lost confidence. ABOULLAH Effendi told me that no officers were to take off their boots.

To drink tea in the desert is good for Officers, because the water of the desert is salted and smells. One must always boil it. But when the water is boiled there is no taste.

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27th July 1916. Tonight I was the only one who went to the works in the trenches. (The false ones ?) I found great difficulty in finding these places. The direction in which these trenches should extend was determined on, but I found no men or tools to undertake this work. I searched for men and at last I succeeded in fixing the work up. I supervised it. It is very difficult to dig trenches on this ground when one does not know it). It is always necessary to be with one's men when they work; whenever I am not there they either sleep or go away.

To-day I saw the English passing in groups of two before me. ?

This night, at about 9 p.m. the Machine-gun Section No 603, 1 Engineer Company and 1 Machine-gun Company are to start for ABU DAREM. The other Battalions, with the centre are to start for HOD EL SAGIA, and will occupy it. At 10.30 I left for HOD ABU DAREM. The march was quite quiet. Smoking and talking was forbidden. Every man was trying to march and move as quietly as possible. Our hearts were beating because the hour was approaching when we should come into contact. It continued for 3 hours. 1 Company of the Battalion was separated and took another direction. As no orders were given we followed them. As soon as we saw our mistake we returned; half an hour after we heard the first sounds of a fusilade. At last we got to a hill; this hill was an important position. We decided to camp there. We all slept, without pitching tents, in the brushwood with our men. The heat of the sun woke me. I could hear a fusilade.

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I got on the crest of a hill from where I could see the whole neighbourhood. I saw the tracks of our "chasseurs" near the date trees. The enemy is in this wood. I could not see them. 9 or 10 horsemen followed them. (?) These, on hearing the first reports of firing, escaped.

29th July 1916. This night also I worked in the trenches. This work is really a job for 7 platoons. The earth is very soft. Number of men working - 20 men of 1st Coy., 100 men of 2nd Coy., 31 of 4th Coy., 20 from our Engineer Detachment, and 51 from an Engineer Coy.

I slept on the ground. It is very cold during the night. To-day one of our aeroplanes encountered an enemy aeroplane but there were no results. In the evening we went out to dig trenches on the front of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 39th Regiment. We were told that the occupied trenches were to serve as rear lines and that we were to advance and take up another position, but as the main strength of the 3rd Battalion was far in rear of the 2nd Battalion, we were obliged to take up a position further in advance.

We traced the line with the aid of the O.C. Engineer Detachment of the 39th Regiment, Bahaeddine Effendi.- "En resume" the front of every Company was fixed up. 400 sand-bags are expected! at 9 a.m. they turned up.

1st August 1916. (2nd day of BAIRAM.)

On the night of Monday to Tuesday I went to the front with Sergeant Sadik. There I divided my men for work on fortifications on the right and left corners. After the work I returned to the date trees of HOD ABU DAREM where I slept with Beheaddine Eff. O.C. of the Engineer Detachment of the 39th Regiment. At 5 a.m. I returned to our Company camp.

This morning 15 enemy aeroplanes flew over all the encampments, directing the fire of the enemy's ships. 40 shells were fired by the ships and a quantity of bombs were

thrown on the camp where the O.C. of the 39th Regiment was. This night I did not go out on trench work. This night we will advance against the enemy. This has been announced by the O.C. of the Company. Our group of the left wing forms the 3rd Group. The direction of the 3rd Group is towards BIR EL HAMISAH, BIR ABU EL THEILA. The direction (the objective) of the centre is from BIR EL HAMISAH to KATIA. I visited the front of the 1st Battalion with Hassan Eff.

This night we had a violent engagement on the front of the 2nd Battalion. A map and pocketbook which fell from an Englishman was picked up. I saw the map. Our left wing is active. They say that 4 English have been killed.

To-day at 4 a.m. I went with my platoon to the Headquarters of the left flank. I sat in a tent. I am feeling ill. To-day there is a sandstorm. Sand was covering us where we sat. At 6. I went with my platoon to the front where the 4th Battalion was. I re-arranged the parapets and trenches. The infantry force was composed of 200 men. The front was at a distance of about 600 metres. There was not a single infantry officer in the trenches. I directed these works. Taking my platoon I went near the burnt date tree grove, on the S. of the date trees of ABU DAREM.

To-day I spent my BAIRAM on the S. of this wood. I wished to spend this Holy Day with my family but I think under these circumstances it is more glorious to be where duty calls. Anyway a man cannot forget his happy family life. We had soup, pilaco and meat.

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No 131.

Amey
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

9th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. REMARKS BY GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE, dated 27th July 1916
ON SITUATION.

1. REMARKS BY GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE, ON PRESENT SITUATION.

Our gains on the SOMME battle-front during the week have been principally at FOUREAUX wood and in and around POZIERES village. The taking of this village was completed on 26th, after a week of hard fighting. From various captured documents it is apparent that the Germans attached great importance to the holding of the village and consequently its capture may be regarded as being very satisfactory. The heavy German counter-attacks which have been a feature of the battle all through have rather gained in intensity this week but generally speaking they have met with rather less success than in the earlier stages. The whole of our line has been subjected to them at one time or another but only at GUILLEMONT, LONGUEVAL and FOUREAUX wood have they attained a measure of success, while they have continued to cost the Germans heavy casualties.

You will have noticed in the daily telegram of 23rd July that we succeeded in taking the outskirts of the village of GUILLEMONT but were driven out by a counter-attack. The reasons for our failure are firstly the skilful use of Machine guns by the enemy and secondly the weather conditions which have prevailed. The area in which these two villages lie is peculiarly suited to the successful employment of Machine guns by reason of the large amount of standing corn and the numerous small copses which afford easy and effectual cover for them making them exceedingly difficult to locate. Rainy and misty weather has rendered thorough aerial reconnaissance very difficult and prevented the accurate location of enemy trenches and batteries. For these reasons no general attack on GUILLEMONT has yet been made, that on 23rd instant being carried out by small forces only. It is probable that no general attack will be made until some means have been found of dealing effectively with enemy machine guns and of obtaining thorough aerial reconnaissance.

Since the beginning of the battle 160 German Battalions have been brought up to the British front of which nine have since been withdrawn altogether from the area.

The resumption of the offensive by the French on their front North and South of the SOMME met with success and advances were made on both banks on 20th July. For the most part the French have been left in undisturbed possession of their gains and only in the neighbourhood of SOYECOURT have a few unimportant counter-attacks been delivered against their new positions. These counter-attacks were repulsed with ease.

Since the beginning of the battle 162 German battalions have been brought up to the French front, of which ten have since been withdrawn from the area.

At VERDUN the French have been making steady progress on the right bank of the MEUSE in the THIAUMONT-FLEURY sector by means of counter-attacks which gained a little ground each day; 800 prisoners were taken by them in this sector between 13th and 23rd July. At the same time all our information goes to show that the enemy intends to make another ^{great} attack on VERDUN which they hope will be decisive. They have brought up the III Bavarian Corps (2 Divisions) from ST. MIHIEL to this front, and these troops have been in a quiet part of the line and are comparatively fresh. A Corps order was read to the men of the Corps on 16th July announcing that heavy sacrifices would have to be made by them but that if every man did his duty VERDUN would be taken and peace would soon follow.

The enemy has so far procured the men for his counter-attacks on the SOMME front by thinning his line at other parts and by interchanging tired Divisions with more or less fresh ones from quiet parts of the line and he may continue to do so. But it is worthy of note that, in spite of this procedure, the number of troops he finds it necessary to maintain on the front of attack is steadily increasing as the salient widens. As soon as we have succeeded in gaining possession of the whole of the enemy second line between POZIERES and the SOMME his difficulties will greatly increase in this respect as he will have no strongly fortified line to fall back on and the lie of the ground will be in our favour. He will then require much larger reinforcements to prevent our further advance and it is difficult to see how these can be provided unless he withdraws troops from the VERDUN front.

In all the Germans have been compelled to reinforce the SOMME front with 292 Battalions, or the equivalent of 32 Divisions. This represents the number they have been forced to maintain in the area and is exclusive of those who have been withdrawn after fighting.

In the Eastern theatre the Russian operations have been somewhat delayed by bad weather and floods but progress has been made at many points. Their greatest success was obtained on the South-Western flank of the LUTSK salient, a little South of the confluence of the LIPA and the STYR. On the 20th they dislodged the Austrians from the village of VERBEN on the right bank of the STYR, secured the crossings over that river and drove back the enemy in disorder beyond BERESTECHO. They occupied this village and advanced a few miles further to the South-WEST. In this fighting more than 12,000 prisoners were secured, bringing the total number of prisoners captured on this part of the front

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since 16th July to 27,000 with 40 guns. On 24th the Russians made further progress in this direction, breaking through the enemy's line on the SLOUVKA, an Eastern affluent of the STYR. On the 25th they crossed the river, capturing 1000 prisoners and 4 guns. In addition, advances were made South of RIGA, and North of SMORGON and the Russians claim to have made progress East of GOROKHOV and on the LIPA and to have repulsed German attacks on the STOKHOD, while South of the DNIESTER the Russian flank guards have advanced towards the main ridge of the CARPATHIANS.

The Germans have been reinforcing the STOKHOD and LIPA fronts and have been substituting German for Austrian Divisions, and they have now only $2\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions in reserve in the Eastern theatre out of a total of $50\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions. They have now concentrated all their reserves for the defence of KOVEL and even if they are successful in holding that place they can spare no more troops for the Galician front and a combined Russian offensive on the whole Southern front may lead to a general retirement of the Austrian armies. The unreliable character of many of the Austrian troops is proving an increasing strain on the German Army, while the mixture of Units shown by the prisoners taken points to the fact that the Germans are experiencing great difficulty in making good at short notice the considerable losses they are suffering. The recent Russian advance North of BRODY seriously threatens the security of the Austrian line in that area.

The Italian counter-offensive has been making good progress and advances have been made in the Southern

TRENTINO at MONTE CIMONE, which was captured on 24th July, on the Northern slopes of PASUBIO, on MONTE MAYO and on CORNO DES COSTON (East of the BORCOLA pass). Also in the Eastern TRENTINO South of the BRENTA at MONTE CHIESA and CAMPIGOLETTI progress has been made. A substantial success was obtained in the DOLOMITES North of CIMA D'ASTA where the storming of the strong positions of CAVALLAZA, COL BRICO, MONTE STRADONE and the ROLLE pass has enabled them to complete their occupation of the UPPER TRAVIGNOLO and SAN PELLEGRINO valleys. In these operations they took 395 prisoners.

On the GARNIA front the Italians have stormed the EISHR peak in the SEXTEN valley and have completed the occupation of CIMA VALLONE in the UPPER PIAVE valley.

The Austrian losses in their offensive in the TRENTINO are reported to have been very heavy, but they have sustained comparatively few casualties in the retirement.

The Italian advance north of CIMA D'ASTA may exercise an important effect on the situation in the TRENTINO if they can continue their progress down the TRAVIGNOLO valley, where they are now about 12 miles from the important road junction of CAVALESE. Their progress may seriously threaten the security of the only line of communication of the Austrian troops in the TRENTINO which runs along the ADIGE valley. The capture of MONTE CIMONE is also important as it gives access to the UPPER ASTICO valley.

The Russians have obtained great successes in the CAUCASUS during the week, two of which are of great importance, namely the securing of the whole of the lateral route between TREBIZOND and

ERZEROUH and the capture of ERZINGAN. The first of these has been their main objective during the past few months while the second places in their hands a very important Turkish base and main military centre in ARMENIA; its capture compromises the whole situation of the Turkish Armies between BITLIS and the sea and will probably have an important moral effect in the East. In addition to these successes the Russians captured FOL BAZAR 17 miles from PLATANA.

The Turkish retirement is probably due mainly to lack of artillery and ammunition and to difficulties of transport and supply. The small number of prisoners captured in the early part of the retreat would seem to indicate that it was deliberate but it is possible that considerable confusion ensued in the later stages when large numbers of troops were forced back into the narrow valley in which ERZINGAN is situated. The Russians have so far not reported any large capture of prisoners and guns but it appears that the Turks were throwing away guns, rifles and provisions when the Russians were approaching ERZINGAN. It is therefore possible that considerable captures were made, the details of which are lacking. It is known that the Turks set fire to large quantities of stores at ERZINGAN before they retired.

In MESOPOTAMIA there have been no developments beyond unimportant skirmishes between hostile and friendly Arabs which ended in the success of the latter. The long expected "SHAMAI" (North wind) has arrived and caused a very welcome drop in the temperature.

In East AFRICA there has been no change on the HANDENI-MROGORO line. In the lower USAMBARA area our columns have driven the enemy South of the PANGANI river. We now hold

the entire railway and district and are utilising the port of TANGA. General Van Deventer has begun his march on the Central Railway. Our forces which occupied MWANZA have pursued the enemy who were dislodged from that port both on land and on the lake. At the South end of the STUHMANN SOUND two German lake steamers have been captured with much war material and specie. The Western Belgian columns are reported to be held up by transport difficulties.

The bulk of the German forces operating North of the Central Railway appear to be opposed to General HOSKINS' column on the HANDEMI-MROGORO line. Our troops in this quarter will await the development of General Van Deventer's operations and will advance when the latter is in a position to co-operate.

There appears to be evidence of a general weakening of the German resistance in all areas except those in which the enemy are opposing General HOSKINS and General Van Deventer.

SECRET

No. 132.

Amey
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

10th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS
from 29th July to 4th August 1916.

1. RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS
from 29th July to 4th August 1916.

CANAL FRONT.

NORTHERN SECTION.

The resume has been somewhat delayed this week owing to stress of work. The account given below is confined to a description of operations as seen from the air.

The average total daily hours of reconnaissances during the first five days of August were $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours, representing a distance of about 1900 miles daily, and many pilots and observers were out over the enemy's lines twice or three times a day for several consecutive days. Casualties in the air during the period amounted to two, Captain GRANT DALTON, D.S.O., and Lieut. PULLINGER both wounded in several places.

On July 29th a machine which was hit by anti-aircraft fire while reconnoitring ABD, had a forced landing 12 miles within the enemy's lines but the pilot, Lieut. LAYE, and observer, Lieut. Lord GLENTWORTH, after burning their machine succeeded in making their way in safety back to our lines. This is the first instance for over 6 weeks of one of our machines being brought to earth in the enemy's country, although most of our engagements occur over his lines.

On the 2nd August, Lieut. MACLAREN (pilot), and 2/Lieut. WEST (observer), brought a machine to earth over SALIANA. It fell with a crash from several thousand feet. During the period the R.F.C. has co-operated with Monitors in artillery work, and has taken a great many photographs of the enemy's positions from which the Topographical Section have compiled several accurate maps of his trenches.

During the operations all available machines in the country were concentrated at KANTARA, ROMANI, PORT SAID and ISMAILIA. In the early morning of the 26th July, 2 aeroplanes, piloted by Capt. F. JENKINS and Lieut. EDWARDS, arrived at ISMAILIA from SOLLUM, having flown the whole distance from SOLLUM to CAIRO on the previous day, a distance of 380 miles and a flight of 7 hours having been accomplished in one day.

The following is a detailed account of the operations of the week.

Between the 29th and the 31st July, the enemy was seen to be bringing up continual reinforcements along the Northern road between ABD and OGHRAHINA, viz., on the 29th, 600; on the 30th, 1.100 men and a battery; on the 31st, 3.500 men. On the 1st August, only 500 men were seen moving on this route and after that date no further movements of troops Westwards were seen E. of OGHRAHINA, which seemed to show that the enemy had by that date concentrated the bulk of his forces in the neighbourhood of his front line.*

* On the 2nd two teams of 16 horses each were observed drawing heavy guns towards RESHAHAT. The tracks of the sledges on which they were carried were afterwards traced on photographs to a point a short distance West of that place, where they appear to have been unloaded and carried to the corner of a marsh just North of the road between RESHAHAT and UMM UGHA, the last 200 yards of track being subsequently obliterated.

Meanwhile he was improving his trench line and pushing forward an advanced line towards UGI UGBA, whilst MAGEIBRA, originally held in strength, was being gradually abandoned and its garrison being moved North-Westwards. RESHAFAT was reported strengthened on the 29th, and UMM UGBA occupied ^{by} a force of 600 on the 31st. On this day our aeroplanes saw altogether about 7,500 men, and the total of the enemy's forces was estimated, from his camps, at 13,900.

During these days the R.F.C. (which had hitherto, acting under instructions from the General Staff, refrained from any aggressive action) passed to the offensive.

On the 29th July, they attacked and bombed the enemy's camel lines at his advanced base at EL MAZAR, and on the afternoon of the 1st, 5 machines attacked with bombs the enemy's supposed Headquarters at DHABA and the camps of NEGILIAT and OGHFATIFA.

On the same morning there had been a most successful artillery co-operation with the monitors which shelled the camps at NEGILIAT and OGHFATIFA. Altogether 36 bombs were dropped by the 5 raiding machines, 17 on DHABA and 4 on a column of infantry in close formation, the first of which exploded in the midst of the leading section, the remaining bombs being dropped on the remaining camps.*

* From a captured Turkish Officer's diary of the 1st August :

"This morning 15 enemy aeroplanes flew over all encampments, directing the fire of the enemy's ships. 40 shells were fired by the ships, and a quantity of bombs thrown on the camp where the O.C. of the 39th Regiment was."

He multiplies the aeroplanes by three. He seems to confirm the observer who reported DHABA as a Headquarters Camp.

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From this time onwards the enemy's camps and Lines of Communications were the continual object of bombing attacks by our aeroplanes.

Whilst a constant watch was being kept on the enemy front line and his lines of communication from EL ARISH, the route from HASSANA through MAGHARA to BAYUD, on which movements of troops and stores had been reported by Intelligence Agents, was also being reconnoitred. This flight of nearly 200 miles was undertaken on the 2nd. It established the fact that the enemy was using this route but not to any great extent. 450 camels were seen, 3 guns and about 30 infantry marching.

An attempt next day to lie in wait for the guns and bomb them was ^{un}successful, owing to the enemy not keeping to the time expected.

On the morning of the 3rd August, the 3rd Section reported that the enemy had occupied KATIA during the night and that he was holding a line stretching from the immediate West of hill 110, past the high ground 800 yards N.W. of EL RABAH, over the high ground E. and S.E. of KATIA, to the high ground $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles N.W. of BIR HERMISAH. That morning our own cavalry were seen extending E. of ROMANI Southwards towards NAGID. The enemy were facing them in a semi-circle extending from ABU HAMRA through KATIA and BIR MAHLUK to BIR NAGID, the last three places being entrenched.

The task of the R.F.C. consisted during the attack which the enemy made this day in following the movements of the enemy's troops, in co-operating with our monitors which were bombarding the enemy's camps, in preventing hostile reconnaissance of our lines, in bombing attacks on the enemy, and in watching the rear of the enemy's positions for reinforcements. Altogether 2,060 miles were flown this day.

Special attention was given to all possible avenues of approach for enemy reinforcements. The road was thoroughly searched as far as SALMANA; BAYUD was watched and the country round HAMISAH and THEILA, but no indications of the approach of further fighting troops were detected. MAGEIBRA defences were reported as neglected and filling up.

On the 4th August, the enemy's operations as observed from the air, consisted of movements of many small bodies of troops, in the main, advancing, until late in the day, then retiring in places. In spite of continual interference by enemy aeroplanes and very accurate anti-aircraft fire, these movements were observed and reports transmitted to our forces throughout the day. Our machines were employed in tactical reconnaissance of the battle front, including ABU HAMRA, KATIB GANNIT, HOD EL ENNA, BIR ABU DIYUK, BIR ABU GULUB. They also reconnoitred over that part of the enemy's country immediately East of his front, as well as the main possible lines of approach for his reinforcements, namely the Northern road (as far as SALMANA) and the district round BAYUD and MAGEIBRA. Artillery co-operation was carried out this day, and was notably successful in the case of monitor No 15 her fire being directed to an enemy camp at HOD UM UGBA, and four direct hits observed.

THE CENTRE AND SOUTHERN SECTIONS.

Both sections were carefully patrolled during the period under review. In the Centre a watch was kept on the route from RODE SALEM to FAGAIA, in view of the intelligence that a demonstration against ISMAILIA in the form of a raid by a body of the Turkish camel corps was being prepared there. Daily patrols were carried out in the South on the SUEZ front.

The SOUTHWESTERN FRONT.

A reconnaissance over the Western portion of DAMKLA oasis on the 25th showed that the enemy were not occupying this part of the country in any strength.

THE WESTERN FRONT.

No news of any interest from this front.

SECRET

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No. 133.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

11th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE.

Army go

1. EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF AN OFFICER
CAPTURED NEAR KATIA ON 6th AUGUST 1916.

EXTRACTS TAKEN FROM THE INTERROGATION OF AN OFFICER
CAPTURED NEAR KATIA on 6th AUGUST 1916.

The 3rd Division, to which this Officer was attached, consists of the 31st, 32nd, and 39th Regiments, each of 4 battalions; the Reserve Battalion of every Regiment remains two or three days behind the other three.

The whole Division took 7 days going from ALEPPO to HATHIRA, South of BIR SABA, including one day in DAMASCUS.

Engines on the railway are few; trucks seem to be sufficient in number, but many have been destroyed and some have been sent towards MECCA.

The mail train is supposed to run from DAMASCUS to BIR SABA on Thursdays and Fridays and carries Officers and passengers. Frequently it does not run on Fridays owing to lack of engines. The daily train is supposed to run with supplies, (biscuits, Pek Simit, barley, flour, crushed wheat, Bulgur,) to BIR SABA, but very often there is no train for three and four days at a time.

The 3rd Division left BIR SABA about 29th July.

The Headquarters of the 8th Army Corps were ^{then} transferred from JERUSALEM to BIR SABA. (Our W/T interceptions confirm this).

Kushuk Jemal Pasha, O.C. of the 8th Army Corps, was made at the same time Commandant of the Desert.

The route the Division took was :-

- from JEMAMA to SHELLAL - one night.
- to SHEIKH ZUNAID - one night.
- to EL ARISH - one night.
- to BIR EL MAZAR - two nights.
- to BIR EL ABD - two nights.
- to KATIA - two nights.

All marching was done at night because of aircraft. The men are much afraid of aircraft and machine guns. They march with ten minutes rest for each hour's march and a long interval of 1½ to 2 hours rest at midnight. Troops always rested during the day under trees as they found aircraft never bombarded them there.

Eight days rations should have been dumped at BIR EL ABD and BIR EL MAZAR, but nothing was found there, so the men fought on the eight days reserve rations which they had carried with them. The well water at BIR EL ABD and BIR EL MAZAR was too brackish to drink, and the men had to drink the water which had been brought by camels.

Of the 139 camels of the battalion to which the prisoner belonged, 80 carried water.

TURKISH PLANS.

He said the Turkish plan was to push forward, capture the advanced British Posts, perhaps attack the Canal, and anyway keep us busy.

Jemal Pasha, G.O.C. 4th Army Corps is stated to have been against the expedition, on the ground that preparations were not complete, but Kress von Kressenstein is understood to have carried this attack out on his own initiative.

It was generally believed a big expedition was going to take place in October with a force of 30,000/40,000 men. When this attack took place the right wing was to be commanded by Kress von Kressenstein, the centre by Kuchuk Jemal Pasha, and the left wing by Behjet Bey, who was recently Commandant of the Desert, afterwards Inspector of the Desert, and now is "Commandant de place" at BIR HASSANA.

The prisoner stated the Turks feared that if they advanced on the Canal, the British might land at ALEXANDRETTA, JAFFA, or elsewhere to cut them off.

Upon the revolt of the Sherif of MECCA many Turkish Officers and Doctors were withdrawn from the 3rd Division to be sent to MECCA; the Arab Officers were not trusted sufficiently to be sent. A number of railway trucks, covered waggons for barley, and camels were also sent to DAMASCUS for the HEDJAZ campaign.

The general feeling of the men is distinctly against the Germans, who they now see have deceived them. The men have heard that the population of the countries behind them is starving, and that women, in many parts, have been abused. They are anxious about their own families. They feel that they themselves are being made to fight ostensibly for a religion in which the Government has no belief.

On the whole the men are badly treated by their Officers. When they attacked the other day at KATIA the men were very tired and hungry and thirsty, and not at all keen.

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S E C R E T .

No. 134.

Army 90
I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

12th August, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE 5th WING, ROYAL FLYING CORPS, from AUGUST 5th to AUGUST 11th, 1916.
2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES, SINAI and SOUTHERN SYRIA,

* * * * *

1. RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF THE 5th WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS FROM AUGUST 5th to AUGUST 11th, 1916.

The Royal Flying Corps during the last week has been employed on:-

- (1) Tactical reconnaissance, in co-operation with No. 3. Section, during the recent operations in the SINAI Peninsula.
- (2) Distant reconnaissance over the enemy's lines of retreat, combined with
- (3) Offensive action by means of bombs used against camps and troops on the ground, and machine-gun fire against hostile aircraft.
- (4) Protective reconnaissance over the front of No. 1. and No. 2. Sections; and over the KHARGA Oasis District.

These operations will be dealt with in greater detail below.

Casualties during the week total 5 Officers wounded, none of them dangerously.

OPERATIONS IN DETAIL.

* * * * *

Reconnaissance (1) and (2)

The following short account of the movements of our own troops and those of the enemy, as observed from the air, will serve to show the extent of the reconnaissance carried out by the machines of the 5th Wing, Royal Flying Corps. It has been drawn up entirely without reference to other sources of information, and is intended to be merely a summary of reconnaissance.

On 5/3/16 the enemy were seen to be in full retreat throughout their depth. Our aeroplanes covered the whole area as far E. as ABD in their reconnaissance and everywhere retreating troops and transport were seen. Hospitals seen at UMM UGBA and KATIA in the morning were gone before evening. Though small rearguards were left in several

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places, it seemed certain that the enemy would make no stand at any rate until they reached the line NEGILIAT - QASAB, where a fair number of stationary troops were observed.

On the 6th August fairly large camps were seen at HOMMOSSIA and HOD EL DHAKAR, pointing to a possible rear-guard stand on this line, but the main body, 6000 - 7000 troops and numerous camels, were seen on the march E. of SALMANA.

On the 7th August, the enemy were holding the OGH RATINA - QASAB line, covering the further retirement of troops from ABD and SALMANA. At 1640 troops were draining away from the OGH RATINA Line.

In the Southern part of UMM AISHA, many cavalry were seen, but this part of the operations is difficult to follow from the air reconnaissance. It subsequently resolved itself into a flanking movement of our cavalry.

On 8th August, enemy troops were still moving E. from SALMANA. The OGH RATINA - SAGIA line was seen to be deserted and was later occupied by our cavalry. Trenches were made at MUSHALFAT, facing S.W. ABD was still being gradually evacuated, and it seemed obvious that a rear-guard action would be fought at MUSHALFAT, supported from ABD. Meanwhile the aerodrome hangars at ABD had been removed.

On the 9th August, the MUSHALFAT defences were completed to form a circle. HOD WILLEGHA was also put into a state of defence against attacks from the S.W. showing that the enemy were aware of the flanking movement of our cavalry from S. UMM AISHA. The movement of troops between ABD and SALMANA were difficult to follow, but all information pointed to a rear-guard stand at MUSHALFAT and HOD WILLEGHA, supported from ABD and SALMANA.

On 10th August, the enemy were seen to be apparently digging up stores (or ammunition)?) at ABD. In the afternoon a dump of stores was seen at ABD. The hospital had gone.

On 11th August, 1500 camels were seen coming towards GHEISI from the South (to take stores from ABD ?) and the latest reports of the 11th appear to show that the WILLEGHA defence is over, and that the enemy is retiring to a position further East, as a very long column of camels and 600 men were seen at 1455 moving E. between ABD and SALMANA.

Offensive Action.

BOMBS.

5/8/16.

<u>Place.</u>	<u>Target.</u>	<u>Result.</u>
ABD.	3 enemy planes on ground.	Missed.
DHAKR.	Column of troops 1 mile.	3 hits.
BADIEH.	Camels and men.	4 effective.
DHAKAR (?) or DHAKR (?).	Column Infantry 500 yds.	8 effective, Many killed or wounded.
DHAKAR.	Column Infantry.	3 effective.
DHAKAR.	Camels.	2 effective. Apparently large number killed, remainder dispersed.

6/8/16.

N I L .

7/8/16.

MASIA.	Hod.	1 effective.
OGHRATINA.	Camels and troops.	1 effective.
KEIRBA.	Camels.	Unobserved.
1.m. N. of MASIA.	?	2 effective.

8/8/16.

N I L .

9/8/16.

N I L .

10/8/16.

N I L .

11/8/16.

N I L .

Combats in the Air.

Date.	Machine.	Place.	Enemy machine.	Notes.
5/8/13.	Bristol.	Romani.	1 Fokker. 2 Aviatika. (?)	Our pilot wounded in 3 places. Machine landed at Romani.
6/8/13.	S.E.2c.	ABD.	Aviatik.	Enemy's gun put out of action. Machine escaped.
7/8/13.	de Havilland.	ABD.	Tractor Biplane.	Hostile machine chased for 15 miles, but escaped.

Protective Reconnaissances.

Protective reconnaissances over the fronts of No. 1.
and No. 2. Sections and the KHARGA District, were
carried out frequently, but nothing of interest is reported.

* * * * *

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI AND SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality	Agents report					R.F.C. report					Remarks.
	MEN	GUNS	SHEL TERS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	SHEL TERS	TENTS	DATE	
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>											
S. MACHARA.	60	-	11	16	30/7	50	-	-	-	2/8	Road from HASSANA much used.
RODH SALEM.	40	-	-	12	3/8	80	-	8	12	9/8	Large quantities of stores dumped according to agents 400 camel corps probably arrived from HASSANA on 9/8
EL HAMMA.	200	2	5	26	24/7	50	-	5	16	2/8	
HASSANA.	800	8	-	80	5/8	600	-	-	-	2/8	R.F.C. report 2 extra L.P tents otherwise no change. Tracks of 400 camel corps seen on road to RODH SALEM on 9/8.
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>											
SUDR EL HEITAN.	40	-	-	-	23/7	-	-	1	1	8/8	
AIN SUDR.	130	2	3	13	26/7	-	-	5	13	1/8	
NEKHL.	1000	10	3	80	25/7	-	-	-	-	-	
SEILAT EL GHURZA.	130	-	-	-	1/8	-	-	-	-	-	
BIR TAWAL.	30	-	-	-	27/7	-	-	-	-	8/8	R.F.C. numerous tracks.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI AND SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents report.					R.F.C. Report.					Remarks.	
	MEN	GUNS	ENGINE TRUCKS	TENTS	DATE	MEN	GUNS	SHEL TERS	TENTS	DATE		
<u>BASE TROOPS.</u>												
KOSSAIMA.	1100	8	-	-	8/8						Railway reached here. 4 hangars in Wadi E. Many tents, most empty. 2 aeroplanes. 50 mud store buildings. Many tents empty. R.N.A.S. nothing on road to RAFA. R.N.A.S. saw nothing on road Agent did not enter camp so numbers are unreliable. Does not include guns on coast. 3 aeroplanes N.E corner of town. Small garrison. 400 on march to ARISH on 1/8/16. Small post. 500 on march to ARISH on 1/8/16. On 3/8 500 riding to ARISH. On 10/8 R.N.A.S. report camp capable of holding 2500 4 miles N.E.	
AUJA.	250	4	-	150	5/8							
BIR SABA.	650	-	-	-	2/8							
SHELLAL.	150	-	9	60	5/8							
KHAN YUNIS.	900	13	-	290	4/8							
GAZA	1400	16	-	300	5/8				5/8			
RAFA.	1050	6	-	400	6/8				5/8			
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>												
EL ARISH.	1900	7	-	165	5/8							
ADVANCED TROOPS												
LAHFAN.	-	-	-	200	30/7							
MAGDHABA.	-	-	16	250	30/7							
ABU AWEIGLIA.	30	-	3	6	4/8				26	11/8		
MAZAR.	430	-	-	50	4/8							
Between MAZAR & AED												
											Enemy retreating from KATIA. Rearguard estimated at 6000 on 10/8/16. Line held on 11/8/16 was AED-MUSHALFAT -JAMEIL. On 12/8 our cavalry occupied BIR EL ABD.	

SECRET.

No. 135

Ammygo
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

13th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. TRANSLATION OF TURKISH ORDERS FOUND ON PRISONERS
CAPTURED RECENTLY NEAR KATIA.

2. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE dated 6/8/16
Situation between the 30th July and 5th August 1916.

1. TRANSLATION OF TURKISH ORDERS FOUND ON PRISONERS CAPTURED RECENTLY NEAR KATIA.

The following translation of Turkish orders, found on prisoners captured recently near KATIA, has been made by the Intelligence Branch, General Staff, Cairo.

M I L I T A R Y .

GENERAL ORDERS - Infantry and Machine-guns.

- (1) I expect every officer, of whatever grade to give an example of courage to his subordinates. I expect the rank and file to show the superiority of Turks to British Troops as their comrades have done at GALLIPOLI and in IRAK.
- (2) Men are to make all possible use of entrenching tools and sandbags during attack and defence.
- (3) Since a continuous supply of S.A.A. cannot be effected great economy is to be observed in its expenditure. Consequently both in attack and defence fire must be opened only at short ranges.
- (4) Flanking detachments must exercise the utmost vigilance against flank attacks. Owing to the enemy's great strength in Cavalry, great vigilance is imperative. On this account unsupported wings must dig in as deeply as possible.
- (5) The effect of the enemy's fire on our firing line must be communicated to the neighbouring artillery and M.G. Officers, who are ordered to support our firing line.

If the firing line is not so supported, the effect of the enemy's fire is to be communicated to the O.C. Infantry for transmission to the Artillery and M.G.

Companies, so that the effect of the enemy's fire may be countered by artillery or A.G. assistance to our troops.

- (6) Infantry must be provided with pistols firing flares and red signalling flags. Our artillery will thus be better enabled to lengthen their ranges.
- (7) Our own positions must be indicated by triangular red cloths in wooden frames, which, however, must not be visible to the enemy.
- (8) Owing to the close nature of the country and the frequency of mist (haze) in the morning, constant communication must be kept up with the first line to avoid accidents from the fire of our own guns.
- (9) Two Medjidies for every soldier bringing in an enemy rifle.

C A V A L R Y .

- (1) In close country, with many hills and obstacles our reconnaissances will have a good opportunity of observing the enemy's movements and camps, beginning with his actual front (?) S T. 5 reward for all valuable information about the enemy.
- (2) Reconnoitring parties must do all in their power to capture prisoners S T. 5 reward per head.
- (3) As there are no cavalry, reconnaissances will be carried out under the direction of mounted Officers by Beduins attached to them.

ARTILLERY.

- (1) (7) In the case of entrenched positions. The Turkish Mountain Gun, firing Austrian Mtn. Gun Shell is to be used against moving (or movable) targets in the enemy's lines, while the German Heavy Guns are to be employed against the entrenched positions thereof.
- (2) As shell is scarce and can only be replaced with great difficulty, great economy is to be displayed by the Artillery.
- (3) (OBSCURE)
- (4) Among the chief duties of O.C. Batteries will be choice of observation stations. With this object, when required, the O.C. Battery will leave his Battery and observe fearlessly, keeping up communication with his Battery by telephone over the intervening space.
- (5) To prevent dust caused by discharge betraying gun positions, mats are to be spread under the muzzle of each gun.
- (6) During prolonged infantry encounters, O.C.'s of Infantry Units will send officers to observe the effect of the Turkish Mountain Batteries and Austrian shells on the enemy's firing line.

* * * * *

H.Q. 1st EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,

July 9th/1916.

ORDERS FOR ADVANCE FROM EL ARISH.

- (1) The regulations regarding the march have been explained in previous orders.
- (2) Fresh orders will be issued to the advanced-guard on reaching the line OGHRAATINA - HOD-EL-MESSIA - MUGHEIERA and to the detachment proceeding to BIR-EL-ABD.

The orders issued on July 8th 1916 refer to the advance from EL ARISH.

THE MARCH.

- (1) The march under war conditions commences from EL ARISH. i.e. It being probable that hostile reconnaissances will be encountered, the advance must be effected with the necessary screen. There being a Turkish Detachment at BIR EL MAZAR, up to this point ordinary precautions need be observed. From BIR EL MAZAR the war zone commences. From this point it is necessary to separate the advanced-guard and main body and send reconnoitring detachments ahead of the Advanced-guard.
- (2) Silence is to be strictly observed on the march. Special attention must be paid to this by troops moving along the shore. Orders must be given quietly during night marches. No smoking at night and no use to be made, if possible, of electric torches after BIR EL MAZAR.

(3) It is probable that units moving along the shore may be exposed to the fire of enemy ships. In this event troops will take to the nearest cover in an orderly manner without waiting for orders.

(4) Every precaution must be taken to facilitate the march, e.g. collars, shirts, head-coverings to be opened, boots to be removed.

To prevent confusion among the units on the march, the intervals by day must be increased to 100 metres. Files must be opened to give the men air. They must be closed at night and all straggling stopped immediately.

To take advantage of the cool nights to cover long distances halts must be shortened.

As a rule the troops will march between 6 and 7 pm. till 11 pm. After a halt from 11 pm. to 1 am. they will proceed so as to reach their destination by 7 am.

After every 100 minutes marching troops to halt 20 minutes.

Men and animals to be given "a breather" (soluk molasi) after passing through difficult ground.

(5) Draught oxen to be watered at every watering place.

(3) In difficult ground where guns and carts cannot be moved by the teams, they will have to be hauled by Guy ropes attached to the wheels. Where planks have been laid down the assistance of men (hauling) is necessary. It is every C.O.'s duty and "his honour" (sheref) to render the maximum assistance to guns and carts in difficult ground. On such ground limbers and carts will have to be emptied if necessary.

Infantry must assist artillery in the above manner.

Artillery Officers must inform Infantry Officers of extent of their requirements in men for haulage, and Infantry

Infantry Officers must obey instructions under this head issued by their O.C.'s or by Artillery Officers.

INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) In order to minimise the results of aeroplane bombs tents in encampments are to be scattered and distributed over a considerable area. Men, animals and transport to be divided into small groups.
- (2) As enemy aircraft are likely to fly above our camps between 4 am. and 7 am. and between 5 pm and 7 pm. and to take our tents as targets, on the approach of enemy aircraft being reported troops will disperse in small groups (which are then to remain stationary) for some hundred yards away from the centre of the Camp. O.C.'s are to select positions for infantry and machine gun fire against aircraft attacking camps.

No other units (except those detailed for the purpose) are to fire on enemy aircraft and machine gun and infantry fire is not to be employed against aeroplanes flying very high.

- (3) All existing means, and any which can be improvised are to be employed to protect (men) against the sun, and measures must be taken to meet cases in which tents are insufficient.
- (4) As far as BIR -EL-MAZAR, the covering troops need not be in great strength. Beyond BIR - EL - MAZAR the covering forces must be strengthened and precautions organised against surprise. Patrols and sentries must be posted during daylight on all dominating points, and beduin camel scouts sent out to observe enemy movements and report in time to the O.C.

In case of surprise the (situation of the) rallying points fixed upon must be carefully kept in mind. These positions must be shown to Officers who are 2nd in Command (1st Assistant C.O's) and must be defensively organized.

(5) To avoid discovery by enemy aircraft tents are to be covered with earth, mud, scrub etc.

(6) Near camps "simili-camps" (Dummy Camps) are to be pitched in order to attract the attention of aircraft. Holes are to be dug in the earth to simulate tents.

(7) When the troops are resting a few sentries are to be posted the better to protect their repose.

(8) In order to mark the whereabouts of C.O's and other high officers, special indications must be placed on their quarters (tents)

(9) In cases where detachments are separated by a considerable distance roads are to be indicated by simple signs.

(10) On enemy aeroplanes coming in sight all ranks will lie down, and try to bury themselves in the sand (Kunlar arasinda kendilerini gyomejek dir) in order to avoid fragments of bombs.

* * * * *

2. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE, dated 6th August 1916.

Situation between 30th July and 5th August 1916.

NORTH OF THE SOMME.

We took the offensive on the 30th July and captured the German trenches along the whole front from hill 139 N.E. of HARDECOURT down to the edge of the river. We penetrated the HEM WOOD, and captured the MONAGU FARM. The Germans made strong counter-attacks, particularly on the MONAGU FARM, but this place remained finally in our hands.

On the 1st of August after heavy fighting, we captured a fortified work situated to the North of the MONAGU FARM.

On the 2nd of August we were engaged in driving back the German counter-attacks, which they were then delivering on practically all the positions we had captured.

SOUTH OF THE SOMME.

Here we have made two rectifications on our front line, towards the East and also South-west of ESTRÉES.

VERDUN AREA.

In the VERDUN area, incessant fighting has been in progress since the 1st of August between the MEUSE, near VACHER-AU-VILLE and LA LAUFEE; attaining the greatest violence in the neighbourhood of THIAUMONT, FLEURY, and in front of DOUAUMONT.

On the 1st August the enemy attacked, but without success, our positions to the West and to the

South of the THIAUMONT work. Towards the end of the day we made some progress to the South of this place. On the same day the Germans attacked on a front of 6 kilometres, our trench-line to the East of FLEURY, in the VAUX CHAPITRE WOOD, and the CHENOIS WOOD, and they gained ground at several points.

On the 2nd of August we took the German trenches to the East of VACHERAUVILLE, and also to the West and South of the THIAUMONT WORK, and we made ground along the ravine, running South from FLEURY to the outskirts of the village.

On the 3rd of August we were able to recapture some part of the ground lost on the 1st inst. in the CHENOIS WOOD.

In the FLEURY sector our continuous progress permitted us to occupy the village and to reach the high road leading from FLEURY to the THIAUMONT WORK. During the night of the 3rd and 4th we took the THIAUMONT WORK.

On the 4th of August the Germans succeeded, by their counter-attacks in retaking both the village of FLEURY, and the THIAUMONT WORK, but we regained the latter place towards five in the morning, and held it in spite of further counter-attacks, and we also re-occupied a considerable part of the village of FLEURY.

The total number of prisoners taken during the week, mostly in the MEUSE Valley, exceeds 2,500.

S E C R E T.

No. 136.

Summary

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y.

15th August 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF "Offizier stellvertreter"
(Officer substitute) RUDOLF JOHANN BIGGA.

Page 729.

1. EXTRACTS FROM DIARY OF "Stellvertreter" (Officer substitute)
RUDOLF JOHANN BIGGA.

Starting from 18th June 1916.

Many rumours of the contemplated expedition (into Egypt) state that it will start in the middle of July and will last 14 days.

At last we have fixed up our mess - it is going splendidly. Food very good with plenty to drink. Great rejoicings over the sea-victory. None the less pleased are we to hear about the aerial fight over EL ARISH.

English aeroplanes bombed us from 10.000 feet up. Two of these machines destroyed. Two Englishmen were shot by Turkish Infantry, one through his machine coming to the ground, possibly through careless handling of the same. To-day Herr Ohelmer returned from JERUSALEM having been on sick leave.

19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd June 1916.

4.000 Mk. have just arrived for eight of us, awful hard luck on the ninth who will get nothing, but still, he doesn't require it, so he can just as well do without it. Since the 20th it has been fearfully hot. Hope this is the last day of it (22nd) - Yesterday evening we had as guests 1/Lieut. Blumecke and Major Loschel. About 2 o'clock in the morning they both departed to their respective dwellings very much the worse for wear. I hope they got there safely.

Yesterday the first practice route march for the Canal. As well, we had practice in visual training, apart from being very humours it was all worth learning.

26th June 1916.

Still very slow. Lt. Andreist returned fit. Yesterday we went out shooting. To-day first field practice on the range of No.2 Company. Yesterday post arrived with 30 marks for last month.

27th, 28th, 29th and 30th June 1916.

A great number of letters during the last few days, unfortunately I have never got my packet of films.

On the morning of the 6th we start - To begin with I was delighted to hear of the good news of the sea-victory. If one rejoiced over such great deeds of the Almighty, the joy would be very much greater if, by rejoicing, we could control and order the doings of those who fight on land; I would rather the sea-battle had been a land battle.

What we get to do here, and I trust I will not get as much as it would appear we will have to do, is entirely dependant on the conditions under which we will have to serve.

Up till the 6th, the day of our departure, we were very busy making numerous preparations, bringing up our companies to strength and preparing our equipment etc.

6th July 1916.

Visited by a furious sandstorm and amidst much confusion we left for ARISH. Got to sleep towards 4 o'clock, our expected arrival in ASTURDH (?) will not be till late in the day. Lost one Turk who was not in a fit state, having imbibed freely and consequently overcome by the heat, and who died on the morning of the 7th.

Resting now for a bit in the sun as there is no shade, taking a sand-bath or perspiring freely.

8th July 1916.

Our reception in ASTURDH (?) was very comical ! in so much as our Major (M.G.) the Count and old Benknatz were conspicuous, the latter not knowing that the former held such an exalted rank.

9th July 1916.

Towards 9 o'clock in the morning we came later to a town which seemed to be populated only by small dogs but several merchants were there from whom we bought the necessities of life. Bathed twice.

10th July 1916.

Left at 5 o'clock in the evening for M: after a short night's rest we reached HADIE about three in the morning. For food I had recourse to the field kitchen.

11th July 1916.

But before leaving, I must touch on the friendliness of the people and their zeal to do all they could for us. Between HADIE - EL AUJA and ABU AWEIGLIA there is a light railway which I took, starting at three o'clock and with half an hour's wait on the way to get food we reached ABU AWEIGLIA sometime between 8.30 and 10 p.m.

12th July 1916.

During the day we reached MAGDEBI.

13th July 1916.

Rested there. Feeling fairly fit.

14th July 1916.

The guides who had come from JAFFA left us here.

15th July 1916.

Arrived in RAFU EL ARISH. Once more in a tent on the green grass, as well as splendid sand. Together with the sun

Page 001

and the South-wind we had little to complain about.

16th July 1916.

In the morning I had a dip in the sea (I need it). Much enjoyed it, though the water was rather cold. Colonel lectured me this morning on personal deportment. It is surprising that he should do this considering what he is himself. Received a good many letters by the mail. Several from home. In the morning at 6.35 we pressed forward.

18th July 1916.

Left 5-30 p.m. Had to walk to the sea. Didn't see any Englishmen and had a bath in the sea. Saw a small British gunboat which was 10 Km. away from the coast. At EL ARISH there were several other English aeroplanes, which fired at the scouting boats. This caused us great amusement. We had a very bad sandstorm which made marching very difficult, so we came back and rested.

19th July 1916.

Spent the day in reconnaissance work although this was a rest day. Had a Bedouin guide with us. By outpost position we had to camp. The horses were very shy and tried to drive each other away.

20th July 1916.

Rested up till 5 p.m. Great jokes were hurled at the guide for his stupidity. We were guided by a guard in front fully equipped. I did not think this was necessary under the circumstances.

The Colonel promoted one of the younger Officers. I cannot understand why, as he is very much our junior.

21st July 1916.

Walking very much easier. Had our coffee made out of salt-water. Cocoa was even worse. In the evening we reach BERAAT. Slept there. Aeroplanes came over and made several good shots at us.

22nd July 1916.

The Major (Graf) of the M.G. went to OGRATINA. We rested. Another visit by English aeroplanes who again did good work. Many palm-trees in this neighbourhood. Being my birthday we made merry by drinking much wine. Afterwards everyone was very tired, otherwise everything all right.

23rd July 1916.

Slept late. Awakened by aeroplanes. 5 p.m. left BEHRA for MARGEBERA. One guide had great difficulty in making out the way. Only the Bedouins were able to do it.

24th July 1916.

Another enemy aeroplane attack and at 4 o'clock we left for Hodemassieh. Lieut. Rohmer joined us here. Had another birthday party in the evening. Oberst. Ibrahim Bey joined us ; a charming man. He was able to speak German. With him was Captain and Adjutant Mahmoud. Much sand and sun as usual.

25th July 1916.

7 o'clock^{a-m} inspection by Hasri Bey, O.C. 32nd Infantry Regiment. Afterwards he came and talked to some of us and we found him most agreeable. Afterwards it was surprising to see how much he drank. Afterwards we went out on patrol work.

Some captured Englishmen were marched past us.

An English bi-plane chased two of our aeroplanes, we had to retreat and did not engage him. In the evening

RAAG, BGR,

we had various camp amusements.

26th July 1916.

5 a.m.: got up. Had coffee. Reconnaissance patrol of the position. 15 M.Gs. were placed in position. Very many hills all around. Were visited by enemy H.E. shells but they did no damage and remained sticking in the sand. At 3 p.m. we awaited Oberst. von Kress but he did not put in an appearance. We had very good food, roast and sweets to follow. Afterwards I slept very well as a result. Left there in the evening.

27th July 1916.

We rode through deep sand to our front position. Went to sleep but had to get up to carry out orders issued by the Colonel.

28th July 1916.

Slept very well. Went with the Colonel to inspect our new positions.

Great extent of front and only four machine guns. I cannot understand the English at all. For a long time we round the positions and during that time we received no fire. Neither did we see any signs of any patrols in the neighbourhood. Got my birthday presents with a letter from Fraulein Breusch. The first greetings that I received were that I had been too lax in my own correspondence.

English aeroplanes came over reconnoitring.

29th July 1916.

Owing to too much sand having been piled up it was difficult to obtain a good view from the listening post. Turkish artillery fired but did not do very much. Two English aeroplanes came over and throw bombs at us. After this there was peace for the time being.

30th July 1916.

I am now 6 days over my 26th birthday. Can always sleep very well and that is the chief thing.

Rode up to the top of a hill called HOD EL GIFGAFFA. Later on the Count joined me and consulted me as to our position.

Marched off towards evening.

31st July 1916.

Woke up at 3 a.m. with delightful "petit dejeuner" as regards the eatables, but coffee was appalling. Several Officers came up and greeted me and we stayed talking for a while. We (Officers) bade farewell to each other (this is a common practice in the German Army before an engagement).

1st August 1916.

Lieut. Ander and Lieut. Rohmer came to see me. They were very annoyed at not having their morning meal. Pay day. Rode as far as GAFFA. Only very little water left in our water bottles. Took some photographs. At 4 o'clock we returned. Four English aeroplanes came over. Fired at them with our guns but without success. They dropped 12 bombs whereby 2 were killed. The firing lasted for about $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour. A German aeroplane having crossed over their lines, returned to us and descended behind our lines. Apparently our planes do not seem to be very successful.

2nd August 1916.

Many preparations made in the morning to press forward for the attack, and reaching the enemy's position, the attack began. Walking was not difficult. Those mounted found it very pleasant. Reached KATIA - all well ; firing started at midnight. The artiller commander was successful in capturing several guns. The Bedouin patrol got as far as the enemy's outpost but returned very quickly. Lost my Company but found them again after 2 hours.

Page 305.

3rd August 1916.

Got some sleep but was awakened by bombs from enemy aircraft. At 12 midday the aeroplanes withdrew. Then although I had time for sleep I was unable to do so. Towards 6 p.m. firing began again. Went as far as ABU SPANDE and ABU ATZ. No idea where I shall be tomorrow at the same time.

4th August 1916.

At 7 a.m. left BER MEMBRUKA. No idea where I am now. Company 305 is now attached to the 8th Battalion. In the thick of the fight. Took over several guns from the other companies. The 3rd and the 2nd platoons went into the firing line while the 1st was in reserve. Camels and horses brought back. We waited until the Turks took the neighbouring hill - fighting continued here for an interminable time. Many Turks were killed before this hill was taken. At 3 o'clock the position was in our possession. Having done this I placed my machine guns in position. Soon after this I was hit myself in the arm. In this position I had a splendid view. A thousand rounds of ammunition fired.

At 8 p.m. retired from my position as the fight was not so fierce. Turkish infantry fought very well. From all accounts they had no artillery. Many hundreds of Turks lay dead on the higher ground. I remained lying in the heat of the sun. I would have given anything to have had a cigarette. The amount of wounded was enormous.

NOTE:- The men say that at this juncture BIGGA called for his horse and left the action, leaving them to be captured. He was not a gentleman or of the Officer class.

S E C R E T .

No. 138.

Amery
I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

17th August 1918.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. EXTRACTS FROM DOCUMENTS FOUND ON CAPTURED
 PRISONERS.

EXTRACTS FROM DOCUMENTS FOUND ON CAPTURED PRISONERS.

No.3. Battalion Orders of the 2nd Battalion Reserve Regiment of the 3rd Division, dated July 30th, 1916.

1. "As we have no biscuits in the Camp, the Commandant of the Regiment has given orders that double rations will be served to the men in lieu of bread, of the other commodities.
2. The iron ration carried on the person will not be consumed.
3. I am sure that my comrades, who know as well as I do, the difficulties and hardships of war will manage for to-night and to-morrow morning with "Boulgour Pilof" and meat.
4. To-day there will be served out dried fruits and dates. These will be consumed at a later date should a ration not be served out, owing to any particular circumstances.

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No.4. A telegram to the Commander of the 2nd Dromedary Mounted Company at MEAZA.

" I have gone as far as the vicinity of MAGBERE and I have ascertained by reconnaissance that there is an enemy cavalry force of one regiment strength, but as there were guards on the hills, we could not approach to ascertain the presence of any guns.

Now I am coming to BICUT to obtain some water. I shall return again to reconnoitre.

Reserve Cadet Officer,

SAMI.

? August 9th 1916.

No. 5. A draft of a letter to his superior from the
"Military Post Office" Officer (named) NIAZI
at BYOUT to the Director of Desert Telegraph
No. 6.(undated).


"Au nom de Dieu! Ayez pitie pour nous".

During the last five days now I have had very very
little but for the last twelve hours absolutely not a drop
of water have I put to my lips. I sent five days ago
two camels to EL ARISH (?) to fetch water, but as they
have not yet arrived, I beg you to save me from this thirst".

No. 6. A CODE OF SIGNALS WITH FLAGS.

To call or start the message, make one
large sweep round at full extent of the arm,
in front of the body.

To signal the end of the message several
similar sweeps as above but quickly.




Wave both flags up and down on the right hand
side.

= That the platoon on the right only is meant.




Wave both flags up and down on the left hand side.


= That the platoon on the left only is meant.




To hold one flag upright, resting upon the
chest, signifies the angle of elevation from
the ground, and is followed by the number of
degrees of that angle.




An increase in elevation, and is preceded
by the number of degrees of such increase.



The flag is moved up and down perpendicularly being retained in a perpendicular position
= "open fire on the right" or "fire has been opened from the right".




Hold and retain one flag on the left and move the perpendicular flag up and down several times
= "partial fire" (?)



Bring the flag to the side (R. or L. not indicated) and move horizontally to and fro several times
= "ordinary fire" (??)



= "Decrease of elevation" The number of degrees of such decrease must precede the signal.



One flag is held horizontally in line with the shoulder and brought round and under to a corresponding position on the other side of the body (R. or L. not indicated)
= "One group".



Translation of Turkish Road Report.

G.H.Q.

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

GENERAL ORDERS RE MARCH FROM EL ARISH.

REPORT ON ROADS. (Date July 9).

1. The route from EL ARISH to ABOU FELAIL about 15 Kilometres in length and sandy. As troops in movement are visible from the Sea all bodies of troops must use this section at night only. Animals to be watered at MUSAID. Camps to be organised on the Dunes at ABOU FELAIL. The water at ABOU FELAIL being undrinkable, water must be brought from EL ARISH with the Force, and supplies replenished at MUSAID. Animals can be watered at ABOU FELAIL, but if they will not drink this or other brackish water, they must be watered from the supply carried with the Force. All receptacles for carrying water must be replenished at MUSAID.

The distance between FELAIL and BIR EL MAZAR is about 28 kilometres over very difficult country. The first stages are visible from the Sea ? The most difficult parts of this route have the planks laid. There is no water for animals between the above points in the desert. Consequently water must be brought with the Force from BITTIA. Water supply at BIR EL MAZAR sufficient.

Carts etc, will not take the BIR EL MAZAR Road but must follow the edge of BARDAWIL LANE where troops will encamp.

Positions selected for camp nearly 5 kilometres from MAZAR halt, indicated by sign posts.

Cattle on the hoof and pack animals are to be sent to BIR EL MAZAR.

BIR EL MAZAR - MAZAIIF Section about 20 kilometres over bad ground. Animals to be watered with water brought from BIR EL MAZAR. BIR EL MAZAIIF well is about 4 kilometres off the route. Water only fit for animals. Water for troops to be brought from BIR EL MAZAR. To avoid soft sand, troops will encamp South bank of BARDAWIL LAKE.

MAZAIIF - BIR EL ABD Section 20 kilometres difficult ground. Animals can be watered half way at ? SALMANA. Sufficient water at BIR EL ABD.

Section EL ARISH - BITTIA about 15 kilometres bad ground. Sufficient water at BITTIA.

BITTIA - BIR EL MAZAR Section. About 28 kilometres. fairly difficult, water at MAZAR.

MAZAR - BIR EL ABD Section. About 40 kilometres. Animals can be watered at SALMANA or SAIMA.

BIR EL ABD - OGHRAITINA Section 18 kilometres very difficult country. Drinking water at ? ILIQIL. Water for animals at HOD EL GIRBA.

MAGHARA - EL HAYUL, BIR EL MAZAR - BAYUD - MAGEIBRA Routes soft sand, difficult.

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GENERAL ORDERS RE RATIONS AND FORAGE.

1. From EL ARISH all units will be supplied with Rations for 7 days, 3 days forage for animals. Every opportunity of letting animals graze should be taken. It is again notified that all animals, especially camels, which are easily satisfied

should be allowed to graze, (over and above corn given them) on such weeds and grass as can be found in the desert. (This seems to be the general sense.)

2. Troops will make use of the supplies they bring with them. Supplies to be replenished from the Main Supply Depot at BIR EL MAZAR.
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