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SECRET.



No. 5.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

ENEMY TERRITORY.

10th May, 1918.

POLITICAL.

It is reported that 16 German Officers, 15 Persian Delegates and several Persian Officers arrived at Aleppo, February 17th to 20th, all en route for Persia. This is no doubt the Persian Mission reported in the Summary of April 26th, 1918, as being on the point of leaving Constantinople for Northern Persia, for the purpose of winning over the Moslem elements in that country to the Turkish cause.

TURCO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

A Christian priest, who was in exile at Damascus until the end of March, states that, according to popular report, the Vali of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, had instigated the posting up of placards in denunciation of the Germans. The bad feeling between the Turks and Germans was increasing.

The dislike of the native population for the Germans was caused not only by their ill-treatment of women, but also by their being billeted in private houses in the city.

A Jewish deserter who entered our lines on 13th April, 1918, states that the Germans have a Casino at Aleppo. One night a German Officer thrashed a Turkish Officer. The Turk having complained, General Kress von Kressenstein published an order to the effect that Turkish Officers, as Allies of the Germans, were entitled to respect. German soldiers who read this order ridiculed its contents. In general, the hatred between Germans and Turks increases daily. The Germans call the Turks "lousy" and the Turks retaliate by calling the Germans "swine."

An Armenian deserter, formerly in business in Smyrna, reports that from October, 1914, German firms began buying large quantities of Opium in Smyrna. Several Smyrna firms sent representatives to Germany to establish commercial relations, but the decrease in agricultural production caused by the war affected all these business plans unfavourably. Informant thinks that the importation of German goods into Turkey has diminished during the war to the extent of about one quarter of its pre-war volume.

All German troops in Syria and Turkey send to Germany eggs, flour, lentils, beans, etc. in postal parcels, and in return receive chocolates, cigars, etc. Informant was in Jerusalem for about two years until our occupation, and saw the German Jews there importing goods from Germany in postal parcels of 5 to 9 kilograms.

An Arab Cadet Officer, who deserted April 18th, 1918, says that German and Turkish soldiers do not get on well together, as the Germans despise the Turks for being ill-clothed and ill-fed, while the Turks envy and hate the Germans. German soldiers refuse to eat, drink, or travel with Turks. German and Turkish Officers, however, get on well together, and are seen drinking together in public. There seems to be no jealousy between them over the question of commands, etc.

Agents report that, early in March, an outbreak of popular feeling took place in Aleppo against the German buying of grain. A German motor lorry, which was being loaded with grain, was severely stoned in one of the streets of the town. In his attempts to get away, the driver is said to have killed six or seven women.

In Northern Syria, the Germans are already beginning to buy up the next harvest at inflated prices—PT. 20 (coin) per rotol (5½ lb.) and upwards. On March 15th, the Vali of Beirut stopped 15 trucks of wheat which were being sent to Aleppo. It was thought that the grain bought by the Germans is not being sent to Germany, but is being stored at Rayak and Aleppo in readiness for new arrivals of troops.

ARAB MOVEMENT.

A Christian Priest, lately an exile in Damascus, reports that the people of that city dislike both Turks and Germans, and long for either the British or the Sherif, or both, to deliver them. He states that the Arabs, East of Jordan, are rather tired of waiting for the Sherif, and are disappointed that the British did not stay. But if either the Sherif or the British come, they and the Druses right up to Damascus are ready to join in against the Turks.

Moslem and Christian refugees from East of Jordan reports that the Arabs of those regions will probably all turn to the Sherif as soon as his forces move north. As for the Christians, they prefer the Sherif to the Turks, but at the same time they fear the nomad Arabs in view of their raids on the settled population. They look with some apprehension on the permanent rule of the Sherif, and would prefer a British occupation.

An Arab Cadet Officer, who deserted on April 18th, 1918, states that Arab Officers in the Turkish Army are badly treated, being passed over in favour of Turks for promotion and command. A Turkish 2nd Lieutenant is sometimes put over an Arab Captain. Turkish Officers got leave—twenty days or a month every year—whilst informant had had no leave for two years.

Religious hostility between Arabs, Moslems, Christians and Jews no longer exists, owing to their common hatred of the Turks, and these different elements are now on good terms with each other.

The Arabs are well disposed towards the King of the Hejaz as head of their religion, and expect him to set up an Arab Government in Syria. The Christians and Jews also favour him as an Ally to the British. No news of the King of the Hejaz is ever published in the newspapers, and his name is never mentioned in public by Arabs, through fear of the Turks.

Agents report that the former Sheikh Ul Islam, with Izzet Pasha, Nazim Pasha, and others are said to have arrived at Damascus on March 18th, for the purpose of negotiating with the King of the Hejaz with a view to peace.

NOTE.—According to previous information, it is the present Sheikh Ul Islam, Musa Kiazim Effendi, who is charged with this mission.

An Arab deserter, who came in with the Salt refugees, states that very few of the Salt townsmen would join the Sherif's Army, but the Arabs in the surrounding districts were all awaiting his coming in order to join in turning the Turks out of the country.

It was reported from Deraa, on April 27th, 1918, that the Druses are waiting for the British to advance to Deraa, when they will pillage the town. The people of Jerash (141. W.14) and El Hosn (140. Y.) are still keenly anticipating the British advance. The Arabs of Suf (140. P.26) are ready to fall on the Circassians of Jerash at the first opportune moment.

ARMENIANS, TREATMENT OF, Etc.

A credible informant, who visited the districts of Dier Ez Zor, Mardin, Diarbekir, Mosul and El Jezireh between the end of September and the beginning of December, 1917, fully confirms previous reports of the wholesale massacre of Armenians in 1915 and afterwards, of which he heard many details from survivors, besides seeing countless skeletons and other remains of the victims. He also states that, in addition to the Armenians, no less than 50,000 Chaldean Catholics were massacred, and he gives the names of a number of Chaldean Bishops and Priests who were killed during the massacres.

A party of Armenian refugees, who succeeded in leaving Kerak on April 18th, 1918, and came into Hebron, had previously been robbed of their money, and after escaping from the town were attacked by Bedouins on the road. They state that there are about 2,000 Armenians still in Kerak, who are being very badly treated by the Arab Sheikhs, and the refugees think that, if relief does not come quickly, they will mostly die of starvation.

An agent reports that near Suweila, described as between Salt and Amman, he counted the corpses of 253 Armenians, men, women and children. None of them had been shot, but all had had their throats cut, except some babies who had been stamped on. The men were apart, and tied together. These people were Armenian refugees from Suedia district, who had settled in Wadi Sir, Amman, Suweila, Ain Omar, etc. When the British withdrew from Amman some of them had started for Jericho, some hid in caves and in the hills, and others hid in their houses. The Circassians of Amman and Suweila, however, had rounded them all up and butchered them. At Salt, the Armenians had not been touched. At Madeba, orders had been given for the deportation of all Armenian refugees, but they succeeded in escaping to the number of 45, at night, and walked into the British lines. Agent heard that they had been attacked by Bedouins on their way, and had arrived stark naked.

The Armenian Catholic Bishop of Cairo has addressed a warm letter of thanks to the King of the Hejaz for the care shown by Sherif Feisal for 250 Armenian families exiled by the Turks to the country East of Jordan.

ECONOMIC.

PALESTINE FRONT.

Several reports from Agents state that the growing crops in the Bidieh (098. S. 7. b), Mes-Ha (084. N. 17. a), Zawieh (084. N. 21. b.d) and Azzun (084. J. 35. c) area are promising, but that they are being ruined by Turkish Army horses which are allowed to graze on them. The above confirms previous reports of shortage of barley and other forage.

The following information has been obtained from refugees and deserters regarding crop prospects in villages on our immediate front in the Nablus district:—

Much ground has been sown around Bidieh, Mes-Ha and Zawieh (see above), but growing crops have been devoured by Turkish horses; also all trees cut down.

Tul Keram, Kakon (084. U. 4. d), Kulunsaweh (084. W. 27. a) area is fairly well sown with wheat. The hills around Kalkilieh (084. H. 25. d) are cultivated. The growing crops at Azzun (084. J. 35. c) have been eaten by the Turkish horses. At Mezrah (099. B. 23. c) what little crops there were have been entirely eaten by the Turkish horses.

An Agent reports as follows on the area under cultivation and crop prospects in districts which he visited between the 14th and 20th of April:—

In the Jenin district (097. V. 35. b. d), barley and wheat crops were fairly good. The area under cultivation is about one-third of the normal.

In the Beisan district (111. J. 2. a) the barley crops are good.

In the Irbid (110. Y. 10. b)—Deraa district, about 50 % of the normal area is under cultivation. The crops are mostly barley.

In the Ajlun (126. J. 9.)—Fara (125. T. 24) district, barley and lentils have been sown. The crops are good, but still green.

In the Kafrinji (126. K. 5)—Abu Obeida (126. O. 25) district the crops are good, and about the normal area is under cultivation.

EAST OF JORDAN.

Information obtained from Moslem Christian refugees from East of Jordan is to the effect that the economic condition of Palestine would be immensely improved by the re-occupation of the Salt and Amman districts in the near future. Great stores of grain and the coming harvest will be lost to us if not acquired very soon. During the war, the regions of Kerak, Madeba, Salt and Amman supplied most of the wheat for the civil population of Jerusalem and vicinity, and was also sufficient for the needs of the Turkish Army on the Beersheba—Gaza front and in southern Palestine generally. In addition, there are large supplies of barley and grapes. The grape crop of Salt is said to be worth £100,000 per annum, and the crop this year is expected to be unusually good. In and about Salt there is a large number of cattle, horses and donkeys in good condition, and the acquisition of these animals would greatly improve agricultural conditions in Palestine. Refugees also could return to their homes and this would be a decided advantage both to us and them.

It is reported from Maain (5 miles S.W. of Madeba) that the grazing in that district is good and abundant, sheep and cattle are plentiful, and an inhabitant has stated that the district could supply 100 sheep and 50 cattle daily, which could be supplemented from the local Bedouins, who possess flocks. Grain is scarce, but the crops are excellent and much has been sown. The crops are much behind the crops in the plain, and showed no sign of ripening at end of April.

Turkish prisoners of war, captured on the 25th April, stated that Turkish troops East of Jordan were often without bread, once for as long as four days. The bread ration was nominally half an oke (1.4 lb.) per diem, besides wheat boiled in water morning and evening. Occasionally a few ounces of meat were put in the dixies. The men fight over this piece of meat, which is invariably seized by the strongest man.

NORTHERN SYRIA.

A Jewish deserter, who was at Aleppo from the beginning of December, 1917, to the middle of January, 1918, states that during that period there were daily deaths at Aleppo due to poverty and misery. The price of bread was 60 P.T. paper per oke ($2\frac{3}{4}$ lb.). £T. 1 in gold was worth £T. 7 in paper, and in certain localities one could get even £T. 8 or 9 in notes for £T. 1 in gold.

Agents report that in Northern Syria, from Aleppo to Rayak, the crops are good, but harvest prospects are not good, owing to the great shortage of labour. In the Akka district (Acre), the crops are good, but the area sown is small. In the Lebanon, the harvest prospects are excellent.

The rate of exchange at Beirut on the 11th of March was £T. 1 paper = $19\frac{1}{2}$ P.T. coin.

The following prices for flour were current during March :—

Beirut,	March	8th,	30 to 31 P.T. coin per rotol ($5\frac{1}{2}$ lb.).
"	"	16th,	33
"	"	17th,	50
"	"	24th/25th,	52 to 56
Aleppo,	"	15th,	70
Damascus,	"	20th,	40
Zahle & Hama,	"	24th/25th,	50

The flour merchants of Beirut were interviewed on March 17th by the Vali, who discussed with them the rise in the price of flour. The merchants appear to have been threatened with exile unless the price was reduced, and were also directed to produce a certain quantity of wheat to be sold to the Municipality at considerably below market price for relief distribution.

CONSTANTINOPLE.

An Arab Officer deserter reports that the following prices were current in Constantinople about the end of February :—

Bread, per oke ($2\frac{3}{4}$ lb.)	20 P.T. paper	Butter, per oke ($2\frac{3}{4}$ lb.)	200 P.T. paper.
Meat, "	150 " "	Olive Oil, "	110 " "
Sugar, "	200 " "	Rice, "	100 " "

A pair of shoes cost £T. 8 and a suit of cloths £T. 30 paper. Benzine could not be bought and no civilian motor cars were allowed.

A Constantinople newspaper announced on the 1st March that the peace with Russia had caused a considerable fall in the Insurance rates for shipping in the Black Sea. The premiums for the voyage Constantinople—Samsun, which had been at 30% had fallen to 20%, and those for the voyage Constantinople—Eregli, which had been at 20% had fallen, first to 15% and later to 18%.

It is reported from Constantinople that the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, in prolonging the concession of the Tobacco Régie Company, have greatly modified its terms. For instance, the former maximum of $12\frac{1}{2}$ % for the Tithe on tobacco is now done away with, and it is only stipulated that the extra taxation is not to be higher than the taxation on other produce of the soil.

NOTE.—This is no doubt intended to provide for a War Super-Tax on tobacco, which was not possible under the old concession to the Régie Company.

Also, the cultivation of tobacco can now be extended to other districts by the sole order of the Turkish Government, whereas formerly it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Régie Company; and the exclusive right of the Company to manufacture cigarettes, etc., has been modified, so that, in future, others than the Company will have the right to manufacture cigarettes, but for export only, and subject to the supervision of the Régie Company.

GENERAL.

A document, recently captured, makes it possible to draw a comparison between the Turkish soldier's ration in March, 1918, and his peace-time ration in March, 1914:—

PEACE-TIME RATION.	EXTRA RATIONS.
900 grammes of bread	Molasses, coffee, tea, bread and
600 „ „ biscuits	curds. These may be replaced
250 „ „ meat	by Tahin Helva, a sweetmeat
150 „ „ bulgur(wheat porridge)	made of sesame and molasses.
20 „ „ cooking butter	There was also a generous allow-
20 „ „ salt.	ance of fuel and soap.

On this front, the average daily ration of the Turkish soldier is now 500–600 grammes of bread, with a little wheat porridge and perhaps a few vegetables. Meat is rarely issued, and in very small quantities,

Compare this with the summer rations of our troops (vide G.R.O. 3815.).

336 grammes or $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. fresh meat	84 grammes or 3oz. jam
446 „ „ 1lb. bread	84 „ „ 3oz. sugar
112 „ „ 4oz. bacon	56 „ „ 2oz. vegetables; with
112 „ „ 4oz. potatoes	tea, milk, salt, etc., and extra issues.

FINANCIAL.

A report has been received of the speech of Javid Bey, the Turkish Minister of Finance, on laying the Budget Estimates for 1918 before the Turkish Chamber of Deputies on the 21st of February, 1918 (see Summary No. 4 of April 26th, 1918).

Javid Bey said that the decrease of two millions in estimated expenditure—£T51,000,000 as against £T53,000,000 in 1917—was more apparent than real, as certain items which figured in last year's estimates had been omitted in the present ones. For instance, the sum of £T3,170,000 for the Railway Administration is no longer included in the Budget, as that Administration now procures the necessary funds by the conclusion of various conventions and agreements approved by the Chamber.

He drew attention to the great increase in the charge for military pensions. This had risen from £T2,500,000 in 1916 to £T3,900,000 in 1917, and now stood at £T5,500,000 in 1918 for 183,234 pensioners, the members of whose families were 379,289 in number, and Javid Bey added that he thought that this number would not be the quarter of those who would receive pensions.

He estimated the normal expenditure of the country after the war at £T40,000,000, and said that it would then be necessary to establish a budgetary equilibrium, but did not explain how that desirable result was to be arrived at.

With regard to the estimates of Revenue, he explained that the estimate for the Land and House Tax had been increased from £T1,700,000 to £T2,100,000, that for the Sheep Tax from £T1,200,000 to £T2,500,000, because it has been doubled by a special law, and that for the Tithe from £T4,100,000 to £T8,800,000, owing to the great rise in the price of cereals. This sum of £T8,800,000 was a minimum figure, and he believed that this year the Tithe would realize £T12,000,000 to £T13,000,000, as it had done last year. This, said Javid Bey, was a striking proof of the disadvantages of the Tithe System, under which the distress of the population gives rise to an increase of Government Revenue.

The apparent deficit was in round numbers £T14,000,000, but as he anticipated extraordinary military expenditure to the extent of £T60,000,000, it would be necessary to find about £T74,000,000 for the coming year. Provision was already made for the first six months by the recent loan of £T36,000,000 concluded in Germany, of which four millions in marks was ear-marked for certain purchases in Austria and Germany. For their further requirements he had decided, if possible, not to issue any more paper money, but to raise an Internal Loan at 5% interest and 1% sinking fund, the interest to be paid in gold, and guarantees similar to those for Foreign Loans to be lodged with the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The revenues allotted to the service of this loan would be collected in paper money. Six weeks before the coupon was due, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration would present this paper money to the German Government, which would exchange it for gold to be paid over to the holders of the Internal Loan Bonds. This would offer a double advantage:—(1) by convincing the population that Turkish notes were as good as gold; and (2) by withdrawing so much paper money from circulation. Javid Bey thought that the Internal Loan ought to bring in £T30,000,000 to £T40,000,000, but at a moderate estimate, as there were very few investments in Turkey offering 5% interest *in gold*, there ought to be no difficulty in finding at least £T20,000,000. If the Internal Loan failed they would apply to Germany for a further loan, and only if that resource failed them would they resort to a further issue of paper money.

Javid Bey then made an elaborate statement showing that the cost of the war to Turkey up to the time of speaking was from £T220,000,000 to £T230,000,000. Coming to the question of Turkish indebtedness, he stated that the new debts, including what was due for military requisitions and loans from Austro-Hungarian banks, amounted to £T233,000,000, to be added to the old debt of £T155,000,000, making the total public debt of Turkey £T388,000,000.

He insisted on the point that, financially speaking, Turkey had only been a very light burden on Germany, from whom she had received in marks, in £T., in gold and in silver, no more than £T70,000,000, equivalent to the expenses of the German Army for a period of 20 to 25 days. Germany had thus made less sacrifices in money for Turkey than she had done for Bulgaria.

Javid Bey took credit for the fact that during the war, the Turkish Government has collected and lodged in the Ottoman Bank £T8,700,000 for interest due on the old debt to the enemy creditors of Turkey.

He dealt at some length with the question of paper money, the total amount of which issued is £T138,000,000, and the real amount in circulation, according to his reckoning, £T90,000,000 to £T95,000,000. He then drew attention to what he considered the most serious danger to the country, namely, the enormous increase in the prices of almost all commodities, independently of the fictitious rise caused by the unfavourable rate of exchange of paper money.

He gave the following instances. At Beirut before the war, the price of wheat was 1½ P.T. the oke. To-day it is 7½ P.T. *in coin*, or an increase of 500%. At Konia before the war, petroleum cost 2 P.T. the oke. It now costs 40 P.T. *in coin*, or an increase of 2,000%, and if paid for in paper, it costs 40 by 3.5=140 P.T.

Javid Beys speech which ended with a flowery and patriotic peroration, is said to have been loudly applauded by the Chamber of Deputies, which is quite incapable of criticizing the fallacious and misleading statements of which it is made up.

SANITARY.

An Arab of Mejdal, who returned recently from enemy territory, states that he was conscripted in 1915, and employed in the Turkish Army Medical Corps at Jerusalem, which he left on the British occupation. He then proceeded to Nablus, where he remained five days, after which he fell sick with fever. He was sent to Damascus, where he was medically boarded, found unfit for service, and told that he could return to his home. On surprise being expressed at his being allowed to return to territory in British occupation, he said that this was customary with the Turks, who had acted similarly in other cases.

The following information concerning Public Health in Northern Syria, is taken from Beirut newspapers published during March, 1918 :—

The spread of Syphilis having assumed very large proportions in Damascus, a special Commission has been formed to take the necessary measures for the treatment of infected persons, and for the protection of those who are not yet affected. According to official figures, 90% of the prostitutes of Damascus are contaminated. Venereal disease having assumed terrible proportions in Beirut, a dispensary has been opened in the Place de l'Union, where persons irrespective of race or religion will be treated gratis, and supplied with the necessary drugs.

An Armenian Officer deserter states that cholera broke out in Amman on April 25th.

ATTACHMENTS.

- (i). Military History of the Arab Revolt.
- (ii). Outline map of Syria and Palestine showing Turkish Administrative Division.

G.S.P.I.,

G.H.Q.,

E.E.F.

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.

**ATTACHMENT TO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
No. 5, 10th May, 1918.**

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE ARAB REVOLT.

The Arab Revolt began on the 5th June, 1916, with the formation of a thin Bedouin cordon round Medina, where Ali and Feisal, two sons of the Sherif, or Emir of Mecca, were in command. The Hejaz Railway was broken at several points between Medina and Abu Naam; but the Arabs, inexperienced in demolition, did not effect enough, before being driven off by relief parties with machine-guns, to interrupt seriously the communications of Medina with the North, and the besieging force, short of arms and supplies, and with no guns worth mentioning, could do little but watch the city from afar. Jiddah, however, which was attacked on 9th June, held out barely a week. Cut off from Mecca by the loss of the blockhouses on the road and exposed to naval guns and planes, the Turkish garrison, in a weak position north of the town, yielded to the instance of the civilian population and surrendered at discretion. Mecca had passed in the meantime into the Emir's hands with the exception of the forts and entrenched barracks, held by small garrisons, the bulk of the Turkish force being absent in summer quarters at Taif with the Governor-General. These garrisons, who had had some inkling of what was coming, opened fire on the town, putting a shell or two even into or near the Great Mosque, to the infinite scandal of all pious Moslems; and they were not reduced till artillery was brought up from Jiddah. They had all surrendered by the 16th July. Taif, where over 2,000 men, the bulk of the Turkish force, were entrenched, with Ghalib Pasha, the G.O.C. and Governor-General, held out much longer—till 23rd September—and then capitulated from hopelessness rather than from scarcity or fear of its assailants. It had been blockaded very effectively for three and a half months by Sherif Abdullah, the Emir's second son, with a mixed force of Ateibah Bedouins and Meccan townfolk, but though regularly bombarded, it had never been really assaulted.

Smaller places, like Lith and Yambo, surrendered as soon as they were seriously attacked, and the greater part of the Hejaz was now clear of the Turks. So far the task of the Arabs had been comparatively easy. Isolated bodies of troops, divided from all possible relief by 300 miles of hostile, ill-watered country and barred from the sea, were bound to capitulate sooner or later, however superior in fighting quality and equipment to their foes. But the Medina garrison was in a different case. It had been reinforced, re-armed, re-victualled, and reassured by successful sorties during these four months, and late in September, it was able to issue forth, driving the Arabs before it, and make Medina secure by establishing a cordon of fortified posts thirty to forty miles out along the Mecca roads. This done, the Turks pushed farther still, realising that their best defence was an offensive, and at one time they threatened to occupy both Yambo and Rabugh, the important half-way house to Mecca. But only some 14,000 strong, they had not the forces necessary to hold such distant objectives together with the lines of communication. Considerable Arab armies moved up from south and south-west, and the Turks withdrew again behind the fortified outposts of Medina at the end of the year.

It had become clear that little was to be hoped from an Arab siege of Medina, and even less from any assaults the Arabs might be induced to make upon its works. The only operation likely to be fruitful would be systematic attack on its communications *i.e.*, on the Hejaz Railway, which, from Damascus to Medina, develops over 800 miles of single track. For such raiding, however, and for ultimate extension of the revolt to Syria, more northerly bases than Jiddah, Rabugh, or even Yambo, were required. Therefore, at the end of January, 1917, Sherif Feisal, with the Northern Arab Army, installed himself at Wejh, already occupied by landing parties, and proceeded to extend his hold still farther north to Dhaba and Mowilah on the Midian coast. His brother, Abdullah, had come up meanwhile to Wadi Ais, north-west of Medina, leaving only the eldest of the family, Ali, in the former theatre of operations.

The raiding carried out during the following six months, with British and French help, lowered the strength and spirit of the Turkish forces in Medina, provided scope for adventure which attracted many fresh Arab elements, and offered a demonstration of activity which induced many more to engage themselves on the Sherifian side in view of a move still farther north. But it did not cut off Medina. The permanent way proved harder to wreck irretrievably, and the enemy better prepared to make interruptions good, than had been expected. Organised demolition work, without hope of loot, and the dogged holding of points on a broken track against regular forces, are congenial neither to the Bedouin's mind nor to his manner of fighting. His natural indiscipline and incapacity for system ruined one promising scheme after another, and it was not till, in the autumn of 1917, a different policy—that of mining trains, offering immediate plunder—was acted upon, that satisfactory results began to be obtained. Even then, however, the Arabs could not be induced to finish the destruction of a train before starting to loot it, or to follow up success by wholesale demolition of permanent way or defence of a break.

Meanwhile, early in July, Akaba had been captured from the Turks, and Sherif Feisal moved up. Operations and propaganda could now be extended much farther northwards. Previously there had been no raiding of the railway above Tebuk. Now it was attacked, not only south of Maan but north, while Arab forces threatened both Maan itself and also the forest district on the northwest, whence the railway locomotives were drawing their fuel supply. The effect on Medina was soon evident, and had the Turks been in a position to evacuate by the railway without almost certain disaster,

they would probably have done so early in the current year. But, for lack of sufficient rolling stock and troops to keep the line during withdrawal, they eventually decided to hold on, as the lesser evil; for, in any case, they were secure for some months of being able to repel direct Arab attack, all reduced and scurvy-ridden though their troops had become, both at headquarters and on the line of communication. There they still are, and the precarious communication, which they long maintained with the rest of the Empire through Hadiyah, Medain Salih, Tebuk, and Maan, the four points more or less adequately held on five hundred miles of railway, is becoming impossible. So the forlorn hope slowly fades.

Having secured the adhesion or neutrality of all Arabs as far up as Maan, and made provisional arrangements with others to northward, Feisal could now contemplate an advance into the trans-Jordan country. He had collected, from one source or another, some thousands of partly trained troops, besides contingents from Bedouin tribes of higher fighting quality than the Hejazis. Also he was much better equipped with guns, small arms, and auxiliary services than any Arab army had been theretofore. The Turks in Maan and the Hishe Forest made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra region in October and November, 1917, but proved too weak to press home any advantage they gained. The cold of the highlands in winter and lack of transport militated against strong counter-offensives by the Arabs, but in January, 1918, they were able to begin an advance towards the eastern Dead Sea lands. There were but few Turks to oppose them, and the local inhabitants, though jealous and suspicious of a strange force in their midst, did not obstruct. Shobak and Hishe Forest were occupied, and towards the end of January, the Arabs had taken and passed Tafilah, raided up to Mezraa on the Dead Sea, and begun to threaten the Turks in Kerak and on the railway north of Jurf el-Derwish.

To stay an advance, which, if not checked, would bring all their Hejaz forces into an inextricable situation, the Turks renewed, in February, their efforts at offensive, from Kerak and from the railway. The first attempt by an infantry force, about 700 strong, to reach Tafilah ended in signal disaster, barely fifty men getting back to Kerak, with the loss of all guns and material. A second attempt, made from the railway early in March, with two comparatively strong columns, stiffened by German units, effected its purpose with little difficulty, the Arabs retiring from Tafilah to Shobak; but its effect was demonstrative only, the Turks being unable to remain at Tafilah in view of the probability of an advance by the British across Jordan. The Arabs re-occupied Tafilah on 18th March, and, on the Turks withdrawing from Kerak a few days later, a detachment of Feisal's irregular troops entered this place also. They did not, however, stay long. The past month of April has been marked by a great increase of Arab activity, and as a result of the capture of all the stations on the line between Maan and Mudowara and destruction of track and bridges for over seventy miles, Medina is now definitely isolated. Maan itself has been vigorously attacked, and Feisal's forces, though unable at the first attempt to hold the station after entering it, are entrenched in a position dominating both station and town. Further north much damage has been done to stations, track, and bridges, and the great tribe of the Beni Sakhr, as well as many lesser tribes, has come out for the Arab cause.

G.S.P.I.,

G.H.Q.,

E.E.F.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.**ENEMY TERRITORY.***25th May, 1918.***POLITICAL.**

It is reported from Constantinople that serious differences exist between the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha and the Minister of War, Enver Pasha. Although a reconciliation is said to have taken place in December last, there appears to have been a ministerial crisis about the middle of April. Some people thought Talaat Pasha would fall and would be replaced by Jemal Pasha.

The position of the Government cannot however be said to be precarious. Talaat and his ministry appear to be as firmly in the saddle as ever. This is largely due to the Russian and Roumanian peace, the prospect of recovering the Eastern provinces lost to Russia in 1878, and the large number of "profiteers" who are quite willing to see the war go on.

Discontent, however, exists. It is especially noticeable among those in receipt of pensions. The Government have therefore selected the leaders among the Military and Civil pensioners, and supplied them with funds to engage in business. A similar policy has been followed in the Army where a number of Junior Turkish Officers are said to be very much against the C.U.P., and to hate Enver, Talaat and Jemal. Money is supplied to the relatives of unruly officers with a view to silencing them.

A neutral European who was recently in Smyrna and left Constantinople at the beginning of April, reports that the Turkish people in general have no great confidence in final victory. He believes two thirds of them are in favour of a separate peace at any price.

Information has been received that the Persian Mission, mentioned in Summary No. 5 as having arrived at Aleppo, February 17th—20th, was unable to proceed owing to lack of transport and funds. The Persians, 150 in number, were petitioning the Turkish Government for permission to return to Constantinople. It is reported from Constantinople that difficulties have arisen between the Turkish Government and the Peace delegates of the Caucasus Republic, owing to the fact that the majority of these delegates are Christians. The Turks hold that the delegation cannot possibly be representative, as there are many Moslems in the Caucasus. They say they can only discuss peace terms with a delegation consisting chiefly of Moslems.

It was reported from Constantinople towards the end of March that Turkey had signed a convention with Germany whereby the territorial integrity of Turkey was guaranteed.

Turkey was also said to have signed an agreement with Bulgaria by which Dedeagatch and district will be returned to Turkey. Bulgaria will receive the Dobrudja, Kavala, Drama and other districts in Macedonia.

TURKO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

There are indications of a growing fear on the part of Talaat Pasha and other members of the Government of the control exercised by the Germans over everything in Turkey and of a desire to establish a "rapprochement" with the Entente Powers, though they seek in vain for a means of doing so.

The Germans assure the Turks that their offensive in the West will be entirely successful and that the British will be obliged to accept terms involving withdrawal from Mesopotamia and Palestine. They therefore recommend that the Turks should not make unnecessary sacrifices in opposing the British advance. These assurances appear to have thoroughly satisfied the Turkish Government.

Although the Turkish Government is outwardly in perfect agreement with the Germans, Anti-German feeling is growing more and more pronounced. German and Turkish Officers seem to get on well together. Austrians of all ranks behave well and are liked. German Commanders of Divisions are more or less popular with the men as their presence usually means better food. German soldiers are, however, hated. They behave badly in public being frequently found drunk in cafés and cinemas. In Damascus, a prisoner states, they ill-treat the Moslem women. They are constantly involved in brawls and on one occasion killed two Turkish soldiers with their bayonets. On the railway they will not travel with Turks, but use the butts of their rifles on them when they try to come into the carriage. An Armenian Officer Prisoner of War states that when his battalion left Damascus on May 1st, they had 40 men in one truck, while in the next truck there were only 2 German soldiers, who refused to have any Turks in with them. German soldiers usually travel 1st class. A Syrian Christian Medical Officer says he witnessed the following incident at Rayak. A German soldier having taken possession of a compartment in a railway carriage at the station, stood at the door forbidding any one else to enter. A Turkish Major went up the steps and asked for admission which was refused. He tried to force his way in, but the German gave him a kick in the chest, which sent him flat on his back. He picked himself up and tried to make for the German soldier, but was restrained by the Officer Commanding the station, who was also a Turkish Major. Five minutes later the train moved on with the German soldier alone in the compartment peacefully smoking his pipe. Similar incidents are frequent.

A Syrian Interpreter, recently captured, says, the German troops with whom he came in contact, some of them volunteers, were very dissatisfied and disappointed. They said they would prefer to fight and die on the Western front since they had seen the condition and organization of the Turkish troops. They were ashamed to be the Allies of such people.

In Constantinople, a few months ago, the authorities dealt severely with those who used the expression "Giaour" (infidel) in speaking of Christians. Now it was not infrequent to hear the words "Allaman Giaour" (German infidel) used openly in the streets.

German military successes have undoubtedly made a great impression on the public in Syria and all over Turkey. The Turkish press constantly draws the conclusion that the Central Powers have been and will remain victorious. Christians as well as Moslems in Syria are obliged to declare that they share the same belief.

The Turks realise that Germany is more to be blamed than Turkey for their present sufferings. The Turkish soldier, even more than the Turkish people at large, dislikes the Germans as he sees the superior treatment offered by the Turkish authorities to the German soldiers, and his indignation knows no bounds when he sees that there are no German units fighting side by side with him, while he knows that many Turkish units are being decimated fighting for the Germans in Galicia and Roumania.

ARMENIANS.

A well educated and intelligent Armenian deserter gives the following account of the treatment of Armenian deportees in Northern Syria:—

In the municipalities of the towns there are special officials who register the names of deportees and are supposed to provide food and shelter for those in need. As a matter of fact food is never distributed, and the deportees, mostly women and children, suffer greatly from hunger and are obliged to eat herbs and grass.

At Aleppo there is a workshop to provide employment for the deportees, but there is only room there for a small proportion of the total numbers. At Hama, Homs, Damascus, El Kuneitra and the neighbourhood, the Armenian deportees are able to earn their living, thanks to their industrious habits. At Damascus, especially, they are doing fairly well in various branches of trade. Armenian women, girls, and children of the poorest classes try to make a living by selling bread in the streets.

An Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, gives the following information:—

The Turks are very bitter against Armenians both in civil life and in the Army where every offence committed by an Armenian is harshly dealt with. Armenians can only be promoted to 2nd-Lieutenant, excepting doctors, who are Captains, and chemists, who are 1st-Lieutenants. Most Armenians are now penniless. Informant's uncle, a rich man before the war, has £6,000 in the Deutscher Bank but cannot draw a penny as the Bank has received orders from the Government not to pay money to Armenians. A cousin was compelled to join the Turkish Army in order to get food for his family of nine persons. When he was taken prisoner at El Arish the whole family starved to death near Damascus.

Another Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, who is a native of Brusa, states that before the war there was an Armenian population of more than 10,000 in that city, but now there were only eight families living there. About an equal number of Armenians lived at Buyuk Yenikeui, but now there are none. There were also about 15,000 Armenians in the villages round these two places, but none are left now.

About two months ago the Turks began to recruit Armenians in Damascus, and informant heard from his cousin, who lived there, that the Turks were compelling all young Armenian men to become Moslems and to adopt Turkish names.

ARAB MOVEMENT.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured May 1st, has given the following information:—

The Moslem Arabs are anxious to see the restoration of an Arab Khalifate, but Arabic speaking Christians favour a foreign occupation, British or French, the choice depending mainly on their education. All, however, are agreed that the Turks are not fit to rule.

The Arabs of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Nablus and neighbourhood, think the British owe much of their success in Palestine to Arab assistance. With very few exceptions all Arabs in these places mention the Sherif of Mecca's name with respect, though with a certain timidity. Their ideas on the subject of the kingdom of the Hejaz are very vague, but they cherish the hope that the Sherif at the head of large Arab forces will come and deliver them from Turkish oppression.

An intelligent and credible Jewish refugee recently reported that the Druses who have been favourably treated by the Turks and have greatly profited by excellent harvests and high prices are observing an expectant attitude. Pro-British sentiment is still strong among them and they are quite aware that, if the Turks are victorious in the war, they will be the first to suffer.

A refugee, recently imprisoned in Damascus, states that he heard from a Christian journalist who was his fellow prisoner, that the Turks had entirely ruined the Lebanon, its population being starved and utterly demoralised. The Lebanon Druses were faring little better than their Christian neighbours. The Turks no longer seek to conciliate them, having succeeded in sowing the seeds of dissension among the Chiefs. One powerful family was said to be in utter destitution. Their daughters had become servants and prostitutes to Turkish Officers. Informant heard that in the last few months a number of Druse Chiefs had been arrested.

At the beginning of the war the Turks tried to check the Arab movement by hanging and exiling the leaders. They have been very hard hit by the Hejaz revolt and vow to pay King Hussein and his men out when the war is over. After an explosion near Zerka (156. T.28.) on the Hejaz railway at the beginning of April, the Turks collected the Chiefs of the tribes along the track from Zerka northwards, and obliged them to ride on all the trains between Deraa and Damascus, paying them so much a day and their food.

ECONOMIC.

PALESTINE FRONT.

A Syrian Medical Officer, Prisoner of War, captured on April 30th, 1918, states that Turkish troops in the front line receive sufficient rations to keep them in good condition. Up to 700 grammes (about 1½ lb.) of bread, and soup or a stew with meat once a day. The quality of the bread is very poor. Troops in the interior, Lines of Communications, Medical Corps and Hospital Patients do not get enough food, and consequently their vitality is very low.

The issue of boots is not sufficient to keep the men shod.

The wheat and barley crops South of Damascus are excellent. The following prices were current in Nablus at the end of April, 1918:—

Brown bread, per rotol (5½ lbs.)	...	30	P.T. Silver.
Durra " " "	...	20	" "
Barley " " "	...	18	" "
Meat (very scarce) " " "	...	60	" "
Sugar " " "	...	300	" "

Some Arab deserters, who surrendered on May 12th, 1918, stated, the inhabitants of Tul Keram have been on the verge of starvation, the poorest living on herbs and grass only. New crops, however, are now coming on the market.

NORTHERN SYRIA.

In Damascus there are about ten large shops, run by Germans, selling hardware, leather, cloth and military outfits. The goods come from Germany without difficulty. The prices are the same as those in native shops, but the quality of the articles is far superior.

The following prices were current in Damascus on April 15th, 1918:—

Wheat, per rotol (5½ lbs.)	...	40 to 45	P.T. Coin.
Oats " " "	...	30	" "
Durra " " "	...	40	" "
Beef " " "	...	50	" "
Mutton " " "	...	80	" "
One pair shoes, £T. 15 (paper).			
One pair boots, £T. 30 " "			
One suit of clothes, £T. 50 (paper).			

Coal was unobtainable and charcoal expensive. Benzine was being sold by German and Austrian Soldiers for 60 P.T. coin for 12 Litres.

About five months ago an order was issued by the Turkish Government allowing each Officer to buy about 10 kilograms of wheat monthly from the Government stores, whereupon every Officer bought much larger quantities and sold it to civilians, thereby making large profits. After four months this order was rescinded.

Clothing is now made in Damascus and is of very poor quality. There appears to be a good supply of wool but the cost is high. Boots are also made in Damascus. There is a good supply of leather, mostly cowhides, but also camel and horse hides, which come from the Government factory at Mashgara in the Lebanon.

The following prices were current in the middle of April in Aleppo and district:—

Bread, 16 P.T. (coin) per oke (2¾ lb.).
Barley, 15 P.T. (coin) per oke (2¾ lb.).
One pair European boots, £T. 2½ (coin).
One pair boots of native leather, £T. 1½ (coin).

The rate of exchange rose after peace was declared with Russia to £T. 1 = 35 P.T.

The crop prospects were good and there had been abundant rains. The barley harvest was expected to end in May and the wheat harvest in the middle of June.

There were practically no camels, horses were few and in bad condition owing to lack of forage, donkeys were not numerous.

The rate of exchange at Damascus on April 15th, 1918, was £T. 1 = 15 P.T. (coin). Towards the end of the month it had risen to P.T. 29 (coin) and on May 1st it was P.T. 40 (coin).

CONSTANTINOPLE AND ASIA MINOR.

The condition of the population of Constantinople towards the end of March is reported to have been as bad as ever. Women brought their children to the municipalities and laid them on the floor, saying "Take them, we cannot feed them." Mobs from time to time raided military stores and took what they wanted.

An Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, who left Constantinople on April 16th, states that prices were as follows :—

Bread	per oke (2 $\frac{3}{4}$ lb.)	...	25-30 P.T. paper.
Meat	" "	...	200 "
Rice	" "	...	80 "
Cooking Butter	" "	...	250 "
Olive Oil	" "	...	200 "
Milk	" "	...	40 "

A pair of boots cost £T. 15 paper and a suit of clothes £T. 25-30 paper.

The rate of exchange on April 10th was £T. 1 = 30 P.T. coin.

An Arab deserter who passed through a great part of central Asia Minor on foot between February and April describes the crop prospects in that region as very promising. At Angora where he was about April 12th, a $\frac{3}{4}$ kilo loaf of bread (1'65 lbs.) cost 4 P.T. silver. In Asia Minor the rate of exchange was £T. 1 = 20 P.T. silver.

SANITARY.

An Armenian deserter states that, at Damascus, in March, there was much eye disease among the troops. There were 50 cases of scurvy in the hospital to which he was admitted.

A Greek Medical Officer, prisoner of war, captured on March 25th, 1918, states that when he was employed in the hospital at Es Salt, at the end of February, heavy mortality was caused by (a) typhus, (b) dysentery, (c) general debility. In a hospital with a little over a thousand patients, the death rates from these causes were approximately as follows :—

- (a) 18 deaths out of 300 cases in 3 months.
- (b) 8-10 deaths daily for 3 months.
- (c) 12-20 deaths daily for 3 months.

Latterly, however, there had been an improvement, as milk, which had been unobtainable, was supplied, and deaths from (b) and (c) together only averaged five or six daily. Medicines and drugs were plentiful, but no cotton wool could be obtained.

A Syrian Medical Officer, prisoner of war, captured on April 30th, 1918, states that all drugs now come from Germany. There is still a plentiful supply of the following :—Quinine, asperine, bismuth, potassium permanganate, camphorated oil, chloride of mercury sublimate. Finer drugs are rare or lacking. A cotton factory in Damascus supplies plenty of good quality bandages, dressings, and cotton wool. There is a sufficiency of surgical instruments, all made in Germany.

Hospitals are inefficient owing to the lack of suitable and sufficient food for patients. Bad transport of patients also contributes to the high rate of mortality. Patients have wooden beds and good mattresses. The principal diseases are malaria (most frequent of all), dysentery, venereal (not allowed into hospital, but treated in the battalion), typhoid, paratyphoid, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. One case only of cholera occurred at Amman, about April 14th.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured on April 30th, 1918, gives the following account of health conditions at Damascus, where he was in April, and in the Lebanon :—

The chief cause of the poor state of public health is chronic starvation and its consequences. Typhus is endemic everywhere, but not so deadly as it used to be, as the microbe seems to have become attenuated. Cholera appeared in Beirut and Damascus two years ago, in the summer, but was soon got under. One case was reported in Amman about April 15th. Malaria in all its varieties is most prevalent everywhere. Dysentery is more common in Palestine than in the north. Tuberculosis is increasing from lack of physical resistance in the starving population. Smallpox is kept under by vaccination and such cases as occur are sporadic. Influenza is common on the sea coast and "three day fever" is also to be met with. Pneumonia, Pleurisy and Rheumatism are sporadic. Diphtheria and Typhoid are sporadic in general but Typhoid is endemic in Beirut. Venereal diseases make frightful ravages in Beirut and Damascus. Skin diseases of all sorts, especially scabies, are rampant owing to want of soap and new clothing, especially in the army and in the larger towns.

An Armenian Cadet Officer, captured on May 3rd, 1918, who left Constantinople on April 10th, states there was an outbreak of Typhus in the army and among the civil population during the last month he was there. The disease was still rife when he left. His company had 15 cases. The names of civilians who died were published daily in the newspapers. The death rate among civilians was 35 to 37 daily.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured May 1st, 1918, gives the following instances of the treatment of medical personnel in the Turkish Army :—

Doctors and Pharmacists are frequently marched to their posts under an armed guard. The last hospital formed at Es Salt was organized as follows. The Medical Officer in charge received orders to leave Damascus when he was ill in bed suffering from Pyuria. He objected, but by orders of the Principal Medical Officer, Lines of Communications at Damascus, he was carried in his night shirt to the District Commander on a stretcher, and was told that should he die, the orders were to send his body to Es Salt. He was then marched in his night-shirt to the station with a bayonet behind him.

The Pharmacist's only son was ill with meningitis. He received orders to leave while at work in his hospital and was not allowed to take leave of his dying son, nor to get his luggage, nor to see his wife.

As for the Army Medical Corps men selected for the hospital, they were roped together to the number of 63, but only 13 were found on arrival at Es Salt.

Great mortality was caused in the Mezzeh Hospital at Damascus owing to the insufficient food supplied by Lines of Communications. The principal Medical Officer of the IVth Army complained about the death rate to the Medical Officer in charge, who promptly put all the Medical Officers in his hospital into prison, including informant. He would not vary the diet lest he should give trouble to Lines of Communication. Needless to say the death rate did not decrease.

A Constantinople newspaper of February 26th, 1918, publishes a statement by the Director of the Public Health Department to the Turkish Chamber of Deputies.

He said that exanthemic typhus and cholera continue to rage in Turkey and that the Administration had taken measures to deal with these epidemics. 80% of the doctors were however with the Army and it had been found necessary to hand over the work of the civilian doctors to military doctors.

With regard to typhus, cleanliness was the only safeguard, and bathing establishments had been set up with the different armies, to which the poorer classes of the population were sent. The results of this campaign had not been very brilliant. In 1916, 29,000 cases were reported, and 25,000 in 1917. In Constantinople there were great difficulties owing to the large numbers of the population and the failure of doctors to report cases at once. Also the baths were for a long time without hot water owing to lack of fuel, and soap was very expensive.

More successful results were obtained with cholera. In 1916 there were 10,090 cases reported, and in 1917 only 1,080.

For small-pox the Constantinople laboratories could produce 28,000,000 tubes of vaccine annually, and laboratories had been set up at Sivas and Damascus.

Malaria was very prevalent, especially on the Black Sea coast. 2,700 kilograms of quinine had been distributed in the past year against only 632 kilograms the year before.

There was an unconfirmed report of plague at Trebizond at the end of January, and steps were taken to inoculate all troops proceeding in that direction.

ATTACHMENT.

A Note on "King Husein of Hejaz and His Sons."

G.S.P.I.,

G.H.Q.,

E.E.F.

ATTACHMENT TO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,

No. 6, 25th May, 1918.

KING HUSEIN OF HEJAZ AND HIS SONS.

There are some thousands of sherifs (Arabic plural, *ashraf*) in the Moslem world, all claiming direct descent from the Prophet, through his daughter, Fatima, wife of the Caliph Ali; and all are entitled also to be called seyyids (plural, *saada*). Among the accepted *ashraf*, only those on the Meccan register, which has been kept for many centuries past, if not from the Prophet's own time, are of absolutely unquestioned legitimacy. They are divided into a number of clans, living mostly in the Hejaz as an accepted aristocracy with peculiar privileges and under a law of their own.

For four centuries after the Prophet's time, sherifs were not of great account, the political power being in the hands of the Ummeyad Caliphs of Damascus and the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, none of whom were sherifial. Indeed, no one sprung from the Prophet has ever been an accepted Caliph. With the decline of the power of Baghdad, however, and the establishment of a sherifial dynasty, the Fatimite, in Egypt, the Prophet's blood began everywhere to assume enhanced importance, and, late in the 10th century, one of the *ashraf* got possession of Mecca, and inaugurated in Hejaz a tradition of sherifial temporal power, whose holder was regarded as Emir and head of the *Ashraf-Sherif par excellence*, or, as mediæval European writers termed him, "Grand Sherif." For many generations this Emirate was precarious and depended much on Egyptian favour; and no dynasty secured long possession till a fighting Sherif of the Juheinah Arabs, one Qatada, seized Mecca at the opening of the 13th century. From him King Husein descends.

Some three centuries later Qatada's dynasty produced a Prince of exceptional force and power of organization, Mohammed abu Numei. It was he who, taking advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman Sultanate at the time, finally established the predominance of the Meccan Emir in Hejaz, and the exclusive right of his own family to the Emirate. That the Emir can be chosen only from descendants of Abu Numei is now held a matter of course. He had several sons. The Emirate got into, and remained for a long time in, the line of one of these, Zeid, successive Emirs obtaining their positions generally after much intrigue and even bloodshed, and seeking confirmation *ex post facto* at the hands of the Ottoman Caliphs. Thus it was till early in the last century, after Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt, had occupied Hejaz, expelling the Wahabites. He removed the reigning Emir, Ghalib, but appointed his son, Yahya; and it was not until the latter had taken up a hostile attitude towards his representative and, in the precinct of the Kaaba itself, stabbed a nephew suspected of being friendly to the Egyptian Pasha, that Mohammed Ali thought of exchanging the Zeid House (Dhawi Zeid) for another. He had, in Cairo, at the time a certain Sherif, Mohammed ibn Abdul Muin el-Aun, descended from Abu Numei's eldest son Abdullah, from whom the line is known as the Abadila. This Sherif was nominated Emir in 1827, and sent with an Egyptian force to take possession and instal the Abadila House. He was the present King's grandfather. The Zeid house, however, was not quite done with. Members of it have been nominated four times since that date to the Emirate, whenever the Porte had occasion to give the Abadila house a salutary lesson, and twice they have actually taken possession. The last of such nominations took place two years ago, when Emir Husein had declared his independence. Sherif Ali Haidar, a descendant of the Emir Ghalib, dispossessed by Mohammed Ali, was invested at Constantinople and sent down to Medina; but he was not able to proceed to Mecca to take up his dignity, and eventually gave up and retired.

Three sons of Mohammed Ali's nominee reigned, but the father of the present King of Hejaz died before his turn to succeed came, and his son Husein was living on the Bosphorus in 1908, when his cousin, the Emir Ali, had been destituted by the Porte, and his uncle, the aged Abdillah, nominated to succeed, but very ill at the time, had died without being able to proceed to Mecca. Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier, consulted a representative of our Embassy and the result was the nomination of Husein, then about 54 years of age, but a man in full vigour and of remarkable intelligence and courage. He proceeded to Mecca, determined to restore the prestige and independence of the Sherifate, and to that end, to rely on the Bedouin tribes which were traditionally attached to the fortunes of the Emir, but had been allowed to get out of hand in the last two reigns. He sent his four sons, Ali, Abdullah, Feisal, and Zeid, all born at Constantinople, to lead the nomad life, and committed his infant grandsons to Bedouin nurses in the desert. He took other measures also, which the wealth of his family, largely derived from Egyptian lands given to his grandfather by Mohammed Ali, made possible. By undertaking two expeditions on behalf of the Porte in 1910, one to Qasim and one to Asir, he allayed any suspicions of his loyalty, trained two of his sons, Abdullah and Feisal in Arab warfare, and created the nucleus of a Bedouin force. His eldest son, Ali, he used mainly at Medina, while both Abdullah and Feisal became Deputies in the Constantinople Parliament, the one representing Mecca, the other Jeddah. Zeid, the fourth, son of a Turkish wife, had hardly yet emerged from the harem.

By 1913 Emir Husein had formed definite plans for obtaining independence of Ottoman control, though prepared to recognize the formal suzerainty of the Caliph. His sons, had come into contact with the Arab Committees at Constantinople, and early in 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo to see how the land lay. Both he and Feisal had taken a prominent part in claiming Arab rights before the Chamber, and had had passages of arms with Enver and other Young Turks. The outbreak of War between Turkey and the Entente promised the long sought opportunity; but Feisal, sent up to Constantinople in 1915 to see how the War was going, reported unfavourably on our chances in Gallipoli. To gain time Emir Husein allowed his son, Ali, to raise a regiment at Medina to co-operate with the Turks in Sinai, well knowing it would do us no harm (as indeed, in the event, it did not!). Sent up again early in 1916, when Syria was exasperated by Jemal Pasha's severities, Feisal advised revolt, and on reaching Medina again in May, after hoodwinking Jemal in Damascus and Medina, and on finding there a picked force nearly ready to accompany Baron von Stotzingen southwards (*see* No. 2), he urged on his father that it must be then or never. A month later the Revolt began.

The old King is the ablest of the family. Mild in appearance and of the traditional Imam type, he is capable of severity and has great persistence and courage. He is a very hard worker and of most abstemious, even Spartan, life. His knowledge of affairs is that of a well educated Turk and sometimes surprises one. His chief faults are his paternal conception of government, his inability to delegate details and trifles of administration to others, his ignorance of his own ignorance of military matters, and his irritability. Of his sons, the eldest, Ali, is a courteous pleasant gentleman, not wanting in ability, but delicate and of a religious turn and not much force. Abdullah is a politician, with not much taste for, or knowledge of, fighting, naturally indolent and fond of pleasure, free-thinking and addicted to dabbling in European matters. There are some who hold him the ablest of the family; but more put Feisal in that place. The latter has more taste for fighting than the rest, and is of very charming address, and a great desert diplomatist. He is as hard a worker as his father, and better able to delegate authority; but he has not the old man's obstinate persistence and strength of character. Zeid has not fully developed yet. He is still soft, unreliable, and averse from strenuous action. He was his mother's darling and has not quite outgrown that stage. The education of all four has been of the modern Turkish sort, and, like their father, they speak Turkish well. Feisal knows a good deal of French, and so does Abdullah, but neither uses this knowledge much. Of the four, Feisal has made the most of his opportunity in the present war, and is better known to the general Arab world than his brothers. All have much respect for, and very real fear of, their father.


G.S.P.I.,

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E.E.F.

RULING SHERIFIAL FAMILY OF MECCA.*

Mohammed Ibn Abd el Mu'in Ibn Aun
(Emir 1827-1851 and 1856-1858).



* A member of the rival Dhawi Zeid clan which was in power before 1827, viz. Abd el Mutallib, son of the Emir Ghàlib and grandson of the Emir Mesaid, was appointed Emir 1851-1856, and again, in extreme old age, 1880-1882 after the murder of Emir Husein.

SECRET.

No. 6.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.**ENEMY TERRITORY.**

25th May, 1918.

POLITICAL.

It is reported from Constantinople that serious differences exist between the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha and the Minister of War, Enver Pasha. Although a reconciliation is said to have taken place in December last, there appears to have been a ministerial crisis about the middle of April. Some people thought Talaat Pasha would fall and would be replaced by Jemal Pasha.

The position of the Government cannot however be said to be precarious. Talaat and his ministry appear to be as firmly in the saddle as ever. This is largely due to the Russian and Roumanian peace, the prospect of recovering the Eastern provinces lost to Russia in 1878, and the large number of "profiteers" who are quite willing to see the war go on.

Discontent, however, exists. It is especially noticeable among those in receipt of pensions. The Government have therefore selected the leaders among the Military and Civil pensioners, and supplied them with funds to engage in business. A similar policy has been followed in the Army where a number of Junior Turkish Officers are said to be very much against the C.U.P., and to hate Enver, Talaat and Jemal. Money is supplied to the relatives of unruly officers with a view to silencing them.

A neutral European who was recently in Smyrna and left Constantinople at the beginning of April, reports that the Turkish people in general have no great confidence in final victory. He believes two thirds of them are in favour of a separate peace at any price.

Information has been received that the Persian Mission, mentioned in Summary No. 5 as having arrived at Aleppo, February 17th—20th, was unable to proceed owing to lack of transport and funds. The Persians, 150 in number, were petitioning the Turkish Government for permission to return to Constantinople. It is reported from Constantinople that difficulties have arisen between the Turkish Government and the Peace delegates of the Caucasus Republic, owing to the fact that the majority of these delegates are Christians. The Turks hold that the delegation cannot possibly be representative, as there are many Moslems in the Caucasus. They say they can only discuss peace terms with a delegation consisting chiefly of Moslems.

It was reported from Constantinople towards the end of March that Turkey had signed a convention with Germany whereby the territorial integrity of Turkey was guaranteed.

Turkey was also said to have signed an agreement with Bulgaria by which Dedeagatch and district will be returned to Turkey. Bulgaria will receive the Dobrudja, Kavala, Drama and other districts in Macedonia.

TURKO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

There are indications of a growing fear on the part of Talaat Pasha and other members of the Government of the control exercised by the Germans over everything in Turkey and of a desire to establish a "rapprochement" with the Entente Powers, though they seek in vain for a means of doing so.

The Germans assure the Turks that their offensive in the West will be entirely successful and that the British will be obliged to accept terms involving withdrawal from Mesopotamia and Palestine. They therefore recommend that the Turks should not make unnecessary sacrifices in opposing the British advance. These assurances appear to have thoroughly satisfied the Turkish Government.

Although the Turkish Government is outwardly in perfect agreement with the Germans, Anti-German feeling is growing more and more pronounced. German and Turkish Officers seem to get on well together. Austrians of all ranks behave well and are liked. German Commanders of Divisions are more or less popular with the men as their presence usually means better food. German soldiers are, however, hated. They behave badly in public being frequently found drunk in cafés and cinemas. In Damascus, a prisoner states, they ill-treat the Moslem women. They are constantly involved in brawls and on one occasion killed two Turkish soldiers with their bayonets. On the railway they will not travel with Turks, but use the butts of their rifles on them when they try to come into the carriage. An Armenian Officer Prisoner of War states that when his battalion left Damascus on May 1st, they had 40 men in one truck, while in the next truck there were only 2 German soldiers, who refused to have any Turks in with them. German soldiers usually travel 1st class. A Syrian Christian Medical Officer says he witnessed the following incident at Rayak. A German soldier having taken possession of a compartment in a railway carriage at the station, stood at the door forbidding any one else to enter. A Turkish Major went up the steps and asked for admission which was refused. He tried to force his way in, but the German gave him a kick in the chest, which sent him flat on his back. He picked himself up and tried to make for the German soldier, but was restrained by the Officer Commanding the station, who was also a Turkish Major. Five minutes later the train moved on with the German soldier alone in the compartment peacefully smoking his pipe. Similar incidents are frequent.

A Syrian Interpreter, recently captured, says, the German troops with whom he came in contact, some of them volunteers, were very dissatisfied and disappointed. They said they would prefer to fight and die on the Western front since they had seen the condition and organization of the Turkish troops. They were ashamed to be the Allies of such people.

In Constantinople, a few months ago, the authorities dealt severely with those who used the expression "Giaour" (infidel) in speaking of Christians. Now it was not infrequent to hear the words "Allaman Giaour" (German infidel) used openly in the streets.

German military successes have undoubtedly made a great impression on the public in Syria and all over Turkey. The Turkish press constantly draws the conclusion that the Central Powers have been and will remain victorious. Christians as well as Moslems in Syria are obliged to declare that they share the same belief.

The Turks realise that Germany is more to be blamed than Turkey for their present sufferings. The Turkish soldier, even more than the Turkish people at large, dislikes the Germans as he sees the superior treatment offered by the Turkish authorities to the German soldiers, and his indignation knows no bounds when he sees that there are no German units fighting side by side with him, while he knows that many Turkish units are being decimated fighting for the Germans in Galicia and Roumania.

ARMENIANS.

A well educated and intelligent Armenian deserter gives the following account of the treatment of Armenian deportees in Northern Syria:—

In the municipalities of the towns there are special officials who register the names of deportees and are supposed to provide food and shelter for those in need. As a matter of fact food is never distributed, and the deportees, mostly women and children, suffer greatly from hunger and are obliged to eat herbs and grass.

At Aleppo there is a workshop to provide employment for the deportees, but there is only room there for a small proportion of the total numbers. At Hama, Homs, Damascus, El Kuneitra and the neighbourhood, the Armenian deportees are able to earn their living, thanks to their industrious habits. At Damascus, especially, they are doing fairly well in various branches of trade. Armenian women, girls, and children of the poorest classes try to make a living by selling bread in the streets.

An Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, gives the following information:—

The Turks are very bitter against Armenians both in civil life and in the Army where every offence committed by an Armenian is harshly dealt with. Armenians can only be promoted to 2nd-Lieutenant, excepting doctors, who are Captains, and chemists, who are 1st-Lieutenants. Most Armenians are now penniless. Informant's uncle, a rich man before the war, has £6,000 in the Deutscher Bank but cannot draw a penny as the Bank has received orders from the Government not to pay money to Armenians. A cousin was compelled to join the Turkish Army in order to get food for his family of nine persons. When he was taken prisoner at El Arish the whole family starved to death near Damascus.

Another Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, who is a native of Brusa, states that before the war there was an Armenian population of more than 10,000 in that city, but now there were only eight families living there. About an equal number of Armenians lived at Buyuk Yenikeui, but now there are none. There were also about 15,000 Armenians in the villages round these two places, but none are left now.

About two months ago the Turks began to recruit Armenians in Damascus, and informant heard from his cousin, who lived there, that the Turks were compelling all young Armenian men to become Moslems and to adopt Turkish names.

ARAB MOVEMENT.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured May 1st, has given the following information:—

The Moslem Arabs are anxious to see the restoration of an Arab Khalifate, but Arabic speaking Christians favour a foreign occupation, British or French, the choice depending mainly on their education. All, however, are agreed that the Turks are not fit to rule.

The Arabs of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Nablus and neighbourhood, think the British owe much of their success in Palestine to Arab assistance. With very few exceptions all Arabs in these places mention the Sherif of Mecca's name with respect, though with a certain timidity. Their ideas on the subject of the kingdom of the Hejaz are very vague, but they cherish the hope that the Sherif at the head of large Arab forces will come and deliver them from Turkish oppression.

An intelligent and credible Jewish refugee recently reported that the Druses who have been favourably treated by the Turks and have greatly profited by excellent harvests and high prices are observing an expectant attitude. Pro-British sentiment is still strong among them and they are quite aware that, if the Turks are victorious in the war, they will be the first to suffer.

A refugee, recently imprisoned in Damascus, states that he heard from a Christian journalist who was his fellow prisoner, that the Turks had entirely ruined the Lebanon, its population being starved and utterly demoralised. The Lebanon Druses were faring little better than their Christian neighbours. The Turks no longer seek to conciliate them, having succeeded in sowing the seeds of dissension among the Chiefs. One powerful family was said to be in utter destitution. Their daughters had become servants and prostitutes to Turkish Officers. Informant heard that in the last few months a number of Druse Chiefs had been arrested.

At the beginning of the war the Turks tried to check the Arab movement by hanging and exiling the leaders. They have been very hard hit by the Hejaz revolt and vow to pay King Hussein and his men out when the war is over. After an explosion near Zerka (156. T.28.) on the Hejaz railway at the beginning of April, the Turks collected the Chiefs of the tribes along the track from Zerka northwards, and obliged them to ride on all the trains between Deraa and Damascus, paying them so much a day and their food.

ECONOMIC.

PALESTINE FRONT.

A Syrian Medical Officer, Prisoner of War, captured on April 30th, 1918, states that Turkish troops in the front line receive sufficient rations to keep them in good condition. Up to 700 grammes (about 1½ lb.) of bread, and soup or a stew with meat once a day. The quality of the bread is very poor. Troops in the interior, Lines of Communications, Medical Corps and Hospital Patients do not get enough food, and consequently their vitality is very low.

The issue of boots is not sufficient to keep the men shod.

The wheat and barley crops South of Damascus are excellent. The following prices were current in Nablus at the end of April, 1918 :—

Brown bread, per rotol (5½ lbs.)	...	80	P.T. Silver.
Durra " " "	...	20	" "
Barley " " "	...	18	" "
Meat (very scarce) " " "	...	60	" "
Sugar " " "	...	300	" "

Some Arab deserters, who surrendered on May 12th, 1918, stated, the inhabitants of Tul Keram have been on the verge of starvation, the poorest living on herbs and grass only. New crops, however, are now coming on the market.

NORTHERN SYRIA.

In Damascus there are about ten large shops, run by Germans, selling hardware, leather, cloth and military outfits. The goods come from Germany without difficulty. The prices are the same as those in native shops, but the quality of the articles is far superior.

The following prices were current in Damascus on April 15th, 1918 :—

Wheat, per rotol (5½ lbs.)	...	40 to 45	P.T. Coin.
Oats " " "	...	30	" "
Durra " " "	...	40	" "
Beef " " "	...	50	" "
Mutton " " "	...	80	" "
One pair shoes, £T. 15 (paper).			
One pair boots, £T. 30 " "			
One suit of clothes, £T. 50 (paper).			

Coal was unobtainable and charcoal expensive. Benzine was being sold by German and Austrian Soldiers for 60 P.T. coin for 12 Litres.

About five months ago an order was issued by the Turkish Government allowing each Officer to buy about 10 kilograms of wheat monthly from the Government stores, whereupon every Officer bought much larger quantities and sold it to civilians, thereby making large profits. After four months this order was rescinded.

Clothing is now made in Damascus and is of very poor quality. There appears to be a good supply of wool but the cost is high. Boots are also made in Damascus. There is a good supply of leather, mostly cowhides, but also camel and horse hides, which come from the Government factory at Mashgara in the Lebanon.

The following prices were current in the middle of April in Aleppo and district :—

Bread, 16 P.T. (coin) per oke (2¾ lb.).
Barley, 15 P.T. (coin) per oke (2¾ lb.).
One pair European boots, £T. 2½ (coin).
One pair boots of native leather, £T. 1½ (coin).

The rate of exchange rose after peace was declared with Russia to £T. 1 = 35 P.T.

The crop prospects were good and there had been abundant rains. The barley harvest was expected to end in May and the wheat harvest in the middle of June.

There were practically no camels, horses were few and in bad condition owing to lack of forage, donkeys were not numerous.

The rate of exchange at Damascus on April 15th, 1918, was £T. 1 = 15 P.T. (coin). Towards the end of the month it had risen to P.T. 29 (coin) and on May 1st it was P.T. 40 (coin).

CONSTANTINOPLE AND ASIA MINOR.

The condition of the population of Constantinople towards the end of March is reported to have been as bad as ever. Women brought their children to the municipalities and laid them on the floor, saying "Take them, we cannot feed them." Mobs from time to time raided military stores and took what they wanted.

An Armenian Officer, prisoner of war, who left Constantinople on April 16th, states that prices were as follows:—

Bread	per oke (2 $\frac{3}{4}$ lb.)	...	25-30 P.T. paper.
Meat	" "	...	200 "
Rice	" "	...	80 "
Cooking Butter	" "	...	250 "
Olive Oil	" "	...	200 "
Milk	" "	...	40 "

A pair of boots cost £T. 15 paper and a suit of clothes £T. 25-30 paper.

The rate of exchange on April 10th was £T. 1 = 30 P.T. coin.

An Arab deserter who passed through a great part of central Asia Minor on foot between February and April describes the crop prospects in that region as very promising. At Angora where he was about April 12th, a $\frac{3}{4}$ kilo loaf of bread (1'65lbs.) cost 4 P.T. silver. In Asia Minor the rate of exchange was £T. 1 = 20 P.T. silver.

SANITARY.

An Armenian deserter states that, at Damascus, in March, there was much eye disease among the troops. There were 50 cases of scurvy in the hospital to which he was admitted.

A Greek Medical Officer, prisoner of war, captured on March 25th, 1918, states that when he was employed in the hospital at Es Salt, at the end of February, heavy mortality was caused by (a) typhus, (b) dysentery, (c) general debility. In a hospital with a little over a thousand patients, the death rates from these causes were approximately as follows:—

- (a) 18 deaths out of 300 cases in 3 months.
- (b) 8-10 deaths daily for 3 months.
- (c) 12-20 deaths daily for 3 months.

Latterly, however, there had been an improvement, as milk, which had been unobtainable, was supplied, and deaths from (b) and (c) together only averaged five or six daily. Medicines and drugs were plentiful, but no cotton wool could be obtained.

A Syrian Medical Officer, prisoner of war, captured on April 30th, 1918, states that all drugs now come from Germany. There is still a plentiful supply of the following:—Quinine, asperine, bismuth, potassium permanganate, camphorated oil, chloride of mercury sublimate. Finer drugs are rare or lacking. A cotton factory in Damascus supplies plenty of good quality bandages, dressings, and cotton wool. There is a sufficiency of surgical instruments, all made in Germany.

Hospitals are inefficient owing to the lack of suitable and sufficient food for patients. Bad transport of patients also contributes to the high rate of mortality. Patients have wooden beds and good mattresses. The principal diseases are malaria (most frequent of all), dysentery, venereal (not allowed into hospital, but treated in the battalion), typhoid, paratyphoid, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. One case only of cholera occurred at Amman, about April 14th.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured on April 30th, 1918, gives the following account of health conditions at Damascus, where he was in April, and in the Lebanon:—

The chief cause of the poor state of public health is chronic starvation and its consequences. Typhus is endemic everywhere, but not so deadly as it used to be, as the microbe seems to have become attenuated. Cholera appeared in Beirut and Damascus two years ago, in the summer, but was soon got under. One case was reported in Amman about April 15th. Malaria in all its varieties is most prevalent everywhere. Dysentery is more common in Palestine than in the north. Tuberculosis is increasing from lack of physical resistance in the starving population. Smallpox is kept under by vaccination and such cases as occur are sporadic. Influenza is common on the sea coast and "three day fever" is also to be met with. Pneumonia, Pleurisy and Rheumatism are sporadic. Diphtheria and Typhoid are sporadic in general but Typhoid is endemic in Beirut. Venereal diseases make frightful ravages in Beirut and Damascus. Skin diseases of all sorts, especially scabies, are rampant owing to want of soap and new clothing, especially in the army and in the larger towns.

An Armenian Cadet Officer, captured on May 3rd, 1918, who left Constantinople on April 10th, states there was an outbreak of Typhus in the army and among the civil population during the last month he was there. The disease was still rife when he left. His company had 15 cases. The names of civilians who died were published daily in the newspapers. The death rate among civilians was 35 to 37 daily.

A Syrian Christian Medical Officer, captured May 1st, 1918, gives the following instances of the treatment of medical personnel in the Turkish Army:—

Doctors and Pharmacists are frequently marched to their posts under an armed guard. The last hospital formed at Es Salt was organized as follows. The Medical Officer in charge received orders to leave Damascus when he was ill in bed suffering from Pyuria. He objected, but by orders of the Principal Medical Officer, Lines of Communications at Damascus, he was carried in his night shirt to the District Commander on a stretcher, and was told that should he die, the orders were to send his body to Es Salt. He was then marched in his night-shirt to the station with a bayonet behind him.

The Pharmacist's only son was ill with meningitis. He received orders to leave while at work in his hospital and was not allowed to take leave of his dying son, nor to get his luggage, nor to see his wife.

As for the Army Medical Corps men selected for the hospital, they were roped together to the number of 63, but only 13 were found on arrival at Es Salt.

Great mortality was caused in the Mezzeh Hospital at Damascus owing to the insufficient food supplied by Lines of Communications. The principal Medical Officer of the IVth Army complained about the death rate to the Medical Officer in charge, who promptly put all the Medical Officers in his hospital into prison, including informant. He would not vary the diet lest he should give trouble to Lines of Communication. Needless to say the death rate did not decrease.

A Constantinople newspaper of February 26th, 1918, publishes a statement by the Director of the Public Health Department to the Turkish Chamber of Deputies.

He said that exanthemic typhus and cholera continue to rage in Turkey and that the Administration had taken measures to deal with these epidemics. 80% of the doctors were however with the Army and it had been found necessary to hand over the work of the civilian doctors to military doctors.

With regard to typhus, cleanliness was the only safeguard, and bathing establishments had been set up with the different armies, to which the poorer classes of the population were sent. The results of this campaign had not been very brilliant. In 1916, 29,000 cases were reported, and 25,000 in 1917. In Constantinople there were great difficulties owing to the large numbers of the population and the failure of doctors to report cases at once. Also the baths were for a long time without hot water owing to lack of fuel, and soap was very expensive.

More successful results were obtained with cholera. In 1916 there were 10,090 cases reported, and in 1917 only 1,080.

For small-pox the Constantinople laboratories could produce 28,000,000 tubes of vaccine annually, and laboratories had been set up at Sivas and Damascus.

Malaria was very prevalent, especially on the Black Sea coast. 2,700 kilograms of quinine had been distributed in the past year against only 632 kilograms the year before.

There was an unconfirmed report of plague at Trebizond at the end of January, and steps were taken to inoculate all troops proceeding in that direction.

ATTACHMENT.

A Note on "King Husein of Hejaz and His Sons."

G.S.P.I.,

G.H.Q.,

E.E.F.

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.

ATTACHMENT TO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,

No. 6, 25th May, 1918.

KING HUSEIN OF HEJAZ AND HIS SONS.

There are some thousands of sherifs (Arabic plural, *ashraf*) in the Moslem world, all claiming direct descent from the Prophet, through his daughter, Fatima, wife of the Caliph Ali; and all are entitled also to be called seyyids (plural, *saada*). Among the accepted *ashraf*, only those on the Meccan register, which has been kept for many centuries past, if not from the Prophet's own time, are of absolutely unquestioned legitimacy. They are divided into a number of clans, living mostly in the Hejaz as an accepted aristocracy with peculiar privileges and under a law of their own.

For four centuries after the Prophet's time, sherifs were not of great account, the political power being in the hands of the Ummeyad Caliphs of Damascus and the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, none of whom were sherifial. Indeed, no one sprung from the Prophet has ever been an accepted Caliph. With the decline of the power of Baghdad, however, and the establishment of a sherifial dynasty, the Fatimite, in Egypt, the Prophet's blood began everywhere to assume enhanced importance, and, late in the 10th century, one of the *ashraf* got possession of Mecca, and inaugurated in Hejaz a tradition of sherifial temporal power, whose holder was regarded as Emir and head of the *Ashraf-Sherif par excellence*, or, as mediæval European writers termed him, "Grand Sherif." For many generations this Emirate was precarious and depended much on Egyptian favour; and no dynasty secured long possession till a fighting Sherif of the Juheinah Arabs, one Qatada, seized Mecca at the opening of the 13th century. From him King Husein descends.

Some three centuries later Qatada's dynasty produced a Prince of exceptional force and power of organization, Mohammed abu Numei. It was he who, taking advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman Sultanate at the time, finally established the predominance of the Meccan Emir in Hejaz, and the exclusive right of his own family to the Emirate. That the Emir can be chosen only from descendants of Abu Numei is now held a matter of course. He had several sons. The Emirate got into, and remained for a long time in, the line of one of these, Zeid, successive Emirs obtaining their positions generally after much intrigue and even bloodshed, and seeking confirmation *ex post facto* at the hands of the Ottoman Caliphs. Thus it was till early in the last century, after Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt, had occupied Hejaz, expelling the Wahabites. He removed the reigning Emir, Ghalib, but appointed his son, Yahya; and it was not until the latter had taken up a hostile attitude towards his representative and, in the precinct of the Kaaba itself, stabbed a nephew suspected of being friendly to the Egyptian Pasha, that Mohammed Ali thought of exchanging the Zeid House (Dhawi Zeid) for another. He had, in Cairo, at the time a certain Sherif, Mohammed ibn Abdul Muin el-Aun, descended from Abu Numei's eldest son Abdullah, from whom the line is known as the Abadila. This Sherif was nominated Emir in 1827, and sent with an Egyptian force to take possession and instal the Abadila House. He was the present King's grandfather. The Zeid house, however, was not quite done with. Members of it have been nominated four times since that date to the Emirate, whenever the Porte had occasion to give the Abadila house a salutary lesson, and twice they have actually taken possession. The last of such nominations took place two years ago, when Emir Husein had declared his independence. Sherif Ali Haidar, a descendant of the Emir Ghalib, dispossessed by Mohammed Ali, was invested at Constantinople and sent down to Medina; but he was not able to proceed to Mecca to take up his dignity, and eventually gave up and retired.

Three sons of Mohammed Ali's nominee reigned, but the father of the present King of Hejaz died before his turn to succeed came, and his son Husein was living on the Bosphorus in 1908, when his cousin, the Emir Ali, had been destituted by the Porte, and his uncle, the aged Abdillah, nominated to succeed, but very ill at the time, had died without being able to proceed to Mecca. Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier, consulted a representative of our Embassy and the result was the nomination of Husein, then about 54 years of age, but a man in full vigour and of remarkable intelligence and courage. He proceeded to Mecca, determined to restore the prestige and independence of the Sherifate, and to that end, to rely on the Bedouin tribes which were traditionally attached to the fortunes of the Emir, but had been allowed to get out of hand in the last two reigns. He sent his four sons, Ali, Abdullah, Feisal, and Zeid, all born at Constantinople, to lead the nomad life, and committed his infant grandsons to Bedouin nurses in the desert. He took other measures also, which the wealth of his family, largely derived from Egyptian lands given to his grandfather by Mohammed Ali, made possible. By undertaking two expeditions on behalf of the Porte in 1910, one to Qasim and one to Asir, he allayed any suspicions of his loyalty, trained two of his sons, Abdullah and Feisal in Arab warfare, and created the nucleus of a Bedouin force. His eldest son, Ali, he used mainly at Medina, while both Abdullah and Feisal became Deputies in the Constantinople Parliament, the one representing Mecca, the other Jeddah. Zeid, the fourth, son of a Turkish wife, had hardly yet emerged from the harem.

By 1913 Emir Husein had formed definite plans for obtaining independence of Ottoman control, though prepared to recognize the formal suzerainty of the Caliph. His sons, had come into contact with the Arab Committees at Constantinople, and early in 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo to see how the land lay. Both he and Feisal had taken a prominent part in claiming Arab rights before the Chamber, and had had passages of arms with Enver and other Young Turks. The outbreak of War between Turkey and the Entente promised the long sought opportunity; but Feisal, sent up to Constantinople in 1915 to see how the War was going, reported unfavourably on our chances in Gallipoli. To gain time Emir Husein allowed his son, Ali, to raise a regiment at Medina to co-operate with the Turks in Sinai, well knowing it would do us no harm (as indeed, in the event, it did not!). Sent up again early in 1916, when Syria was exasperated by Jemal Pasha's severities, Feisal advised revolt, and on reaching Medina again in May, after hoodwinking Jemal in Damascus and Medina, and on finding there a picked force nearly ready to accompany Baron von Stotzingen southwards (*see* No. 2), he urged on his father that it must be then or never. A month later the Revolt began.


The old King is the ablest of the family. Mild in appearance and of the traditional Imam type, he is capable of severity and has great persistence and courage. He is a very hard worker and of most abstemious, even Spartan, life. His knowledge of affairs is that of a well educated Turk and sometimes surprises one. His chief faults are his paternal conception of government, his inability to delegate details and trifles of administration to others, his ignorance of his own ignorance of military matters, and his irritability. Of his sons, the eldest, Ali, is a courteous pleasant gentleman, not wanting in ability, but delicate and of a religious turn and not much force. Abdullah is a politician, with not much taste for, or knowledge of, fighting, naturally indolent and fond of pleasure, free-thinking and addicted to dabbling in European matters. There are some who hold him the ablest of the family; but more put Feisal in that place. The latter has more taste for fighting than the rest, and is of very charming address, and a great desert diplomatist. He is as hard a worker as his father, and better able to delegate authority; but he has not the old man's obstinate persistence and strength of character. Zeid has not fully developed yet. He is still soft, unreliable, and averse from strenuous action. He was his mother's darling and has not quite outgrown that stage. The education of all four has been of the modern Turkish sort, and, like their father, they speak Turkish well. Feisal knows a good deal of French, and so does Abdullah, but neither uses this knowledge much. Of the four, Feisal has made the most of his opportunity in the present war, and is better known to the general Arab world than his brothers. All have much respect for, and very real fear of, their father.

G.S.P.I.,

G.H.Q.,

E.E.F.

RULING SHERIFIAL FAMILY OF MECCA.*



* A member of the rival Dhawi Zeid clan which was in power before 1827, viz. Abd el Mutallib, son of the Emir Ghàlib and grandson of the Emir Mesaid, was appointed Emir 1851-1856, and again, in extreme old age, 1880-1882 after the murder of Emir Husein.