


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/14/2 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 4th Army

November 1916



AWM4-1/14/2PART2

6th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
1916 ARMY.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 6th November, 1916.

No.....
Date.....

490

1. No operations were undertaken during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

The following was the situation in the morning :-
a line was being consolidated from T.5.b.6.8 to N.35.d.2.3.
Strong points had been established at T.5.b.6.6, N.35.d.2.3
and N.35.d.0.4. A bombing post had been established 150
yards N.E. of SUMMER TRENCH in the Sunken road. ORION
Trench was still in German hands. The situation of 17th
Division was unchanged.

Touch was obtained with the French during the
day at T.5.b.8.4. Trenches were dug as follows :-
From T.5.b.8.4 - T.5.b.6.8 - T.5.b.1.9 and from N.35.c.
9.4 - N.35.c.6.7 $\frac{1}{2}$ - southern end of SUMMER TRENCH. Strong
points were established at T.5.b.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.8, T.5.b. $\frac{1}{2}$.9 and a
bombing post at N.35.a.3.3.

LES BOEUFs and the areas immediately West of it
were heavily shelled during the day.

The right brigade of the 33rd Divn. was relieved
by 1 Bde. 8th Divn. during the night.

3. Anzac Corps.

Hostile shelling was slight during the night.

In the afternoon the hostile artillery heavily
shelled the front line of the Left Bde. of the 2nd
Australian Division. Also the enemy fired single red
rockets from his trenches but no action followed.

During the night the 2nd Australian Divn. by
bombing attacks established posts at M.24.b.2.9, M.24.b.0.9
and M.18.d.1.1.

4. III Corps.

The day passed quietly.

The enemy shelled the Sunken road in M.17.c.

Shelling of LE SANS heavier than usual.

A bright windy day.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

No operations.

6. AIRCRAFT.

113 hours were flown by 77 pilots.

There was high wind during the day with occas-
ional rainstorms.

One successful trench reconnaissance was made.

4 batteries were successfully engaged. 2 direct

....hits

6th November, 1916. 4th ARMY.

GENERAL STAFF
HEADQUARTERS

hits caused explosions. 9 direct hits were obtained on trenches. 7 batteries were located.

Hostile activity was below normal. There were no combats.

63 photographs were taken.

A big gun was discovered on railway mounting at G.19.d.5.7.

2 - 20 lb bombs were dropped on LE TRANSLOY.

7. PRISONERS.

8 o.r. reported.

8. CASUALTIES.

	Officers	O.R.
1/6th November (estimated)	75	2915
Totals up to date ..	<u>11,092</u>	<u>263,830</u>

9. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	9
13 pdr. S.	1,256
,, H.E.	19
18 pdr. S.	66,730
,, H.E.	28,662
4.5" How. H.E.	18,918
4.7" Mk VI S.	268
,, H.E.	788
60 pdr. S.	4,117
,, H.E.	3,019
6" How. H.E.	543
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	5,973
6" Mk VII S.	211
,, H.E.	255
8" How. H.E.	1,489
9.2" How. H.E.	1,864
12" How. H.E.	72
12" Gun H.E.	1

10. WEATHER.

High wind, with occasional rainstorms.

11. MOVES and ARRIVALS.

30th Divn. (1) Transport Pioneer bn. from TOUTENCOURT to Third Army.

(2) Personnel Pioneer Bn. from Anzac Corps to Third Army.

2nd Ind. Cav. Divn.

Reserve Park from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.

Guarda Divn.

(1) Transport 2 bns from LONGPRE to DAOURS.

(2) Personnel 2 Bns. from area 4 by 'bus to XIV Corps.

(3) Transport Pioneer Bn. from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.

(4) Personnel Pioneer Bn. from ALBERT by train to area 4.

....(New

6th Novr., 1916.

(New back area boundary of Anzac Corps comes into force. 4th Australian Divn. transferred from XV Corps to Anzac Corps accordingly).

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12. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
Anzac ,,	1A, 2A, 5A*.
XIV ,,	8*, 17, 29*, 33.
Army Reserve	(XV Corps HQ, Guards, 4, 4A, 20, 29, 60. 2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.

13. GENERAL.

(a) The following letter was sent out to III Corps and Anzac Corps :-

299/61 (G),

" 1. The Army Commander wishes the attack on those objectives allotted to the III Corps and I Anzac Corps for the attack on the 5th November, which were not captured on that date, to be renewed at an early date. This includes the hostile trenches in N.20. central.

2. G.Os.C. III and I Anzac Corps will arrange direct the details of the co-operation for this attack, which should be carried out, if possible, on the 9th.

3. III Corps and I Anzac Corps will report to A.H.Q. the arrangements that have been made as early as possible.

4. Special provision should be made for the artillery to deal with all communication trenches by which bombing counter-attacks are likely to be made, and fire to be maintained on all areas hidden from direct view in which the enemy can bring forward reinforcements or assemble for counter-attacks.

(Sgd.) A.A. Montgomery,

H.Q., Fourth Army.
6/11/16.

Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army."

(b) The following letter was sent to the XIV Corps :-

405 (G).

" 1. As soon as our communications with the front are improved, and the weather conditions permit, the XIV Corps will be required to attack LE TRANSLOY.

2. In order to enable this attack to be carried out it will be necessary to take over some front from the French Sixth Army on our right, as it is intended that this attack shall be made from the South.

3. The Army Commander wishes you to submit as early

....as

6th November, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

as possible your proposals as to how much front would be required, and also what back area and communications it would be necessary for you to take over.

H.Q., Fourth Army,
6/11/18.

(Sgd.) A.A. Montgomery,
Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

- (c) The Army Commander held a Conference at HEILLY at 3.0 p.m., a precis of what took place being attached.

6th November, 1918.

A conference was held at HEILLY at 3.0 p.m.,
at which the following were present :-

G.Os.C., III, XIV, XV, and I Anzac Corps.

B.Gs, G.S.

B.Gs, R.A.

D.A. & Q.M.Gs.

C.Es.

G.O.C., 4th Bde. R.F.C.

Major Lord Gort, Adv. G.H.Q.

H.R.H. The Prince of Wales also attended.

The Army Commander said that, as regards the general situation, our operations had been very much hampered by the weather recently, and on the whole of the front of the Fourth, Fifth and French Sixth Armies it had not been possible to make as much progress as was wished.

The operations of the Fifth Army, with which we had been waiting to co-operate, had now been definitely postponed until more settled weather set in.

On the 5th (yesterday) the French Sixth Army, although not successful in getting their full objectives, succeeded in gaining a footing in ST. PIERRE VAAST WOOD and in some trenches in the neighbourhood of SAILLY-SAILLISEL.

Generally speaking, the policy of the C.-in-C. was for the Fourth Army not to make any large advance towards BAPAUME until the Armies on the flanks had been able to come up into line. The French intended to continue the attack of the 5th and to gain ground towards SAILLISEL, with the object of gaining possession of ST. PIERRE VAAST WOOD. On the extreme right the XIV Corps were successful in gaining their objectives in the neighbourhood of HAZY and MIRAGE Trenches.

Corps Commanders then described the present positions of their lines.

The A.C. continued that the Fifth Army had modified their programme and proposed to limit their operations to the attack of the line ST. PIERRE DIVION - BEAUCOURT - SERRE, all inclusive, in order to gain possession of the BEAUCOURT - SERRE Spur. This operation would take place on the 9th, weather permitting. The Army Commander considered that this would be a suitable opportunity to repeat the operation which the III and Anzac Corps attempted on the 5th, and that then, or before, an operation North of WARLENCOURT might be undertaken.

The ultimate objective of the XIV Corps was LE TRANSLOY, but he appreciated the fact that a direct attack on it from our present line was not a feasible operation. For the time being the XIV Corps were to endeavour to improve their position with a view to their ultimate objective.

Broadly speaking, the Fourth Army policy was to undertake modified operations in order to maintain the force of the enemy that was opposed to it.

The chief object of the operations of the Fourth, Fifth and French Sixth Armies would not be altogether to break through, but to retain as many of the

....enemy

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GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

enemy as possible on the Western front and prevent them reinforcing their Armies which were engaged in operations against the Russians and Roumanians. Operations on this scale would be continued throughout the Winter when weather permits, and we were therefore to be prepared to undertake such operations as circumstances would allow. It was fully realised that with the ground and trenches in the present condition it was impossible for the infantry to attempt to advance.

The A.C. said the organisation of the Fourth Army was now fixed. The III Corps would retain the 1st, 15th, 43rd and 50th Divisions. The Anzac Corps their own Divisions. The XIV and XV Corps would probably not remain as they were but the Divisions would be interchanged between them.

Notwithstanding the fact that we must be prepared to undertake operations of a limited nature during the Winter it was not to be forgotten that Winter was upon us and troops must be kept in good condition, and that a good deal of work must be done to achieve this object. Not only must we work on the front line, but Intermediate and Back lines must be constructed. The enemy had a large number of guns on our front, and, as he had a certain number of fresh divisions, a counter-attack to regain some of the ground that he had lost in the Battle was not impossible.

The organisation and selection of positions for defensive purposes, particularly in reference to villages like LESBOEUF, FLERS, MARTINPUICH and LE SARRS must be taken in hand at once. Behind these villages the big ridge running by HIGH WOOD, LONGUEVAL and GINCHY would be our main line of defence. In front of this ridge an Intermediate line would be organised on the approximate line of the old FLERS Trench. Army H.Q. would shortly issue a map broadly showing the proposed lines of defence, and Corps Commanders would be asked to work out schemes for their respective fronts. The villages mentioned above must be put in a proper state of defence, and garrisons always maintained in them not only capable of defending them but of constructing new machine gun emplacements properly secured and protected.

As regards ammunition, the A.C. did not anticipate there would be any real shortage. The 6" gun ammunition continued to be the main trouble. We were not limited in regard to keeping up fire on the enemy and night firing must be continued as up to date.

He insisted on the careful study of air photographs, particularly with a view to directing artillery fire on to the enemy's lines of approach. Machine gun fire was continually to be used to prevent the enemy from working. Particular attention must be placed in making deep dug-outs and shelters for the men in the front area, and, although labour may be short, the work had got to be done and therefore it should be begun at once.

The A.C. emphasised the importance of training of troops with a view to an offensive on a large scale at an early date next year. Both the III and ANzac Corps will have two divisions out of the line which can be trained. The greatest attention must be paid to the training of young officers to command platoons and companies and giving them constant exercise in tactical handling of troops which is not taught at home. The XV and XIV Corps will

....arrange

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arrange Regimental and Brigade H.Q. with a view to teaching young officers to undertake small attack schemes. Notwithstanding the number of Schools arranged for by higher formations divisions must arrange for their own Divisional Schools for the instruction of young officers. A pamphlet which was being issued on a large scale on the organisation of the Army front during the Winter did not imply that we were going to settle down to a defensive front. Guides for framing trench orders were included, but it was not intended that orders issued by lower formations must be exactly like it.

The importance of good communications was emphasised; on that the comfort of the troops depends. Railways were being pushed forward as far as possible in order to save the roads, and if the arrangement which had just been made with the Director of Railways could be carried out the situation should be considerably improved.

As regards the III Corps, the principle was to get the normal gauge railway as far forward as possible consistent with safety. It had now reached BAZENTIN, and, shortly, it was hoped to run another line to the North of BAZENTIN village where an Engineer dump could be formed for the Corps between CONTALMAISON village and S.12.central. From this point Decauville could be run down to MARTINPUICH. As regards the Anzac Corps, the railway would be continued to LONGUEVAL and eventually into FLERS. One Decauville railway had already reached FLERS and it was proposed to put another one down there as well. As regards the XIV Corps the normal gauge railway used by them was under the French and the French had been asked to continue the line through GUILLEMONT, South of GINCHY and to make a station half way between LESBOEUF and GINCHY on the southern side of the Spur. If Decauville could be run from there the carrying would be reduced enormously. This railway could not be finished in less than three weeks. There was also the metre gauge line to GUILLEMONT which could be used for ammunition. When the above policy was completed we should be able to take all the lorries off the road. Decauville should be used with tractors and not steam engines, the latter having various mechanical disadvantages.

The A.C. called the attention of C.Es. to the lack of co-ordination in getting the right things to the right place in the right quantities, particularly with reference to timber and stone. Sometimes it had been reported that the amount of labour was not consistent with the amount of material available at different places.

A new department had been formed called the Transportation Department. It was not yet in full working order and we should probably not see the benefit of it for several weeks to come.

The A.C. considered that the control and direction of road construction in Corps areas should be under Corps and he was very opposed to any interference with Corps Commanders in anything that takes place in their areas.

He emphasised the importance of getting huts and billets for the troops in order to avoid a high rate of sickness. At present the rate was very low, but with the cold weather it must certainly increase. 1,000 huts have been got up to date, but it was not certain when the others were coming. As far as possible a certain number of battery detachments of artillery should be pulled out for a rest.

7th November, 1916.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 7th November, 1916.

1. No operations took place during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front.
Hostile aircraft was active over the Corps back areas during the night, a number of bombs were dropped.
Zeppelins apparently crossed over the Corps area moving in a northerly direction over FRICOURT at 10.45 p.m.

Hostile artillery was active on the support and reserve lines of both the 33rd and 17th Divisions during the day.

1 Bde., 8th Division, relieved the right Bde., 33rd Division, during the night 6/7th, the relief of the left Bde. of 33rd Divn. by a Bde. of 8th Divn. was commenced during the night 7/8th.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the night the situation was unchanged, except that bombing posts were established in the MAZE.

During the day on the front of the 1st Australian Divn., the enemy shelled S.17.b. between 10.0 and 11.0 a.m. and N.31.b.2.0 at 3.40 p.m., otherwise the day was quiet.

A Red Cross party were observed carrying stretchers at about N.20.a.7.5.

On the front of 2nd Aust. Divn. FACTORY CORNER and FLERS were heavily shelled during the afternoon, also the front and support lines.

4. III Corps.

Hostile artillery was not very active. There was considerable sniping from the neighbourhood of BUTTE and HOOK SAP.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

During the night 6/7th a successful raid was carried out at K.17.d.12.12, several dug-outs were bombed, and it is estimated that 30 Germans were killed. Two wounded prisoners were brought in.

Otherwise there was no events of importance.

6. AIRCRAFT.

9 hours were flown by 6 pilots.

There was a high wind, with rain, all day.

No hostile activity.

18 - 20 lb bombs dropped by No. 18 Squadron

....between

7th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
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4th ARMY.

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Date

between 11.30 p.m. on the 6th and 1.0 a.m. on the 7th.
12 were dropped near lights in the neighbourhood
of VERMAND and HERMIES. Rockets were being fired from
the vicinity of these lights, and there were German
machines in the air, so it was probable they were landing
lights. The effect of these bombs could not be
observed. 6.- 20 lb bombs were dropped on sheds near the
canal locks at HAM. Two of the sheds were seen to be on
fire, and were still burning when the lines were re-crossed.
One machine made a successful forced landing outside his
aerodrome.

7. PRISONERS.

13 o.r. were reported.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	352
13 pdr. S.	..	100
,, H.E.	..	234
18 pdr. S.	..	27,844
,, H.E.	..	16,131
4.5" How. H.E.	..	6,837
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	72
,, H.E.	..	297
60 pdr. S.	..	1,522
,, H.E.	..	938
6" Howr. H.E.	..	319
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	3,857
6" Mk VII S.	..	51
,, H.E.	..	132
8" How. H.E.	..	878
9.2" How. H.E.	..	1,297
12" How. H.E.	..	36

9. WEATHER.

High wind and rain all day.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

2nd Ind. Cav. Divn. Reserve Park from ARGOEUVES to area 6.
1st Ind. Cav. Divn. Reserve Park from CORBIE to ST.
SAUVEUR.
Transport Pioneer Bn. Guards Division from ARGOEUVES to
area 4.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
I Anzac Corps	1A, 2A, 4A*, 5A*.
XIV Corps	8, 17, 29*, 33*.
Army Reserve	XV Corps H.Q., Guards, 4, 20, 29, 60. 2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.

....12.

7th November, 1916

No.
Date

12. GENERAL.

The following letter was sent by the A.C. to G.H.Q. under Fourth Army No. 305 (G) :-

1. Reference your O.A.D. 197, dated 29th October, 1916.
2. The policy laid down in the above quoted letter raises possibilities, which though they have no doubt already been considered by the C.-in-C., are, in my opinion, so important that I should fail in my duty as an Army Commander if I did not represent the difficulties which this policy appears to me to involve.
3. All the Divisions allotted to the Fourth Army for the Winter operations have taken part in the Battle of the SOMME twice, most of them three or four times. They have had very heavy losses amounting in some cases to from 7,000 to 10,000 men, and have suffered very severely in officers, N.C.officers and specialists.
4. The replacement of the rank and file to bring up the Divisions to full strength is in progress and does not at present appear to afford serious difficulties. The replacement of the trained officers, N.C.Os. and specialists is another matter, and one which very seriously affects the fighting qualities of battalions and companies.
5. Experience proves that after severe periods of fighting, in which Divisions have had heavy losses, the time taken by a battalion to recover and regain its state of efficiency depends almost entirely on what nucleus of trained officers and N.C.Os. remains available to train and weld together the old and new elements.
6. After LOOS and the fighting of 1915, units required periods ranging from 2 to 4 months to recover their efficiency; some took even more and then did not reach their former standard.
7. Prior to the attack of the 1st July this year all the Divisions that took part had had from 6 to 8 months in which to train their young officers and specialists. During these months officers had time to get to know and gain the confidence of their men, which is the root of British discipline and leadership, and without which, satisfactory results cannot be expected.
8. Although the number of experienced officers and N.C.Os. available last Winter and Spring was limited, it was very largely in excess of what is available now after the losses on the SOMME. It is no exaggeration to say that in most units now, even in the best Divisions like the Guards, the nucleus on which we must depend for preparing the general offensive in the Spring has almost reached breaking point.
9. The strain on the remnant of the trained personnel is of course very severe and cannot be extended indefinitely. The officers and N.C.Os. who possess the necessary knowledge and character to be able to instruct and discipline the new drafts are the most valuable assets that remain to us from the old Army.
10. In every offensive action that is carried out an ever increasing toll is taken of these priceless instructors and if battalions are bled dry there is serious risk

....of

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GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

"of lowering the standard of fighting efficiency to a point which may render doubtful the success of the operations in the coming Spring campaign.

11. The Army that undertook the offensive on the 1st July was, in a large measure, insufficiently trained for the duties it was called upon to undertake. This was, I think, proved by the many instances in which the necessary initiative, born of experience and knowledge in the officers, especially the younger ones, and of discipline and training in the men, was absent when the critical moment arrived. It is due to this that many of the successful operations undertaken during the last 4 months have failed to obtain the full measure of success that the bravery displayed by the troops deserved.

12. In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to rebuild our units on the slender framework that is left, by training younger officers and N.C.Os. in their duties and this must be done before we can hope to carry out a successful offensive on any considerable scale.

13. Under present conditions, with the difficulties and exhaustion which prevail in the Fourth Army area, coupled with the paramount necessity of maintaining modified offensive operations against the enemy, it will demand the greatest efforts by all ranks to bring the troops to that standard of discipline and training which will ensure the success of next year's operations.

14. It is, therefore, in my opinion, most desirable to strictly limit our offensive operations to those necessary for improving the position of our front system and not to engage in any extended enterprises which do not fulfil this purpose. Otherwise there is grave risk that by attempting too much, we may fail in matters of far greater importance next Spring."

(b) The following letter was sent out to the III and Anzac Corps, under Fourth Army No. 299/62 (G). -

" 1. Reference Fourth Army No. 299/61 (G), of 6th Novr., 1916.

2. Owing to the continued bad weather the Army Commander has decided to postpone the attacks of the III Corps and I Anzac Corps on the BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT and the trenches in M.17 and M.18 indefinitely until finer weather prevails.

3. He would like the I Anzac Corps to clear up the situation in N.20. central independently of the above operations whenever a favourable opportunity occurs.

(Sgd.) A.A. Montgomery, M.G.G.S."

8th November, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.....
Date.....

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 8th November, 1918.

1. No operations took place during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

Between 12 midnight and 12.30 a.m. SHINE TRENCH was heavily shelled, otherwise the situation was normal on the Corps front.

The relief of the 33rd Division by the 8th Division was completed during the night.

During the day hostile artillery was active on the Corps support and reserve lines all along the front.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the day the hostile artillery was active against the front line of the 1st Aust. Divn.

There was considerable aerial activity on both sides, hostile aeroplanes used m.gs. against the 1st Australian Division trenches.

Between 6.30 and 7.0 p.m. hostile artillery activity increased on the 2nd Aust. Divn. front.

4. III Corps.

The front trench system was shelled during the night at intervals.

Hostile artillery was active shelling EAUCOURT and MARTINPUICH Road. There was heavy shelling of S.3.c. during the day.

The farther attack on GIRD TRENCH and Sunken Road M.18.c. ordered for November 9th has been indefinitely postponed until the weather improves.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

No operations were undertaken during the day.

6. AIRCRAFT.

77 hours were flown by 56 pilots.

During the day there was high wind, with cloud, and some fair intervals.

10 batteries, of which 3 were active, were engaged. 34 batteries were located.

Hostile activity was normal. There was one indecisive combat.

76 plates were exposed, of which 29 were successful.

2 + 20 lb bombs were dropped on PYS.

7. PRISONERS.

11 o.r. were reported.

8.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	83
18 pdr. S.	..	19,566
H.E.	..	9,709
4.5" How. H.E.	..	3,924
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	11
H.E.	..	234
60 pdr. S.	..	1,224
H.E.	..	509
6" How. H.E.	..	96
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	1,210
6" Mk VII S.	..	10
H.E.	..	168
8" How. H.E.	..	113
9.2" How. H.E.	..	210

9. WEATHER.

High wind and cloud, with some fair intervals.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

1st Indian Cav. Divn. Reserve Park from ST. SAUVEUR to area 6.

2nd Cav. Divn. from XIV Corps to bivouacs S. of QUERRIEU.

Guards Divn. (1) Transport 2 Bdes. from area 4 to SAISSEVAL and AILLY.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps 1*, 15*, 48, 50.

Anzac Corps 1A, 2A, 4A*, 5A*.

XIV Corps 8, 17, 29*, 33*.

Army Reserve (XV Corps H.Q., Guards, 4, 20, 29, 60.
(2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.

12. GENERAL.

(a) The following correspondence passed between Lord Cavan, Commanding XIV Corps and A.H.Q. -

"Fourth Army. SECRET. 302 (G).

XIV Corps No. G.S.O.585/3.

1. With reference to the points raised at yesterday's Conference, I am of opinion that in view of the continued wet weather, it is impossible to undertake even a minor offensive at the present moment.

2. The immediate objectives which I have in view are - The Gunpits in T.5.b.9.9 and SLEET TRENCH on the right of the Corps, and the Sunken Road in

....N.35.a.

8th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

N.35.a., and ORION TRENCH in the centre of the
Corps.

3. I propose to keep these under constant art-
illery fire for the present, and as soon as there have
been 2 or 3 fine days, to make a surprise attack on
them under cover of darkness.

(Sgd.) CAVAN,

Lieut.-General,
Commanding XIV Corps."

8/11/16.

"XIV Corps.

The Army Commander approves of these proposals.
To be carried out when the weather conditions
permit.

(Sgd.) A.A.Montgomery,

Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

8/11/16.

9th November, 1916

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

Name.....
Date.....

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 9th November, 1916.

1. No operations took place.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front.
The situation was unchanged in the evening.
Hostile artillery activity was below normal during the day.

Enemy aircraft was active in the morning and there were a number of hostile balloons up.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the day the front trenches of 1st Aust. Divn. were consistently shelled.

Hostile aeroplanes were very active during the day, also during the night until midnight.

Hostile artillery fire was considerably decreased during the night.

4. III Corps.

At 3.15 p.m., in conjunction with heavy artillery, a hurricane bombardment of the GIRD LINE was carried out. Shrapnel was fired for the first three minutes, then H.E. As soon as the H.E. barrage commenced, the enemy sent up several rockets, which burst into orange lights and soon afterwards opened a barrage on our trenches and Sunken Road in M.23.a.

A battery position in M.27.b. was shelled with 15 cm from the direction of BOIS LOUPART between 3.30 p.m. and dusk.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

There were no operations on this date.

6. AIRCRAFT.

278 hours were flown by 108 pilots.

It was a fine day.

One successful trench reconnaissance was made.

27 batteries, of which 8 were active, were engaged, 5 silenced, 3 under area call. 23 direct hits were obtained on batteries damaging 11 pits, dugouts and causing two explosions.

Hostile aircraft was active, especially in the morning.

16 combats occurred. During a combat between an offensive patrol and several German machines, Lieut. Knight drove down two machines; one was lost to sight and the other went down in a steep spiral with the engine full on. Later, two machines were seen on their noses near LE TRANSLOY, in which neighbourhood the fight had taken place.

152 photographs were taken.

Lt. A.A. Patterson, No. 34 Squadron, died of

....wounds

9th November, 1918

GENERAL STAFF.
HEADQUARTERS.
4th ARMY.

wounds received in a combat.

Capt. Norman, No. 18 Squadron, wounded.

4 - 20 lb bombs were dropped on billets.

Combat. Report of observer of a
B.E.12 on arty. observation duty.

"When over LE SARS we were attacked by a hostile aeroplane which dived on us from behind. The pilot kept straight on instead of spiralling, but perhaps he was already hit. The enemy's first burst shot the machine about a good bit, hitting the instrument board, rear petrol tank, propellor (nine shots) etc. I fired off half a drum and the H.A. drew off. The machine went into a spin and I took control and landed rather badly in a French aerodrome near No. 9 Squadron.
The pilot died on admission to hospital."

7. PRISONERS.

6 o.r. reported during the day.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	1,297
18 pdr. S.	..	23,793
H.E.	..	14,594
4.5" How. H.E.	..	6,002
4.7" Mk VI. S.	..	221
H.E.	..	269
60 pdr. S.	..	1,667
H.E.	..	1,322
6" How.	..	2,079
6" Mk VII S.	..	31
H.E.	..	81
8" How.	...	419
9.2" How.	..	335
9.2" Gun	..	5
12" How.	..	45

Up to noon.

9. WEATHER.

Fine day.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

2nd Cav. Divn. from QUERRIEU bivouacs to BELLOY, YZEUX, BOURDON.

33rd Divn. (1) 1 Infy. Bde. (personnel) by train XIV Corps to area 5.

(2) Transport 1 Infy. Bde. from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.

Guards Divn.

(1) Transport 2 Bde. groups from area 3 to XIV Corps.

(2) Transport 1 Bde. group from area 4 to AILLY-sur-SOMME.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps 1*, 15*, 48, 50..

Anzac Corps 1A, 2A, 4A*, 5A*.

XIV Corps 8, 17, 29*, 33*

Army Reserve (XV Corps H.Q., Guards, 4, 20, 29, 60,
(2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.

10th November, 1916

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
ARMY.

No.
Date

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 10th November, 1916.

1. No operations were undertaken.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front.
The 8th Division back area was heavily shelled in the morning and hostile artillery was active during the day on DEWDROP and THISTLE TRENCHES and LESBOEUF.

A hostile aeroplane was brought down at 12.30 p.m. at GUEUDECOURT.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the day hostile artillery was fairly active on the front of the 1st Aust. Divn. On the 2nd Aust. Divn. front the enemy artillery was slightly more active.

Hostile aeroplanes were active.

4. III Corps.

The situation was unchanged - quiet night.
A post was established during the night at M.17.a.9.0. half way between MAXWELL and BUTTE Trenches about 100 yards to the right of WARLENCOURT Road.

The day was quieter than usual.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

No operations. The operations against REGINA Trench on the night 10/11th Novr. are referred to in Summary of 11th.

6. AIRCRAFT.

221 hours were flown by 102 pilots.
There was ground mist early but fine later.
16 batteries, of which 4 were active, were engaged. 18 direct hits were obtained on batteries, which damaged 9 emplacements, and two battery positions were badly knocked about. 22 batteries were located. 20 direct hits were obtained on trenches. A working party was engaged and scattered by zone call.

Hostile aircraft was active, especially after noon. There were 9 combats.

Capt. Portal shot down a machine which was seen to crash near BEAULENCOURT.

A machine attacked on the 9th by an offensive patrol of No. 24 Squadron was seen to crash near BEAULENCOURT. In addition a machine was seen to fall in flames near FLERS. A machine was seen to crash between BETRANCOURT and YTRES.

A machine was seen to land near BARASTRE and Lieuts. Coward and Merris fired a drum at this machine after it had landed.

169 plates were exposed.

Combat. (Report of pilot of a B.E.12 on defensive patrol).
Time 1.15 p.m.

"Having lost the patrol, saw 2 H.A. at 13,000

....ft.

10th November, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

11. GENERAL.

- (a) The following letter was received from Fifth Army :-

"SECRET.
Fourth Army.

Fifth Army No. S.G.72/73.
Fourth Army No. 419 (G).

1. Will you kindly inform me whether you agree to taking over again the portion of front between the CHALK PIT (M.15.b.) and about M.15.a.3.6, which was taken over from the III Corps by II Corps when the attack on the QUADRANGLE was first contemplated.

2. Owing to the change in form of the operations of the Fifth Army, this portion of the front is no longer required and for the same reason it is now possible to withdraw the batteries of the Canadian Field Artillery in action near MARTINPUICH. I understand the III Corps particularly desire this.

3. If you will wire your concurrence to the above proposal, instructions will be issued to II Corps to arrange the matter direct with III Corps.

(Sgd.) N.Malcolm, M.G., for
General,

10/11/18.

Commanding Fifth Army."

- (b) At 10.35 p.m. the following wire was sent agreeing to the above proposal. -

"G.2917.

In answer to your letter No. S.G.72/73, dated 10th November AAA I concur AAA III Corps is being informed."

11th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 11th November, 1916.

1. No operations were undertaken during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

Hostile aircraft was active over the Corps back areas during the night.

On the 8th Division front, BAYONET TRENCH was shelled during the night.

The night was quiet on the 17th Division front.

Hostile artillery was below normal on the 8th and 17th Division's fronts except in the neighbourhood of LES BOEUFs.

Hostile aircraft was active at intervals.

3. Anzac Corps.

The day was quiet.

During the night there was light intermittent hostile shelling.

4. III Corps.

At 12 midnight our m.gs. in M.15.c. and 2 guns in 26th AVENUE, M.27.a., co-operated by indirect fire on BELOW TRENCH and the DRY DITCH - M.4.c., with the attack on REGINA TRENCH of the Corps on the left.

Our artillery carried out barrages and firing as ordered, the wire in M.10.c. and M.9.d. and strong point in M.4.a. were shelled.

In reply to our Chinese attack at 12.5 a.m. the enemy barraged SNAG SUPPORT and EAUCOURT. Otherwise hostile artillery was quiet.

Hostile aircraft was very active, continually shooting with machine guns at our trenches, but were too high for aimed fire.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

A very successful operation was carried out during the night by the 4th Canadian Division. The portion of REGINA TRENCH from M.13.a.6.1 to FARMER ROAD in M.14.b., which was the objective, had been previously isolated by heavy artillery bombardment during the afternoon and at midnight it was rushed with little opposition. Pushing forward, posts were established at M.13.b.7.3 $\frac{1}{2}$, M.14.a.5.7 and M.14.b.3.3, and consolidation was rapidly effected on a line about 100 yards in advance of the old REGINA TRENCH. Our casualties were very slight.

6. AIRCRAFT.

24 hours were flown by 32 pilots.

There was a thick mist all day.

One battery was engaged, and six batteries

....located.

11th November, 1916. 4th ARMY.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

located.

Hostile artillery was below normal. A number of German bombing machines crossed the line on the night of the 10th - 11th. One landed near HEILLY, probably an Albatross, but the pilot had set fire to the machine. 2 - 20 lb bombs were dropped on trenches.

7. PRISONERS.

1 officer and 5 o.r. were reported.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	996
18 pdr. S.	..	19,867
H.E.	..	10,360
4.5" How. H.E.	..	4,562
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	94
H.E.	..	248
60 pdr. S.	..	1,429
H.E.	..	1,417
6" How. H.E.	..	89
6" 26 cwt H.E.	..	1,210
6" Mk VII S.	..	69
H.E.	..	146
8" How. H.E.	..	454
9.2" Gun H.E.	..	9
12" How. H.E.	..	18

9. WEATHER.

Thick mist all day.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

33rd Divn. (1) Personnel 1 Infy. Bde. by train XIV Corps to area 5.
(2) Transport 2 Bdes. ARGOEUVES to area 5.

Guards Divn. (1) Personnel 1 Bde. by 'bus area 4 to XIV Corps area.

Dismounted personnel Cavalry Division (2nd Cav. Divn. and 2nd Ind. Cav. Divn.) leave Fourth Army under arrangements "Q", Fourth Army.

6th Divn. (1) Artillery from XIV Corps to TALMAS and VILLERS-BOCAGE.

11. COMPOSITION FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
XIV Corps	Guards*, 8, 17, 29*.
Anzac Corps	1A, 2A, 4A*, 5A*.
Army Reserve	(XV Corps H.Q., 4, 20, 29, 33, 60. (2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.

12. GENERAL.

(a) At 7.45 p.m. instructions were issued as regards a Chinese attack to be made on the 13th, in co-operation with the Fifth Army attack. [299/63 (G) attached.]

11th November, 1916

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

(b) The following letter was sent out from A.H.Q. -

"Adv. G.H.Q.
-----"

G.G.359.

I request that 12 French 37 mm. Guns and 12,000 rounds of ammunition be obtained for the use of the Fourth Army.

These guns are specially required on the Fourth Army front, owing to the considerable difficulty which exists in moving forward or maintaining field guns in advanced positions.

These guns have, I understand, proved themselves to be particularly efficacious for dealing with hostile machine guns.

In the attack it is my intention to push ^{them} forward in close support of the infantry.

On the defence they should prove well suited to dealing with hostile "Tanks", should the Germans adopt this method of warfare.

The requisite personnel I should find from Fourth Army resources, and for the training of a few instructors I would arrange with the French locally.

(Sgd.) H.Rawlinson,

General, Commdg.
Fourth Army."

11/11/16.

SECRET

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date.

Copy No.

III Corps. XV Corps.
XIV Corps. Fifth Army.
I Anzac Corps Third Army.
4th Bde. R.F.C. Sixth French Army.
 Adv. G.F.C.

For
information.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.
899/63(c).

11.11.16.

1. The Fifth Army are attacking on the 13th November.
2. All Corps will bombard the enemy's front line system more heavily on 12th November.
3. At Zero on the 13th November a Chinese attack will be carried out along the whole front of the Fourth Army.
The object of this attack is to assist the Fifth Army by persuading the enemy to anticipate an attack by the Fourth Army and, incidentally, to inflict casualties upon him.
4. Each Corps will draw up its own plan of action for the Chinese attack subject to the following :—
 - (1) There will be no intense fire previous to Zero.
 - (2) From zero to zero + 20 the fire of both R.F.A. and H.Q.A., will be intense, subject to such brief intervals as may be required for the purpose of misloading the enemy.
From zero + 20 to zero + 40 the fire will gradually die down.
5. Counter-battery fire will be similarly directed, but will be maintained at its full vigour after zero + 20 so long as the hostile artillery is active.
Special attention is to be paid to the hostile artillery in and around BOIS LOUPART.
6. The hour of zero will be in the early morning.
The exact time will be notified later.
7. The trenches will be kept as clear of infantry as possible during the Chinese attack.
8. Watches will be synchronised by telephone with Signals, A.H.Q., at 6 p.m. on 12th November.
9. Acknowledge by wire.

Accuratun

H.Q., Fourth Army.
11th November, 1916.

Major General.
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Issued at 4.45 pm

12th November,

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
1946. ARMY.

No.....
Date.....

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 12th November, 1916.

1. No operations were undertaken during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

Hostile artillery was active on the 8th Divn. front during the night, a number of gas shells being used.

The night was quiet on the 17th Division's front.

The situation was unchanged in the evening. Hostile artillery was active round T.9. central and East of LES BOEUFs during the day.

There was intermittent shelling of the support and reserve lines of the 17th Division during the day.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the night there was light intermittent shelling.

During the day the enemy shelled our support trenches between 2 and 3.0 p.m. in retaliation for our shelling, otherwise the situation was normal.

It was reported that the clock tower at BAPAUME had been destroyed by our artillery.

The enemy shelled heavily the right sector of the front line of 1st Australian Division from 7.30 to 8.0 p.m.

4. III Corps. During the morning the enemy shelled continuously the vicinity of EAUCOURT and HEXHAM Road.

During the late afternoon there was heavy shelling of SNAG and ABBAYE Trenches and HEXHAM Road.

The night was fairly quiet.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

Gas was successfully discharged at 5.0 a.m. and 3.0 p.m. on the V Corps front, otherwise there was nothing of importance to report.

6. AIRCRAFT.

8 hours flown by 21 pilots.
There was low cloud all day.
No war flying was possible.

7. PRISONERS.

3 o.r. reported.

8.

AMMUNITION

EXPENDITURE.

12th November, 1916

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	27
18 pdr. S.	..	17,029
H.E.	..	11,250
4.5" How. H.E.	..	4,425
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	61
H.E.	..	114
60 pdr. S.	..	1,777
H.E.	..	690
6" How. H.E.	..	169
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	1,569
6" Mk VII S.	..	11
H.E.	..	154
8" How. H.E.	..	355
9.2" How. H.E.	..	402
15" How. H.E.	..	1

9. WEATHER.

Low cloud all day.

10. MOVES and ARRIVALS.

2nd Ind. Cav. Divn. artillery from Anzac and XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES and ST. SAUVEUR.

Guards Divn. (1) Transport Pioneer Bn. from ST. MAULVIS (area 4) to AILLY-sur-SOMME.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
Anzac Corps	1A, 2A, 4A*, 5A*.
XIV Corps	Guards*, 8, 17, 29*.
Army Reserve	(XV Corps H.Q., 4, 20, 29, 33, 60. (2nd Cav. Divn.)

* Corps reserve.

12. GENERAL.

12.10 p.m.

(a) Instructions were issued [Fourth Army No. 299/64 (G) attached] for the zero hour for the attack on the 13th November to be 5.45 a.m.

(b) At 6.10 p.m. instructions were issued [Fourth Army No. 299/65 (G) attached] for the attacks of the III and Anzac Corps on the 14th November.

SECRET

War Diary

GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS 4th ARMY
No. 299/64(G).
Date 12/11/16.

495

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. Pulteney, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Commanding III Corps.
Lieut. Gen. F.R. The Earl of Cavan, K.P., C.B., M.V.O.
Commanding XIV Corps.
Lieut.-Gen. ^{Sir} W.R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B.
C.I.E., D.S.O., Commanding I Anzac Corps.
Brig.-Gen. E.B. Ashmore, C.M.G., M.V.O.
Commanding 4th Bde, R.F.C.

1. With reference to paragraph 6 of Fourth Army
No. 299/63(G) of 11/11/16.

2. The hour of Zero will be 5.45 a.m. on the
13th November.

This hour is only to be communicated to those
whom it immediately concerns. In no case should it
be communicated by telephone.

3. Acknowledge by wire.

(Signed) A.A. Montgomery.
Major General.
General Staff, Fourth Army.

H.Q., Fourth Army.
12th November, 1916.

Issued at 12. 10 p.m.

SECRET

War Diary

GENERAL STAFF
HEADQUARTERS
4th ARMY.

No. 399/35(G).

Date 12.11.16.

III Corps.
I Anzac Corps.

4th Bde., R.F.C. } For information.
XIV Corps. }

1. The III Corps and I Anzac Corps will attack GIRD TRENCH, GIRD SUPPORT and HOOK SAP on the morning of the 14th November.

2. The objectives to be attacked and the boundaries between Corps are shown on the attached map.

3. (a) Artillery barrages will be arranged between Corps.

(b) Special provision will be made for the artillery to deal with all trenches by which bombing counter-attacks are likely to be made, and for fire to be maintained on all areas hidden from direct view in which the enemy can bring forward reinforcements or assemble for counter-attacks.

4. The hour of Zero will be decided between Corps. and will be notified to A.H.Q.

It should not be communicated to the troops earlier than is absolutely necessary and must in no case be communicated by telephone.

5. Acknowledge by wire.

H.Q., Fourth Army,
12th November, 1916.

(Sgd.) A.A. Montgomery, Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Issued at 6.10 p.m.



13th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.....
Date.....

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 13th November, 1916.

1. No operations were undertaken during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

Hostile artillery was active on the 8th Divn. front during the night especially on DEWDROP and THISTLE trenches, between 7.30 and 8.0 p.m. Hostile artillery was active on the 17th Division front between 6.0 and 8.0 p.m.

The relief of the 17th Division by the Guards Division was commenced.

Hostile artillery was below normal on the 8th Divn. front, and on the left of 17th Divn. front, but active on the right brigade of the 17th Divn.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the day there was some shelling of FLERS and GUEUDECOURT.

The night was quiet except for some shelling of CHEESE Road.

4. III Corps.

The enemy's retaliation to our Chinese attack was heavier than usual on the 50th Divisions' front.

Otherwise a fairly quiet day.

The night was quiet except for intermittent shelling of HEXHAM Road.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

At 5.45 a.m. the Fifth Army attacked on a front of about 9,000 yards from R.20.d. to K.23.b.

South of the ANCRE, where the attack was carried out by the 19th and 39th Divisions, all objectives were gained to a maximum depth of about 1,600 yards:

This included the capture of the village of ST. PIERRE DIVION.

North of the ANCRE, the outskirts of BEAUCOURT were reached by the 63rd Division.

BEAUMONT HAMEL was captured by the 51st Divn. North of BEAUMONT HAMEL, the 2nd Division captured the enemy's trenches to a depth of about 500 yards.

The attack on SERRE by the 3rd Division failed.

The attack by the 31st Division North of the 3rd Divn. was partially successful, front and support trenches being captured, but owing to the failure of 3rd Division's attack the 31st Division was withdrawn under cover of darkness.

As a result of these operations, about 4,000 unwounded prisoners were reported captured.

6. AIRCRAFT. Fog and low cloud all day. No flying was

....possibb

7. PRISONERS.

1 o.r. reported.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

18 pdr. S.	..	32,957
" H.E.	..	16,892
4.5" How. H.E.	..	8,941
4.7" Gun Shrapnel	..	302
" H.E.	..	231
60 pdr. S.	..	1,439
" H.E.	..	1,411
6" How. H.E.	..	64
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	3,984
6" Mk VII H.E.	..	356
8" How. H.E.	..	1,034
9.2" How. H.E.	..	1,458
12" How. H.E.	..	20

9. WEATHER.

Fog and low cloud all day.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

5th Aust. Divn.

(1) Artillery from K area (Reserve Army) to TALMAS and VILLERS-BOCAGE.

2nd Ind. Cav. Divn.

(1) Artillery from ARGOEUVES and ST. SAUVEUR to METIGNY HEUCOURT and VERGIES.

6th Divn. (1) Artillery from TALMAS and VILLERS-BOCAGE to Third Army area.

29th Divn. (1) Transport 1 Infy. Bde. from area 5 to ST. SAUVEUR.

Guards Divn.

(1) Transport Pioneer Bn. from AILLY to XIV Corps.

(2) Personnel Pioneer Bn. from ST. MAULVIS by 'bus to XIV Corps.

33rd Divn. (1) Transport 1 Field Coy. from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.

(2) Personnel 1 Fd. Coy. from XIV Corps by 'bus to area 5.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps 1*, 15*, 48, 50.

Anzac Corps 1A*, 2A, 4A, 5A*.

XIV Corps Guards, 8, 17*, 29*.

Army Reserve (XV Corps H.Q., 4, 20, 29, 33, 60.
(2nd Cav. Divn.)

* Corps reserve.

14th November 1918

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 14th November, 1918.

1. At 6.45 a.m. an attack was made by the left Division of the I Anzac Corps and the right bn. of the III Corps, with a view to capturing the MAZE, GIRD SUPPORT and HOOK SAP. The attack was partially successful, about 700 yards of the GIRD TRENCH being captured.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front.
The relief of the 17th Division by the Guards Division was completed during the night.

During the day hostile artillery confined itself to indiscriminate shelling of the back areas, especially FLERS and the FLERS LINE.

3. Anzac Corps.

The night till zero hour was quiet.

At 6.45 a.m. an attack was carried out by the 2nd Australian Division on the following objectives, in conjunction with an attack by the III Corps :-

To capture the MAZE and the GIRD LINE from M.24.a.9.6 to M.18.c.2.8 $\frac{1}{2}$, where junction was to be made with the III Corps, and GIRD SUPPORT from junction of BITE TRENCH at M.24.b.3 $\frac{1}{2}$.9 to M.18.a.3.1.

The attack was carried out by two battalions (25th and 26th) 7th Australian Brigade on the right and one bn. (19th) 5th Brigade on the left.

At 9.40 a.m. Corps stated that the left battalion reported the first objective taken and troops were pushing on to the second. The wounded of centre battalion reported the second objective taken, also some prisoners, about 40. The right half of right battalion were back in original trenches, the trenches on their front being very strongly held.

At 12.5 p.m. the Corps stated that the left and centre battalions reported they had gained the final objective and were consolidating. The right battalion was getting strong opposition, and two companies from the reserve were then making a fresh attack.

An aeroplane reconnaissance between 12.5 and 3.5 p.m. reported red flares at M.18.c.4.9, M.18.c.30.95 and M.18.c.7.7, that is in GIRD SUPPORT trench.

In the evening report the 2nd Australian Divn. reported the situation as at 1.30 p.m. as follows :-

Left of centre battalion gained objective and are consolidating. Right battalion failed to take objective owing to opposition in the MAZE. Strong points constructed at M.18.c.7 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 and 9 $\frac{1}{2}$.1, and a sap had been dug connecting M.18.c.7 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 with jumping-off trench at M.18.c.3 $\frac{1}{2}$.0.

The following is the situation given by the Corps on the morning of November 15th, which is included in the summary as the situation was probably the same the previous night :-

....Our

14th November, 1946. ARMY.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS.

No.
Date

Our front line now runs from right division boundary along original front to M.24.a.6.4, thence M.18.c.3 $\frac{1}{2}$.0, 6.2 $\frac{1}{2}$, and along GIRD trench to M.18.c.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.9.

To summarize the operations :-

The attack of the right bn. against the MAZE failed, it being very strongly held. The right half of centre bn.'s attack also failed, but the left half got into GIRD TRENCH, and probably were in GIRD SUPPORT at one period.

The attack of the left bn. was successful, and GIRD SUPPORT on their front was actually taken, but as this trench was practically obliterated, and their flanks were in the air, they were bombed out of it, and retired back to GIRD trench.

The situation on the 1st Australian Division's front during the day was unchanged.

4. III Corps.

The night was quiet.

At 3.45 a.m. the 50th Division attacked the following objectives in conjunction with an attack by the 2nd Australian Division on their right :-

GIRD Trench from about M.18.c.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.8 $\frac{1}{2}$, where junction was to be made with the Anzac Corps, to M.17.b.7.2, and GIRD SUPPORT from the junction with Anzac Corps at M.18.a.3.1 to M.18.a.1.3.

The attack was carried out by the 149th Infy. Bde., with 1/5th Northumberland Fusiliers on the right and the 1/7th on the left.

A message from Corps at 9.30 a.m. stated that the right company commander of the 1/5th North.Fus., who was wounded, reported having captured the enemy trench and that he was in touch with the Anzacs.

At 10.25 a.m. the Corps stated that the 50th Division reported that they appeared to hold the GIRD LINE on the right in touch with the Anzacs, and that our men could be seen in HOOK SAP, but that no report had been received from the left battalion.

At 10.55 a message was received from Corps stating that the 149th Infy. Bde. reported the 1/7th North. Fus. were holding HOOK SAP and probably the junction of HOOK SAP and GIRD TRENCH and that post with machine gun had been established at M.17.b.1.1.

The situation on remainder of the front was obscure.

In their evening report the Corps stated that from a pigeon message received and reports of wounded, the situation appeared to be as follows :-

About 150 men were holding 100 yards of GIRD TRENCH left of Sunken Road at M.18.c.4.7 in touch with Anzacs. A block was established at M.18.c.3.7 $\frac{1}{2}$. We were also holding HOOK SAP but communication was not established with it.

Two companies were to go forward at 6.30 p.m. to clear up the situation.

To summarize, it appears that the attack was a success as far as the capture of GIRD TRENCH was concerned, but GIRD SUPPORT was not taken.

A counter-attack made by the enemy about 5.0 p.m. turned our troops out of HOOK SAP and GIRD TRENCH as far East as about M.18.c.1.9 $\frac{1}{2}$, leaving only about 150 men of the 149th Bde. in GIRD TRENCH on the left of the Anzacs.

....These

14th November, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

No.
Date

These were fed, etc., by the Anzac Corps as the 149th Bde. had no means of communication with them. During the night there were occasional heavy bursts of artillery fire on front trenches of 48th Divn.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

The village of BEAUCOURT was captured during the day; also some progress was made to the North-east of BEAUMONT HAMEL.

The total of prisoners for the 13th and 14th was reported to be 5165, and some hundreds more were expected.

6. AIRCRAFT.

52 hours were flown by 58 pilots.

There were low clouds most of the day, clearing for a short time during the afternoon.

Three batteries were engaged, of which two were active.

Hostile activity was normal; there were two combats.

No photographs were taken.

3 Contact patrols were carried out.

7. PRISONERS.

Corps	During the day.		Up to Novr 13th incl.		Grand total.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
XIV	-	-	206	6305	206	6305
Anzac	-	19	149	6114	149	6133
III	1	15	71	3687	72	3702
C.C.S.	-	-	61	4645	61	4645
VIII & X	-	-	8	544	8	544
	1	34	495	21295	496	21329

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

18 pdr. S.	..	31,974
" H.E.	..	22,213
4.5" How. H.E.	..	8,435
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	369
" H.E.	..	354
60 pdr. S.	..	2,939
" H.E.	..	1,423
6" How. H.E.	..	295
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	3,105
6" Mk VII S.	..	35
" H.E.	..	313
8" How. H.E.	..	1,457
9.2" How. H.E.	..	1,417
12" How. H.E.	..	43
15" How. H.E.	..	6

14th Novr.

503

No.
Date

9. WEATHER.

There were low clouds most of the day, clearing for a short time during the afternoon.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

5th Aust. Divn.

(1) Artillery from TALMAS and VILLERS-BOCAGE to Anzac Corps area.

2nd Ind. Cav. Divn.

(1) Artillery from VERGIES, METIGNY, HEUCOURT to BEAUCHAMPS.

29th Divn.

(1) Transport 1 Bde. from ST. SAUVEUR to XIV Corps.

(2) Personnel 1 Bde. from area 5 by 'bus to XIV Corps.

17th Divn.

(1) Personnel 1 Bde. by train from area XIV Corps to area 3.

(2) Transport 1 Bde. from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.

20th Divn.

(1) 1 Infy. Bde. from area 3 to area 4.

33rd Divn.

(1) Transport 1 Field Coy. from ARGOEUVES to area 5.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps 1*, 15*, 48, 50.

I Anzac Corps 1A*, 2A, 4A, 5A*.

XIV Corps Guards, 8, 17*, 29*.

Army Reserve (XV Corps H.Q., 4, 20, 33, 60, ~~End Cav.~~
(Divn.

* Corps reserve.

12. GENERAL.

(a) The following letter was received from G.H.Q.-

"Fourth Army.
O.A.D. 209/2.

Fourth Army No. 305 (G)
SECRET.

With reference to O.A.D. 209/1, dated 13th instant, and in confirmation of telephone message sent you at 12.45 p.m. today, herewith a map showing the proposed new boundary between the Fourth British Army and the French Sixth Army. This line is only provisional. As mentioned in O.A.D. 209/1 the exact boundary lines and questions of detail will be settled later.

Adv. G.H.Q.,
14/11/16.

(Sgd.) E.L.Tandy, for Lieut.-Gen.,
C.G.S.

15th November, 1916

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 15th November, 1916.

1. No operations were undertaken during the day.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front.
The situation was unchanged in the evening.
Hostile artillery was more active than usual on the 8th Division front, especially on BENNET TRENCH and the valley north of GINCHY.

3. ANZAC CORPS.

Hostile artillery was active against the front of the 2nd Australian Division between midnight and 1.15 a.m. Support areas were also shelled during the night.
At about 1.45 p.m. a report was received that the enemy were massing near the road at M.18.c.7.9. Prompt artillery measures were taken, and no attack took place.

The 2nd Australian Division reported they held GIRD TRENCH from M.24.a.7 $\frac{1}{2}$.8 to left Divisional boundary. A few gas shells were fired into FLERS.
During the night hostile artillery was less active against the GIRD LINE.

Our patrols reported the enemy holding GIRD SUPPORT trench.

4. III Corps.

The situation during the night was unchanged.
A message from the Corps at 9.15 a.m. stated the 50th Division reported they held the GIRD LINE to just short of HOOK SAP, but had no men in HOOK SAP or BUTTE Trench.

During the night communication was obtained with men in GIRD TRENCH by Sunken Road, but this was only possible by night.

Arrangements were made with the Anzacs to supply these men.

At 1.0 p.m. and again at 3.30 p.m. the enemy was reported to be concentrating behind the captured portion of GIRD TRENCH, but the situation was dealt with by our artillery and no attack resulted.

At 7.45 p.m. the Corps reported that 50th Divn. held the GIRD LINE from M.18.c.4.7 to about M.18.c.2.9 and no other part of their objective.

During the night hostile artillery was active on back areas and communications of the 50th Division. Otherwise the situation was normal.

5. FIFTH ARMY.

Some ground was gained to the N. and N.E. of BEAUMONT HAMEL. Prisoners for three days operations reported to amount to 5,678.

.....6. AIRCRAFT.

15th November, 1918.

505

6. AIRCRAFT.

There was low cloud and mist all day.
No successful work was done.

7. PRISONERS.

8 o.r. were reported.

8. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	421
18 pdr. S.	..	27,363
" H.E.	..	16,403
4.5" How. H.E.	..	7,067
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	1,471
" H.E.	..	1,733
6" How. H.E.	..	202
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	1,901
6" Mk VII S.	..	133
" H.E.	..	166
8" How. H.E.	..	439
9.2" How. H.E.	..	686
12" How. H.E.	..	20

9. WEATHER.

Low cloud and mist all day.

10. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

17th Divn. (1) Transport 1 Bde. from XIV Corps to
ARGOEUVES.
(2) Personnel 1 Bde. by train XIV Corps to
area 3.
20th Divn. (1) Transport 1 Bde. from area 3 to XIV Corps.
(2) Personnel 1 Bde. by 'bus area 3 to XIV
Corps.

11. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
I Anzac Corps	1A*, 2A, 4A, 5A*.
XIV Corps	Guards, 8, 17*, 29*.
Army Reserve	(XV Corps H.Q., 4, 20, 33, 60.

* Corps reserve.

12. GENERAL.

(a) Instructions were sent out [299/66 (G) attached,
for a re-adjustment of the front of the Army in the im-
mediate future.

SECRET

War Diary

III Corps.
XIV Corps.
XV Corps.
I Anzac Corps.
4th Bde., R.F.C.

GENERAL STAFF, HEADQUARTERS 4th ARMY.
299/33(S).
No.
Date 15.11.18.

506

1. A readjustment of the front of the Fourth Army will take place in the immediate future.
2. The new tactical boundaries of Corps are shown on the attached map.
3. A map will be issued shortly showing the administrative boundaries between Corps in the rear areas.
4. (a) The III Corps will take over from the I Anzac Corps as far South as the Sunken Road at N.19.B.4.8. (inclusive). Relief to be completed by 8 a.m. 22nd November. Details to be arranged between the Corps concerned.
(b) The I Anzac Corps will take over from the XIV Corps as far South as the Sunken Road at N.35.A.2.1. (inclusive). Relief to be completed by 8 a.m. 22nd November. Details to be arranged between Corps concerned.
(c) At a date yet to be fixed (probably about 1st December) the XIV Corps will commence taking over from the French IX Corps as far South as the road at U.14.B.9.8. (inclusive). Further orders will be issued as regards this relief.
(d) On the completion of the relief of the IX French Corps by the XIV Corps, the XV Corps will commence to take over the French front between the road at U.14.B.9.8. (exclusive) and a point North-east of BOUCHAVESNES about C.15.B.5.6. Further orders will be issued regarding this relief, which will probably commence about the second week of December and be carried out by Divisions commencing on the left.
5. Separate orders as regards the redistribution of artillery will be issued by the M.G., R.A., Fourth Army.
6. Orders will be issued later as regards the redistribution of Army Troops (A.T.Coys., Tunnelling Coys., etc.).
7. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. Cunningham

H.Q., Fourth Army,
15th November, 1918.

Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

16th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF.
HEADQUARTERS.
4th ARMY.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 16th November, 1916.

507

1. In the afternoon the enemy counter-attacked the positions in the GIRD Trench which had been captured from him on the 14th November, and drove our troops back to their original line.

2. XIV Corps.

The night was quiet on the Corps front, except that hostile machine guns interfered considerably with our working parties.

The situation was unchanged in the evening. Hostile artillery was below normal - the enemy shelled LES BOEUFs, MORVAL and the battery positions West of them with little effect.

3. Anzac Corps.

During the night the situation was normal. Our patrols reported that GIRD SUPPORT was held by the enemy.

A hostile aeroplane was brought down at T.l.c. about 12.30 p.m., pilot and observer being taken prisoner.

The captured portion of GIRD Trench was heavily shelled during the afternoon.

At about 5.0 p.m. a strong hostile counter-attack was made against the portion of GIRD trench captured by the III Corps and Anzacs on the 14th instant. One party of the enemy bombed in an S.E. direction down GIRD Trench, another worked along between GIRD Trench and our original front line. An attack appears also to have been made across the open from GIRD SUPPORT.

As a result of the counter-attack our troops were forced out of the portion of GIRD Trench captured on November 14th, and retired to original line held previous to that date.

4. III Corps.

During the night there was some shelling of communication trenches and back area of 50th Divn.

At 10.40 a.m. 5 German aeroplanes flew low over the trenches of 50th Divn. firing at our men with machine guns.

At about 3.0 p.m. on this date the enemy opened a heavy bombardment on the portion of the GIRD TRENCH captured by us on the 15th instant. This became intense between 4.0 p.m. and 5.0 p.m. One of the first shells landed on our blocking party at M.18.c.1.9 and knocked out all the men and two Lewis guns. Whilst our men were attending to the wounded here, the enemy started to bomb down from the North-west, at the same time making an extremely strong frontal attack with a large force. The Australians on the right were similarly strongly attacked,

....and

18th November, 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY:

No.
Date

and very soon both the Australians and our men were forced back and had to retire to our original jumping off trenches.

508

5. FIFTH ARMY.

There were no operations on this day.
The total prisoners, unwounded and wounded, since the 13th instant, inclusive, 5981.

6. PRISONERS.

1 officer and 5 o.r. reported.

7. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	1, 054
18 pdr. S.	..	16,831
H.E.	..	9,237
4.5" How. H.E.	..	3,305
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	144
H.E.	..	286
60 pdr. S.	..	750
H.E.	..	704
6" How. H.E.	..	42
6" 26 cwt How. H.E.	..	1,557
6" Mk VII S.	..	45
H.E.	..	120
8" How. H.E.	..	442
9.2" How. H.E.	..	412
12" How. H.E.	..	18

8. WEATHER.

Fine, with mist in the morning.

9. MOVES and ARRIVALS.

20th Divn. (1) Transport 1 Bde. from area 3 to XIV Corps.
(2) Personnel 1 Bde. by 'bus from area 3 to XIV Corps.
17th Divn. (1) Transport 1 Bde. from XIV Corps to ARGOEUVES.
(2) Personnel 1 Bde. by train from XIV Corps to area 3.

10. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps	1*, 15*, 48, 50.
Anzac Corps	1A*, 2A, 4A, 5A*
XIV Corps	Guards, 8, 17*, 20*, 29*.
Army Reserve	XV Corps H.Q., 4, 33.

* Corps reserve.

Richard A. L. E.
Maj.-Gen.
General Staff, Fourth Army.

21/6/17

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 5th November, 1916

463

1. (a) In the early morning the Anzac Corps attempted to clear up the situation in N.20.d. 4 prisoners were captured, but the assaulting parties were eventually forced to withdraw to their original line.
At 9.10 a.m. an attack was made by the 50th Divn. (III Corps) and 5th Aus. Divn. (Anzac Corps) with a view to capturing the BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT and the GIRD lines to the East of that point. Some initial success was obtained and at one period most of the objectives, including the BUTTE itself, were in our hands. Later in the day, owing to a series of heavy counter-attacks, our troops were forced to withdraw. For some time the 50th Division held on to BUTTE ALLEY but a further counter-attack drove them back to their original trenches.
At 11.10 a.m., the XIV Corps attacked, in conjunction with the French on their right. Very little opposition was encountered, and all objectives were gained.
A heavy gale raged throughout the day, so that contact patrols had to work under the most adverse conditions.
- (b) The Sixth French Army attacked the S.W. and N.W. edges of ST. PIERRE VAAST WOOD, SAILLISEL and BUKOVINE Trench. Most of the objectives were reached in places, but the enemy counter-attacked and drove back the French from the ground gained, except S. of SAILLISEL. Prisoners taken amounted to about 500.

2. XIV Corps.

An attack was carried out by the XIV Corps in conjunction with the III and XV Corps and French Sixth Army. The objectives for the attack were BORITSKA, MIRAGE, HAZY and ORION TRENCHES.
The first three named trenches were the objectives of the 33rd Division.
ORION Trench was the objective of the 17th Divn.
At 11.10 a.m. the attack was launched.
The disposition of the Corps was as follows :-
Right. 33rd Divn. Right Bde. 100th Infy. Bde.
Left Bde. 19th ,, ,,
Left. 17th Divn. Right Bde. 50th Infy. Bde.
Centre ,, 51st ,,
Left ,, 52nd ,,
All objectives were captured with the exception of ORION.
At midnight the line appeared to run as follows:-
N.36.c.5.1 thence just south end of SLEET TRENCH, -
N.35.c.9.2 - SUMMER TRENCH.

3. Anzac Corps.

At 12.30 a.m. an attack was made by the 1st Australian Brigade to clear up the situation about N.20. central. The objective was to establish a line from the

....sap

5th November, 1916.

sap at about N.20.c.7.8 across to our strong point at cross-roads N.20.b.6.0.

At 6.15 a.m. the Corps reported that the first attack was unsuccessful. It was carried out in heavy rain, and the enemy opened his barrage close to his own lines immediately, and was ready with his machine guns.

A second attack was made at 1.0 a.m. which also failed, although it appeared possible that some progress had been made.

The hostile trenches were strongly manned, and owing to their low siting our barrage seemed high.

One bombing attack went along LARD TRENCH to N.20.b.4.4, killing 35 enemy and taking 5 prisoners, another moved down LARD TRENCH to N.20.d.3.4. Both these parties were forced to retire.

In the end our troops were back practically where they started from.

At 9.10 a.m., in conjunction with the III Corps, the 7th Australian Brigade made an attack with the following objective :-

To establish line from our front line at N.19.a.5.8 $\frac{1}{2}$, N.13.c.3.5 to about M.18.a.6.4, where touch was to be made with the III Corps.

At 1.10 p.m. the Corps stated that the 5th Australian Division reported GIRD and BAYONET trenches were captured, but the enemy held GIRD SUPPORT from M.18.a.2.2 to M.18.c.6.8.

There was a very heavy barrage on GIRD Trench, and also machine gun fire from the N.W.

At 2.0 p.m. a message received from Corps stated that 5th Australian Division reported all objectives appeared to be in our possession except small portion of GIRD SUPPORT on our left. Our left was reported to be at M.18.c.5.9. Enemy machine gun fire was heavy on our left flank.

A message received from Corps at 6.55 p.m. stated that the 5th Australian Division reported that they held junction of BITE TRENCH at M.24.b.3.9 to M.18.d.1.1 thence along GIRD SUPPORT to M.18.c.6.6 thence joining up to M.18.c.2.5, so as to obtain touch with the III Corps.

A trench was also being dug from M.24.b.8.8 to M.24.b.3.9.

There was heavy hostile shelling along the whole front.

A message from the Corps at 10.0 p.m. stated that the right battalion which captured portion of BAYONET TRENCH, had been driven out of it by an enemy bombing attack between noon and 2.0 p.m.

The centre battalion held all the ground gained including the MAZE up to BITE TRENCH.

The left battalion had its left flank at about M.18.c.6.6 and joined to the Centre Battalion but it was impossible to say definitely that the line was in GIRD SUPPORT for the whole length, as the trenches were a good deal knocked about.

Our left at M.18.c.6.6 was being joined to our line at M.18.c.1.4 and on our right flank the junction was being made from M.24.b.40.95 to M.24.b.9.8.

A message from Corps at 11.10 p.m. stated that the left battalion, which was only holding shell holes, had fallen back to its original position and that the only enemy position in our hands was the MAZE between M.24.b.4.9 to M.24.a.7.9. They also reported that there were not sufficient fresh troops available to repair the situation in the morning, and that the III Corps had been so informed.

The morning report of the 6th instant showed that all the attacking troops were back in their original

....line.

5th November, 1918.

line.

The failure of the right of the III Corps attack undoubtedly affected the success of the Anzac attack.

It is doubtful whether the left battalion actually got into GIRD TRENCH; probably it occupied shell holes close to it.

The fact that both flanks were in the air made it easier for the enemy to bomb our troops out of the positions captured.

The relief of the troops of the 5th Australian Division by the 2nd Australian Division had been completed previous to the attack, but the command did not pass to the 2nd Division until after the attack had been made.

4. III Corps.

An attack was made by the III Corps in conjunction with that of the ^{IX}XV and XIV Corps.

The objective of the III Corps was - BUTTE de WARLENCOURT and the GIRD LINE and GIRD SUPPORT in M.17.a. and b., M.18.a. and c.

The attack was carried out by the 151st Infy. Bde., 50th Division.

The 2nd Anzac Divn. attacked at the same hour immediately on the right, the boundary between Corps being a line parallel to and east of the Sunken road in M.18.c. and M.23.b.

Zero hour was 9.10 a.m.

There had been some heavy rain during the night combined with an S.W. gale, which was at its height about the time of the attack.

Aeroplanes attempted to go up, but could not observe and thus no information could be obtained from contact patrols.

An intense artillery barrage was opened at zero, and our infantry advanced. The weather conditions were much against them, the men having to pull one another out of our jumping off trenches. Despite this all three battalions started well. Very soon, however, our right battalion came under extremely heavy machine gun fire from the right flank (probably from about the Sunken road M.18.c.4.7) and could advance no further. Casualties were increasing, and at 11.0 a.m. a message was received that they were back in SNAG TRENCH. The left of the Corps on the right was also hung up.

On the left centre and left, our troops made good progress, and were seen going round and over the BUTTE de WARLENCOURT, and advanced to the GIRD LINE. A machine gun was captured at about M.17.a.1.3. A post was established on the BAPAUME Road and consolidation was begun. During the whole time, however, the enemy put up a strong defence on our left flank, and there was almost continuous close fighting in this quarter. Three counter-attacks here were driven off, but finally our troops in the GIRD LINE were forced back, and at about 7.30 p.m. the line ran from about M.16.b.9.8 round the North of the QUARRY to BUTTE ALLEY South of the BUTTE, along BUTTE ALLEY to about M.17.a.4.5, thence in shell holes to 17.a.9.5, where we had a post. The situation then remained practically unchanged till about 11.0 p.m. though hand to hand fighting was proceeding most of the time on the left flank. At about 11.0 p.m., after four hours' bombardment on our

....original

5th November, 1916.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

original front and support lines a sudden strong German counter-attack was launched, and our men were forced back to their original trenches.

The rest of the night was spent in getting up supplies and clearing the wounded.

The failure of this operation seems to have been partly due to the wet state of the ground, but more especially to the machine gun fire which came from the Sunken road in M.18.c. and not from HOOK SAP as reported. Owing to the strength of the wind the difficulty of the artillery was great.

The Germans appear to have also used a barrage of long range machine gun fire. Artillery barrage was reported to have been feeble.

A fresh brigade was employed for this attack and every man knew what he was expected to do.

5. Fifth Army.

The situation was unchanged. There was no event of importance to record.

6.. AIRCRAFT.

20 hours were flown by 14 pilots.

Clouds and gale of wind.

15 batteries located. 1 batty. engaged by area call.

1 zone call on trenches.

Hostile activity was below normal.

No. 3 Squadron took 28 photographs with the 110 parasol, in spite of the gale, which made flying very difficult.

A contact patrol of No. 34 Squadron followed the attack on the BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT, and read a message from the ground asking for bombs, which were dropped.

7. PRISONERS.

15 o.r. reported.

8. CASUALTIES.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
1/5th November (estimated) .	47	1500
Total to date. ,,	<u>11,064</u>	<u>262,515</u>

9. AMMUNITION.

EXPENDITURE.

5th November, 1916. ARMY.

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
1916. ARMY.

9. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.

A.A.	..	1,554
13 pdr. S.	..	422
,, H.E.	..	1,000
18 pdr. S.	..	41,776
,, H.E.	..	23,665
4.5" How. H.E.	..	14,227
4.7" Mk VI S.	..	368
,, H.E.	..	960
60 pdr. S.	..	3,514
,, H.E.	..	3,401
6" How. H.E.	..	455
6" 26 cwt H.E.	..	6,790
6" Mk VII S.	..	224
,, H.E.	..	315
8" Howr. H.E.	..	2,167
9.2" How. H.E.	..	3,291
9.2" Gun	..	1
12" How. H.E.	..	54
15" How. H.E.	..	16

10. WEATHER.

Gales of wind and clouds, making flying almost impossible.

11. MOVES AND ARRIVALS.

30th Divn. (1) Transport Pioneer bn. from XV Corps to TOUTENCOURT.

60th Divn. (1) Divnl. Ammn. Column and Heavy trench mortar batteries from OCCOCHES to PONT REMY (area 6) to join Division.

4th Aus. Divn. (1) 1 Bn., Pioneer bn., and 2 Field Coys. from area D to Anzac Corps by 'bus and road.

Guards Divn. (1) Transport 2 bns. from area 4 to LONGPRE.

12. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY.

III Corps 1*, 15*, 48, 50.

XIV ,, 8*, 17, 29*, 33.

Anzac ,, 1A, 2A*, 5A.

Army Reserve (XV Corps H.Q., Guards, 4, 4A, 29, 60.
(2nd Cav. Divn.

* Corps reserve.





SECRET ³⁸²

Wartley app 1

III Corps. Sixth French Army) For
XIV Corps. G.H.Q.) information.
XV Corps. Col Dillon, D.S.O.)
I Anzac Corps.
4th Bde. R.F.C.

GENERAL STAFF
HEADQUARTERS
4th ARMY.

NO. 306(G)
DATE 80/11/16.

1. The attached map ¹ 40,000 shows the new boundaries between the XV Corps and the French Sixth Army and between the XV and XIV Corps on completion of reliefs.

2. The reliefs of the IX French Corps by the XIV Corps will be completed as follows :-

Infantry - by 8 a.m. 4th December.
Divn. Artillery - by 8 a.m. 7th December.
Heavy Artillery - As opportunity offers and weather conditions permit. To be completed if possible by 15th December.

Details to be arranged direct between Corps concerned.

3. The reliefs of the XX French Corps ^{and northern portion of VI French Corps} by XV Corps will be completed as follows :-

Infantry to commence 7th December and be completed by 8 a.m. 11th December.

Divn. Artillery to commence December 11th and be completed by 8 a.m. 15th December.

Heavy Artillery as opportunity offers and weather conditions permit. To be completed if possible by 15th December.

Details to be arranged direct between Corps concerned.

4. The part of the XX Corps front which comes into the area allotted to the XIV Corps will be taken over on the night of the 7/8th December, under arrangements to be made direct between XIV Corps and the XX French Corps.

5. The adjustment of back areas will be made gradually by arrangement direct between the XIV and XV Corps and the French and will be completed by 15th December. After this date the areas will be allotted to Corps as shown on the attached map 100,000.

6. The following transfers of R.E., Labour and Pioneer units will be made to XV Corps between 7th - 15th December under arrangements to be made between Corps concerned :-

A.T. Coys. 1 Coy. from III Corps.
1 Coy. from I Anzac Corps.
2 Coys. from XIV Corps (including 1 Coy. lately arrived.)

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2.

Tunnelling Coy. 1 Coy. from I Anzac Corps.
2 Coy. from III Corps.
Labour BNS. 1 BN. from I Anzac Corps.
1 BN. from XIV Corps.
Cav. Pioneer BNS. 1 BN. now temporarily on loan with
XIV Corps.

7. The French Labour on the roads in the area to be taken over will be relieved by Corps as follows :-

XIV Corps - between 10th and 15th December.

XV Corps - between 15th and 20th December.

Details of reliefs to be arranged with the French by the Corps concerned.

8. The XV Corps will hand over Camps 15 and 16 to XIV Corps as arranged

9. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. M. G. M. G.

H.Q., Fourth Army,
26th November, 1916.

Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Issued at 10.30 am

COPY
SECRET

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS
4th ARMY.

305/1 (G),
27/11/16.

G.H.Q.

1. In reply to your O.A.D. 231, of 25th Novr., 1916.

2. There are two small operations on the front of the III Corps which, weather permitting, it may be possible to carry out during the first few days of December :-

(a) Capture of HOOK SAP in M.17.c.

(b) Capture of the BUTTE de WARLENCOURT, QUARRY (M.16.b., M.17.a.) and CULVERT (M.16.b.8.8.)

Both these operations if successful will improve our line. |

3. I have been into the question with the two Divisional Commanders concerned today, and they are both of opinion that, with the ground and trenches in the state they now are, any larger operation is impossible. I agree with this opinion. They report that the present conditions are very bad and that it is with difficulty that they can carry out reliefs and keep the men supplied with rations and ammunition in the front line.

4. The conditions on the rest of the front are equally difficult, and it would not be possible to carry out any operations at present on the fronts of the I Anzac and XIV Corps.

5. Plans will be drawn up at once for increased artillery activity on the fronts of the III Corps and I Anzac Corps, but, in view of the fact that the relief of the French IX, XX and part of the VI Corps will be in progress between the 1st and 15th December, it does not seem to me to be advisable to order increased artillery activity on the fronts of the XIV and XV Corps during this period.

(Sgd.) W.P. Pulteney,
Lieut.-General,
Commanding Fourth Army.

H.Q., Fourth Army,
27th November, 1916.

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SECRET

Warheady App 4
G.O.361.

III Corps.
XIV Corps.
XV Corps.
I Anzac Corps.
4th Bde., R.F.C.

Reference Fourth Army No. 4/A.A./361 dated 17th instant and 305(G) dated 26th instant.

1. Para. 9 of 4/A.A./361.

Heavy Artillery Group Headquarters and Batteries will be transferred to the XV Corps as shown on the attached.

The date of transfer will be notified later.

2. Para. 3 of 305(G).

In order to enable the XV Corps to commence taking over the Heavy Artillery positions that they require from the French, with as little delay as possible, Corps concerned will :-

- (a) Give facilities for Commanders of the units mentioned to carry out reconnaissances of their new positions, under orders from G.O.C.R.A. XV Corps.
- (b) Arrange for the units themselves to move into their new positions as required. The movements of these units will be communicated to Fourth Army who will issue instructions for their administration until the XV Corps take over the line and the transfers are definitely ordered from this office.

The XV Corps will communicate their requirements direct to the III, I Anzac and XIV Corps.

3. Corps will issue such instructions as they may consider necessary to ensure that any ammunition left in gun pits is either removed or handed over to relieving units.

(Sgd.) G.F. Boscawen,
Capt. and Lt. Major
for M.G., G.S.,
Fourth Army.

27/11/1916.

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ARTILLERY UNITS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE XV CORPS.

Nature.	III Corps.	I Anzac Corps.	XIV Corps.
H.A. Groups.	34th H.A.G.	18th H.A.G. 21st H.A.G.	6th H.A.G.
4.7" Gun.	-	1/1 Kent.	-
60-pdr. 4 Gun.	127 Hvy. Bty.	-	155th Hvy. Bty.
60-pdr. 6 Gun.	137 Hvy. Bty. 17 Hvy. Bty.	117 Hvy. Bty. 150 Hvy. Bty.	-
6" Gun.	107 Sge. Bty.	-	-
6" How. 28 cwt.	111 Sge. Bty. 141 Sge. Bty.	-	15 Siege Bty. 26 Siege Bty. 116 Siege Bty. 110 Siege Bty.
8" How.	61 Sge Bty.	120 Sge. Bty. 135 Sge. Bty. 156 Sge. Bty.	-
9.2" How.	-	118 Sge. Bty. 158 Sge. Bty.	66 Siege Bty. 95 Siege Bty.
12" How.	-	-	85 Siege Bty.

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SECRET

GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.

200/PS (a),
No.
10/11/16.
Date

Maj.-Gen. F.W.N. McCracken, C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding III Corps.

Lt.-Gen. F.R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., O.B., M.V.O.,
Commanding XIV Corps.

Lt.-Gen. Sir W.R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
Commanding I Anzac Corps.

Lt.-Gen. Sir J.P. DuCane, K.C.B.,
Commanding XV Corps.

1. Instructions have been received from the C.-in-C. that the Fourth and Fifth Armies are to be prepared to support to the utmost in their power an attack by the French South of the SOMME which the latter propose to carry out on a considerable front early in December and of which they will give us three days' notice before the preliminary bombardment begins.

2. The Army Commander has gone into the question with G.H.Q. and pointed out the difficulties under which the Fourth Army labours at present, viz., the state of the ground and our communications, and the fact that we have a big relief on in both the XIV and XV Corps areas between 1st and 15th December.

3. It has therefore been decided that no operation will take place on the front of the XIV and XV Corps, nor will these two Corps take part in any bombardment that is carried out.

4. The III Corps and I Anzac Corps will make the necessary preparations to carry out a Chinese attack preceded by 48 hours preliminary bombardment at 3 days' notice from the receipt of the warning order, and will submit plans to A.H.Q. as early as possible.

5. The plans submitted should be based on the following :-

- (a) Preliminary bombardment to commence at 0.0 a.m. two days previous to the date of the French attack (that is to say "X" day, "Z" day being the date of the French attack).
- (b) Such targets for heavy artillery will be selected by Corps as will benefit them most in future operations and at the same time will be most likely to induce the enemy to believe that an attack is imminent, and inflict the greatest loss on him.
- (c) The fire on "X" day will be very deliberate and will gradually increase in rate up to zero on "Z" day. It will be continued night and day, but at night will be confined to bursts of fire on selected targets at varied intervals during the night.
- (d) At zero on "Z" day Divisional Artillery stationary and creeping barrages will be established all along the front of both Corps. Lifts will be arranged at such intervals as may be necessary. The fire to be allowed to die down after zero plus 30.
- (e) The bombardment by heavy artillery will continue throughout "Z" day, and will gradually die down from zero plus 30 to 4.0 p.m., at which hour this special operation will terminate. The M.G., R.A. is issuing special allotments of ammunition to Corps concerned.

6. Two attacks, in accordance with verbal orders already issued to III Corps, will be prepared :-

....(s)

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End. Bk 22

- (a) Against the BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT by the left Division;
and
- (b) Against HOOK SAP by the right Division of the III Corps.

These attacks will not be carried out unless the weather is favourable, and the state of the ground gives a reasonable chance of success. If carried out they will take place in the early morning of "X" day, or evening of "W" day, as a surprise, and previous to the commencement of the preliminary bombardment.

If "W" or "X" days fall between the 4th and 6th of December the attacks will not take place, owing to relief.

7. The Fifth Army is also carrying out a two days' bombardment and Chinese attack.

8. The above information, and especially as regards the French attack, should be communicated to as few officers as possible, and, in the case of the XIV and XV Corps, to no-one but the senior General Staff Officer of the Corps.

9. Acknowledge.

(sd) A.A. Montgomery

Major-General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

H.Q., Fourth Army,
30th November, 1916.

Issued At

9.45 pm

Copies to - MGRA -
Gen Davidson

LIGNY-THILLOY

TRENCHES CORRECTED TO



SECRET 33RD DIV. N^O 24. 1/10,000 3.11.16

SECRET 33RD DIV. N^O 25 1/10000 3.11.16



X 50. XV Corps. 23.10.16.

SECRET

SCALE 10/1000

510 B

TRENCHES CORRECTED TO X.R. 1016

TILL
LINE

18

14

15

7

23

24

19

20

21

COURT L'ABBAYE
(in ruins)

Swan Lane

Factory Corner

GUEUDECOURT

