


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/17/1 Part 1

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters,  
Dardanelles Army

November 1915



AWM4-1/17/1PART1



Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.  
(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
IMBROS	November 23 <sup>rd</sup>		General Head quarters IMBROS in form the date called Army Headquarters Imbros. New General Head quarters at LEMNOS. Gen Sir W. B. Woodhouse remains SO Lia C IMBROS	
		0830	Nothing to report from French 8 and 9 Corps	
		0932	Angac report - at 8 pm. enemy attacked APEX. but was repulsed, one party of about 50 tanks got to within bombing distance. One aircraft shot.	
			Following tele from received from G H Q. Chief orders that all reinforcements for M E F now at MODROS except those for 29, 42 <sup>nd</sup> 52 <sup>nd</sup> and RNDM. will be sent to ALEXANDRIA. All drafts in future will be diverted to Alexandria. Landing of ammunition at ANZAC and SOVI 2 will be limited to what is absolutely necessary, to replace expenditure.	
		1930	Nothing to report from all corps	
			Telegram from D ST MODROS regarding supplies (filed left/pendex)	23 <sup>rd</sup> A
			Letter from D G M E MODROS to ANG (filed left/pendex)	23 <sup>rd</sup> B
		2305	Lieut Col Gen Robert Scott DSO. Assistant Military Secretary is ordered to join G H Q. Modros	
			Repaten use of gas on SOVI 2 and ANZAC from Major KEVITT (filed left/pendex)	23 <sup>rd</sup> C



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Imbros	November 24 <sup>th</sup>	0830	Trench H <sup>1</sup> and G <sup>1</sup> have nothing to report	
		1007	Angon report states - 'Enemy exploded a mine opposite 'Quinn's Post' at 7.45 a.m. The damage was done. Beach was shelled at regular intervals during the night	
		1020	G <sup>1</sup> report all quiet	
			Genl. let Espinell telegraph to G <sup>1</sup> to ask if the report that the hospital at Sardinia was shelled by the Turks, in reply to the telegram of O.L. G <sup>1</sup> says that he considers the shelling of the hospital to have been unintentional, as the fire was aimed at a lighter which was stranded on the beach and a working party. It was not therefore officially reported.	
			Telegram is despatched to all units, stating that in future all communications for units in the Peninsula will be addressed to Genl. H <sup>1</sup> and not to General D <sup>1</sup> .	
		1948	G <sup>1</sup> telegraphs that left subsection of A and support trenches were heavily shelled in the afternoon.	
		2121	Angon report that beach was steadily shelled throughout the day.	
			Other units have nothing to report.	
			Angon H <sup>1</sup> telegram is despatched to all units regarding working accommodation at Mudros (Filed Appendix).	
			Telegram from G <sup>1</sup> of 'Lagoon' received cancelling the instructions mentioned in the telegram re reinforcements of Nov 23 <sup>rd</sup> . All drafts will in future proceed to Alexandria.	
			Wells' mules, and no wind. Genl. Sir W. Birdwood arrived at H <sup>1</sup> G <sup>1</sup> in Mudros.	



# INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Hour



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## or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Brass heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
India	November 25		<p>Outline scheme for evacuation of prisoners.</p> <p>Letter J.O.C. Dardanelles Army, writes to G.C.S. S.H.Q. that Corps Commanders are in favour of recommendations of the Committee. At Anzac and Suvla Corps Commanders are ready to begin intermediate stage as soon as necessary craft are available. They are also of opinion that the final stage should be completed in 48 hours. I am therefore of opinion that unless the Naval resources are much greater, the evacuation of Gallipoli should not take place until that of Suvla and Anzac is completed.</p> <p>The C.G.S. telegraphs to Lieut. W. Bechwood that orders will shortly be issued by S.H.Q. for the evacuation of the prisoners, but all arrangements will be left in Lieut. W. Bechwood's hands. The greatest secrecy is to be observed and only chosen subordinate commanders can be informed.</p>	15 A.



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Imbros	November 26		<p>Admiral</p> <p>Van Office telegram to A.H.G. "Admiralty has informed Superintendent Maitte as follows - Recommend men should not be sent on slow ships in large numbers. By making use of every opportunity including men of war and the Steamship 'Vehem' and sending a few men by every ship it should be possible to transport a good number weekly.</p> <p>0845 Nothing to report from Foul and 8 Tups</p> <p>0852 Heavy squall, against our entire left, causing some casualties from 9 Tups.</p> <p>0922 Heavy report intermittent shelling of head all night.</p> <p>2044 8 Tups have nothing further to report</p> <p>2057 9 Tups report 'On edge of rain flooding began at, otherwise all quiet'</p> <p>2057 Foul report that trenches and V Beach were heavily shelled all day.</p> <p>2009 Angae report 'Beaches shelled all day; violent storm at 5.15 pm. all boats sent away early.</p> <p>Transport for 54 D<sup>2</sup> is 1 1/2 miles off Waltham's Pen at 6 pm 27<sup>th</sup>. 4,800 men should be on board before day break, 15,000 troops are in the trenches, it is hoped that supply of ships will be sent regularly at 6 pm till all are despatched.</p> <p>2 Coy (Furler) left Angae for Madras last night.</p> <p>Heavy rainstorm during the day, with very cold wind.</p> <p>Van f. G.H.O. - No ships sent to Jeddah, further pending receipt of final decision of Cabinet (Appendix)</p> <p>Letter to J. in view of C.B.S. in view of late command. (Appendix)</p>	<p>26 A.</p> <p>26 B.</p>



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# WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Army Form C. 2118.

626

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Imbros	Nov. 27 <sup>c</sup>	0930	Nothing to report from S, <sup>Angae</sup> and French	
		0939	Angae report large number of trenches flooded during the night, a good deal of damage done by the rain.	
		1957	S info report about 20 ft of shelling to which W of new bar worked away today.	
		1941	9 info report as follows "Chordale Hill heavily shelled today causing several casualties. We retaliated with all our guns. The heavy rain has caused many of our trenches to be flooded." At 2102 9 info report as follows "A considerable portion of A and C sections the condition of trenches gave some cause for anxiety. Certain trenches may have to be abandoned at all events temporarily. Officers and men are already very sick on account of cold rain."	
		2026	French report some mining activity on both sides.	
		2050	Angae report some further trenches have been flooded out. Very hot and cold but no local damage done by storm.	
			A H G. was to Angae with reference to 9 info report <sup>that</sup> if evacuation of certain trenches is necessary by 9 info, the march prepared to protect the left flank which will be exposed.	(Angae)
			Com. Mander. Chief decides that today's ration issue is to be maintained as follows. Soda 50,000 men. Angae 40,000 men. Killers 35,000 men.	
			Telegram is despatched to all Corps. "Do not embark any more ammunition till further orders received."	
			Telegram received from G H G. "Do not move at present any more troops other than the 64 Div and 9 reserve battalions. Further arrangements have been made. Tent accommodation for 150,000 men to be sent from Alexandria to Imbros."	
			Heavy rain storm followed towards evening by sleet. Very cold wind from the north continues.	



# WAR DIARY

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## or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

62

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Indus	November 21		<p>Despatch 9 Corps to A.H.Q. re attack on Peshawar (Appendix)</p> <p>Despatch A.H.Q. 18 Corps and Angas about defence measures, and offensive attitude adopted to decision enemy (Appendix)</p> <p>Despatch from G.H.Q. cancelling memo of Corps 18 Corps</p>	<p>27 A</p> <p>27 B</p> <p>27 C.</p>



# WAR DIARY

or

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Jordan	November 28	0800	Telegram is received from War Office stating that Dardanelles and Salonica armies will make their demands on Levant Base (Alexandria) separately and independently for all supplies transport etc. Demands in home are to be made direct by J.O.C. Levant Base not J.O.C. Egypt	
		0845	Nothing particular to report from 8 Corps, French and League, but all Corps report extreme cold and the Hygiene has turned to snow	
		1300	Following report is received from 9 Corps: The situation is disquieting owing to the number of officers and men falling sick from cold and exposure. They have for some deaths from this cause. All hospitals are overcrowded, and the sick must be evacuated. Some parts of the line are only held by stragglers and much equipment has been left on the floods. There is no immediate cause for anxiety, as Turks have suffered as much as we have, but there is no line here where men can be removed. In reply to this telegram A.H.Q. is satisfied that hospital ships will be sent to Syria when weather moderates and evacuation is possible.	
		1545	8 Corps report that the Turks have used another form of gas on indigenous workers. This caused throttling of temples and had the lasting mauling effects. The entire ship of the Mediterranean & Hephthalis harbour has broken up and disappeared, and a section of the deep water pier has been washed away; all lighters and small craft are therefore in precarious position, and the Navy are to be requested to send another ship to be sunk at earliest opportunity. Instructions are sent to all Corps commanders with reference to care of feet and protection from frostbite, also instructions to be made when from the 6 Corps men they should be to be removed to C.M.C. All units have been warned about frostbite, they are all being supplied of warm clothing. League and Miller report men fairly comfortable in the trenches, but 5 Corps & 4 Corps have had a bad time; Seragatsi have also suffered considerably. What force the Arabs in the Syrian Mts.	
			The weather has been for the night during the last 24 hours for any evacuation of strong ammunition or personnel from the Peninsula a great deal of damage has been done to Hephthalis harbour.	

1577 Wt. W10791/1773 500,000 1/15 D. D. & L. A.D.S.S./Forms/C. 2118.

\* 86' Doh are reported to have suffered over 150 deaths from cold and exposure.



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## OR INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Imbros	November 29	0845	Camps report all quiet	
		1125	Chief Engineer Inzac comes to E.M.C. as follows: We have now only 3 days water and $\frac{1}{2}$ ration for troops on Imbros line. Hope you will arrange that Navy deliver water at earliest possible moment.	
			G. troops suggest that every transport should carry its own landing party, owing to the difficulty of finding fatigues for beach parties. This difficulty is caused by number of men suffering from impoison.	
			Telegram from the G.O.C. in C. to G.O.C. G. troops filed Appendix.	26-H
		1950	French and 8 troops have nothing further to report.	
		2043	G. troops report intense cold, and the gale still continues. Opposite the 13th Div 500 Boats advanced out of their hatches, but as they refused to lay down their arms they were fired on and 15 were killed. This was possibly meant for a ruse to discover if the hatches were held.	
		2154	Inzac report heavy shelling of beach line. Casualties 8 officers and about 100 rank and file, most covered by heavy burst. 12 in shells unaccounted for.	27-B
			Notes on 8 troops beaching, taken in file Appendix.	30-B
			Camps report a situation as present sent to H.Q. Munda (filed Appendix).	24-C
			Notes on 8 troops about system of defense mine (Appendix).	24-D
			Notes on H.Q. about damage (Kephala beach) and difficulties of landing troops at Imbros.	24-E
			Notes on Inzac - Proposals for 1st and Final Stages water supply.	



# WAR DIARY

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Imbro	November 30 <sup>th</sup>	0900	Corps report all quiet	
		1100	Admiral Wemyss arrived at Imbro and inspected the damage to Repheles Harbour. J. K. A. was to A.H.O. ascertain requirements of Dyng's troops as regards food shelter and general requirements. Also his proposals as regards holding his line. Sending J. L. to obtain your views tomorrow and send him also to see local conditions at Suda. This late hour is repeated to 9 troops further information.	
		1930	All Corps report considerable shelling during last 24 hours.	
		2110	Telegram despatched to J.H.O. 'Owing to destruction piers D Beach propose construct new pier V Beach and have arranged suitable site. May balance of 117 Railway Coy at Mudros to be spared for this duty, which is very urgent. Dun Office were 'We have reliable information that Germans are preparing to use flame projections in Gallipoli'. Small quantity of stores and vehicles evacuated from Imbro. as work has recommenced. Weather fine but cold, frost during the night 11°. Conversation between J.O.C. and Admiral Wemyss (filed Appendix) Letter L.S.H.Q. to A.H.O. with reference to troops put forward to go to Melibey.	30-A 30-B

*Wemyss*



026  
SECRET

REPORT ON USE OF GAS ON SUVLA AND ANZAC FRONTS.  
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(1) Lie of country along the present Front.  
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(a) SUVLA FRONT.

In the 11th Division Area (Trenches D.57 to D.44, Map 135 compiled September, 1915), the country does not lend itself in our opinion to the use of gas either by the enemy or ourselves, owing to the distance apart of the trenches and the broken country in between.

In the 29th Division (Trenches C.64 to C.50, Map 118) more level ground is encountered, and speaking generally, although the country is not ideal, under favourable conditions of wind and distance between the opposing front lines, gas could be used by either side. Owing to the amount of scrub a plentiful supply of gas would be required.

At C.62 the distance between the opposing front lines is about 450 yards, which diminishes to about 300 yards at C.57, this intervening distance being more or less maintained along the remainder of the front of the Division, i.e. to C.50. We are of opinion that where the distance between the opposing front lines is sufficient to permit the shelling of our front trenches, the use of gas would be dangerous as the enemy would be able to heavily bombard our gas-posts and thus inflict losses not only directly amongst our troops but also indirectly owing to the damage done to our gas-apparatus. The front of the 29th Division is practically enfiladed by enemy batteries situated on the high ground

/opposite



opposite JEPHSON'S POST.

In the trenches occupied by the 13th Division, B.69 to B.50 (on Map 113 of September 1915, B.68 is shown on the left flank), the distance between the opposing lines varies from about 250 yards at B.69 to about 500 yards in the Section near CHOCOLATE HILL.

At B.69 the ground is nearly level for 120 yards from our firing line then falls slightly to the Turkish firing line which is about 250 yards distant from our own. At B.65 and B.64, the intervening ground is rather scrubby but nearly level, the opposing front lines at this point being about 350 yards apart.

From the left of B.62 to the right of B.58, there is a slight slope downwards from the Turkish lines to our own and the intervening distance has increased to about 450 yards and there is but little scrub.

From B.58 to B.50 the distance between the opposing front lines is generally about 500 yards, the ground sloping downwards towards the Turks who are in a valley.

Summarising these remarks, the ground and general slope on the front of the 13th Division appear suitable for the use of gas. The distance between the opposing lines is at present sufficiently great to probably allow of the shelling of the front trenches on practically the whole front of this Division. Furthermore, where our positions can be enfiladed, the use of gas is very inadvisable.

On the Front of the 2nd Mounted Division, the ground is mostly flat, here the distance between the enemy's firing

/line



line and our own is considerably less than on the front of the 13th Division, often under 150 yards, and gas might be used by either side given favourable wind conditions. Further, owing to the slight depth at which water is found below the surface, the trenches on our side are shallow and the same probably holds good for the Turkish trenches. Of the SUVLA front, this country appears to be the most suitable portion portion for the use of gas by either side under favourable conditions of wind.

(b) ANZAC FRONT.

Passing SUSAK KUYU and entering the front now occupied by the 54th Division the lie of the country as far as HILL 60 is similar to that occupied by the 2nd Mounted Division on the right of CHOCOLATE HILL, and like the latter, is suitable for the use of gas under favourable conditions as regards wind and protection from shell fire.

In the region of HILL 60 the ground becomes more uneven, but given favourable wind conditions and a very plentiful supply, gas might still be used; the country in this particular region cannot however be described as well suited for the use of gas.

From HILL 60 to the Right Flank of the 1st Australian Division the country along the line of trenches is very much broken and is generally unsuitable for gas attacks. At the APEX, QUINN'S POST and LONE PINE, where the ground is level and the opposing trenches near to one another, the enemy could use gas on very short fronts, but in our opinion this is very improbable.

/On



On the ANZAC front the possibility arises that the enemy may have command of the head of a gully leading down to our lines. This is noticeable in the case of MONASH GULLY. Should the enemy resort to the use of gas in such a position, so that it streams down the valley, troops occupying the bed of the gully should be warned immediately, and proceed to higher ground.

The above remarks upon the SUVLA and ANZAC fronts have been made with reference to the suitability of the country for the use of cylinders of gas in the front trenches and not to the use of asphyxiating bombs or shells. The effect of the use of bombs and shells will naturally be local and its intensity depends on the severity of the bombardment. It is thus necessary, whatever be the nature of the country that all precautions against gas attacks should be made along the entire front.

On the fronts of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions considerable tunnelling has been done and in some cases these trenches lead to dead ends or to underground shelters against high explosive shell fire, it would be dangerous to occupy these during gas attacks.

#### (2) WIND CONDITIONS.

- - - - -

According to information obtained, the prevailing winds are N.E. and S.W. For effective use of gas by the enemy an easterly wind would be required. The wind which blows from the N.E. is however reported to be usually so strong that we infer it is seldom favourable for gas attack by the enemy.

The wind from the S.W. is said to be more gentle in character. As our line runs in most parts of the front

/from



from-east of north to a few degrees west of south, the most favourable wind for our offensive would be a little north of west; consequently the S.W. wind necessarily increases the distance the gas would have to traverse before reaching the enemy's trench. This increase requires consideration when the opposing trenches are not in close proximity.

(3) PRECAUTIONS AGAINST  
- - - - -  
GAS ATTACKS.  
- - - - -

(1) Gas Helmets. These should be periodically inspected to see that they are sound, and damaged helmets immediately replaced. On enquiry, we were assured that this was being done, but that difficulty had been experienced in obtaining the necessary supplies for re-issue. It is highly important that the supply be forthcoming, but should it be inadequate, company officers should instruct their men that limited protection may be obtained by holding the material of the damaged helmet over the mouth and nose.

(2) Knapsack Sprayers and Spraying Solutions. The number of sprayers for use in clearing the trenches after a gas attack should be increased, the present number is inadequate. In our opinion, the number should be at least eight per Brigade, and where a considerable amount of tunnelling has been done, extra sprayers are advised. The solution for use in the sprayers should be made up and kept in covered receptacles near at hand. From experience, it appears undesirable to keep the solution in the tank of the knapsack sprayer. This solution is made by dissolving 1 lb. of washing soda and 6 lbs. of /hyposulphite



hyposulphite of soda in 3 gallons of water, and a supply of these materials should be at hand in the Trench Stores throughout the front.

(3) Tunnels and Underground Shelters. As mentioned above, much tunnelling has been done in the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions. In this Section we recommend that blankets or other suitable material previously impregnated should be hung across the openings to prevent the entrance of gas. The initial impregnation of the material might be done at the Anti-Gas Depot at MUDROS after ascertaining the quantity required.

(sgd.) J.T. HEWITT,  
Major, R.E.

IMBROS.

20th November, 1915.

~~George~~  
GEORGE BLACKSHAW,  
Captain, R.E.



*001*  
P R I O R I T Y.



From:- D.Q.M.G: MUDROS.

To:- G.H.Q. IMBROS.

-----

M.l.

23-11-15.

*Mo  
L38*

Despd. 1825.  
Recd. 2130.

Ample room will shortly be available at MUDROS for Brigades to rest. Please inform I.G.C. as to numbers you can send and on what date. Daily ferries should be loaded with any surplus equipment and surplus serviceable rifles. These should be put in charge of troops coming to rest; each 5 rifles in charge of one man to protect from weather. Please acknowledge.

(Acknowledged and all corps informed.- Latter asked to wire what numbers can be spared and when).

-----

1 copy to "O".  
2 copies "Q".  
2 copies "A".  
1 copy D.D.O.S.

"Q" Cables.  
Resting troops general.



024  
**SECRET**



From:- D.S.T. Mudros.

To:- D.D.S.T., IMBROS.  
-----

S.823.

23rd November.

Despd. 1745.  
Recd. 2030.

Owing to requirements for SALONICA impossible at present to send supplies forward. Issue of bread and fresh meat is to be made at ANZAC and SUVLA alternate days only. Owing to probable large increase of numbers at IMBROS raise immediate stock at depot there to 500.000 rations for men, 8000 for animals, and 8000 Indian rations. For this purpose am withdrawing Packling (sic) and East Point from SUVLA to IMBROS. (Group undecipherable) sufficient hay and grain to keep up to ten days but not more SUVLA and ANZAC. Wire for any article you may require additional to those on Packling. Maintain ANZAC SUVLA at 10 days fuel no more if you require more fuel IMBROS wire if you wish to withdraw COMEDIAN from SUVLA and ANZAC and serve Peninsula with G. ship. Can send you hay and grain from here if necessary. Except as above no supplies are to be landed at SUVLA or ANZAC unless required for immediate consumption. Send you in CLIFFORD tomorrow oats, meal, oil, special Indian (fruit?) Wire your requirements G. ships and lighters in order to carry out these instructions.

1 copy D.D.S.T.  
2 copies "Q".  
1 copy "O"  
"Q" Cables.



026

PRIORITY.

*Handwritten:* Harding



From

G. H. Q.

*Handwritten:* W.A.

To

8th, 9th, A. & N.Z. Army Corps.  
-----

O.548.

26.11.15.

Desp. 0930.

Ample room will shortly be available at MUDROS  
for resting troops AAA Wire at once numbers you can  
spare and when AAA Load daily ferries with surplus  
equipment and surplus serviceable rifles AAA Latter  
should be in charge of troops going to rest, each five  
rifles in charge of one man to protect from weather.

Q cables.  
Resting general,



War Orders

Nov 25/15

25<sup>th</sup> November, 1915.

To

The General Officer Commanding,

8th Army Corps.

9th Army Corps.

A. N. Z. A. C.

The following definitions are to be noted :-

A GRENADE is any explosive charge capable of being thrown by hand or fired from a rifle.

A BOMB is any explosive charge, thrown from a Trench Mortar or Howitzer, or dropped from aircraft.

Since confusion is likely to occur if these terms are interchanged, care must be taken in future to refer to such explosives by their correct nomenclature. A descriptive list of Grenades is published herewith, with the official designation of each underlined. They must invariably be referred to in future by their official designation and not by the descriptive title noted in brackets.

It should be noted that a catapult throws grenades and not bombs. The Garland Howitzer throws bombs and not "Garland Grenades" as they are often called.

The following terms also are to be taken into use :-

Grenadiers instead of Bomb Throwers. §

Grenade School instead of Bomb School.

§ A "Bomb Thrower" is a synonymous term for Trench Mortar.

Copy to W.W.O.S.

(Ld). C. F. Aspinall, Lt. Col.

For Major-General, G.S.  
Dardanelles Army.



GRENADES.

Hand No. 1.

(R.L. Impact or percussion Grenade).

Consists of a brass cylinder encircled by a narrow cast iron ring, serrated to break up into 16 fragments.

This cylinder is mounted on a wood block to which a cane or wood handle with streamers is attached.

The firing needle is carried in a removable brass cap, centrally pierced for the safety pin and stamped with the words "Remove", "Travel" and "Fire".

Hand No. 2.

(Sometimes known as "Mexican" Impact or percussion Grenade).

Somewhat similar to No. 1 but the handle is secured to the base of the grenade by a short length of iron rod on to which a wooden "grip" is fixed, with streamers attached. The safety pin in this case passes through the base of the grenade; this grenade has no safety cap and the recess in the head of the grenade for the detonator is closed by a screwed ebonite plug.

Rifle No. 3.

(Hales Rifle Grenade).

Consists of a serrated steel body, the rearward end of which is closed by a base piece which carries the needle pellet, two retaining bolts, wind vane and releasing socket with safety pin. To the base piece is fixed a base plug carrying the spring clip and a 10-inch steel rod.



Rifle No. 4.

(Naval Grenade).

Consists of a brass body with an aluminium base which carries an aluminium wind vane, through the collar of which a safety pin passes. The base is also fitted with a spring clip to grip the nose cap of the rifle and screwed for the reception of a 10-inch steel rod. There is no set back collar as in the case of the No. 3 Grenade.

Hand No. 5.

(Mills Grenade).

Has an oval shaped cast iron body which is weakened by longitudinal and transverse grooves. A central portion containing the percussion arrangement is screwed into one end of the body leaving a recess which is closed by a screwed plug. It has two chambers parallel with the length of the grenade, the larger one containing a striker and spring; the smaller chamber the detonator. The space outside the central portion is filled with high explosive. The head of the striker protrudes from a hole in the upper end of the grenade and is held in the "cocked" position by one end of a curved lever on the outside of the body. The lever is held in position by a safety pin passing through it and two lugs formed on the top of the body.

Hand No. 6.

(R.L. Light Friction Pattern).

Consists of a cylindrical tin body with rounded edges 2.5 inches in diameter and 4 inches long filled with high explosive.

Two studs are provided on top of the body, with either of which the springs on the flange of the igniter engage and lock the latter in the grenade.



A cavity is left down the centre of the H.E. tapering outwards at the top to receive a friction igniter.

The igniter consists of a metal holder containing a friction bar, short length of safety fuze and a detonator; a flange having two notches and two springs on its outer edge is soldered to the exterior of the holder. Two horns are also provided to form a grip for turning the igniter into the locked position in the grenade. Weight 1 lb.

Hand No. 7.

(R.L. Heavy Friction pattern).

Is the same external shape as the No. 6. and takes the same igniter. It differs however internally in having an internal cylinder, the space between which and the body is filled with H.E., with a cavity left down the centre to receive the igniter. Weight 2 lbs.

Hand No. 8.

("Double cylinder" Light pattern).

Consists of an outer tin cylinder 3 inches deep with tin bottom and internal tin cylinder of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches in diameter. The top is closed by a ring of tin soldered to the inner and outer cylinders, while the inner cylinder is closed by a tin lid. The latter has a hole in the centre to the under side of which the top of a copper detonator holder is soldered. The central cylinder is filled with H.E. and the space between the two cylinders is filled with  $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch steel balls and resin. Weight  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. N.B. A large number of these "double cylinder" grenades were manufactured in EGYPT and, although of inferior pattern, are, for all practical purposes, the same and should be referred to as No. 8.



Hand No. 9.

("Double cylinder" Heavy pattern).

differs only from No. 8 in having space between the two cylinders entirely filled with steel balls. Weight 2 lbs.

Hand No. 13.

(pitcher grenade)

consists of a cylindrical steel body 1.8 inches in diameter and 4 inches long with an internal tin cylinder, the latter being filled with H.E. The body has the sides weakened by longitudinal and transverse grooves. The top of the internal cylinder is closed with a tin disc having a central hole to the underside of which is soldered a receptacle for the safety fuze and lower end of the igniter. An attachment plate for fixing the igniter is soldered on top of the cylinder and the igniter is fixed down in position in the slots of the attachment plate by pressing down three small ears provided. The igniter consists of a cylindrical brass head with cover, the cover being attached by a piece of tape to the ignition arrangement in the head. This cover is held in position on the head by two bayonet joints. The removal of the cover is effected by a slight turn followed by a sharp jerk; this operation fires the igniter and lights the end of the safety fuse.

Hand "A".

(Spherical or Cricket Ball Grenade).

At present these are of three patterns:-

(1) Those manufactured in MALTA.-

which consists of a spherical cast iron body closed by a brass screw plug. The fuze which passes through the centre of this plug has the exploder or detonator fastened on the inside end and the igniting arrangement which



consists of a brass ferrule filled with safety match composition on its outside end. The match composition is protected by a brass cap. An half moon shaped steel ring is sprung on to the brass plug to enable the grenade to be hung on to a belt,

(2) Those manufactured in EGYPT.-

similar to above but the match composition is protected by a paper sleeve instead of a brass ferrule, and instead of the half moon shaped steel ring a small steel ring is secured to the top of the brass plug.

(3) (With Brocks Igniter).

These are manufactured in England, and are similar to above but the top of the closing plug is almost flush with the outer surface of the grenade. This plug is fitted with a copper sleeve for the reception of the igniter and has a short length of copper wire attached to a small lug for securing the detonator. The detonating apparatus consists of a Detonator, length of fuse and igniter assembled together ready for use. The top of the igniter is protected by a damp proof cover painted black, which is removed by tearing off a small tape.

- - - - -



OUTLINE      SCHEME  
for  
EVACUATION of the PENINSULA

1. General Outline.
2. Basis of Calculation.
3. Disposal of troops after leaving the Beaches.
4. Preliminary Stage.
5. Intermediate Stage.
6. Final Stage.
7. Requirements in Vessels.
8. Suggested outline of withdrawal of Wounded.

-----  
Appendix 'A' - Table showing daily withdrawals. (The  
allotment of troops ~~will~~ given is only  
for illustration and suggestion).  
-----

4 Copies typed.  
25.11.15.  
B.R.M.



OUTLINE SCHEME for the EVACUATION of the PENINSULA.I.- GENERAL OUTLINE

1. The evacuation will be carried out in three stages -

- (a) Preliminary stage.
- (b) Intermediate stage.
- (c) Final stage.

2. The preliminary stage is that in which, all troops and all animals and material not required for a defensive winter campaign can be evacuated without comment before definite sanction to a withdrawal is received. This evacuation to include all troops due for rest who can be spared, all animals not required for the maintenance of the reduced force, all damaged guns, and all stores not required during the winter months.

3. The intermediate stage will begin directly the policy of withdrawal is accepted, and will include all men, guns, animals and stores not required for the tactical defence of our positions during the final stage.

4. The final stage will be the withdrawal of troops only, and, once begun, must be carried out with the maximum of speed possible. During this stage it must be recognized that it will probably be impossible to withdraw any more guns, supplies, stores, or material.

It must be realized that bad weather may at any time prolong these stages. The troops and guns left for the final stage must therefore be sufficient to hold our position during, say, a week of bad weather throughout which time we might be continuously attacked by superior numbers.

Further, though the programme for the intermediate period should include all troops, guns, animals, etc., not required for the final period, it must be accepted that it might at any



time be necessary to cease embarking guns, animals, and stores, and press forward the embarkation of troops (final period) with all possible speed.

5. For the success of the scheme it is essential :-

- (a) That a decision should be arrived at immediately, owing to the approach of winter weather, and the consequent danger of delay.
- (b) That as soon as the decision to withdraw is made, no more personnel, stores or supplies should be sent to the Peninsula.
- (c) That efforts to prevent espionage should be redoubled, the censorship made more strict, and all outward mails held up until the final period is begun.

## 2. BASIS of CALCULATION.

I. The present strengths at SUVLA, ANZAC, and HELLES are -

Place.	Men.	Animals.	Guns.
SUVLA.	50800	3000	91
ANZAC.	41300	2358	105
HELLES (Br)	32070	5718	124
.. (French)	10558	3501	73
T O T A L	134728	14587	393

Of the above, the effective rifles are, at present -

Place	Rifles	Yards of front
SUVLA.	32.407	11.000
ANZAC.	27.718	11.000
HELLES (Br.)	20.139	5.300
.. (French)	7.000	1.700

2. As a working basis for this scheme it may be taken -

- (a) That the whole French Force, less one-third of French Artillery, should be withdrawn during the intermediate period, owing to the difficulties of divided command during the final withdrawal. The French line would in this



case be taken over by British troops.

(b) That a total of two rifles per yard, plus one-third of our Artillery, and a proportion of administrative services and beach personnel, should suffice to hold the line for a week's fighting, and that only these numbers should be left for the final period -

(c) Thus, the troops left for the final period might be -

Place.	Troops.	Guns.	Animals.
SUVLA.	26.000	40	1.000
ANZAC.	26.000	40	500
HELLES.	18.500	60	1.000
T O T A L	70.500	140	2.500

(d) This leaves the following to be evacuated during the preliminary and intermediate periods -

Place.	Troops.	Guns.	Animals.
SUVLA.	24.800	51	2.000
ANZAC.	15.300	65	1.868
HELLES (Br)	13.600	34	4.718
.. (French)	10.558	53	3.501
TOTAL (less French who will carry out their own evacuation).	53.700	200	8.586

(e) The actual details of troops to be evacuated during each period should be left to the decision of Corps Commanders, subject only to the above numbers being complied with.

A suggested detail is given in Appendix 'A'.

3. - DISPOSAL OF TROOPS AFTER LEAVING BEACHES.

Troops and animals leaving the Peninsula can be accommodated as follows :-

(a)	At IMBROS	20.000 men	4.000 animals
(b)	At MUDROS	60.000 men	4.600 animals
(c)	On Transports	25.000 men	
(d)	-- do --		
	(sent away during the preliminary period)	19.000 men	
		124.000	8.600

§. Some of these will be from the Peninsula. The balance will be from details at MUDROS, thus making room in that Island for more than the 50.000 mentioned in (b) above.

\* Less 19000 to be taken off on return of the ships in (d), less sick and wounded in hospital ships, and less any killed.

§ To be reduced according to numbers accommodated in horse ships.



#### 4.- THE PRELIMINARY STAGE .

This has already been begun.

The total numbers of men which it is suggested to remove are shown in Appendix 'A'.

Corps Commanders are being asked about numbers of animals they can spare, and some have already been withdrawn.

#### 5.- THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE.

1. If possible the following numbers should be evacuated during this stage (vide suggested detail in Appendix 'A')-

Place.	Men.	Guns.	Animals.
HELLES	10.600	84	4.718
ANZAC	9.600	74	1.868
SUVLA	17.500	58	2.000

2. (A) of these about 3.000 men should be evacuated each night.
- (B) All the guns in (1) should be embarked in the first two nights.
- (C) On the third and following nights as many animals, vehicles and stores (in addition to 3.000 men) as it is possible to embark.
- (D) No definite number of days can be allotted to this stage, but it will be advisable for it to continue as long as tactical exigencies permit or until everything not required to be left for the final stage has been removed.
- (E) As soon as the final stage is ordered to begin all embarking of animals, guns, and stores must cease and the embarkation of men only be proceeded with at the utmost speed.

#### 6.- PROGRAMME OF FINAL STAGE.

<u>1st Night</u> -	Helles	10.000	
	Anzac	7.000	
	Suvla	7.000	
		-----	
		24.000	(18.000 in Carriers 6.000 in Battleships)



<u>2nd Night</u>	-	Helles	8.500	
		Anzac	7.000	
		Suvla	7.000	
			-----	(16.500 in Carriers
			22.500	( 6.000 in Battleships
<u>3rd Night</u>	-	Helles	-	
		Anzac	6.000	
		Suvla	12.000	
			-----	( 12.000 in Carriers
			18.000	( 6.000 in Battleships
<u>4th Night</u>	-	Anzac	6.200	
				( 3.200 in Carriers
				( 3.000 in Battleships

-----

NOTES.

- (a) In the event of the intermediate stage being curtailed one or more nights as necessary must be added to the final stage in order to embark the balance of the men left over from the intermediate stage.
- (b) During the final stage any opportunity which occurs of saving guns or vehicles without interfering with the rapid embarkation of men will be seized. A few horse boats or lighters will be at each beach for this purpose.
- (c) As soon as the French Force has completed its re-embarkation 'V' beach as well as 'W' beach will be used for the embarkation of British troops at Helles. A definite period of, say, 3 days (extensible to 4 days if tactical exigencies permit) should be given to the French to complete their embarkation.
- (d) Arrangements will be made by the Navy to have boats off the shore at points where it is possible that stragglers or wounded may come down - such as Gully beach.



NOTES.

- (a) The 3 gun ships should be capable of holding about 80 guns apiece, and should have 5 ton derricks. They would be allocated one to each beach (Helle, Anzac and Suvla.)
- (b) The 6 store ships could be any ships capable of hoisting and stowing numbers of vehicles, water carts, etc. Two would be allocated to each beach - one at the beach, one at Mudros ready to relieve the other when full.
- (c) The 6 horse-ships would be allocated 2 to each beach - one at the beach, the other at Imbros or Mudros. They would be loaded at night, and unloaded at Imbros or Mudros.
- (d) All the above would go to Imbros during daylight, except those at Suvla, which could remain there.

XXX XX  
X

8. SUGGESTED OUTLINE of WITHDRAWAL OF WOUNDED.

This scheme entails the possible evacuation of 1000 badly wounded to be evacuated at each beach in 24 hours.

The AQUITANIA (capacity 3500) and MAURETANIA (2500) to be at Mudros for the hospital ships to discharge into.

12 Hospital ships (capacity 500 cases each) to be available, 6 at Mudros and 6 at the beaches - 2 at each beach.

Two motor lighters for wounded only at each beach. These motor lighters should each be capable of taking off 500 wounded per 24 hours to the Hospital ships.

Each Hospital ship when full, will go to Mudros and discharge into AQUITANIA or MAURETANIA, another one taking her place off the beach. After filling up MAURETANIA and AQUITANIA the Hospital ships would cease to ferry, and remain as hospitals - proceeding as directed.

Lightly wounded must embark with the fighting troops in the carriers.

(sd) G.L. MacMunn Col.  
F.H. Mitchell Capt. R.N.  
C.F. Aspinall Lt. Col.

Mudros. 16/11/15.



# APPENDIX "A".

HELLES		ANZAC		SUVLA.	
Formation	Numbers	Formation	Numbers	Formation	Numbers.
PRELIMINARY PERIOD.					
Details	3.000	54th Divn. Eastern Mount- ed Brigade Details.	3359  1073 <u>1000</u> <u>5432</u>	53rd Divn. Details.	4647 3000
Totals	<u>3.000</u>				<u>7647</u>
INTERMEDIATE PERIOD.					
87th Brigade	2.500	29th Indian		29th Divn.	6507
S.E.Mtd B'de	1.228	Inf. B'de.	3091	Details.	10900
Lowland M.Bde	855	Details.	6500		
Details.	5.000				
Artillery.	<u>1.000</u>				
Totals.	<u>10.583</u>		<u>9591</u>		<u>17407</u>
FINAL PERIOD.					
1st Divn.	4385	1st Austln.Div.	6131	11th Divn.	9284
R.N. Divn.	6751	2nd Austln.Div.	9776	13th Divn.	8429
52nd Divn.	4420	N.Z. Divn.	6288	2nd S.W. M. Bde.	1255
Artillery.	1000	Details.	3000	Mtd. Divn.	2285
Details.	2000	Artillery.	1000	Artillery.	1000
Totals.	<u>18556</u>		<u>26195</u>	Details.	<u>3500</u> <u>25753</u>
Grand Total	32139		41218		50807



7. THE VESSELS REQUIRED FOR CARRYING OUT THIS PROGRAMME WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:-

I. INTERMEDIATE STAGE.

PLACE	Troop Carriers	Trawlers	Motor Lighters	Flat Lighters.	Tugs	Steam Boats	Horse Boats	Gun Ships	Store Ships	Horse Ships	Hospital Ships.
HELLS	5	5	5	6(Maltese) 1(Egypt'n)	4	6	-	1	2	2	Normal Arrangements.
ANZAC	4	5	10	-	3	10	10	1	2	2	
SUVLA	4	5	10	1(Maltese) 1(Egypt'n)	3	6	6	1	2	2	
TOTAL.	13	15	25	7 2	10	22	16	3	6	6	



026  
J.

II. FINAL STAGE.

PLACE.	Troop Carriers.	trawlers.	Motor lighters.	tugs.	flat lighters.	Steam boats.	Horse boats.	Old Battleships.	Hospital Ships.	Hospital motor lighters
HELLES.	12	5	8	4	4	6	-	-	4	2
ANZAC	5	5	10	5	-	6	6	2	4	2
SUVLA.	5	5	10	3	2	6	6	2	4	2
Total.	22	15	28	10	6	18	12	4	Ⓔ 14	6

Ⓐ plus 5 from Helles on 3rd night.

Ⓑ Includes AQUITANIA and MAURITANIA at Mudros.

91



92  
GSR/2/48  
**SECRET**  
26

Dardanelles Army Headquarters.

26. Nov. 1915

C. G. S.

General Headquarters.

I today visited Cape Helles and discussed the details of the impending evacuation both with the G.O.C. 8th Corps and the G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire des Dardanelles.

2. I found that General Davies has grave doubts whether the evacuation of Cape Helles is now possible, owing to the fact that every one of the piers at W Beach has been destroyed by the recent gale, and that it may take at least a month of fine weather to repair them.

In these circumstances I at once sent you my G33 from 8th Corps Headquarters, asking that the despatch of reinforcements for 8th Corps and 29th Division to Alexandria might be delayed.

3. I have, however, called on General Davies for his views and proposals for the evacuation and will make a further report to you as soon as they are received.

4. From my conversation with General Brulard I gathered that he considers that the difficulties of maintaining our position at Helles, if the Anzac and Sivla positions are evacuated, and if the Turks get a plentiful supply of artillery ammunition, would be so great, that as to render a voluntary withdrawal from Helles most advisable.

At the same time he could give me no idea as to when he could begin an intermediate stage of withdrawal, as he was quite ignorant of the French naval capabilities. I have, however, called up on him also to furnish me with an immediate report.

5.



5. Your instructions regarding the necessity for absolute secrecy are being strictly observed and I have already warned Corps Commanders<sup>\*</sup> that they must tell no one but their senior General Staff officers that an evacuation is contemplated.

\*including  
Gen. Broun

(Sd.) W.R. Broun  
Lieut. General.  
Commanding Dardanelles Army.



026  
From, C.in C., MEDFORCE

SECRET

94

To, G.O.C., Dardanelles Army.

26A

O.56I

26th November 1915

Desp. 1500

Recd. 1700

Chief hopes that in making preliminary arrangements for evacuation you will see that no steps are taken to jeopardize your position in view of possibility of delay in receipt of final decision of Cabinet.

2 Copies typed  
B.R.M.



PRIORITY.SECRET.

From, G.H.Q.

To, A.H.Q.

Ob. 16

27th. November 1915

Desp. 1212

Recd. 1354

Do not move at present any more troops other than  
54th. Division garrison battalions for whom arrangements  
have been made.

1 Copy 'O'  
2 Copies 'Q'



9b  
SECRET

From, A.H.Q.

To, 8th Corps  
Anzac

Oa.352

27th November 1915

Desp.1340

G.H.Q.wish us to consider and report on following points. One. Practicability of organizing immediately in each area a system of defensive mines to cover withdrawal of troops. Two . Advisability of adopting an active offensive attitude to deceive enemy regarding our intentions. Please report on above points.

Two Copies typed

B.R.M.



PRIORITY

SECRET

From, 9th Corps.

To, A.H.Q.

GC.144

27th November 1915

Desp. 1857

Recd. 1940

Your Oa.353.

1. This is being organized.
2. An attack on PIMPLE without proper support from artillery would be more difficult now than formerly. The heavy losses we should incur would hardly compensate us, especially in view of subsequent evacuation. The remainder of line is so heavily flooded that maintenance is difficult at present. We have arranged artillery bombardments on various points of the enemy's line with a view of similar attacks.

2 Copies typed  
B.R.P.



To. G. O. C. 9th Corps.

Sender's Number. O. 588.

Day of Month. 29.

Many thanks your telegram and am most grateful to you and your divisional and brigade commanders for all your exertions and the encouragement you have given the troops AAA Hope it may be possible withdraw large proportion troops from flooded areas to high ground as if trenches are full of water they are useless to Turks as to us AAA Small barricaded posts with good entanglements should cover all flooded areas AAA Well done in having got so many Turks AAA I hear that everywhere they are having even worse time than ourselves and very sorry 29th Division have suffered much but hope possible change in weather will do much to put things right Glad you have been able evacuate sick today and am asking G.H.Q. to send up your reinforcements AAA Anzac and Helles have been more fortunate in their positions than your troops and are full of cheer.

From. General Birdwood.

(Sgd). C.F. Aspinall.  
Lt. - Col.  
G. S.



626  
From, Anzac.

To, A.H.Q.

99  
SECRET

24E

GA. 387

29th November, 1915

Desp. 2139

Recd. 2245

My proposals summarized are as follows:-

1st Stage:- 20,000 men and 60 guns, much stores; 10 days required, and treble the transport now here, and at least 6 steamboats.

Final Stage:- 2 nights. 12,000 men from existing piers first night, at least 12 guns.

2nd night, embarkation at maximum rate from eight places directly in rear of lines, transport being close in.

The shelling today shows that prompt action must be taken on any decision that is made.

2 Copies typed  
B.R.M.



0916  
PRIORITY

100  
**SECRET**  
29/11

From,  
A.H.Q.

To,  
G.H.Q.

O.585

29th November 1915

Desp. 1515

Devastation KEPHALOS Harbour is excessive. Centre sunk ship gone, piers damaged; and all steamboats sunk including those from ANZAC which had come here for shelter. Lighters ashore, also water ship, torpedo boat and many others. Consider only chance of making harbour possible is to sink and fill old battleship, and even then result doubtful, but of this Navy can best judge. Failing this consider troops cannot be landed here to rest, and that ANZAC troops as well as SUVLA should be sent MUDROS and ALEXANDRIA. This would involve immediate concentration of all troopships available in MUDROS Harbour in anticipation of short spell of any fine weather which may supervene. But the advantage of being able to bring troops here as well as to MUDROS in case of urgency is of course manifest, and would partially be met by keeping a few troopships here.

3 copies typed  
B.R.M.



*War Diary*  
*Nov 24/15*  
HEADQUARTERS,

DARDANELLES ARMY,

*B* *29th* November, 1915.

FROM:- GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF,  
DARDANELLES ARMY.

TO:- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The following notes, based on work done and experience obtained in the 8th Corps, are forwarded for your information, and if you approve, for communicating to the Officer Commanding, Grenade School, MUDROS.

1. CORPS BOMBING GROUND. 850 yards by 350 yards.

Provided with a traversed trench 180 yards long with three communicating trenches, each 60 yards long, running into it.

Used for throwing, and carrying out trench tactics with, live Grenades.

A fatigue party once a fortnight repairs the damage done to the trenches by the explosion of the Grenades.

2. The growing importance of bombing may be seen from the fact that the bombs and Grenades used by the 8th Corps during the week-ended September 18th, 1915, were only 112, whereas during that ending November 7th, 1915, 12497 were expended, chiefly in offensive action against the enemy.

The Battalion Grenadiers should become the envy of the rest of the rank and file and, to attain this state of affairs, it is necessary to pick out the keenest and most experienced officers and N.C.O's as instructors who will be able to popularise bombing and rouse up in their men the enthusiasm necessary to ensure the required efficiency. It must also be impressed on all officers concerned that it is their duty to take the necessary steps to safeguard both themselves and their men against accidents with Grenades and to instil in them, by their care, confidence in the weapons they use as well as keenness and enthusiasm in getting the best results out of these weapons.

The occurrence of accidents with Grenades is naturally prejudicial to the popularity of bombing and the first step towards efficient Grenadier-training must be absolute confidence in the officers supervising the training of the men and their action in the trenches.

Efficiency can only be finally attained by the institution of a regular system of Grenade training in which the principles must always remain the same, at least with regard to the more important features. Hence it is

/necessary



102  
(2).

necessary to lay down a special system of bombing attack, which must always be adhered to in principle and assiduously practised, to standardise programmes of instruction in bombing, and to adopt a general method for bringing up supplies of Grenades during the attack.

### 3. PRINCIPLES of EMPLOYMENT.

Grenadiers may be employed in either attack or defence.

In Attack. they may be employed:-

- (i). Distributed along the front and on the flanks of an attack, to bomb into the enemy's trench.
- (ii). After sapping to within bombing distance of the enemy's trenches, to clear a portion of a trench before rushing it.
- (iii). When in the enemy's trench, to proceed from traverse to traverse clearing each in turn; in this case the Grenadiers should, in nearly all cases, work both ways.
- (iv). To bomb machine-gunners out of their emplacements.

In Defence. Grenadiers may be employed to resist any of the above forms of attack, for a counter-attack along a trench captured by the enemy and up communicating trenches. A very favourable time for the employment of Grenades in resisting an attack on our trenches will be when the enemy has reached the wire entanglement and is endeavouring to work his way through it.

### 4. RAPID MOVEMENT TO SURPRISE ENEMY.

If movement is quick and determined, the chance of success is enormously increased. The quicker a man moves the more likely he is to surprise the enemy and the more difficult it is for the enemy to hit him with a Grenade which is a slow moving high trajectory missile.

### 5. SUPPLY OF GRENADES IN THE ATTACK.

A systematic organization is necessary to enable supplies of Grenades to be passed up to the front and casualties to be replaced almost automatically.

### 6. WEARING OF EQUIPMENT BY GRENADIERS.

It has been decided that all Grenadiers must carry their rifles and bandoliers, as well as Wallace Tools and two sandbags each whilst conducting a bombing attack; the rifle is worn slung vertically over the shoulder.

Pads are provided (or the shoulder straps rolled up) to prevent the rifle sling slipping off the shoulder.

All men are taught to throw Grenades thus equipped, and tactical bombing is also carried out with equipment on.

### 7. USE OF DAMPERS.

At least 10 dampers should be kept

/ready



(3).

ready at each barricade or bomb station. The best Damper is a sand-bag about 2' by 2' about 1/3 full of loamy clay. Blankets, coats, etc., may be used to fairly good advantage as dampers, but earth is required if damping is to be really effective.

8. BOMBING SCREENS.

Several bombing screens about 6' x 4', made of timber and galvanised iron netting, should always be carried by the working parties immediately following the bombing parties in the assault.

9. PRECAUTIONS to be TAKEN REGARDING RIFLE and HAND GRENADES.

Rifle Grenades that fail to explode on percussion are most dangerous and should never be handled, but should be blown up with a bomb placed along-side the grenade and the fuze then lit.

Hand Grenades that have not exploded (owing to damp fuzes, etc.) should be returned to Officer Commanding Bomb Park through the Divisional Grenade Schools. They should not be left lying about in the trenches or on the Corps Bombing Ground.

10. SYSTEM OF BOMBING ATTACK.

The following system of Bombing Attack now taught and assiduously practised in all the Divisional Grenade Schools :-

All bombing parties consist of 8 men each, being 1 observer, (also the leader of the party), 2 bayonet men, 2 throwers, 2 carriers, and 1 damper.

In the diagram shown above, 1 is the observer, 2 is a thrower, 3 is a carrier, 4 is the damper, 5 and 6 are bayonet men, 7 is a second thrower, and 8 is a second carrier.

All the 8 men of such parties should be interchangeable; the 2 bayonet men lead the way and wait in position, as shown in the diagram, until the trench B.C. has been cleared of the enemy by grenades thrown into it by the throwers: after that, the party advances to clear the next stretch of trench.

The observer directs the throwing and gives the signal to advance etc.: Nos. 7 and 8 remain in reserve, a traverse behind, to come up at once if necessary or to replace casualties.

When starting a bombing attack somewhere in the middle of a traversed enemy fire trench, 2 bombing parties should be used at first, one going to the right and one to the left, each closely supported by another bombing party: as soon as a communicating trench is met, the supporting bombing party is ordered to continue the bombing along the fire trench and the leading bombing party turns down the communicating trench and erects a temporary barricade, which must not be nearer than 40 yards from the fire trench, so as to be out of bombing distance.

/This



626 154  
(4).

This temporary barricade will be held by the bombing party until a special working party has erected a permanent barricade at a selected point behind and has cleared the trench in front of this barricade so as to give a good field of fire down it.

The bombing party can then be withdrawn to the permanent barricade which they will hold as a bombing station until relieved.

The supporting party on taking over the bombing along the fire trench sends back one of its number (either No.7 or No.8) to order up one of the reserve bombing parties in support.

Temporary barricades, to be subsequently replaced by permanent ones, will be erected at the furthest points reached in the enemy's fire trench, the same procedure as laid down for communicating trenches being followed as far as possible.



11. NOTES ON TRENCH TACTICS FOR ORGANIZED BOMBING PARTIES.

Men must be taught to work in organised bombing parties.

The N.C.O. will generally act as observer and must watch closely where the grenades are falling so as to direct the throwers' aim, not omitting to have the trenches running round the traverses well bombed, to prevent the enemy taking cover there; he must also watch carefully for any signs of wavering on the part of the enemy and, when he sees any signs of the enemy withdrawing from the piece of trench which his party are bombing, he should at once order an advance.

Bayonet Men. When the bayonet men are advancing they should do so with great dash and resolution. It is of but little use for these men to stalk along, a quick resolute dash being almost certain to finish the work of demoralisation of the enemy commenced by the grenadiers.

Carriers. One carrier will always remain near the thrower to supply and, if necessary, assist him in throwing. The other carrier will remain as spare man, behind the next traverse and will help to keep the party ahead constantly supplied with grenades.

The damper. The damper will carry at least 10 empty sandbags with him, and as soon as the party reaches a part of the trench which is being bombed by the enemy he will fill two or three of these sandbags about  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd full of earth and drop them on any live grenades which land in that part of the trench. Many casualties will be prevented if this is efficiently done.

Throwers. The thrower should cover with grenade fire the trench between the farthest point he can reach and the nearest point where the enemy are thought to be. The Spare Thrower will remain behind the next traverse with the Spare Carrier and both will assist in supplying the leading thrower with grenades.

When a point is reached from which it is found impossible to dislodge the enemy the grenadiers will erect a temporary barricade of sandbags with a wire netting screen on top; the latter should always be carried by the working parties following in rear of the grenadiers. As a rule the most suitable place for this barricade is about two yards in front of the furthestmost traverse captured. Whilst this barricade is being erected the thrower will remain in his position behind the traverse and continue dropping grenades over the 2nd and 3rd traverses; the observer will erect a small sandbag loophole and be prepared to shoot any of the enemy who show themselves. As soon as the barrier and screen are erected the thrower will move his station to the small pit made by the barrier and traverse and he is then fairly safe from the enemy's bombing, as most of the grenades will either hit the wire screen and bounce back into the trench or will pitch over the traverse into the empty trench behind. The thrower will now be in the pit with the first carrier and the observer close to him in the trench encircling the traverse; the bayonet men will be hard by and one

/will



- 6 -

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will take the observer's place at the loophole. (See Sketch 2.) The spare men will have fallen back behind the traverse in rear after helping to erect the temporary barricade. The latter is to protect the party from exploding grenades and will seldom be bullet proof. Meanwhile a working party has been erecting a permanent barricade in the most suitable place which will probably be at the next traverse or 2 traverses in rear. Loopholes should be made in the permanent barricade and a "T" head should be made to the trench as marked in blue dotted lines on Sketch 2; sufficient room must be left for the grenadier party to get past before closing the barricade. As soon as possible after the "T" head and loopholeed barricade have been completed, a bomb-proof shelter should be erected. When the latter barricade is completed, except for the closing up of the passage way above referred to, a small working party should commence cutting away the traverse behind the temporary barricade. As soon as that is done the temporary barricade should be destroyed and the grenadier and working parties retire behind the permanent barricade after which the passage is closed. There is now a clear field of fire from our barricade to that held by the enemy and none can approach from the latter without coming under fire from the loopholes.

FLAGS. Bombing parties should always carry flags and should place one of them at each new advanced point they reach, so that any of their other grenadier parties, and also their own artillery, may know where they are.

NUMBER OF BOMBING PARTIES. The number of bombing parties required for trench storming will depend entirely on the extent of the line to be stormed and the number of communicating trenches known to be leading back from it to the enemy's second line.

It will always be necessary to have sufficient parties to hold each communicating trench as well as the flanks of the piece of trench to be occupied.

Each group of parties should be followed by a small working party of engineers whom will build barricades, erect loopholes, etc.

SKETCH No. 2.



## 12. NOTES FOR USE OF GRENADE INSTRUCTIONS.

### Care of Fuzes, Detonators and Explosives.

#### F U Z E S.

##### (1) TYPES IN USE.

White Commercial Safety. (white countered gutta percha  
Black Service Safety. (No. 10 - mark 1).  
Red Instantaneous.

The White Commercial Safety burns  $1\frac{3}{4}$ " in 5 seconds.  
The Black Service " "  $1\frac{1}{8}$ " " "  
Red is instantaneous and ribbed outside so that it can  
be distinguished in the dark.

##### (2) CUTTING.

Fuzes must be cut square and in very accurate lengths with a sharp knife; they should be cut on a marked measured board.

##### (3) INSERTING FUZE INTO DETONATOR.

The white fuze slips in easily and should be carefully inserted as far as it will go without forcing.

The black service fuze being of a larger diameter requires more care in insertion; the fuze should be twisted gently between the forefinger and thumb until it fits the detonator.

The tape should never be removed as this causes the flame to spurt out from the side of the fuze through the rubber covering instead of spurting out at the end and so lighting the detonator in the correct time the fuze is cut for, which may lead to a bad accident, as it prematurely explodes the grenade.

When the fuze is properly inserted into the detonator (out of which all sawdust should first have been shaken) the open end of the detonator should be gently pinched at the side, care being taken not to damage the fuze.

##### (4) LIGHTING OF FUZES.

Much practice should be given to men in lighting fuzes in dummy grenades and throwing them. also in lighting different lengths of fuze and counting seconds. Men should light fuzes by putting the match head on to the fuze and striking the box on the match.

By holding different lengths of fuze and counting seconds whilst they burn, men soon learn that they have plenty of time to throw a five second fused grenade after lighting it without injury to themselves.

##### (5) INSTANTANEOUS FUZE.

This fuze is only required when a number of simultaneous explosions are required; the various charges are connected by simultaneous fuze to a junction and when the junction is ignited the various instantaneous fuzes ignite their charge.

only/



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Only skilled men should handle it.

(6) Fuzes must be kept dry and in a cool place and not be knocked about or bruised. Bombs and grenades with exposed fuzes should be exchanged for others to ensure safety.

#### DETONATORS AND PERCUSSION CAPS.

(7) TYPES IN USE AT PRESENT. Nos. 6 and 8 and various percussion caps.

No. 6 Detonator has a striking force of about 60 lbs.

No. 8 " " " " " " 120 "

In appearance the No. 8 is considerably larger than No. 6.

(8) DESCRIPTION.

A detonator is a small copper cylinder open at one end and loaded with fulminate of mercury, which is a highly sensitive explosive.

All High Explosives in use require detonation to ensure complete explosion.

(9) CARE IN HANDLING.

Owing to the very sensitive nature of fulminate of mercury, the greatest care must be taken in handling detonators, etc. A very light blow, or even a squeeze, will cause these to explode, and the explosion is powerful enough to blow off a man's hand.

Detonators must never be forced into bombs and grenades, and if they do not fit, the holes must be enlarged, but not with the detonators.

Great care must be taken not to pinch the fulminate when pinching the detonator on to the fuze.

(10) HIGH EXPLOSIVES.

Types in use in GALLIPOLI at present are as follows:-

Gelignite.

Ammonal.

Picric Acid.

Cordite. (This is practically not used at all in bombing operations.)

Gelignite is issued in sticks, is of a soft plastic nature, and is one of the best high explosives for bombs and grenades on account of the ease with which it is handled and it is not affected by damp. It freezes at 40 degrees Fm. and care should always be taken when it is in a frozen state.

It can be lit but it is dangerous if a piece of any size catches fire on account of the great heat generated being liable to explode the charge.

Ammonal is equally good as an explosive, but it is a powder similar in appearance to gun-powder, and therefore not so easy to handle. It is also adversely affected by damp and usually requires a No. 8 Detonator to explode it whereas a No. 6 explodes Gelignite.

Ammonal will not burn.

Picric Acid is in the form of a yellow powder, and therefore not so easy to handle as plastic sticks of Gelignite.

Lyddite/



109  
Lyddite is a solidified form of picric Acid.

Cordite is made in small thin strings and has not given such good results as the other three explosives for bomb work.

All explosives should be stored in a cool, dry place, and no smoking or fire allowed anywhere near.

Remember a little carelessness near a magazine may not only cost you your own life, but also that of anybody else in the vicinity; therefore for the sake of your comrades always take all precautions and obey all rules when dealing with explosives or when you happen to be in or near a magazine of any description.

*Ed. W. Birdwood*

Lieut-General,

Commanding DARDANELLES ARMY.



026  
From, 8th Corps,

To, A.H.Q.

10  
**SECRET**  
29/11

HW.1189

29th November 1915

Desp.1225

Recd.1254

In reply to Oa.353.

There exists at present a system of defensive mines which could be adapted to required purpose in a short time. There is no such system on the second line which would have to be taken up, and much work would be necessary there. The mining personnel are at present fully occupied in close contact underground with the enemy.

As regards an active offensive, I am preparing an operation similar to that carried out on the 15th November by the 52nd Division, but I shall require another fortnight to prepare, and shall need an increase in artillery ammunition, and also reinforcements to replace certain casualties.

2 Copies typed.  
B.R.M.





SECRET

From:- ~~77777~~ A.H.Q.

To:- G.H.Q.

No 29 B

O.587.

November, 29th.

Despd. 1855.

8th Corps asks that all reinforcements for 52nd and R.N.D. and any details for 42nd may be sent to peninsula otherwise troops now due for rest cannot be spared AAA I hope this may be arranged AAA 9th Corps also asks for all reinforcements as otherwise, owing to number of casualties from exposure the position at SÜVLA will be precarious and work on the beaches impossible. Following just received from 9th Corps AAA begins Yesterday MOUNTED DIVISION suffered severely especially in reserve trenches AAA Many in hospital hope only temporarily AAA Line practically intact throughout AAA 13th Division have 800 sick but have stood strain well; line-intact--AAA troops in good spirits and have killed large number of enemy who evacuated their trenches AAA Discipline and confidence well maintained; line intact AAA 29th Division condition serious; trenches flooded to parapet and evacuation of certain portions compulsory AAA Severe cold following on floods has caused much sickness and loss of life; one brigade practically out of action AAA Hope that with rest and care many will return to ranks tomorrow AAA 11th Division suffered very little owing to occupying high ground AAA 53rd Division in reserve suffered much from sickness AAA end of quotation.

1 copy "A"  
1 copy "Q"  
Secret cables "A"



112  
SECRET

From, G.H.Q.

To, A.H.Q.

OB. 36

30th November 1915

Desp. 1445

Recd. 1643

If evacuation ordered Chief wishes first 20,000 men taken off to go to Mitylene. Bear this in mind in formulating your plans.

2 Copies typed  
B. R.M.



626  
30 A  
113  
I.-Copy of a letter from Rear Admiral R.WEMYSS to  
Lieut.General Sir W.R.BIRDWOOD.

-----  
H.M.S.LORD NELSON. 27.II.15 (Saturday)

My dear BIRDWOOD,

DE ROBECK has just gone off on leave and  
left me temporarily in command. I should much like to  
see you and propose coming over on Monday. Do you think  
you could get BYNG and DAVIES to come over. We must  
have a talk about matters.

Yours very sincerely  
(Sd.) R.A.WEMYSS  
-----

II.- Copy of a telegram from Lieut.General Sir W.R.  
BIRDWOOD to Rear Admiral R.WEMYSS.

-----  
O.575. 27.II.15. (Priority)

Your letter of today. Will of course arrange meet-  
ing. What time would suit you best. You will under-  
stand meeting will not be possible unless weather  
permits.  
-----

III.-Copy of a telegram from Army Headquarters, DARDAN-  
ELLES Army, to Corps Commanders.

-----  
O.579. 28.II.15. (Priority)

Vice Admiral WEMYSS who is temporarily commanding  
fleet is anxious to meet Corps Commanders here tomo r-  
row if weather permits. I will let you know time of  
meeting later. Will General BYNG arrange for destroyer  
to come over in and will he call for General GODLEY en  
route. Corps Co mmanders should bring with them defin-  
ite proposals based on outline scheme shown them last  
week. /  
-----

IV.- Copy of a telegram from Rear Admiral 'SWIFTSURE'  
to General BIRDWOOD.

-----  
O700 30.II.15.

Admiral WEMYSS is coming to KEPHALO today in 'CHEL-  
MER' about 11 a.m.  
-----

V.- Copy of a telegram from Army Hqrs., DARDANELLES  
Army, to Gen.BYNG, SUVLA, and Gen.GODLEY, ANZAC.

-----  
O.889 30.II.15 (Priority)

V.A. arrives about 11 a.m. today. Can you arrange to  
be here about that time calling for General GODLEY on  
the way. M.T.O. SUVLA and M.T.O. ANZAC are being asked  
to accompany you. Addressed Gen.BYNG, repeated Gen.  
GODLEY.  
-----



0210  
114  
VI.- Copy of a telegram from Army Headquarters, DARDANELLES  
Army, to General DAVIES, HELLES.  
-----

O.590. 30.11.15.  
V.A. arrives here 11 a.m. Have asked for destroyer to fetch  
you about 10 a.m. Please bring your M.T.O.  
-----

VII.- Copy of a telegram from General BYNG, SIVLA, to Army  
Headquarters, DARDANELLES Army.  
-----

BB.110 30.11.15.  
Impossible for me to come over today unless very urgent.  
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