


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/17/2 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters,
Dardanelles Army

November - December 1915



AWM4-1/17/2PART2

030
SECRET 13

PROCEEDINGS OF A JOINT NAVAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEE
HELD AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS, DARDANELLES ARMY.

30th NOVEMBER, 1915.

1. The Committee consider that the evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC should proceed simultaneously and that HELLES should be deferred till the completion of the other two.

The principal reason for this opinion is that the number of motor lighters and troop carriers available, making due allowance for casualties and breakdowns, would not be sufficient to remove the troops from all three places simultaneously at the rate per night that the Corps Commanders consider essential.

The general principals proposed for the evacuation, which are the same for all three places with slight modifications, and which have been agreed to by the Corps Commanders and N.T.O.s, are as follows:-

- (i) All men and animals and vehicles not necessary for a defensive winter campaign having now been removed as to the greater part, the evacuation of each beach will take place in two stages.

- (a) Intermediate, which should be completed in approximately 10 working nights, and during which 3,000 men and a proportion of guns and animals would be evacuated each night from each place.

- (b) Final stage, which should be completed in 48 hours, during which time 20,000 to 24,000 men must be taken off from each place.

The total number of motor lighters available, excluding those now under repair, is taken as 37. It is considered they should be allocated as follows:-

KEPHALOS....10. 6 of these to serve as a reserve to replace any damaged during the operations.

SUVLA.....10.
ANZAC.....10.
MUDROS..... 7.

(ii) Each motor lighter employed at the Peninsula during both intermediate and final periods to have a tug or trawler working in conjunction with it, to tow and render any assistance necessary.

(iii) During the final period to have at each place a number of steamboats, each with a cutter in tow, to embark stragglers or wounded who may come down at any point on the beach.

It is to be noted that this plan proposes landing troops at KEPHALOS. It is not known whether steps will be taken to repair the recent damage sufficiently for this purpose, but if it is decided not to land troops here, additional large transports will be necessary to accommodate the troops who would otherwise land.

2. Proceeding now to detailed proposals for each place.

AT SUVLA.

Intermediate Stage.

The following vessels should be provided.

- 3 Ferry Steamers. OSMANIEH (2000) PRINCESS ENA (500)
I A.B.Vessel (500).
- 1 Old Battleship, or a transport.
- 1 QUEEN LOUISE - For guns and heavy vehicles.
- 2 'G' Supply Ships - For vehicles.
ST.OSWALD) - For animals.
REDBREAST)
- 10 Motor Lighters.
- 10 Tugs or Trawlers.
- 6 Steamboats.

3,000 men will be embarked in the ferry steamers nightly, which will take them to MUDROS, whence the first 20,000 will be sent to MITYLENE in large transports.

The old battleship would remain at SUVLA to embark up to 3,000 men the following night, in case any or all of the three ferry steamers fail to return from MUDROS in time.. She will proceed to MUDROS, discharge, and return as necessary.

/As many

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As many guns, vehicles, and animals as possible will be embarked each night in addition to the 3,000 men.

The QUEEN LOUISE and 2 'G' Ships to remain at SUVLA until all guns and vehicles which can be spared are on board, when they will proceed to MUDROS.

"ST. OSWALD" and "READBREAST" will remain at SUVLA till full, when they will go to MUDROS, unload, and return. If possible more horse ships should be provided so that embarkation can go on nightly without interruption.

FINAL STAGE.

About 24,000 men will remain to be embarked in this stage, and it is considered that these should be taken off in 48 hours.

Thus 12,000 men should be evacuated each night..

For this the following vessels are proposed:-

- 2 Old Battleships or Transports (2,000 men each).
- 3 Ferry Steamers (same as Intermediate Stage - 3,000 men).
- 7 A.B. or other steamers.
- 10 Motor Lighters.
- 10 Tugs or Trawlers.
- 10 Steamboats, each with a cutter in tow.

The Ferry Steamers and A.B. Steamers will go to MUDROS when full, discharge into large transports and return to SUVLA by dark.

The 2 Old Battleships or Transports will go to MUDROS when full, but it is improbable that they can empty and get back to SUVLA by dark on the 2nd day, and therefore other ships must be available to take their place for embarking 4,000 men on the 2nd night.

It is essential for the success of the above that sufficient empty transports are at MUDROS to allow of the troop carriers, etc., going alongside and discharging without delay.

ANZACGeneral -

To carry out scheme of embarkation it is essential that No.8 Pier (near WILLIAM'S Pier) be repaired at once. It is understood that this will not entail much time or labour.

Also that a floating pontoon or barrel pier be constructed to connect shore to MILO.

Before the evacuation is commenced, ANZAC should be completed to her full water storage, in order to obviate as far as possible the necessity of supplying water during the operation.

Intermediate Stage -

The following vessels should be provided:-

- 3 Ferry steamers - ABBASIEH (1500) EL NAHIRA (1000),
BARRY (500).
- 1 old battleship or transport (At KEPHALOS).
ACHAIA For guns and heavy vehicles.
- 2 'G' Supply ships. For vehicles.
ERMINE For animals.
- 10 motor lighters.
- 10 tugs or trawlers.
- 6 steamboats.

3,000 men will be embarked in the ferry steamers nightly, which will take them to KEPHALOS returning the following night. If weather prevents or delays the troops being landed at KEPHALOS, the troops would be put into the old battleship in KEPHALOS or at ALIKI BAY, and thence landed as opportunity offers.

As many guns, vehicles and animals as possible will be embarked each night in addition to the 3,000 men.

The 'ACHAIA', 'G' ships, and 'ERMINE' will proceed to ANZAC from KEPHALOS each evening, returning to KEPHALOS for daylight hours. 'ERMINE', when full, will take her animals to MUDROS, returning as soon as cleared. If possible more horse ships should be provided so that embarkation can proceed nightly without interruption.

Final Stage -

About 20,000 men will remain to be embarked in this stage, which should be completed in 48 hours, 10,000 men being evacuated each night.

For this the following vessels are proposed:-

- 2 old battleships or transports (2000 men each).
- 3 Ferry steamers (same as intermediate stage - 3000 men).
- 4 A.B. or other steamers (3000 men).
- 10 motor lighters.
- 10 trawlers.
- 10 steamboats, each with cutter in tow.

The plan of embarkation will be as follows:-

- (a) C beach - 2 motor lighters, 2000 men in 2 to 3 trips.
- (b) WILLIAM'S
& No.8 Pier - 6 motor lighters, 6000 men in 2 to 3 trips.
- (c) WATSON, or
BRIGHTON Beach - 2 motor lighters, 2000 men in 2 to 3 trips.

All troops will be brought to IMBROS and landed by tugs and trawlers, and any motor lighters available, during the day, the ships returning to ANZAC at dusk for the second 10,000 men.

HELLES -

As the embarkation at HELLES will take place after that at SUVLA and ANZAC, the same vessels and small craft will be available, less losses and casualties.

During the Intermediate Stage the French will embark all their troops, guns, etc., at 'V' Beach, and therefore 'W' Beach only will be available for British troops during this period.

It is considered by the N.T.O. HELLES, that 3,000 men and a proportion of guns or animals can be embarked nightly at 'W' Beach in its present condition.

Thus if the same craft are provided as for SUVLA the Intermediate Stage will be carried out as at SUVLA, the French meanwhile embarking at 'V' Beach.

/If.

(6)

If any assistance is required by the French, it should be possible to provide them with some motor lighters.

For the final stage, 'W' & 'V' Beaches will be available for the British, and this stage can be completed in 48 hours, on the lines proposed for SUVLA.

It must be remembered that 'V' Beach is almost sure to be under constant heavy shelling from the ASIATIC shore.

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SECRET

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From G.O.C.inC. Dardane-llés Army.
To C.G.S. G.H.Q.

1st December 1915.

Sir,

In reply to your letters G.O.C./Z/1 dated 25th and 26th November, I have the honour to inform you that my plans for the evacuation of the whole peninsula are now assuming definite shape, and that I am ready to begin the intermediate period at Suvla and Anzac immediately your orders are received and the necessary sea-transport collected.

2. I was in the first instance of opinion that the evacuation of Suvla, Anzac, and Helles should be simultaneous. Further consideration, however, has convinced me that such a scheme is impossible with existing naval resources, and that the withdrawal from Helles should not be started until the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac is complete. Captains Mitchell R.N., Captain Lambert R.N. and the Naval Transport Officers at the various beaches who were yesterday consulted by them, are all unanimous in this opinion, and the two officers first mentioned consider that an attempt to evacuate all three beaches simultaneously might seriously jeopardise our chances of success, as there would be absolutely no reserve of sea-transport in hand.

3. Lieut. General Davies, 8th Corps, is of opinion

opinion that owing to the recent damage to W. Beach, he could not commence the withdrawal of his troops until this damage is made good. the time required for the these rep airs naturally depends on the weather, but it is estimated that if work could be continuous, the beach would probably be restored to approximately its old condition in from 6 to 8 weeks. I attach a copy of General Davies' remarks on this point, but should point out that, since receiving it, I have learnt that he is not supported in his opinion by the Naval Transport Officer at Helles (Captain Byres R.N.R.), who considers that given the necessary sea-transport, W Beach could be used for an embarkation in its present state, at the rate of some 3000 men a night.

4. As regards the embarkation at Suvla and Anzac, both the Corps Commanders and myself are sanguine that, given ample boats and fine weather, the whole of the troops and the greater part of our guns can be embarked successfully with very little loss, and it is only in regard to the naval difficulties that I have any apprehension.

5. As regards Helles, it is obvious that the previous evacuation of Suvla and Anzac will greatly increase the difficulties of evacuating the Southern zone. Moreover, owing to the daily increasing chances of bad weather as the season progresses, we must be prepared to find it necessary to postpone the evacuation of that area for an indefinite period.

While, therefore, making all plans for the withdrawal
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from Helles as soon as the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac is completed. I consider that there should, in the meanwhile, be no diminution in the strength of the 8th Corps and no cessation of landing ammunition and supplies at C. Helles. It will, indeed, be necessary, in the first instance, to augment the Helles garrison by two infantry brigades. Owing to the greater distance of the front line trenches from the beach, compared with Suvla and Anzac, it will be impossible to withdraw men straight from their present positions to the boats, and the evacuation at Helles will have to be carried out in two stages - first a contraction of our front by retiring to the Eski line, and then the final stage, the rearmost troops eventually holding a covering position guarding Lancashire Landing and V Beach. It is for the necessary improvements to the Eski Line and the final covering position that these two Brigades are required, there being no troops available at Helles for this work at the present time.

6. As regards the Corps Expeditionnaire des Dardanelles, I am strongly of opinion that with the exception of a few heavy guns, the whole French force should be evacuated before the final stage is begun. In this way only can unity of command and absence of confusion be ensured. I would propose, therefore, to withdraw the French immediately after our retirement to the Eski Line had been effected and our position there made good.

7. With reference to Para 3 of your G.S./Z/1 of 25th ult,

(a) A system of defensive mines is in existence at C. Helles, and can be adapted for the required purpose
in

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in a short time. There is no such system on the second line which would have to be occupied during a withdrawal. The mining personnel is at present fully occupied in contact with the enemy.

At ANZAC the Corps Commander is hopeful that, owing to the peculiarities of the terrain, the front line may be held until the last, and that, provided the normal conditions are undisturbed, the withdrawal of the greater part of the troops may be effected without the enemy's knowledge. In certain carefully selected positions, however, the explosion of mines will be utilized to impose caution on the enemy.

At SUVLA a defensive mining system is now being organized.

(B) As regards the possibility of adopting an active offensive, a similar operation to that carried out by the 52nd Division on the 15th November is now in course of preparation at CAPE HELLES. Another fortnight will be required to complete these preparations. An increase in artillery ammunition and reinforcements to replace the casualties which will be incurred will be needed. This action, together with continued bombing activity, will not be inconsistent with the methods employed by the 8th Corps in the last few weeks.

At ANZAC on the other hand, small advances have not been practicable, and our offensive has been confined to periodic bursts of fire activity. The Corps Commander is now attempting to accustom the enemy to spells of total quiescence followed by periods of violent fire action, in the hope that a sudden cessation of activity in the final stage will not ~~then~~ ~~then~~ arouse suspicion.

The G.O.C., 9th Corps is of opinion, and I agree, that an attack on the PIMPLE, without very full artillery support, would be of greater difficulty now than formerly, and that the heavy losses incurred would not only be unjustified by the

results but might embarrass the subsequent embarkation. Artillery bombardments of various portions of the enemy's line are being arranged to occupy his attention and simulate offensive preparations.

8. I attach a copy of the recommendations as regards sea transport required, which have been drawn up by my staff with the assistance of the Naval officers you placed at my disposal and the N.T.O's at the various beaches.

9. A detailed scheme for the military side of the withdrawal, which in the case of SUVLA and ANZAC will be carried out as a combined operation under my immediate orders, will be forwarded to you later.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Lieut. General.

Commanding DARDANELLES Army.

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Special Army Order.

Headquarters,

Dardanelles Army,

2nd December, 1915.

The Army Commander wishes to express his thanks to the General Officer Commanding, 9th Corps, the general officers, and other ranks under him, for the strenuous and self sacrificing devotion they have displayed during the last few days, while our front - especially on the left flank, has been subjected to such stress of weather and so severe a blizzard.

The conditions prevailing were probably more severe than any to which our troops in France and Flanders were subjected during last winter, and the hardships which our men have suffered have consequently been intense. It is, however, a cause of great satisfaction to know that their spirits have been in no way impaired; and the Army Commander is sure that such troops will continue to see through whatever may be before them with the determination and fortitude which they have shown on every occasion since landing on the Peninsula.

C. F. Apinall

Lieutenant-Colonel,
G.S.

War Diary

HEADQUARTERS DARDANELLES ARMY.

3rd December, 1915.

FROM:

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF,
DARDANELLES ARMY.

TO :

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

A statement showing the general changes in distribution of hostile artillery on the peninsula during the period 18th - 25th November, 1915, is forwarded herewith.

Ed. H. R. Birdwood

Lieut-General,

Commanding DARDANELLES ARMY.

DARDANELLES ARMY HEADQUARTERS,

3rd December, 1915.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY DURING PERIOD,
18TH to 25TH NOVEMBER, 1915.

1. Number. There was an increase of one four gun battery of Field Guns and two 4.2 inch Howitzers, which is practically the whole change in this respect. Total about 183.
2. Movement. The general movement has been Southwards to the HELLES front, there being an increased number of 17 reported active, this was probably in view of the projected attack on the 21st November.
3. The massing of guns on ANZAC'S right reported last week has been broken up, and both at ANZAC and SUVLA guns have been concentrated more nearly opposite the junction of the two Corps.
4. Expenditure of Ammunition. Hostile Artillery activity has been evinced on one or more fronts daily, and there is no doubt that the amount of ammunition now available is greater than it has been in the past.
5. General. The beach at ANZAC has been an object of particular attention both night and day.
6. Portions of ANZAC and SUVLA have been shelled daily.
7. HELLES, except on the occasion of the attack on the 21st November, was fairly lightly treated.
8. The hostile Anti-Aircraft guns were not in evidence at all.

W. R. Birdwood
Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

FROM:- SUPERFLUX, CAIRO.

TO:- GENERAL BIRDWOOD.

- - - - -

2356.E.

Desp. Dec. 3rd. 2305.

Recd. Dec. 4th. 0800.

There are now 16,000 Australian & New Zealand infantry in this base, 10,000 more arrive this month. They are organised in two Brigades for administration and employment if required. Sir John MAXWELL is suggesting to General MONRO that Australians be asked to form a 9th Brigade from reinforcements here, Staffs, officers and N.C.O's being furnished from Divisions in Anzac. This would still leave approximately 10,000 reinforcements available for units in Anzac plus 10,000 arriving before January. Sir J. MAXWELL also wants to ask Australia to sanction a camel corps of 500 men to be raised here from reinforcements and officered on same lines as Australian Brigade. Do you agree - seems sound.

1 copy to "O".

2 copies to "A".

1 copy to A.M.S.

Anzac Reinforcements.
Secret Cables "A".

(Original partly undecipherable repeat asked for
4.12.15 and received 2130 on 8.12.15.)

SECRET.

From. A.H.Q.

To, G.O.C., 9th Corps.

O.618

5th December 1915

Desp.I945.

In continuation of OB.542 dated 27th November
it should be clearly understood that nothing is to be
evacuated from the Peninsula except surplus material
likely to be required during winter months.

Please acknowledge.

2 copies 'Q'.

War Diary
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,

DARDANELLES ARMY.

6th December, 1915.

FROM:- GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,

DARDANELLES ARMY.

TO:- THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF;

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

I forward herewith a copy of a memorandum received from 8th Corps, enclosing a report by Major Le Sueur, gas expert attached to 8th Corps Headquarters.

I also forward a copy of a telegram handed me personally by Colonel Fitzgerald when I was at Mudros.

I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by G.O.C. 8th Corps, and would urge that we should be provided with a trained Chemist Company or Companies R.E., and sufficient gas to be able to make an offensive attack in the event of the Turks initiating these methods against us. At present, it is believed that we have in this theatre only sufficient gas for use on a front of 1000 yards for half an hour, and no personnel to use it; and the training of personnel either in these islands or in Egypt is manifestly inadvisable.

I would further point out that in the event of

/our

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our withdrawing from the Peninsula, the use of gas
defensively to cover the retirement of the rear guard;
at, say, Helles might, if the wind were favourable,
be of the greatest tactical advantage.

(Sd) W. R. Birdwood

Lieutenant-General,
Commanding DARDANELLES ARMY.

SECRET.

O./354.

Headquarters,

8th Army Corps,

5th December 1915.

B.G. G.S.,

A.H.Q.

In forwarding the attached report by Major Le Sueur I wish to state that I am strongly of opinion that we should have available out here both personnel and material for making offensive use of gas.

I understand from Major Le Sueur's report that the personnel would be found and trained in England, and that the four officers out here could study local conditions and draw up schemes for the employment of gas should it be considered advisable to make use of it.

I strongly urge that we look well ahead in this matter so that we do not, at any future time, find ourselves taken at a disadvantage which we can only repair after a long interval which may well prove disastrous.

We are already warned that the enemy intend to use gas and, owing to our peculiar situation and the want of adequate relief for the troops in the front line, the only effective answer to such an attack would be a retaliation in kind.

(Sgd) FRANCIS DAVIES,

Lt-General,
Commanding 8th Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Headquarters,

8th Army Corps,

4th December, 1915.

To

B.G., G.S.
8th Army Corps.

MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE FORMATION OF ~~THE~~^A CORPS SPECIALLY
INSTRUCTED IN THE USE OF GAS FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES.

- - - - -

I desire to draw your attention to the fact that, as far as I know, there is at present no specially trained unit or Chemist Corps attached to the M.E.F., which could be employed in the event of gas being used by us against the enemy. Now that the Turks have used lachrymating gases underground in our mines, it seems highly probable that they will use similar methods above ground if they can obtain the necessary material.

The handling of gas cylinders and the letting-off of the gas can only be done by men who have ^{had} previous instruction in this work, and for this purpose I would suggest the formation of a Chemist Corps similar to that which, I understand, we have in France. The personnel of a Chemist Corps for working gas along a 1600 yards front would be approximately as follows:-

Officers. 2 Majors, 2 Captains, 8 Lieutenants.
Major Hewitt, Captain Blackshaw, Captain Colson and I (Major Le Sueur) are already attached to the M.E.F. The other officers would be obtained from Field or Fortress Companies.

Men. Number. - about 350.

Type. - Sappers whose trades are fitters, plumbers, etc. and men with some knowledge of chemistry.

Training. 15 days as maximum.

Locality for Training.

It would be impossible to train the men out here without the enemy obtaining knowledge of it and this might enable him to use gas before we did; moreover, the success of a gas attack
/depends

depends a great deal on the enemy being taken by surprise; the idea of training the men out here must therefore be regarded as not feasible. This view has been impressed on me by various officers and more particularly by Lieut-Colonel Aspinall at G.H.Q. (now A.H.Q.) who, in conversation, has told me that he ~~na~~ regards the training of men out here as quite out of the question. Under these circumstances I am of the opinion that the training would be best carried out in England; a number of suitable men could be rapidly got together, trained at Chatham, brought out here, detailed for other work and collected together as soon as it had been decided to use gas.

The senior officers could visit both our Army and the French Army in France and obtain from the military authorities there all the latest information about the use of gas, asphyxiating gases, flame projectors, etc., and the methods adopted to overcome them; this information, I need hardly say, would be of the highest possible value.

One of the instructions given to me by the Trench Warfare Department (Ministry of Munition of War) just before leaving England was that I was to help to organise a Chemist Corps, and my object in presenting this Memorandum is in no way to urge the advisability or inadvisability of using gas against the enemy, but simply to draw attention to the fact that, as far as I know, the M.E.F. has no organisation ready to use gas against the enemy.

I may add that early in October, when stationed at MUDROS WEST, and temporarily attached to D. of W. Major Hewitt, R.E. and I addressed a letter, dealing with the question of the formation of a Chemist Corps, to the D. of W., and this letter was forwarded to G.H.Q.

(Sgd). H. R. LE SUEUR,
Major. R.E.

From

Colonel FITZGERALD.

To

Chief, War Office.

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No. 85 cipher.

19.11.15.

Lord Kitchener understood that experts in the use of gas were to be sent out to GALLIPOLI. Your chemists have arrived but they have no practical experience in the use of gas offensively. It is impossible to train men locally; would it be possible to send out some men who have had practical experience in France.?

G.S.R. 290.

DARDANELLES ARMY HEADQUARTERS,

6th December, 1915.

To

Chief of the General Staff,

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force

In order to deal with the large amount of grenades and grenade throwers which have been in use in the 8th Corps, a unit was improvised, which started working on the 13th August last, and which has hitherto been known as the "8th Corps Bomb Factory". This unit has done most valuable work, including repairs to catapults and grenade throwers, cutting fuzes, and fitting detonators, and experimental work. In addition, it is responsible for the receipt and issue of all grenades, bombs and explosives, and for the entire charge of magazines in that Army Corps. As the bulk of explosives are drawn during the hours of darkness, this necessitates a considerable amount of night work.

The G.O.C., 8th Army Corps has now asked that this unit should be recognised as an improvised unit with a War Establishment as shown in the attached table.

The large proportion of N.C.O's in the proposed War Establishment is due to the fact that a considerable amount of extra labour, in the form of working parties, is continually employed, amounting to a total of over 100 every day, and requiring constant supervision.

As it is desirable that the men forming the grenade factory should be replaced in their own units, and that N.C.O's should be promoted from the existing staff, it is

requested/

requested that sanction may be accorded to this War Establishment. As the personnel are already working in this Factory, and are all R.E., the question of pay is not affected, except as regards the promotion of N.C.O's, who would be surplus to existing establishments, and who, unless this proposed establishment is sanctioned, cannot obtain the rate of pay to which, it is considered, their services entitle them.

(Sgd) W.R. Birdwood,
Lieutenant-General,
Commanding DARDANELLES ARMY.

Copies to :-

"A"
"C.E.".

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GRENADIER FACTORY: 8th ARMY CORPS.

WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

Detail.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	Serjeants & S. S. Sgts.	Rank & File.	Total.	Remarks.
Officer.	1	-	-	-	1	(a) To include -
Quartermaster Sgt. R.E.	-	-	1	-	1	Carpenters 6
Serjeant.	-	-	1	-	1	Blacksmiths 2
Corporals, R.E.	-	-	-	3	3	Wire Splicers 2
Sappers.	-	-	-	34(a)	34	Fitters 2
Batman.	-	-	-	1	1	Tinsmiths 2
	1	-	2	38	41	

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HEADQUARTERS DARDANELLES ARMY.

84 December, 1915.

From.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
DARDANELLES ARMY.

To.
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE?

A statement showing the general changes in distribution of hostile artillery on the peninsula during the period 26th November to 2nd December, 1915, is forwarded herewith.

(Sgd) C. F. Aspinall

for Lieut. General,
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

December, 1915.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY DURING PERIOD

26th NOV. TO 2nd DECEMBER, 1915.

1. Number. Three four-gun Batteries of Field Artillery appear to have been withdrawn, or were at any rate not active. As against this, six anti-aircraft guns gave evidence of their being still in position.
2. A hostile 12 inch, as also a 9.2 inch, both apparently howitzers, gave evidence of their presence on the 29th, doing a good deal of damage to trenches at ANZAC and causing many casualties. This is the only day on which they were recorded.
3. A small increase in 6 inch guns is noticed on the HELLES front.
4. Leaving the A.A. guns out of the question there was a diminution of 8 guns in the total.
5. Movement. The guns on the Asiatic shore have been reduced from 11 to 6, and on the European side about 11 less are in position against the HELLES front, or a total of 16 guns less firing on HELLES.
6. There is practically no change opposite ANZAC, but 8 more against SUVLA. This latter increase is on the north flank. Generally, the movement both at ANZAC and SUVLA is away from the junction of the Corps where, last week, they were shown to be in greater strength.
7. Expenditure of Ammunition. This is still maintained at a higher pitch mentioned last week.
8. General. The shooting on the part of the enemy is reported as more accurate and better controlled of late than was the case in the past.
9. Portions of all fronts have received attention, particularly at the beaches at ANZAC and SUVLA and the ships in SUVLA harbour.

10. Two 60pr. guns of the 10th Heavy Battery were disabled by direct hits. One of these guns was hit two days in succession.

11. Prisoners report the arrival of a battery of 25 c.m. guns and one of 35 c.m. The Intelligence Reports state that they are 24 c.m. and 305 m.m. respectively. The latter are coast defence mortars which are suitable for siege warfare. I am inclined to think that the guns reported as 9.2 inch and 12 inch referred to in para. 2 were samples of these.

(Sd) G. F. Aspinall

for Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

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O(h)
From:- A.H.Q.

To;- G.H.Q.

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O.644.

December, 9th.

Despd.2150.

May W.O. be asked to request French Government to allow us to retain roofing and other trench materials now in reserve at V Beach AAA Much is required to make sector we have got to take over efficient and French have it while we have none AAA BRULARD is asking permission from his Government to give us these stores, but wishes us to back up his request.

2 copies "Q"
1 copy C.E.
File Z.49.
Secret Cables "A".

630
SECRET



FROM:- A. H. Q.

TO:- G. H. Q.

O. 645.

8.12.15.

Desp. 2235.

Will you please ask W.O. to ask French Government to leave at HELLES not only trench material already in trenches which we are taking over but also proportion of reserves of sandbags, timber, wire and roofing now on "V" Beach. BRULARD has already asked for this permission but wants us to back up his request AAA They have large reserves at HELLES and we have none.

2 copies to "Q".

Secret Cables "A".
Z.49.

038
62
PRIORITY.



FROM:- A.H.Q.

TO:- G.H.Q.

O.636.

8-12-15.

Desp.1220.

French have orders to send CREOLES to MUDROS soon as possible and separately from SENEGALESE AAA I consequently ordered DAVIES yesterday to arrange take over portion of French line to O.16 square 13.N.1. soon as convenient and this will be done probably on eleventh AAA Subsequently I propose send him more troops to enable him take up to A.20 and relieve the SENEGALESE AAA Final destination of CREOLES not known by French.

Secret Cables "A".

Z/49.

030
SECRET 016)



FROM:- 8TH CORPS.

TO:- A. H. Q.

✓ H.O. 1104.

7.12.15.

Desp. 2247.

Recd. 2315.

I have arranged to take over on December 11th
May request be made home for French to supply
us with material from the reserves available here, other-
wise they may be shipped to SALONICA.

We shall require much to make the new sector
efficient and they have it while we have none.

1 Copy to "O"
2 Copies to "A"

Z.49.



SECRET

From:- A.H.Q.

To:-I.G.C.

O.628.

December, 7th.

Despd. 1025.

Can you spare Garrison Battalion for TENEDOS to relieve French guard recalled to peninsula owing to departure of Senegalese AAA Important to provide protection for aviation sheds and no French troops available AAA Troops should arrive TENEDOS on ninth or tenth if possible.

Addressed I.G.C., repeated G.H.Q.

1 copy "Q"
1 copy "A"

File Z.49.
I.G.C. cables.



SECRET

From:- A.H.Q.

To:- 8th Corps.

O.626.

December, 7th.

Despd.1010.

Your H.W.1226 and O.359 AAA Creoles will go first followed by Senegalese when transports ready AAA Arrange to take over line up to O.16 on first convenient day AAA you will eventually be required to extend to A.20 but not till reinforced AAA Fully realise your difficulties and will give you every possible assistance.

File Z.49.

PRIORITY.

From,
General BIRDWOOD.

To,
General BRULARD.

O.627

7th. December 1915

Desp.III5.

Afin vous rendre possible évacuation Gréoles j'ai donné ordre DAVIES occuper ligne jusqu'à O.16 dès que seriez respectivement en mesure effectuer ce mouvement. Posterieurement je renforcerais 8e Corps et lui ordonnerai étendre ligne jusqu'à A.20 pour relève Sénégalais. Je prends informations au sujet transports pour Senegalais. Je demande bataillon troupes britanniques pour TENEDOS.

63
61
SECRET

From, D. A. G., G. H. Q.

To, A. H. Q., D. A.

AA.6155

6th December 1915

Desp. 1615
Recd. 1719

Reply to OA 414.

Following available and have been ordered up hope
proceed tomorrow.

42nd Divn.....	75
52nd Divn.....	68
R.N. Divn.....	63
87th Brigade.....	800

Relief for troops on beaches receiving attention
5 officers 200 others K.O.S.B. already ordered up for this
purpose in addition to above drafts.

From, A. H. Q.

To, 8th Corps.

OA.417

6th December 1915

Desp. 1750

Reply to HW.1220.

Following available and have been ordered up hope
proceed tomorrow

42nd Divn.....	75
52nd Divn.....	68
R.N. Divn.....	63
87th Brigade	800

Relief for troops on beaches receiving attention
5 officers 200 others K.O.S.B. already ordered up for this
purpose in addition to above drafts.

030
68
51
PRIORITY

SECRET

From, A.H.Q.

To, G.H.Q.

O.622

6th December 1915

Deep.

Continuation of my O.615.

General BRULARD has now received orders from France to embark all his greeks as well as Senegalese. This will leave him only 3500 rifles and he cannot hold more of the line than from the coast to A.20, which is situated at the tree marked in KRITHIA Sheet one over 20.000, one hundred yards south of 18.N.7.

I await answer to my Oa 414 before I can decide whether it is possible for DAVIES to hold so extended a front as this entails without additional units, especially as many new communication trenches may have to be made.

2. BRULARD is also informed by the GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL that English Government has already given orders for transports to convey Senegalese to EGYPT, and he asks for further information on this subject, and whether, if this is the case, it would be more convenient if the Senegalese were taken first to MUDROS. He had originally intended sending them to TENEDOS. I told him yesterday that it was presumed French transports would be provided for both moves.

030
PRIORITY

67

From, 8th Corps

To, A.H.Q.

SECRET

HW. 1226

6th December 1915

Desp. 1452
Recd. 1510

In reply to O.614.

I am now informed by BRULARD that he has orders to evacuate not only the Senegalese but also the Creoles. This would entail our taking over an extra 500 yards, which is impossible with present troops.

Letter follows by next trawler.

030

70

SECRET

From, General BRULARD.

To, General BIRDWOOD.

34.

No. 0110 M Secret

6th December 1915

Desp. 1125
Recd. 1300

Je reçois du GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL FRANÇAIS ordre confirmant celui que vous m'avez envoyé hier concernant mise à la disposition du Gouvernement Britannique de tous nos Sénégalais. Mais je dois en outre embarquer tout de suite tous nos Créoles, ce qui réduit nombre fusils disponibles pour défense à 3500. Dans ces conditions il ne m'est plus possible garder jusqu'à A.12 exclusivement comme vous vous aviez bien voulu prescrire hier. Toutefois désireux faciliter solution commune je vous propose établir ma gauche au point A.20 inclus.

Deuxièmement d'après télégramme du GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL FRANÇAIS Gouvernement Anglais a donné déjà ordre pour transport Sénégalais sur EGYPTÉ. Si vous avez quelques renseignements à ce sujet je vous serais reconnaissant de me les communiquer afin que je puisse me tenir prêt à obéir aux ordres embarquement.

Estimez-vous que ce serait préférable transporter d'abord Sénégalais MOUDROS ?

030
71
From, A.H.Q.

To, T
G.H.Q.

SECRET

Oa 414

5th December 1915

Desp. 1710

Following from 8th Corps with reference to relief of French begins please wire soon the numbers of reinforcements for each division and 87th brigade separately which are available and ordered up. This is to enable readjustment to be made. Is it possible to send up any relief for fighting troops now working on the beaches ends.

Can you please let us have the necessary information.

630 72

SECRET

From,

8th Corps

To,

A.H.Q.

HW.1220

5th December 1915

Desp.1555
Recd.1630

Reply to O.614.

please wire soon the numbers of reinforcements for each division and 87th brigade separately which are available and ordered up. This is to enable readjustment to be made. Is it possible to send up any relief for fighting troops now working on the beaches.

73
SECRET

From, A.H.Q.

To, G.H.Q.

O.615

5th December 1915

Desp.1225

Your OB.65.

When this move was foreshadowed last month I anticipated reinforcing HELLES with another brigade 29th Division, but owing to recent wastage at SUVLA this is no longer possible. Am therefore arranging for DAVIES to fill the gap in first instance with his present troops, BRULARD assisting by holding rather more than half present French line with remaining French Brigade. Will wire details and first destination of Senegalese as soon as arranged. BRULARD told me yesterday that he had been promised French troops in place of Senegalese. Hope their arrival may be expedited if this is the case. Meanwhile will you please continue sending all available reinforcements 8th Corps and 87th Brigade to HELLES.

74
SECRET

030
From, A.H.Q.

To, 8th Corps.

O.614

5th December 1915

Desp.1200

Senegalese troops are to be withdrawn as soon as practicable. Meet General BRULARD and make arrangements for taking over part of his line. BRULARD is being ordered to assist you by continuing to hold rather more than half his present line. Suggest A.12 as suitable point of junction. No orders for French artillery to be withdrawn. It is impossible to send you more units at present, but all your reinforcements are being ordered up, and even with this extension of your front you will have more men per yard than 9th Corps or Anzac. Telegraph earliest date on which you can take over new line.

75
SECRET

From, Sir W.R. Birdwood.

To, General Brulard.

O.613.

5th December 1915

Desp. 1200

D'après les ordres du G.H.Q., vous retirerez des que possible d'HELLER les troupes Senegalaises pour les transporter dans les îles, puis en ÉGYPTÉ lorsque les transports deviendront disponibles. J'ai prescrit au General DAVIES de s'entendre avec vous pour prendre une partie de votre ligne, mais, n'ayant pas de troupes disponibles pour remplacer les unités partantes, j'estime nécessaire que vous étendiez un peu celles qui restent de façon à leur faire occuper un front légèrement supérieur à la moitié du front français actuel. Dès que vous aurez vu DAVIES faites moi connaître la date d'embarquement et le premier lieu de destination des Senegalais. Je pense que la marine française fournira les moyens pour ce premier transport et pour le voyage en ÉGYPTÉ. Il n'y a pas d'ordres pour le départ de l'artillerie française. Je propose à DAVIES que la ligne anglaise soit étendue au Sud jusqu'à A.12 inclus.

76
SECRET

030
From, G.H.Q.

To, A.H.Q.

OB 65

Desp. ^{41C} ~~300~~ December 1915 2159
Recd. ^{51C} ~~41C~~ 0010

War Office directs that Senegal troops are to be withdrawn as soon as practical from HELLES to islands and to proceed to EGYPT whenever transports can be provided.

Telegraph your proposals for relieving them, and where French propose to move them in first instance. Presume French will provide transport for both moves.

03. 77
SECRET

From, G.H.Q.
To, A.H.Q., D.A.

9 A

OB.86

9th December 1915

Desp. 0913
Recd. 1015

Have referred to Secretary of State for War previous wire concerning diplomatic relations if we use MITYLENE, and ask if we can accommodate 20,000 troops there.

Reply begins - "Give me your project for distribution of troops evacuated from SUEVLA and ANZAC "(if their?)(group undecipherable) Understood that "you would first use IMBROS, TENEDOS, and MITYLENE as "well as MUDROS as temporary bases. After you have "reinforced HELLES and relieved Senegalese will you "have 20,000 men to go to MITYLENE ?"-Message ends.

Diplomatic reference has been avoided but presume MITYLENE is to be used if necessary. Please wire your project when settled upon.

(Repeat of doubtful and missing groups asked for)

5 copies typed
B.R.M.

030
O.B.R. 244.

78
J. B. 9
Headquarters.

Dardanelles Army.

24 December, 1915.

From.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING.
DARDANELLES ARMY.

To.
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

I forward herewith a memorandum by the General Officer commanding 9th Corps, together with a report by the General officer commanding 53rd Division on the state of the troops under his command. I also attach a ration strength of the division dated 4th December and a return showing the numbers evacuated as a result of the blizzard.

2. I regret to say that, as the whole-hearted efforts of Major-general Marshall and his subordinate commanders and staff to pull the division together have had so little result, I am convinced that it is only a waste of valuable officers to maintain the division as such, any longer, and I recommend that the suggestion in para. 4 of General Byng's memorandum be adopted as soon as convenient after the division has been withdrawn from the peninsula.

3. If this is approved by the Commander-in-Chief I recommend that the initial task of reorganizing the division as a brigade be entrusted to Major-general Marshall.

H. R. Birdwood
Lieut. General,
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

SUBJECT :- REST FOR 53rd DIVISION.A.H.Q.
- - - -

1. I forward herewith a report by the G.O.C. 53rd Division suggesting that his command should be withdrawn and sent away to rest.

As I was not here when the Division landed I am unable to say whether the statement as to its action on the 8th and 9th August is as stated, but I believe it to be absolutely true.

2. Since I have had command of the 9th Army Corps, now $3\frac{1}{2}$ months, I have endeavoured to do all that is humanly possible under our present conditions to restore it to a state of active efficiency. I had it brought into Reserve Area where the men were employed on fatigue day and night, and digging. There is no doubt the spirit of the officers and men did improve and I again used one Brigade in the trenches where it did very satisfactorily. This, however, I consider was attributable to the self-sacrifice of the Brigadier and one or two officers who were indefatigable in their work.

3. Last week the terrific storm and blizzard brought matters to a crisis, and neither officers nor men stood it.

The strength of the Division is now about 1,500 effectives and these are in such poor condition of spirit that I regret to say I do not think I can count on them to stand a severe action.

To compare this formation to those of the New Army and the Yeomanry is only to come to a conclusion very detrimental to it as regards efficiency.

It has received a most excellent Divisional Commander

/and

and the best Brigadiers I could select. These have worked with unflagging keenness, but as regards the units the lack of previous training and regimental spirit are still apparent and the last few days have brought about an apathetic despondency which seems to me to be incurable without withdrawal from the Peninsula and rest.

4. Owing to the lack of numbers and apparent impossibility of receiving drafts, I recommend that the infantry of this Division be constituted as a Brigade and sent to Egypt or some other place where it would set free other men whose spirits have not succumbed to the arduous conditions of the Dardanelles.

If this were done the Divisional and non-utilized Brigade Staffs could be found employment easily with my other formations.

5. As, however, even these remnants of the infantry of the 53rd Division are useful for fatigue work on beaches, etc., I would not suggest parting with them until our policy here is decided upon and our destination known.

(sgd.) J. BYNG.

Lieut.-General;

Commanding 9th Army Corps.

1st December, 1915.

030
81
C O P Y.

Headquarters,

9th Corps.
- - - - -

Without wishing to special plead in the case of the 53rd Division I would like to bring the following facts forward on its behalf :-

1. When it originally landed on 8th August, battalions as they landed had to be thrown in the fight and take part in the attack then in progress.
2. After dark that night the G.O.C. Division received an order to re-organise and carry out an attack next day on the position - ANAFARTA SAGIR - HILL 112 - . The Division was much scattered only one Brigade being intact and it was only by dint of great exertions on the part of the Staff that a greater part of it was collected. (One Battalion Infantry, the H.Q. Signal Coy, some Field Ambulances and other units still being on board ship). The men had had no rest, were tired out and without water. The attack failed, and in these few days the Division lost roughly 40% in killed and wounded, including two Brigadiers and the pick of the officers.
3. I was given command of the Division on 24th August when two Brigades were holding trenches with the third Brigade in Reserve.

My new Brigadiers worked hard and the trenches were greatly improved. The sanitary state was excellent and I thought that both officers and men of the Battalions were improving in both knowledge and morale.

4. Towards the latter part of September the Division was withdrawn from the front line to the Reserve Areas "A" and "B". Here there was no rest either from shell fire or

/work

work; in fact both the danger and labour were increased, and the necessary training was difficult to carry out.

5. During all this time (in common with the rest of the Corps) both officers and men suffered dysentery and many were sent sick, while nearly all were debilitated.

6. Except, however, in this Division new drafts were continually arriving for other Units in the Corps so that they were continually getting fresh blood.

7. Most of the Mounted Division were sent off to rest towards the end of October and a Brigade of this Division took their place in the front line; this change improved both their health and morale. (I understand that this Brigade did very good work whilst employed in the front line.

8. By the end of November, no reinforcements having arrived, the Division had lost through casualties and sickness about 75%. I had the units in Reserve Area carefully medically inspected and my acting A.D.M.S. reported fully on the physical condition of the men, which he stated was roughly 40% below par. On the top of this came heavy rain when - owing to the lack of head-cover - all the men got thoroughly soaked as also did their blankets. This heavy rain was followed by a change of wind to the North and then a strong blizzard and its effect on men, both physically and morally much below par, has been such, that the Division has practically ceased to exist.

To sum up, I would venture to suggest that the remnants of the Division be withdrawn as early as possible and given a chance of recuperation, collecting its convalescents, receiving such reinforcements as are available and getting officers and men prepared by training for such work as may be in progress in the Spring.

83
- 3 -

I think that nothing under three months in a good climate such as Egypt, in the winter, will be sufficient to put the Division in anything like a satisfactory state to take the Field.

(sgt.) W.R. MARSHALL,

Major-General.

Commanding 53rd Division.

Headquarters,

1.12.15.

Form. 'D'.

Ration strength at 7 pm. 4.12.15.
after evacuation of the 1978
shown on Appendix II.

53rd (Welsh) Division. 4.12.15. (7 pm.)			List No.	Units excluded and where attached.
Name of Unit.	Officers.	O.R.		
Headquarters & Signalling Sec.	16	141.		
Divisional Cyclist Coy.	2	58		
Divisional Artillery Headquarters.				
Brigade.				
Brigade.				
Brigade.				
Brigade.				
Battery.				
Battery.				
Battery.				
Divisional S.A. Ammn. Col.	1	46		
Divisional Engineers H.Q.	3	9		
1st Welsh Field Coy. R.E.	3	70.		
2/1st Cheshire Fd. Coy. R.E.	10	103.		
158th Brigade.				
Headquarters & Signalling Sec.	3	14		
1/5th R.W.F. Battalion.)	5	174		
1/6th R.W.F. ")	20	269		
1/7th R.W.F. ")	4	175		
1/1st Hereford "				
Total.	32	632.		
159th Brigade.				
Headquarters & Signalling Sec.	5	38		
1/4th Cheshire Battalion.	14	154		
1/7th Cheshire "	18	205		
1/4th Welsh "	10	201		
1/5th Welsh "	15	307		
Total.	62	905		
160th Brigade.				
Headquarters & Signalling Sec.	6	46		
1/4th Sussex Battalion.)	30	479		
2/4th Queens R.W.S. ")	12	208		
2/1st Middlesex ")	23	311		
2/4th R.W. Kent "				
Total.	71	1044		
A.S.C. Details.	10	43		
1/1st Welsh Field Amb.	10	269.		
1/2nd " " "	9	224		
1/3rd " " "	10	236		
2/1st Welsh Field Co. R.E.	5	196.		

53rd (WELSH) DIVISION. NUMBERS EVACUATED OWING TO BLIZZARD.

U n i t.	Officers.	O.R.	Totals.	Remarks.
158th Brigade Headquarters.	1	4		
5th - 6th R.W. Fusiliers.	27	519		
1/7th R.W. Fusiliers.	-	145		
1/1st Herefordshire Regt.	12	341		
	40	1009	1049	
159th Brigade Headquarters.	-	2		
1/4th Cheshire Regt.	1	192		
1/7th Cheshire "	-	197		
4th - 5th Welsh Regt.	4	250		
	5	641	646	
160th Brigade Headquarters.	-	-		
2/4th Queen's R.W.S. Regt.	-	81		
1/4th Royal Sussex Regt.	-	75		
2/4th Royal W. Kent Regt.	1	49		
2/10th Middlesex Regt.	8	64		
	9	269	278	
Divisional Headquarters.	-	-		
Royal Engineers.	-	-		
S.A.A. Column.	-	-		
Army Service Corps.	-	4		
Cyclist Company.	-	1		
1/1st Welsh Field Ambulance.	-	-		
1/2nd " " "	-	-		
1/3 " " "	-	-		
	-	5	5	
<u>Total.</u>			<u>1,978.</u>	

(Sgd) W. R. MARSHALL,
Major-General,
Commanding 53rd (Welsh) Division.

036
86
DARDANELLES ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

9 December, 1915.

From: GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,

DARDANELLES ARMY.

To : CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

In continuation of my G.S.R. 48, dated 1st December I gather from today's Naval and Military Conference, that nothing has yet been done to collect the shipping recommended in the report forwarded with that letter as necessary for the evacuation.

Every day is now of the greatest importance, not only on account of the chances of bad weather, but also on account of the phases of the moon. Had shipping been at once available, I should, in view of the very serious disadvantages of attempting an evacuation during full moon, have recommended the curtailment of the period of embarkation to 5 days, and the abandonment of everything but men and guns. By this means I should have hoped to complete the evacuation while the moon was still in its first quarter. As it is, however, I understand that the necessary shipping is widely scattered and cannot be collected for several days - also that the Navy do not consider it safe to bring more lighters and tugs to the beaches in large numbers till the breakwater at Kephale is completed, and that the vessel intended for this purpose cannot arrive before the 18th inst.

In

030 87

In these circumstances, I propose to carry on with the Intermediate Period with such vessels as are already at my disposal, but fear that owing to this unfortunate delay in preliminary arrangements, it may be essential to postpone the final stage until the moon has reached its last quarter.

It is, however, quite possible that, once evacuation has been started, we may not be able to choose our own time for its continuation, and I look on it as essential that the necessary arrangements should be made by the Navy at the earliest possible moment. May the Vice Admiral therefore be asked :-

- (i) To provide the shipping suggested in the Naval and Military Committee report of the 1st December not later than the 18th inst.
- (ii) To guarantee that the Kephale breakwater be completed on the same date.

Lieut. General.

Commanding Dardanelles Army.

SECRET

G.S.R. 2.49.

HEADQUARTERS,

DARDANELLES ARMY.

6th December, 1918.

Wm. Denny

From. GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
DARDANELLES ARMY.

To. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

I wish to bring to your notice the views of the G.O.C., 5th Corps, with which I am in agreement, on the requirements of the land forces at CAPE HELLES as regards Naval Support in the event of the 5th Corps being required to maintain this position during the winter, and I beg to request that, should they meet with your approval, representations may be made to the Vice Admiral accordingly.

2. In the first place it is thought desirable that the supporting squadron should be a permanent one and should consist of such ships as may be able, not only to assist our operations with heavy and accurate fire whenever the weather permits of such assistance being given, but also to keep the sea and give some measure of support when the weather is bad.

3. From experience already gained, the classes of ships most useful from our point of view are destroyers, heavy gun monitors, cruisers of the "EDGAR" class, and, for large operations for which a heavy volume of fire is required, battleships.

4. As regards destroyers, it is urged that if possible the same destroyers might always be employed on the left flank of this position where their work has been in the past as

valuable

valuable as it is important. The intimate knowledge of local conditions gained by the officers commanding H.M.S. "SCORPION", "REYNARD", and "WOLVERINE", together with the fact that these destroyers are armed with 12pr. guns as well as 4", and consequently have a larger supply of ammunition available, render them particularly suited for this work if their services could be made permanently available.

5. As regards monitors, experience has proved that only those armed with heavy guns which have a stable gun platform are sufficiently accurate to undertake the requisite fire on hostile works and trenches in fairly close proximity to our own lines. It is not known how many of these are available, but at least three could be usefully employed, and it is essential that, if possible, they should not be changed, or otherwise the valuable ammunition expended in registration and the experience gained in each operation are very largely wasted.

6. Owing to the fact that, in heavy weather such as may be expected during the next four months, even the large monitors will be unable on many occasions to come to our assistance and support, it is very desirable that there should be available at least two cruisers of the "EDGAR" class. One of these cruisers would then be available to fire on the enemy's trenches in case of emergency when the monitors could not come out, while the other engaged the enemy's batteries as at present arranged.

Owing to their shorter ranging guns, such a cruiser could not take the place of the monitors except in case of urgent need, as she might be driven off by the fire of the enemy's batteries.

7. It is suggested that battleships also are desirable, as, in the case of a big operation, the value of a heavy

630
 volume of fire would be so great as probably to render possible a successful attack (on a large scale) which otherwise would require a larger amount of artillery ammunition than is likely to be available. The dangers and difficulties which would have to be faced and overcome if such ships were to be employed are fully realised, but it is urged that the matter should receive serious consideration in view of the great advantage which would undoubtedly result should it be decided in the spring to make further combined efforts to achieve our object of forcing the Dardanelles.

8. It is not known whether it would be a practical scheme to net such an area that ships would be able to manoeuvre in security from the submarine danger. But it appears that this, or some form of adequate protection to the ships themselves, might be worth trying.

9. If the use of battleships in this manner is considered, it would be very desirable to have one or two always available during the winter months, as, far better than the cruiser, they would be able to take the place of the monitors in heavy weather, and thus gain experience in the methods of fire to be used and knowledge of objectives to be engaged which would be of the greatest value if and when larger operations are undertaken.

10. As ^{ga}re~~fers~~ the amount of ammunition ^{required} for such a bombardment, it must be remembered that the fire of the ships would only be auxiliary to that of the shore batteries, and that the fire of 10 or 12 guns of 9.2" calibre and upwards, and from 12 to 20 6", would form an enormous increase to our present artillery power on the Peninsula, while, with present facilities

63
91
facilities, ships can replace their ammunition more easily and speedily than can the batteries on shore.

11. In this connection it is for consideration whether preparations could not be ^{made} in case offensive operations are at a future time to be renewed, to provide adequate facilities for landing rapidly and securely large quantities of ammunition. A large quay of a more permanent kind than any hitherto attempted would be invaluable, and preparations for its construction could hardly be begun too soon.

(Sd.) L. R. D. Hood Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Dardenelles Army.

10th December, 1915.

To.
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

In continuation of my letters Nos. G.S.R.Z.48 ,
dated 1st and 9th December, I now enclose for information
a copy of instructions issued to Corps Commanders this day

Since issuing these instructions your telegram No.
C.M.Q.T. 90 has been received and communicated to all concerned

2. With reference to my letter of yesterday's date

I have had to consider very carefully whether it would not
be better to delay the final stage until after the period of
full moon. Had there been no other consideration I should
have unhesitatingly have decided in favour of this course
but after weighing all the chances of winter gales I have
come to the conclusion that the wisest plan is to go straight
ahead and carry out the final stage as soon as the Navy can pro-
vide the necessary ships, more especially as there is a good
prospect of cloudy nights at this time of the year. Clouds
cannot of course be depended on but bad weather at Christmas
time appears to be more or less certain, and delay now might
mean that we should find ourselves with ^{out} pierce and without the
necessary number of small craft to carry out the evacuation.

3. With reference to your telegram O.B. 86 my detailed
suggestions for the ultimate location of troops is as follows:-
11th Division, IMBROS, 13th Division, Mounted Division, New
Zealand & Australian Division, 54th Division, and 5 vlia details
at MUDROS; 29th Division at HELLES, 1st Australian Division,
2nd Australian Division and ANZAC details at BITYLENE; and
53rd Division, four Light Horse Brigades, Indian Infantry
Brigade, and Eastern Mounted Brigade to EGYPT

This

This will entail providing transports for some 17,000 troops^{*} including those for whom accommodation at Mudros will not at first be available.

4. I would suggest that in order to make more room in Mudros the 3rd Australian Brigade should be sent to Mitylene at the first opportunity. They will be most useful there in preparing camps for the remainder of the corps.

5. I also suggest that if my proposal to send the 29th Division to Helles is approved all drafts for that division now at Mudros should be sent up to join the 8th Corps as soon as opportunity offers.

(Sd.) W.R. Dunderwood Lieut-General,
Commanding Dardanelles Army.

* viz some 14,000 direct to Egypt and 3,000 for whom there will probably not be room at Mudros in the first instance, and who will consequently have to remain on board transports.

G.S.R. Z.48.

INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING 9th CORPS
AND AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
DARDANELLES ARMY,
10th December, 1915.

1. The Cabinet has ordered the evacuation of SUVLA and ANZAC to be commenced immediately.
2. The evacuation will be carried out in two stages :-
 - (a) The INTERMEDIATE STAGE, which has already commenced. This will consist of the gradual and methodical evacuation of all men, guns, and animals not required for the tactical defence of our positions during a period which it is hoped will not exceed two days, but which may, in the event of bad weather supervening, be extended to a week, or even more. As much material, stores, and supplies as possible will be evacuated during the Intermediate Stage.
 - (b) The FINAL STAGE. This will consist of the embarkation of ~~men~~ and guns only, and must be completed in two nights. The only personnel kept for this stage will be fighting men and medical personnel.
3. The decision as to the number of men and guns to be embarked during each stage is left to the discretion of Corps Commanders, subject only to the proviso that the number of men kept for the final stage must not exceed 20,000 at each place, this being the maximum number that can be dealt with by the Navy in two nights.
4. The allotment of ships and lighters to each Corps for the Intermediate Stage is given in Appendix "A".

This stage must be completed not later than daybreak on the 19th December.

Guns.

guns, war-like stores, and other material of value must be evacuated as early as possible in this stage, in order that, should the tactical situation necessitate the curtailment of this stage, the losses of valuable equipment may be by so much reduced.

The relative order of importance in which, subject to tactical considerations, guns are to be evacuated is, howitzers, heavy guns, 18 pounders, 15 pounders, 10 pounders and smaller pieces. The Commander-in-Chief directs that, if possible, all howitzers and heavy guns should be saved.

The programme of embarkation will be left entirely to Corps Commanders, who will make all necessary arrangements with their respective Naval Transport Officers. Naval Transport Officers will be responsible for the allotment of troops, guns, and stores to the craft at their disposal.

Corps Commanders will report daily to Army Headquarters the number of personnel, animals, guns, and vehicles evacuated during the preceding night, and the units to which the personnel and guns belong.

5. The final stage will take place on the 19th and 20th December. Combined Naval and Military orders for this stage will be issued shortly.

The closest co-operation between Corps Commanders will be of the utmost importance. To assist in this object it is suggested that each Corps Commander should attach to the other Corps Headquarters a Staff Officer fully conversant with his plans. It is essential that the final withdrawal from the front line trenches at the junction of corps should be simultaneous, at an hour to be mutually arranged by Corps Commanders.

6. It is recognised that it may be impossible to embark any guns or stores during the final stage, but any opportunity that occurs for doing so without impeding the embarkation of personnel must be seized.

Every gun left behind must be so completely blown to bits as to ensure its worthlessness to the enemy, even as a trophy.

7. Certain contingencies may compel the Army commander to order the abandonment of the intermediate stage and the beginning of the final stage before the programme for the intermediate stage has been completed. In this eventuality one or more nights, as necessary, will be added to the final stage in order to embark the balance of men left over from the intermediate stage. The embarkation of further guns, animals, stores, and material will, in this case, be abandoned.

8. The Army commander directs that particular attention be paid to the following points:-

(a) The early accumulation of reserves of stores, water, and ammunition in the trenches.

(b) Preparation for the destruction of all ammunition, stores, and supplies which have to be abandoned. If feasible, it will be probably advisable to prepare effective mines under every dump of abandoned ammunition to explode by electric contact mines at the last moment.

(c) Full use of mines and entanglements, trip wires etc. R.E. personnel must be left with the rear parties to complete these arrangements.

When our trenches are very close to the enemy and mine tunnels in the direction of their positions have been commenced, these should be completed at once,

and

and large mines placed ready for explosion when our rear parties are evacuating their trenches. Several such large explosions may well prevent the enemy from following up.

(d) The necessity for complete silence, especially during the final stages of the operation, must be impressed on all ranks.

(e) During daylight, lighters and small craft should ply off the beaches in the normal manner.

(f) The early evacuation of documents, records, etc.

(g) The possibility of the Turks commencing an attack and the necessity for guarding against it. Such attacks will become more and more likely as the evacuation progresses. Should the enemy develop an attack across the open, offering opportunities for the infliction of heavy casualties, a counter attack should be launched with vigour.

(h) Any small detachments of reinforcements which may be sent up in the near future should be landed in daylight, in order to give the Turks the impression that we are still landing troops.

(i) The possibility of deceiving the enemy by restricting movement by daylight on the beaches and in the open for the next few days, followed by alternate periods of activity and quiescence.

The adoption of similar methods of alternate activity and inactivity as regards night firing.

9. The Vice Admiral is arranging to have boats off the shore throughout the course of the final stage at points where

wounded

wounded or stragglers may come down to the Beach.

100. Owing to damage to lighters or other unavoidable causes, a certain number of men may still possibly still be on shore at daybreak after the last night of the final stage. A keep must therefore be prepared in each area, as near as possible to a practicable landing place, in which such men could maintain themselves until embarked later. This keep must be provided with supplies of water, food, and S.A. Ammunition. It must not be used, however, until it is clear that there are no means of immediate embarkation.

11. The troops from ANZAC will be concentrated in the first instance at MUDROS and MITYLENE; those from SUYLA at MUDROS, except 15,000 for the final stage, who will be sent to IMBROS.

9th Corps Headquarters to IMBROS; A and N.Z. Corps Headquarters to MUDROS.

12. The eventual distribution of troops will probably be as follows:-

11th Division	}	IMBROS and MUDROS
13th Division		
Mounted Division		
1st Australian Division	}	MITYLENE and MUDROS
2nd Australian Division		
N.Z. & Australian Division		
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th	}	EGYPT
Aus. Lt. Horse Brigades		
29th Division		HELLES
53rd Division	}	EGYPT
29th Indian Inf. Brigade		
Eastern Mounted Brigade		

13. A suggested programme of evacuation of artillery has been drawn up, and is attached as Appendix "B". This programme is for guidance only, and may be varied or altered by Corps Commanders at their discretion.

14. MEDICAL. During the intermediate stage the arrangements for evacuation of sick and wounded will be normal.

during the final stage lightly wounded cases must embark

with

(6)

with the fighting troops.

Two Hospital lighters will be provided at each beach for conveyance of badly wounded cases to hospital ships, of which there will be two at each beach.

A proportion of medical personnel, with accommodation for badly wounded cases, must remain on the Peninsula till after the evacuation has been completed, to tend such wounded as cannot embark.

Permission will be asked the following day for the medical personnel and wounded to be embarked on hospital ships.

(Sgd) C.F. Aspinall,

Lieut. Colonel,

General Staff.

APPENDIX "A".VESSELS ALLOTTED FOR INTERMEDIATE STAGE.

Place	Ferry Steamers,	Motor Lighters.	Steam Boats	Gun Ships	Store Ships	Horse Ships
SUVLA	3 (to hold 3000 men)	7 ϕ	3 ϕ	1	2	2
ANZAC	3 (to hold 3000 men)	6 ϕ	2 ϕ	1 @	2	1

ϕ More motor lighters and steamboats will be sent if found necessary by N.T.O., at beach, but it is undesirable to have more than absolutely necessary during this stage until KEPHALO harbour is made secure by a ship being sunk to fill the gap in the breakwater.

@ Also takes horses.

SUGGESTED EVACUATION OF GUNS FROM ANZAC AND SOVLA.

These may be modified by G.O's C. Corps in accordance with Tactical considerations.

ANZAC.

	Total	Guns already	Intermedia to stage		Final stage	
			1st period	2nd period	1st Night	To remain
18pr.	52	8	17	10	-	17
6" How.	7	-	4	3	-	-
4.7" gun	1	-	1	-	-	-
5" How.	20	-	10	6	-	4
4.5" How.	8	-	4	4	-	-
4" Naval	2	-	2	-	-	-
10pr. mountn.	12	-	-	-	12	-
3pr. Hetchkie	2	-	-	2	-	-
A.A. guns	1	-	-	1	1	-

Of these 17th Siege Battery, 4 of 6" Hows. }
 2 4" Naval guns } go to HELLES.

SOVLA

18pr.	64	6	10	12	28	11
4.5" How.	8	2	4	2	-	-
6pr.	8	6	2	-	-	-
5" How.	4	-	-	-	-	4
10pr. mountn.	8	-	-	-	-	8
A.A. guns.	2	-	-	2	-	-

Of these 2 batteries 4.5" Hows. (8 guns) go to HELLES.

1. When some guns of a battery are evacuated and some remain, ammunition of evacuated guns should remain with those still in position.
2. When all guns of a particular nature are evacuated, the ammunition should be handed over to the park for evacuation.
3. If guns have to be destroyed, this should be total demolition of gun and carriage, so that they cannot be removed as trophies.
4. Guns should be left as widely distributed, firing from their original positions, as can be arranged, suited to tactical considerations, and, when practicable, moved, so as to fire and give the appearance of many emplacements being occupied.