
## AWM4 Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries, 1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/28/14

Title: 11th Infantry Battalion

May 1916



AWM4-23/28/14

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	1 m		Remarks or References		
Date. Place and	d Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.		
Ray 20 SAILLY	8-15 The Pataleo	is less transport			
		the fining line with			
PRANCE		29 o. R. and aunkies			
		cetion of 300 Bde	VI		
		in the PETILLON, area.	1603		
	Regimental	0	133		
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Date. Place and Time.  1916.  Remarks to App att  1916.  Remarks to App att  22 Rang shelled heavily several  tamic darring the day, warning	or References endices, &c., ached.	
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May 21 Juring line 2 th. wounded by enemies bounds of Enemy cheiled heavely several	or References endices, &c., ached.	
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Date. 1916	Place and Time.	Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
Lay 26	Jiving line	Every again sheeled heraity.
		I breaked our panapet, which
		bur articlery breached their their
		parapet in retaliation. 90 h.
1		wounded I hieled.
-May 27		Enemy fire 2 260 HE. aheeles 4 90 Shrapace
		to our communication trember,
		and wounding 2, O.R. Our artillery
		retaliated: "both hambi thrown"
		From 2" trench mortan gun were
		Craced a large breach in the

					050
	Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.	
	1910			accached.	
			enemys karapet. This was coored		
	1		by oar fewis guns at night	7	
	Lay 28	Journa Cine	Eachy fired 400 cheels into our	12 P	
		F	area, principally HE + sheapall	7.7.1	
			bun artillery + treach mortars	29	
			retaliated effectively. 80k.	1	
			wounded & 2 Keller. Jewis My,	01	
			owing to its mobility is proving	P 1	
			very effective, in quietening	33/2	
			Enemy Raipers, & Rometimes	<u> </u>	
1	2.0		tis machine guns.		
		4	chemy quiet. He sent onen a		
			per large ments at y some of		
	3.39s/9.14.—C.1105	56.	eacher of 2 th, wounding 10.h.		

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

				23
Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.	
Lac 30.	bring lane	Eveny commenced a frence hombaid.	APPENDIX'A'	
	,	neat of our lines at 8.10 pm -	Copy of Clo.	
-/		with HE, Chrapnel, Acreal a	expatch.	
		toupedoes, and Hambs - which o	tached.	
		Plastionatel 9 30 pm - Result	1 10 8/	H*0
		RD Branchow + 2/1. ap Brooks)	1/4/00	
-		and 59 traunais and 6 missing	19 12 12	
May 31.	· ·	Eveny quit until 6.30 pm	7	
<u> </u>		their several hands were	1	
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		1 R AUDO	replocol	
		0.11	4992	
D 398/9.14.—C.110	56.			

To 3rd. Brigade Headquarters.

June 1st. 1916.

Bombardment of Left Sub-Section of the Brigade Frontage of the 1st. Australian Divisional Sector of the PETILLON Section.

Attempted German Raid on night of 30th. May 1916.

In amplification of my progressive reports on the above subject

I beg to submit the following report:-

At 2010 on the 30th. May 1916 the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment on a section of our front line parapet, our support lines, CORDON-NERRIE POST and our communication trenches (MINE AVENUE and CELLAR FARM AVENUE).

It was swident that the bombardment had been timed for that hour as the attack on all points commenced simultaneously.

(i) Guns, large calibre, using H.E. onna small salient in our line and on CORDONNERIE POST.

(ii) Trench Mortar Batteries and Aerial Torpedoes on salient.

(iii) Guns using shrapnel on Communication trenches and on either side of salient for a distance of about 250 yards.

(iv) Guns, 77 m.m. on parapet and supports line.

The bombardment raged with unabated and awful fury until 2130 when it slackened appreciably; at 2140 it ceased altogether.

By this time NO MAN'S LAND and the ground between the firing

line and the supports were enveloped in dense smoke.

The parapet of the salient for a distance of 100 yards (actual prapet frontage) had been demolished. Some of the men occupying the space had beenk killed before they could be withdrawn. The others were withdrawn to the flanks but we practically maintained, under the trying circimstances, an unbroken sequence on lether side of the salient.

In the meantime I had been in communication with the Company Commanders and immediately the bombardment was raised off the parapet they joined forces across the salient and pushed forward over the debris and

opened up a heavy rifle fire.

Whilst the bombardment was proceeding, the enemy kept mup a lively and continuous fire with his machine guns braversing ou parapets and then switched them on to the salient and to other parts of the line where the parapet had been breached.

Our Machine Guns, particularly the Lewis Guns (mobile) had been bringing enfilade fire to bear on NO MAN'S LAND in front of that part of

the line which was being so fiercely bombarded.

During the bombardment all but the observers and Lewis Machine Gunners were kept well under the parapet but immediately the bombardment ceased the whole line opened fore on the enemy's trenches.

so soon as the bombardment commenced assistance was asked of our Artillery and very soon our guns were in full action. The Trench Mortar Battery in our area also came into action and rendered most valuable assistance.

The damage done to our lines seemed appalling, but whilst the bombardment was proceeding organisation was going on in rear and in ax very short time not only was the firing line reinforced but working parties, well organised, were at work building up the parapet, clearing away debris

and reopening the communication trenches.

As I have previously reported, our lines were considerably damaged. In addition to the damage to the firing line CORDONNERIE POST had its interior blown outd the support lines suffered considerably whilst, for the time being, our communication trenches were rendered useless. By daylight, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy, we had constructed a new parapet around the salient, the communication trenches had been reopened, our wounded had been evacuated and other breaches in the parapet repaired.

In the meantime I had been hearing rumours that the bombardment was followed by a raid. None of my Officers were able to verify this but at daylight, on going into the question, I found evidence that one

At the section (N.10.c.65. 65 to N.10.c.75. 80.) the parapet was razed. I round that three lengths of white tape had been laid from the enemy's line (120 yardsh distant) to our entanglements, whilst

(3) 6 in Front of our parapet were 40 hand grenades (reference S.S.398 see plate Appendix No.A figures 1 & 2), cylindrical grenade with friction tube, 6 packets of yellow explosive (Kill Guickauf), a ladder and a life presermver. All these articles were collected. I also found three men who actually saw a party of four or five Germans inside our parapet or what at that time was the ruins of our parapet. One, a Machine Gunner, on rising to bring his Lewis Gun into action was knocked over with a bomb. A Sapper came to his rescue, and though both men were knocke over again, they got the gun into action well in the front of the aedrie and it remained there sweeping NO MAN'S LAND by enfilade fire during the night thus protecting the breach against attack. Two other men say they saw three or four Germans but they were partially buried at the time and guns and boms were not available. They saw the party appear on the debris immediately the enemy guns lifted fire off the parapet and whilst our lines in rear were being shelled. I accept as an established fact that a small party of the enemy did actually reach our trenches under an intense bombardment and under cover of the dense smoke but the party withdrew at once and were not seen by the men who manned the debiss immediately the bombardment ceased. At the point of attack mining has been very active and no doubt the object of the raid was to destroy our mining chambers.

I am inclined to the view that only the enemy's scouts were able to reach our lines. The prompt manner in which the breach was manned after a such a heavy bombardment, and the valuable aid given by our machine guns mad any raid an impossibility.

whatever

The party which reached the parapet did no damage/to our lines and I venture to assert it was unable to return by the way by which it came.

I regret to say I lost one Lewis Machine Gun. Eyewitnesses say

it was blown up with its bearer during the bombardment.

The casualties were heavy being Killed 36 other ranks, Wounded

2 Officers and 59 other ranks and Missing 6 other ranks.

with regard to the missing personnel, whole portions of the line were blown up and no doubt the men were either blown to atoms or smothered in the several craters which were formed in the lines.

In connection with the great amount of work which was done after the bombardment everyone responded to my orders which were:-

(1) "That we must be prepared for an assault no matter how soon it "was made.

(3) "That every effort was to be made to conceal from the enemy the "damage he had effected to our lines".

As regards the cheerfulness and resourcefulness of the men during the bombardment and of the action of the Officers and N.C.O's., I cannot speak too highly - the manner in which they manned the debris beggards description. All were animated with one desire, viz., that the Germans should not break our lines.

It was apparent to me that the orders issued for the defence of the Sub-section had been carefully studied by the Officers. Nothing that could be done was left to chance and had an attack been launched I feel sure a valiant resistance would have been offered.

I received most valuable assistance from the 19th. Battalion; members of the 1st. Pioneer Battalion worked assiduously whilst the 9th. Battalion Bombers were placed at my disposal. I find it difficult to single out far appears ther Officers, N.C.O's. or men for special mention when all ranks did so well. Most valuable services were rendered by the Battalion Signallers in maintaining communication neckessitating the laying of fresh lines under fire, runners carried messages across the open in the face of what appeared to be certain death; the Machine Gunners entirely disregarded the fire of the enemy in order to sweep NO MAN'S LAND in front of the ruined parapets, Stretcher Bearers went to the assistance of their wounded comrades in the face of "hell let loose", Section Commanders rallied their men and one man sang a song without a tremor during the bombardment. Observers and sentries remained at their posts regardless of personal risk.

when it is taken into consideration that no one present had ever experienced such a fierce bombardment and many men had previously not been under fire I feel proud of the fact th t every man stood his ground. Company Commanders and the Regimental Staff proved to be Officers in every

sense of the word.



I would, however, particularly bring to your notice for special consideration the following Officers, N.C.O's. and men:-

Captain MEDCALF F.G. and CAPTAIN MACFARLANE A.H., both of whome rose to the occasion, shewed a splendid devotion to duty, rallied their men,

were resourceful and carried out my orders to the very letter.

To 2/Lieut. WALTER/G.R.S. and 2/Lieut. FORBES S.F., who were in immediate command of the Platoons on either side of the section where the whole of the front line defences were blown away, much credit is due for the action and effective way in which they assisted their respective Company Commanders to rejoin forces across the salient and to man and hold the debris until the parapet was restored.

No. 2022 Coy. Sgt. Mjr. SHIPTON B., who, during the bombardment, moved

about amongst the men and kept them confident.

No.190 Sergeant Adam R.W.

No.111 Sergeant VINCENT H. couraged and handled their men with market No.1910Sergeant BELL W. ability during a very critical period.

No.368 Sergeant WALKER D.

No.1357 Private HODGE H. and No.586 Private PLUNKETT W. did most excellent work with their Machine Guns at great personal risk, the latter, although knocked over twice by bombs, got his gun into action well in advance of the debris and swept the line of retreat of the enemy and practically made it impossible for a raid to be maid£at that point.

No. 1871 Private STRATTON ENJ. Assistance rendered to and collection

No. 2480 Private GARDNER E of wounded under heavy fire.

No. 3791 Private FOWLER W.H.

No. 1971 Private KYNASTON E.H. For the conveyance of messages across No. 3146 Private WEST L W the open inthe face of what appeared No. 3129 Private THOMPSON G.H. to be certain death whilst telephonic communication was interrupted.

No.2054 Corporal PINE D For laying and repairing telephone wires No.2594 Private DUNKLEY L in the open under heavy fire.

The following Officers N.C.O's and men rendered most valuable services Major DENTON J.S. D.S.O. Major MILNER J.T. O.C."D" Coy.

Captain HEMINGWAY R. Adjutant. 2/Lieut. BRODIE A.C. Signal Officer.

Lieut. HAIJAHAN W.R.
NOW 3237 Lce. Cpl. BROWN W.D. No. 3677 Lce. Cpl. FRY V.E.

No. 3686 Private COLE N. No. 4016 WOOLCOTT E Private. No. 1046 SERGEANT RICHARDSON R.L.No. 1545 Sergeant GRAHAM W.W.

No. 1046 SERGEANT RICHARDSON R.L.No. 1545 Sergeant GRAHAM W.W.

I attach reports from Company Command rs, and other Officers, also a reference plan.

C. O. 11th.Battalion.