

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/6/2 Part 6

**Title:** General Staff, General  
Headquarters, Egyptian  
Expeditionary Force

May 1916




AWM4-1/6/2PART6



1/351

W.D.

From Westforce.  
To G. H. Q.



G.S.B. 178 cipher.

28/5/18.

Dep. 1207.  
Recd. 1300.  
Decd. 1400.

In reply to O.A.C. 150, battery being retained  
is 1st Cheshire R.F.A.

Copies to :-

- O.
- O.(b)
- G.S.S.
- H.Q.R.A.
- Q.
- A.

Filed G.S. 2/55.  
" G.S. Cables.



1/352.

WAD

From Westforce, MOGHARA, 1550.  
To Egyptforce.

SECRET

M.F.193.

28/5/16.

Desp. 1428.  
Recd. 1515.  
Decd. 1520.

Will send report on SOLLUM on Saturday on return from  
MOGHARA. Addressed G.H.Q., E.E.F., repeated W.F.F.

Copies to :-

G.  
G.(b)  
G.S.S.  
G.-in-C.

I.  
Filed G.S. 2/28/16.  
" G.S. Cables.





1/353

W.D.

G-

From Signal.  
To General Sir Archibald Murray.

00119. 20/5/19. Desp. 1200.  
Recd. 1819.

Your M.S.589 of today.

On behalf of Lieut.-Colonel Kelly and the Western Field Force and myself, I beg to very cordially thank you and the force under your command for your highly appreciated congratulations on the successful occupation of EL FASHER. Your recommendation of the strenuous work performed by the staff and on the lines of communication will give the greatest pleasure to every member of the force. The invaluable assistance you have been good enough to afford has largely contributed to the success of the operations, and I beg you will accept my very grateful thanks.

- Copies to :-  
 G.  
 G.(b)  
 G.S.S.  
 G.-in-C.  
 I.  
 M.G.R.A.  
 Q.  
 A.  
 E.-in-C.  
 Filed G.S. 2/41  
 G.S. Cables.





1/354

W 8

H.

From:- A.H.Q. SALONICA.

To:- G.H.Q.

A. 468. cipher.

26/5/16.

Desp. 1235.  
Recd. 1930.  
Decd. 1935.

Your A.M. 505. May 23rd. 418.

37th Army troops Co. R.E. now employed to reinforce base R.E.Park until arrival of additional personnel sanctioned for latter. Under conditions now obtaining here more and not less Army troops Company Royal Engineers are urgently required. Hospital hutting and roads make it imperative that no R.Es units should be withdrawn. Trust order to despatch 37th Company may be reconsidered.

Copies to :-  
O.  
O(b).  
C.G.S.  
A.  
G.  
E-in-C.

Filed G.S. 81/1.  
\* G.S. Cables.





W.D.

From:- Egyptforce.

To:- Troopers.

A.M. 561. cipher.

26/5/16.


Deep. 1920.

Your 16967. cipher. A.O.S.

Number of M.F.P. submitted in my A.M. 440 can be reduced by 8 Sergeants and 70 other ranks. Estimated requirements thus become 1 Warrant Officer, 18 Sergeants, 227 other ranks.

Copies to :-  
O.  
O(b).  
C.G.S.  
A.

Filed G.S. 229.  
" G.S. Cables.



W.D.

From Chief Egyptforce.

To Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 568 cipher.

26/5/16.

Deep.

Evening report. All well.

Copies to :-

O.  
O.(b)  
C.G.S.  
C.-in-C.  
A.  
G.  
I.

Filed G.S. 2/29.  
" G.S. Cables.




K.



1/356

WP

SECRET



L

Senior Naval Officer,  
EGYPT.

-----  
With reference to your letter No. 52, dated 25.5.16., the Commander-in-Chief, has no objection to H.M.S. "Ben-my-Chree" proceeding to ADEN to undertake a Naval aeroplane offensive as you suggest.

(Sgd) Mynden Bell

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
26.5.16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



W.D.  
General Officer Commanding,  
A. & N.E. Training Centre.



As sufficient horses are now available to complete the mounting of the <sup>11th and</sup> 12th Light Horse Regiments, instructions are being issued for the concentration of the dismounted portions of these units at TEL EL KEBIR, where the issue of horses will take place. You should report as early as possible to D.Q.M.G., General Headquarters, the date on which you will be prepared to receive them, in order that <sup>definite</sup> orders for the concentration may be issued and arrangements made regarding the despatch of horses to TEL EL KEBIR.

As soon as the mounting of these units has been carried out, you should forward a further report to that effect, in order that arrangements may be made for the completed regiments to rejoin the brigades to which they are attached.

(Sgd) A Hyndman Bell

G.H.Q.,  
25/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to Q



1358  
N

W.D.

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 2 Section,  
Canal Defences.

G.S. (OPERATIONAL)  
No. 253/2  
Date

Horses are now available to complete the 11th Light Horse up to War Establishment in horses. The dismounted squadrons of that regiment will therefore be concentrated as early as possible at TEL EL KEBIR, where the issue of horses will be carried out. Please communicate direct with D.Q.M.G., General Headquarters, regarding details of the move to TEL EL KEBIR.

As soon as the issue of horses has been effected, the regiment, complete, will be moved back to rejoin the 3rd Light Horse Brigade in No. 2 Section.

(Sgd) A. Hynden Bell

G.H.Q.,  
26/5/16.


Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to 2nd A. & N.Z. A.C.

y n &



W.D.  
General Officer Commanding,  
No. 3 Section,  
Canal Defences.



-----  
With reference to your G.R.193/45 of the 11th inst., *in confirmation of telephonic conversation with Lt. Col. Davies this morning,* as horses are now available to complete the 12th Light Horse Regiment up to War Establishment, it has been decided to concentrate the regiment, as soon as possible, at TEL EL KEBIR, where the issue of horses will be carried out. Please communicate direct with D.Q.M.G., General Headquarters, regarding details of the move of the dismounted squadrons to TEL EL KEBIR.

As soon as the issue of horses has been effected, the regiment, complete, will be moved back to rejoin its brigade with the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.


(Sgd) A Lynden Bell

G.H.Q.,  
26/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to D





W.D.

1/360  
P.

Secretary,  
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

26th May, 1916.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 8th inst. No. 40/War Office/2535 (S.D.S.b.), I have the honour to state that the instructions contained in War Office letter No. 40/War Office/2535 (S.D.2) dated 15th June 1915, have been noted, and in accordance with para. 3 thereof, I beg to enclose a copy of "Notes on the tactical handling of the Lewis Gun".

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

(sgd) A. Lynden Bell  
M.G. C.S.

for  
General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



1/361

*W.D.*



General Officer Commanding,  
No. 3 Section,  
Canal Defences.

-----

With reference to an enquiry received from the 11th Division, please note that No. 135 has been allotted to the newly formed Howitzer Brigade with that Division.

*(Sgd) C. F. Perkins*  
*Major-General*


Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
26/5/16.



*W.D.*

*1362*  
*R.*



**SECRET**

General Officer Commanding,  
A. & N. Z. Training Centre,  
TEL EL KEBIR.

In order to form Headquarters (less commander) and Machine Gun Section for the 13th Light Horse, prior to the embarkation of that unit for FRANCE with the 2nd. A. & N. Z. Army Corps, it has been decided to withdraw the machine gun section from the Training Regiment at TEL EL KEBIR, and to supply the remainder of Headquarters from the Light Horse Training Regiments under your command.

Please carry out the formation of these Headquarters (less a commander who will be appointed on the arrival of the regiment in FRANCE) forthwith, and report when this has been done.

Orders regarding disposal pending embarkation will be issued in due course.

You should take steps immediately to form a new machine-gun section for the Training Regt. from which the 13th Light Horse Section is withdrawn.

*Sgt. L. P. Dawnan*  
*for Lt. Col. C. S.*

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
25.5.18.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

*Copy to Lt. Gen. Godley.*





SECRET

1/363

The,  
Chief of the Imperial General Staff,  
War Office, London, S.W.

In view of the possibility of operations taking place at Salonika, I think you should fully understand the problem of ammunition referred to in General Milne's private letter to you dated 13th May, a copy of which he sent me.

The ammunition situation is as follows :-

1. Stock of shell.

(1). I informed the War Office that I considered that it was advisable to keep 50% above the amount laid down for each nature of ordnance in the field, both at Salonika and in Egypt, owing to our distance from England. These numbers are :-

18-pounder	}	1500 rounds per guns.
15-pounder		
10-pounder		
2.75"		
4.5" howr.	}	1200 rounds per guns.
5" howr.		
13-pounder A.A.	}	750 rounds per guns.
60-pounder		
6" VII . . . . .		600 rounds per gun.

It is not recommended that any increase on above should be made.

(2). The War Office, in their 13002 (A.2.) of 8/2/16, say "We cannot at present work up to the 50% in all natures".

(3). At Salonika they have at present :-

18-pounder . . . . .	1700	rounds per gun.
2.75" . . . . .	1035	ditto
4.5" howitzer . . . . .	1155	ditto
13-pounder A.A. . . . .	360	ditto
60-pounder . . . . .	782	ditto
Naval guns :-		
4.7 . . . . .	1078	rounds per gun.
6" VII . . . . .	548	ditto
6" XI . . . . .	641	ditto

There is thus a small deficiency in 4.5" ammunition and a large  
one



one in 13-pounder A.A. and 2.75. These are being made up as soon as the ammunition becomes available from England.

(4). Our difficulties are caused by the supply of Force D., which, before the fall of Kut, was considered our first duty. The numbers required vary from time to time, and it has not been possible to accurately foretell what their demands will be. We have at present to send within the next two months :-

18-pounder . . . . .	50,000.
4.5" howitzer . . . . .	18,000.
60-pounder . . . . .	2,750.
5" howitzer . . . . .	25,000.
15-pounder . . . . .	6,000.

II. Proportion of H.E.

(5). The proportions laid down for the principal natures of guns and reported to War Office in D.O.S.483 of 13/3/16 :-

18-pounder . . . . .	20%
4.5" howitzer . . . . .	75%
60-pounder . . . . .	55%

War Office answer in 14370 (A.2.) of 14/3/16 : "Owing to requirements elsewhere no further supplies of H.E. for the guns mentioned can be made at present".

(6). The result of above is that the proportion at Salonika and here stand as follows :-

	<u>18-pr.</u>	<u>4.5".</u>	<u>60-pr.</u>
Egypt.	0.77%	24%	32%
Salonika.	12%	56%	49%

(7). Here again the supply to Force D. has complicated matters. They have been taking 60% H.E. for 18-pr., 100% for 4.5", and 72% for 60-pr.

(8). Two ships are promised shortly, each bringing :-

50,000 H.E.	18-pr.
10,000 H.E.	4.5".
2,000 H.E.	60-pr.,

which will help us to a certain extent if the Basra demand does not vary.

(9). It



1/365

(9). It is for you to decide on the relative importance of Salonika and Mesopotamia.

*(Sgd) A. J. Murray*

General,  
Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

General Headquarters,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.  
28th May 1916.



1/366.

A

W.D.

From Troopers.

To Egyptforce.

17215 cipher S.D.S.


26/5/16.  
27/5/16.

Desp. 2020.  
Recd. 0625.  
Decd. 0640.

G.O.C. Force D now asks for divisional cyclist company, 15th Division, which is at present attached to 42nd Division. Please send it and report date of despatch.

Copies to :-

- Q.
- O.
- O.(b)
- G.G.S.
- A.



W.D.

From A.H.Q., SALONICA.

To D.A.S.

A.486 cipher.

26/5/16.  
27/5/16.

Desp. 2015.  
Recd. 0625.  
Decd. 0655.

B

Will it be possible for five brigade machine gun officers of the 22nd and 26th Divisions to be absorbed in companies being formed at home for these divisions? It would be highly expedient to retain these officers' services with machine gun companies of their respective brigades.

Copies to :-

- A.
  - O.
  - O.(b)
  - G.G.S.
- Filed G.S. 90.  
\* A: ... Cables.





SECRET

C  
1/367

W.D.

From:- G.H.Q.

To:- Westforce, repeated I.G.C. and No. 2 Section.

O.A. 73.

27/5/18.


Desp. 1055.

Move of 158th Infantry Brigade to Canal Zone will be postponed pending further instructions. The 158th Brigade will be moved at once to ZEITOUN, where it will remain concentrated and held ready to move at very short notice on receipt of orders. The moves to MOASCAR of other units of the 58th Division, will take place as already ordered.

Addressed Westforce, repeated I.G.C. and No. 2 Section.

Copies to :-

- Q.
- O.
- O(b).
- G.G.S.
- G-in-C.
- A.



11

W.D.

SECRET

From:- G.H.Q.

To:- 42nd. Division, repeated No. 1 Section.

O.A. 74. cipher

27/5/18.

Desp. 1155.  
Recd.


The divisional cyclist company attached 42nd Division is required to re-join 15th Division. This company must be held in readiness for early embarkation at short notice. Detailed arrangements for move will be communicated direct by D.C.M.G., G.H.Q. at an early date.

Addressed 42nd. Division, repeated No. 1 Section.

Copies to :-

- O.
- O(b).
- G.G.S.
- G-in-C.
- Q.
- A.

Filed G.S. 132.  
" G.S. Cables.





1/368

E

W/D

From :- EGYPTFORCE.

To :- TROOPERS.

A.M. 505.

27/5/18

Desp. 1815.

Weekly return R.P.C. :-

(a) 27, (b) 9, (c) B.E. 2 c's serviceable 33, unserviceable 19, Bristol serviceable 9, unserviceable 3, De Havilland serviceable 3, unserviceable 3.

My A.M. 547 of May 20th. Number of pilots on strength but not available under heading (b) should read 4.

Copies to :-

- Q.
- O(b).
- C.G.S.
- I.
- Q.

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No. ....

SECRET

SECRET

W/D

From :- Chief LONDON.

To :- Chief EGYPTFORCE.

17227 cipher.

27/5/18

Recd. 1900  
Deed. 2145

My. 15408 of 13th April.

Shall be glad to know how question of rifles and ammunition for SHERIF now stands.

Copies to :-

- Q. } for action.
- I. }
- C. in C.
- C.G.S.
- O(b).
- Filed Q cables.
- G.S. 234 (F. in E).

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No. ....  
Date .....



1/369

G

W.D.

From Chief, Egyptforce.

To Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 565 cipher.

27/5/16.

Desp. 1980


Evening Report.

All well.

Copies to :-

- O.(b)
- C.-in-C.
- C.C.S.
- I.
- A.
- G.

Filed G.S. Z/29.5  
 " G.S. Cables.





1/370 H

WD

SECRET

G.O.C., DELTA DISTRICT.  
.. ALEXANDRIA DISTRICT.)

SECRET  
27.5.16  
Personal

With reference to the scheme drawn up for local  
defence of CAIRO )  
ALEXANDRIA ) the Commander-in-Chief wishes to be  
informed whether full preparation has been made to put the  
scheme rapidly and effectively into operation in the event  
of serious internal disturbance. He particularly emphasises  
the necessity of carefully considering all points of special  
importance or vulnerability, with a view to providing for  
their effective defence at the shortest notice.


It should be understood that no disturbance of this  
nature is at present anticipated, but the Commander-in-Chief  
wishes to receive definite assurance that all precautionary  
measures have been taken to ensure a state of thorough  
preparedness at all times for any emergency that may arise.

(sd) A. Linden Bell

G.O.C., E.E.F.  
27/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force





WED

General Officer Commanding,  
2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

In confirmation of telephone conversation with General Gwynne this morning, the Commander-in-Chief will inspect the 4th Australian Division at SERAPEUM on Monday, 29th instant, at 1700. The Commander-in-Chief intends to arrive at SERAPEUM by launch. Horses for his party of 1 A.D.C. and 2 other officers, will be arranged for.

Will you please state what time the Commander-in-Chief should reach SERAPEUM East Bank, and what will be the detailed arrangements on arrival there.

*(Sgd) J.A.A. Cammell*  
for Capt A.S.  
Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
27/5/18.

Copy to :-

A.D.C. to C.inC.



1/372

K  
1/372

WP

SECRET

G.S. Z/34/2.

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 1 Section.  
-----


The attached copy of memo. No. G.S.Z/34/2 of 50-day's  
date addressed to General Officer Commanding, No. 2 Section,  
is forwarded for your information.

(Sgd) G.F. Perkins Major Genl.

fr Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
27.5.16.





W.D.

11373

Vice Admiral,  
Commanding Eastern Mediterranean Squadron.

27th May, 1916.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. O.B.A.277 of the 24th inst., and previous telegrams commencing with your No. 1951 dated 19th May, I have the honour to inform you that the Military Postal Authorities have ascertained from the Mail Officer at Navy House, PORT SAID, that the registered parcel containing copy No. 21 of the "Military Reports on SYRIA, Parts I and II, 1911", and copy No. 45 of the "Military Report on ASIA MINOR, 1906", referred to in my letter of the 23rd April last, No.G.S.6/1, was despatched from PORT SAID on the 16th May, 1916.

I hope the books in question have now reached you safely.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Ego) A Hyndent Bell  
M.G.  
for  
General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



1/374

**SECRET**



*W.P.*

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 3 Section.

-----

With reference to your letter forwarding letter No. G. 209, dated 23.5.16., from General Officer Commanding, 11th. Division, instructions are being issued to the Deputy Director of Works to fit the inlets of the inundations between BALLAH and QANTARA with the necessary pipes and sluice gates to maintain these inundations at a proper level.

*(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell.*


G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
27.5.16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

*Copy to E.in C.*



W.D.



General Officer Commanding,  
E.A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

-----  
In view of the necessity of reducing to a minimum the number of guards on the West bank of the Canal in the FERRY POST and ISMAILIA area, and to ensure that no overlapping occurs between your command and that of Administrative Commandant, ISMAILIA, <sup>please</sup> ~~you should~~ forward as soon as possible a detailed statement showing, on a plan, the location and strength of all such guards at present furnished by the units under your command, <sup>also any guards furnished by you in Ismailia area.</sup>

You should also state whether you consider that the number or strength of these guards can be in any way reduced.

The Commander-in-Chief has noticed that in <sup>some</sup> ~~many~~ cases the guardrooms <sup>at times</sup> are not kept in a clean and orderly state, and trusts that steps will be taken to check the recurrence of this state of things in the future.

*(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell*

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
27/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



1/376

W.D.

Administrative Commandant,  
ISMAILIA.



-----

In view of the necessity of reducing to a minimum the number of guards in the ISMAILIA area, and to ensure that no overlapping occurs between your command and that of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps, please forward as soon as possible a detailed statement showing, on a plan, the location and strength of all such guards at present furnished by the units under your command, and also any guards in your area furnished by the 2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

You should also state whether you consider that the number or strength of these guards can be in any way reduced.

(Sgd) J.A.H. Gammell  
Capt. A.S.  
for Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q.,  
27/5/18.



**SECRET**

G.S. 2/33.

P  
1/377

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 1 Section.

-----

With reference to your O/310/21/31 of May 12th., the Commander-in-Chief approves of the following proposals as regards the construction of lateral roads in No. 1 Section.

(1) A road to connect the bridge-heads at EL SHATT and EL KUBRI on the east bank of the Canal. This road will be in lieu of that previously contemplated to join EL SHATT and KUBRI rail-heads.

(2) A road to connect EL KUBRI with SHALLUFFA. This road will be constructed in prolongation of the SUEZ - KUBRI road on the west bank of the Canal, and will be substituted for the proposed road from KUBRI rail-head to MANCHESTER POST.

It should be understood, however, that work on these roads cannot be commenced at once, but must wait until it can be undertaken without prejudice to progress of important roads now in course of construction on the west bank in No. 2 Section and of the QANTARA - QATIA road in No. 3 Section.

(Sgd) *A. Lynden Bell.*

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
27.5.16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to :- E.-in-C.



W.D.

1/378

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 2 Section,  
Canal Defences.

G.S. Z/34/2

SECRET

-----  
With reference to your G.4 of May 23rd, the  
Commander-in-Chief has decided that it is desirable to  
empty the rock cisterns in the neighbourhood of MOIYA HARAB  
as soon as this can be effected. Please consider a definite  
scheme for carrying this out at an early date, and forward  
your plan when prepared for the Commander-in-Chief's approval.

It is not intended that these cisterns should be  
destroyed, as it is considered that to draw off the water  
by siphon, if practicable, is all that is required.

In this connection it will be well to consider  
the timing of the operation, in relation to the weekly Arab  
market, held every Friday, as it is desirable to disturb  
native opinion as little as possible by our action.

*(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell.*

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
27/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to

G.O.C., No. 1 Section.



Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Service _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO Canal Company

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 022 155	28		

*All clear*



From G.H.Q.  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time 0850


The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) H.H. Gammell  
 Signature of Addressee or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Service _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO No 1 Section

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 022 153	28		

*Your 2/20/15 dated 26-5-16 re: redistribution of ground signal has been approved O.C. R.T.C. informed accordingly*



From G.H.Q.  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time 0845

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) H.H. Gammell  
 Signature of Addressee or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

*1/319*



W.D.

SECRET

1380

From : Sirdar.  
To : Aeronautics.

640 cipher.

29/5/16

Desp. 1815.  
Recd. 1900.

Following received from Grows begins :-

"I find that the aeroplanes especially those which have done most flights are strained and I think in a dangerous condition, owing to climate and long flights in a very bumpy atmosphere. I think therefore that now that the main object of the campaign has been accomplished the flight should withdraw at an early date. The weather will probably become worse shortly. Sand storms may knock down the machine tents and the overbearing heat of the rains will certainly affect the woodwork of the aeroplanes and there may be a fatal accident. Commandant R.F.C. EGYPT informs me that he would like to get aeroplanes back to RAJ June 5th. As aeroplanes are at present required for communications it may be necessary to postpone their return, but I request that they should be set free by June 20th which should give time for other arrangements to be made for communication. I also request meanwhile flights should be reduced as much as possible in order to avoid risking lives of the pilots now that there is no urgent military need. Please repeat Aeronautics." ends.

I have replied as follows, begins :- Your telegram noted and repeated as requested. KEMLY agrees to the return of flight to RAJ. The value of the aeroplanes and excellent services of all ranks of the R.F.C. had induced the hope that they still might have done very useful service west FASHER, but in view of what you say and having regard to the fact that as far as can be seen at present the main military objective has been successfully achieved ( ? I concur) in the immediate return of the flight to RAJ.

Ends.

Copies to :- O(a). C-in-C.  
O(b). 5th Wing, R.F.C.  
C.G.S. Filed Z.41.  
" G.S. Cables.





SECRET

D 1/381

W 10

SECRET.

From :- Chief LONDON.

To :- Chief EGYPTFORC.

17240 cipher.

27/5/16

28/5/16

Desp. 1845

Recd. 0605

Deed. 0615

Foreign Office has received from Italian Government memorandum stating that our commander at SOLLUM has informed Italians that he proposed to undertake motor raid into Italian zone. Italians object, and in these circumstances such an operation cannot be carried out. I make representations through our Foreign Office and should be glad of your views.

Copies to :-


O(b).

C.G.S.

G. in C.

I.

Filed G.S. Z/28/8



W 10

E

From:- Egyptforce.

To:- Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 565 cipher.

28/5/16.

Desp. 2115.

Evening Report.

All well.

Copies to :-

O(b).

G-in-C.

C.G.S.


I.

A.

G.


Major Vitale.

Filed G.S. Z/29.  
G.S. Cables.





*W.D.*



Officer Commanding,  
Royal Flying Corps.

-----  
Owing to the reorganisation of the defences of  
No. 1 Section, ground signal sets for communicating with  
aircraft are now established at the following posts :-

- |                    |                  |
|--------------------|------------------|
| AYUN MUSA          | KUBRI Railhead.  |
| QUARANTINE POST.   | MANCHESTER POST. |
| GEBEL MURR.        | ASHTON POST.     |
| EL SHATT Railhead. | GENEFPE.         |

All signal sets from other posts have been withdrawn.

*(Sgd) A. C. Dawson*  
*for Capt A.S.*  
Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
23/5/16.



*WD*  
**SECRET**

*G*

G.S. 2/24/1.59

*1/383*

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 1 Section.

-----  
With reference to your O/810/41/1 dated May 25th., the Commander-in-Chief, while strongly of opinion that an isolated post, such as BIR MABEIUK, should not be held unless its security against attack can be absolutely assured, has decided, in view of your representations, that this post may for the present be maintained. In making this decision, however, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to lay stress upon the following points which he considers of essential importance.

- (a) All works at this post should be trebly wired.
- (b) A minimum reserve of 4 days' water supply should be maintained.
- (c) The ammunition reserve (300 rounds per rifle) should be increased to provide for the possibility of a defence extended over atleast 2 days.
- (d) A carefully trained bombing section should be allotted to the post, and a plentiful supply of bombs maintained.

*(sd) A. L. Quaden Bell*

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
28.5.16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



From:- Chief, Egyptforce.  
To:- Chief, LONDON.

SECRET

A  
1/384

A.M. 568.

20/5/16.

Deep. 0010.

Your 17240 cipher.

The following telegram was communicated to me a short time ago by the High Commissioner, begins :-  
From Foreign Office, to High Commissioner. 301 April 16th.  
(being repeat of 563 to ROME). Please intimate to the Italian Government on the first favourable opportunity that the eventual delimitation of the EGYPT - TRIPOLI boundary will not be affected in any way by any military dispositions which may be made on the Frontier. ends.

In accordance with this I authorised the G.O.C. West-force to search for arms in the area west of SOLLUM, any such work to be carried out without prejudice to the Frontier question. I also informed the Italian Commander at BARDIA through my Italian Military Attache that I hoped he would have no objection to our troops operating within Italian territory in search of arms etc., and that I was quite agreeable to the Italians operating similarly inside our territory, the only proviso being that no forts were built by us inside Italian territory or by them inside their territory. The particular operation to which the Italians object is a proposed raid with the object of capturing NURI and several Turkish Officers who were located 80 miles west of SOLLUM. My view is strongly that we and the Italians should be allowed to operate in one another's territory in accordance with the terms of Foreign Office telegram quoted above. It is specially important that we should be allowed to operate in Italian territory in view of the defensive attitude to which the Italians are apparently committed by order of their Government. Unless this is arranged, I feel sure that Italian territory will become an enemy dumping ground for ammunition and a base for raids into our territory.

Copies to :- C(b).  
C.S.S.  
C.-in-C.  
I.

Filed C.S. 2/28/8.  
" G.S. Cables.





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. 86

Prefix	Code	Words	Received	Sent, or sent out	Office Stamp.
		£ a. d.	From	At	
Charges to collect	Service Instructions.		By	To	By

Handed in at \_\_\_\_\_ Office \_\_\_\_\_ m. Received \_\_\_\_\_ m.

TO CHIEF, EGYPT FORCE ISMAILIA

\*Sender's Number Day of Month In reply to Number AAA

Will travel to Cairo as requested

FROM SNO Egypt PLACE & TIME

\*This line should be erased if not required.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.						Service.
Sent					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	Date
At						m.
To						From
By						By

TO Capt Corbett H.M.S. Jupiter.

Sender's Number. Day of Month In reply to Number AAA

Commander in Chief wishes you to attend conference at Savoy Hotel Cairo tomorrow 30th inst. Would you please leave Port Said by train at 0815 tomorrow morning. C.M.C. will join this train at Ismailia 1000.


From S.M.C. Place Time 0900

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressee or person authorized to telegraph in his name.





WA



From:- Captain Corbett, H.M.S. "Jupiter".  
To:- Chief, Egyptforce.

29/5/16.                      Desp. 0014.  
   Recd. 0605.  
   Decd. 0610.

Will arrive to-morrow Monday as arranged.

Copies to :- O(a).  
   O(b).  
   C.G.S.

Filed G.S. Cables.

WA

12

From:- De Robeck, SALONICA.  
To:- Egyptforce.

1731. cipher.                      28/5/16.                      Desp. 1805.  
   29/5/16.                      Recd. 0610.  
                                        Decd. 0615.

Your O.A.B. 273. May 21st.  
Registered packet F.P.O.G.M. number 17 now  
received.

Copies to :- O(b).  
   C.G.S.

Filed G.S. 6/1.  
" G.S. Cables.





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on file of:	No. of Messages
Office of Origin and Service Instructions						
<i>Priority</i> At To By			Sent		Date	From
TO		Canal Company				By

Sender's Number: *000156*

Day of Month: *29th*

In reply to Number: *AAA*

From	Place	Time	Signature of Addressor of telegram authorized to telegraph in his name.
<i>440</i>		<i>0650</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>



*1387*

SECRET.

From Communications.

To D.Q.M.G.




0.1575.Q. cipher.

29/5/16.

Desp. 1358.  
 Recd. 1450.  
 Decd. 1500.

Reference D.A.G., G.H.Q. 14543 of May 23rd, are first reinforcements 4th Australian Division to be embarked before 5th Australian Division ?

Copies to :-  
 Q.  
 A.  
 O.(b)  
 C.G.S.  
 Filed Q. Cables.





*W.C.R.*  
SECRET.

*H.*  
**SECRET**

From Chief, Egyptforce.  
To Chief, LONDON.

*1/388*

---

A.H. 587 cipher.                      29/5/18.                      Deep. 1545.

Now I am losing the Australian, and possibly the 11th, Divisions, I shall be very much depleted of railway personnel which these Divisions have found out of their ranks, and I cannot work railways without at least one more railway company. I have instructed SALONIGA to send me 37th Army Troops Company, and they reply as follows. Begins :-

37th Army Troops Company R.E. now employed to reinforce Base R.E. Park until arrival of additional personnel sanctioned for latter. Under conditions now obtaining here, more and not less Army Troops Companies R.E. are urgently required. Hospital hutting and roads make it imperative that no R.E. units should be withdrawn. Trust order to despatch 37th Company may be reconsidered. Ends.

In view of this, I do not like to withdraw 37th Company without your knowing about it, but I cannot maintain my troops in their present positions unless my railways are working. The matter is urgent. Can you assist SALONIGA if I take the company away ?

---

Copies to :-

O.(b)  
G.S.S.  
C.-in-C.  
Q.  
E.-in-C.  
Filed G.S. 81/1.  
" G.S. Cables.





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

34-6014

Charges to Pay

Office Stamp

GHQ 29.V.15

TELEGRAPHS

Service Instructions.

Handed in at Office m. Received

TO

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
1270	Thursday		AAA

Dallas wishes to know  
 under whose command the 155th  
 will be sent to  
 ZETOWN  
 for treatment part of 534  
 Line

OPERATION 7159

FROM PLACE & TIME

Westmead 15.0

609



1/390

K

WD

SECRET

From:- 53rd Division, ISMAILIA.

To:- G.H.Q.

G.S.O.

29/5/18.

Desp. 1918.  
Recd. 1954.

53rd Division arrivals at MOASCAR 1/1st Welsh  
 Howitzer Brigade R.F.A. 18 officers, 380 O.R., 352 animals,  
 4 guns. Casualty Clearing Station 9 officers, 70 O.R.,  
 2 animals. Sanitary Section 9 O.R. Headquarters  
 4 officers 19 O.R., 12 animals. One Battery 1/2nd.  
 Welsh Brigade R.F.A. 5 officers, 190 O.R., 170 animals,  
 4 guns. Moves 2 battalions Staging Camp to Roadhead.

Copies to :-  
 Q.  
 C(b).  
 C.S.S.  
 A.  
 M.G.R.A.  
 E.-in-C.  
 D.A.S.

Filed G.S. Z/SP.  
 " G.S. Cables.





1/39/

W/D

✓


From:- G.H.Q.  
To:- A.H.Q., BALONICA.

A.M. 588. cipher. 29/5/16. Desp. 1935.

Lieut-Colonel and Headquarters Staff of 30th Heavy Brigade available can you employ same.

Copies to :- C(b).  
C.S.S.  
Q.  
A.  
H.G.R.A.

Filed G.S. 224.  
" G.S. Cables.



M

W/D

From : Egyptforce.  
To : Chief London.

A.M. 580. 29/5/16 Desp. 2005.

Evening Report. All well.

Copies to :- C(b).  
C-in-C.  
C.S.S.  
A.  
Q.

Filed G.S. Z.29.  
" G.S. Cables.





1/392N

From:- CHIEF EGYPTFORCE.

To:- TROOPERS LONDON.

A.M. 579 cipher.


29/5/15

Despatch. 2008.

A Railway Operating Division is necessary for working the QUANTARA - KATIA line of which over 40 kilometres have been constructed and are being worked. Approval is asked for establishment of 1 officer and 99 other ranks. Of these, can following be sent from ENGLAND as early as possible, 1 officer (traffic), 11 Station-masters, 2 Yard-foremen, 20 Shunters, 15 Guards, 1 Clerk, 4 Wagon-examiners, total 54 ? Remainder can be found by local transfer. Details of proposed establishment by mail.

Copies to O(b).  
C.O.S.  
A.  
H.-in-C.

Filed G.S. 281.  
G.S. Cables.



Army Form C. 2121.

"A" FORM

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Prefix Code m. m. Read at m. m. of Message

Office of Origin and Service Instructions. Charge

Priority

At m. m. Sent m. m. Service.

To m. m. (Signature of "Franking Officer.")

By m. m.

TO GOC Westforce  
GOC Westforce 530 Dism  
GOC Delta District

Sender's Number. Day of Month In reply to Number

\* 0A 75 29th A 270 AAA

158th Bde with temporary  
under the command of GOC  
Delta District via Admin's Westforce  
repeated Delta District and 530 Dism



From G.H.C.

Place 2008

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(2) Signature of Addressee or person authorized to sign in his name.



1/393 P

SECRET

W.D.

From:- CHIEF LONDON.  
To:- CHIEF EGYPTFORC.

17393.cipher. 29/5/16 Despd. 1440.  
Reed. 2130.  
Des'd. 2132.

Force 'D' are pressing for a Pioneer Battalion. Can you spare the 23rd Sikh Pioneers ?

Copies to O(a).  
O(b).  
C.G.S.  
C.  
Filed G.S. 132.  
G.S. Cables.



Q

W.D.

From:- SIRDAR.  
To:- GENERAL SIR A. MURRAY.

0533. 29/5/16 Despd. 2138  
Reed. 2150

Later reports confirm completeness of victory at BERLINGIA on May 29nd. All Sultan's best troops and commanders were present. Most of latter were accounted for or have since surrendered. Disarmament is proceeding satisfactorily and several thousand rifles have been already handed in with quantities of ammunition. It appeared that Lieut. Slessor, R.F.C. on morning of 23rd actually bombed large company fleeing PASHER with Ali Dinar. Latter when last seen had a following of only 300 persons and one and a half days' waterless journey in front of him before he could reach GEBEL MARRA.

Copies to: O(a). O(b).  
C.G.S. C.-in-C.  
N.A. I.  
C. A.  
M.G.R.A. D.A.S.  
E.-in-C.  
Filed G.S. Z/41 and G.S. Cables.



WD

G.S. 2/34/ 1  
2  
3

R

1/394

General Officer Commanding,

No. 1 Section.

No. 2 "

No. 3 "

The Commander-in-Chief wishes tactical exercises, based upon a scheme of attack and defence of inner line and bridge-head defences, to be arranged periodically by the General Officers Commanding sections. He considers that such exercises will be of value not only, from the point of view of training, to the troops taking part, but also in demonstrating the strength or weakness of the defensive positions in the event of actual attack by the enemy.

General Officers Commanding sections should arrange for these exercises to take place as may be convenient, but it is intended that they shall be carried out, as opportunity offers, at each bridge-head in every section throughout the line.

Whenever this has been done, a full report of the operation, together with copies of the general and special ideas and of all orders issued, should be forwarded to General Headquarters for the information of the Commander-in-Chief.

(Sgd) *A. Lynden Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q.,  
29/5/18.



*W.D.*

*1/395 S*

G.S. Z/28/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Officer Commanding,  
Western Frontier Force.

-----  
With reference to your letter No. S.R./20/185X dated 24/5/16, arrangements are being made to replace the Section, Hong Kong and Singapore Battery at KHARGA by 3 immobile 15-pdr.guns. These guns, together with sufficient personnel, will be despatched to you as soon as possible, and you will be notified in due course of the date of their arrival.

*Gen A. Lynden Bell*

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
29/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :- M.G.R.A.  
Q.  
D.O.S.  
A.



1/396 T

G.S. Z/34/3.

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 3 Section,  
Canal Defences.  
-----

SECRET

With reference to your G.R./193/89 dated  
May 27th., the Commander-in-Chief considers that, in view  
of the situation in which the 11th Division is placed,  
liable to withdrawal at any moment, it is not desirable  
to employ any part of that Division outside the area  
which it at present occupies, unless you have some very  
special circumstances to urge.

He would be glad to hear if any such special  
circumstances exist.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell.

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,  
29.5.16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



1/397 A

WD

From Troopers.  
To G.H.Q., Egyptforce.

7305 (code) S.D.2. 29/5/16. Desp. 2110.  
30/5/16. Recd. 0314.

Your A.M. 549. <sup>Approval</sup> ~~Appointment~~ given for addition of one A.P.M. graded Staff Lieutenant, 1st Class, for duty in docks.

Copies to :-  
O.(b)  
C.G.S.  
A.  
A.M.S.  
Filed G.S. 11/1.  
" G.S. Cables.



B

WD

SECRET

From:- CHIEF LONDON.  
To:- CHIEF EGYPTFORCE.

17287.cipher. 29/5/16 Despd. 1810  
30/5/16 Recd. 0620  
Decd. 0630

Your A.M. 566<sup>th</sup>.

This matter is being taken up at once with the Foreign Office and I will inform you of the result as soon as possible.

Copies to O(b).  
C.G.S.  
C.-in-C.  
I.  
Filed G.S. 2/23/3.  
G.SW Cables.



\* re EGYPT - TRIPOLI boundary.



1/398 C

**SECRET**

From :- G.O.C., MUDROS.  
To :- EGYPTFORCE.

B.M. 112 cipher. 29/5/16 Desp. 2240  
30/5/16 Recd. 0645  
Decd. 0715  
Your telegram O.A. 69 and A.M. 567 of May 25th.  
MUDROS Boom Defence 6 4 inch guns.  
3 officers, 72 other ranks.  
Anti-aircraft guns 2 " 50 " "

Searchlights sufficient R.E. for 5 with own generating plant.

IMBROS. Anti-aircraft guns, 3 officers, 5 other ranks.

TENEDOS. " " " 2 " 42 " "

Armament being reduced 2 six pdr. guns by order of V.A., E.M.S.

Movable armament returned to Ordnance by R.M.D. May 3rd and thence to Navy.

Copies to :-  
O(a). Q.  
O(b). A.  
C.G.S. Filed G.S. 36  
M.C.B.A. G.S. cables.

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No.....  
Date.....

Army Form C. 2121.  
"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

This message is on a/o of: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of "Franking Officer.")

Code: \_\_\_\_\_ m. Words: \_\_\_\_\_ Charge: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent: \_\_\_\_\_ m.  
Place of Origin and Service Instructions: \_\_\_\_\_

Recd. at: \_\_\_\_\_ m. Date: \_\_\_\_\_ From: \_\_\_\_\_ By: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Canal Company

Sender's Number: 000139 Day of Month: 30 In reply to Number: AAA

Clear

From: \_\_\_\_\_ Place: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: 0455

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Signature of Addressor of person authorized to telegraph in his name. \_\_\_\_\_

\* This line should be erased if not required.

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No.....  
Date.....



1/399 E

SECRET

From:- Chief, EGYPTFORCE.

To:- Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 881. cipher.

30/5/16.

Deep. 1030.

With reference to the move of the Australian Training Centre to ENGLAND, I think I ought to warn you that it consists of over 85,000 men, who will require a large staff of officers with special knowledge of training to deal with them in order to ensure that proper value is obtained from this magnificent raw material. Special attention will have to be paid to discipline in which the bulk of the Australians are still lacking. Moreover, for purposes of discipline as well as for those of training it is in my opinion absolutely essential that the men at the Training Centre should be formed in-to Brigades under experienced Brigadiers who are good disciplinarians. When the order to send the Australian Training Centre to ENGLAND reached me I was, as the result of our experiences since the formation of the Centre at TEL EL KEBIR, about to put forward proposals to you asking for sanction for the appointment of Brigadiers, and a considerably increased training staff, on the lines indicated above.

Copies to :- O(b).  
G.G.S.  
C-21-00

Filed G.S. 358.  
" G.S. 6bles.









SECRET

1/401 G  
SECRET

From :- Chief, SYMPORCH.

To :- BIRDAR.

A.M. 532 cipher.

30/5/18

Desp. 1000

Now that the DARFUR operations have been so successfully terminated, I should be grateful if you would consider the possibility of returning to me the aeroplanes, the 1st Garrison Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, the 2 Pack Wireless Sets with personnel, and also the machine gun personnel which I was able to place at your disposal for the DARFUR operations. The aeroplanes and the garrison battalion are urgently required. The aeroplanes belong to the squadron which has been ordered to SALONICA by the War Office. The garrison battalion is badly wanted by me to replace troops being withdrawn to FRANCE.


Copies to :-

C(b).  
C.G.S.  
C. in C.

A.

Q.

Filed C.S. Z/41  
C.S. cables.






WD

SECRET

1/402 H




From : Chief Egyptforce.  
To : Chief London.

A.M.584 cipher. 30/5/18 Desp. 1238.

Your 17285 cipher. I regret that I cannot possibly spare this battalion. They are at present employed as garrisons at TOR and ABU ZENEIMA, and if they are withdrawn I shall be compelled to abandon those places as I have no other troops available with whom I could relieve them.

Copies to :- O(b). Filed G.S. 132.  
Q. " G.S. Cables.  
C.G.S.

WD



From : 42nd Division.  
To : G. H. Q.

A.1077. cipher. 30/5/18 Desp. 1152.  
Recd. 1260.  
Decd. 1300.

Your C.M.Q. 22/45.  
DACLICK wires move of 13th Division Cyclist Coy. will take place almost immediately, one hundred and thirty one bicycles still required, no advice yet of these being despatched from ALEXANDRIA. Can you hasten ?

Copies to :- Q. Filed G.S. 132.  
O(b). " G.S. Cables.  
C.G.S.  
A.



1/403 J

WSD

From : Egyptforce.  
To : Troopers.

A.M. 585. x 30/5/16 Desp. 1400.

Please cancel my A.M. 561 cipher of 26th May and substitute following :- Your 16967 cipher A.G.3. Number of M.F.P. submitted in my A.M. 440 can be reduced by 8 sergeants and 70 other ranks - estimated requirements thus become 1 Q.M. 1 W.O. 8 Colour sergeants, 25 sergeants, 25 Corporals, 374 Lance Corporals, Total 434.

Copies to :- O.  
O(b).  
C.G.S. Filed G.S. 229.  
A. " G.S. Cables.



SECRET K


From :- 53rd Division.  
To :- G.H.Q.

0222 30/5/16 Desp. 1905  
Recd. 1730

Arrived today:- 1/2nd Welsh Bde. R.F.A., 14 officers, 259 men, 275 animals, 4 guns. 1/1st Cheshire Bde. R.F.A. 17 officers, 480 men, 446 animals, 3 guns. 53rd Mobile Veterinar Section, 1 officer, 22 men, 42 animals. Moves 'B' Battery 275th Howitzer Bde. R.F.A. from MOASGAR to SERAPEUM Staging Camp. 2/4th Kent Railhead to front line. Arrivals SERAPEUM EAST, 273rd Bde. R.F.A.

Copies to :-

Q. E. in C.  
O(b). D.A.S.  
C.G.S. Filed G.S. Z/59  
A. G.S. cables.  
M.G.R.A.





1404  
L

W.D.

From :- War Office, LONDON. DirMilint.

To :- EGYPTFORCE.

17324 cipher M.I.

30/5/16

Desp. 1855

Recd. 1800

Desd. 1830

Foreign Office have asked that Clayton may come home for a short time. I hope you will be able to spare him.

Copies to :-

C.G.S.

I.


O(a).

O(b).

A.

Filed G.S. SO.

W.S. cables.



M

W.D.

From :- Troopers LONDON.

To :- EGYPTFORCE.

17322 cipher A.G. 4A.

30/5/16

Desp. 1515

Recd. 1930

Your M.S. 542, 24th. Major-General Dobell proceeding shortly with a view to taking over command of Western Frontier Force.

Copies to :-

A.M.S.


C. in C.

O(b).

C.G.S.

A.

Filed M.S. cables.





1/405

N

From :- Troopers, LONDON.

To :- Addressed MALTA repeated EGYPTFORCE. (reference our 18944 cipher).

17328 cipher S.D.E.

30/5/18

Desp. 1420

Recd. 1950

Decd. 1950

~~Reference our 18944 cipher.~~

In continuation of our 18945 cipher May 22nd. Please also hold in readiness the following R.E. personnel :- 8 officers, 1 Mechanic Engine Driver, 1 Mechanic Electrician, 48 other ranks, 8 batmen. These are required to man 4 Coast Defence searchlights and one anti-aircraft searchlight. Above numbers should contain suitable proportion of various trades. They will be replaced from ENGLAND.

Copies to :-

- O(b).
- C.G.S.
- A.
- Q.
- E. in C.
- M.G.R.A.
- Filed C.S. 86.
- C.S. cables.





W.D.

SECRET

1/406 0

From : Chief, London.  
To : Addressed SALONIKA; repeated Chief, Egyptforce.

Desp. 1335 }  
Recd. 1930 } 30/5/16.  
Decd. 2005 }

17275 cipher W.O.1085. 30th.

In continuation of my telegram No. 17231 May 27th and reference to your letters May 11th and May 12th, hope it is now quite clear to you that His Majesty's Government has not agreed to a "limited offensive" or any form of offensive operations in the BALKANS beyond such dispositions as were sanctioned in my telegram No. 15781 April 28th. Sarrail appears from your letter to have been misinformed as to our agreement to offensive operations and you should take an early opportunity to put this right. H.M. Government sent a communication to the French Government on May 19th notifying that they could not consent to offensive operations in the BALKANS. Unless and until this policy is changed, of which you will be immediately informed by me, no offensive operations across the Greek frontier are to be undertaken by British troops. Anglo-French Governments are meeting in conference on subject this week.

O(b).  
C.G.S.  
C.-in-C.  
I.  
Gen. Gillman.  
  
Filed Z/S.  
G.S. Cables.



1/407  
P

From :- Troopers LONDON.

To :- G.H.Q.

17522 cipher Q.M.S. 2.

30/5/16

Desp. 1730

Recd. 1955

Decd. 1950

Reference your A.M.544, May 19th.

Following establishment approved Railway Directorate -  
1 Director, 2 Deputy Directors, 2 Assistant Directors, 1 Superin-  
tending clerk, and 5 clerks, also two complete railway transport  
sections. Additional 5 railway transport officers required must  
be considered part of the SALONICA Railway Transport Section  
at present under strength and should be shown on that establishment  
as employed in EGYPT.

Copies to :-

O(b).

C.G.S.

Q.

A.

H. in C.

A.M.S.

Filed G.S. 11/1

G.S. cables.



SECRET

From :- EGYPTFORCE.

To :- Troopers, LONDON.

A.M. 586.

30/5/16

Desp. 2115

Evening report. All well.

Copies to :-

O(b).

C.G.S.

C. in C.

I.

A.

Q.

Filed G.S. 2/29

G.S. cables.





W.P.



G.S. Z.44

R  
1/408

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 1 Section.  
2nd A. & N.Z. A.C.

---


With reference to letter G.S. Z.44/2, it has been decided that in future a full distribution return will only be required monthly (commencing June 4th) and that the weekly return, due at General Headquarters each Sunday, will take the form of a list of changes only.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell

G. H. Q.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,

W.P.



S.

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 2 Section,  
Canal Defences.

---

With reference to letter G.S. 1016 from 53rd Division dated 29/5/16, arrangements are being made to despatch one battalion, West Indies Regiment, to ISMAILIA as soon as possible. You will be notified <sup>as regards the date</sup> of its arrival in due course.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell


G.H.Q.,  
30/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



1/409

WRD



Brigadier General W.Gillman, C.M.G., D.S.O.

In accordance with War Office telegram No. 16982 of 23/5/16, the D.Q.M.G., General Headquarters, has been requested to make arrangements for your early passage to SALONICA to take up your appointment as B.C., G.S., SALONICA Army. The date and place of embarkation will be notified you in due course.

(Incl) A.H.B.

G.H.Q.,  
30/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



URGENT



General Officer Commanding,  
Brd A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

The attached copy of War Office letter No.121/  
Stores/4920 (S.D.S.) dated 17/5/16, which has just been  
received, is forwarded for your information.

The artillery of the 4th and 5th Divisions will be  
reorganised on arrival in FRANCE by the transfer from the  
existing howitzer brigades of one battery to each of the two  
senior brigades of the division, and the receipt from each  
of the 3 gun brigades of one battery of guns.

The brigades will therefore be constituted as  
follows :-

<u>4th Division.</u>	<u>5th Divisions</u>	<u>Constitution.</u>
10th Brigade.	13th Brigade,	- 3 gun and 1 Howr. Battery
11th Brigade.	14th Brigade,	- 3 gun and 1 Howr. Battery
24th Brigade.	25th Brigade,	- 3 gun and 1 Howr. Battery
12th Brigade.	15th Brigade,	- 3 gun Batteries.

The Divisional Ammunition Columns are already  
partially reorganised; the attached papers give further  
details regarding this matter.

G.H.Q.,  
20/5/16.

*C. F. Perkins*  
Major  
Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.





*W.P.*

General Officer Commanding,  
Western Frontier Force.

-----  
Would you kindly furnish information on the following points regarding the Armoured Motor Batteries under your command :-

- (i) Nos. 11 and 12 Batteries. Does the personnel belong to the Motor Machine Gun Corps ? If not, what does it consist of, and is there any A.S.C. personnel ?
- (ii) Presumably these Batteries are organised in accordance with War Establishments for Armoured Motor Cars (EGYPT) dated 28/12/15 ?
- (iii) Can you give any information regarding the Base Unit improvised by the R.N.A.C.D. at ALEXANDRIA, referred to in your 506/G. of May 21st ?
- (iv) As regards the Batteries (Duke of Westminster's) on the North Western Frontier, presumably these should come under the above-mentioned War Establishment ? If not, are you in possession of any other Establishment ? *What are the numbers allotted to these batteries?*
- (v) What are the arrangements as regards workshop units for these Batteries ?

Would you kindly furnish this information as soon as possible, since the situation requires clearing up before the workshop units applied for can be supplied.

In addition, would you please submit a return of vehicles, guns, personnel (showing branch of the service to which they belong), etc., included in all five Batteries mentioned.

*(Sgd)* *C. F. Perkins* Major *C.S.*  
for Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q.,  
30/5/16.



App A  
1/4/12

From:- Troopers, LONDON.

To :- G.H.Q.

17848 cipher S.D.2.

30/5/16

31.5.16

Desp. 2055

Recd. 0615

Deed. 0630


Your M.F.A. 1721.

The establishment of 33rd Base Park Company is as laid down in War Establishments D.2 dated Oct. 29th 1915. The establishment quoted by you was specially sanctioned in connection with operations on GALLIPOLI.

Copies to :-

- A.
- O(b).
- G.G.S.
- E. in C.
- Q.

Filed A cables.



From :- Troopers, LONDON.

To :- G.H.Q.

App B

17848 cipher S.D.2.

30/5/16

31/5/16

Desp. 2100

Recd. 0615

Deed. 0625


Your A.M. 567.

There are three railway Companies already at your disposal and in your telegram A.M. 579 additional operating railway personnel is asked for. You have also two Siege Companies R.E. and one A/T Company R.E. and three territorial Companies R.E. on lines of communications. What is the work for which you require 37th A/T Company R.E. ?

Copies to :-

- O(b).
- G.G.S.
- Q.
- E. in C.

Filed G.S. 81/1  
G.S. cables.





1/413

**SECRET**

APP. C

W.D.

From :- Governor-General, KHARTOUM.  
To :- Chief, EGYPTFORCE.

660 cipher.                      30/5/16                      Desp. 2127  
   31/5/16                      Recd. 0615  
                                        Decd. 0635

Your A.M. 582, 30th. I have already sent instructions for the immediate return of the aeroplanes and the personnel which you were good enough to place at my disposal for the DARFUR operations and for which I am deeply grateful. The two pack wireless sets were not sent. The 1st Garrison battalion Warwickshire Regiment has no connection with DARFUR operations and is the permanent British garrison of the SOUDAN. It is for military and political reasons quite impossible to spare this battalion unless immediately replaced by one of equal strength.

Copies to :-

- O(a).
- O(b).
- C.G.S.
- Q.
- A.
- M.G.R.A.
- D.A.S.
- Filed G.S. 2/41
- G.S. cables.





*W/D*  
SECRET.

*app D*  
*1/4/14*  
**SECRET**

From General, BASRA.

To Egyptforce.

1547/4/A. cipher.

30/5/16.  
31/5/16.

Desp. 2340.  
Recd. 0615.  
Decd. 0700.

After surrender of KUT garrison, and when our sick were being withdrawn, a medical officer of ours was informed the KUT captured garrison was in need of money, and it was suggested arrangements should be made to send money to prisoners of war with Turks through American Consulate Agency. Do you think above would be of any real good. If money is sent as suggested, would the Turks allow it to reach prisoners' hands. Turks under laws of war should, of course, pay our people according to daily rates of pay laid down for prisoners of war declaration. As far as we can judge here, we think Turks would do above provided that they can find necessary funds. Do you think they have the funds and are making such payments?

Should be much obliged for your opinion and advice on whole of above points.

Copies to :-

G.(b)  
G.G.S.  
G.-in-C.  
I. for action

*Filed A.S. Cables*





1/4/15

App E

W.A.

From

Egyptforce.

SECRET

To

General, BASRA.

A.M. 580 cipher.

31/5/16

Desp. 1450.

Your 1547/4/A cipher.

I think the Turks would give money to our prisoners if they had it, but I do not think they have any money to spare for this purpose. I would suggest that money be sent by War Office to American Embassy at CONSTANTINOPLE for our prisoners and that the Embassy be asked to be good enough to ensure that the prisoners get it.

Copies to :- O(b).  
 C.G.S.  
 C-in-C.  
 I.  
 Filed G.S. Cables.

OPERATIONS  
 No. ....  
 Date .....



*W 9*

*App F*

*1/416*

From:- A.H.Q. SALONICA.

To:- G.H.Q.

G.C. 116. cipher.

31/5/16.

Desp. 0030.  
Recd. 0615.  
Decd. 0618.

Your A.M. 568. *\** Yes.

Copies to :-  
O(b).  
C.G.S.  
Q.  
A.  
M.G.R.A.

Filed G.S. 224.  
" G.S. Cables.

*\* re H.Q. Staff,  
20<sup>th</sup> Heavy Bde.*





1/417

W.D.

app G

From:- C.H.Q., Egyptforce.  
To:- Troopers, LONDON.

A.M. 897. cipher. 31/5/18. Desp. 1030.

Your 7227 Q.M.G. 2 E. May 27th.

There is a considerable uncertainty as to what is the maximum establishment for SALONICA Army. May I take it that one revised Railway Transport Section Part VII 121/Railways/53, copy of which was enclosed with your letter 121/Railways 94. Q.M.G.R.E., dated February 23th., is the maximum, and that provided that maximum is not exceeded, reference to War Office for increase in strength required is unnecessary.

Copies to:-  
O (M).  
C.G.S.  
Q.  
A.  
E-in-C.

Filed C.S. 134.  
" G.S. Cables.






From:- No. 3 Section.

To:- G.H.Q.

App H



1/4/18

G. 393.

31/5/18.

Desp. 1048.  
Reed. 1111.

H.Z. Mounted Brigade reached SALMANA at dawn this morning. 1st L.H. Brigade in support at DABABIS. Enemy post about SALMANA driven east with loss of fifteen killed one wounded, one prisoner. Our casualties two slightly wounded. Our troops gave up pursuit and commenced withdrawing west at 0800. Aeroplane reports bombed scattered parties enemy near GANADEL at 0630, killing 20 camels and five to eight men.

Copies to :- O(a) I. E-in-C.  
O(b). Q. D.A.S.  
C.G.S. A. A.M.S.  
C-in-C. M.C.R.A. Filed G.S. Z/48.  
G.S. Cables.

WED

App I



From:- C.G.S., G.H.Q.

To:- General Dallas.

G.A.77.

31/5/18.

Desp. 1300.

In view of negotiations now proceeding with Italian Government, the Chief would be glad if you would instruct O.C. SOLLUM to defer raids across the frontier for a few days.

Copies to :- O(b).  
C.G.S.  
C-in-C.  
I.

Filed G.S. Z/28/3.  
G.S. Cables.





1/419

Opp K

W.D.

SECRET.

SECRET

From:- Chief, Egyptforce.

To:- Dirmilint.

A.M. 535. cipher.

31/5/18.


Deep. 1410.

Your 17324 cipher. M.I.

I spoke yesterday to High Commissioner on this subject as he had received requests from Foreign Office for Clayton to proceed home. McMahon told me that he did not want Clayton to go home until return of mission from Red Sea in about ten days time. I told McMahon I could not possibly spare Clayton at present as I am heavily engaged with Clayton's assistance which is indispensable in arresting undesirables in EGYPT who must be interned for security of EGYPT and the work now entered upon must be concluded. I do not think Clayton can proceed home until the end of June without seriously dislocating this highly important work.

Copies to :- O(b).  
 C.S.S.  
 I.  
 A.

Filed G.S. 30.  
 " G.S. Gables.






WP

App L

1/420

From : Chief Egyptforce.  
To : Chief India.



A.M. 500. 31/5/16 Desp. 1815.

As Indian Camel Corps in EGYPT are widely distributed, the establishment of 1 British Officer per Camel Corps is insufficient. Proposed and necessary establishment for each Camel Corps is 1 Captain and 1 Subaltern, total 2 British officers. Additional officers can be found locally. Presume these will be paid by the Indian Government. Consider above proposals essential as temporary measure while Indian Camel Corps employed in EGYPT. Please wire reply.

Copies to :- O(b). C.G.S. Q.(P.S.) C. A. A.M.S. Filed G.S.137. " G.S.Cables

WP

App M

From : Chief Egyptforce.  
To : Troopers, London.



A.M. 501. 31/5/16 Desp. 1830.

Reference your 121/Staff/2236 (S.D.2) dated 4.5.16, please see my G.S. 11/1 dated 18th May. These crossed in the post. Are proposed establishments sanctioned ? These are considered necessary with following exceptions :- G.S.O.(2) instead G.S.O.(1) at DELTA District Headquarters; G.S.O.(2) instead of G.S.O.(1) at A. & N.Z. Training Centre, and Acting Adjutant instead of Staff Captain at Headquarters of Administrative Commandant, ISMAILIA. Question of O.C. Reinforcements and Staff Captain at Headquarters ALEXANDRIA District being dealt with later by letter.

Copies to :- O(b). C.G.S. A Q. A.M.S. Filed G.S.11/1. " G.S. Cables.



1/421

App IV

SECRET

MP

From:- General Dallas.

To:- C.S.S.

G.S.B. 197 cipher.

31/5/16.

Desp. 1855

Recd. 1870


Decd. 1845

Your O.A. 77

Have wired instructions accordingly.


Copies to :- O(b).  
C-in-C.  
C.S.S.  
I.

Filed G.S. 2/23/8.  
" G.S. Cables.



MP

App #10



From:- Sirdar.

To:- General Sir A. Murray, ALEXANDRIA.

0567.

31/5/16.

Desp. 1822.

Recd. 1823.

DARFUR operations. Colonel Kelly reports from FASHER May 28th., careful estimate of enemy's force defeated at BERIDGIA totals 2600 riflemen. Enemy's losses considerably heavier than first reported and enemy cavalry suffered severely. Total fire-arms confiscated to date is over 3200 and arms still pouring in. Other military store include four guns, fifty five thousand rounds small arm ammunition, three hundred weight gun powder, and quantities of material for manufacture thereof. FASHER appears to have been a veritable armoury. About half the normal population of fifty five thousand has already returned to town.

Copies to :- O(a). I. B-in-C.  
O(b). A. D.A.S.  
C-in-C. Q. A.M.S.  
C.S.S. M.G.R.A. Filed G.S. 2/41.  
" G.S. Cables.



1/422

app P

SECRET

From:- 53rd Division. ISMAILIA.

To:- General Headquarters.

G. 225.

31/5/16.

Deep. 1944.  
Recd. 1955.

Arrivals nil. 265th Howitzer Brigade  
R.F.A. less one battery. 266th Brigade R.F.A.  
less one battery. 267th Brigade R.F.A. less one  
battery. Moved from MOASGAR to Staging Camp.

Copies to :- O(a).  
O(b).  
C.G.S.  
Q.  
M.G.R.A.

(OPERATIONS)  
No. ....  
Date .....

app Q

From : Troopers, London.  
To : EGYPTIAN FORCE.

Deep. 1655. 31/5/16.  
Recd. 2145. 31/5/16.  
Decd. 2200. 31/5/16.

17367 cipher Q.M.G.2.

Your A.M. 567 and 579; my 17346 D.S.D.

We are very short of operating personnel. Can you not obtain what is necessary supplementary to the 276th Company from other formations under you? If absolutely essential the local formation of a further railway company will be authorised, towards which we could send 100 maintenance men, mostly platelayers, with two or three officers. As regards operating personnel asked for in your telegram A.M. 579, we can send all except engine drivers. Additional personnel required for 276th Company asked for by M.F.C. 42265 will be leaving in a few days complete except for five motor fitters not yet ready.

O(b).  
C.G.S.  
Q.  
A.  
E.-in-C.

Filed G.S. 61/1.  
G.S. 281.  
G.S. Cables.

(OPERATIONS)  
No. ....  
Date .....



From:- Director of Works, EGYPTFORCE.

To:- Engineer-in-Chief.

H.F.W. 4578. cipher.

31/5/18.

Desp. 2110.


Recd. 2150.

Decd. 2250.

Does abandonment BENI SALAMA Camp for strategical reasons necessarily involve its being dismantled? This camp is fully fitted out with huts and good water supply for one division. On dismantling half original expense of construction will be lost. Suggested it might remain standing under charge of C.O.S. CAIRO.

Copies to :- E.-in-C. for action.  
O(b).  
C.O.S.  
Q.

Filed Q Cables.





W.D.

Opp. S.

1/424

From :- Chief EGYPTFORCE.

To :- Chief LONDON.

SECRET

A.M. 592

31/5/18

Desp. 2230

Evening report.

Eastern front. A portion of the ANZAC Mounted Division carried out another successful enterprise this morning. The N.Z. Mounted Brigade, supported by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, attacked the enemy's post at BIR SALMANA about 20 miles E.N.E. of KATIA, at dawn. The enemy were driven East, abandoning their camp and leaving 15 killed and 2 prisoners in our hands. Pursuit of enemy was carried on by our mounted troops until 8 a.m. and was afterwards continued by our aeroplanes which bombed scattered parties of the enemy, killing 20 camels and 8 more men.

Western Front. Major Vitale, my Italian military attache, returned from SOLLUM today. The relation between our troops and the Italians are most cordial, frequent visits being exchanged. The soldiers of both nationalities are most anxious to co-operate and the only trouble at all is from Italian politicians.

Copies to :-

- |          |       |               |
|----------|-------|---------------|
| O(b).    |       | M.G.R.A.      |
| C. in C. |       | E. in C.      |
| C.G.S.   |       | D.A.S.        |
| H.A.     |       | A.M.S.        |
| I.       |       | Major Vitale. |
| A.       | Filed | G.S. Z/29     |
| Q.       |       | G.S. cables.  |





1/425

W.D.

Oppt

SECRET

From : Chief, Egyptforce.

To : G.O.C. Midres.

A.M. 593 cipher.

31st May.

Desp. 2256.

Your B.M. 112. cipher.

Para. re IMBROS reads Anti-aircraft guns 3 officers and 5 other ranks. Is this correct? Reference last para., am I to understand that whole of movable armament has now left Islands?

- O(b).
- C.S.S.
- A.
- Q.
- E.-in-C.
- H.G.R.A.
- G.S. 88.
- G.S. Cables.





1/426

"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121

No. of Message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix _____	Code _____	m.	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____ Service _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions _____			Sent _____			Date _____
At _____ m.			To _____		(Signature of "Ranking Officer.")	From _____
By _____			By _____			By _____


TO

TO _____	TO _____	TO _____
----------	----------	----------

Sender's Number _____	Day of Month _____	In reply to Number _____	AAA
-----------------------	--------------------	--------------------------	-----

\* 05 166 31

... to communicate  
 following to you via Beijing please  
 convey to General Lawrence my hearty  
 congratulations on the successful operations  
 of the mounted troops this morning, and  
 any work entrusted to these excellent  
 troops is invariably well executed. G. S.



From _____	Place _____	Time _____
------------	-------------	------------

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor _____	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name. _____
--------------	---

\* This line should be erased if not required.



1/427

20

app V

SECRET

From : Sirdar, KHARTOUM.

To : Chief EGYPTFORCE.

665 cipher.

31/5/16

Desp.  
Recd.  
Decd.

My telegram No. 660, the 2 sets pack wireless  
just arrived and will be returned with the aeroplanes.

Copies to :- O(b).  
C.G.S.  
Q.  
D.A.S.

Filed Z.41.  
" G.S. Cables.

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No. ....  
Date ....  
DEF





Secretary,

War Office, LONDON. S.W.

31st May 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to confirm my wire No. A.M. 579 of 29/5/16, requesting approval for establishment of a Railway Operating Division for EGYPT. I attach a proposed War Establishment.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sd) A. Lynden Bell, M.G.,  
C.G.S.

for

General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copy to :- Q.



RAILWAY OPERATING DIVISION FOR EGYPT.

	Officers (Traffic).	Steam Loco. Foreman.	Station Masters.	Yard Foremen.	Shunters.	Guards.	Telephone operators for traffic working.	Clerks.	Cooks.	Steam Loco. Drivers.	Steam Loco. Firemen.	Petrol Loco. Drivers.	Petrol Loco. Fitters.	Wagon examiners.	T O T A L.
Total Establishment.	1	1	11*	2	20	15	14	2	4	9	9	4	4	4	100

\* One of these to act as Traffic Inspector.

Establishment by ranks to be as for other R.O.D. troops. Scale not known in EGYPT.

604/1



(OPERATIONS)  
No. 104  
G.H.Q. - M.E.F.

WD App X

CONFIDENTIAL

1/430

Lieut. Col. A.W. Jennings-Bramley.

With reference to Colonel Salmend's recommendation that a money reward should be offered to any Arab who may find and bring in a pilot or observer of the Royal Flying Corps, having been compelled to make a forced landing in the SINAI Peninsular, the principle is approved, and the sum of £50 is suggested as a suitable reward.

Will you please take steps to circulate information to this effect in the proper quarters. It should be made quite clear, however, that this reward of £50 is comprehensive, and is offered irrespective of the number of natives who may participate in the assistance given. Where more than one native is concerned, the reward will be divided equally between the whole number. Payments in this connection should be made by you direct, and your receipt will be accepted by the Staff Paymaster, General Headquarters, as a receipt from the Arab to whom payment has been made.

*(Sgd) A Hynden Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
31/5/16.

*copies to Q  
g*



**SECRET**

Chief of the Imperial General Staff,  
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

31  
30th May, 1916.

Sir,

Prior to the departure from EGYPT of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, I think it is desirable to give you some idea of the degree of efficiency which these Divisions will be found to have attained on their arrival in FRANCE. Every effort has, of course, been made to push forward the training of both artillery and infantry within the limits of time available, though the exigencies of organising and equipping the divisions, as well as essential work on the defensive line, have absorbed a certain amount of time which would otherwise have been devoted to training.

As regards the artillery, which is the most backward arm, further training is undoubtedly required to enable batteries to take their place in the line with a reasonable standard of efficiency. In the matter of manoeuvre especially, they are still in rather an elementary stage.

Nevertheless, taking into consideration that this artillery has been formed scarcely two months, and that only 7% of the personnel were originally artillerymen, with about 48% of infantry and 47% of Light Horsemen added, I consider that their general progress is up to my expectations. In this connection it may be noted that the infantry personnel has been found considerably more tractable and responsive to training than have the Light Horsemen.

Shortage of technical equipment, harness, horses, etc., has to some extent interfered with the progress of training,

/but



but these deficiencies have been gradually overcome, and all batteries will have completed their gun practice (150 rounds per 18 pdr. battery and 120 rounds per 4.5" howitzer battery) before they embark.

Concerning the infantry, the material is unquestionably very good, in so far as concerns the rank and file. Officers are, however, on the whole, poor in military knowledge, and herein lies the chief trouble both as regards infantry and artillery. With good regular officers who know how to train and command them, the infantry would soon be turned into a magnificent fighting force. The men are keen and energetic; they have completed their firing; and they are generally much better than I expected, in view of the amount of training they have received. Their training cannot, however, be considered complete, and more is required on arrival in FRANCE in order to put the finishing touches upon what they have learnt here.

Machine Gunners and Bombing Sections are, on the whole, quite satisfactory, and Engineers are mostly up to the average. One of the principal points wherein improvement is needed is marching, and especially march discipline and fit of equipment, which still leaves much to be desired.

In other respects these divisions should be found not inferior to the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions at the time when they landed in FRANCE.

I consider Major-General Sir H.V. Cox, commanding the 4th Division, and Major-General McKay, commanding the 5th Division, quite suitable for the command of Divisions in FRANCE. They are both men of character, determination, and hard fighters.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) A.G. Murray

General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



(General Officer Commanding,)

Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Sections.

*App 2*

1/433  
**SECRET**

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No. 185/2  
Date.....  
G.H.Q. - E.E.F.

The Commander-in-Chief wishes to draw the special attention of the General Officers Commanding Sections to the urgency of maintaining adequate supplies of S.A.A. and bombs in all advanced posts liable to sudden attack by a raiding enemy. He considers that a sufficient ammunition reserve to provide for a defence of at least two days is the minimum which security demands.

A plentiful supply of bombs should also be maintained with trained squads, thoroughly efficient in their use, to handle them.

*(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
31/5/18.

*W.D.*

G.S. (OPERATIONS)  
No. 2/59  
Date.....  
G.H.Q. - E.E.F.

**SECRET**

General Officer Commanding,  
2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

*App AA*

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding the Commander-in-Chief wishes it to be clearly understood that you will continue to command No. 2 Section, Canal Defences, and to direct all operations undertaken from that Section, up to the date of your departure with the 2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps to FRANCE, when the command of No. 2 Section will be handed over to the G.O.C., 53rd Division.

*(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
31/5/18.

Copy to :-

G.O.C., 53rd Division.



1/434

WP

copy AB 2/59

General Officer Commanding,  
53rd Division.

SECRET

-----  
Attached copy of letter to General Officer Commanding  
2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps, is for your information.


(Sgd) *A. Hyndkin Bell*

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
31/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

OPERATIONS  
No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_  
G.H.Q. - E.E.F.





App AC 1/435

The Secretary,  
War Office, London, S.W.

31<sup>st</sup> May, 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to bring to your notice a question regarding the 1st Line Transport of an Infantry Battalion serving with the Salonica Army. On the introduction of the Special Establishment for the Salonica Force "3", the number of the 1st Line Transport animals with an Infantry Battalion was increased from 52 to 102. With this large increase of animals there has been no corresponding increase in the battalion transport staff which still remains at one officer and one sergeant. It is submitted that the present battalion transport staff is insufficient either to supervise the animals in the lines or ensure strict march discipline when on the move, and therefore it is recommended that the addition of one transport sergeant per battalion be authorised.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell M.C.  
C.C.S. for General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :- A.  
Q.





App AD

1/436  
SECRET

General Officer Commanding,  
Western Frontier Force.

In view of the effective occupation of MOGHARA which has now been carried out, the Commander-in-Chief wishes you to consider how far it may be possible, and advisable, to transfer some part <sup>or the whole</sup> of the troops at present in garrison at WADI NATRUN, to MOGHARA in order further to strengthen that post.

With MOGHARA occupied, the role of WADI NATRUN is automatically modified, and the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the advantage to be gained from a stronger post at MOGHARA would fully justify a proportionate reduction in <sup>or complete withdrawal of</sup> the garrison of WADI NATRUN. Will you kindly forward your views for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief as early as possible.


(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
31/5/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



Opp AE



1/437

General Officer Commanding,  
No. 3 Section.

As the result of the comparative trials between  
pedrails and sandtyres carried out QANTIARA on the 27th instant,  
it has been decided that, in view of the obvious superiority  
of the former in deep drift sand, pedrails will as far as  
possible, be provided for guns and heavy vehicles employed  
in the ROMANI - QATIA District, where the condition of the  
sand is particularly bad.

Apart from this area, however, in districts where  
more normal sand conditions prevail it is not considered that  
the pedrail offers sufficient advantages to justify its  
general substitution for sandtyres, and the latter will  
therefore, be retained.

As regards the QATIA district, your demand for  
pedrails should be forwarded in detail as early as possible,  
but in view of the far greater cost of pedrails, and of the  
considerable time which their construction will involve,  
it is very important that your demand should be reduced  
to the minimum of essential requirements, and <sup>that</sup> no vehicle  
which is not absolutely indispensable should be included,  
pack transport for the carriage of ammunition, stores, etc.,  
being substituted wherever possible.

(Sgd) A. Hynden Bell

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
30/5/16.

Copies to :-

H.G.R.A.  
Q.







DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report.				R.F.C. Report.				Remarks.
	MEN.	GUNS.	TANKS.	DATE.	MEN.	GUNS.	TANKS.	DATE.	
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>									
ADVANCED TROOPS.	SALMANA.	-	-	-	- small post -	-	-	15/3	Scaplane report.
	BIR EL MAZAR.	1300	5	-	12/3	600	-	6/3	
	EL ARISH.	2000	17	115	7/3	78	additional	7/3	
	BIR EL MELHI.	--- no post ---		8/3	- small post -	5	-	15/3	
	BIR EL MAGEIBRA.				--- post ---			10/3	
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>									
ADVANCED TROOPS.	MAGHARA.	50	-	24	10/3	- large post -	18	12/3	No aeroplanes.
	RODH SALEM.	-	-	9	10/3	70	-	10	
	EL HALLA.	- post	-	13	10/3	300	-	24	
	HASSANA.	90	-	100	9/3	500	1 A.A.	100	
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>									
ADVANCED TROOPS.	BIR EL GIDDI.	-	-	-	-	- small post -	-	7/3	} - Phone Connection.
	SUDR EL MEITAN.	-	-	-	-	do.	4	15/3	
	AIN SUDR.	-	-	-	-	do.	8	15/3	
	MEKHL.	350	3	50	5/3	-	-	-	
	BIR EL TAWAL.	-	-	-	-	- small post -	-	15/3	
BASE TROOPS.	KOSSAIMA.	50	-	25	11/3				
	AUJA.	3500	4	-	27/5				
	BIR SABA.	6500	11	900	2/3				
	RAFA.	1000	4	100	1/3				
	ZUWEID.	100	-	30	2/3				

bst



DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI & SOUTHERN SYRIA.

Locality.	Agents Report.				R.F.C. Report.				Remarks.
	MEN.	GUNS.	TENTS.	DATE.	MEN.	GUNS.	TENTS.	DATE.	
<u>NORTHERN ROAD.</u>									
SALMANA.	-	-	-	-	- small post -	-	-	15/6	Scaplane report.
BIR EL MAZAR.	1300	5	-	12/6	600	-	25	6/6	
EL ARISH.	2000	17	115	7/6	78	additional	-	7/6	
BIR EL MELHI.	---	no post	---	8/6	- small post -	-	5	15/6	
BIR EL MAGELBRA.					--- post ---			10/6	
<u>CENTRAL ROAD.</u>									
MAGHARA.	50	-	24	10/6	- large post -	-	18	12/6	No aeroplanes.
RODH SALEM.	-	-	9	10/6	70	-	10	12/6	
EL HAIFA.	-	post	18	10/6	600	-	24	13/5	
HASSANA.	90	-	100	9/6	500	1 A.A.	100	31/5	
<u>SOUTHERN ROAD.</u>									
BIR EL GIDDI.	-	-	-	-	- small post -	-	-	7/6	} - Phone Connection.
SUDR EL HEITAN.	-	-	-	-	do.	-	4	15/6	
AIN SUDR.	-	-	-	-	do.	-	8	15/6	
NEKHL.	350	3	50	5/6	-	-	-	-	
BIR EL TAWAL.	-	-	-	-	- small post -	-	-	15/6	
<u>BASE TROOPS</u>									
KOSSAIMA.	50	-	25	11/6					
AUJA.	3500	4	-	27/5					
BIR SABA.	6500	11	900	2/6					
RAFA.	1000	4	100	1/6					
ZUWEID.	100	-	30	2/6					



MEMORANDUM REGARDING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF ISKANDERUN.  
-----

1. Fifteen months ago, before the inception of the Dardanelles Expedition, operations in the neighbourhood of ALEXANDRETTA appeared to offer favourable prospects. At that time there were no considerable Turkish forces south or east of ALEXANDRETTA, and to have seized the railway north of the Gulf of ISKANDERUN would have meant cutting off MESOPOTAMIA and PALESTINE from the remainder of the Turkish Empire. MESOPOTAMIA would have been placed more or less at the mercy of a sufficient expeditionary force despatched from INDIA, and the defence of EGYPT would have been secured, since it would have been made impossible to move a large Turkish force southward, and to maintain it for operations in SINAI.

It has always been realised that a considerable force would be necessary in order to carry the operations in the Gulf of ISKANDERUN to a successful conclusion. Possibly it was anticipated that the Dardanelles operations would make a less heavy call on our resources. In any case, the former plan was given up in favour of the latter.

2. Just six months ago, when it became clear that the Dardanelles operations had failed, the proposal to undertake operations in the neighbourhood of ALEXANDRETTA was again revived. The scheme was very closely gone into by Sir Charles Monro on the occasion of his first visit to EGYPT in the early days of November, 1915. The project has a close relation with that of the defence of EGYPT, and in considering the scheme Sir Charles Monro had the advantage of the advice and knowledge of officers in the Egyptian War Office who were thoroughly conversant with its every aspect.

/ Sir John



*App. to War Diary*

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM REGARDING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF ISKANDERUN.  
-----

1. Fifteen months ago, before the inception of the Dardanelles

**SECRET**

APPENDIX AZ.

Operations in the Gulf of ISKANDERUN.

Appreciation by the General Staff, General Headquarters,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

*Alfred Bell*

G.H.Q.,  
E.E.F.,

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

revived. The ~~project~~<sup>scheme</sup> was very closely gone into by Sir Charles  
Monro on the occasion of his first visit to EGYPT in the early  
days of November, 1915. The project has a close relation with  
that of the defence of EGYPT, and in considering the scheme Sir  
Charles Monro had the advantage of the advice and knowledge of  
officers in the Egyptian War Office who were thoroughly  
conversant with <sup>its</sup> every aspect ~~of the scheme.~~

/Sir John

*W.F.M.*



Sir John Maxwell and the High Commissioner were both, at that time, in favour of undertaking the ISKANDERUN operation as a set-off to the proposed evacuation of the GALLIPOLI Peninsula. It was pointed out with great force that, if a landing could be effected in the Gulf of ISKANDERUN by a force of sufficient size to ensure the seizure of the railway about MISSIS, thereby severing the communications connecting the Turkish Armies in the north with MESOPOTAMIA and EGYPT, not only would the moral effect of the evacuation of the GALLIPOLI Peninsula be to a great extent counteracted, but ~~that~~ the Turkish forces in MESOPOTAMIA could not be reinforced and could with difficulty be maintained, while the despatch of a serious force for the invasion of EGYPT would become wholly out of the question.

After much consideration, the proposal eventually fell through :-

(a) To begin with, it was found that 8 complete divisions, specially equipped, would be required if the operations were to have reasonable prospects of success. This estimate, moreover agreed exactly with an appreciation prepared about the same time by the General Staff at the War Office. And although at first sight there might have seemed some economy in the use of 8 Divisions at MISSIS instead of 13 divisions at the Dardanelles the circumstances were such that new troops would have had to be provided for the ISKANDERUN operations, since the Dardanelles Army, at that time, was practically hors de combat as far as its power to undertake any fresh enterprise was concerned, while the effective strength of the whole of its 13 divisions did not amount to that of 8 complete divisions.

(b) Secondly, an even more insuperable bar to the project was the fact that the commitments of the Navy in the maintenance of

/the



2.

1/3

the Dardanelles Army were such as absolutely to preclude the undertaking of further landing operations at any other point in the Levant.

(c) Thirdly, the French placed an absolute veto on British operations in a region which they held to be within their own sphere of influence.

3. It is understood that at the present time there is a tendency in some quarters to revive the ISKANDERUN project.

Taking the objections which were raised at its last revival in the reverse order :-

(a) It does not seem likely that the opposition of the French will be less decided at the present time than it was last November, when circumstances had so shaped themselves that the fate of the Allied operations in the Levant were exercising an influence out of all proportion to their importance on the course of the general campaign.

(b) The Navy has now the most complete knowledge of what is involved in maintaining a large military force based on an open beach. Though the Naval commitments in the Dardanelles are now closed, it is understood that much small craft, etc., has been despatched from the Levant to the Persian Gulf, reducing the Naval capacity in these waters. The matter is one for the Navy to decide, but it is probable that much previous preparation and collection of material would be necessary before the Navy were in a position to undertake the vital services which an army operating in the Gulf of ISKANDERUN would require of it. Some months delay might well be involved, and even then the increased activity of enemy submarines in the Levant makes the problem far less inviting than that with which the Navy was faced in April 1915.

/ (c)



(c) No new factors have arisen which appear to make it necessary to modify the estimate of the number of troops required for the projected operations. Eight Divisions, however, are not available in the Levant.

There are 5 Divisions in the SALONICA Army, which at present it appears impossible to make available for operations elsewhere. In EGYPT, apart from some 85,000 troops of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, 11th and 42nd Divisions, Composite.T.F. Brigade, and certain Indian units, all preparing for or awaiting embarkation to other theatres, there are about 150,000 troops, composed as follows:-

- (a) Troops available for active operations -
  - 52nd, 53rd, 54th Divisions, Australian Light Horse, Yeomanry, Indian troops, West Indian troops, Camel Corps, R.F.C. and Armoured Cars, etc. .. .. . 90,000.
- (b) Garrison battalions (not fit for active operations in the field). .. .. . 10,000.
- (c) Australians under training, Base Depots, Administrative Services of L. of C. etc., Camel Transport Corps, Egyptian Labour Corps, Hospitals and various. 50,000.

None of the troops under (b) and (c) are available for active operations in the field. Those under (a) do not amount to more than 50,000 rifles, including Light Horse and Yeomanry.

Three divisions, with the mounted troops actually available, may be taken as the minimum necessary for the defence of EGYPT from the east. It would be necessary to retain these divisions in EGYPT until any operations further afield had been brought to so successful a conclusion as practically to eliminate all chance of danger from this quarter. The necessary force for a landing in the Gulf of ISKANDERUN could not, therefore, be obtained in the Levant

/ except

cf. p. 6 X



except by diverting troops at present in EGYPT which are destined for other theatres, and by withdrawing the greater part of our force from MACEDONIA in order to make up the numbers required for the enterprise. This course would seem to be open to grave objection in view of the doubtful value of the operations suggested - far from any vital or decisive point. Additional cogency seems to be lent to this objection at the present time, since, from the point of view of the defence of EGYPT, the situation has been profoundly modified during the last six months.

4. Six months ago little or no preparation had been made to meet any attack on EGYPT from the east; our Mesopotamian Force was making its way slowly towards BAGHDAD; and practically the whole Turkish Army was engaged, either on the GALLIPOLI Peninsula or making head against the Russians in the CAUSASUS. If it had been practicable at that time to strangle the Turkish communications with the east and <sup>the</sup> south by seizing the BAGHDAD railway about MISSIS, it would have become practically impossible for the Turks either to reinforce their opposition to our MESOPOTAMIAN advance or to make any serious threat whatever against EGYPT.

The situation to-day is very different. The Turks have done their worst in MESOPOTAMIA. The supply of ammunition and war-like stores to their troops in that theatre might be made more difficult if they should lose the railway at the head of the Gulf of ISKANDERUM, but this could only be brought about by the employment of a force - exerting indirect pressure only - several times as great as the whole of our forces now operating in MESOPOTAMIA. Moreover, the Turkish forces in MESOPOTAMIA are by no means solely dependent on the ALEXANDRETTA

/ section



section of the BAGHDAD railway for their supplies. Ammunition is now, or soon will be, forthcoming from factories at DIARBEEKIR and KHARPUT, whence it will reach the army by river (during the flood season) or by road and the eastern portion of the BAGHDAD railway.

As regards the eastern defences of EGYPT, our arrangements are now almost completed. We hold, or shall very shortly hold, every point at which any but an inconsiderable force can obtain water within striking distance of the Canal. From the MEDITERRANEAN to the Gulf of SUEZ the enemy advancing against EGYPT must deploy his troops for an attack with a waterless region, extending over several marches, at his back. It is not impossible that the attempt might be made; but unless the enemy could push his attack to a successful conclusion within a day or two of gaining contact with our troops, it would be practically impossible for him to keep them deployed in the desert so as to maintain his attack. The amount of water transport required would be enormous, besides being very vulnerable if he should ever succeed in effecting the disposition of his troops on a wide front. Our dispositions, now approaching completion, should preclude, so far as is humanly possible, all risk of an enemy pushing through a successful attack on a wide front in one rush. It is, therefore, no longer so vital as it appeared to be in November 1915 to strangle in Northern SYRIA any attempt which the enemy may contemplate making.

Moreover, as has been pointed out, the force required to strangle such an attempt has been placed at 8 Divisions. But certainly, in view of the new arrangements for the defence of EGYPT from the east, less than 8 Divisions would be necessary, in any circumstances whatever, to make that defence impregnable

/within

at what price?  
p. 4.  
x.



within EGYPT itself, and in a much less difficult and less hazardous way.

5. If the ISKANDERUM enterprise should be completely successful, it might, it is true, have the effect of reducing the pressure on the Russians advancing from the CAUCASUS. Our invading force might attract against itself an equal number of the enemy at all events. But the German military advisers of Turkey would be well aware - none better - that our force, once established at MISSIS and holding the great forty-mile perimeter necessary to make that position good, would have reached the limit of its powers. To expect them, therefore, to counsel leaving only a containing force before us, while continuing to devote all energies to the campaign against the Russians, is only to give them credit for being likely to act on sound military principles.

If the undertaking were not fully successful, it might temporarily have the effect of reducing the pressure on the Russians to an equal extent. But this would be at the great cost of imperilling the very existence of our invading force in the same way as the existence of the Dardanelles' Army was imperilled. Failing a successful rush, penetrating 25 miles inland to MISSIS, this danger would be instant.

As regards the communications of the Turkish Army opposing the Russians, our seizure of the BAGHDAD railway at MISSIS would have no effect. The Turks main line of defence is now drawn back to KONIA, and their communications run by way of the ANGORA line, to feed which rolling stock has been withdrawn from the BAGHDAD railway.

Finally, and in view more especially of certain measures which have been recently taken in CYPRUS and else-  
/where



where, the enemy is not likely to be taken wholly by surprise. Experience of the landings at CAPE HELLES, ANZAC, and SUVLA BAY in April and August 1915, lends no encouragement to a proposal to undertake a similar operation elsewhere, without the advantage of complete surprise, unless (as in this case is impossible) it could be carried out so near to, and so directly in conjunction with, the Russian operations, as to make the military advantages commensurate with the risks.

6. In view of these circumstances, it would appear that a revival of the ALEXANDRETTA - MISSIS project, while open to all the objections which were raised against it at its previous emergence, has no longer even such advantages to be urged for it as at that time it had. It would seem likely, on the other hand, to lead to a highly objectionable dispersion of our military resources, with little or no prospect of military advantage to be gained.

"O".  
3/5/16.

*J. Downey*

Lt.-Colonel,  
G.S.