


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/22/42

**Title:** 5th Infantry Battalion

August 1918



AWM4-23/22/42

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ORIGINAL.  
DUPLICATE.  
TRIPLICATE.

29

EX 114

**Australian Imperial Force.**

**WAR DIARY**

OF

5TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION



FOR

AUGUST 1918.

Signature of Officer compiling

*Stanford Lewis*

Signature of Officer Commanding

*Dalmeida Leut Col*

5th Battalion A.I.F.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

60

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
FRANCE Sheets 27 & 36A W.17.D.S.8.	1918 Aug. 1		Battalion in Support position on MOOLENACKER - STRAZELLE Sector. Lieuts J.W. MAUNSELL and F.W. CORLETT returned from XV Corps Bombing School. Lieut. R. KOPKE rejoined Battalion from General List (Invalided). Copy of letter written by General Sir. W.R. BIRDWOOD to G.O.C. 1st Aust Div. after his visit to 5th Bn. Camp at RACQUINGHEM attached.	No. 1
		2	Battalion in Support. Major T. HASTIE MC returned from Paris leave. Fighting Strength of Battalion on this date - 27 Officers, 678 O.R. On night of 2/3rd instant Bn. was relieved from the Support position in the MOOLENACKER - STRAZELLE Sector by 2nd Battalion HAMPSHIRE Regiment and marched to Camp at LA KREULE where it arrived at 1 a.m. Operation Order No. 27 attached.	No. 2
		3	Battalion moved by march route to billets at LYNDE. Starting from LA KREULE at 9.30 p.m. and arriving in billets at LYNDE at 2.30 a.m. on the 4th instant. Operation Order No 28 Lieut-Col. D. A. LUKTON CMG, DSO returned from 2nd A.I. Brigade.	No. 3
		4	Battalion at LYNDE. Church Parade. Commeration Day. Lieut. G.L. MAKIN resumed duty from Supernumary List. Lieut. A.M. GILLIES returned from PARIS leave. Copy of letter from Lt-General DE LISLE to G.O.C. 1st Aust. Div. on Division leaving XV Corps attached.	No. 4
		5	Battalion at LYNDE. Holiday and cleaning up.	
HAZEBROUCK & AMIENS 1 : 100,000.		6	Battalion moved by march route to ST. OMER and entrained for LONGPRE at 11.30 a.m. Bn. was on the train from 11.30 a.m. to 8.30 p.m. same evening. After detraining Bn. proceeded by march route to billets at BETHENCOURT, arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on 7th instant. Operation Order No. 29 attached.	

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~~OF~~  
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required.)

29

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
FRANCE Amiens 1 : 100,000	1918 Aug 7		Battalion at BETTENCOURT. The day was spent resting. In the evening Bn moved to ST. OUVEN where they embussed at 10 p.m. being in the busses until 2.30 a.m. next morning. Bn de-bussed at FORT CAMON and moved by march route to billets at CAMON, arriving there about 3 a.m. Operation Order No. 30 attached.	No. 6
		8	The Battalion (less Nucleus which remained at CAMON) moved by march route to AUBIGNY, arriving there at 8 p.m. Operation Order No. 30A attached.	No. 7
HARBONNIERS		9	The Battalion moved by march route to BAYONVILLERS and at 2 p.m. moved forward in Support of the 7th A.I. Battalion to attack and capture the RED line. A line running from approx. X10 Central to Railway at F.5.C.33. 8th A.I. Battalion were on the right of the 7th Battalion, and the 6th A.I. Battalion were in support to the 8th Battalion? Tanks assisted in the attack but lost direction, and at 4.45 p.m. were knocked out by fire of enemy artillery. 7th and 8th Battalions captured the RED LINE but heavy casualties were caused by the M.C. fire. On the left of the 7th Battalion the 2nd. A.I. Division failed to get forward and "D" Company 5th Battalion (Capt. H. BURKE MC) moved forward and established a position to protect the left flank of the 2nd A.I. brigade. (Memo E.R.100 attached) Strength of Battalion on going into the attack - 27 Officers 593 O.R. Casualties were :- Lieut. J.W. MAUNSELL, 2/Lt. J. COLVIN MM and 9 O.R. Killed in Action. Lieuts. H.F. MORRISON MC, N.S. MADDOX MC & Bar, C.C. HANSON MC, H.H. BARBER MC, H.L. SIMPSON, F.W. CORLETT and 62 O.R. Wounded. Fighting strength of Bn on this date 30 Officers 696 O.R.	No. 8
		10	The 5th & 6th Battalions moved at 8 a.m. to attack and capture BLUE LINE - S26.D.83 - A9.C.27. 5th Battalion (Lieut-Col. D.A. LUXTON CMG, DSO.) was on the left, 6th Bn. on the right, 8th Bn. in Support and 7th Bn. in Reserve. 3rd. A.I. Brigade on the left of 2nd A.I. Brigade and 2nd Canadian Division on the right.	2

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~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required.)

29

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
France HARBONNIERS Sheet	1918 Aug. 10		<p>5th Battalion were disposed for the attack as follows:- "A" Company (Major T. HASTIE MC) on the Right. "B" Company (Capt. S. RICKETSON DOM) on the left "C" Company (Lieut. M.E. THOMPSON) in Support, with "D" Company (Capt. H. BURKE MC) in Reserve. Operation Order NO 31 attached. No Tanks were available for this attack but a creeping barrage was put down (as per memo AZB 196 attached). Companies moved off in lines of sections in Single File at 8 a.m. and proceeded to attack under heavy M.G. fire. NARRATIVE of Operations of the Battalion in the attack on 9th &amp; 10th August by C.O. and Report by R.M.O. attached, also original messages received during the operations and copies of those sent out from Battalion. Strength of Battalion on going into the attack 10 August 1918 - 19 Officers &amp; 522 O.R. Casualties were - 20 O.R. Killed in Action. Lieut. H.C. MORRISON &amp; 1 O.R. Missing, Lieuts. A. TAVENER, A. J. ROBINSON &amp; 78 O.R. wounded. The Nucleus Battalion moved by march route from CAMON to BLANGY TRONVILLE. Lieut. D. ROBERTSON returned from XV Corps Rest Camp.</p>	No. 9 No.10 No.11
	11		<p>8th Battalion and one Company of 7th Bn moved through our lines and captured the BLUE LINE - A.9.C.28 - S.26.D.83 (See AZB 209 attached). During the afternoon TWO Companies of the 5th Battalion relieved TWO Companies of the 8th Bn in front line. Operation Order No. 32 herewith. Casualties were :- Lt. P. J. O'FARRELL &amp; 3 O.R. Killed in Action, 19 O.R. Wounded and 2 O.R. Wounded and remained on duty. On night of 11/12th inst the 5th Battalion were relieved by 3rd. Australian Battalion and moved to Divisional Reserve at X28B. Operation Order No. 33 attached. Honours and awards as per attached list.</p>	No.12 No.13 No.14 No.15
	12		<p>Battalion in Divisional Reserve at W28B. Casualties 3 O.R. wounded.</p>	
			<p>do. do. do. do. Lieut. H.F. MORRISON MC &amp; 9 O.R. previously</p>	
	13		<p>reported Wounded now reported Died of Wounds.</p>	

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WAR DIARY

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
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or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

29

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
FRANCE CARBONNIERS Sheet	1918			
	AUG			
	14		Battalion at Divisional Reserve at X.28.b. List of Casualties during Operations 9.10.11 & 12th instant attached.	No. 16
	15		Battalion relieved by 2 Battalions American 132nd Regiment and proceeded by march route to CERISY, arriving there at about 9 p.m. Operation Order No. 34 attached. The Nucleus moved by march route from BLANGY TRONVILLE at about 2 p.m. and joined Battalion on arrival at CERISY. Capt. E.G.de T. PERLEZEL returned from U.K. Leave. Lt. J.A. ANDERSON returned from 2nd Army Rest Camp. Lt. F.L. LANGFORD returned from 2nd Army S.O.S. School. Lts. R.G. SAMSON & J.W. JONES taken on strength from Seconded list (Attached). (Invalided).	NLO; 17
	16		Battalion resting at CERISY. Morning spent in re-organising. Bathing in the Canal during the afternoon. Fighting strength of Bn 33 Officer & 601 O.R.	
	17		do. do. do. do.	
	18		Battalion moved by march route to HAMELET, leaving at 8.30 a.m. and arriving at HAMELET about 9.30 a.m. Operation Order 35. Tents and Shelters were erected in Sq O.6.D.1.6.	No. 18
	19		Battalion resting at HAMELET.	
	20		do. do. do. Battalion paraded at 8.30 a.m. and witnessed a demonstration given by the Tanks near HAMEL. Lt. W.T. MEIKLE returned from LIAISON FORCE (with American Unit).	
	21		Nucleus moved by march route to CORBIE at 3 p.m. Lt. IMRAY returned from 2 Army Musketry School. Lt. HARRIS returned from Sick List. Lt. W. J. ELLISON returned from 2 Army Schl. Nominal Roll of Nucleus attached. On the night of 21/22nd Bn moved by march route to Support area of 14th A.I. Bde. Leaving HAMELET at 8 p.m. & arriving in Support Trench at R 19 D at about 11.30 p.m. "A" & "B" Coys 5th Bn relieved "D" Coy 53rd Bn. "C" & "D" Coys 5th Bn relieved "C" Coy. 53rd Bn. Operation Order No. 36 attached.	No. 19
			No. 20	

WAR DIARY

Army Form G. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

29

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
FRANCE HARBONNIERS Sheet	1918			
	Aug.			
	22		Battalion in Support position. 7th Battalion on the right and 4th Battalion 1st A.I. Bde on the left. Casualties 2 O.R. Killed & 6 O.R. wounded.	
	23		At 2 a.m. Battalion moved into Assembly Position on tape to attack GREEN LINE. "B" Coy. (Capt. PERMEZEL) on right. "C" Coy. (Capt. ANGEL) on left. "A" Coy. (Capt. O'SULLIVAN) Support Right. "D" Coy. (Capt. I. BURKE MC) Support Left. 7th Battalion were in Support. 5th Battalion were on the right with 8th Bn. in support. 1st A.I. Bde were on the left. Operation Order No. 37 & Battle Instructions No. 1 attached. Attack commenced at 4.45 a.m. and Bn moved forward under cover of artillery barrage. Six tanks took part in the advance on the Battalion sector. On reaching ST. MARTIN WOODS the 2 Support Companies were pushed forward into the front line to assist in the mopping up and clearing of the wood. Bn reached final objective on schedule time. Maps shewing our line before & after attack attached. Approximate number of prisoners accounted for by the Battalion 450. Original messages received from Companies on reaching final objective attached. Fighting Strength of Battalion on going into attack 25 Officers & 503 O.R. Casualties were - Capt. H. BURKE MC Killed in Action. Capt. B.M. O'SULLIVAN Died of Wounds. 21 O.R. Killed in Action. 2/Lt S.E. FLEMING Wounded, Lt. D. ROBERTSON Wounded (Gas). Lt. A.M. GILLIES Wounded (Gas), Lt. D.B. HARRIS <sup>Wounded</sup> Missing. 76 O.R. Wounded, 5 O.R. Wounded (Gas) and 5 O.R. Missing. Report on Operations carried out by Bn. by Lt-Col D.A. LUXTON CMG DSO attached. List of Honours and Awards attached. Lts. W.T. MEIKLE & M.E. THOMPSON to Aust. Corps Infantry School. Lt BOOTH Wounded and remained on duty. Fighting Strength, of Bn 25 Officers & 503 O.R.	No. 21 No. 22 No. 23
	24		Battalion in front line. Casualties were 4 O.R. Wounded and 4 O.R. Wounded (Gas) Lt. C. CAMERON evacuated to Hospital.	No. 24
25		7th Bn. relieved 5th Bn in front line. Operation Order No. 38. Battalion subjected to Gas Shell (Mustard) Bombardment. Casualties were 2 O.R. Killed, Lt. G.L. MAKIN & 13 O.R. Wounded, Capt. W.K. FLOOK & 24 O.Rs Wounded (Gas). Capt FLOOK relieved by Capt. O.J. ELLIS.	No. 25	

21

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or  
**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.**

(Erase heading not required.)

29

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
FRANCE HARBONNIERS Sheet	1918 Aug 26		Battalion in Support. Casualties were - Lieuts J.W. JONES & R. KOEKE & 13 O.Rs Wounded (Gas). On night of 26/27th instant Bn was relieved in Support by 31st Battalion. Relief was completed by 11.55 p.m. and Bn proceeded by Bus to HAMEL, thence be march route to P.14.D where bivouacs were erected. Nucleus Company rejoined Bn on arrival at this location. Operation Order No. 39 attached. Lt. W.F. TURNER rejoined from Hospital. 2/Lt. T.A. ROBERTSON taken on strength from General Infantry Reinforcements.	No. 26
		27	Battalion resting at P.14.D. Lt. S.V. KIRWOOD MM accidentally wounded.	
		28	do. do. do. Lt. W.R. VOLUM proceeded to G.H.Q. I.G. School.	
		29	do. do. do. Lt. J.A. ANDERSON to 4th Army Infantry School. Lt. A.F. BECHERVAISE to 1st Training Brigade.	
		30	do. do. do. Lt-Col. D.A. LUMTON CMG DSO., Capt. S. RICKETSON DCM, Lt. N.W. CUZENS & Lt. W.J. ELLISON proceeded on leave to U.K. Training as per Syllabus attached.	No. 27
		31	do. do. do. Fighting Strength of Bn. 22 Officers & 407 O.Rs. do. do. do.	No. 28 No. 29

9

# WAR DIARY *Appendix*

OF

5TH. INFANTRY BATTALION - AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES.

FOR

August

1918.

## LIST OF APPENDICES.

No.	Subject.
1	Copy of Genl. Sir. W.R. Birdwood's letter.
2	Operation Order No. 27
3	" " " 28
4	Copy of letter from Lt-Genl De Lisle.
5	Operation Order No. 29
6	" " " 30
7	" " " 30A
8	Copy of Memo E.R.100
9	Operation Order No. 31
10	Copy of AZB 196
11	Copy of original messages to & from Battalion.
12	together with C.Os Narrative of Operations.
12	Copy AZB 209.
13	Operation Order No. 32
14	" " " 33
15	Honours and awards list.
16	List of Casualties.
17	Operation Order No. 34
18	" " " 35
19	Nominal Roll of Nucleus.
20	Operation Order No. 36
21	" " " 37 & Battle Instructions No.1.
22	Maps shewing line before and after attacks.
23	Messages from Coys. on reaching final objectives.
24	Report on Operations by C.O.
25	Operation Order No. 38
26	" " " 39
27	Training Syllabus.
28	Divl & Bde Intelligence summaries.
29	Summary of weather reports.

Appendix

18

Copy 29

22/7/18.

My dear Luxton,

I am indeed pleased to be able to pass on a note like the enclosed. It was splendid to notice the smart turn out and fit appearance of the men on Sunday and this, I am sure, is brought about only by the care and interest of the officers in their men. It all adds so much to the fighting and lasting spirit of the men. I will run down to see you tomorrow, arriving at 10 a.m.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) T.W. GLASGOW.

Copy.

Headquarters,  
A. I. F.

My dear Glasgow,

In case you care to pass it on, I should like to tell you how extremely pleased I was with the 5th Battalion camp, which I saw after Church parade. I thought the whole Brigade was looking extremely well, smartly turned out and evidently full of spirit. It was a real pleasure to see what was apparently such a well run camp, both as regards the men and the arrangements connected with the camp - as Luxton had for his Battalion.

Yours ever,

(sgd) W.R. BIRDWOOD.

SECRET.

Copy No .....

5TH A.I. BATTALION  
OPERATION ORDER NO. 27.

Reference Sheets 27 SE &amp; 36A NE.

- RELIEF. 1. (a) On night 2/3rd August the 2nd A.I. Bde will be relieved by the 88th I. Bde and one Bn of the 86th Inf. Bde.  
(b) 5th A.I. Bn will be relieved by the 2nd Bn Hampshire Regt.
- MAPS &c. 2. (a) All maps, plans of works, aerial photos, defence schemes will be handed over.  
(b) S.O.S. Signals, ammunition, area and trench stores will be handed over & receipts obtained.
- GUIDES. 3. Company Commanders will supply one guide per platoon for incoming Companies. One guide from Bn Hqrs will meet Hqrs of incoming Bn at X roads at W16.D.1.4 at 9 p.m. Guides from "A" & "B" Coys will meet incoming Companies at X roads at W16.D.1.4 at 9 p.m. Guides from "C" & "D" Coys will meet incoming Coys at X roads at W16.S/20.95 at 9 p.m. At least one guide per Company 1/2 Bn Hampshire Regt should proceed with our guides to X roads.
- COMPLETION OF RELIEF. 4. Completion of relief will be notified to Bn Hqrs by sending the code word ABDULLA.
- MOVE. 5. On completion of relief 5 Bn will move to Camp at V.15.B.8.8.
- DISTANCES. 6. The following distances will be maintained on the march :- 100 yards between platoons.
- ROUTE. 7. "A" & "B" Coys will move to V.15.B.8.3 via W16.D.1.4  
"C" & "D" " " " " " " " " " ROUGE CROIX.
- LEWIS GUNS BLANKETS? 8. One limber per Company will report at the following places to convey L.G. & Blankets:-  
"A" Coy. limber to "A" Coy Hqrs W.24.D.0.6  
"B" " " " "B" " " W.24.A.4.7  
"C" " " " "C" " at W.18.B.6.3  
"D" " " " House at W.18.D.0.2  
One limber and Mess Cart will report to Bn Hqrs -  
Maltese cart will report to R.A.P. W.24.A.4.7.

ACKNOWLEDGE.(Sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

Copy No.	To whom	Method.	Time
1	"A" Coy.	D.R.	4.15 p.m.
2	"B" "	"	"
3	"C" "	"	"
4	"D" "	"	"
5	2nd Hants	"	"
6	Q.M.	"	"
7	File		
8-10	War Diary		

SECRET.

Appendix

Copy No. ....

10

BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No. 28.

Reference Sheets

27 S.E. - 36A N.E. - 36A N.W.

3/8/18.

MOVE.

1. (a) On night 3/4th August the 2nd A.I. Bde. group will move to BLARINGHAM area and on arrival will be concentrated in G.H.Q. Reserve ready for an early train movement.
- (b) 5th Bn. will move to billets near LYNDSE.

STARTING POINT.

2. Head of column will pass entrance to camp - V.15.B.8.3. - at 8.45 p.m.

ROUTE.

3. V.20.D.6.3. - V.24.C.2.9. - WALLER Cappel - C.I. central.

ORDER OF MARCH.

4. H.Q. Sigs., Intelligence; Band; "D"; "O"; "B"; "A" Coys., Headquarters Details (Lieut. SIMPSON); Water details, Police, Transport.

DISTANCES.

5. The following distances will be maintained on the march - Between Battalions 500 yards.  
" Companies 100 "  
" Bn. & Transport 100 "

HALTS.

6. There will be halts of 10 minutes, at 10 minutes to each clock hour.

DRESS.

7. Fighting order; greatcoat rolled and carried on top of haversack; mess tin & steel helmet to be carried on straps of haversacks, helmets on top.

COOKERS.

8. Company cooks will move in rear of respective Coys.

LEWIS GUNNERS.

9. Coy. L.Gs. will be carried on Coy. limbers. A.A. gun will be carried on company cooker.

VALISES, COY.

10. & REGTL. RECORDS. Will be stacked on parade ground by 6 p.m.

CERTIFICATES & STATES.

11. Certificates of cleanliness and marching out states to be forwarded by Company Commanders and Specialist Officers to Bn. Hdqtrs. by 8.15 p.m.

COMPLETION OF MOVE.

12. Coys., etc., will report to Battalion Headquarters when settled in billets.

REPORTS.

13. To head of column.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sgd) A.O. RIGG, Lieut. Adjt.

Copy No.	To whom.	Method.
1	Filo	
2 - 4	War Diary	
5	Brigade	Runner
6	O.C. "A" Coy.	"
7	" "B" "	"
8	" "C" "	"
9	" "D" "	"
10	Sig. Off.	"
11	Q.M.	"
12	T.O.	"
13	Intell. Off.	"
14	R.M.O.	"
15	R.S.M.	"

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
15/8/18.

The following is a letter received from the Corps Commander XV Corps, the contents of which the Divisional Commander wishes to be conveyed to the troops at the earliest opportunity.

In addition to this letter, the Army Commander 2nd Army wishes that the troops should be made aware of his appreciation of the work done by the Division during its tour in the STRAZENEL Sector and that the men should be told how sorry all ranks of the 2nd Army are to lose them.

:-:-:-:-

Major-General T.W. GLASGOW, CB. CME. DSO.  
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

"Before your magnificent Division leaves my Corps, I wish to thank you and all ranks under your command for the exceptional services rendered during the past four months.

Joining this Corps on April 12th during the Battle of the LYS, the Division selected and prepared a position to defend the HAZEBROUCK Front, and a few days later repulsed two heavy attacks with severe losses to the enemy. This action brought the enemy's advance to a standstill.

Since then, the Division has held the most important sector of this front continuously, and by skilful raiding and minor operations has advanced the line over a mile on a front of 5,000 yards, capturing just short of 1,000 prisoners, and causing such damage to the troops of the enemy that nine divisions have been replaced.

The complete success of all minor operations, the skill displayed by the patrols by day as well as by night; the gallantry and determination of the troops; and their high state of training and discipline have excited the admiration and emulation of all, and I desire that you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their fine work and my regret that the Division is leaving my Command."

(sgd) Beauvois de Lisle.

Lieutenant-General.  
Commanding XV Corps.

XV Corps Headquarters.  
4th August, 1918.

SECRET

Appendix

5 Copy No. 2  
12

5th AUST. INFANTRY  
BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 29.

5/8/19.

Reference Sheets HAZEBROUCK & AMIENS 1.100.000.

MOVE.

1. 2nd. A. I. Bde Group will be transferred by Rail from 2nd Army to the 4th Army on the 6th instant. 5th Battalion will move in accordance with the attached time table.

LOADING & UNLOADING PARTIES.

2. (a) "A" Company with Cooker and Team will act as Loading party at St. OMER. This party will report to the R.T.O. at St. OMER Station at 3.53 a.m. on 6th instant and will travel by train No. 34.  
(b) "C" Company with Cooker & Team will act as unloading party at LONGPRE and will travel by train No 31.  
(c) O.C. of "A" and "C" Companies will report to the R.T.Os. at their respective Stations as early as possible in order to obtain full information as to their duties. They will arrange with the Area Commandants concerned for their parties to be billeted as near as possible to the Railway Stations at which they will be required to work.

BILLETING PARTY.

3. A billeting party with bicycles consisting of Lieut. R.A. CUFF and 1 N.C.O. per Company and one from Hqrs. will travel by train No. 28 and will report to O.C. train at St. OMER at 6.15 a.m. on the 6th instant. On arrival at LONGPRE Lieut. CUFF will make the necessary arrangements for billeting the Battalion.

ORDER OF MARCH.

4. H.Q. Sigs. & Intelligence, Band, "B", "C", & "D" Companies and H.Q. Details, A.M.C. & Police.  
"A" Company will move independently and will leave Camp at 11 p.m. on the 5th instant and proceed to St. OMER. Transport will move independently and will arrive at Station at St. OMER on the 6th instant at 8 AM; i.e. 3 hours prior to time of departure of train.

ROUTE.

5. LYNDE - RENESCURE - FORT ROUGE - ARCQUES - ST. OMER.

STARTING POINT & TIME.

6. The head of column will pass Church LYNDE at 5 a.m. on 6th instant.

DISTANCES.

7. On the march to entraining and from detraining Stations the following distances will be maintained :-  
Between Battalions 500 yards  
Between Companies 100 yards  
Between Battalion and Transport 100 yards.

HALTS.

8. There will be halts of 10 minutes at 10 minutes to each clock hour.

DRESS.

9. Full marching order, blankets rolled and waterproof sheets folded underneath supporting straps of packs.

A.A. GUNS.

10. A.A. Guns will be carried on the march and mounted for A.A. work on the train.

P.T.O.

TRAVELLING INSTRUCTIONS.

11. Os.C. Trains will see that the following instructions are carried out:-
- (a) No liquor will be allowed on the train.
  - (b) Riding on the steps or any dangerous position is forbidden.
  - (c) Troops will not be allowed to leave trains at any time without the permission of an Officer or Senior N.C.O., Os.C. Companies will detail a Platoon of 1 Officer and 8 O.Rs to prevent troops from leaving the train without permission.
  - (d) Troops if given permission may enter Station Buffets for the purpose of obtaining refreshments but no liquor may be purchased. A Platoon will be posted to prevent this and the Proprietor will be warned that the place will be declared out of bounds should any attempt be made to sell same.
  - (e) No personnel will be allowed in the brake vans at each end of the trains, nor on the roofs of coaches.
  - (f) No covered trucks will be used for luggage.
  - (g) Lewis Guns will be mounted on all trains for use if necessary against hostile aircraft.

REPORTS.

12. Reports to head of column.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To whom</u>	<u>Method</u>
1	Filo	
2-4	War Diary	
5	Brigade	Runner
6	O.C. "A" Coy.	"
7	" "B" "	"
8	" "C" "	"
9	" "D" "	"
10	Sig. Officer	"
11	Intelligence	"
12	Q.M.	"
13	T.O.	"

ENTRAINING TABLE to accompany Battalion Operation Order No. 29.

Train No.	Serial No.	Unit or Formation	Entraining Station	Departure Date	Time	Detraining Station	O.C. Train.
28	LA01 LA05	1st Aust. Div. Hqs. and Div. Wing Reinf. Camp Hq. & No. 1 Sect. Signal Coy. All Billeting parties.	St. OMER	6-8-18	0753	LONGPRE	Major E.B. AYRIS
31	LA22 LA06	5th Battn. less 1 Coy. Cooker & Team Divisional Salvage Company.	St. OMER	6-8-18	1103	LONGPRE	Lt-Col. D.A. LUXTON G.M.C., D.S.O.
34	LA82 LA77 LA22A LA07	2nd Field Coy. A.E. No 3 Coy. Divisional Train 1 Company, Cooker & Team of 5th Battn. 1 Platoon Aust. Corps Cyclists Battn.	St. OMER	6-8-18	1403	LONGPRE	Major <del>COOKER</del> .

SECRET.Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
5/8/18.ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCOMPANY  
BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 29.  
-----ROUTINE.

1. Company Commanders will arrange their own routine for to-morrow 6th instant.

TRANSPORT.

- 2.
- Cookers.
- Horses will call for Cookers at 4.30 A.M. at which time the Cookers will be ready to move. Urns will be filled before that hour. Cooks will arrange to have tea for the Battalion on arrival at ontraining station. Company Commanders horses to be at Company Headquarters by 4.30 a.m.

VALISES? REGTL.& COY. RECORDS.

3. All valises and Regimental and Company Record Boxes will be at Q.M. Store by 4 a.m.

BILLETING PARTY.

- N.C.Os detailed for billeting party will report to
- 
- 4.
- Lieut. CUFF
- at Battalion Signal Office at 5 a.m. sharp, where they will procure bicycles.

MESS STORES.

5. Company Mess Boxes will be carried on Company Cooker.

MARCHING OUT STATES.

6. Marching out States will be handed to Adjutant at ontraining station at 9.30 a.m.

ACKNOWLEDGE.(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

Reference: Sheet AMIENS.

MOVE.

1. 5th Bn A.I.F. will move by march route to ST. OVEN and there embus for CAMON on nights 7/8th August 1918.

STARTING POINT & TIME.

2. Head of column will be in position at road junction at Major T. HASTIE'S billet at 8 p.m.

ORDER OF MARCH.

3. Hqrs Sigs, Intelligence, Details, Band, "A", "B", "C", "D" Companies and Police. Transport and Cookers will move independently.

DISTANCES.

4. 10 yards between Companies.

DRESS.

5. Marching order with blankets rolled in Ground Sheet.

EMBUSSING POINT

6. Head of column will be at Cross roads at HALTE at ST. OVEN.

FORMATION.

7. Companies and Hqrs will be told off in groups of 25, with 6 groups every 80 yards of road space.

EMBUSSING OFFICER.

8. Major H. CARTER will be Bn embussing Officer.

DEBUSSING.

9. On receipt of orders to "debus" Companies will form up in column of route and clear the road at once.

GUIDES.

10. Guides will meet Companies on arrival at destination and conduct Companies to their billets.

COMPLETION OF MOVE.

11. Will be notified to Bn. Hqrs.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut,  
Adjutant.

29  
SECRET.5TH. BATTALION  
OPERATION ORDER NO. 30 A.

3/8/18.

NUCLEUS.

1. Nucleus of "A", "B" & "C" Companies will move to billet No. 19 RUE de PONCHET by 3.45 p.m. to-day. Nucleus of "D" Company and Headquarters will move to Bn. Hqrs billet (THE CHATEAU) by 3.45 p.m. today. All Officers of Nucleus will live at the CHATEAU. All valises of Battalion and Nucleus will be dumped at the CHATEAU. Capt. ANGEL will be responsible for custody of Valises and packs. Nominal Rolls of Nucleus to be forwarded to Bn. Hqrs at once.

MOVE.

2. Battalion (less Nucleus) will move to AUBIGNY area this afternoon.

STARTING POINT

3. Bridge in M.16.D.

ORDER OF MARCH

4. (a) Sigs, Intelligence, Hqrs, Band, "B", "A", "C" & "D" Companies.  
(b) Companies will be in position with head of column at Starting Point by 4.5 p.m.

DRESS.

5. Fighting order, greatcoat rolled in ground sheet. Water bottles filled. Iron Ration and Day's Ration will be carried.

TRANSPORT.

6. Will move in rear of Battalion.  
Cookers.

Will move in rear of Companies and carry A.A.Guns.

DISTANCES.

7. The following distances will be maintained:-  
120 yards between Companies  
120 yards between Battalion & Transport.

COMPLETION OF MOVE.

8. Completion of move will be notified to Bn. Hqrs.

REPORTS.

9. Reports to head of column;

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.,  
Adjutant.

To all Companies.

Headquarters 5th Bn. A.I.F.

Message to All Companies, Hqrs., Transport.

E.R.100

9/8/18.

Form up at once in column of route on the road, in the following order - Hqrs, "A", "C", "B", "D" Companies.

Dress: Fighting order and extra S.A.A.

L.G. Limbers will move in rear of leading platoon and cooker in rear of Company. Sig. Limber in rear of Hqrs.

(Sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.,  
Adjutant.

Appendix

8

18

SECRET.5TH. BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 31

10/8/18.

1. "C" Phase will commence to-day the 10th instant. BLUE LINE will be captured - 5th and 6th Bns will carry out attack on Brigade front with 6th Bn. on the right - CANADIANS will be on right of 6th Bn, 3rd A.I. Bde will be on left of 5th Bn.

BOUNDARIES.

2. Right Boundary of Bde will be Railway Line.  
Left " inclusive to 3rd Brigade; from X29A5.3 - S25D0.8 - S27C0.6.  
Inter-battalion boundary will be a line from F5A5.5 - A3C3.5 - One section of 2nd M.G. Bn will be attached to 5th Bn. Attack will be under an Artillery barrage, particulars of which will be forwarded later.

ZERO HOUR.

3. Zero hour will be 8 a.m.

ATTACK.

4. Attack will be launched in depth with "A" Coy. on the right - "B" Coy. on the left and will capture and consolidate BLUE LINE. S3C3.5 - S3A3.0 - S3A0.9 - X26D9.3. "C" Coy. will be in support - "D" Coy. in reserve.  
"A" & "B" Coys. will form up and occupy a position in the RED LINE in Sq X23C and X29A making use of trenches and cover from view.  
"C" Coy. will take up position along the GREEN line in Sq X20B and X21C.  
"D" Coy. will take over present position of "B" Coy. when vacated.  
Coys. will report as soon as they are in position to Bn. Hqs.

SYNCHRONISATION.

5. Watches will be synchronised with Runners' watches.

MOVE.

6. Coys. will move at once to positions.

(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

-----  
Reference Operation Order No. 31

10/8/18.

The jumping off line will be RED LINE.  
A creeping barrage will be put down 700 yards clear of the RED LINE at ZERO minus 15 minutes.  
At Zero hour it will commence moving forward by lifts of 100 yards in two minutes.  
On reaching the BLUE LINE a protective barrage will be put down. Fire will cease at request of G.O.C. Brigade.  
Heavy artillery will co-operate preparatory to and during the operation.

(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

To 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Bns., 2nd M.G. Coy., 3rd A.I. Bde.

AZB 193 9/8/18.

The "C" Phase (the capture of the BLUE LINE) will be carried out to-morrow 10th instant. 5th & 6th Bns will carry out the attack on the Brigade front with 6th Bn on the right. A Canadian Brigade will be on the right of 6th Bn and the 3rd A.I. Bde on the left of the 5th Bn.

The right boundary of the Bde will be the Railway line, the left boundary the road (inclusive to the 3rd A.I. Bde) from X29.A.5.3 to S25.D.0.8 to S27.C.0.6.

The inter-Battalion boundary will be the line from F.5.A.5.5 to A.3.C.3.5.

One of each of the sections of the 2nd M.G. Coy, now in reserve, will be attached to each 5th & 6th Bns.

The attack will be under an artillery barrage, particulars of which will be forwarded later.

Zero hour will be 3 a.m.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(sd/) H.F. WATSON, Capt..

From 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.

Time 11.55 p.m.

To 5th 6th 7th 8th Bns 2nd M.G. Coy.

AZB 196 10/8/18.

Reference AZB 193. The jumping off line will be the RED LINE.

A creeping barrage will be put down 700 yards clear of the RED LINE at ZERO minus 15 minutes.

At ZERO hour it will commence moving forward by lifts of 100 yards in two minutes. On reaching the BLUE LINE a protective barrage will be put down. Fire will cease at request of G.O.C.s the Brigade. Heavy artillery will co-operate preparatory to and during the operation.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(sd.) H.F. WATSON, Capt.

From 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.

Time 3.20 a.m.

SECRET.Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
17/8/18.

From C.O. 5th Battalion A.I.F.

To Headquarters 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS OF 5th BATTALION A.I.F. IN THE  
ATTACK ON 9th and 10th AUGUST, 1918, IN THE VICINITY OF VAUVILLIERS  
AND LIHONS.

PRELIMINARY.

The Battalion was relieved from the support position in the MOOLENACKER - STRAZELLE Sector on the night of 2nd/3rd August, 1918, by 2nd Battalion Hampshire Regiment and marched to camp at LA KREULE, where it arrived at 1 a.m. on the 3rd inst.

On August 3rd the Battalion moved by march route to billets at LYNDE, starting from LA KREULE at 9.20 p.m. and arriving in billets at LYNDE at 2.30 a.m. on the 4th.

August 4th - Church Parade - Commemoration Day.

August 5th - Holiday and cleaning up.

August 6th.- Battalion moved by march route to St. OMER and entrained for LONGERE at 11.30 a.m. The battalion was on the train from 11.30 a.m. to 8.30 p.m. the same evening, and then proceeded by march route to billets at BETTECOURT arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on the 7th.

August 7th.- The day was spent in resting. In the evening the Battalion moved to St. <sup>OVER</sup>OMER where they embarked at 10 p.m., being in the busses till 2.30 a.m. the next day. The battalion disembarked at FORT CAMON and moved by march route to billets at CAMON, arriving there at about 3 a.m.

August 8th.- The battalion moved by march route to AUBIGNY, leaving CAMON at 4 p.m. and arriving at AUBIGNY (less Nucleus which remained at CAMON) at 8 p.m.

August 9th.- Battalion moved by march route to BAYONVILLIERS and at 2 p.m. moved forward in support of the 7th Battalion to attack and capture the RED line - a line running from approximately X.10 Central to railway at F.5.C.3.3. 8th Battalion were on the Right with 6th Battalion in Support.

7th Battalion on Left with 5th Battalion in Support.

ASSEMBLY.

The Battalion assembled in Squares W.3 and Q.33 with two companies in front line and two companies in support.-

"A" on the Right with "C" on the Left Front Line.

"B" on the Right with "D" on the Left in Support.

The battalion was in support to the 7th Battalion on the Left with orders to support the 7th Battalion in their attack on the RED line. This would not be done without orders from Brigade.

P.T.O.

FORMATION.

The formation decided upon for the advance was as follows :-  
Two companies in front line and two companies in rear, each company with two lines of sections in artillery formation with a screen two hundred yards in advance. Support companies were 200 yards in rear in artillery formation.

ADVANCE.

The Battalion advanced in support to the 7th Battalion at 2.30 p.m. keeping HARBONNIERS on our left flank. On passing through HARBONNIERS it then became necessary for the right flank to swing well up so that the left flank would pass just on the right of HARBONNIERS. During this time the Battalion came under fairly heavy shell fire (4.2's.) which inflicted a few casualties.

On reaching Squares W.18. B & D it was found that the 7th Battalion left flank was in the air. Orders were then issued to O.C. "C" Company to push forward and cover the 7th Battalion left flank. This was done at 4.30 p.m. It also became apparent that the 7th Battalion line was very thin and needed reinforcing. This was done by one company - "D" Company - who reinforced the 7th Battalion centre, leaving two companies in support to the 7th Battalion who consolidated the ~~GREEN~~ RED line.

Battalion Headquarters were located with 7th Battalion Headquarters at X.13.D.2.9.

COMMUNICATIONS & REPORTS.

First message received from O.C. "A" Coy. Line Right -  
"I have reached road in X.14.B. and have sent to line to ascertain position and what is required of us and about 10 casualties - Lieut. CORLETT wounded. Time 4.50 p.m."

Message from "B" Company:-

"Company at present disposed in X.20.B. with Company Headquarters at X.20.B.1.8. "A" Company ahead of me. Major HASTIE is in touch with 7th Battalion and will move forward when they do. I have not been able to get in touch with anybody on my right."

Message from O.C. Tanks -

"All tanks knocked out. Strong opposition machine guns in wood X.3. Time 4.45 p.m."

Message to "A", "B", "C" & "D" Coys.-

"A" & "C" Coys. will push out and occupy line approx. at X.21.B. Central X.15.D. central - X.15.A. central - X.10.C. central. "C" Coy. will form a defensive flank. "A" Coy. will be on the right. "B" Coy. will be in rear of "A". "D" Coy. in rear of "C" Coy.. Every effort must be made to establish liaison with flank units at once. 7th Battalion occupy line approx. through X.17.C. - X.23.A. Time 7.30 p.m."

Message from O.C. "A" Coy.-

"An consolidating line N.E. of tram line running through X.21.B. & D. "C" Coy. should prolong line through X.15 B. & D and am trying to let them know and if 7th Battalion are where you say they have left machine guns and snipers on ridge. They are troublesome and as left flank seems dangerous and is not known I told "B" Coy. to keep an eye on the left flank. Have had a patrol to 7th Battalion forward positions at X.22.2.8.8. where the line is very thin and has been troubled by machine guns. Will try and ascertain position in order that I may consolidate."

P.T.O.

Message from "C" Company.-

My position is one platoon at X.22.B.0.7. and two others at X.22.A.8.7. I am with "A" Coy. 7th Battalion at X.22.B.0.7. Am not in touch on left and though I have seen a rumor from "A" Coy. 5th Battalion I do not know their exact position. Will try and get in touch when it gets dark see E.R. 10 just received. My position is as above stated. Am watching left flank but at present it is in the air. About one platoon of 2nd Division is 400 yards in my rear. Lieuts. MORRISON & HANSON are both wounded. Casualties as far as I know about 30. We are held up here by machine gun fire and enemy can be seen moving across my front and going to my left flank. We want ammunition and water. Time 8.40pm."

Message from O.C. "D" Coy.-

"Am in trench running from X.15.C.1.4. to X.15.C.4.9. and am endeavouring to gain touch on flanks. Shall I move further forward? Time 6 p.m."

(Message issued from Headquarters ordering this company forward).

Message from O.C. "A" Company.-

My P.M. 8 explains situation. Am carrying out orders in E.R. 10. Heavy shelling caused about 30 casualties and many men are mixed in companies. Am trying to sort out with "C" Company. Enemy machine guns troublesome."

Message from O.C. "D" Coy. 10.30 p.m.-

"As ordered I came forward and am now on road in X.23.A. with some of the 7th Battalion on my right. Owing to casualties in "C" Coy. I sent Lieut. MORRISON down to take charge. I have ordered them forward half left to form a flank back to 25th Battalion who have not moved. Our line now runs from right along road to X.23A.2.7. - X.16.D.5.8. Ammunition is urgently needed and should be sent to my Headquarters at X.23.A.1.4. All quiet on our front now. Position is secure. In the capture of this position we lost 4 killed and 20 wounded and they are gradually being sent back. We also sent back 20 prisoners. There is now no machine gun fire from our left and the line is secure from the right of the 7th to the 25th Battalions, gap between these battalions having now been filled by "D" Coy. 5th Battalion. We have 11 Lewis guns and 1 German gun on this company. Must have ammunition tonight. Timed 10.30 p.m."

Message from O.C. "C" Coy.-

"Company Headquarters have been advanced to X.22.B.2.8. I am in touch on the right with 16 platoon of "D" Coy and on the left with the 25th Battalion. I have a consultation with Capt. BURKE and he informs me that 7th Battalion are unable to take over all his front and that he will remain where he is and if 7th Battalion takes over from "D" Coy. the distance between left flank of the 7th Battalion and the right flank of the 25th Battalion will be roughly 800 yards. This I am holding with 3 platoons and 1 in reserve at Company Headquarters. (Sgd) OLLIO."

Message received from Brigade.-

"On capture of RED line 7th and 8th Battalions will consolidate same. Patrols will be pushed out well in front to protect line. Should the capture of the BLUE line be ordered 5th and 6th Battalions will attack with 5th Battalion on the right. 3rd A.I. Brigade will be on the left of 5th Battalion. On 3rd A.I. Brigade moving up 7th Battalion will move back into reserve in rear of 8th Battalion. Inter-Brigade boundary for the attack will be - X.23.C.3.6. and S.25.D.0.8 along road inclusive to 5th Battalion - S.27.C.0.5. Inter-battalion boundary will be X.29.C.5.5. - A.2.C.2.8. - A.3.C.2.7. ACKNOWLEDGE. Time 5.25 p.m. Received 8.5 p.m."

On receipt of this order the following order was issued:-

"Battalion Operation Order No. 31. SECRET.

""C" Coy will commence today, 10th inst. BLUE line will be captured. 5th and 6th Battalions will carry out attack on Brigade front with 6th Battalion on the right. Canadians will be on the right of the 6th. 3rd A.I. Brigade will be on the left of the 5th. Right boundary of Brigade will be railway line.

Left Boundary inclusive of 3rd A.I. Brigade from X.29.A.5.3. - S.25.D.0.8. - S.27.C.0.6.

Inter-Battalion boundary will be line from X.29.C.5.5.

One section of 2nd M.G. Bn. will be attached to 5th Battalion. Attack

P.T.O.

"Attack will be under an Artillery barrage particulars of which will be forwarded later. Zero hour will be 8 a.m. Attack will be launched in depth with "A" Company on the right and "B" Company on the left, "C" Company in Support and "D" Company in Reserve. Battalion will capture and consolidate BLUE LINE - A.3.C.3.5 - A.3.A.3.0 - A.3.A.0.9 - X.26.D.9.3 "A" & "B" Companies will form up and occupy positions in RED LINE in Squares X.23.C and X.29.A making use of trenches and cover from view. "C" Company will take up position along GREEN LINE in Squares X.20.B and X.21.C. "D" Company will take over present position of "B" Company when vacated. Companies will report as soon as they are in position to Bn. Headquarters. Watches will be synchronised with runners' watches on receipt of orders. Companies will move to positions at once."

Message from Brigades:-

"(C) phrase. Capture of BLUE LINE will be carried out tomorrow 10th inst. 5th and 6th Battalions will carry out attack on Brigade front. 6th Battalion on the right. Consistans will be on the right of 6th Battalion. 3rd A.I. Brigade on the left of 5th Battalion. Right boundary of the Brigade will be Railway Line. Left boundary road inclusive of 3rd A.I. Brigade from X.29.A - S.25.D.0.8 to S.27.0.0.6. Inter-Battalion boundary will be line from F.5.A.5.5 to A.3.C.3.5. One of each of the sections of the 2nd Machine Gun Company now in reserve will be attached to each of 5th and 6th Battalions. Attack will be under Artillery Barrage particulars of which will be forwarded later. Zero hour will be 8 a.m. Acknowledge. Time 11.30 a.m."

Message from Brigade 10th instant:-

"Reference A.2.B.123. Jumping off line will be RED LINE. A creeping barrage will be put down 700 yards clear of the RED LINE at ZERO minus 15 minutes. At ZERO hour it will commence moving forward by leaps of 100 yards in two minutes. A protective barrage will be put down. Fire will cease on the request of G.O.C. Brigade. Heavy artillery will co-operate during the operation. Acknowledge."

Message from G.O.C. "A" Company:-

"9th Battalion appear to be held up on our left AAA We are held up on account of machine gun fire and heavy casualties AAA Am in touch with "B" Company which is also held up. Machine gun fire from the rear has been troublesome. Only one Officer left Lieut. VOLUN. Casualties cannot yet be estimated. Enemy machine gun fire heavy. Our barrage short. Am in touch with "B" Company and can see 6th Battalion."

Message from B.O.C.:-

"Present position approximately 200 yards in front of wood at F.6.A. Line runs from there to Eastern edge of GREY WOOD. Register for B.O.C. intercepted 1st. Artillery Brigade and message from "B" Company:-

"Am in touch with 9th Battalion and am going to attempt to get forward with them. We are too far to our right and I reckon I am in about F.6.A. and have moved forward of Wood in S.1.

Maps are bad so I am not absolutely sure of my whereabouts but have agreed with "A" Company that our locations are approximately correct.

Message from 9th Battalion signed J.H. CHAMMAN, Lieut & Adjutant

Time 11.30 a.m.:-

"Situation on our front AAA We have reached BLUE LINE except in X.26.A8.9 to right boundary. There is also a packet in our line in large wood in squares 12.27 and 25.28. We are dealing with this wood now. This is the position from which machine guns are troubling you."

Message from G.O.C. "A" Company:-

"Cannot understand 9th Battalion being there as machine gun fire from their front is very heavy on us. We are just a little to our right and machine gun fire from BOIS GREUX is very heavy AAA I have just been in to line and find 9th - "B" - "A" and 6th all in touch and all are held up AAA Only one tank near us and although dashing about it cannot do anything. I think it has just been hit AAA Shelling not heavy S.9's and .77's. Casualties - Lieut. Mansell killed - about 50 or 60 other ranks killed or wounded. Time 11.50 a.m."

11  
25Message from O.C. "B" Coy.

"Enemy reported massing in Wood on 9th Battalion front. Enemy using 77s against us. Machine Gun fire increasing. Have decided with O.C. "A" Company to remain where we are at present till flanks are able to get up to our assistance. 10th Battalion are in rear about 1000 yards with orders to remain at that distance from us. Have not been in touch with them though."

Operation Order from Brigade:-

"On the night of 10/11th August the 8th Battalion with one Company of the 7th attached will attack and capture the BLUE LINE. The 3rd A.I. Brigade will co-operate on the left. The Brigade boundaries for the attack will be as laid down for this morning's attack. Operation will be assisted by Artillery and Tanks. 6 Tanks will operate on this Brigade front and 4 on the front of the 3rd A.I. Bde. Prior to ZERO hour the attacking troops will be formed up immediately in rear of our present front line and at ZERO hour will advance in rear of the tanks and capture and consolidate the position. The action of the tanks will be as follows:- At ZERO minus 5 minutes they will pass through our present front line and at ZERO will proceed in rear of the barrage working towards LIMONS and the woods in the vicinity thereof. On the capture of the objective they will patrol in front of same in order to reduce any hostile positions on the immediate front. The action of the artillery will be as follows. At ZERO a creeping barrage will be put down on the grid line running front A.8.A.0.5 to S.26.D.0.8. At ZERO plus two minutes it will advance at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes until it reaches a line 700 yards beyond the objective when it will remain stationary in order to protect the consolidation. The heavies will fire during the operation on CHAULNES and BOIS de TRIANOULAIRE in accordance with instructions issued. Two sections of the 2nd Machine Gun Company are placed at the disposal of O.C. 8th Battalion to assist in the operation. ZERO hour will be 4 a.m.  
Acknowledge. Time 10.30 p.m."

Battalion Operation Order No. 22.

"Two Companies of 5th Battalion will relieve two Companies of the 8th Battalion in left sub-sector along BLUE LINE shown on attached map. "C" Company will relieve on the right "D" Company on the left. 5th Battalion boundary right will be a line from A.3.C.2.5 to F.5.B.2.9. 5th Battalion left boundary will be Brigade boundary to and including road in X.26.D.9.2. Inter-Company boundary as shown on attached map. "A" & "B" Companies will remain in BLUE LINE as shown on attached map and will be in Support with "A" Company on right. Move. Companies will take over by pushing forward small parties. Reserve. Front line Companies will keep one platoon in reserve at Coy. Hqrs. Movement. As little movement as possible during relief. O.C. "C" Company will push forward as per verbal instructions."

Battalion Operation Order No. 23.

"On the night 11/12th August 2nd A.I. Bde will be relieved by 1st. A.I. Bde. 5th Battalion will be relieved by 3rd Battalion."

Attack.

The warning order to move forward from AUBIGNY was received about 5 a.m. later another order was received from Brigade that Battalion was to move as per instructions issued in AZB 170 previously received. On receipt of this order the Battalion had to be issued throughout with extra 100 rounds per man together with 2 bombs per man, all of which had to be detonated before issue. This took time and delayed the Battalion about an hour. It further stated in Brigade AZB 171 that further orders would be issued on the march. Up till 1.30 on the morning of the 9th no orders had been issued.

P.T.O.

(5)

The Battalion had been on the march from 8 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. and had halted about 1000 yards this side of HARBONNIERS where it was thought advisable for the men to have their lunch. This was done during which time the Lewis Guns and Signalling gear were issued to the Battalion. At 1.45 p.m. the message was received for the C.O. to report to Bde Headquarters at GUILACOURT. Further instructions issued by the Brigadier to the C.O. 5th Battalion were as follows:-

"7th and 8th Battalions are formed up in Squares 16 B & D and will attack at once with ten tanks. Boundaries as shown on map handed over; 8th Battalion on the right and 7th Battalion on the left with 6th Battalion Support right and 5th Battalion Support left. Battalions to move immediately. In the event of the 8th Battalion being held up on the right 6th Battalion in Support will support the 8th Battalion on the left flank. 5th Battalion will then move in rear of 8th Battalion and will support the 8th Battalion. On the capture of the RED LINE further orders will be issued later."

These orders were issued to Company Commanders verbally who immediately moved into position and the advance continued.

During the advance it was seen that men would be unable to continue with their greatcoats carried so these were dumped and collected later by the Transport personnel.

Battalion never actually gained touch with the 7th Battalion until they were on their objective - the RED LINE. It was soon seen that the left flank of the 7th Battalion was in trouble, therefore orders were issued for one Company of the 5th Battalion to cover the left flank of the 7th Battalion. This was done and the C.O. of the 7th notified of same.

The attack at LIHONS on the 10th August was very hurried and as a consequence it was impossible for a proper reconnaissance to be made of the ground over which the attack was to be launched.

All orders together with maps were received far too late, the Artillery barrage table was not received until 7 o'clock and it was too late to communicate same to the men who were by that time in position.

The lack of communication between Battalion and Brigade was apparent right from the start; also the necessary information which was required by Battalions was not forthcoming.

The maps as issued were bad. As the position to be taken was a strong fortified position maps of a larger scale than 1:40,000 should have been issued. Just before the attack on the 10th three separate maps were sent from Brigade, these maps proved absolutely useless to Officers in an attack such as was carried out as there was neither time nor the places for Battalions to paste these maps together and cut them down, and I think that when maps are issued to take in three corners such as the maps used this might be done further back in rear than in front line Battalions. The order for the attack, when the Battalion had already been engaged and two Companies were already involved in the front line, did not make any provision for filling the line from where these Companies had to be withdrawn. It was therefore found impossible to withdraw two Companies so as to be on the forming up ground by 7.30 a.m., the time as ordered before the attack.

It was not until 10 o'clock on the morning of the 10th that two Coys who were in Support and Reserve were able to be brought forward.

The artillery barrage before starting was short and was falling into men who were formed up for the attack. This was rectified later.

The attack was launched to time and went forward well but it was considered by all those actually engaged in the attack that the artillery barrage was far too thin for an attack on an organised position and in view of the shortage of ammunition this might have been replaced by a smoke screen to cover the actual advance of the attackers thereby saving many casualties.

P.T.O.

As it soon became apparent that the Artillery had moved forward too far for the Infantry who had to mop up strong points and were held up from time to time from machine guns and machine gun posts these had to be cleared up before the general line was able to advance. As no visual signalling stations were arranged for before the advance it was impossible to get communication to the rear other than by runner and this meant time.

The 3rd A.I. Bde had worked forward on our left but the 9th Battalion were held up with the result that we were unable to push forward to the final objective therefore it was thought advisable to consolidate the line running from A.7.C.6. Central through two roads on left near OREPY WOOD.

The method of the advance from the assembly position was with four platoons in front in two waves followed by two platoons in support in one wave with two reserve platoons in one wave in rear. The support Company and Reserve Company came up in artillery formation.

On account of the heavy machine gun fire which it was anticipated would be encountered and which turned out to be correct the reserve platoons of the front line Companies moved in sections in line.

The reserve platoons were used for mopping up the Quarry near Square Tower and then were used to strengthen the flanks of Companies and a c envelopo SAUSAGE FACTORY WOOD.

After the attack had been held up patrols were pushed out to reconnoitre the ground in front. One patrol moving down into LIONS where they engaged an enemy machine gun and after having one casualty returned to our lines. The enemy machine gunners in almost all instances died by their guns but their protective screens in some cases either surrendered or ran.

Prisoners. It is estimated that the Battalion captured close on 75 prisoners. These prisoners were sent to the rear but no escort was told off to guard them in every case. In some cases where men were sent back with prisoners those men had to go a considerable distance and being men who had been engaged in the fighting and in nearly every case very tired men I would suggest that some facilities be made whereby prisoners could be handed over to escorts as close up to the fighting as possible, thus saving man power in the front line and also conserving the men's strength who would otherwise be able to return to the fight.

Vickers Guns & Artillery. The Vickers Guns moved under Lieut. HORAN and were attached to the two front line Companies and proved of the greatest assistance and did some very valuable work as did also Lieut. SLEWTHEN of the 2nd Brigade Field Artillery who moved forward with the advance throughout and rendered great assistance by his personal reconnaissance of the ground and direction of artillery fire.

The captured light guns were used very effectively against the enemy the benefit of having men who were trained in both light and heavy guns being apparent.

Stokes Mortars. I think that Stokes Mortars would have been of great value in the recent attack, they could have been attached to Battalions and have been sent forward to clear out any nest of machine guns at a moment's notice thereby saving losses to the Infantry which otherwise have to outflank or rush machine gun positions frontally.

Information. All the available information should be made known to as many men as possible in the attack and the ideal to be aimed at is for them to know practically everything their Officers know about what is doing. This also applies to Battalions to know what Brigade is doing.

P. T. O. G.

28

and flank units. It is just as necessary for that information to be sent to Companies in the line from the rear as it is necessary for them to send all the information back as to what is going on with them.

Our losses are estimated at about four to one. These losses are excessive and I think with some consideration of the appreciation of the situation at the time these losses might have been kept much lower.

The attack and capture of the BLUE LINE by the 8th Battalion.  
The 8th Battalion with one Company of the 7th Battalion had orders to capture and consolidate on the BLUE LINE in conjunction with the 3rd A.I. Bn on our left. Two companies of the 8th Battalion formed up in our line one hour before ZERO. These Companies were taken forward and placed in position by Company Commanders of Right and Left Companies and all available information handed over. These Companies moved forward at 4 a.m. but as far as could be seen the tanks co-operating with them were not in position until later. The Company on the left moved forward straight through LIHONS and captured the BLUE LINE. No opposition was met in LIHONS but as far as could be ascertained the Company on the Left only had one casualty in taking LIHONS.

Between the 8th and 10th August the Battalion had marched some 20 miles from CANON to AUBIGNY a distance of 8 miles, and from AUBIGNY to VADVILLE some 12 miles, on top of which they had to attack a strong position. This together with meals at irregular intervals has a very telling effect on the men and would in time affect their fighting power. I would therefore recommend that if it be possible to bus men to position of assembly thereby saving unnecessary marching a lot would be gained by this.

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
17/8/18.

Report by R.M.O. 5th Battalion A.I.F.

on operations of 9th & 10th August near VAUVILLIERS & LIHONS.

The Battalion went into action on 9/8/18 at 6.30 p.m. I established R.A.P. in a house at X.20.D.7.3. Casualties were evacuated very quickly - the only congestion occurring from 6.30 to 9 p.m. owing to the late arrival of Ambulance Stretcher Bearers. At 9 p.m. there were approximately 50 stretcher cases awaiting removal but these were evacuated very rapidly by car and by 11 p.m. the congestion was relieved. Casualties continued to come in steadily during the night.

On 10/8/18 I moved with B.H.Q. and established R.A.P. at X.28.B.3.5. Casualties came in steadily all day. I had 3 squads of 2nd Field Ambulance bearers attached to R.A.P. Cases were quickly evacuated and there was no congestion.

Wounds. The majority of cases were bullet wounds - rifle and machine gun - very few shell wounds. Three slightly gassed cases.

Comments. The evacuation of wounded from the line to R.A.P. was extremely rapid. I enquired carefully as to the time each case had been lying out after being wounded and there were only two cases in which the wounded had been lying out for more than 3 hours.

Shell dressings were easily obtainable from Field Ambulance but there was a scarcity of Thomas Splints - none being obtainable.

In conclusion I should like to draw attention to the most gallant and consistent work performed by all the Battalion Stretcher Bearers who after a weeks continuous travelling with full packs and very little rest, worked continuously for over 60 hours without a spell, being the whole of the time under very heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

*W. H. Park*

Captain,  
R.M.O. 5th Bn A.I.F.

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	Reed. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			This message is on a/c of:		Date	
Sent			Service		From	
At			m.		By	
To					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
By						
TO 5 6 7 8 Bns 2nd MCB						
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		AAA		
* A2B 170	9					
<p>You will be prepared to move at 6 AM to position about HARBONNIERS (square N11) with a view to advancing the advance to-day. Advance will be by small parties with 8: Bn on right 7: Bn on left + 5 + 6: Bns on rear with 6: Bn on right. One section of 2nd MC Coy will move with each 7: 18: Bns remainder of Coy following on rear of 6: 8: Bns. Ammunition, blankets &amp; water cart should move to HAYONVILLE. Should this move be ordered copying order will be sent later.</p>						
From	2:1 Am 2/Bch					
Place						
Time	6 20 AM					
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) H7 hat						
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name						

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	Reed. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			This message is on a/c of:		Date	
Sent			Service		From	
At			m.		By	
To					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
By						
TO 5 6 7 8 Bns 2nd MCB						
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		AAA		
* A2B 170	9					
<p>You will move at once on accordance with instructions given in A2B 170. You will receive further orders whilst on the march. Report to this office time of leaving present location.</p>						
From	2:1 Am 2/Bch					
Place						
Time	10 20 AM					
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) H7 hat						
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name						

Appendix

11 20

At	m.	Service.	Date
To			From
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	

TO all boys  
HQ Transport

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* ER 100	9		

Form up at once in  
columns of platoons on the  
road. in the following order  
Hqs A C B D boys  
Dress fighting order & extra  
saba.

L G Lums will move in  
rear of leading platoon and  
cover the rear of Coy  
Reg. Lums in rear of HQ.

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) *[Signature]*  
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

At	m.	Service.	Date
To			From
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	

TO 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> Bns, 2<sup>nd</sup> MG Coy  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aus Inf Bde

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* A33 193	9		

The C Phase the capture of the BLUE  
line will be carried out tomorrow  
10:00. 5<sup>th</sup> + 6<sup>th</sup> Bns will carry out  
the attack on the Brigade front with  
6<sup>th</sup> Bn on the right. A Canadian Bde  
will be on the right of 6<sup>th</sup> Bn + the  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aus Inf Bde on the left of 5<sup>th</sup> Bn.  
The Right boundary of the 3<sup>rd</sup> will be  
the Railway line, the Left boundary  
the road (inclusive to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde)  
from X29 A53 to S25 D08 to S27 C06.  
The inter Bn boundary will be the  
line from F5 A55 to A3C 35. One of  
each of the sections of 2<sup>nd</sup> MG Coy will  
be attached to each 5<sup>th</sup> + 6<sup>th</sup> Bns. The  
attack will be under an artillery barrage.

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Appendix

11-31

To .....  
 From .....  
 By ..... (Signature of "Franking Officer.") By .....

TO } Contd

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA  
 \* W23 193 9

particulars of which will be forwarded later. Zero hour will be 8 A.M. Acknowledge

From 2<sup>nd</sup> Div Supt Bde  
 Place  
 Time 11.55 P.M.

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line, except AAA, should be erased if not required.  
 Wt. W 3253/P511. 500,000 Pads. 1/18. B. & S. Ltd. (E2389.)

To .....  
 By ..... (Signature of "Franking Officer.") By .....

TO } 5 1732

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA  
 \* T.H. 1 9

I have reached Road  
 via X 14 b running  
 to VAUVILLERS and  
 I have sent to LINE  
 to ascertain position  
 and what is required  
 of us. Acc about  
 (10) ten casualties  
 LT. CORLETTE wounded.

From  
 Place O.C. A Coy  
 Time 4/50 pm

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line, except AAA, should be erased if not required.  
 Wt. W 3253/P511. 500,000 Pads. 1/18. B. & S. Ltd. (E2389.)

Appendix

11-29

To	By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	From	By
TO	Bin	H.Q.		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	A A A	
*	9			
Company at present disposed in X 20 B with 60 H.Q. X 20 B 18.				
A Co. ahead of me. Major Haste is in touch with G. Co. + will move forward when they do.				
I have not been able to get touch with anybody on my right nor have I seen anybody.				
From	Ricketson Capt.			
Place	O. B. Co.			
Time	5 5 P M			
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)				
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.			

\* This line, except A A A, should be erased if not required.  
 Wt. W 3258/P511. 500,000 Pads. 1/18. B. & S. Ltd. (E2389.)

To 5<sup>th</sup> Bu

All tanks knocked out.  
 Opposite (M.G) in wood in X3.

Ricketson Major  
 O.B. Tanks

4 45 P.M.  
 7 Aug

Bin H.Q. / Have info forwarded for info  
 4 45 P.M. Ricketson Capt  
 O.B. Co.  
 Ricketson

Appendix

11-33

At	m.	Service	Date
To			From
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By

TO A. Coy + 6 Coy  
B + D Coy

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* ER.10.	9.		

A and C Coy will  
Push out and occupy approx  
line X21 B central - X45 D central -  
X15 A central - X10 C central -  
C Coy will form a defensive  
flank. A Coy will be on the right.  
B Coy will be in rear of A Coy  
D Coy in rear of C Coy.  
Every effort must be made to  
establish position with flank  
units at once.  
4<sup>th</sup> B Coy occupy a line approx  
through X19 C - X23 A.

From 5<sup>th</sup> BN AIF

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

At	m.	Service	Date
To			From
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By

TO 5<sup>th</sup> BN

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* TH.8	9		

Am consolidating line  
of ~~4<sup>th</sup> B Coy~~ TRAM LINE  
EAST running through X21 B + D  
C Coy should probably  
through X15 B + D and  
am trying to let them  
know that I + 7<sup>th</sup> B Coy  
are where you say  
they have left MG and  
snipers on ridge  
they are troublesome am  
As LEFT flank seems  
glamperous and is not  
strong I told B Coy  
to keep an eye on the  
left flank and B Coy HQ

From X20 B Coy. A Coy HQ X21 B 3.5. am

Place Please send MAP.

Time SEE NEXT sheet

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix

29

APPENDIX

11 35



TO 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> Bns

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

\*A20183

9

AAA

On capture of RED line 7<sup>th</sup> & 8<sup>th</sup> Bns will consolidate same. Patrols will be pushed out well in front to protect the line.

Should the capture of the BLUE line be <sup>ordered</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> & 6<sup>th</sup> Bns will attack with 6<sup>th</sup> Bn on the right. 3<sup>rd</sup> Aus Inf Bde will be on the left of 5<sup>th</sup> Bn. On 3<sup>rd</sup> Aus Inf Bde moving up 7<sup>th</sup> Bn will move back onto perimeter in rear of 8<sup>th</sup> Bn. Inter-Bde boundary for the attack will be X23C36 - 525/88 along road. (enclosure to 5<sup>th</sup> Bn) - 527C05. Inter-Battalion boundary will be X29C55 - A2C38 - A3C27. Acknowledge

From 2<sup>nd</sup> Aus Inf Bde  
 Place  
 Time 6:25 PM

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z) [Signature] Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

Sent		Date
At	m.	Service.
To	From	
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By

TO: *5th*

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

\* *Continued*

*I have had a  
patrol to 7th forward  
position about X 22 C. 8.8  
where the line is very  
thin and is being  
troubled by M.G.'s and  
will try and ascertain  
their position after I  
consolidate. Am. May  
I send for B if they  
are required for the line  
I am consolidating.*

From	
Place	<i>7.10 p</i>
Time	

*The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)*

*J. Hartsman*  
Censor, Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

*90 C.O. 5th B. 71 F*

*My position is on plateau*

*X 22 60.7 7777 <sup>not</sup> remaining and*

*at plateau X 22 60.9. + two*

*others at X 22 78.7 7777*

*I am with 17 Coy of 7th Bn at*

*X 22 60.7 7777 and not on*

*ground left, but though*

*I have seen a runner*

*from A Coy 5th. I do not*

*know their exact position*

Appendix

11

Bm 1428

[Faint handwritten text on a grid background]

AAA Will try to get touch  
 when it gets dark, AAA.  
 ER 10 just received AAA.  
 My position is already ~~is~~  
 stated. AAA Am watching  
 my left flank but at  
 present it is in the air.  
 AAA. About one platoon  
 of 2nd Division is about  
~~200~~ 400 yds. in my rear  
 AAA. Lieut. Morrison &  
 Lieut. Hanson are both  
 wounded AAA. Casualties

So far as I know about  
 20 AAA. We are held up  
 here by M.G. fire. AAA  
 Enemy can be seen moving  
 across my front but you  
 to my left flank. AAA.  
 We want ammunition &  
 water AAA.

W. J. Thompson  
 Lieut. in  
 Coy 58

8.40  
 P.M.

Appendix 11 27

John Datta

I'm in trench running from  
 X15C14 to X15C49.  
 I am endeavouring to gain touch  
 on flanks & C Coy  
 Shall I move further  
 forward.

John Datta  
 6pm 9/11/18

TO		5th Div	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* TH 9.	9	ER 10	
My TH 8 explains the situations and am carrying out orders in ER 10 and heavy shelling caused about (20) twenty casualties and many men are mixed in companies so am trying to sort out with "C" Coy and trying M.G. rather troublesome and suggest call at X.20 26.58 for a phone			
From	D. C. A.		
Place	8th Div		
Time	8.40 am		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.		(Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.		

Appendix


11

In the capture of this position  
 we lost 4 killed & 20  
 wounded & they are  
~~at present~~ gradually being  
 sent back. We also  
 sent back 20 prisoners.  
 There is now no machine  
 gun fire from our left  
 as the line is secure from  
 night of 7<sup>th</sup> to 25<sup>th</sup> the ~~gap~~  
 gap between those two  
 battalions having now been  
 filled by D & C Coys 5<sup>th</sup> Br.  
 We have 11 L.G.'s & one  
 German gun on this Coy  
 & must have ammunition  
 tonight.

10.30 pm  
 J. H. Barber  
 B.C. Coy

TO B.H.Q. and B. Coy			
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	
* T.H 10	9	AAA	
Situation LINE 7 <sup>th</sup> Br on right D and C in line with C on left Ann A Coy in support with some Bde M.G.'s Ann All three Coys are weakened by casualties and ammo & bombs are required of 3 <sup>rd</sup> Bde do not go through tomorrow Ann A Coy are working as two platoons on acct of casualties Ann LT. BARBER and CORLETT wounded.			
From	Continued		
Place			
Time			
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)			
Censor. Signature of Addressee or person authorised to telegraph in his name.			

Appendix



5<sup>th</sup> Div  
A.I.

By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By
TO	Continued		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* 1210	10		
<p>"A" can protect from road X 21 d. 4 to X 15 d. 8. 3          I think "B" should be on my left and anyone of 3rd Bde going forward I should tell tanks of MG's on crest about 7th line and 7th are trying to locate post. and day light sniping is very troublesome at present and I have been up to line and find it is impossible for 7th to hold without the assistance they have at present</p>			
From	IC. A. Coy		
Place			
Time	12.10 am		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.		(Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.		

By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By
TO	5.6.7.8 Bn 2nd MG Co		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* 12B 196	10		
<p>Reference 12B 193. The pumping off line will be the RED line &amp; creeping barrage will be put down 700 yards clear of the RED line at zero - 15 minutes at zero hour it will commence moving forward by lifts of 100 yards in two minutes. On reaching the BLUE line a protective barrage will be put down. Fire will cease at request of G.O.C. the Brigades Heavy artillery will be prepared to fire during the operation.          Acknowledge</p>			
From	2nd Am Inf Bde		
Place			
Time	3.20 AM		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.		(Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.		

Appendix

11

B. J. H.

Appendix

11.

40

<u>Secret</u>	Sent	Service	Date
	At		From
	To		By
	By	(Signature of "Franking Officer")	

TO	5 6 7 8 <sup>th</sup> Bns 2 <sup>nd</sup> M <sup>g</sup> Coy		
	1 <sup>st</sup> Aust. Div 1 <sup>st</sup> Aust. Inf Bde		
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Aust. Inf Bde 12 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Bde		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
Az/B 209.	10		

On the night 10/11 Aug. the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion with one company of the 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion attached will attack & capture the BLUE line. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Inf Bde will co-operate on the left. The Bde boundaries for the attack will be as laid down for this morning's attack. The operation will be assisted by artillery & tanks. Six tanks will operate on this Bde's front & four on the front of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Inf Bde. Prior to zero hour the attacking troops will be formed up immediately in rear of our present front line & at zero hour will advance in rear of the tanks & capture & consolidate the position. The action of the Tanks will

From	
Place	
Time	

Sent	Service	Date
At		From
To		By
By	(Signature of "Franking Officer")	

TO	Count		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
Az/B 209	10		

be as follows - at zero - 5 mins they will pass through our present front line & at zero will proceed in rear of the barrage working towards L'HONS & the woods in the vicinity thereof. On the capture of the objective they will patrol in front of same wif order to reduce any hostile positions on the immediate front. The action of the artillery will be as follows - At zero a creeping barrage will be put down on the grid line running from A8.A.O.5 to S.26.C.O.8. At zero + 2 mins it will advance at the rate of 100 yds in three mins. until it reaches a line 700 yds beyond the objective when it will remain

From	
Place	
Time	

Appendix

11  
41

At .....m. Service. Date.....  
 To 3 From .....  
 By ..... (Signature of "Franking Officer") By.....

TO { Cont'd

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA  
 W/B 209 10

Stationary in order to protect the consolidation. The Heavies will fire during the operation on CHAULNES & BOIS DE TRIANOULAIRE in accordance with instructions issued. Two sections of the 2nd Mly Coy are placed at the disposal of CO 8<sup>th</sup> Bn to assist in the operation. Zero hour will be 4 A.M.  
 ACKNOWLEDGE

From 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde  
 Place  
 Time 10.30 pm

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name  
 H. H. [Signature] Capt. [Signature]  
 See Major

\* This line should be erased if not required.

To Adj. S. Lt. Bn.  
 Company H.O. has been advanced to X 22 to 28. aas  
 I am ~~there~~ in touch on the right with 16 Platoon of D Coy 7 on the left with the 25<sup>th</sup> Bn. aas I have had a consultation with Captain Burtke who informs me that 7<sup>th</sup> Bn are unable to take over all his front & that he

Appendix  
 11  
 42

will remain where he is. aaa  
 Hq. 7th Bn. take over from  
 D company the distance between  
 the left flank of the 7th Bn.  
 & the right flank of the 25th.  
 Bn. will be roughly 800 yds. aaa This  
 I am holding with 3 platoons  
 & one in reserve at company  
 HQ.  
 Time  
 0710  
 H. C. C. forming  
 App. C. C. C.

TO Bn. H.Q.

Sender's Number. * M.G. 22	Day of Month.	In reply to Number. AAA
-------------------------------	---------------	----------------------------

At the request of Col Mullins  
 A + B Cos have taken up  
 a position with the left of  
 B Co resting on the road instead  
 of the right as laid down  
 in Fin operation Order.

From O. C. B Co

Place

Time 7.45

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) Stick bomb apt  
 Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

\* This line, except AAA, should be erased if not required.  
 Wt. W 3258/P511. 500,000 Pads. 1/18. B. & S. Ltd. (E2389.)

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Appendix

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150

Prefix.....	Code.....	Words.....	Received.	Sent, or sent out.	Office Stamp.
		£ s. d.	From <i>DOFU</i>	At.....m.	<i>10/8/18</i>
Charges to Collect			By <i>Don</i>	To.....	<i>118</i>
Service Instructions.				By.....	
Handed in at.....		Office.....	m.	Received.....	<i>2150/18</i>
TO	<i>Don (5 Bn)</i>				
*Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA		
<i>7H 15</i>	<i>10</i>				
<i>99<sup>th</sup></i>	<i>appear to be held</i>				
<i>up</i>	<i>on our left</i>				
<i>aaa</i>	<i>we are held up</i>				
<i>aaa</i>	<i>on account of</i>				
<i>mg</i>	<i>fire and heavy</i>				
<i>Casualties</i>	<i>aaa are in</i>				
<i>touch</i>	<i>with "B" who is</i>				
<i>also</i>	<i>held up M.G. fire</i>				
<i>from</i>	<i>left rear</i>				
<i>troublesome</i>	<i>aaa call</i>				
<i>one</i>	<i>officer left. (1st)</i>				
FROM	<i>VOLUN) aaaa line</i>				
TIME & PLACE	<i>approx 9.1.32 aaaa</i>				

Appendix

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Prefix	Code	Words	Received.	Sent, or sent out.	Office Stamp.
		£ s. d.	DOG V	At . . . . . m.	
Charges to Collect			From	To	
Service Instructions.			By	By	
Handed in at . . . . . Office . . . . . m.			Received . . . . . m.		
TO	BOBU (5 Brn)				
*Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA		
TH16	10				
Have reached about.					
R6A9.5 still going on.					
Casualties not yet be					
estimated aaaa enemy					
mg fire heavy aaaa					
and range short aaaa					
am in back with B Coy					
and can see 6th Coy					
FROM	O.C. A Coy				
TIME & PLACE	G. d. r. a. m.				

Handed in at . . . . . Office . . . . . m.				Received . . . . . m.
				5.30 P.
TO	M Field arty Bde			
*Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
	10 <sup>th</sup>			
Approx front line SE of				
BOIS CRESSY X.30				
Through wood in F1B to Ply line				
F.7B central and do not know				
situation EAST of BOIS CRESSY				
MGs holding up advance				
between our line and outskirts				
of L14ONS				
FROM	F.O.O. F.1.B			
PLACE & TIME	13.30			

Appendix

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TO	F.A. Co	1st F.A.B. H.Q.		
Sender's Number		Day of Month	In reply to Number	
*		10.		AAA
Present position of line Eastern Regiments	of ruins edge for.	approx wood from of S.O.S.	200 yds in these	F.6. A1. to Wood.
From				
Place				
Time	9-50.			
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.				
	(Z)	Kashentzky		

TO	Bn H.Q.			
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		
* M 420	10			AAA
<p>I am in touch with 9th Bn and am going to attempt to get forward with them. We have come too far to our right and reckon I am far about F.C. a and have my right forward of success in S1. Maps are atrociously bad, so am not absolutely sure of my whereabouts, but have agreed with O.C. a Coy and former officer of that location as I have stated are approximately correct.</p>				
From				
Place	X 0 a			
Time				

Appendix

11 146

Appendix

11

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Wagant  
to 1st 7

To		From	
By		By	
		(Signature of "Franking Officer")	
TO		5th Batta	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
LM 5	10th		
<p>Situation on our front aca          We have reached the blue line          except in 20 a s g to right boundary          There is also a pocket in our          line in large wood in squares          19. 20. 25. 26. aca          We are dealing with this wood          how aca This is the position          from which we seem to          be troubling you.</p> <p>5th Batta          Recd 12/10/18          This situation as they          is up          12/10/18</p>			
From	Place	Time	
	an 9th Bn		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.			(Z)
Censor.			Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

To		From	
By		By	
		(Signature of "Franking Officer")	
TO		5th Batta	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* T.H. 18	10	E.R. 106	
<p>Cannot understand 9th          being through as M.G.          fire from their front          is very heavy on          us aca We are          just a little to our          right and M.G. fire          from BOIS CRESSY is          very heavy. aca          to line and just been          9th - B - A - 6th all in          trench and all          are held up aca          J.A.A. is terribly          short all through</p>			
From	Place	Time	

Appendix

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TO	Continued		
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* T 1418	10		

only one tank  
 near us and  
 although dashing  
 about it, can't  
 do anything.  
 think it has just  
 been hit and  
 shelling (not  
 heavy) 5' 9" and 77<sup>5</sup>  
 am.

Casualties

LT. MANSELL KILLED  
 about 50 or 60 O.R.  
 killed and wounded.  
 aaa I do not think this is  
 overestimated as I have

From under 40 m time,  
 Place  
 Time 11.50 am

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

David M. M. M.

Prefix.....Code.....Words.....	Received.	Sent, or sent out.	Office Stamp.
t s. d.	From <i>Rowa</i>	At .....m.	<i>ET 600</i>
Charges to Collect	By <i>Chap</i>	To .....	<i>10/8/18</i>
Service Instructions		By .....	
Handed in at.....Office.....m.		Received <i>4.57</i>	
TO	<i>Y03U</i>		
*Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number.	AAA
<i>013206</i>	<i>10<sup>th</sup></i>	<i>—</i>	
<i>Motor loading post has</i>			
<i>been established at</i>			
<i>X21D41 for sketch cases</i>			
FROM	<i>Rowa</i>		
PLACE & TIME	<i>4.35 pm</i>		

Appendix

*1110*

TO		By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By	
TO		By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		AAA			
* 10.9.29	10						

Enemy reported missing in wood on 9<sup>th</sup> in front.

Enemy using 77<sup>s</sup> against us. Machine Gun fire increasing. Have decided with C. C. A. to remain where we are at present until flanks are able to get up to our assistance. ~~There~~ satisfied we cannot take guns in our front frontally without very heavy casualties. What about tanks?? I understand the

From

TO		By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By	
TO		By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		AAA			
* 10.9.29	10						

Tenth Batta. are in rear about 1000 yards with order to remain at that distance from us. Have not been in touch with them though. Please advise if they are supporting wif also. What our own supporting Coy. are. Do not think of an attack with present weakened Coy. advisable without some closer support. Approx angle of gun fire about 50 degrees. Want ammunition. Send up

From	J. J. J. J.		
Place	J. J. J. J.		
Time	J. J. J. J.		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.			
			(Z)
			C. C. B. Coy

Appendix 111

Support's  
Support's  
ly widened  
over a  
the as a  
with your  
dulligan 261  
Co. 101

09  
11

Appendix

SECRET. 5th 6th 7th 8th Bns and M.G. Coy. 1st Aust. Div. 1st A.I. Bde  
3rd A.I. Bde, 12th Canadian Bde.

AZB 209 10/8/18.

On the night of the 10/11th August the 8th Bn with one Coy of the 7th Bn attached will attack and capture the BLUE LINE. The 3rd A.I. Bde will co-operate on the left. The Bde boundaries for the attack will be as laid down for this morning's attack. The operation will be assisted by artillery and tanks. Six tanks will operate on this Bde's front and four on the front of the 3rd A.I. Bde. Prior to ZERO hour the attacking troops will be formed up immediately in rear of our present front line and at ZERO hour will advance in rear of the tanks and capture and consolidate the position. The action of the tanks will be as follows - At Zero - 5 minutes they will pass through our present front line and at Zero will proceed in rear of the barrage working towards LIONS and the woods in the vicinity thereof. On the capture of the objective they will patrol in front of same in order to reduce any hostile positions on the immediate front. The action of the artillery will be as follows - At Zero a creeping barrage will be put down on the grid line running from AS40.5 to 32500.8. At Zero plus 3 minutes it will advance at the rate of 100 yds in 3 minutes until it reaches a line 700 yds beyond the objective when it will remain stationary in order to protect the consolidation. The heavies will fire during the operation on CHAUMES and BOIS DE BRIANCOULAINS in accordance with instructions issued. 2 sections of the 2nd MG Coy are placed at the disposal of the C.O. 8th Bn to assist in the operation. Zero hour will be 4 a.m. ACKNOWLEDGE. (Sd.) H.F. WATSON, Capt.  
From 1st Aust. Div. Bde. Bde Major.  
Time 10.30 p.m.

Appendix

1/2  
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SECRET.5TH. BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 32.

11/8/18.

Reference : Sheet HARBONNIERS.

RELIEF.

1. Two Companies of 5th Bn. will relieve Two Companies 8th Bn in left sub-sector along R.D LINE shown on attached map.  
"C" Company will relieve on the Right.  
"D" " " " " " Left.  
5th Bn. boundary right will be a line from 4302.5 to F.5.8.2.9.  
5th Bn. left boundary will be Brigade boundary to and including road in E.26.9.9.2.  
Inter-Company boundary as shown on attached map.  
"A" & "B" Companies will remain in BLUE LINE as shown on attached map and will be in Support with "A" on the right.

MOVE.

2. Companies will take over by pushing forward small parties.

RESERVE.

3. Front line Companies will keep one platoon in reserve at Company Headquarters.

MOVEMENT.

4. As little movement as possible during relief.  
O.C. "C" Company will push forward as per verbal instructions.

GROUND FLARES.

5. Line Companies will carry ground flares.  
"A" & "B" Companies will hand over same to "C" & "D" Companies.  
O.C. "D" Company will relieve the guard of 1 N.C.O. & 3 O.R. at present at Wet Canteen in village of LIONS. This guard is at present supplied by 3rd Bde.

DISPOSITION  
SKETCHES.

6. Will be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible after relief.

ACKNOWLEDGE.(sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant

SECRET.5TH BN. OPERATION ORDER NO. 33.

11/8/18.

M.R. COL.

On night of 11/12th August 2nd. A. I. Bde will be relieved by 1st A.I. Bde.

On relief the 2nd A.I. Bde will move to Divisional Reserve.

5th Bn. will be relieved by 3rd Bn/ and move to Sq X.28.

"C" & "D" Companies will each send TWO guides per platoon to Bn. Hqrs on receipt of this order.

"A" & "B" Companies will each send ONE guide per platoon to Bn. Hqrs.

Maps will not be handed over. Spare S.A.A. and ground flares will be handed over. S.O.S. will be handed over and receipts obtained.

On relief "C" & "D" Companies will move to trench system at X.28.A.9.5.

On relief "A" & "B" Companies will move to Quarrybat X.28.B central.

Company Cookers will be located at Bn. Hqrs.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant

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List of Recommendations.

No.	Rank	Name	Recommended for	Date
3026	L/Cpl	Bloxsome N.R.	M.C.	14.8.18
828a	Pte	Cheverton J.	D.C.M.	"
	Lieut.	Béchervaise A.F.	M.C.	"
	"	Kirwood S.V. MM	M.C.	"
	"	Volum W.R.	M.C.	"
	"	Parker T.S.	M.C.	"
1027	Cpl	Allison M.R.	M.M.	"
1829	Sgt	Williams J. DCM & Bar	M.M.	"
3245	Cpl	Bunting J.	M.M.	"
445	Sgt	Moodie W.M.	M.M.	"
3782	Cpl	Dickson S.	M.M.	"
1770	Pte	Jackson F.W.	M.M.	"
1904	Sgt	Anderson R.A.	M.M.	"
31378	Pte	Young H.	M.M.	"
3439	"	Wills R.	M.M.	"
5358	"	Day G.C.	M.M.	"
386	Sgt	Piper G.T.	D.C.M.	"
4008	Pte	Mullane T.G.	D.C.M.	"
6731	"	Chalk H.O.	D.C.M.	"
7278	"	Kerr W.C.	D.C.M.	"
4768a	L/Cpl	Clarke C.A.	D.C.M.	"
6855	Pte	Barber H.	M.M.	"
703b	"	Wright M.G.	M.M.	"
6960	"	Brown C.M.	M.M.	"
7558	"	Smith T.H.	M.M.	"
	Capt.	Ricketson S. DCM	M.C.	16.8.18
4298	Pte	Stevens C.W.	M.M.	17.8.18
280	"	Merrin A.M. MM	Bar to M.M.	"
3495	"	Reid M.	M.M.	"
3409	Sgt	Simpson J.	M.M.	"
3855	Cpl	Haw A.H.	M.M.	"
7071	Pte	Ritchie W.	M.M.	"
919	Sgt	Kelly H.	M.C.	29.8.18
2nd ALTA Bty	Lieut	Darling J.	M.C.	"
	Lt. Capt	Anderson J.A.	M.C.	"
	Capt	Permezel E.G. de T.	M.C.	"
	"	Angel F.	M.C.	"
636	L/Cpl	Clark Jas.	D.C.M.	"
1018b	"	Webster V.	D.C.M.	"
4008	Pte	Mullane T.G.	D.C.M.	"
4762a	Sgt	Croskell A.P. MM	Bar to M.M.	"
5773	Pte	Thoms S.E. MM	Bar to M.M.	"
2478	"	Woods C.H.	M.M.	"
5734	"	Moore H.D.	M.M.	"
2821a	"	Booley H.	M.M.	"
2295	"	Cooper J.V.	M.M.	"
5984	L/Cpl	Caldwell R.J.	M.M.	"
204	Sgt	Clerk J.W.	M.M.	"
5365	Pte	Evans C.O.	M.M.	"
6044	"	McPherson A.S.	M.M.	"
4133	L/Cpl	Anderson T.L.	M.M.	"
208b	Pte	Ashman E.A. St.E.	M.M.	"
3990	T/Cpl	Moore W.	D.C.M.	"
2071	Pte	Kildea S.T.	M.M.	"

Headquarters, 5th Battalion  
12/8/18.KILLED IN ACTION.

Lieut. J. W. Mannsoll 5th Bn Killed in Action				9/8/18
	2nd Lt.	J. Colvin M.M.	"	"
"D"	No. 537a	L/Cpl H. Barling	"	"
	5386	" W. G. Heppner	"	"
	6594	Pte F. P. Tighe	"	"
	3688	" A. F. Anderson	"	"
	5720	" L. Kefoed	"	10/8/18
	3998	" A. F. Hawkon	"	"
"C"	3337	L/Cpl P. V. Mason	"	"
	2614	Pte H. H. Simpson	"	9/8/18
	3814	" G. Flanagan	"	"
	2493	" J. Keogh	"	"

WOUNDED.

Lieut. H. L. Simpson				Wounded	9/8/18
"C"	"	"	H. F. Morrison MC	"	"
	"	"	N.S. Maddox MC & Bar	"	"
	"	"	C. C. Hanson MC	"	"
	No. 3412	Sgt	R. Smith 5th Bn.	"	"
	4321	Cpl	S. R. Tivoy	"	"
	6370	Pte	T. Watson	"	"
	5062a	"	J. P. Clohesy	"	"
	6997	"	P. H. Davis	"	"
	2042a	"	H. C. Manning	"	"
	5668	"	H. Coutts	"	"
	4295	L/Cpl	A. E. Skelton	"	"
	6580	Pte	L. E. Sumner	"	"
	379	"	C. G. Broadhurst	"	"
	2414	"	F. W. Mitchell	"	"
	3144	L/Sgt	E. W. Jacobo	"	"
	578a	Bpa.	J. Dalton	"	"
	10627	L/Cpl	H. B. Gausor MM	"	"
	4204a	"	A. J. M. Walter	"	"
	6273	Pte	A. C. Hewitt	"	"
	6651	"	D. J. Jones	"	"
	6665	"	D. F. Duncan	"	"
	157a	"	A.C.M. Craig	"	"
	264a	"	R. E. Harman	"	"
	1559	Sgt	A. T. Johnson	"	"
	1336	Cpl	R. O. Allon	"	"
	6577	Pte	C. A. Shepherd	"	"
	4082a	"	A.O.C. Dandy	"	"
	4249	"	R. G. Matthews	"	"
	4145	"	W. A. Blackman 5th Bn.	"	"
"D"	6371	"	G. Walden	"	"
	6788	"	O. H. McPherson	"	"
	7346	"	S. J. Jury	"	"
	6087	"	L. B. Shaw	"	"
	6735	"	H. A. Davis	"	"
	3060	"	H. Cameron	"	"
	3518	"	F. W. Barham	"	"
	5354a	"	W. G. Mann	"	"
	6822	"	R. B. Troaky	"	"
	7526	"	L. S. McCall	"	"
	612c	L/Cpl	F. Dridan	"	"
	5382	Pte	S. P. Hastings MM	"	"
	1020b	"	L. Wilson	"	"
	7047a	"	T. S. Maxwell	"	10/8/18
	6743	"	P. A. Flower	"	"
	7615	"	A. E. Young	"	"
	1612	Cpl	E. Schwab MM	"	"
HQ	405b	Pte	H. C. Smith	"	"
"B"	3096	"	R. E. Winchcombe	"	"
"C"	6320	Cpl	S. E. Neilson	"	"
	5371	Pte	J. J. Ferguson	"	"
	762	B/Cpl	A. Hall MM & 2 Bars	"	"
	560a	L/Cpl	L. V. Zimmer 5th Bn	"	"
	947b	Pte	P. McCarthy	"	"

## CASUALTY LIST - 5th Battalion, -

Vol 29

## KILLED IN ACTION.

No.	Rank	Name	Unit	Status	Date
5058a	Pte	M. W. T. Collings	5th Bn.	Killed in Action	10/8/18
1764	"	G. Hyland	"	"	9/8/18

## MISSING.

No.	Rank	Name	Unit	Status	Date
7543	Lieut.	H. C. Morrison	5th Bn.	Missing	10/8/18
5739	Pte	F. A. Rance	"	"	12/8/18
	"	J. McCracken	"	"	10/8/18

## WOUNDED.

No.	Rank	Name	Unit	Status	Date
4281	Pte	W. Ramsay	5th Bn.	Wounded	9/8/18
5456	"	E. G. Anderson	"	"	"
7552	"	W. G. Richards	"	"	10/8/18
7536	"	T. E. R. Ferry	"	"	"
4970	"	W. Andrews	"	"	"
5777	"	I. O. Wangemann	"	"	"
5310	"	S. G. Milos	"	"	9/8/18
3324	"	A. G. Leigh	"	"	"
4304	"	T. J. Simula	"	"	"
3784	L/Sgt	J. B. Dixon	"	"	12/8/18
4852	Opl.	F. A. Mills	"	"	"
6855	Pte	H. H. Barber	"	"	"
6960	"	G. M. Brown	"	"	"
703b	"	M. G. Wright	"	"	"
7471	"	A. Duclos	"	"	11/8/18
3491	L/Opl	H. D. T. Power	"	"	12/8/18
4858	Pte	J. D. Mackinnon	"	"	"
833a	"	H. R. Burns	"	"	"

LIST OF CASUALTIES.

Appendix

1657

KILLED IN ACTION.

				5th Bn.	Killed in Action	
"A"	No.	Lieut. P.	J. O'FARRELL	"	"	11/8/18
		Sgt	J. Hodgo	"	"	10/8/18
		L/Cpl	D. S. McIntosh	"	"	"
		Pto	M. Newton	"	"	"
		"	W. Cleland	"	"	9/8/18
		"	G. S. Stafford	"	"	10/8/18
		"	J. W. Carr	"	"	"
"B"		Sgt	R. A. Hagar	"	"	"
		Pto	H. Boedlo	"	"	"
		"	J. J. Clarko	"	"	"
		"	C. W. Woodbridge	"	"	"
		"	F. W. Clotz	"	"	"
		"	J. Barrow	"	"	"
		L/Cpl	M. Clarke	"	"	"
		Pto	R. Chapman	"	"	"
		"	T. S. B. Beaver	"	"	"
		"	T. F. Bovis	"	"	"
		"	H. J. Daniel	"	"	"
"C"		"	C. C. McKonzie	"	"	11/8/18
		"	O. Jones	"	"	"
		"	O. Bishold	"	"	"
"D"		"	J. W. Borwick	"	"	"

WOUNDED.

				5th Bn.	Wounded	
		Lieut.	F. W. Corlott	"	"	9/8/18
		"	H. H. Barber MC	"	"	"
		"	A. Tavorer	"	"	10/8/18
		"	A. J. Robinson	"	"	"
"A"	No.	Sgt	W. Waterman	"	"	9/8/18
		Cpl	O. C. Murphy	"	"	"
		L/Cpl	R. L. Pennell	"	"	"
		"	J. Ritchie	"	"	"
		Pto	G. C. Knight	"	"	"
		"	H. H. Stewart	"	"	"
		"	W. Clifford	"	"	"
		"	H. Trevena	"	"	"
		"	A. Angus	"	"	"
		"	H. R. Tidy	"	"	"
		"	R. W. Lisson	"	"	"
		"	A. E. Harris	"	"	"
		"	L. Mullaly	"	"	"
		"	A. G. Perry	"	"	"
		"	R. J. King	"	"	"
		"	B. C. Mills	"	"	"
		"	F. W. Tozer	"	"	"
		Cpl	E. J. Burke	"	"	10/8/18
		Pte	T. H. Smith	"	"	"
		"	H. W. Atherton	"	"	"
		"	A. N. Hart	"	"	"
		"	T. W. Webster	"	"	"
		"	S. Williams	"	"	"
		"	H. P. Warren	"	"	"
		"	S. L. Andrews	"	"	"
		"	T. H. Brooks	"	"	"
		"	W. J. Critch	"	"	"
		"	P. J. Green	"	"	"
		"	F. G. Reid	"	"	"
		"	L. H. P. Smith	"	"	"
		"	R. Dowker	"	"	"
		"	G. E. Suggett	"	"	"
		"	N. G. Currie	"	"	"
		"	W. J. Chamberlain	"	"	"
		"	D. E. Nix	"	"	"
		"	A. Yates	"	"	"
		L/Cpl	J. L. Snodgrass	"	"	"
		Pto	R. R. McKay	"	"	"
		"	H. E. A. Poon	"	"	"

P.T.O.

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WOUNDED  
Appendix 16

Rank	Number	Name	5th Bn.	Wounded	Date	Notes
Cpl	7225	G. W. Warwick	"	"	10/8/18	
Pte	5150a	G. A. Guffe	"	"	"	
"	6460	H. J. Matthew	"	"	"	
L/Cpl	7457	R. K. Broso	"	"	"	
Pte	6501	H. S. Decker	"	"	"	
"	670b	C. H. Graham	"	"	"	
"	6489	A. J. Randall	"	"	"	
"	6618	S. Easton	"	"	"	
"	7546	F. J. Young	"	"	"	
Sgt.	4768a	E. J. Rogers	"	"	"	
L/Cpl	6844	C. A. Clarko	"	"	"	
Pte	975b	J. T. Wallace	"	"	"	
"	828a	F. Pickup	"	"	"	
"	8459	J. Choverton	"	"	"	
Cpl	6790	W. H. Storry	"	"	"	(Remd. on Du
Pte	6624	J. F. N. Mackimmon	"	"	"	
"	6744	W. B. Elliott	"	"	"	
"	6669	T. Finamore	"	"	"	
"	646	P. F. Koenoy	"	"	"	
Sgt.	678	J. F. McMillan	"	"	"	
Cpl.	593a	J. Banks	"	"	"	
Pte	7356	H. J. Wallor	"	"	"	
L/Cpl	7068	R. E. Jenkins	"	"	"	
Rank						
L/Cpl	7535	D. Orchard	"	"	"	
Pte	4328	G. O'Halloran	"	"	"	
"	3727	P. Taylor	"	"	"	
L/Cpl	6631	G. F. Brown	"	"	"	
"	5346	C. J. M. Mitchell	"	"	"	
"	5797	G. L. Cameron	"	"	"	
Pte	7215	W. H. Smith	"	"	"	
"	6274	W. G. Coombs	"	"	"	
"	6104	F. Hayes	"	"	"	
"	7437	H. T. Winter	"	"	"	
"	6521	A. H. Auhl	"	"	"	
"	3822	J. E. Kendall	"	"	"	
Sgt.	6467	J. G. Fulcher	"	"	"	
Pte	6482	H. G. Bockwith	"	"	"	
"	5051a	J. R. Davis	"	"	"	
"	8163a	P. F. Barrett	"	"	"	
"	6471	W. C. Brown	"	"	"	
L/Cpl	7278	S. L. M. Butler	"	"	"	
Pte	3026	W. C. Korr	"	"	"	
L/Cpl		N. R. Bloxsome	"	"	11/8/18 (remd. at duty)	
Rank						
Pte	5662	W. H. Evans	"	"	11/8/18	
"	772	E. Williams	"	"	"	
Sgt.	3424	D. A. Suthorland	"	"	"	
Pte	7327	M. THOMPSON	"	"	"	
"	7541	E. Ritchie	"	"	"	
"	925b	C. Knight	"	"	"	
"	6034	W. P. Luttick	"	"	"	
"	7107	F. W. Wholan	"	"	"	
"	7588	R. Wright	"	"	"	
"	4298	C. W. Skynner Stevens	"	"	"	
"	7614	A. Griffiths	"	"	"	
Pte	3464	W. H. May MM	"	"	"	(remd. at aut
L/Cpl	3879	A. McDonald	"	"	"	
"	2876	H. W. Johnson	"	"	"	
Pte	8749	J. A. Charters	"	"	"	
"	8950	W. Rayment	"	"	"	
"	7613	J. T. Splatt	"	"	"	
"	654a	S. Middleton	"	"	"	
"	7804	M. Burke	"	"	12/8/18	
Pte		S. Barber	"	"	9/8/18	

SECRET.      5th BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 34      15/8/18.

Reference : Sheet HARBONNIERS.

- RELIEF.      1. 2nd A.I.Bde will be relieved on afternoon of 15th August by 2 Battalions of the 132nd AMERICAN REGT. who will arrive in Squares X22 & X28 by 7 p.m.
- MOVE.      2. 5th Bn. will move at 5.30 p.m. to the CERISY area irrespective of the arrival of the 132nd Americans.
- STARTING POINT & TIME.      3. Head of column will leave present camp at 5.30 p.m.
- ROUTE.      4. X28B - HARBONNIERS - BAYONVILLERS - CERISY.
- ORDER OF MARCH.      5. Headquarters, "D", "C", "B" & "A" Coys..
- DISTANCES.      6. Following distances will be maintained:-  
100 yards between platoons  
200    "                      Companies.
- LEWIS GUNS.      7. One half limber per Company will be available at Bn Hqrs at 5 p.m. to-night for Lewis Guns. A.A.Gun will be carried on L.G. limber and will be ready for instant use against E.A.
- COOKERS.      8. Will proceed independently and will carry evening meal in course of preparation.
- TRANSPORT.      9. Will move independently under the orders of the Brigade T.O.
- NUCLEUS.      10. Will rejoin Battalion on arrival at CERISY area.
- COMPLETION OF MOVE.      11. Will be notified to Bn. Hqrs.
- REPORTS.      12. To head of column.

ACKNOWLEDGE;

(sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.,  
Adjutant.

SECRET.

Copy No....

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.

17/8/18.

BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No. 35.

Appendix

18/60

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Reference Shoot  
62 D.

MOVE. 1. 2nd A.I. Bde. will move by March Route of the 18th inst. to HAMELET Area.

STARTING POINT AND TIME.

2. Head of Column will pass Starting Point Q8.b.2.8, at 8.30 a.m. Companies will be formed up ready to move at 8.25 a.m.

ORDER OF MARCH.

3. H.Q. Sigs and Intell., H.Q. Details, "A" "B" "C" "D" Coys. Water Duties and Police.

ROUTE. 4. Q.8.b.2.8, Q.7.a.3.8 7, P.4.d.1.2, P.2.c.6.7 to HAMELET.

DISTANCES. The following distances will be maintained. - Between Coys. 100 yds.  
5. between Platoons 100 yards.

HALTS. 6. Of 10 minutes at 10 minutes to each clock hour.

DRESS. 7. Marching Order.

TRANSPORT. Transport will move independently under orders of Brigade T.O.

LEWIS GUNS. Company L.G. Limbers will report to Companies at 7.30 a.m. to collect Lewis Guns. A.A. Guns will be carried on Coy. Cookers.

COOKERS. 10. Cookers will move in rear of Companies with midday meal in course of preparation.

VALISES, BLANKETS, COMPANY AND REGIMENTAL RECORDS &c.

11. Blankets will be rolled in bundles of 10 and clearly marked, and dumped at "A" Coy.'s Cooker at 7.30 a.m., also Coy. Record Boxes. Each Coy. will detail 2 men to act as guard over the blankets. Officers' valises and blankets of Headquarters Details will be dumped at Q.M. Store at the same hour. R.S.M. will detail 2 men to act as guard on H.Q. Blankets.

ADVANCE PARTY. Lieut. R.A. Guff and 1 N.C.O. per Coy. and 1 for H.Q. with 12. bicycles will report to Capt. Maltby at Area Commandant's Office HAMELET at 8 a.m. This party will assemble at B.H.Q. at 7 a.m.

TRENCH SHELTERS. All Trench Shelters will be folded and dumped near "B" Coy's Cooker by 7.30 a.m. T.O. will arrange for limber to report at that hour to convey Shelters to Area Commandant's Office CERISY -GAILLY. Lt. Gillies will obtain receipt in triplicate from the Area Commandant for Trench Shelters handed over.

ROUTINE. 14. Reveille 6 a.m., Breakfast 6.30, Sick Parade 7.30.

REPORTS. 15. To Head of Column.

COMPLETION OF MOVE. 17. To be notified to Battalion Headquarters.

18. Acknowledge.

(Sgd.) O. Riggs;  
Lieut., Adjutant.

Copy No.	To whom	Method	Copy No.	To whom	Method.
1	File		5.	Brigade	Runner
2 - 4	War Diary		7.	"B" Coy.	"
6.	"A" Coy.	Runner	9.	"D" "	"
8.	"C" "	"	11.	T.O.	"
10.	Q.M.	"	13.	R.S.M.	"
12.	Sig. & Intell.	"			

E.R. 120  
21/8/18.

O.C.  
5th Battalion Nucleus Company.

Please send the following men-to report to their Company  
Commanders at once -

<u>WA<sup>N</sup> COY.</u>	6044	Pte	McPherson A.R.	1623b	Pte	DaFonte A.
	208b	"	Ashman H.A.	5608	"	Mortison T.
	7445	"	Brown H.C.	7515	"	Morris V.F.
	833a	"	Jones A.	7495	"	Hetchin F.J.
<u>WB<sup>N</sup> COY.</u>	3782	Cpl	Dickson S.B.	3777	"	Dondley H.J.
	5712	Pte	Barnett M.	7465	"	Cleary T.
	3283	"	Fright A.J.	6639	"	Silvester G.B.
	7469	"	Dodd A.E.	5698	"	Goodwill A.J.
<u>WC<sup>N</sup> COY.</u>	3335	Cpl	Marshall P.H.	884	L/Cpl	Piper V.W.
	2294	Pte	Bulford W.	6891	Pte	Higgins P.
<u>WD<sup>N</sup> COY.</u>	922	Sgt	Kellaway V.	7844	T/Cpl	Dew H.
	4008	Pte	Mullane T.G.	4893	Pte	Hoxboud R.
	2091	"	Thompson W.A.	7458	"	Garboen H.
	3685	"	Allen V.P.	5360	"	Doolum W.J.

*copy to*  
Lieut-Colonel  
Commanding 5th Battalion A.I.F.

Appendix

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NOMINAL ROLL OF N.C.O.s & MEN AT NUCLEUS.

Headquarters 201 Sgt Cunningham M.D. 311 Sgt Phillips G.H. MM (Sick)  
 3134 Sgt Standing V.S. 5245a " Watson Jas.  
 3972 Sgt Wood W.  
Signallers 20 Pte Baldarini J.F. 2681 Pte Sibson T.H.  
Intelligence 2430 " Callaghan D. 7490 " Barrett G.F.

WAR COY.

Bowls Gunners 6014 Pte ~~McPherson A.R.~~ 7515 Pte Morris V.F.  
 1622a " ~~De Wombo A.~~ 3609 L/Opl Anderson W.H.  
 2085 " ~~Adams H.A.~~ 7549 Pte Rodgers G.R.P.  
 6727 " Clark R.W. 3059 " Dye F.C.  
 1305 " Ryan P. 2506 " Harris R.H.  
Signallers 3608 " ~~Mortimer H.~~ 833A " Jones A.  
 7445 " ~~Brown H.C.~~ 7495 " ~~Hutchins H.J.~~  
Bombers 6520 " Koir W.M. 5738 " Moad L.G.  
 35 L/Sgt ~~McLeod J.L.~~ 5359 L/Opl ~~Dickson L.R.~~ (Schools)  
 3757 Sgt ~~Candy P.S.~~  
 2514 L/Opl ~~Muir R.~~ (Rost Camp) 3736 Pte ~~Gabill L.J.~~ (Rost Camp)  
 6240 Pte ~~Dawson S.J.~~ do.

WAR COY.

445 Sgt ~~Medio W.M.~~ 3782 Cpl ~~Dickson S.V.~~  
 6550 T/Opl ~~McCallum T.A.~~  
Bowls Gunners 3777 Pte ~~Densley H.J.~~ 6712 Pte ~~Barnett M.~~  
 7465 " ~~Gleary T.~~ 6328 Dr/Mjr ~~Pickott F.~~  
Bombers 2335 " ~~Dawson T.~~ 6247 Pte ~~Elms G.B.~~  
 3283 " ~~Fright A.J.~~ 6639 " ~~Silvester G.B.~~  
 7469 " ~~Dodd A.H.~~ 8376 " ~~Glanville G.B.~~  
 2721 " ~~Wilson H.H.~~ 4172 " ~~Cogloy W.C.~~  
 1310 " ~~Nelson J.~~  
Scouts 5693 " ~~Goodwill J.~~  
Signallers 6635 " ~~Murphy T.H.~~ 5376 " ~~Fullerton W.J.~~  
 3026 T/Opl ~~Bloxsome N.R.~~ (Rost Camp) 3037 Pte ~~Brockle J.G.~~  
 5786 Pte ~~Worsley E.H.~~ do. (Rost Camp)  
 96 QSM ~~Smith D.~~ MO

WAR COY.

143 S/Sgt ~~Shackel A.H.~~ 3335 Cpl ~~Marshall P.H.~~  
 284 L/Opl ~~Piper V.W.~~  
Bowls Gunners 126 Cpl ~~Hall R.J.~~ 284 L/Opl ~~Soccolghini T.~~  
Bombers 799 Pte ~~Honey A.L.~~ MM 2673 Pte ~~Hargroves A.L.~~  
 5694 " ~~George L.A.~~ 335b " ~~Maher F.D.~~  
 3333 " ~~Mann E.~~ 2294 " ~~Bulford W.~~  
 6291 " ~~Higgins E.J.~~  
Scouts 377 " ~~Stensfield H.J.~~  
Signaller 5736 " ~~Deady A.E.~~  
 5060A Pte ~~Clarke W.~~ (Rost Camp) 5406 Pte ~~Wayne A.~~ (Rost Camp)  
 2286 " ~~Quin T.~~ do.

WAR COY. Schools

907 Sgt. ~~Morrison A.T.~~ 2591 Sgt ~~Foster J.J.~~  
 3995 Pte ~~Vandy L.~~  
Bowls Gunners 932 Sgt ~~Kellaway V.~~ 7244 T/Opl ~~Dow H.~~  
 2091 Pte ~~Thompson W.A.~~ 7458 Pte ~~Garbeon H.~~  
 3685 " ~~Allen V.P.~~ 5360 " ~~Docley W.J.~~  
 3015 L/O ~~Bedford W.~~ 490 L/Opl ~~Newman A.~~ MM  
 235b Pte ~~Bond T.J.~~ 6727 Pte ~~Lee R.M.C.~~  
Bombers 7200 " ~~Beyle P.J.~~ 7345 " ~~Garracher P.J.~~  
 7311 " ~~Rarkin T.~~ 2577 " ~~Clements A.~~  
 554A " ~~Sells J.~~ 323 " ~~Bales A.V.~~  
 6520 " ~~Koir W.M.~~  
Scouts 4008 " ~~Mullane T.G.~~ 4893 " ~~Newbound R.~~  
 2827 " ~~Free N.J.~~  
 716 QMS ~~Ling T.J.~~ 120 Cpl ~~Atkins E.~~

21/8/18.

ORDER

5th AUST. INFANTRY  
BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 36

Reference HARBONNIERES Sheet.

MOVE

1. 2nd. A. I. Bde. will move by march route on the night 21/22nd August to the support area of the 14th A.I. Bde.

STARTING POINT & TIME

2. Head of column will pass Starting Point (O. 6. D. 6. 2) at 8 p.m. Companies will form up in column of route with head of column at Starting Point at 7.55 p.m.

ROUTE

3. O. 6. D. 6. 1 W. HAMEL W. WARFUSSES FOUCAUCOURT ROAD as far as Q 29, thence to billets.

ORDER OF MARCH

4. H.Q. Details, "WON", "WBN", "WDA", & "WA" Companies, Billets.

DISTANCES

5. The following distances will be maintained: 100 yards between platoons, 100 yards between Companies.

HALTS

6. There will be halts of 10 minutes at 10 minutes to each clock hour.

ARMED

7. Fighting order; great coats rolled and carried on top of haversacks.

TRANSPORT

8. Transport will move independently under the orders of the Brigade T.O. Cookers. Company Cookers will move in rear of Companies.

HEAVY GUNS

9. L.G. limbers will be loaded by 6 p.m. and will move in rear of leading platoon and Companies. A.A. Guns will be carried ready for instant use, on L.G. limbers.

VALISES

10. Valises, felt hats clearly marked and Regimental and Company record boxes so will be stacked at Q.M. Store by 6 p.m. today.

TRENCH SHEDDERS

11. All tents and trench shelters will be stacked on road near "WA" Company by 3.45 p.m. 21st instant. Companies will obtain receipts from Sgt. O. S. V. DANSON for trench shelters so returned. T.O. will arrange for limber to convey shelters so, to Area Commandant WANDER. Sgt. DANSON will obtain receipt for same in TRIPLECAUSE.

NUCLEUS

12. Nucleus Company will move to billets at CORBIN at 3 p.m. Completion of move will be notified to Bn. Hqs.

REPORTS

13. Reports to head of column.

ACKNOWLEDGE  
Method

No.	To whom	Method
1	File	
2	War Diary	
5	Brigade	Runner
6	O.C. "WA" Coy	"
7	" "WBN" "	"
8	" "WON" "	"
9	" "WDA" "	"
10	S.O.	"
11	Sig. Officer	"
12	Int. M	"
13	Q.M.	"
14	R.C.M.O.	"
15	R.S.C.M.	"

(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut. Adjutant.

SECRET.

Copy No ..... 5

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
22/8/18.BATTALION OPERATION ORDER NO. 37.

Reference H-BONNIERES Sheet &amp; Aero photo.

1. On 2 day 2nd A.I. Bde in conjunction with 97th Inf Bde on the right, and 1st A.I. Bde on the left, will attack and capture enemy's position as far as GREEN line shown on attached map.

BOUNDARIES.

2. Bde, Battalion and inter Company boundaries will be as shown on attached map.

ATTACK.

3. The attack will be carried out on a two Battalion front-5th and 6th Battalions being in the line, 6th Battalion on the right, 5th Battalion on the left, 8th Battalion in Support right, 7th Battalion in Support left.

METHOD OF ATTACK.

4. (a) Prior to ZERO, 5th Battalion will be formed up on the taped line with "B" Company on the right, "C" Company on the left, "A" Company in Support right, "D" Company in Support left. 7th & 8th Battalions will be formed up in Support (approximately 1000 yards in rear of taped line). All troops will be in position 60 minutes prior to ZERO.
- (b) At 30 minutes prior to ZERO the front line troops of the 14th A.I. Bde will be withdrawn from the forward posts and will re-occupy same on attacking troops moving forward.
- (c) On barrage commencing to move forward at ZERO plus 3 "B" & "C" Companies preceded by TANKS will move forward to the attack, each with two platoons in the front line and H.Qrs and one platoon in second line. "A" & "D" Companies will move forward 50 yards in rear of "B" & "C" Companies in artillery formation. 7th Battalion will follow in artillery formation, approximately 1000 yards in rear of 5th Battalion.
- (d) "A" & "D" Companies will be responsible for "Mopping up" the area in rear of the front line Companies.
- (e) On the GREEN line being captured, consolidation will be commenced forthwith and Companies will be disposed in depth. "A" & "D" Coys. will consolidate a position approximately 600 yards in rear of GREEN line.

ACTION OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

5. 5. At ZERO a barrage will be placed on a line 200 yards in front of the taped line. At ZERO plus 3 minutes the barrage will lift at the rate of 100 yards in 2 minutes for three lifts. On the fourth lift it will lift at the rate of 100 yds in 3 minutes until it reaches the line R.23.D.5.8 - R.17.G.7.5 where it will halt for 15 minutes. On commencing to move forward again the barrage will lift at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes up to and beyond the GREEN line when it will halt for 15 minutes and then cease.

ACTION OF TANKS.

6. Action of Tanks will be:-
  - (a) Six tanks from 13th Tank Battalion will work on the Battalion frontage, 3 on the right and 3 on the left.
  - (b) Tanks for the operation will be assembled in the

P.T.O.

(2)

the MORCOURT Valley by dawn on 22nd August.  
At 9.30 p.m. on Y-Z night the tanks will commence to move forward to the tank start line, 1000 yards in rear of the taped line. They will reach the taped line at ZERO hour in order to deploy in front of the Infantry when the barrage lifts at ZERO plus 3 minutes.

- (c) Two tanks (when the tanks start to move forward to the assault a light will be flashed from the rear of the tanks) on passing the wood at E 29 will swing to the LEFT and clear up the forward edges of wood and valley. Four tanks will work through the wood in R 29 and R23. Two tanks will skirt the left edge of the wood, swinging to the right on passing same, and clear up the forward edge of the wood and the valley.
- (d) On the barrage moving forward after the 15 minutes halt, all tanks will work straight on to the GREEN line and beyond.
- (e) Half an hour after the Infantry are established in their objective tanks will be released, on the signal from Company by raising the steel helmet on the end of the rifle, and will then rally in MORCOURT Valley.

VICKERS M.G. 7. Half a section of 2nd M.Gun Company is allotted to each of "B" & "C" Companies and will accompany them in the advance but will not move forward from the Support Line during consolidation, and will then come under the orders of the O.C. 2nd M.G. Coy.

A.L.T.M. 8. One gun of 2nd A.L.T.M. Battery is allotted to each "B" and "C" Coys. and will move forward with Companies during advance.

ZERO HOUR 9. Zero Hour will be notified later.

BN. HEADQRS. 10. Location of Battalion Headquarters will be notified later.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS. 11. Will be issued later.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sgd.) A. O. RIGG, Lieut.,  
ADJUTANT.

Copy No.	Issued to	Method.
1.	File	X
2 - 4	War Diary	-
5.	Brigade	Runner
6.	7th Bn.	"
7.	2nd M.G. Coy.	"
8.	2nd A.L.T.M. Bty.	"
9.	6th Bn.	"
10.	Tanks	"
11.	"A" Coy.	"
12.	"B" Coy.	"
13.	"C" Coy.	"
14.	"D" Coy.	"
15.	Sig. Officer	"
16 - 20	Spare.	"

## BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No.1

Appendix 1

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66

Issued under Battalion Order 37. . . .

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
22/8/18.

1. Synchronisation of Watches. Lieut. ANDERSON will leave Bn. Hqrs. at 5 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. on Y day, and will synchronise watches with all Companies.
2. S.O.S. Signal. The S.O.S. Signal for the operation will be that at present in use, viz., rifle grenade bursting into red over red over red. The S.O.S. Signal will be inoperative on the Divisional front for 15 minutes before zero.
3. Assembly of Troops.
  - (a) The 5th and 6th Bns. will form up on a taped line laid under Brigade arrangements and as shown on barrage map issued to all concerned and not on the line as shown on map issued with Bn. Order No. 37.
  - (b) From this taped forming up line tapes will be run to the rear defining the Brigade and inter-Battalion boundaries and forward giving the directing line.
  - (c) The 7th and 8th Bns. will form up a line 500 yards in rear of and approximately parallel with the FRAMERVILLE-TROYART ROAD.
  - (d) In moving to the forming up positions cross country routes will be used. The WARFUSEL-FOUCAUCOURT ROAD will be avoided.
  - (e) Coys. will meet guides at 55th Bn. Headquarters who will lead all troops into position by zero minus 60 minutes.
4. Tanks. Unless the situation urgently demands their further employment tanks will be released automatically 2 1/2 hours after zero, and will re-assemble in the valley North of TROYART.
5. Smoke. Artillery smoke screen will be placed on BRAY SPUR in L.29 and across the mouth of the CHOINOLLES VALLEY. In addition aircraft will drop smoke bombs on selected positions. No special percentage of smoke will be put down to define the fall of the creeping barrage, the barrage halt of 15 minutes or the final protective barrage.
6. Signalling. Sig. Officer will arrange for a line to be laid to Line Coys.
7. Liaison. (a) "C" Coy. will detail parties to meet parties from the 1st Aust. Inf. Bde at R.23.Central and R.24.B.1.O.  
(b) Coys. will detail Officers or senior N.C.Os to keep liaison with flanking Companies.  
(c) 5th and 6th Bns will each detail one reliable N.C.O. or private to accompany each tank operating on their Bn front. These men will be carried in the tank and will work under the orders of the Officers in charge of the tanks. They will report to the C.O. 13th Tank Bn. at Q.13.A.1.2 by 6 p.m. on the 22nd instant.
8. Aeroplanes;
  - (a) Contact aeroplanes. 1. Red ground flares will be lit to indicate infantry positions. Flares will be lit by the most advanced line of infantry only. Not the whole of the flares will be lit at the first call, a proportion will be kept back and lit on subsequent calls.  
2? Contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the objective at zero plus 2 hours. Call for flares is a succession of "As" on the Claxton Horn and the firing of a white Very Light. If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately it will call again after ten minutes. If it fails to obtain a reply

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it will repeat its calls at half hour intervals. These aeroplanes are distinguished by rectangular panels 2 ft. by 1 ft. on both lower planes about 3 ft from the fuselage.

3. Metal disc will be flashed to indicate positions of most advanced infantry. Positions will also be indicated by laying three or four rifles parallel to one another at regular intervals across the top of the trench.

(b) Counter Attack Aeroplanes. From zero hour counter attack aeroplanes will be constantly in the air. The signal to infantry when enemy troops are preparing for a counter attack is a white parachute flare fired in the direction of the impending counter attack.

(c) Ammunition Carrying Aeroplanes.

(I) These machines have the underside of the lower planes painted black for a distance of 2 1/2 feet from the tips.

(II) Ammunition will be dropped for Vickers Guns.

8. Intelligence and disposal of Prisoners of War. Instructions contained in paras. 1;2;3;4;5;8 and 9 of Divisional Battle Instructions No.1 issued on 7th inst. will be adhered to during the forthcoming battle. In the light of the operations of the 9th inst. and succeeding days the following points and additional instructions are issued and emphasised:-
- (a) Captured documents except those upon Bn. Commanders can take immediate action will be forwarded to Bde Hqrs as quickly as possible. German Official instruments and apparatus should also be forwarded.
- (b) It is essential that the locality where documents are found or prisoners captured be reported. The number of the Bn. making the capture is a useful indication though if possible the actual location should be stated.
- (c) The P.O.W. cage will be established in the vicinity of the MORCOURT-PROYART ROAD in Q.17.C or D. The Divl Intelligence Officer will be in attendance. Numerous sign boards will be in position indicating the cage.
- (d) In order to effect economy in personnel and in time the following method for the collection and disposal of prisoners during the forthcoming operations will be used:-
- (I) The A.P.M. will have a screen of mounted Military Policemen stationed along the Divisional front at an approximate distance of 1 mile from the front line. This screen will cover all routes from the front line in the Divisional area. Adjacent routes in flanking areas will also be watched.
- (II) Bn. escorts will be instructed to take prisoners of war to the rear and to deliver them to the 1st Aust Divl mounted Military Policeman they meet; who will hand the escort a typed receipt. Escorts will be instructed that in the unlikely event of missing members of the M.M.P. screen they will proceed to the Divl P.O.W. cage on the MORCOURT-PROYART ROAD.
- (III) The A.P.M. will keep a reserve of M.M.P. at the Divl cage for filling gaps in the screen and at Hqrs of Bde in the line for prisoners who may be miss directed.
- (IV) Close touch between the Divl cage and D.H.Q. will be maintained and any information of value gained by the Divl Intelligence Officer will be immediately forwarded to those concerned. Attempts will be made to maintain direct touch between Hqrs of Bdes in the line and the Divl cage.
- (v) The A.P.M. will keep a close check of the number of prisoners taken by particular units.
9. Success Signal. This signal will be a rifle grenade

bursting into white over white over white. A proportion of these signals will be carried by each platoon, and will be fired under orders of an Officer on reaching the Green Line.

10. Consolidation. (a) The final objective will be that shown on the barrage map issued to all concerned and not that shown on the map issued with Bn. Order.  
 (b) Consolidation will be carried out on this line and in depth in rear, but every effort must be made to exploit success and to push out posts at least 300 yards in front of the objective as laid down. This will be done under cover of the protective barrage and later under cover of the heavies.  
 (c) Two sections of the 2nd Field Coy. are detailed to assist in the consolidation of the line on the final objective and will move up immediately that objective is reported to have been captured.  
 (d) 7th and 8th Bns will each detail carrying parties of 50 men for the purpose of carrying R.E. material to the final objectives. These parties will be placed on the left flank of the 8th Bn. and the right flank of the 7th Bn and will be accompanied each by an Officer from the 2nd Field Coy during the advance. Each party will be told off into detachments of 25, each under an Officer or senior N.C.O. Should the 7th & 8th Bns become engaged in the fighting and the C.Os consider that these parties cannot be spared, the Field Coy Officers accompanying them will be informed.  
 (e) The Support Line will be constructed on the general line R.35.B - R.29D; - R.29B. - R.23.D. One Company of the 1st Pioneer Bn will assist the 7th and 8th Bns in the constructions of this line.

(f) All lines and posts will be wired as rapidly as possible. In addition to the carrying parties detailed above 3 supply tanks will carry R.E. material forward.

(g) Joint posts will be established by units concerned at the following locations (approximately) R.23 Central - R24.B.1.0 - R.36.A.4.0 - M.31.B.5.0 - R.35.Central - R.30.Central - R29 Central.  
 12. Dress. Fighting order with ground sheet rolled: 220 rounds of SAA 2 rifle grenades, 1 ground flare, 1 iron ration and filled water bottle/ A proportion of men will carry S.O.S. signals and success flares. 25% of the support Coys of the attacking Bns and the advanced Coys of the Support Bns will carry picks and shovels in the proportion of 1 pick to four shovels.

13. General.

(a) The 7th and 8th Bns will maintain a distance of 1000 yds in rear of the 5th and 6th Bns during the advance and will not become engaged in the fighting unless the attack is hung up. Should the necessity for the assistance for the support Bns arise C.Os of these Bns will act on their own initiative but will immediately notify Bde Hqs of their action, taken.  
 (b) C.Os will move forward in touch with their Bns as the advance progresses and will establish their Hqs at locations from which the progress of the operations can be observed and controlled  
 (c) Attacking Bns will not delay the advance by thoroughly mopping up all dugouts but must push on the clearing up being left to the rear troops.


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ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sd.) AWO. RIGG, Lieut.  
 Adjutant.

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
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
Vol 29  
1:40,000

Map used by 5<sup>th</sup> Bn AIF during operations of 9<sup>th</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> 11<sup>th</sup> August 1918  
Parts of 62° 62' 66° 66'

# ENEMY SECTOR ORGANIZATION

- REFERENCE**
- Army boundary
  - Corps boundary
  - Divisional boundary
  - Support Troops
  - Reserve Troops
  - Corps Headquarters
  - Divisional Headquarters
  - Other Headquarters
  - Ammunition Dumps
  - Supply Dumps
  - Railheads (Arrow denotes section served)
  - Detraining Point, ditto
  - Rest Biliets & Camps
  - Hospitals
  - Aerodromes
  - Railways - Broad gauge Double
  - Single
  - Light Railway
  - Artillery Positions - Field
  - Heavy
  - Calibre uncertain

NOTE - Artillery positions shown are those which have been recently been established as above. There are in addition other batteries not definitely located. H.Q. shown in brackets are approximate locations only.



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ENEMY SECTOR ORGANIZATION

6000  
1/10/44

TO 5 Bn

Sender's Number. P 4 Day of Month. 23 In reply to Number. AAA

I am in your GREEN LINE but it is imperative that help is given to the left as the enemy appear to have still in the right edge of wood. Please send as urgent and send up 36 grenades. S.A.H. 36 grenades

From B Co

Place Time 6.25

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]

TO Adjt 5th Bn

Sender's Number. A 5 Day of Month. 23 In reply to Number. AAA

Final objective gained - opposition very slight. (sometimes slight). Am now pushing out, but consolidate ~~with~~ on line arranged. Am in touch with 4th Bn on left & B Co on right. Right flank's advance slow.

From C Co

Place Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]

Appendix

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TO  
 5th Bn  
 P. 12.  
 G. 2  
 12th Bn  
 1918

Adir  
 5th Bn

Appendix  
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Secret

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
29/8/18.

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS

CARRIED OUT BY 5TH BATTALION ON 23rd, 24th & 25th AUG. 1918.

Reference: HARBONNIERS Shoot 1: 40,000.

The Battalion after the operations of 10/11th instant moved to GERISY and then to HAMELLET Area, where it remained resting and re-organising until the 21st instant.

On night of 21st August Brigade Commander held a conference of Battalion Commanders in CORBIE where it was decided that the 2nd A.I.Bd would attack and capture the BLUE line as shown on attached map (Zero time and date to be notified later.) 6th Battalion to attack on Right, 5th Battalion on Left through ST. MARTIN WOODS, 8th Battalion in support to 6th Bn. with 7th Bn. supporting 5th Battalion on Left.

At this conference full discussion took place and detailed instructions were given to all Unit Commanders, together with maps. This enabled Unit Commanders to reconnoitre the area prior to attack and together with maps and aerial photos as issued, proved to be of great assistance in subsequent events.

It enabled every man to know his role in the attack and it also enabled Company Commanders to explain to the men what was expected of them.

All arrangements of the attack were gone into thoroughly and it left little, if anything, wanting in arrangements to perfect this attack.

Orders were issued for Battalion to move from HAMELLET on evening of 21st instant - head of column to pass Starting Point at 8.20 p.m. Battalion moved off in column of platoons at 50 yds between platoons.

DRESS, Dress being as for the attack - Fighting Order and ground shoots.

Battalion took over from two Companies of the 55th Battalion in R 19 O, relief being completed by 12.30 a.m.

22nd August, Battalion spent day resting in this area.

It was decided for attack to take place on morning of the 23rd August, Zero hour being fixed at 4.45 a.m.

At 2 a.m. on morning of 23rd instant Battalion moved into Assembly Position on tape line, as laid down in Brigade Orders - 2 Companies in front line and 2 Companies in Support, Battalion was in position 60 minutes before Zero.

This assembly was covered by patrols of front line troops of 55th Battalion, these being withdrawn 15 minutes prior to Zero. 4 casualties occurred through shell fire moving to Assembly Position but Battalion had no casualties while formed up on tape.

At ZERO Battalion moved forward under cover of an Artillery barrage. At ZERO plus 3 minutes advance commenced.

The Tanks which were to proceed and move forward with the attack were late getting into position with the result that Companies had to move forward without the support of tanks. These subsequently came up and afterwards took part in the advance.

Seven minutes prior to Zero 2 red lights were put up by the enemy (apparently his S.O.S.), evidently he had heard the tanks moving. No action seemed to follow his S.O.S. as it was not repeated until the artillery barrage came down at Zero and then all along the line the enemy S.O.S. was put up.

Soon after advance commenced prisoners started to pour in and they were immediately formed up and sent to rear. Advance went forward well under cover of a well placed barrage and no serious check was met during the whole of the advance. Stokes Mortars proved of great help in dealing with any slight check caused by enemy Machine Guns. Very little shell fire was experienced in the early stages of the advance as it would appear that enemy barrage line was well in rear.

On reaching ST. MARTIN WOODS two Support Companies had to be pushed forward into the front line to assist in the mopping up and

P. T. O.

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS

and clearing of these woods. 7th Battalion were thus able to move forward into close support but at no time was it found necessary for these troops to be used in the front line.

I have no remarks to make as regards the artillery barrage. The barrage right through proved to be very effective and this was apparent by the number of prisoners who remained in dugouts.

The smoke screen was too far back for me to be able to report on same as there was such a lot of smoke and dust that it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe.

Tanks undoubtedly proved of great assistance during the attack, both as regards attacking and later as baggage tanks which enabled ammunition and engineers material to be carried forward very early in the attack.

Communication. Communication was good right throughout the attack with the exception that the line from Brigade to Battalion might have come forward a little sooner than it did (that is 8 hours).

Lieut-Colonel  
Commanding 5th Battalion A.I.F.

Orders were issued for Battalion to move from ...  
at 8.30 p.m. Battalion moved off in column of platoons at 8.30 p.m.  
Barrage, being fired on for the attack - fighting order and ground  
Battalion took over from two Companies of the 5th Battalion  
in 19.0, relief being completed by 18.30 p.m.  
Battalion spent day working in this area.  
It was ordered for attack to take place in morning of the  
23rd August, zero hour being fixed at 4.45 a.m.  
At 8 a.m. on morning of 23rd August Battalion moved into Assembly  
Position on zero hour, as laid down in Brigade Order - 2 Companies  
in front line and 2 Companies in support. Battalion was in position  
50 minutes before zero.  
This assembly was covered by patrols of front line troops of  
5th Battalion, these being withdrawn 15 minutes prior to zero.  
Battalion covered through until the moving to Assembly Position  
but Battalion had no casualties with forward up on zero.  
At zero Battalion moved forward under cover of an artillery  
barrage. At zero plus 3 minutes several companies  
The tanks which were to proceed and move forward with the  
attack were late getting into position with the result that Company  
had to move forward without the support of tanks. These subsequently  
came up and afterwards took part in the advance.  
Over minutes prior to zero a red light was put up by the  
enemy (apparently his 2.0.2.), obviously he had heard the tanks moving.  
The order seemed to follow his 2.0.2. as it was not repeated until the  
artillery barrage came down at zero and then all along the line the  
enemy 2.0.2. was put up.  
Soon after advance commenced prisoners started to pour in and  
they were immediately turned up and sent to rear.  
Advance went forward well under cover of a well placed barrage and no  
artillery check was met during the whole of the advance.  
Section Machine proved of great help in dealing with any slight check  
caused by enemy Machine Gun. Very little shell fire was experienced  
in the early stages of the advance as it would appear that enemy  
barrage line was well in rear.  
On reaching ST. MARTIN WOODS two Support Companies had to be  
pushed forward into the front line to assist in the mopping up and

SECRET.Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
29/8/18.

## APPENDIX TO REPORT ON OPERATIONS

23rd, 24th & 26th August 1918.  
-----Lessons Learnt.

It is undoubtedly essential that a section of Infantry be pushed forward to closely support tanks in attack, as on several occasions when tanks had gone too far forward the enemy were thus enabled to man their guns and thus hold up the Infantry.

It would appear in some cases that the enemy remained in their trench until the tanks had passed and then opened fire on the Infantry.

This would not occur if a section of Infantry was detailed to move in rear and closely supporting tanks.

The Success Signals as arranged by Brigade (three white flares) could not be seen. These were repeated three times when Companies had gained their objective but could not be seen owing to smoke of barrage. I would suggest, therefore, that a coloured flare be used for this purpose for an attack in daylight.

Lieut. Colonel,  
Commanding 5th Battalion A.I.F.

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.

Medical Report on attack on 23/8/18.

23/8/18. Battalion attacked German Line. Casualties Light moderate.

These were mostly due to shell wounds. Evacuations worked smoothly, all cases being evacuated within three hours of commencement of barrage. No shortage of stretchers or dressings.

24/8/18. Battalion heavily bombarded with gas shells (mustard) on previous night, causing many casualties from gas poisoning to be evacuated. Capt. FLOOK, R.M.O. at time, was ~~relieved~~ evacuated gassed and I relieved him on afternoon 24th inst. Very few casualties from then on. Battalion relieved on night of 25/26th instant.

Since coming out of the line several cases had to be evacuated owing to delayed action of gas.

(Sd.) G. J. ELLIS, Capt.,  
R.M.O. 5th Bn. A.I.F.

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SECRET.

5TH BN. OPERATION ORDER NO. 38.

25/8/18.

RELIEF.

1. 7th Battalion will relieve 5th Battalion as follows on 25th August 1918.

"C" Company 5th Battalion will be relieved by  
"D" Coy. of 7th Battalion.

"A" & "B" Coys. 5th Battalion will be relieved  
by "D" Coy. of 7th Battalion.

"D" Coy. 5th Battalion will remain at present  
location but O.C. "D" will hand over  
Company Hqs to C.O. 7th Bn for Bn. Hqs.  
5th Battalion Hqs and R.A.P. will not move from  
present location.

- METHOD OF RELIEF. 2. Line Companies of 5th Battalion will be relieved by small parties of 7th Battalion moving forward and small parties of 5th Battalion moving back on relief. Communication Trench must be used and all movement must be concealed from the enemy. If possible, new posts established on Road this afternoon will be relieved, but relief must not take place till dark if there is any chance of the enemy observing the relief.

- DETAILS OF RELIEF. 3. Company Commanders of 5th Battalion concerned will arrange details of relief with Company Commanders of 7th Battalion.

COMPLETION OF RELIEF.

4. Relief to be notified to Bn. Hqs by sending the code word "FRED-ERIC."

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.  
Adjutant.

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SECRET.Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
26/5/18.5TH. BATTALION OPERATION ORDER 39.

Reference: Sheet HARBONNIERS.

RELIEF.

1. 5th Battalion will be relieved on night 26/27th instant by two Companies of 31st Battalion A.I.F. "A" Company 31st Battalion will relieve "D" Coy. 5th Battalion. "C" Company 31st Bn. will relieve "A", "B" & "C" Companies 5th Bn.

MOVE.

2. One relief Companies will move to R.25.C.0.4 where they will report to Bn. embussing Officer (Lieut. CUFF). Officers in charge of bus should be familiar with the Route. Busses will arrive at R.25.C.0.4 between 9.30 and 10.30 p.m.

ROUTE.

3. R.25.C.0.4 - Q.27.C.3.4 - MORCOURT - CERISY - GAILLY - P.5.C where guides will meet Battalion.

COMPLETION OF RELIEF.

4. Companies will report at once to Bn. Hqrs when relieved by sending the code word "FISHER."

LEWIS GUNS.

5. Limbers will call for Company Lewis Guns at "C" Company Headquarters A.23.D.7.6 at about 7.30 p.m. Half limber will be available for the guns of each Company.

SIGNALLING LIMBER.

6. Will report to Bn. Hqrs at 7.30 p.m.

GUIDES.

7. "D" Company will send 4 guides, "A", "B" & "C" Companies 2 guides each to Bn. Hqrs by 7 p.m. to guide incoming unit.

ACKNOWLEDGE.(sd.) A.O.RIGG, Lieut.,  
Adjutant.

A Coffee Stall will be available for troops at R.25.C.0.4.

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.  
29/8/18.

**PROGRAMME OF TRAINING**

from 30th August - 6th September 1918.

August 30	9 to 9.20 a.m.	Battalion fall in & inspection.
	9.20 to 9.45 a.m.	Guards and sentries.
	9.45 " 10.45 a.m.	Lewis Gun Training.
	10.45 " 11 a.m.	Smoke Oh! Lecture by Officers on Platoon in attack.
	11 " 11.30 a.m.	Musketry, indicating targets, fire control.
	11.30 " 11.45 a.m.	Signals and whistle blasts.
	11.45 " 12 noon	Open order work.
2	4.30 p.m.	Battalion to march to CORBIE to concert.
-----		
31	9 " 9.20 a.m.	Battalion fall in & inspection.
	9.20 " 9.30 "	Gas Drill.
	9.30 " 10 "	Model Platoon Work, Guards & Sentries.
	10 " 10.45 "	Rifle Grenade & Lewis Gun Work.
	10.45 " 11 "	Smoke Oh!
	11 " 11.45 "	Open order drill.
	11.45 " 12 noon	Fall in & smartening up drill.
Afternoon		Recreational training.
-----		
Soptr 1	Church Parade	
-----		
2	9 to 9.20 a.m.	Fall in.
	9.20 " 10 "	Musketry, indicating targets, fire direction and control.
	10. " 10.45 "	Platoon in attack on Strong Posts.
	10.45 " 11 "	Scheme to be worked out before hand.
	11 " 11.45 "	Lecture on exercise as practised, faults to be pointed out.
	11.45 " 12 noon	Artillery formation, advancing in open order.
	Afternoon	
-----		
3	9 " 9.20 a.m.	Battalion Parade.
	9.20 " 10.45 "	Company in attack as in open order.
	10.45 " 11 "	Smoke Oh! Lecture on Outposts by Company Commanders. Special attention to protection by night & day.
	Afternoon	
-----		
4	9 " 9.20 a.m.	Battalion Parade.
	9.20 " 9.45 "	Model Platoon work.
	9.45 " 10.45 "	Company as advanced guard.
	10.45 " 11 "	Smoke Oh! Lecture by Company Commanders on advanced guards.
	11 " 11.45 "	Lewis Gun work.
	11.45 " 12 noon	Setting up drill.
	Afternoon	
-----		

F. T. O.

Sept 5 9 to 9.20 a.m. Battalion fall in & inspection.  
 9.20 " 12 noon Lewis Guns on range, remainder of Company on Musketry & Bayonet Fighting.  
 Afternoon Recreational Training.

6 9 " 9.20 a.m. Battalion fall in.  
 9.20 " 12 noon Battalion in attack, semi-open warfare, co-operation with tanks and Vickers Guns. Tanks to be represented by limbers. C.O. will work out scheme and will go over scheme with Coy. & Platoon Commanders the day previous to the attack.  
 afternoon Recreational Training.

Signalling. Sig. Officer will train Signallers for Headquarters & Company. Signallers will report to Sig. Officer before Battalion Parade.

Intelligence. Intelligence Officer will train Intelligence personnel who will report to him before Battalion Parade.

Lewis Guns. Special classes will be held so as to complete establishment of Nos. 1 in Battalion. Those men will be trained in German Machine Guns in order to instruct their gun teams. Q.M. will arrange to draw guns for this purpose from Brigade Musketry Officer.

(Sd.) A.O. RIGG, Lieut.,  
 Adjutant.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

14-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4.

6.a.m. 13-8-18. to 6.a.m. 14-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.I. Infantry.

a. Patrols. At S.19.B.6.6. signs of the trench having been occupied by the enemy within the last 24 hours were observed. Licut. BINNS and 3 other ranks of the right Brigade at 3.p.m. moved to the road running diagonally through S.20.B. An enemy listening post was driven in and the occupants of an enemy post were aroused. The post, whose strength is estimated at 40 rifles, opened up a heavy fire with the result that Licut. BINNS was killed. The remainder of the patrol bombed the post inflicting 8 casualties and then withdrew. A fighting patrol of 1 Officer and 15 other ranks was immediately organised and moved to within bombing range of the enemy post and more casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The patrol was again forced to withdraw owing to the cross fire of Machine Guns.

Enemy posts at S.20.A.7.3. and S.19.D.6.5. were also bombed and casualties inflicted on the enemy. Patrols operating from the right Battalion at 5.p.m. under Licut. BAIRD came across a party of 20 of the enemy who were enjoying a quiet chat outside a dugout. One of them was shot by the patrol and bombs were thrown at the remainder. Heavy M.G. fire again forced the patrol to withdraw. Other information is summarised under "Enemy Defences".

b. Infantry Arms. Owing to the scarcity of targets activity was limited. Practice against low flying F.A. was indulged in by Lewis and Vickers Gunners.

2. Artillery. Intermittent harassing fire was carried out by Brigades, special attention being paid to enemy roads, tracks, and approaches to CHAULNES. Bursts of fire were put down at intervals on to roads in S.21.A., S.21.Cont. and S.22.C.&D., MADAME COPSE, and other reported centres of enemy activity.

Excellent observed shoots were carried out by the 2nd.F.4. Brigade on Machine Guns and Snipers in the vicinity of MADAME WOOD and occupied trenches in S.20.Mentral and S.14.A.

3. Aircraft. At 4.30.p.m. as a result of a combat, one of our planes was driven down in flames opposite the right Division. Later, another of our planes was forced to land in the same locality.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.I. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Remains very alert, but seems quieter than usual. A decrease in the use of unaimed rifle and M.G. fire was noticeable. At night enemy was heard working opposite the right Brigade, apparently wiring. Opposite the left repeated calls for artillery support were made.

b. Infantry Arms. M.Guns were much quieter than usual especially during the night. At one period for over an hour opposite the right Brigade there was an absence of M.G. fire which is unusual. Trench Mortars showed increased activity on the front lines of both Brigades.

c. Artillery. Displayed increased activity. Squares F.5., F.6., X.29., X.30., S.26., X.16., X.22., X.23., were treated to harassing fire. X.16. - X.17.C.&D. - X.22.B. - X.23. and 24. - CREPEY WOOD - Cross roads in X.13.D. were subjected to short shell storms at intervals.

Road from VAUVILLERS to HARBONNIERES was subject to searching fire from a H.V. Gun. Railway Siding in X.13.A.&B. received attention from 15 and 21 cm guns and hows. AUGER WOOD also received considerable attention. A certain amount of gas was placed on our extreme left.

( 2 )

2. Enemy Defences. Posts. Enemy is holding trench from S.13.C. 55.50. to S.13.A.20.55. Fresh earth observed by patrol at S.13.C. 1.9. Trench from S.26.D.8.8. to S.26.D.95.05. appears to be occupied. Enemy post at S.20.B.3.3. is very strongly held. Posts at S.20.A.7.3. - S.19.B.3.5. MADAME WOOD strongly defended. M.Guns. S.20.C.9.9. - MADAME WOOD - Evidence points to the fact that the enemy brings forward M.Guns at night and withdraws them at dawn. T.Ms. A L.T.M. was observed firing from approx. S.27.A. 70.75. Work. What seemed to be sounds of wiring heard opposite right Brigade. A great amount of trench work is in course of construction in S.21. and S.27.
3. Movement. Much movement observed in S.21. and S.27. A group of trucks in S.27. is the scene of much activity and apparently contains valuable material which the enemy has been working hard to remove. The fully laden limbers reported in yesterdays summary as moving N. and E. through S.27. and S.28. were apparently being used for the transportation of this material. Much traffic was observed along road from S.28.B.2.8. to VERMANDOVILLE. Individual movement was observed in vicinity of trenches in S.3.D.
4. Identifications.
- (a) 3rd.Bn. 7th.Bav. I.R. 5th. Bav. Div.  
(wounded soldier who had been lying helpless for 2 days)  
taken East of LIHONS.
- (b) 81st.Prussian I.R. - 21st.Div. - wounded prisoner (since died)  
taken East of LIHONS.
5. Material. 1 L.M.G. found by right Brigade S. of CAIN COPSE.

NOTES.

(1) The peculiar behaviour of enemy M.Guns opposite the right Brigade and the sounds of talking and movement in F.9. during the night suggests either a local relief in this locality or attempts at reorganisation.

(2) The identification of the 81st.I.R. 21st.Division E of LIHONS is confirmed.

(3) A superficial study of the enemy artillery fire suggests the following conclusions:-

(1) More guns have been brought into line during the past 24 hours.

(2) The enemy artillery does not know the exact location of our front line.

(3) Owing to the loss of observation most of the shooting is necessarily blind and inaccurate.

(4) The enemy is apprehensive as to our intentions (This is supported by his aerial activity)

(4) Further reports of ground observers and patrols, confirms and a study of aerial photos, the enemy line of resistance as tentatively defined in yesterdays summary viz:-

SAURIEN ALLEY (S.7.B.2.D.) to MADAME WOOD to SATRAPE ALLEY (S.13.D.) - trench running S.E. at S.20.A.15.50. - then across to LIHU FM (S.20.B.) From LIHU FM to CAIN COPSE (S.26.D.) no touch with the enemy has been gained, but it is very probable that the enemy mans the trench S.20.B. 6.1. - S.20.D.4.5. - S.26.B.7.3. - to S.26.D.8.8.

From S.26.D.8.8. the line seems to run S. along the trench to S.26.D. 95.05. It has not yet been possible to definitely locate the enemy further to the South, though there is no doubt that he occupies trenches recently dug in A.3.A. and A.2.D.

Along the line as defined above the enemy may be expected to offer resistance.

(5) Attention is drawn to the Annex to this Summary containing a translation of a German document captured by the 3rd.A.I. Brigade. The document is an interrogation of several of our men captured a few days before the recent attack. This document shows among other things -

(1) the importance of keeping projected operations as secret as possible. (2) The amount of information probably unwittingly given away by the privates who were captured. (3) The patriotic attitude adopted by the

( 5 )

Sergeant to be the only safe one.

It is suggested that the contents of this translation be communicated to all ranks.

*R. G. Smith*  
 for  
 Liout-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

ARMY SUMMARY.

Situation: August 12th & Night 12/13th Inst.

North of the SOMME, the remaining hostile positions between ETINHEM and BRAY fell into our hands. The enemy delivered no counter-attacks in this part of the front. Elements of the 54th Res. Div. are still in the line, other hostile formations being the 245rd and 26th Res. Divs. Of these two Divisions however, only 1 Regt in each has been identified by prisoners hence it is not possible to estimate their fighting value with any degree of accuracy.

Between the SOMME and the AMIENS - ST QUENTIN road, HERICOURT, CATEAUX Wood and ST. GERMAIN Wood, as well as the Village of PROYART, were captured by the Australians, together with over 500 prisoners. The units identified consisted of elements of the 15th, 107th and 108th Divisions.

In the LIHONS area it was thought that a possible concentration of hostile troops was taking place yesterday afternoon. A special low flying reconnaissance proved this to be incorrect, but reported that the hostile trenches were strongly manned by men who appeared to be wearing dark blue uniform. These troops are very probably a JAEGER formation (dark green) and corroborate the statements of prisoners captured yesterday, that Jaegers have arrived on the battle field. It is not at present certain whether this indicates the arrival of the Alpine Corps or whether a dismounted Cavalry Bde., to which a Battalion of Jaegers has been attached, is in the line. From information received it appears that the latter is more probable.

From the fact that Regts. of the same Division have been identified some distance apart, it is apparent that the enemy are still very disorganised. A new division was identified yesterday near FOQUESCOURT.

The enemy are now in greater strength between this village and ROYE. Division will be identified today astride the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN Road.

PRISONERS. The number of prisoners who passed through Cages and C.G.S. since the 8th inst., now amounts to 20,585 of whom 507 are officers.

Prince RUPPRECHT has now at his disposal 10 fresh divisions, while the Crown Prince has 9 fit to fight.

In addition there are 4 fresh divisions in rest in the Southern Group of Armies.

Lieut. BILIK, the German Airman who is reported to have brought down 21 of our planes and who is believed to belong to the 1st Pursuit Squadron (RICHTOFENS), was forced to land in our lines on the 10th.

EFFECT OF OUR LOW FLYING PLANES. Prisoners are unanimous in their statements concerning the great moral effect and material loss caused by our low flying planes. On several occasions roads were completely blocked by direct hits on transport, and serious casualties were inflicted. Losses were frequently inflicted on parties of the enemy by machine gun fire.

( 2 )


GERMAN LOSSES. An aviator prisoner states that it is a matter of common knowledge that the German air losses are very much higher than the figures officially published. The prisoner knows of a definite instance when the publication of losses was suppressed; this was on or about the 6th August, when five enemy two seaters were crashed by us on the German side of the lines on the MARVILLE front, the crews of three being killed, and of the other two badly wounded.

In the Army Aviation Commanders orders of the 9th August, in which a weeks casualties were published, no reference was made to these machines.

GENERAL. One small counter-attack was made yesterday near FOUQUESCOURT. It was repulsed. No fresh divisions have been identified since yesterday morning. The Germans appear to be strongest in the FOUQUESCOURT - ROYE area. There are no signs, however of any intended counter-attack.

The enemy appear now to be weak astride the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN road, and it is anticipated that a fresh division will shortly be identified in this area.

Train and road movements yesterday afternoon and early this morning show there are no signs of the arrival of fresh division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

14-8-18.

Interpretation of captured document in W.24. Sheet 62.D.

Examination of 1 Sgt and 5 privates of "A" Company 51st Battalion, 13th Aust. Inf. Bde. 4th Aust. Division, taken prisoners at 4 a.m. in HOURS.

<u>War Organisation.</u>	<u>13th. Bde.</u>	<u>12th. Bde.</u>	<u>4th. Bde.</u>
	49th. Bn.	45th. Bn.	13th. Bn.
	50th. Bn.	46th. Bn.	14th. Bn.
	51st. Bn.	46th. Bn.	15th. Bn.
			16th. Bn.

Attached to formation 4th Aust. Pioneer Battalion; other attached details unknown. The broadening up of the 4th Battalion of the 13th, and 12th Brigades took place 2 months ago. The 4th Bde. has 4 Battalions. The 4th M.G. Coy. are absorbed in the 4th M.G. Bn.

Commanders. 4th Australian Division - Major-General. McLACHLAN.  
 13th Aust. Brigade. - Brig-General. GLASGOW.  
 4th Aust. Brigade. - Brig-General. BRAND.  
 51st. Battalion. - Lieut-Col. CRISTY.

Employment. The Brigade has been in this Sector since 31st July 1918. as also has the 51st Battalion.

Relief. They relieved the French - possible the 532nd Inf. Regt.

Flanks. One of the prisoners had heard that French troops are on each flank, the other prisoners could not say.

Other troops. On the night they came into the line, 31/7/18, one prisoner saw a detachment of Americans about 500 strong, one to two kilometres west of HOURS, marching towards the front. Whether they went in and where is unknown. Another prisoner heard that an American M.G. Coy. was in support or Reserve to the 13th. Inf. Bde.

Class. Average men up to 30 years, only a small percentage between 30 and 40 years.

Losses. Numbers could not be given by prisoners but they were light. The prisoner know nothing of the casualties in the attack.

Depot. The last big draft (140) men came to the Battalion at the end of April; latterly only a few returned sick.

Weapons. Leo-Enfield rifle; three platoons have two Lewis guns and the fourth platoon on the other hand one Lewis gun.

Gas Protection. Not much could be gleaned.

Rations. Very good and sufficient.

Position. The forward trenches are in good condition; no dugouts are in them only shelters. Wire defences are very weak. About the reserve and support trenches, mortar and machine gun positions, they could say nothing as up till now they have been only in the forward line. There are endless defences in the rear well wired.

Route to front. AMIFNS - ROYE Road.

Attack Intentions. Were denied. Neither attack practised nor preparations are in progress.

( 2 )

History. The Battalion was relieving about 17th, June in the SAILLY Sector by the 12th. Brigade and came back near DAOURS for about 8 days, there they did light work. From June 26th to August 6th. they were in the HAMEL Sector in Support and in Reserve. After the attack on HAMEL they were sent forward for some days to bury the dead and do salvage work. From here the 2nd. Battalion of the Brigade went to RIVERY near AMIENS and the 1st. Battalion of the Brigade to GLISY where the Brigade remained until July 31st.

Method of Capture. After a short German artillery preparation they were attacked in rear by German Infantry resistance appeared useless so they surrendered to superior numbers.

Disposition in Sector. The prisoners' platoon No. 2 lay on both sides of the AMIENS - ROYE Road, North from there lay a third platoon and further north "C" Company of their Battalion. On the South they were connected with the 1st. Platoon. "B" and "D" Companies were in Support and Reserve. The 2nd. Battalion was Brigade Reserve.

Headquarters, Brigade Staff. Position unknown.

Strength. 4 Platoons of 26 to 28 men per company - 110 men 4 Officers. 4th. Platoon consists of Specialists, Signallers, clerks, runners, officers' servants - ration strength of this unknown.

Personal. Prisoners are young men 21 - 51 years of age. They give one a good soldierly impression although their military knowledge is limited. The Sgt. who was the only one who has served a long unbroken period with the troops refused to make any military statement and could not be shaken in his resolve by any means employed. The remainder were, some a short while with the Battalion, others on account of wounds, a long time in hospital and convalescent. Whether their statements are pretence or truth there is no means of proving, all were reticent and only after a lot of talking to did their tongues become loose.

General Feeling. Confident - they speak a great deal of the American assistance.

The number sick with Gripes is small - no reports could be got from them about lights, air service, meteorological service, very lights, dirigible balloons, captive balloons, firing butt for Lewis gun, long range shooting, spanning of artillery to mechanical limbers, bombing of back areas, and defence against Toller Cross Gas.

(Sgd) SCHACHT.

Lieut. & Liaison Officer.  
Imperial Headquarters.  
5-8-18.

Appendix 2887  
15-8-18.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 5.

6.a.m. 14-8-18. to 3.a.m. 15-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.I. Infantry.

a. Patrols. Squares X.17.D. X.18.C. and X.24.A. were searched but no signs of the enemy were observed. Patrols report the enemy to be abnormally quiet.

b. Infantry Arms. Vickers guns engaged targets in MADAME WOOD. POLYGON WOOD. AMBERG COPSE. MIEG WOOD; Lewis Guns took advantage of all moving targets presented to them. Stokes Mortars silenced a M.G. at A.9.A.O.O. during the night. Enemy movement also was engaged by Stokes. Right Battalion Snipers claim one hit near enemy post at A.2.B.9.2. Rifle Grenadiers of the right Brigade did some firing.

2. Artillery. Very little firing was done by our field Batteries during the period. Special attention was paid to the thorough searching and sweeping of enemy activity in MADAME WOOD during the evening and early morning. At 12.15.p.m. 102nd How. Battery carried out a shoot on M.W. position located at S.27.A.7.7. The Mortar has since remained silent.

At 2.30.p.m. H.A. shelled SOYECOURT - ABLAINCOURT. Roads where much traffic was reported and also CHAULNES were shelled during the period. At 3.30.a.m. in answer to an increase of enemy fire, our batteries increased fire. The enemys fire seemed immediately to decrease.

3. Aircraft. Our aircraft displayed much activity and enemys front and rear areas were constantly patrolled throughout the period. Our fighting squadrons had many encounters with enemy formations during the period. At 8.p.m. as a result of a combat over POLYGON WOOD one of our CAMEL machines was forced to land in A.3.A.O.O. The machine made a safe landing and the pilot is probably a prisoner. At about the same hour one of our DE HAVILAND machines crashed in S.19. One of our R.E.8 machines was also forced to land and caught fire in the vicinity of VAUVILLERS. All our planes were heavily engaged by A.A. and M.G. fire upon approaching enemy territory.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.I. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Is not aggressive, but remains on the alert and is obviously in a very nervous state of tension.

b. Machine Guns. Were quiet during the day. At night the right flank of the left Brigade was onfiladed by M.Guns shooting wildly. It is noteworthy that no M.Gs fired from MADAME WOOD during the night.

c. Trench Mortars, were inactive. M.W. at S.27.A.7.7. was silenced by our Artillery.

d. We gave Enemy Snipers no opportunities for practice.

e. Artillery. An increase in the volume of hostile fire is noticeable. Targets at Squares selected for harassing or destructive fire were ; - CREPEY WOOD - AUGER WOOD - X.30.A. - S.25.B. - X.27.B. - LIHONS - X.9. - X.10. - X.29.A.&.B. - X.15.D. - X.16. 17. 22. 23. 24. Most of this fire seemed to come from sound bearings of 58 - 60° and 66 - 68° from X.23.C.4.6.

In addition to these harassing and destructive shoots the enemy indulged in what appeared to be practice barrages. These fell about every two hours, fire lasting from 2 to 10 minutes.

Areas so treated were CREPEY WOOD and rear, LIHONS and rear and all other possible areas of troop concentration.

FRAMMERVILLE and back areas were treated to fire by a H.V. gun and 15 and 21 cm guns. CREPEY WOOD - X.17. - S.30.A. received a considerable concentration of gas shells. 7.7. cm. 10.cm. 15.cm. and 21 cms. H.E. and shrapnel being mixed with the gas in the proportion of about 3 H.E. and shrapnel to 1 gas shell.

Location of Guns. 15 cm gun located at approx S.15.A.7.0. Successful engaged by C.Bs.

( 2 )

**f. Aircraft.** Hostile planes showed a marked increase in activity throughout the day and night. Whenever possible our planes and formations were engaged by enemy formations and reconnaissance patrols were carried out at regular intervals during the day. From 8 to 7 p.m. a flight of 10 FOKKER Biplanes flew S. along our lines and accounted for two of our scouting machines. Bombing Squadrons were also active during the night. All hostile machines were engaged by our M.G. fire.

Balloons were observed on the following grid bearings during the day from F.6.C.3.2. - 850, 85 $\frac{1}{2}$ 0, 1420, 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ 0, 1190, 990.

**2. Enemy Defences.** Posts. Trenches at A.9.C.2.9. are occupied. Whilst our patrols were operating no flares were fired from trench running E. of MADAME WOOD, which was reported occupied in our last Summary. M.Guns. A.9.A.0.0. - X.8.C.9.4. - S.13.D.5.2. approx.

**3. Movement.** Individual movement soon from HART COPSE to trenches in S.27.B. - along road near the Three Apple Trees in S.22.D.1.1. - MERCURE Trench (S.14.A.) along road S.8.C. disappearing in vicinity of trench at S.8.C.2.2. - S.8. and 9. - VENUS trench (S.14.A.) - Between 1.50. to 2.p.m. there was considerable traffic of motor vehicles backwards and forward on road between SOYECOURT and ABALINCOURT in S.4. and 5. Several single vehicles in addition were noticed on this road during the afternoon. A train was observed at 2.a.m. in vicinity of CHAULNES.

**4. Miscellaneous.** Red Cross Flag seen flying from building in S.9. on Western side of VERMANDOVILLERS.

**NOTES.** (1) The absence of Infantry activity in MADAME WOOD, which before hand showed considerable liveliness, is noteworthy and needs investigation. It is possible that our incessant harassing of this locality has forced the enemy to withdraw from the position.

(2) The increase in enemy heavy artillery fire and in gas shelling is noteworthy.

*Langley*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

#### INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

#### ARMY SUMMARY.

Situation August 13th and Night 13/14th Instant.

Beyond a small attack carried out by the enemy with about 200 men, in the FOUQUESCOURT area yesterday morning, no hostile infantry action has been reported.

N. of the SOMME, from identifications obtained, it appears that hostile units are very disorganised, as battalions belonging to the 253rd 54th Res., 108th, 27th, 43rd Res., and 26th Res. Divisions were identified by prisoners and documents between MORLANCOURT and BRAY yesterday morning. A company of the 17th Pioneer Bn. (43rd Res. Div.) was also identified by prisoners. They had been sent forward to reinforce the line W. of BRAY.

From an air reconnaissance last night, it appears that a considerable number of moving lights were seen on the roads in the MONTAUBAN, GUILLEFONT and COMBLES area, possibly denoting the arrival of a fresh division, though no movement was seen yesterday pointing to this possibility.

South of the SOMME, between the river and the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN road, the same disorganization of units exists, prisoners belonging to the 15th, 108th and 243rd Divisions being captured.

( 3 )

It was anticipated that a fresh division would arrive in this area yesterday, but there is nothing to show that this supposition is correct. In the LIHONS area, elements of the 21st Division were identified. This division was formerly in the line south of the AVRE, and had only been recently relieved prior to the 8th Aug. Its fighting value should not be great, and it will probably not have been brought up to strength.

No change in the order of battle is reported between CHAULNES and ROYE. The enemy appear to have strengthened their artillery in this sector, and the shooting has improved in quality.

#### BOMBING RAIDS.

By Day. 20 112-lb and 8 25-lb bombs were dropped on PERONNE Station. Two direct hits were observed on sidings. In addition 46 25-lb bombs were dropped on dumps at CHAULNES; bursts were seen on the dump, and 3 direct hits were observed on Rolling Stock on Sidings.

By Night. 3 112-lb bombs and 353 25-lb bombs were dropped on various targets including ST. CHRIST and FALVY bridges and roads. A direct hit on a train at TINCOURT was claimed, and also two fires caused. The areas MONTAUBAN, MARTINPUICH and COMBLES and DOMPIERRE and HERBECOURT showed a large number of lights. These could not be seen by subsequent machines, after the areas had been bombed.

21st. Div. 81. st. I.R. N. LIHONS. Aug. 13th. Man Killed.  
This division was relieved in the CASTEL Sector on the 26th July. by the 14th. Bav. Div. After resting in the ROSIERES - CHAULNES area till the 3rd August, it moved off to CAMBRAI. It is now probably in close support, ready to send a regiment to reinforce the front where needed.

EFFECT OF OUR LOW FLYING MACHINES. A British prisoner of War, who escaped during the last few days from PERONNE, stated that he saw on the 8th inst, a large amount of transport and stores of different regiments retiring through PERONNE. They were attacked by one of our low flying machines, which caused a very great deal of confusion and a considerable number of casualties.

#### ENEMYS INTENTIONS PREVIOUS TO THE ALLIED ATTACK ON THE SOMME.

A captured secret document of the 26th. Inf. Bde. 13th. Div., dated 8-7-18, states that preparations for attacks were being made along nearly the whole of the Western Front at that date, and that the brigade had been ordered to make preparations for a limited attack in the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Sector, to be ready within two weeks. The necessity for secrecy and the concealment of all work which could be seen from the air is emphasized.

GENERAL. Hostile units are much disorganized between DERNANCOURT and the main AMIENS - ALBERT Road. It is considered that this front must very shortly be reinforced by fresh troops. Between CHAULNES and ROYE, artillery activity has increased, and the strength of the enemy appears greater here than on other parts of the front.

No hostile counter-attacks have been delivered during the last 24 hours, and no signs of preparations for counter-attacks have been seen.

Aust. Corps. Summary. Since the beginning of operations on August 8th, 168 Officers 7,773 O.R. unwounded, and 27 Officers, 783 O.R. wounded, have been captured by this Corps, making a grand total of 195 Officers, 8,556 O.Rs.

P.T.O.

TRANSLATION.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

TO FRENCH ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

Four years of efforts with our faithful Allies; four years of hardships stoically endured, begin to bear their fruits.

Smashed in his fifth attempt of 1918, the invader retires. His fighting strength decreases, his spirit wavers, whilst by your sides your American brothers, just landed, make the disconcerted enemy feel the power of their blows.

Always at the vanguard of the Allies, you have prepared tomorrow's triumphs.

I said to you yesterday;

Obstinancy, patience; the comrades arrive ---

I say to you today;

Tenacity, audacity, and you will force victory.

Soldiers of France, I salute your colours, endowed with a new glory.

(signed) Potain.

G.H.Q. 6/8/1918.

~~TRANSLATION OF A DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY US 23-6-18.~~  
Translation of a Document captured by us 23-6-18.

107th. Inf. Div.

Secret - Urgent.

Div. H.Q.  
21-8-18.  
10. a.m.DIVISIONAL ORDER.

1. All work in the forward lines is to be cut down as far as possible. Only necessary work to be done. As far as labour is available, this should be employed in the improvement and building of the Main Line of Resistance, especially of Strong Points and M. Gun nests therein, to give our Infantry in case of an overwhelming attack a place of resistance, as referred to in our order I.A. 2072. O.P. of 14th inst. Every man must know that the Main Line of resistance is the line where the decisive battle must take place. This position will be held not only by the outpost troops which withdraw to this line, but also by the counter-attack, support and reserve troops, however far behind they may be. The M.G. zone of fire must also cover the Valley North of HERLEVILLE so that an attack up this Valley can be dealt with. Parts of the M.G. Coy of the 2nd. Bn. 122nd Fus. Regt. (243rd Divn) can be used for this purpose. The Pioneer M.G. Coy remain in Divisional Reserve. Their position N.W. - W. and S.W. of FOUCAUCOURT will be prepared by the 213th. Inf. Bde. Also to the South the Tank Gun arc of fire is to be so placed that any enemy attacks over HERLEVILLE can be thrown back.
2. The 2nd. Bn. 122nd. Fus. Regt. will remain as at present, i.e., in reserve to the Divisional front. The 2nd. Bn of the 81st. Regt. (21st. Div) remains the main counter-attack Bn near FAY (see Para 3 below). The 213th. Inf. Bde has to keep in touch with the 2 abovenamed regiments. They will only come into action under orders of the Division. The Battalions in reserve to man the defence lines of the 21st. Div. Battle Zone (on the right) are near CAPPY and DOMPIERRE.
3. The 213th. Inf. Bde and D.A. will keep themselves acquainted with the situation of the 2nd. Battle Zone, with the object of garrisoning this zone. In case of a mass attack the 213th. Bde will take up the defence of this line with their remaining reserves ( 4 Nucleus Battalions); and the artillery will man the artillery positions with their reserves ( 4 Nucleus) troops which will be for the present under the orders of the 243rd Div. for tactical purposes, will on the night 21/22nd be reinforced in the Divisional Sector by the 2nd. Bn. 81st. Regt.
4. We must still be prepared for a surprise attack by the enemy. Fog preparations are to be carried out carefully, even if it necessitates the weakening of fighting infantry units.

(sgd) HAVENSTEIN.

N.B.

213th. Inf. Bde is the Inf. Bde of the 107th Division. The rest of the Div is made up of Arty and Div units. Regiments of the 213th. Inf. Bde. are 227th. R.I.R. - 232nd. R.I.R. - 52nd. R.I.R. The 122nd. Fus. Regt. belongs to the 247th. Bde of the 243rd. Divn.

P40

DIVISIONAL ORDER.  
107th, Division.

21-8-18.

" We have passed through a period of heavy fighting. The British have tried to follow up their successes of the 8th inst by pushing their best Divisions forward. Nevertheless his "attacking-last" has been broken by the Battle scarred troops of our 2nd Army. All arms have vied with one another in their heroic effort. Our line remains intact and our will is unshaken not to yield to the enemy another foot of ground. I therefore offer my warmest thanks to all troops concerned and I am sure the 2nd Army will again shatter all enemy attacks if called upon to do so.

However it must again be pointed out to the Army that the enemy must not be permitted to take us by surprise. This can only be prevented by keen observation of the enemys movements, of his artillery and transport, and by the activity of numerous patrols."

MARWITZ. "

EXTRACTS.

Captured Documents of the 213th. Inf. Bde. 21-8-18.

Protective Patrols must in foggy weather, be pushed far out to locate enemys advanced positions and immediately recognise movements of attack.

Such Patrols should be fitted with Telephones so that they can communicate immediately to front line and Tank Guns any suspicious enemy movements.

To prevent mistakes such patrols will be issued with white bands.

Army Order No. 19.

19-8-18.

(a) A Tank Commander taken prisoner by a neighbouring Army states -

" That H.G.s are the Tanks worst enemies. Especially in the enemys last attack H.G. fire had been the cause of making a number of Tanks turn back. Even though ordinary H.G. shells do not penetrate the Armour plating, the crew suffers great inconvenience, as the impact of Bullets on the plates causes flame points to appear on the inside. The great effect of H.G. fire even without special Amm. and at short range is again pointed out to the infantry.

In these latest attacks French tactics were to send a few Tanks in advance and follow up with a stronger wave of Tanks shortly afterwards.

This points to the necessity of the Tank defences being always kept in readiness for the stronger second wave, after the 1st weaker one has been repulsed.

5.a.m. 23-8-18. to 8.a.m. 24-8-18.

**A. OUR OPERATIONS.**

At 4.45.a.m. supported by Artillery and Tanks our Infantry advanced the line according to plan and decisively defeated the enemy.

**Phase 1.** The objective line ran roughly from S. to N. along the old French defences in R.30. - R.30. - R.24. - R.17. to CHUIGNOLLES inclusive to jumping off line and was to be gained by 2 Brigades by a set-piece attack. Forming up by infantry and Tanks was completed without incident in good time.

The artillery barrage opened well and the infantry were immediately able to advance under its protection along the whole front of attack. The enemy retaliated almost immediately with a light scattered barrage, which proved no hindrance to our advance. The enemy occupying the outpost lines offered very little resistance and the advance suffered no check until the line of woods R.35. - R.29. - R.23. - R.16. R.10. was reached. These woods were found to be defended strongly by Machine guns. By this time Tanks had become engaged and with their valuable co-operation the resistance was very soon broken down. Machine Guns in ST. DENIS WOODS. (R.35.) - the small wood R.29. Central - the Southern portion of ST MARTIN WOODS (R.29.A.) - CHUIGNOLLES WOOD (R.10.B.). & the "pot holes" lining the cliff on the E. side of the Valley in R.17. were manned and put up a strong resistance, machine guns sweeping the ROBERT WOOD re-entrant. Many of these guns were inaccessible to Tanks and were finally put out of action by Infantry. By about 6.5.a.m. the right Brigade was approximately on its objective. The position of the extreme right Battalion in relation to the Division on the right remained obscure but was finally cleared up without trouble.

Snipers and M.Guns held out in HERLEVILLE WOOD R.29.D. but these were successfully mopped up later on.

In the meantime the left Brigade was steadily dealing with the opposition offered by the enemy and by about 6.30.a.m. was on the objective line except on the right where they were held up in R.17. This was rectified by our troops moving down the ROBERT WOOD Gully, and breaking down the enemy resistance. They then gained their objective.

**Phase 2.** Consisted of exploitation by the left Brigade without artillery support. Patrols were pushed out and wherever possible the line was advanced until finally it ran at about 9.30.a.m. as follows from N. to S. LUC WOOD. (R.3.) - LONG WOOD (R.4.) - CHUIGNOLLES WOOD. (R.10.B.) inclusive - Sunken road R.10.B. - R.11.A. to trench R.17.B.5.9. - Sunken road M.15.B.1.9. then South to R.13.C.7.7. - M.19.B.3.2.

Between the completion of this phase and the commencement of the third phase, the enemy opposite the left Brigade withdrew to a defensive line along the S. and S.W. lower slopes of Hill 90. L.55.D.

This line was reinforced later in the morning and the enemy was observed to be digging in and manning trenches already in existence along the rough line CHUIGNES - R.5.D.3.C. - R.5.A. - L.34.D. - FROISSY BRACON (L.34.B.)

Machine Guns and sniping fire from this line interfered to a certain extent with our consolidation. At about 11.a.m. our artillery opened heavy fire for half an hour on the above positions, after which enemy M.G. fire decreased considerably.

**Phase 3.**

During the morning the Reserve Brigade had assembled in the Valley in R.8.C. and D. and R.14.A. At about 10.a.m. one Battalion was moved forward and by 2.p.m. had established itself N. of and around LUC WOOD (R.3.B.) as a flank protection to the Brigade which with Tank and Artillery support, at that hour commenced its forward movement with two Battalions in the line.

(4 pages)

For War diary  
auth [signature]

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The enemy made a strenuous resistance at all points. The enemy fought very well, Machine Gunners in particular using their weapons with great skill and determination. CARENNA WOOD and Sunken roads in R.5.B. were difficult to take, but were finally surrounded and mopped up. Garrisons of HARLY WOOD and the Chalk pits in R.6.A.C.D. also fought well, but when once these positions were taken, the enemy began to retire in disorder. Parties of our infantry followed the enemy to GAPPY Village inflicting on him heavy casualties all the way. They then withdrew to the pre-arranged line.

Result of the Operations.

(1) Line. As a result of this operation our line now runs from N. to S. approximately as follows; - L.28.D.5.5. - L.35.D.4.0. - L.33.C.8.4. - R.6.A.4.0. - R.12.A.9.8. - M.7.B.5.0. - M.13.B.5.0. - M.19.B.5.0. - R.24.C.8.0. - M.25.B.0.0. - M.25.D.0.0. - R.33.A.5.0.

(2) No of Prisoners etc.

No of Prisoners captured during the operation is as follows;

	Unwounded:
Left Brigade.	24 Offs. 730. 0.Rs.
Right Brigade.	37 " 1166. "
Reserve Brigade.	- " 269.
	<u>61. Offs. 2,134. Other Ranks.</u>

In addition to this number 86 other ranks were evacuated from Divisional P.O.W. Cage as being unfit to walk further.

Total number of wounded prisoners evacuated through M.D.S. to date 29 541 other ranks which probably includes the 86 other ranks mentioned above.

A large number of the enemy were killed particularly in areas where resistance was made.

(3) Material Captured. The following is a conservative estimate; -

- One 15 inch Naval Gun (blown up by the enemy)
- 1 battery 10 cm. Howitzers.
- 13 7.7 cm. or anti-tank guns.
- T. mortars and H. Guns not yet counted.
- One broad gauge railway engine and several trucks, Amplifier set.

(a) Infantry arms, effectively co-operated in every phase of our attack. Vickers Guns in several instances were able to seize fleeting opportunities afforded by the enemy when retreating and inflicted heavy casualties on them. Gun teams who were well forward with the advancing infantry were able to support them on several occasions. Stokes mortars were used with advantage particularly during the opening stages of each phase of the attack.

(b) Aircraft. Our contact and reconnaissance planes (R.E.8s) were much in evidence and except during the rather frequent intervals when scouting E.A. drove them off, were continually over our lines, calling for flares, dropping ammunition, machine gunning the enemy etc. etc.

(c) Tanks, were of great assistance to our advance, especially in the opening stages of the battle. Excellent liaison between infantry and tanks was maintained throughout.

(d) Artillery. Supplied very effective barrage fire for the infantry advance and engaged subsequent enemy movement when opportunities occurred.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Infantry. During the operation, the enemy fought well and stubbornly. Machine Gunners particularly fought their guns in many instances to the last. A considerable amount of H.G. fire was directed against the Tanks.

(b) Artillery. The reply to our attack though prompt, was not formidable. The enemy however was very quick in shortening range in accordance with our advance. Within one hour of zero he was shelling ST MARTIN WOODS and the vicinity, and within 90 minutes of zero, he was shelling the N. and S. GULLY. During the day, all ridges and woods were shelled heavily. During the night 25/24th artillery fire of light calibres showed a considerable decrease.

Enemy Defences. Complete knowledge of the enemys new dispositions and system of defence has not yet been gained.

Opposite the right brigade the enemy seems to have established an outpost system, but the main line appears to run along the old French System H.32.A.2.0. - W. of FOUCAUCOURT - to H.26.B.7.0. then North to LAPIN WOOD. North of this point enemy dispositions remain obscure.

#### Identifications.

		Prisoners.	
		Offs.	O.Rs.
80th. Fus. R. )	7.	243	
87th. I. R. )		108.	
81st. I. R. )	14.	471.	
21st. M. W. Det ) 21st.		18.	
21st. Pnr. Bn. ) Div.	1.	56.	
21st. Signal. Co )	1.		
27th. F. A. Regt )		8.	
227th. R. I. R. )	3.	124.	
232nd. R. I. R. )	20.	391.	
52nd. R. I. R. ) 107th.	5.	113.	
213. Pioneer Coy ) Divn.		13.	
107th. Bearer Coy )		5.	
107th. M. V. Coy. )	1.	24.	
132. Fus. Regt. ) 243rd.	2.	105.	
253rd. Pioneer Co. ) Divn.		15.	
122nd. Signal Co. )		3.	
60th. Field. Bakery. Column.		4.	
107th. F. A. Regt.		8.	
221st. F. A. Regt.		2.	
72nd. Listening Set.		3.	
41st. Wireless Detachments. )			
128th. " " )		4.	

#### NOTES.

(1) Undoubtedly the enemy was expecting our attack though the date was apparently unknown.

(a) Prisoners state our attack was expected.

(b) Number of prisoners taken and number of enemy dead is abnormally large (For instance the no of prisoners captured by the right Brigade alone is about 75% of the total number of the attackers of the right Brigade)

This suggests that the enemy had thickened his defence in preparation for our attack.

(c) We identified in close support to the 107th Division, the 243rd Division which had been previously identified N. of the SOMME and which it was presumed had been withdrawn. This suggests that the 243rd Division was intended to either relieve the 107th Division in the near future or to "stiffen" the Defence as suggested above.

(2) The extensive use of Machine Guns against Tanks which was very noticeable during the operation is apparently the result of an order which we captured to the effect that M.G. fire against Tanks is very effective and was to be employed whenever possible.

A translation of this document will appear in a future summary.

(5) An examination of the captured territory reveals some interesting facts from which conclusions can be drawn.

(a) Several of the enemy outposts are very cleverly camouflaged and do not show upon our aeroplane photographs.

(b) Practically all enemy stables had small dugouts or "graves" dug for the horses picnics etc, and very many huts and shelters had underground splinter proof dugouts adjacent. This points to the efficacy of our aeroplane bombing.

(c) A great number of dead horses were found in and around the N. and S. valley where many stables were situated. This also points to the efficacy of our aeroplane bombing and artillery shooting.

(4) All identifications were normal except that of the 243rd Div. which as stated above, was presumed to have been withdrawn. All regiments of the 21st and 107th Divisions were identified. Each regiment had 1 Battalion in line, 1 in support and one in reserve. At least 2 Battalions of each regiment were engaged. The troops who manned the defences of Hill 90 during the morning 25rd inst were battalions of the 21st Divn, probably the reserve Battalions.

As a result of this operation, it can almost certainly be said that the 21st Division ceases to be a "fresh Division" and elements still in line will probably be relieved in the near future. The 107th Division also which before our attack was classed as a "tired division", will now obviously be shortly relieved.

Whether these reliefs will be carried out by the 243rd Division or other Divisions it is impossible to say.

*Langhin Capt*  
Liout-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

The following identifications were established by the 1st. Aust. Division during the operation commencing the morning of the 23rd August 1918.

21st. Division.		Offs.	Captures. O. Rs.
80th. Fus. Regt.	1st. Battalion.	7	221.
"	2nd. " "		1.
"	3rd. " "		19.
	Signal Coy.		2.
		<u>7</u>	<u>243.</u>
87th. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.		6.
	2nd. " "		5.
	3rd. " "		97.
			<u>108.</u>
81st. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	6.	180.
	3rd. Battalion.	8.	291.
		<u>14.</u>	<u>471.</u>
21st. M. W. Detachment.			18.
21st. Pioneer Battalion.			
21st. Signal Coy.		1.	56.
37th. F. A. Regt.		1.	
			3.
		<u>2.</u>	<u>82.</u>

Total unwounded from the 21st. Division. 23. Offs. 904. O. Rs.

107th. Division.		Offs.	O. Rs.
227. R. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	2.	34.
	2nd. " "		52.
	3rd. " "	1.	34.
	Signal Company.		4.
		<u>3.</u>	<u>124.</u>
232. R. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	8.	171.
	2nd. " "	8.	90.
	3rd. " "	10.	123.
	Battalion & Regimental Staffs.		7.
		<u>26.</u>	<u>391.</u>
52. R. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	2.	54.
	2nd. " "	1.	24.
	3rd. " "	2.	35.
		<u>5.</u>	<u>113.</u>
213th. Pioneer Coy.			15.
107th. Bearer Coy.			5.
107th. H. W. Coy.		1.	24.
		<u>1.</u>	<u>42.</u>
Total unwounded for the 107th Division.		35 Offs.	670. O. Rs.

243rd. Division.		Offs.	O. Rs.
122. Fus. Regt.	2nd. Battalion.	2.	105.
253. Pioneer Coy.			15.
122. Signal Coy.			3.
		<u>2.</u>	<u>126.</u>



24-8-18.

Short Preliminary Interrogation and conversation with prisoners, gives us the following Summarised information.

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21st Division.

General. The prisoners belonging to the 21st Division, were by far the finest men physically, and their morale was of a much higher standard, than that of the 107th Division, or 243rd Division. They all agreed that our attack was expected in the near future, but nevertheless the execution of the attack was a complete surprise.

Officers and N.C.Os individually remarked, that the rapidity and dash of our troops, astounded them and assisted materially in their defeat. When our barrage opened a special alarm was given, all were told to stand to, but they were too late and before they realized or appreciated the situation, hand to hand fighting was in progress, our troops not only attacking from the front, but from the rear and flanks. The front line troops became demoralised and the confusion soon spread to the rear; By this time Tanks were assisting in spreading havoc and were extending the demoralizing effect to the enemy support lines.

Strength. The average company fighting strength throughout the Division was about 50.

Order of Battle. From N. to S. 37.I.R. 30.Fus.Regt. 31.I.R.

Dispositions. 1 battalion in line 1 in support and 1 in rest.

Reliefs. The 21st Division had been told that they should be relieved any day but the relieving division was unknown.

107th Division.

They had been in the line for 11 weeks and had been constantly promised relief but the majority of them had never even had a glimpse of the rear areas for months. Had they not been relieved of the monotonous existence by being taken prisoners they state that serious consequences might have arisen within the Regiments of the Division. The Battalion Commanders and the other Officers of 232.R.I.R. all state that their division was thoroughly exhausted and in spite of the fact that they were ordered to stand to throughout the night it was impossible to get men to obey the order. With the exception of one Battalion Commander, who had recently joined the battalion from a Jager Zu Fuss Regiment, prisoners were quite delighted with their new conditions.

The Battalion Commander above mentioned, was apparently disliked by his battalion, for when escorted to the Divisional Cage, he was met with subdued giggles and guffaws, from the remainder of his battalion who were at that time on parade.

Order of battle. North to South - 232.I.R. 227.R.I.R. 32.R.I.R.

Strength. The average company fighting strength throughout the division was between 25 and 30.

Relief. Relief had been expected for the last few weeks, and the result of our recent operations, would make it an immediate necessity.

243rd Division. ( 122. Fus.Regt.)

General. The 122.Fus.Regt. was identified in R.30. 1 Battalion of the regiment being in close reserve to the 232.R.I.R. 107.Division the two other Battalions being in rear. The men appeared to be of good fighting material but lacking the necessary moral.

Strength. The average strength of companies according to prisoners statements should be about 40 or 45.

Miscellaneous Information.

The Pioneer Company 253, had sent a party of 28 men to build dugouts for the regimental staff of the 122.Fus.Regt.

Field Bakery Company 60, is a Corps unit, and in this case is attached to the 51st.Corps. 2nd.ARMV. The personnel consists of a

100

a lieutenant or inspector and 150 O.R. They have twelve large ovens in DEWIS at V.9.40.95. near the stream.

Prisoners on the whole were not of the opinion that a general or local retirement is probable along this sector, much work being carried on in the forward areas including the building of dugouts.

Prisoners all spoke of the demoralizing effect of our night bombing and our superiority in the air by day.

Questioned as to their knowledge of the situation on the other fronts, prisoners knew practically nothing, and shown a map, explained that it was impossible.

Intentions. Officers, N.C.O.s and men were all under the impression that no attack was contemplated by them on this front, and that a purely defensive policy was being adopted.

Coming events. It appears most probable that elements of 243 Division will take over from what remains of the 107th Division.

*[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. It appears to be a detailed report or narrative.]*

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2.

6.a.m. 24-8-18. to 6.a.m. 25-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.I. Infantry.

The Right Line Battalion left Brigade improved their position during yesterday and pushed forward their posts 200 yards without opposition. A Bomb-stop was erected in trench at R.6.C.9.6. At 6.30.p.m. a party moved out from this point along trench towards enemy positions and after proceeding 200 yards encountered the enemy and drove them out of their posts. Our party then withdrew and erected a new bomb-stop 100 yards in advance of the first.

Left Line Battalion left Brigade advanced their position during the night with artillery support and established a new line as follows:- L.29.D.6.3. - L.29.D.6.0. to L.35.B.6.6. - thence in front of Square Wood to L.35.B.8.0. - L.35.D.8.5. - and L.36.C.25.30. During the move forward heavy machine gun fire was encountered from Sunken Road in L.36.A. and from the CANAL.

a. Patrols. An enemy party was encountered at M.31.B.7.2. This party threw a few hand grenades and then hurriedly retreated. Otherwise though our patrols pushed well out into No Mans Land, none of the enemy was encountered.

b. Infantry Arms. Were active on profitable targets. M.W. at M.31.D.6.2. was silenced. Three captured M.Ws emplaced at R.30.A.1.8. were used and 38 rounds were employed in searching fire on M.25.B.3.D. and M.26.A.3.C.

c. Artillery. Was active, shelling FOUCAUCOURT, Windmill in M.32.A. E. and W. road in M.26.C.2.D. and other targets. From 8.50.p.m. to 9.20.p.m. and again at 2.50/4.10.a.m. Squares L.36. and M.1.2. were subjected to barrage fire.

d. Aircraft. Moderately active. It was noticeable that during the afternoon our planes over forward areas were heavily engaged by A.A. Batteries.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.I. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Was very alert and nervous and called for artillery support on frequent occasions without apparent reason. The slightest movement in our forward areas is shelled. Opposite the right Brigade, enemy hurriedly, after throwing a few grenades when our men approached.

b. Infantry Arms. Were active opposite the left but less active opposite right of our sector. 12 Pineapple bombs were fired from the direction of EARLS WOOD (G.31.D.)

c. Artillery. Opposite the left Brigade hostile artillery was very active during the period, but opposite the right Brigade artillery were only active at night.

CHUIGNES - L.34.B. - ravines in R.4. 5. 11. FROISSY BEACON - PROYART - R.10. - R.8.A.B.3.D. - L.34.D. and L.34.A. - L.3.5.C.2.D. - were shelled. During the night the enemy used a considerable number of gas shells (Yellow Cross mixed with H.E.) Gullies in R.23. R.29. R.35. ST MARTINS WOODS - R.36.C. - and Valley in R.5.C. and E.11.A.2.B. were freely gassed.

d. Aircraft. Between 7 and 8.a.m. and 5. and 8.p.m. single E.A. patrolled our forward areas particularly on the left. At 5.p.m. 5 E.A. flew over forward areas of right Brigade. Bombing machines were busy at night on rear areas.

2. Movement. Individual movement observed in FOUCAUCOURT and the vicinity of windmill in M.32.A. Men who appeared to be digging were observed on ridge in the vicinity of G.32.C.

3. Enemy Defences. Sunken road in L.36.A. contains active M.Guns. M.Gun located at M.32.A.8.5. (approx). Posts were located at M.31.B. 6.2. - M.25.D.7.1. and suspected at M.26.C.7.5. - M.26.D.2.9. - M.26.B.3.2. - M.26.B.4.3. - M.26.B.5.5. - M.32.A.6.6.

It would appear that opposite the right Brigade the enemy is holding the trench running from H.30.B.5.8. to H.26.D. thence S.W. through H.26.D. and E.32.A. with a few outposts pushed out in front.

4. Identifications. 87th.I.R. - 21st.Division. 2 unwounded prisoners by left Brigade. 202.R.I.R. 43rd.R.Div. 1 wounded prisoner by left Brigade.

5. Captures. Prisoners captured since 23rd inst now total.

UNWOUNDED.

Offs. O.Rs.

61 2184.

WOUNDED.

O.Rs.

373.

Grand Total 2599 all ranks.

### Notes.

Attached are rough translations of documents captured during the recent operations.

The Divisional order of the 107th Division dated 21st inst is interesting and allows us to form a pretty accurate idea of the enemy dispositions before the battle.

In the first place, the document shows that the enemy was undoubtedly expecting us to attack in the near future.

The order also shows that the enemy forces were still in a considerable state of disorganisation evidenced by the attachment of regiments of other Divisions to the 107th Div etc etc.

An examination of the document combined with identifications given the following facts;-

Before the battle the enemy order of Battle in front of us was from N. to S.

87th.I.R. }

30th.Fus.R. } 21st.Divn.

31st.I.R. }

S. Boundary E. AND W. through centre of ST MARTINS WOODS.

232.I.R. }

227.R.I.R. } 107th.Divn.

52.R.I.R. }

Each regiment had 1 Bn in line, one in support and one in reserve. However the enemy had apparently "milked" the 21st Divn of one Bn.

for the 2nd Bn. of the 31st.I.R. which beforehand been the main counter-attack Bn near RAY, came under the orders of the 213.Inf. Bde of the 107th Divn. on the 21/22nd.

Which Bn replaced the 2nd Bn. 31st Regt in the 21st Div is not known. The 107th Division had apparently organized its defence into

(a) outpost line - (b) 1st.Main line of Defence. (c) 2nd Main line of Defence.

The 1st.Main line ran approximately just E. of the N. and S. Valley. The 2nd.Main line apparently ran roughly N. and S. through FOUCCOURT.

The 2nd.Main line was to be garrisoned by Nucleus Bns or remaining reserves, which however were reinforced on the 21/22nd by the milked 2nd Bn of 31st Regt.

Apparently in our advance we broke through the 1st.Main line of Defence, for we captured considerable numbers of men of every Bn in the 107th Division.

But we apparently stopped our advance before reaching the 2nd.Main line, for we did not capture a single man of the 2nd.Bn. 31st.I.R.

But before we broke through the 1st.Main line of resistance, the 107th Divisional Commander threw into the fight all his reserves, which consisted of the 2nd.Bn. 122nd Fus.Regt and the 213th.

Pioneer Coy, of which we captured a number of prisoners.



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\* 3 \*

The 21st. Division meanwhile had 3 regiments in the line, of which 1 Bn was in line, one Bn in support, and ~~one in reserve,~~ except in the case of the 81st. I.R.

These 2 reserve Bns were about CAPPY and DOMPIERRE.

During the morning of the attack we captured several prisoners of the line and support Bns of the 3 regiments.

When the attack paused, the two reserve Bns reinforced the other Bns and dug in on the slopes of HILL 90. Many prisoners of these reserve Bns of the two regiments were captured by the 3rd Bde in their subsequent advance.

So that we have engaged and defeated on the front of these two German Divisions, all Battalions of each Division (except the 2nd. Bn. 81st. Regt which presumably is still manning the 2nd. Main Line of the 107th Div.)

In addition we have engaged the 122nd Fus. Regt of the 243rd. Div. and other miscellaneous details.

*W. G. ... Capt*

Lieut.-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

## Intelligence Summary No 1

29

from 6 a.m. 24-8-18 to 6 a.m. 25-8-18

Headquarters  
25th August 1918A. Our Operations (a) Reliefs

- (1) Infantry - 3th Bn. relieved 6th Bn. in the front line (Right Section). Relief was completed by 12.30 a.m.
- (b) Patrols - Communication was maintained with flanking units throughout the hours of darkness.
- 5th Bn. - Patrols penetrated NO MAN'S LAND to a depth of about 300 yards without encountering any enemy.
- 6th Bn. - A patrol moved along DENICOURT ALLEY to approx. W.25.D.4.9. where recent signs of occupation were found. PIERROT ALLEY was investigated to M.25.D.5.2. but no signs of enemy could be seen.
- 7 Trench in M.31.B. was patrolled as far as M.31.C.7.2. where a Hun party was encountered. Enemy threw a few hand grenades and then hurriedly retreated.
- 8th Bn. - Patrols were pushed out in order to protect relieving troops, no enemy were seen.
- (c) Machine guns were active throughout the night.
- (d) Stokes Mortars, 38 rounds were fired on the following positions-  
Suspected post at M.32.A.5.6. - Post at M.26.C.5.3.  
and against M.W. at M.31.D.6.2. latter was silenced,  
3 Captured M.W's (emplaced at R.30.A.1.0.) were also used and 88 rounds were expended in searching fire at different ranges in M.25.B. and D. and M.26.A. and C. Good bursts were observed.
- (e) Work - Posts have been deepened and extended and wiring has been carried on.
- (f) Aerial - Our aircraft remained moderately active throughout the day. It was most noticeable during the afternoon, he heavily shelled our positions over the forward area.  
A hostile balloon was up on a grid scoring of 20 degrees grid from R.30.C.5.7. from 11.50 a.m. to 3.40 p.m.

2. Artillery

Shelled FOUCAUCOURT and vicinity of Wind Mill in M.32.A. actively where movement had been observed.  
EAST - WEST Road in M.26.C and D. came in for attention.

3. Enemy Intelligence.(a) Infantry

They are not in the least aggressive and on a certain occasion when one of our patrols approached a hostile position, enemy hurriedly retreated after throwing a few grenades.  
Right Battalion report that enemy appears to have a few isolated posts from 300 to 500 yards from our forward positions.  
It would appear that the enemy is holding the trench running from M.20.P.5.8. to M.26.D. thence South West through M.26.D. and M.32.A. with a few posts pushed forward.

His M.G.'s were much less active than during the previous 24 hrs.

(b) Artillery - During the day, enemy artillery was quiet until about 6 p.m. when he again commenced spasmodic bursts.

At night from about 1.15 a.m. to 5 a.m. he heavily gassed the gullies in R.23., R.29 and R.35. Yellow Cross with H.E. was used. St MARTINS WOOD also came in for this shelling. At 10 p.m. a few gas shells were also put over into R.35.C. Shelling Map attached (Division).

(c) Aerial - With the exception of one low flying plane at 7.30 am. remained inactive until 5 pm. when 5 planes came over forward area.(d) Movement - Was observed in FOUCAUCOURT and vicinity of Wind mill in M.32.A. otherwise no movement was observed.(e) Defences - Posts located at M.31.B.6.2. and M.25.D.7.1.  
Suspected posts - at M.26.C.7.5., M.26.D.2.9., M.26.C.3.2., M.26.C.4.3., M.26.C.5.5., M.32.A.6.6.  
M.C. was located at approx. M.32.A.8.5.Sgd. H.F. WATSON Capt. 2ds. Major  
2nd Aust. Infantry Brigade

Headquarters 5th Battalion A.I.F.

WEATHER CHART.

1918  
August 18 Day fine, cool. Wind West, 8 miles per hour.  
19 Day fine, cool. Wind West, 8 to 10 miles per hour.  
20 Morning dull. Afternoon fine. Wind West, 5 miles per hour.  
21 Day very warm. Wind West, 5 miles per hour.  
22 Warm day. Wind West, 6 miles per hour.  
23 Fine day. Wind N.E. 5 to 7 miles per hour.  
24 Day fine & warm. Wind N.W. 5 miles per hour.  
25 Day fine & warm. Wind S.E. 10 miles per hour.  
26 Day fine & cool. Wind S.W. 12 miles per hour.  
27 Morning fine but dull. Afternoon showery. Wind West 5 m per hr.  
28 Day fine & warm. Wind W. 8 to 10 miles per hr.  
29 Day fine & dull. Wind W. 8 miles per hour.  
30 Fine & cool day. Wind W. 8 miles per hour.  
31 Dull day with a few showers of rain early in morning.  
Wind West 10 to 12 miles per hour.

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Appendix

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105-