


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/45/31 PART 1

**Title:** 28th Infantry Battalion

October 1917 Appendices



AWM4-23/45/31PART1

28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

WAR DIARY

CONFIDENTIAL ORIGINAL

Army Form C, 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II,  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 13 1917

VOLUME 19

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
YPRES SHEET 28 NF	11/10/17	8 PM	<p>Battalion moved forward taking over the line in series of irregularly constructed posts in D27A and B from the 35<sup>th</sup> Battalion - 3<sup>rd</sup> Div. 28<sup>th</sup> Batt. N.G.R. at ZENNEBERE REDDOBT DR6 D55.</p> <p><u>CASUALTIES</u> LIEUT CONROY MC.MY. Died of wounds.</p> <p><u>OTHER RANKS</u> WOUNDED 9.</p>	<p>Passive defence of positions. Officers' Orders.</p>
SHEET 28 NF 57	2/10/17		<p>The Railway Embankment consistently shelled by guns of all calibre. Enemy's barrage falls principally on area between cross roads at D27D35 and road at D27A55. Machine gun fire very harassing. Received instructions from Byde re relief by 25<sup>th</sup> BATTN. Relief successfully completed by midnight.</p> <p><u>CASUALTIES</u> <u>OTHER RANKS</u> WOUNDED 5.</p>	
3/10/17	2 AM	<p>Battalion across BELLEWARD RIDGE. Entire day spent in reorganisation of units and preparation for morning assault. Occupying hostile positions of back areas.</p> <p>26<sup>th</sup> Battalion sent as Reserve Battalion.</p>		

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 3-4<sup>TH</sup> 1917

2

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 28 NE	3/10/17	4 PM	<p>CONTINUED</p> <p>During afternoon working parties, attached to attacking Battalions move forward</p> <p>CASUALTIES O/RKS WOUNDED 1</p>	<p>Entered by Intelligence Summary and Situation Orders attached</p>
SHEET 28 NE	4/10/17	7 AM	<p>Zero hour 6 AM. Remainder of Battalion move forward 6:30 AM via WESTHOEK to position two hundred yards SW DRAUGHT HOUSE DR7C. Still-tides connected and consolidated.</p> <p>Attack progressing satisfactorily. 25<sup>TH</sup> BATTN capturing 1<sup>ST</sup> Objective with little or no resistance. BROODSKINDRIDGE RIDGE. The 2<sup>ND</sup> Objective carried by 26<sup>TH</sup> BATTN in fine style but with heavy casualties.</p> <p>Total prisoners captured 262.</p>	
		12 AM	<p>Repeated counter-attacks fail under our effective artillery fire. Throughout this period enemy heavily shelled our newly gained position.</p>	

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J...

2

28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

WAR DIARY

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or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

OCTOBER 46<sup>TH</sup> 1917

3

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 28 NE	4/10/17		<p>CONTINUED</p> <p>28<sup>TH</sup> BATTN. Divided into numerous carrying parties. Did exceptionally fine work. CAP. KING MC WOUNDED. CASUALTIES - OFFICERS WOUNDED 6 - O/RKS K42 - W85 - M5.</p>	Events and operations.
SHEET 28 NE	5/10/17		<p>Relative quiet existed throughout the day on entire front. Consolidation well in hand. Men in excellent spirits. 7 PM Enemy concentrated intense fire on front line and forward area. Our artillery retaliated with good effect. no counter-attacks developed. CASUALTIES OFFICERS WOUNDED 1.</p>	Intelligence operations started.
SHEET 28 NE	6/10/17	2 AM	<p>Relieved by the 17<sup>TH</sup> on completion Battalion withdrew to bivouacs BELLEWARDE RIDGE, JY. Owing to change of Divisional fronts again necessary</p>	Summary of events.

H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 6-7<sup>th</sup> 1917

4

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 28NF	6/10/17		To move forward for purpose of relieving the 17 <sup>th</sup> who on relief manned position on our left. Relief completed by midnight. BATTN. H.Q. 22C	Operations
SHEET 28NF	7/10/17		Together with two companies attached of the 26 <sup>th</sup> BATTN. 28 <sup>th</sup> holding a series of connected shell-holes D23C 8440 - D23C 9030 and system of strong posts tying security yards to the NE. 27 <sup>th</sup> BATTN. holding front line. 25 <sup>th</sup> BATTN in close support. 28 <sup>th</sup> and 26 <sup>th</sup> in support to 25 <sup>th</sup> . 28 <sup>th</sup> BATTN. H.Q. at PILL BOX 22C. Hostile batteries shelled our position intermittently throughout the night. Ground very heavy and boggy.	1-9 <sup>th</sup> ort. covered by CO. 5 <sup>th</sup> attached.

M. J. ...  
J. ...

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28<sup>TH</sup> BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118 59

OCTOBER 8-9<sup>TH</sup> 1917 5

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 28NF	8/10/17		<p>Relieved by the 18<sup>TH</sup> BATTN. Not completed until 6:30 AM. On relief Battalion moved independently to positions KIT-KAT JID. Battalion detailed as working party laying cable TOKIO. Forward area 6<sup>TH</sup> BODF sector mounted. Heavy rain.</p>	OPERATIONS 1/9 <sup>TH</sup> 017. covered by Summary
SHEET 28NF	9/10/17	2:30 AM 5:20 AM 8A	<p>Left KIT KAT and proceeded BROODSEINDE RIDGE manning line of support trench in DR2D and DR8B. Zero hour 5:20 AM. Attack opens with indifferent success. 23<sup>RD</sup> and 24<sup>TH</sup> BATTN. having lost direction fail to "mop up" DAISY and DAIRY WOOD. Therefore being forced to form a defensive flank running back to original front line. For considerable time situation very obscure.</p>	CO's REPORT attached. covered by Summary

*Margaret Wainwright*

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 9<sup>TH</sup> 1917

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Q. 28TH BATTALION, AUSTRALIAN I.F. No. 6 Date

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and references to Appendices

Place Date Hour

CONTINUED

SHEET 28 NR

"1"

9/10/17

7.15A

The 24<sup>TH</sup> BATTN. having reported being held up in DAISY WOOD. a party of 1 Officer 30 men go forward to their assistance endeavouring to join up with the right and filling the gap between a Post of the 24<sup>TH</sup> at DAISY WOOD.

8.24A

An additional party of 2 Officers. 30 men with Lewis Guns establish a S.P. at D23B15. The remainder of the company numbering 28 link up with this SP. by a series of posts D23B18 on 5<sup>TH</sup> B.G.D.F. boundary.

8 PM

12 MID.

Throughout the day enemy concentrated heavy artillery fire on our original front line, while machine guns and sniping were particularly active. Owing to the 5<sup>TH</sup> B.G.D.F. withdrawing to the RED LINE, it became necessary for those of the 6<sup>TH</sup> B.G.D.F. who had succeeded in reaching BLUE LINE (2<sup>ND</sup> OBJECTIVE) to fall back with them. The RED LINE becoming

OPERATIONS 1-9<sup>TH</sup> OCTOBER. COs REPORT attached.

Report of

Messrs. Mammund

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
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OCTOBER 9/10 1917

7

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H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices																		
CONTINUED.																						
SHEET 26 D	9/10/17	10PM	<p>our foremost position. Commencement of relief by 49<sup>TH</sup> BATTN. Remnants of 6<sup>TH</sup> B.G.D.F. and supporting 4<sup>TH</sup> withdrawing to supports. Casualties OFFICERS. WOUNDED 1. - O.RKS. K. 3 WY.</p>																			
SHEET 26A	10/10/17	5:15A	<p>Battalion relief not completed until 5:15AM. men reporting independently to INFANTRY BARRACKS YPRES Throughout forenoon stragglers arriving very fatigued Food rum and clean clothing supplied in abundance.</p>																			
SHEET 27		7PM	<p>Embussed for STEENVORDE area arriving 10PM BATTN HQRs at K21A 72.</p>																			
<table border="0" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;"><u>SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES</u></td> <td style="text-align: right;">PERIOD 1<sup>ST</sup> - 10<sup>TH</sup> OCT. 17</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 40%;"></td> <td style="text-align: center;">OFFICERS</td> <td style="text-align: right;">O/RKS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KILLED IN ACTION</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: right;">44</td> </tr> <tr> <td>WOUNDED</td> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="text-align: right;">102</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MISSING</td> <td style="text-align: center;"></td> <td style="text-align: right;">7</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;"><u>TOTAL</u></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><u>9</u></td> <td style="text-align: right;"><u>153</u></td> </tr> </table>					<u>SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES</u>		PERIOD 1 <sup>ST</sup> - 10 <sup>TH</sup> OCT. 17		OFFICERS	O/RKS	KILLED IN ACTION	1	44	WOUNDED	8	102	MISSING		7	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>153</u>
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WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 11-13<sup>TH</sup> 1917

8

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H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 27 STEENVORDE	11/10/17	2PM	<p>Day spent reorganisation of Units. BATTN. HQRs now K27A49.</p> <p>CAF. STRE. CAMP personnel arrive together with 69 reinforcements and details from ENGLAND</p> <p>3PM. LIEUT COL. COLLETT DSO. reported from ENGLAND to command Battalion. MAJOR CURRIE DSO of the 26<sup>TH</sup> attached as second in command. LIEUT. COL. TRAVERS DSO. returning to the 26<sup>TH</sup> to command.</p>	
SHEET 27	12/10/17		<p>General routine, reorganisation of Units. Requisition for clothing and equipment rendered to Q.M.</p>	
SHEET 27	13/10/17		<p>Heavy rain throughout day prevented to a great extent outdoor training</p>	<p>Murray Hammond Sent</p>

WAR DIARY

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OCTOBER 14-17<sup>TH</sup> 1917

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28<sup>TH</sup> BATTALION, AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
Date.....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 27 STERNVORDE	14/10/17	10AM	Combined Church Parade 26 <sup>TH</sup> 28 <sup>TH</sup> BATTN	
		12.45PM	Informal visit by Divisional Commander	
		1.30PM	GENERAL BIRDWOOD made an informal inspection. 2/LIEUT. M'KEE, HC. marched in from Cadet School. This officer was originally of the 26 <sup>TH</sup> BATTN.	
SHEET 27	15/10/17		Training reduced to a minimum. Parade hours Morning 9-11AM. Afternoon 2-3PM. During afternoon the Battalion had use of the STERNVORDE BATHS. During the absence of the Brigade Commander on leave to ENGLAND. LIEUT COL. COLLETT DSO assumed command of 7 <sup>TH</sup> BDE.	
SHEET 27	16/10/17		Training routine.	
SHEET 27	17/10/17		Training routine. Major Currie D.S.O. on Special Leave to PARIS. CAPTAIN ROYDHOUSE MC To command Battalion during absence.	Wm. J. ... J. ...

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Q.  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No. ....  
Date .....

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
(Erase heading not required.)

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OCTOBER 17. 20<sup>TH</sup> 10

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 27 STERNVORDE	17/10/17	3pm	CONTINUED Informal visit by A/BRIG. LIEUT. COL. COLLETT D.S.O. Half holiday.	
SHEET 27	18/10/17		Training routine.	
SHEET 27	19/10/17	9AM	Complement of Officers & NCOs attend class. P.T. & B.F. held by SGT. JOYCE. Brigade instructor. Marched on - 9 DETAILS, to Reinforcement Camp.	
SHEET 27	20/10/17	11AM	Battalion inspection by Brigade Commander LIEUT. COL. COLLETT D.S.O. followed by March Past. Considering the short time the Battn. had been out of the line. The appearance of the lads, and general turnout was exceedingly good. During the afternoon the challenge	

1875 Wt. W593/826 1,000,000 4/15 J.B.C. & A. A.D.S.S./Forms/C. 2118.

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J. H. Hammon and  
S. J. ...  
10

WAR DIARY

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 20/21

11

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H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 27 STRENVORDE	20/10/17		CONTINUED  issued by the 6 <sup>th</sup> F.A's unbeaten football team was accepted. The match was full of interest, the keenest enthusiasm being displayed by both teams, throughout a closely contested game. The result was to our credit showing a win by 4 points. 2/LIEUT. SPENCER Cadet School marched in together with 116 ORPs. of CAESTRE Reinforcement Camp.	
SHEET 27	21/10/17	11 AM	Presentation of medals and ribbons by LIEUT. GEN. SIR W. BIRDWOOD at 27 <sup>th</sup> BATTN. HQRs. The Military Medal to SGT. MAJOR NELSON. Four ribbons were presented to those who received awards during the recent operations. Total list of decorations and honors bestowed on members of the Unit, together with an account of the actions for which they have been awarded will be noted when published in General Orders.	yppp Juni

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No. ....  
Date .....

# INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 21/23<sup>RD</sup>

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SHEET 27 STEENVOORD	21/10/17	11AM	Battalion Church Parade. A football match. BATTN. V 1 <sup>ST</sup> BGDE. GENERAL SCHOOL ended in our favor. Final score 8.13. 3.6.	
	22/10/17	10AM	Lecture by Divisional Gas Officer on Anti-Gas measures together with practical gas demonstration and tests on 25 <sup>TH</sup> BATTN. Parade Ground.	
		2.15PM	Transport Brigades for inspection by Brigade Commander. LIEUT. COL. COLLETT DSO.	
		5PM	MAJOR CURRIE DSO. returns from PARIS leave.	
SHEET 27	23/10/17		Fifty cases from 28 <sup>TH</sup> BATTN. Comfort Fund, containing clothing, tobacco and mixed groceries. These gifts were distributed and greatly appreciated by all ranks. LIEUTS. J.H. LUNNON - MELLISH IS.	
			LIEUT G O'GRADY and 260 O.Rs marched in of FLETRE.	599 Camp Fletre 12

1875 Wt. W593/826 1,000,000 4/15 J.B.C. & A. A.D.S.S./Forms/C. 2118.

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28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 24/25

1917

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Date .....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices																
STEENVORDE SHEET 27	24/10/17	3pm	<p>Interesting football match with our old rivals the 27<sup>THS</sup>. Condition of ground left much to be desired. The final scores to our disadvantage - the 27<sup>THS</sup> carrying the field by 11 points.</p> <p>Marched in by FLETRÉ 5 Details - 12 Reinforcements. 13 of whom were signallers.</p> <p>The following NCOs to be 2/Lieuts.</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>884</td> <td>SGT. B. MALDONALD</td> <td>3014</td> <td>SGT. G. WOOD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2118</td> <td>F. BOND</td> <td>6028</td> <td>T/CORP J. STEPHENSON</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4777</td> <td>A. LOVEDAY</td> <td>4361</td> <td>" A. MASKEILL.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4069</td> <td>R. PRESTON</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	884	SGT. B. MALDONALD	3014	SGT. G. WOOD	2118	F. BOND	6028	T/CORP J. STEPHENSON	4777	A. LOVEDAY	4361	" A. MASKEILL.	4069	R. PRESTON			
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4777	A. LOVEDAY	4361	" A. MASKEILL.																	
4069	R. PRESTON																			
	25/10/17	1:30pm	<p>Marched out Officers 9 - Other Ranks 161 to Wood Camp FLETRÉ</p>																	
		3pm	<p>Presentation of ribbons awarded during SEPTEMBER operations by LIEUT GEN. SIR W BIRDWOOD.</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>LIEUT G. MEYSEY-HAMMOND MC.M.M.</td> <td>LIEUT W. LEAVER MC.M.M.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LIEUT T. KELLOR MC.</td> <td>SGT. CLARKE DCM.</td> </tr> </table>	LIEUT G. MEYSEY-HAMMOND MC.M.M.	LIEUT W. LEAVER MC.M.M.	LIEUT T. KELLOR MC.	SGT. CLARKE DCM.	<p>5 13</p>												
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LIEUT T. KELLOR MC.	SGT. CLARKE DCM.																			

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER. 26/27 1917

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H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
STEENVORDE SHEET 27.	26/10/17	8AM	Embussing 8AM at STEENVORDE. The Battalion was conveyed to the debussing point on the YPRES-KEMMER Road forward area.	
		12:30P	Battalion moved into tents MAP. REF. SHEET 28 H30A 4585. During afternoon forward line system reorganised with view taking over. Enemy aircraft active during night - numerous bombs being dropped in YPRES and battery positions.	
SHEET 28 NE YPRES	27/10/17	10AM	Packs and surplus gear dumped at Transport Lines. Line equipment consisting only of Blanket, Oilskin, Gaiter, Sox and Sandbag further. Party of 1 Officer 54 O'Rs detached for duty with CRE. while Division in Line. 1 Officer - 30 O'Rs detached to take charge of Baths and Drying Room YPRES. 4 runners detached for duty with Brigade. LIEUT. COL. COLLETT DSO. returns from Brigade to command.	

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WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 27/17

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A.Q.  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and references to Appendices

Place	Date	Hour	CONTINUED
YPRES SHEET 28 NE	27/10/17	NOON	Feet of all Battalion men bathed and treated with Tale Powder.
		3pm	Battalion moved out via WESTHOEK where guides from outgoing Battalion (54 <sup>TH</sup> ) reported to conduct respective companies forward.
BROODSEINDE SHEET 28 NW		8.5pm	The relief was very satisfactory and was successfully accomplished by 8.5pm.
			The Battalion holding the Line from J5B 4042 to D29 D 2995 by a series of irregularly constructed posts.
			This frontage divided into two sectors - On the right "A" Coy. On the left "C" Coy.
			On our right communication established with "B" Coy of the 12/13 NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS. On the left with the 26 <sup>TH</sup> BATTN. A.I.F.
			Support Coy. "B" from J5A 7251 to D29 C 5212 with a further system of posts 50 yards to the S.W. Coy HGRS. J5A 4874
			Reserve Coy "D" from J4B 8621 to J4B 9052 with an additional system 100 yards to the S.W.

SEE DISPOSITION REPORT ATTACHED.



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H.Q.  
28TH BATTALION,  
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WAR DIARY  
or  
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
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OCTOBER 27 - 1917

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSEINDE SHEET 28 NW	27/10/17	9.45P.	<p>CONTINUED.</p> <p>Bath. HQRs. J4B8860 R.A.P. J4B7053</p> <p>MAJOR CURRIE DSO and INT. OFF. made thorough inspection of the line.</p> <p>During the night operations confined to patrols. See Summary of Intelligence attached.</p> <p>7.30P Hostile shelling confined to area J5A.</p> <p>8.50P At 8.50pm and again at 9.50pm our batteries opened up heavy bombardment on our left for period of seven minutes. Retaliation on our sector by no means violent. The BROODSEINDE Ridge and road in D29C and J5A receiving perhaps particular attention. At intervals throughout the night this area was intermittently shelled. REMUS WOOD occasionally searched from end to end with 77 straphed.</p> <p>Bursts of Machine Gun fire throughout night at intervals from direction of CEMETRY WOOD J6A85 approx.</p> <p>A number of enemy searchlights active in rear of our support position.</p> <p>With the exception of artillery activity enemy to a certain degree passive.</p> <p>Casualties - Other Ranks WOUNDED 3. CASSED 2.</p>	<p>OPERATION ORDERS &amp; Summary of Intelligence ATTACHED.</p> <p>Summary of Intelligence</p>

Major G. ...  
16

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or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Army Form C. 2118

OCTOBER. 28/17

17

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSEINDE SHEET 28 NW	28/10/17	3 AM	Enemy shelling slightly increased between 3am and 5.15am - consistent concentration by hostile 5.9 batteries on WESTHOEK - ANZAC VALLEY and east of POLYGON WOOD in J4C.	ORDERS & INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ATTACHED.
		5.30 AM	In reply to our effective bombardment at 5.30 AM this morning enemy heavily shelled the forward area. Generally speaking this activity was confined to a depth of twelve hundred yards along entire front. Canadians on our left attacked PASSECHENDALE with varying success.	
			During the day relative quiet reported on our sector. Desultory shelling of forward area by hostile 5.9 and 4.2 batteries.	
			Weather conditions good. State of ground 400 yards front of our line dry but crumbly - shell holes containing little or no water. CELTIC and CEMETERY WOOD practically impassable.	
			Several enemy observation balloons have been in evidence behind his lines.	
		8.15 pm	Normal aircraft activity during day. Our practice barrage at 8.15 pm evoked little or no retaliation on this sector.	

*Handwritten signature or initials at the bottom right of the page.*

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118

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OCTOBER. 28/29. 1917

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSEINDE SHEET 28 NW	28/10/17	8.17 AM	<p>(CONTINUED)</p> <p>An S.O.S. was sent up from our line direction of DAISY WOOD.</p>	
		8.21 AM	<p>Repetition of S.O.S. on left. Enemy counter attacks repulsed by Canadians.</p>	
		9.25 P.	<p>Hostile heavy batteries directed operations against area in J5A. This activity fairly consistent until 11 PM.</p>	
		"	<p>Large number of gas shells scattered over our entire front line system. ANZAC and WESTHOREK - RIDGES receiving particular attention.</p>	
		11.30 P.	<p>Gas shell bombardment continued, our battery positions in rear suffering heavily.</p>	
		2 AM.	<p>Our front continually patrolled. see report on operations Intelligence Summary.</p>	
			<p>Casualties Other Ranks KILLED 9. WOUNDED 5.</p>	
BROODSEINDE SHEET 28 NW	29/10/17		<p>Caused by our artillery fire reflection from several exploding dumps observed behind enemy lines. Relative quiet existed on our front during the forenoon.</p>	

SEE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.

*Major Manning*  
Sept 1917

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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OCTOBER 29/1917

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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II, and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

No. ....  
Date .....

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices													
BROODSEINDI SHEFT 28 NVV	29/10/17	5:15A	with the exception of the reply to our bombardment at 5:15AM woke - when the enemy placed a fairly heavy barrage in rear of our line. I, B and D with guns of large calibre.	SEE INTELLIGENCE & REPORTS: SUMMARIES													
		6AM	This shelling died down to intermittent fire at 6AM.														
		2PM	Between 2-4PM a number of gas shells with H.E. and shrapnel distributed over ZONNEBEKE area and DRSD.														
		7:45P	Successful shelling of battery positions around WESTHOEK. Inter-company relief successfully completed without casualty. Disposition of companies as follows:														
			<table border="0"> <tr> <td data-bbox="664 1073 996 1143"><u>FRONT LINE</u></td> <td data-bbox="1170 1073 1597 1143">RIGHT SECTOR</td> <td data-bbox="1724 1073 2009 1143">"D" Coy</td> <td data-bbox="2072 1123 2768 1401" rowspan="4" style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td data-bbox="2072 1123 2768 1401" rowspan="4" style="vertical-align: middle;">Each company occupying position of respective company relieved.</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td data-bbox="1186 1153 1518 1202">LEFT "</td> <td data-bbox="1724 1153 1850 1212">"B"</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="696 1252 996 1312"><u>SUPPORTS</u></td> <td></td> <td data-bbox="1724 1232 1850 1292">"C"</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="696 1341 996 1411"><u>RESERVES</u></td> <td></td> <td data-bbox="1724 1322 1850 1391">"A"</td> </tr> </table>		<u>FRONT LINE</u>	RIGHT SECTOR	"D" Coy	}	Each company occupying position of respective company relieved.		LEFT "	"B"	<u>SUPPORTS</u>		"C"	<u>RESERVES</u>	
<u>FRONT LINE</u>	RIGHT SECTOR	"D" Coy	}	Each company occupying position of respective company relieved.													
	LEFT "	"B"															
<u>SUPPORTS</u>		"C"															
<u>RESERVES</u>		"A"															
		8pm.	Between 8-10pm enemy artillery became less sustained, increasing slightly toward midnight.														
			Machine Gun activity from direction CEMETERY WOOD. Generally speaking the day has been marked by a slight decrease of hostile artillery and aggressive features.														

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 29/30 1917

20

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

28th BATTALION, AUSTRALIAN I.F.

Date

Remarks and references to Appendices

Summary of Events and Information

Place Date Hour

CONTINUED

BROODSEINDER SHEET 28 NW

29/10/17

Our batteries carried out some effective stalling of the enemy's organisations and communication. Hostile aerial activity has shown a marked increase at times fourteen enemy planes have been in position over our lines.

CASUALTIES

Officers GASED LIEUT A.F. GABY.

WOUNDED LIEUT J. STUART-SINCLAIR

(afterwards reported DIED OF WOUNDS)

Other Ranks:

GASED

19 } afterwards reported DIED OF GAS - 2.

WOUNDED

Marched in Reinforcement Camp FLETTRE 28 Other Ranks.

30/10/17

MID

From midnight until 2AM a large number of gas shells distributed over a wide area.

5:42A

On our left Canadians advance on PASSCHENDALE.

Replying to our covering bombardment enemy violently retaliated on our front line system. enemy's fire at times increasing to an appreciable degree until at 6AM a lively reciprocal artillery operation was in progress.

SEE INTELLIGENCE & REPORTS. SUMMARIES

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118 99

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28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.  
No.....  
Date.....

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 30/1917

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSEINDER SHEET 28NW	30/10/17	6.5AM	CONTINUED A few minutes after 6AM this activity redoubled in intensity a general barrage being laid on our forward area.	SEE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.
		6.30A	As no advance was made on our front enemy's fire gradually diminished until at 6.30AM normal conditions were resumed.	
		7AM.	Between 7-10AM extraordinarily quiet prevailed on this sector.	
		10AM	From 10A - 12N. The NE corner of POLYGON WOOD was the centre of activity. desultory shelling of J5A.	
		12N.	From NOON - 1.30PM the Eastern side of BROODSEINDER RIDGE was searched with 77 and 4.2 shrapnel and occasionally shells of larger calibre from batteries direction of MOLENAAR.	
			During afternoon very little shelling on our sector. Red Cross Flag observed in position on rough shelter ERID 7570.	
		4.45P	An S.O.S. sent up from direction of PASSCHENDALE. Our batteries opened up heavy bombardment on village and ridge for about an hour.	

Summary of Intelligence  
21

WAR DIARY

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 30/1917

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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

F. G.  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I. F.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSFINDER SHEET 28 NW	30/10/17	9pm.	<p><u>CONTINUED</u></p> <p>Notable decrease of hostile aerial activity on this sector. During the day at irregular periods isolated machines made their appearance for a short time only.</p> <p>Between 9pm - 12 MID. full doses and communications in D28D and D29C were intermittently shelled with shrapnel and 5.9 HE. Enemy's attitude appears to be more restless and uneasy. not knowing apparently from which front to expect an attack.</p> <p><u>CASUALTIES</u></p> <p><u>OFFICERS</u></p> <p>LIEUT D MARTIN WOUNDED &amp; GASSED.</p> <p><u>OTHER RANKS</u></p> <p>KILLED - 1 WOUNDED - 3 GASSED - 6</p> <p>Marched in to Reinforcement Camps FLETRE 4 O.RKS.</p>	<p>SEE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.</p> <p>Missy J. J. J.</p>

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part I. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

H.Q.,  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 31/1917

23

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSEINDER SHEET 28NW	31/10/17	12M 1AM 3.20A 5.43P 5.45P	<p>At intervals during the night (CELTIC WOOD) was lightly shelled.</p> <p>Toward 1AM hostile activity increased, a heavy gas barrage being placed over area J4B and J5A. More than 300 gas shells of all calibre were counted on this sector.</p> <p>Heavy cannonading on our right, no observation of this sector.</p> <p>During forenoon enemy confined himself to lightly shelling our communications in J4B and C, and at intervals ANZAC and WESTHORN RIDGES.</p> <p>Generally speaking ominous quiet has existed on our immediate front during the day.</p> <p>Heavy cannonading on our left. North of the YPRES. ROOLES - RAILWAY.</p> <p>S.O.S. signals fired on a wide front. These signals were repeated several minutes later.</p> <p>Between 5.50-6PM this cannonading noticeably increased at times attaining great intensity. Machine Gun</p>	SEE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES



WAR DIARY

or

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OCTOBER 31/1917

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

H.Q.  
28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BROODSHEINDF SHEET 28NW	31/10/17		<p>CONTINUED</p> <p>fire could be plainly heard. All activity was confined to the area North of the Railway. Throughout these operations comparative quiet existed on our front. Aerial operations slightly below normal. The period of activity lying between 1.50 - 4.30 PM. Several machines were engaged by our Lewis gunners. Six hostile observation balloons were in position.</p> <p>10.15 PM Relieved by 27<sup>th</sup> Battalion. 28<sup>th</sup> Battalion moved out to take over position previously occupied by this Battn. After relief when moving out, the enemy heavily barraged HELLE<sup>2</sup> and ANZAC areas J3 and 9. This activity commencing at 9 PM was consistent to a degree until a few minutes past midnight - becoming then less sustained it gradually diminished until at 3 AM conditions were again normal. The Battalion was in the centre of this activity.</p>	SEE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES
		9 PM		

CASUALTIES

OTHER RANKS

KILLED	3
WOUNDED	5
GASSED	1

Summary of Intelligence  
J. G. G. G.

28TH BATTALION,  
AUSTRALIAN I.F.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II,  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

OCTOBER 31/17

25

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices																		
			<p><u>SUMMARY - OF - CASUALTIES</u></p> <p><u>PERIOD - OCT. 27/31 - 1917</u></p> <table><thead><tr><th></th><th><u>OFFICERS.</u></th><th><u>O.RMS.</u></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>KILLED IN ACTION</td><td>1</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>WOUNDED</td><td>1</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>GASSED</td><td>1</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>SINCE DIED OF WOUNDS</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>SINCE DIED OF GAS</td><td>-</td><td>2</td></tr></tbody></table>		<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>O.RMS.</u>	KILLED IN ACTION	1	13	WOUNDED	1	17	GASSED	1	28	SINCE DIED OF WOUNDS	-	1	SINCE DIED OF GAS	-	2	
	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>O.RMS.</u>																				
KILLED IN ACTION	1	13																				
WOUNDED	1	17																				
GASSED	1	28																				
SINCE DIED OF WOUNDS	-	1																				
SINCE DIED OF GAS	-	2																				
			<p>Barber Cottell Sgd. Coy 28th Inf</p>																			

25

G.O.C.  
7th Aust. Inf. Bde.

APPENDIX.

Sir,

Report on Operations 1/2nd to 8/9th October 1917.

The Battalion marched from the CANAL AREA at 9.45 p.m. 1/2 nd October and took over Front Line (from RAILWAY to ZONNEBEKE LAKE ) from the 33rd Aust. Infantry ( 3rd Aust. Div). Headquarters of Battalion at ZONNEBEKE REDOUBT on the night 2/3rd Oct. The 25th Battalion relieved us at 2.30. p.m. and the 28th then moved back to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE leaving one Officer per Company and a percentage of Specialists with the 25th Battalion. The Casualties while holding the line for the 24 hours were :-

Killed 1 Officer (Lieut CONROY) 3 O/Ranks  
Wounded 31 do

At BELLEWAARDE final orders were received for the attack on BROODSEINDE . The Battalion supplied the following carrying parties :-

4 Officers and 100 O/Ranks carrying for 25th Battn &  
4. do 100 do moving Brigade Dump  
forward from the MUHLE to MOULIN FARM after the 1st Objective had been captured. This left with the Battalion 13 Officers and 211 O/Ranks. all told with 16 Lewis Guns.

At ZERO hour on the 4th Oct. the Battalion as above had arrived at WESTHOEK and at ZERO plus 30 minutes moved forward to jumping off lines of the 26th Battalion. ST. JOSEPH RIDGE with Headquarters at ZONNEBEKE REDOUBT . Casualties were received here from the heavy shelling. Capt KING (Adj) Capt GLYDE and Lieut HARRIS were all wounded getting men under cover.

At about 10.30 a.m. the situation on the Front Line being very indefinite the G.O.C. Ordered me to go forward and make the best dispositions possible in conjunction with the C.O's 25th & 26th Battalions. Both asked me for support and Lewis Guns with teams were sent up to the Front Line (26th Battn ) and to the Support Line (25th Battalion). I reported to the G.O.C on return and remained at Bde Hqrs until dusk when in accordance with Brigade instructions 261/123 I went forward again and in consultation with the C.O.s of the 25th, 26th & 27th Battalions the following dispositions were made, and the Line reorganised as follows :-

26th Battalion and one Coy 27th Battn under Major CURRIE, D.S.O, 26th, held Front Line. 25th Bn support line. 27th Battn (less one Coy) in Strong Point ( constructed under supervision of Engineers) and holding the Line in reserve.

28th Battn in close support to 27th Battn in line  
D.22.c.8.6 , D.22.c.95.30

Headquarters with 27th Battn at D.22.c.95.30 .  
The Battalion remained in this position until the night of 5/6th Oct. when they were relieved by the 17th Battn A.I.F and moved back to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE.

During this Stunt the Battalion suffered approximately 25% casualties. The Carrying Party suffering heavily.

On the 6th inst in accordance with Brigade Order No.135 the Battalion reorganised and moved forward to position previously occupied and took over from the 17th Battalion. The available strength of the 26th Battalion were attached to 28th under my command and the two Battalions at 9. a.m. 7th Oct. consisted of 450 all ranks approx.

Early in the evening of the 7th Oct. the enemy shelled our positions very heavily but fortunately casualties were light. On the night 7/8th Oct in accordance with Bde Order No.136 the battalion with 26th attached were relieved by the 18th Battalion A.I.F.

The 26th Moved to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE and Major CURRIE D.S.O again assumed command of them. The 28th Battn moved to WESTHOEK. This relief was not complete until 9.30 a.m. 8th Oct

At 3. p.m. a party of 100 all told were detailed to carry for cable burying. This party returned at 7. p.m. and immediately reorganised and were issued with Bombs, S.A.A, etc, for operations in accordance with Bde Order, On morning of 9th Oct. At 4.30. p.m. I proceeded to Brigade Hqrs with state and verbally informed the G.O.C that the men were extremely tired and that the available strength was only 158 all told.

On arriving at Brigade I found that an alteration in disposition had been made and had to reconnoitre the new position I did not return to the Battn until at WESTHOEK until 11.30 p.m and having seen the G.O.C 6th Bde ( under whose order the Battn came after Zero hour) at once reorganised into 4 Companies each approx 30 O/Ranks with One Lewis Gun.

At Zero hour 9th Oct. the Battalion after a very exhausting march due to the rain and mud arrived at point of assembly. Hqrs with 25th Bn Hqrs.

According to orders of the 6th Brigade one Coy was at the disposal of the each Battalion Commander of the 6th Bde if required. The C.O's of the 21st, 23rd and 24th Bns each reinforced their front with the 28th Coys and one Coy was left which after supplying stretcher bearers consisted of 2 Offices and 16 O/Ranks.

At mid-day orders were received that the Battn was being relieved in daylight by a Battn of the 12th Bde A.I.F. As this was impossible owing to the general mix up I proceeded to Bde Hqrs after arranging with each C.O of the 6th Bde to relieve the Coys of the Battn after dark.

I reported to the G.O.C's 7th and 6th Bdes and then on night 9/10th after making all arrangements re guides both for ingoing and outgoing troops proceeded to Infantry Barracks YPRES.

The 28th Battalion were finally relieved and in small parties reached YPRES Barracks by 9 a.m. on 10th Oct.

Attached please find list of casualties also state showing present strength and recommendations for gallant conduct.

I desire to state that I had to work under adverse conditions and after the Adjutant was wounded on 4.10.17 had practically no knowledge of the officers and men left in the Battalion whatever. The Assistant Adjutant Lieut GROSSE reported from the Transport Lines and his energy and devotion to duty was most marked but he also was handicapped.

In conclusion, Sir, I beg to state that I cannot speak too highly of the Officers, N.C.O's and men of the Battalion who one and all showed their loyalty to you and me under most exceptional circumstances carrying out their duties splendidly under such adverse conditions.

*Shavers*  
.....Lieut-Col.  
T/Commanding 28th Battalion A.I.F

In the Field  
12th Oct. 1917

## APPENDIX.

28th BATTALION A.I.F.  
-----STRENGTH 10th October 1917.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O/Ranks</u>
Present with Unit	29	646
On detachment	2	116
	<hr/>	
Total strength of Unit	31	762
	<hr/>	

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIESPeriod 1st to 10th October 1917.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O/Ranks</u>
Killed in Action	1	44
Wounded	6	109
Missing	2	7
	<hr/>	
Total	9	160
	<hr/>	

*J. Travers Lt Col  
2/cdg 28th Bn AIF*

Seventh A.I. Brigade. Second Division. Tenth Anzac Corps. 12 October 1917 Date of Recommendation.

Schedule No. (to be left blank)	Unit	Regtl. No.	Rank and Name	Action for which commended	Recommended by	Honour or Reward	(To be left blank)
	28 <sup>th</sup> Battalion A.I.I.		Lieut. GEORGE SPENCER <u>COMPTON</u>	For conspicuous bravery during the attack on BROODSEINDE RIDGE on 4 October 1917, this officer was in charge of a party carrying for the 25 <sup>th</sup> Battalion. The enemy put up a heavy barrage but succeeded in getting his men into positions with full loads. He carried forward S.A.A. Bombs etc. and returned twice to the dump through heavy shell fire showing great dash. He was, unfortunately, severely wounded about 4 p.m. on 4 <sup>th</sup> October but had completed his task.	M.C. M.C.	M.C.	
	28 <sup>th</sup> Battalion A.I.I.		2/Lieut. WILLIAM STANLEY <u>BOUNBY</u>	For conspicuous bravery. This officer during the attack on BROODSEINDE RIDGE on 4 October was in charge of a carrying party for the 25 <sup>th</sup> Battalion. He showed marked leadership in getting his men into positions under heavy enemy shelling and made three trips through the barrage getting up a complete supply of S.A.A. Bombs etc for 25 Battalion.			

M.C.  
 M.C.  
 M.C.

APPENDIX

29

Seventh A.I. Brigade. Second Division. First Anzac Corps. 12 October 1917 Date of Recommendation.

Schedule No. (to be left blank)	Unit	Regtl. No.	Rank and Name	Action for which commended	Recommended by	Honour or Reward	(To be left blank)
	<u>28<sup>th</sup> Battalion</u> <u>A.I.I.</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>CORPORAL WILLIAM CHARLES</u> <u>PIGGOTT</u>	<p>For conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. On the morning of 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1917 this N.C.O. laid a telephone wire up to the front line in daylight, under full view of the enemy, who fired several shots at him from a distance of not more than 100 yards. He succeeded in his task and this line proved most valuable in maintaining touch before the assault on Zonneberg on morning of 4<sup>th</sup> October.</p>	<p><i>Stewart</i> 10/11/17 11/11/17</p>	<u>M.M.</u>	
	<u>29<sup>th</sup> Battalion</u> <u>A.I.I.</u>	<u>6032</u>	<u>4 Corporal FREDERICK</u> <u>JOHN CAPORN</u>	<p>For bravery and devotion to duty. During the attack on BROOSEBROEK RIDGE on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1917, this NCO was a member of a carrying party, carrying ammunition etc, up to the front line. After the officer was wounded Caporn took charge and by his energy and bravery succeeded in keeping the front line supplied, leading his men through heavy enemy shelling on three occasions.</p>		<u>M.M.</u>	

APPENDIX

SECRET

Copy No. 4

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 1st 1917.

ORDER No. 132.

Reference BECELALRE Sheet 1/10,000.  
Sheet 28 N.W. 1/10,000.

1. The following moves will take place on the night 2/3rd October 1917 :-
  - (a) 25th Bn. will relieve 28th Bn. in the front line.
  - (b) 28th Bn. on relief will move back to BELLEAARDE RIDGE.
  - (c) C.O., 27th Bn. will move another Company forward to the vicinity of trench at J.l.b.80.70., the remainder of the Battalion being at WESTHOEK RIDGE.
  - (d) 26th Bn. will move from YPRES to GORDON CAMP. (GORDON CAMP is in the CANAL Area - Area Commandant BELGIAN CHATEAU).
2. The C.O. 28th Battalion will arrange to leave a proportion of specialists and one officer per Company in the line with the 25th Battalion until the night 3/4th October, when they will rejoin their Unit. 28th Battalion will arrange to provide the necessary guides as required by 25th Battalion.
3. Details of moves and reliefs will be arranged mutually between C.O.'s concerned, subject to the terms of this Order.
4. Units moving forward will come fully equipped for the coming operations.
5. Where existing accommodation is not sufficient, troops will dig themselves in.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

*AG Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals. at 12.30 am

- Copies to :
- |                            |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. 25th Bn.                | 11. Staff Capt.      |
| 2. 26th Bn.                | 12. B.T.O.           |
| 3. 27th Bn.                | 13. Bde Bomb Officer |
| 4. 28th Bn.                | 14. 6th A.I.Bde      |
| 5. 7th A.M.G. Coy          | 15. 5th A.I.Bde.     |
| 6. 7th A.L.T.M. Bty.       | 16. 11th A.I.Bde.    |
| 7. Area Comdt (CANAL Area) | 17. 2nd Aust. Div.   |
| 8. 17th AASC               | 18. 7th Field Amb.   |
| 9. G.O.C.                  | 19. 7th Field Coy.   |
| 10. B.M.                   | 20/21 War Diary      |
|                            | 22. File             |
|                            | 22 - 26 Spares.      |



SECRET.

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 1st 1917.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM to accompany Brigade Order No. 13<sup>u</sup>.

1. ROUTES. Attention is drawn to 2nd Aust. Division Administrative Memo No. 176.
2. SUPPLIES. As per Divisional Administrative Memo, except when taken by 1st Line Transport. B.T.O. (Captain J.C. LITTLE) will arrange route forward. Units forward of the Dump will arrange carrying parties to take rations forward from Brigade Dump D.27.c.8.8. (near MUHLE), and Units in rear will arrange to have rations taken direct to them by 1st Line Transport. The 500 emergency rations laid down in Administrative Memo. No. 176 will be dug in at the Brigade Dump, near MUHLE.
3. WATER. Extra water bottles will be issued to Battalions, which will be filled before going in. 500 tins of water will be dug in at the Brigade Dump, and will form the Brigade Reserve. Units will send water forward each day with the rations. *This will be drawn from water point of I.H.D. 54.* Four extra water carts are available, and will be dug in near SANS SOUCI the evening before ZERO day. This water will be used to augment Battalion supplies
4. AMMUNITION. Ammunition to be carried on the man, 220 rounds, and 2 bombs have already been drawn. The Brigade Dump will be at D.27.c.8.8. For approximate amounts on this dump, see Appendix "A". All ammunition demands will be sent to the Officer in charge, Lieut. BOYLE. On the capture of the 1st Objective, the Brigade Bomb Officer will arrange to establish a Forward Dump at approximately MOULIN FARM D.22.d.5.6. Units will arrange to form Battalion Dumps in suitable places.
5. R.E. STORES. The forward R.E. Dump will be at J.2.a.8.5. (a) SIGN BOARDS are available here for issue today. (b) TAPE for 25th and 26th Battalions will be available for issue today. 27th and 28th Battalions will be issued as soon as C.R.E. has it available.
6. PRISONERS OF WAR. The Divisional Cage will be at SHRAPNEL CORNER (See Brigade Preliminary Instructions No.1, Series No.2. para 22).

5024  
33  
62

- 2 -

## 7. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The forward area will be cleared by 6th Field Ambulance, with the following details in addition :-

From 5th Field Ambulance - 2 Tent sub-Divisions and Bearer Division.  
From 7th Field Ambulance - Bearer Division.  
The Medical Dispositions will be as follows :-

R.A.P. Left Bde (will be notified later)	
THE TUNNELS, J.2.d.1.4.	} These Ambulance Posts will be established.
WESTHOEK J.7.d.8.8.	
BELLEJAARDE RIDGE J.7.a.4.3.	
SIMONS POST J.12.c.8.7	
BIRR X ROADS J.17.b.2.8	}

WALKING CASES. These will come back along duckboardtrack which passes close to MUHLE D.27.c.95.80 - DRAUGHT HOUSE - KIT & KAT thence to MENIN ROAD Dressing Station. Walking wounded requiring assistance must not be attended by more than one man, and only if absolutely necessary.

## 8. Each Unit will arrange to increase number of Battalion Stretcher-bearers to 48.

R.M.Os will arrange to establish R.A.Ps in vicinity of Battalion H.Q. as the advance progresses, notifying Brigade Headquarters and the Field Ambulance of the location.

Units will place notice boards indicating R.A.P's Signboards will be available today.

9. BATTLE STRAGGLER POSTS. 28th Battalion will detail 1 N.C.O. and 3 men to be on duty at KIT & KAT. This post will prevent from leaving the forward area all unwounded men except carriers and others whose duty takes them to the rear.

The number, name and unit must be taken of any stragglers <sup>who will be</sup> retained at KIT & KAT until they can be sent back <sup>with</sup> either an Officer or N.C.O. of their own or any other unit, going forward to the line.

*A. Roast*

Major, for Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Distribution as for  
Preliminary Instructions No.1.  
Series 2.

NOTE Appendix 'A' will be issued later

HEADQUARTERS 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
No. 202/18
Date

SECRET.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 1st 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy,  
T.M. Battery.

The following barrages are being carried out in connection with the next stage of the operations :-

- Oct. 1st. ARMY Barrage - 9.30 a.m. to 10.20 a.m.  
8.15 p.m. to 8.51 p.m.
- Oct. 2nd. 1st and 2nd - 6.15 a.m. to 6.48 a.m.  
ANZAC. 5.00 p.m. to 5.39 p.m.
- Oct. 3rd. 1st and 2nd - 7.15 a.m. to 8.5 a.m.  
ANZAC 1.30 p.m. to 2.6 p.m.

In addition to the above the 10th Corps on Divisional Right will carry out bar rages as follows :-

- Oct. 1st. 5.45 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.
- Oct. 2nd. 6.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m.

Units in the line will arrange to note where the enemy's retaliation barrages are placed.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde.

*JJ*

*File 18*

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

No. 22/26

October 1st 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,

The following copy of letter from 1st Anzac is forwarded for information and necessary action by all Transport Officers and Quartermasters :-

" The water in DICKEBUSCH LAKE has been contaminated by horse lines and camps in the catchment area, and has been condemned as unfit for drinking in its present state by the medical authorities.

Pending the removal of the causes of contamination, it will be necessary to install sterilising lorries at each of the Water Tank Stations supplied from this source, and lorries are being supplied forthwith by No. 1. Water Tank Company to operate at the following Tanks :-

<u>Tank</u>	<u>Lorries.</u>	
No. 9.	2	) 1 ANZAC.
No.10.	2	
No.17.	1	
No.60.	1	
No.94	1	

Please issue instructions to the Control Personnel at the Water Points in the Corps Area to the effect that all water drawn from these points by water carts must first be passed through the sterilising lorries."

*gg*

*Lalouch*

Captain, for Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*For information of your  
Transport officer & Q.M.*

*Am & T.O. to note*

*file*

*J. Brown  
T.O. 17077*

*W. H. ...*

Secret.

AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.

---

7th COMPANY.

---

OPERATION ORDER NO. 8.

---

References:-

(Sketch) at BEVELAERE 1/10,000  
(Sketch) at S.M.W. 1/30,000

Copy No. 10 to 28<sup>th</sup> Batt.

1. (a) At a date and time to be notified later, the 2nd. Army in co-operation with 5th Army will advance its front.  
(b) The 2nd. ANZAC Corps will be on left of 1st ANZAC Corps. The 7th A. I. Brigade will attack on the left of 2nd Australian Division, with 11th A. I. Brigade, 3rd Australian Division (2nd ANZAC Corps) on its left again.  
The 6th A. I. Brigade will attack on the right of 7th A. I. Brigade.
2. The final objective of the 2nd. Australian Division will be the line of the ridge MOORDEN NOEK - BROODSHEINDE, between D.20. D.1.3. and D.23. 2.8.2.
3. The operation will probably be in two stages - each stage constituting one objective (shown on attached sketch as RED LINE (1st Objective) and BLUE LINE (2nd Objective)).
4. The 25th Battalion will attack and capture the RED LINE.  
27th Battalion, with 27th Battalion in close support, will attack and capture BLUE LINE.  
28th Battalion will be in Brigade Reserve.
5. This Company will operate with the 7th. A. I. Brigade, and for that purpose will supply 4 Sections as Mobile Guns. Two Sections will support and assist in the consolidation of the 1st and 2nd Objectives i.e. one Section at each.  
One Section will hold the line at ST. JOSEPH'S RIDGE and the remaining Section will be in Reserve at Brigade Headquarters.
6. For tasks allotted to each Section see Appendices A1, A2, A3, and A4.
7. The personnel of Gun Crews, Gun Material and ammunition going over in the attack, see Appendix "C".
8. Special Instructions to Mobile Guns, see Appendix "B".
9. Dress. Fighting Order with 48 hours rations, four Mills Bombs and two sandbags per man.
10. Artillery Barrages. There will be two stages marked RED and BLUE. The Barrage at ZERO will be put down 150 yards in advance of the front line for three minutes. Our front line will be taken as shown on the barrage map.  
The barrage will then advance for two hundred yards at the rate of one hundred yards in four minutes.  
From that point to the RED protective barrage line (300 yards in advance of RED line) it will advance at the rate of 100 yards in 6 minutes.  
It will advance from that line at ZERO plus 130 minutes at the rate of 100 yards in 6 minutes to the BLUE protective barrage line (300 yards in advance of the BLUE line.)  
Posts will be established about 100 yards in advance of the BLUE line. Creeping barrages in depth will then be carried out.
11. Success Signals. will not be fired by assaulting troops, but capture of an objective will be reported by Signal Service - lamp, runner, power buzzer, pigeon or telephone.
12. Date and Zero time will be notified later.  
Watches will be synchronised twice daily with Brigade Headquarters when in the line.

13. The Infantry Jumping Off Line is being reconnoitred, and will be taped out on 24th night, both laterally and forward - the latter to assist in maintaining direction.
14. S. O. S. As detailed verbally.
15. Special Marks. Helmets of troops detailed for capture of Objectives will be marked with a diamond between brim and crown in rear as under  

25th Battalion	RED Diamond.
25th "	BLUE Diamond.
16. Advanced Brigade Headquarters will be at D. 26. c. 15. 30.
17. Company Headquarters will be in vicinity of Advanced Brigade Headquarters.
18. Surplus Spare Parts, Barrels and Belt Boxes will be kept at rear Company Headquarters for the initial stages of the attack.
19. Rations and Water will be drawn from Dump at SANZOUKI.
20. The 8th Brigade will be operating on our Right Flank with the 6th Machine Gun Company, and the 11th Brigade on our Left Flank with the 11th Machine Gun Company.
21. Acknowledge.

*J. Nicholls*  
 ..... Capt.  
 C. O. 7th Company. Aust. M. Gun Corps.

Issued at... 1/10/17

Distribution:-

- |                                     |                        |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Copy No. 1 to Brigade Headquarters. |                        |
| 2                                   | C. O.                  |
| 3                                   | No. 1 Section Officer. |
| 4                                   | " "                    |
| 5                                   | " "                    |
| 6                                   | " "                    |
| 7                                   | 25th Battalion.        |
| 8                                   | 26th Battalion.        |
| 9                                   | 27th Battalion.        |
| 10                                  | 28th Battalion.        |
| 11                                  | Trench Mortar Battery. |
| 12                                  | 11th M. Gun Coy.       |
| 13                                  | 6th M. Gun Coy.        |
| 14                                  | War Diary.             |
| 15                                  | File.                  |
| 16                                  | Spare.                 |

## APPENDIX "A1".

FIRST OBJECTIVE - Red Line on attached Fighting Map.

1. This line will be taken and consolidated by the 25th Battalion. No. 2 Section, under Lieut. Hunter, will support and assist in the consolidation of this objective by placing guns approximately at the following positions:-
 

No. 1 Gun	-	D.22.	d.55.25
2 "	-	D.22.	d.55.65
3 "	-	D.22.	d.45.85.
4 "	-	D.22.	b.45.25.
2. Jumping Off. This Section will jump off from suitable positions with and in rear of the 25th Battalion, paying particular care of being forward of the enemy barrage and heavy shelling lines. They will be in position and report to Company Headquarters to that effect two hours before Zero.
3. On the capture of the second objective, Blue Line by the 25th Battalion the officer in charge of this Section will move his Nos. 2 and 4 Guns respectively forward to positions marked as follows:-
 

No. 2 Gun	-	D.22.	d.85.25.
4 "	-	D.22.	b.65.35.

 These positions will be known as 2.b. and 4.b.
4. This Section is to be in position not later than 10 minutes after consolidation of the objective by the Infantry.

APPENDIX "A2".SECOND OBJECTIVE - Blue Line on attached Fighting Map.

1. This line will be taken and consolidated by the 26th Battalion. No. 1 Section, under Lieut. Douglas, will support and assist in the consolidation of this objective by placing guns approximately at the following positions:-
 

No. 1 Gun	-	D.23.	c.65.20.
2 "	-	D.23.	a.7.2.
3 "	-	D.23.	a.3.3.
4 "	-	D.23.	a.55.60.
2. Jumping Off. This Section will jump off with and in rear of the 26th Battalion, paying particular care of being well forward of enemy barrage and shelling lines. They will be in position and report to Company Headquarters to that effect two hours before Zero.
3. This Section is to be in position not later than 10 minutes after the consolidation of the objective by the Infantry.

APPENDIX "A3".No. 3 Section.

1. This Section, in conjunction with the 28th Battalion will hold the line at ST. JOSEPH'S RIDGE. The Gun Positions are as follows:-
 

No. 1 Gun	-	D.27.	b.15.05.
2 "	-	D.27.	b.5.10.
3 "	-	D.27.	a.40.40.
4 "	-	D.27.	a.25.40.
2. From these positions Nos. 3 and 4 Guns will cover left flank and Nos. 1 and 2 Guns the Right Flank.
3. On the capture of the Second Objective, Blue Line, these guns will move forward to positions approximately at as follows:-
 

1B. No. 1 Gun	-	D.28.	a.65.25.
2B. 2 "	-	D.22.	c.85.35.
3B. 3 "	-	D.22.	c.40.25.
4B. 4 "	-	D.22.	c.45.70.


APPENDIX.

APPENDIX "A4"

No. 4 Section.

- 1. This Section will be held in Reserve at or near Brigade Headquarters at D.26. c.25.30.

On the taking of the second Objective, after No. 3 Section moves forward, this Section will take up the Gun Positions on ST. JOSEPH'S RIDGE vacated by No. 3 Section. They will they lay out on Zero Lines and be in position to switch on to special targets as ordered by the Brigadier.





## APPENDIX "B".

## SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

1. The Section Officer of each of these Mobile Sections is on no account to lose touch with their respective Battalion Commanders. They must work in the closest cooperation possible, as it is only on this that success of the Machine Guns can be obtained.
2. Each Gun Commander and N. C. O. must be thoroughly conversant with the situation, and provided with a Fighting Map.
3. As soon after consolidation as possible the Section Officers will see that there is at least 4000 bulk S. A. A. dumped near each Gun Position. This bulk S. A. A. can be obtained from the Infantry carriers Company or Platoon Dumps.
4. Each Section Officer will obtain an escort of two riflemen and two bombers per gun from their respective Battalion Commanders.
5. If the occasion demands it full belt boxes will be passed forward in relays, i.e. the gun position in rear feeding the one in front on each objective and finally to Company Headquarters, where a surplus of full boxes can always be obtained.
6. There is to be no unnecessary running. Reports can be sent through the Battalion Commanders, through the Brigade and on to the C. O. of the Company, but on final consolidation a runner is to be sent from each gun position direct to Company Headquarters with full particulars concerning that particular gun.
7. The Gun Commanders are to realise that they are in charge of the guns and in the event of their losing touch with their senior N. C. Os. and Officers, they will act on their own initiative and report as ordered.
8. Each Section Officer will see that all ranks are thoroughly conversant with the S. O. S. and Success Signals.
9. Personnel and Gun Equipment are not to be exposed unnecessarily.
10. Code Calls only to be used.
11. In the event of capture all orders and Fighting Maps are to be destroyed.
12. All Gun Positions are to be made with an "All Round Traverse."

## APPENDIX "C".

## PERSONNEL.

1. Each Section will be commanded by one officer.  
One Sergeant or Corporal to each pair of guns.  
and a Gun Crew will consist of the following:-

Gun Commander.

No. 1.

2.

3.

4.

Runner.

2. Gun Material.

Gun.

Tripod.

Auxiliary Tripod (On Gun).

Condenser outfit.

Cleaning Rod.

First Aid Wallet.

Mud Cover.

Trench Carrier.

Gun Rag. Oil. Petrol Can of Water (carried in pack  
by Gun Commander.)

3. Ammunition.

18 Belt Boxes per Gun carried by Nos. 3, 4, and  
runner with special carrying brace.

3 Bandoliers in bulk carried by Sergeant and  
Corporal and Gun Commander.

APPENDIX

SECRET7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
 JOHN JAMES  
 7th AUSTRALIAN  
 INFANTRY BRIGADE

202/19

October 2nd 1917.

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Battalions,  
 Machine Gun Company,  
 T.M. Battery.

1. Barrage maps are forwarded herewith on the following scale :-

10 per Battalion,  
 4 Machine Gun Company,  
 3 Trench Mortar Battery.

2. A special barrage line has been arranged on our front from ZERO to ZERO plus 3 to include the hostile positions on the road running N.W. from ZONNEBEKE CHATEAU. This barrage line is shown in blue pencil on the maps.

3. G.O. 25th Battalion will arrange to withdraw forward posts to the approximate line ZONNEBEKE CHATEAU (D.27.b) - D.21.d.2.1. before ZERO hour. If the posts are withdrawn early, NO MANS LAND must be energetically patrolled until the last possible moment, consistent with safety from our barrage.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

ack 3/10/17

A. G. Base

Major, Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

## APPENDIX.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No. 203/11

Date

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 2nd 1917.

H.Q.,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
M/gun Coy,  
T.M.Bty.

The following accommodation will be reserved for the  
use of the Australian Machine Gun Corps :-

Left Division : Concrete Pill-box - D.27.c.85.15.  
St. Joseph's Institute - D.27.a.75.25.  
MUNLE House - D.27.d.0.8.

*Units will arrange to leave the  
accommodation as above  
A.Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

SECRET.7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
261/107
Date.....

October 2nd 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

OPERATION MEMORANDUM.

1. The consolidation of the position will be in depth. The method suggested for that of the 1st Objective is a continuous trench on the reverse slope of the ridge between the 1st and 2nd Objectives, with observation posts on or below the crest. This trench should be deep and well traversed or wriggled. It should also be wired.

A field of fire of from 70 to 100 yards should be sufficient, and the trace should allow of cross and flanking fire by Lewis and Machine guns.

The enemy would seem to be likely to have observation from the high ground to the North, and the trench should be sited so as to avoid this if possible. Where this cannot be avoided, it would be necessary to revert to shell holes connected up, as is recommended for the 2nd Objective.

Supporting posts should be arranged in rear so as to give increasing strength to the rear.

2. For the 2nd Objective - As this is on the forward slope, and under enemy observation, it will be necessary to take the greatest care to conceal the positions.

An irregular line of consolidated shell holes which will be connected up after dark, would be best. The soil must on no account be thrown above the surface. If large shell holes are selected, the soil from the connecting saps could be used in the centre of the shell holes to form island traverses, sandbags being used torevet the work.

The trace of such a line of shell holes must be very irregular, and facilities for cross and flanking fire should be arranged. Some loose wire should be judiciously placed.

In front of the shell hole line, shell hole outposts or listening posts should be placed.

Supporting posts will also be established in rear.

3 It is of primary importance that all works should be concealed from the enemy, otherwise we can only expect that they will be annihilated by his artillery. This in fact happened to the two Strong Points constructed by the 5th Brigade in the first attack.

4. Wherever troops halt, if there is no good natural cover, they should dig in, even if their stay is going to be short. The above principles however must always be observed. It will usually happen that if the digging is not of much use to those halting temporarily, it will be of use to others.

*A. Boase*  
Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

SECRET.

Copy No. 4

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEORDER NO. 133.

October 2nd 1917.

Reference Sheet BECHLAERE 1/10,000.  
Sheet 28 N.W. 1/30,000.

1. 1st ANZAC Corps in conjunction with Corps on the North and South will advance its front at a time and date to be notified later.  
On the 1st ANZAC Corps front the attack will be carried out by the 1st Australian Division on the Right, and the 2nd Australian Division on the Left.  
The 6th A.I. Brigade on the Right, and the 11th A.I. Brigade (3rd Australian Division (2nd ANZAC)) on the Left will attack simultaneously with the 7th A.I. Brigade.
2. Maps showing boundaries and objectives of 7th A.I. Brigade have already been issued to Units with Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series 2.
3. The attack will be in two stages - each stage constituting one objective, viz:-
  - (1) Capture of RED LINE
  - (2) " of BLUE LINE.
4. (i) The attack will be carried out leapfrog fashion.  
(ii) Battalions are detailed to Objectives as per para 4 of Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series 2.
5. Formations as in para 5 of Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series No.2.  
30 yards between waves.
6. JUMPING OFF.  
Jumping off lines and positions of assembly will be marked out by Battalions as under :-
 

JUMPING OFF	(	25th Bn.	approx.	D.27.b.65.25	to	D.21.d.1.1.
LINES	(	26th Bn.	"	D.27.c.90.75	to	D.27.a.15.50
POSITIONS	(	27th Bn.	approx.	J.2.b.0.8.	to	D.25.d.80.13.
of ASSEMBLY	(	28th Bn.	"	WESTHOLK RIDGE.		

25th Battalion will be in position on these lines by 11 p.m. on ZERO night, and other Battalions by one hour before ZERO.

- 2 -

7.

BARRAGES.

"Creeping" Field Artillery barrages will be supplied as per barrage map which will be issued later, by 2nd and 4th Australian Divisional Artillery.

In addition, there will be a heavy artillery barrage beyond the Field Artillery barrage.

Attention is drawn to para 7 (c) of Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series No.2.

8.

ACTION OF BATTALIONS.

At ZERO hour the 25th Battalion will move up to the barrage, and capture and consolidate the 1st Objective RED LINE.

The 26th Battalion will jump off at ZERO plus 3 minutes, and will follow the 25th Battalion at 500 yards distance.

On capture of RED LINE by 25th Battalion, 26th Battalion will halt, but will commence to move forward again and pass through 25th Battalion, so that they are close up to the barrage in time for the lift at ZERO plus 130 minutes. They will then move forward, capture and consolidate the 2nd Objective (BLUE LINE)

27th Battalion will move off at ZERO and will form up on the ground vacated by 26th Battalion, and jump off from there at ZERO plus 70.

27th Battalion will halt in the vicinity of D.22.central, and be prepared to vigorously support the 26th Battalion in case of necessity. The senior officer on the spot will judge of the necessity, and will act on his own initiative.

28th Battalion will commence to move at ZERO plus 30, to the vicinity of 26th Battalion jumping off tapes, where they will be held in Brigade Reserve.

As soon as consolidation is in progress, and the situation permits, the 27th Battalion will dig a communication trench up to the ridge forward of 1st Objective. This communication trench will be continued through the crest, and on to the consolidated line of shell holes on the 2nd Objective, after dark. This line will be taped out and dug under engineer supervision.

Battalions must at all times be prepared to form a defensive flank or flanks.

9.

5th and 22nd A.M.Gun Coys under the command of D.M.G.O. will provide a creeping machine gun barrage beyond the Field Artillery barrage, and also S.O.S. barrages.

7th A.M.Gun Coy will be mobile in the hands of G.O.C., 7th A.I.Brigade, and will provide 4 guns to cover the advance and consolidation of each of the 25th and 26th Battalions.

10.

TRENCH MORTARS.

O.C., 7th A.L.T.M.Bty will detail 4 guns to go forward with 25th Battalion to RED LINE. 2 of these guns will then be made available for the 26th Bn.

2 mobile guns will be held in readiness in Brigade Reserve near Brigade Dump, near MÜHLE.

- 3 -

- 99
- 10 (cont) The remaining 2 guns will be held in reserve to replace casualties, and crews will be used in preparing ammunition at Brigade Dump until required to go forward.
- Section Commanders of guns detailed to accompany Battalions will report to the C.O. of the Battalion to which they will be attached, not later than the afternoon on the day before ZERO day.
- On capture of RED LINE the section of guns placed at the disposal of 26th Battalion will send a representative to 26th Battalion H.Q.
11. Capture of each objective will be reported to Brigade H.Q. immediately, through the best means available.
- Success signals will NOT be used.
12. CONSOLIDATION.  
During the consolidation of the BLUE LINE a Strong Post will be constructed at D.22.b.90.35 under engineer supervision.
- 27th Battalion will supply one platoon (not less than 55 o/ranks) to dig and garrison this Strong Post. An engineer party of 1 Officer and 12 o/ranks will assist.
- At ZERO hour the above party will be assembled at BELLEWAARDE FARM, and the Officer will report to Engineer Liaison Officer <sup>CO</sup> stationed at Rear B.H.Q. This party will move forward under the direction of the Engineer Officer.
13. CAR RYING PARTIES.  
(a) 28th Battalion will detail the following carrying parties :-  
(i) 1 Company (not less than 100 men) to report to Brigade Bomb Officer for Brigade Carrying party. Time and place of reporting will be notified later.  
(ii) 1 Company - carrying party for 25th Bn. Time and place of reporting to be arranged mutually between C.O.'s. each
- (b), 25th and 26th Battalions will detail a carrying party of 2 N.C.O.'s and 20 men for carrying Stokes Mortar Ammunition forward with mortars for 1st and 2nd Objectives.  
C.O., 7th A.L.F.M.Bty will arrange with C.O. Battalions, time and place of reporting for these parties.
14. Bayonets will not be fixed until the bombardment opens at ZERO.



- 4 -

15. Headquarters of Battalions at ZERO hour will be :-
- 25th Bn. H.Q.) D.26.d.5.f.  
 26th Bn. " ) Overflow in trenches in vicinity.  
 27th Bn. H.Q. D.26.c.1.3.  
 28th Bn. H.Q. BELLE AARDE RIDGE.  
 7th A.M.G. Coy, In vicinity of Brigade H.Q.  
 7th A.L.F.M.B. In vicinity of Brigade Dump near LUHLE.
- Headquarters of 25th and 26th Battalions will move forward on the capture of Objectives so that C.O.'s may direct the consolidation.
16. ADMINISTRATIVE and SIGNAL Instructions are issued herewith.
17. S.O.S. Relay Stations will be established at 25th Bn. H.Q., Brigade H.Q., and on WESTHOEK RIDGE.  
 Other S.O.S. arrangements were issued with Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series No.2.
18. Instructions issued in Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series No.1. regarding method of dealing with low lying aircraft, will be adhered to. Battalions will mount Lewis guns between their support and front lines for this purpose.
19. LIAISON. As in Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series No.2. except that Captain J. ROADHOUSE, M.C. will be Brigade Liaison Officer with 6th A.I. Brigade and not 11th A.I. Bde.
20. Points of junction with neighbouring units and mopping up as in Preliminary Instructions No. 1.
21. The 7th A.I. Brigade will be prepared to hold the position at least 48 hours after capture. During this time consolidation is to be continually improved.
22. Watches will be sent out to Units each morning and each evening, so that Units may synchronize with Brigade time.
23. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde.

Issued to Signals at 9 am

Distribution as for Preliminary  
Instructions No.1. Series No.2.

S. E. C. S. T.

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 2nd 1917.

## SIGNAL ARRANGEMENTS to accompany Brigade Order No. 133.

1. Advanced Brigade H.Q. will be approximately D.26.c.1.3. CABLE HEAD will be at TOKIO (D.27.d.9.6) Position of Brigade Forward Station will be at approximately D.22.d.5.5. which is also Command Post of 25th Battalion.  
26th and 27th Battalions will select approximate positions for Command Posts, and will notify this office by 8 p.m. 2nd inst. of their location.
2. Earth induction set will be installed with up and down working from Brigade Forward Station to a Station at approximately D.27.b.9.1., and then to Advanced Brigade H.Q. at D.26.c.1.3.
3. Communication will be maintained in all cases to the Unit on the Right, although if the unit on the Left does not maintain touch, every endeavour should be made to reach them by runner or visual.
4. (a) Secret Code Calls as issued to Units will be taken into use as soon as Units move from Stations at which "Position Calls" are in use.  
(b) Station Calls for Forward Stations will be the same as Battalion Code Calls prefixed by letter "A"
5. Aeroplane signal sheets will be taken forward. Care is to be taken to hide these from sight except when a plane is in position to receive a message. Sheets should not be set out on forward slopes
6. PIGEONS are allotted as follows :-
 

Brigade Forward Station	10 birds.
25th & 26th Bns - -	8 birds each

Brigade Forward Station will be refilling point for Battalions at a time which will be notified later.
7. The main Brigade Visual Station will be at D.26.c.1.3. and will receive D.D. - D.D. messages from the front. Forward visual stations will work with Daylight Lamps and folding shutters only.  
There will also be a transmitting station at CABLE HEAD - D.27.d.8.7.
8. The Brigade Forward Station under Lieut. HILL, 25th Battalion, will move forward with third wave of 25th Battalion.

- 2 -

9. (a) Owing to the incomplete state of the buried system in the area being taken over, it is anticipated that some difficulty may be experienced in maintaining lines during operations. Every effort must be made to keep touch by other means, viz. visual, pigeons, power buzzer, and runner. It is absolutely necessary that all messages should be curtailed both in length and number as far as possible.

(b) Should it not be possible to obtain an acknowledgment for a message, the message should be sent in duplicate, and by alternative methods or routes.

10. Intelligence Officers of 25th and 26th Bns. each accompanied by two snipers or observers, will accompany the Brigade Forward Party Detachment "A". Their duties will be to keep in touch with the situation and keep their Battalions and Brigade H.Q. fully informed through the Brigade Forward Station. They will also be available for coding and de-coding messages.

This party will report to Lieut. HILL at 25th Battalion at least 2 hours before ZERO.

Personnel as under have reported to Brigade Signal Officer for duty during active operations:-

10 runners per Battalion (including 1 N.C.O.),

28th Battalion - 2 pigeoneers.

## APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

APPENDIX "A" to ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS  
issued with Brigade Order No. 133.

October 2nd 17.

S.A.A.	1,000 boxes	
Bombs No. 23 & 1		
Cartridges)	10,000	plus 35% extra cartridges.
Stokes mortar Amm.	1,500 rounds	
" " Ctgs	1,500	and 25% extra.
" Ring Charges	500	
" Smoke Bombs	200 rounds.	
Ground Flares RED	100	
S.O.S. Grenades	100	(Held at Rear Bde H.Q.)
Water	500	tins
Rations	500	iron
Screw pickets large	300	
" " small	600	
Barbed wire coils	100	
Concertina Barb "	100	
French wire "	100	
Sand bags	6000	

APPENDIX.

S L O T T E R.7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 2nd 1917.

Reference 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 133.

CORRIGENDA. Positions of Assembly. For "J.2.b.0.8" road  
"J.2.a.0.8."Reference Administrative Memo. to accompany 7th A.I.  
Brigade Order No. 132.ADDENDA. Para 7. MEDICAL DISPOSITIONS.R.A.P.'s = Left Brigade.25th Bn. Aid Post is established at  
Advanced Brigade H.Q., and will remain  
there unless a more suitable position  
is found after capture of RED LINE.26th Bn. Aid Post will move with  
Battalion H.Q.

A. B. Boase

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.Distribution as for  
Bde Orders Nos. 132/133.Hold  
119

APPENDIX.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
26/11/17

7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

3rd October 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th & 28th Sns.  
7th M/G/Cooy.  
7th A/L/T/M/Battery.

During our occupation of the line morning 'stand  
to' will be from 4 a.m. to 6 a.m. daily.

*A. J. Boase*

Major,  
Brigade Major,  
7th Aust. Infantry Brigade.

## 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
No. <u>26/112</u>
Date <u>26/11/17</u>

3rd September 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th & 28th Bns.  
7th M/Gun Coy,  
7th T/M/Battery.

1. In connection with the forthcoming operations the question of counter-attack by the enemy is all important, and Unit Commanders will have to have this in mind all the time when making their dispositions and during consolidation. Although we may expect the usual counter-attack with his local reserves within about four (4) hours of Zero it is extremely unlikely after his experiences of our advances of the 20th and 26th September that he will rush in his Divisions as he did then. His failures on these occasions will no doubt lead him to change his tactics. His probable line of action will therefore be to take more time over the organization and preparation of his deliberate counter-attack, and to attack under a carefully prepared artillery bombardment and Barrage probably from 12 to 24 hours after our attack. It will more likely be 24 hours than 12 as he will probably not care to attack in the failing light, relying rather on an all-night bombardment to shake us and his attack at dawn to complete our defeat.

2. That his calculations in this respect will be falsified I am quite confident, or I don't know our boys. It is however, necessary that we do not underestimate the importance of these counter-attacks and that we do not allow our experience of the easy way in which our artillery deal with them to render us careless. On our front the enemy has probably four (4) Divisions available for counter-attack, the probable directions of which will be -

- (i) From the direction of PASSCHENDAELE aiming at the BROODSEINDE RIDGE astride of the Railway or BROODSEINDE-PASSCHENDAELE Road.
- (ii) From the direction of MOORSLEDE aiming at the BROODSEINDE RIDGE immediately on our Divisional front.
- (iii) From the direction of WATERDAMHOEK aiming at the BROODSEINDE RIDGE south of BROODSEINDE about D 29 central.
- (iv) From the direction of STROOIBOOCHHOEK aiming at the BROODSEINDE RIDGE from the South East about J 5, central.

3. It will be seen that all these attacks very much concern us as BROODSEINDE is in the centre of the converging attacks, and it behoves us to be prepared not only to deal with the frontal attack No.2, but to study and plan dispositions to protect our flanks. Whatever may happen on our flanks, the 7th Brigade must not budge from ground that it has gained. It must as hitherto crown the salient.

4. Of these several attacks I consider No.1 to be the one most vital to us. The enemy would no doubt try to get along the ridge and roll us up. To do this he must defeat the 5th Division on our left, in which case our best course would be to vigorously counter-attack along the road and railway to the North East, holding the neck between the Cross Roads and Cash crossing in D 17 c.

5. In the event of any of the other attacks succeeding in breaking in the front on our immediate right a defensive flank would be forged from DAISY WOOD through the Cross Roads at

(2)

BROODSWINDE towards D 22 d 20 00 ; the knoll at D 23 c 10 10 being denied to the enemy.

6 The Counter-attack to the North East or the defensive flank to the South would be the function of the 27th or 28th Bns. The 25th & 26th holding their ground, provided of course that the first two named Bns. or either of them was not absorbed in the defence of the front. At four hours after Zero, — The reserve Brigade (5th) will be disposed as under :-

'A' Bn. - 19th at ANZAC SPUR  
'B' Bn. - 18th at WESTWICK RIDGE  
'C' Bn. - 17th at RAILWAY WOOD  
'D' Bn. - 20th at GORDON CAMP

7. Although no doubt these Counter-attacks will be attempted there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they will not be as successfully and thoroughly dealt with by our artillery and rifle and machine gun fire as were those previously launched against us. What gets through our artillery barrage will be easily defeated.

*A. J. Boase*

Major,  
Brigade Major,  
7th Aust. Infantry Brigade.

*for GOC. 7<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde*



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SECRET

APPENDIX

7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

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261/119

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 3rd 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

1. Regarding action after the attack, and in view of the fact that the enemy will have fair observation on the DROOGENBROODHOEK Ridge and positions for machine guns, also cover behind which he can assemble for attack, both Field and Heavy Artillery are taking steps to send up F.O.O's quickly as soon as the ridge has been gained, in order that fire may be directed with the least delay on to all targets offering.
2. The advantage as far as command is concerned lies with us as the BROODSEINDE ridge is somewhat higher. We also have the advantage of superior artillery.
3. In this connection it is important to remember that if, and when, the enemy is seen massing for an attack, it is far better to direct the concentrated artillery and machine gun fire on to these masses than to fire an S.O.S. Signal which scatters fire all along the front, and perhaps does not cover the places where the enemy is massing at all.
4. To be able to direct artillery and machine gun fire in this way, good communication is necessary by cable line or lamp, or by aeroplane.
5. At night however, or in fog or mist, the S.O.S. will be the only means of using the artillery and machine gun fire.
6. In every case full use must be made of rifle and Lewis or Vickers gun fire on all targets within range, both by day and night.

*A. Broase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

CONFIDENTIAL7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No.1.

October 3rd 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE for 24 hours ending  
6 a.m. 3/10/1917.IDENTIFICATIONS.

Nil.

ENEMY SHELLING.

In reply to our practise barrages yesterday, the enemy sent up flares bursting into two reds and two greens, followed inside one minute by light shelling of our forward area with .77's, 4.2's and 5.9's, both H.E. and shrapnel. The only area that was barraged is the ridge running from ST. JOSEPH INST. through MUHL. The place was shelled from a S.E. direction for the duration of our barrage.

ENEMY ATTITUDE.

Machine Gun and sniping activity has been reduced to a minimum. Since our taking over; the CHATEAU and road areas in D.27.b. were under slight machine gun fire during the day from D.28.b.c.c.

ENEMY DEFENCE.

Two machine guns have been located in concrete dugout at D.21.d.45.45. and one in pillbox at D.21.d.65.25.

The only wire visible is that in front of DOGILE TRENCH, and it is too much blown about to form a serious obstacle to infantry.

HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

Two machines of the ALBATROSS type are constantly over our line at a height of 500 - 600 feet. Apart from this there has been very little aerial activity yesterday.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Orange sprays are freely used during the night without any apparent result. A flare bursting into two reds and two greens is usually followed by shell fire on our forward area.

BALLOONS.

Two balloons are constantly seen rising from E. of MOLENHOEK.

(signed) A.J. BOASE, Major,  
Brigade Major, 7th Australian Infantry Bde.

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APPENDIX

HEADQUARTERS,  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE

Date 281/101

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 3rd 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

Reference Preliminary Instructions No.1. Series 2.  
The following is issued in amplification of para 14 'Contact  
Patrol'

No. 4. Squadron R.F.C. will provide one contact  
aeroplane to work on the Corps front at one time.  
It will be distinguished by a black streamer on the  
rear edge of the left wing.

It will be in the air approximately at the following  
hours :

- On the RED line at zero plus 90 minutes
- On the BLUE line at zero plus 180 minutes, at  
which time flares will be called for by sounding  
a succession of "A's" on the Klaxon horn, or by dropping  
a White Very light!

A code for reporting enemy movements has been  
already issued to all Brigade units, but is repeated herewith  
for further information :-

Enemy collecting at .....	Succession of "Q's"
Enemy advancing from .....	" of "R's"
More than a Battalion ...	" of L.N.
Less than a Battalion ...	" of S.N.

7th Bde

Code Call between Infantry and aircraft "M.W.", and letters  
"W", "X", "Y", or "Z" after Brigade Code letter in case of  
Battalions.

*W. House*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX

HEADQUARTERS,  
7th AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

202/21

No. ....

Date .....

SECRET.7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 3rd 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

The following programme of Artillery activity on the 4th and 5th October is published for information :-

1. Barrage on evening of 4th October.

9.43 p.m. to 10 p.m. Silent period. No firing except in case of enemy attack.

10 p.m. to 10.3 p.m. Standing barrage in depth from 200 yards to 1,000 yards beyond S.O.S. lines.

10.3 p.m. to 10.11 p.m. Silent period.

10.11 p.m. to 10.17 p.m. Standing barrage in depth from 1,200 yards to 2,000 yards beyond S.O.S. Lines.

2. 5th October.

(i) At 5.15 a.m. a barrage in depth will be put down on the fronts of the IX, X, 1st Anzac, and 2nd Anzac Corps - 18-pdrs will cease fire at 5.45 a.m., other natures at 6.6 a.m., unless otherwise required by the tactical situation.

(ii) Bursts of fire of 6 minutes duration at the following times :-

10.0 p.m., 10.11 p.m., 11.0 p.m., and 11.11 p.m.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

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APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No. 261/123

Date

SECRET.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 4th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
7th A.L.T.M.Bty  
2nd Aust Division )  
Right Brigade ) for information  
Left " )

OPERATION MEMORANDUM

As soon as duck permits, the following dispositions will be made :-

- (1) 26th Bn. will form outposts in shell hole positions on BLUE LINE.
- (2) 25th Bn. will garrison the position behind the ridge, being disposed in depth.
- (3) If the situation permits, 27th Bn. will withdraw its men at present with 26th Bn. and occupy a position at approx. D.22.c.90.30 and dig in.
- (4) 28th Bn. will reorganize and occupy position with the 27th Bn.

26th Bn. will adjust their line and gain connection with their own Left, the Right of the Brigade unit on their Left, and with the Right Brigade.

In all cases the best advantage will be taken of the ground, and the above positions are only approximate, and if thought fit, units may adjust numbers to the situation, by lending men.

Lieut. Colonel TRAVERS will explain the situation to C.O.'s, and arrange for necessary adjustments.

Definite and accurate disposition reports will be furnished as soon as possible.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*81*

*Hod*

S. O. C. 1917.

Copy No. 4

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 5th 1917.

Order No. 134

Reference Maps S. O. C. 1/10,000  
Sheets 28 N. and N.E. 1/20,000.

1. The 7th A.I. Brigade will be relieved in the front line of Left Brigade sector of 2nd Australian Division by two Battalions of the 5th A.I. Brigade, and portions of the 5th A.L.T.M. Battery and of the 5th Aust. Machine Gun Company, tonight 5th/6th October.
2. (i) Move table showing dispositions of 7th A.I. Brigade on relief is attached.  
  
(ii) 38th Battalion may keep half the Battalion in RAILWAY WOOD Trenches.  
  
(iii) The CHAPEL, the RECTORY, and LAKE FARM are in 7th A.I. Brigade area.  
KIE - KAI, RED LODGE, and BELLEAUVALE FARM are in 6th A.I. Brigade area.
3. MACHINE GUNS. 7th A.I. Gun Coy will leave two sections (8 guns) as mobile guns, which will come under the Command of G.O.C., 5th A.I. Brigade on relief of 7th A.I. Brigade.
4. TRENCH MORTARS. Two mortars only of 5th A.L.T.M. Battery will relieve the 7th A.L.T.M. Battery.
5. (a) Dumps of ammunition, bombs, strombos horns, and other battle stores will be handed over by units. Receipts in duplicate for stores handed over will be obtained by units handing over, and the duplicate forwarded to Brigade Headquarters within 24 hours of completion of relief.  
  
(b) Captain F.R. CORNELL, M.C. will hand over Brigade Battle Dumps to Bomb Officer of 5th A.I. Brigade.
6. Subject to the terms of this order, all details of relief will be arranged mutually between units concerned.
7. The 7th A.I. Brigade on completion of relief, will be responsible for maintenance of duckboard tracks in rear of RED LINE whilst in the area.
8. (a) Relief to be completed by 5 a.m. on 6th October 1917.  
  
(b) On completion of relief, Command of the front sector will pass to G.O.C., 5th A.I. Brigade.  
  
(c) Completion of each relief is to be notified immediately to Brigade H.Q. by code wire, and a disposition report forwarded.

( 2 )

9. Rations for tomorrow's consumption will be drawn as follows :-

From Brigade Dump (MUNLE) - 27th Bn., 25th Bn.,  
7th A.M.G. Coy.

From Brigade H.Q. RAILWAY FOOD - 28th Bn.

From GORDON CAMP - 26th Bn.

Trench Mortar Battery have already drawn.

10. 7th A.I. Brigade H.Q. will close at D.26.c.1.3. on completion of relief, and will reopen at the same hour at RAILWAY FOOD Dugouts.

11. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. J. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 3.30 p.m.

Copies to :

1. 25th Bn.
2. 26th Bn.
3. 27th Bn.
4. 28th Bn.
5. 7th A/Gun Coy
6. 7th A.L.M. Bty
7. G.O.C.
8. B.M.
9. S.C.
10. Capt. Cornoy.
11. Bde I.O.
12. Bde Sig. Officer
13. Bde Transport Officer
14. 2nd Aust. Div. 'G'
15. " " " 'Q'
16. 17th A.A.S.C.
17. 7th Field Coy.
18. 7th Field Amb.
19. 9th A.I. Bde.
20. 10th "
21. 11th "
22. 5th "
23. 6th "
24. War Diary
25. " "
26. File
- 27/30 Spare.

*Hold*

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

MOVE TABLE to accompany 7th A.I. Brigade No. 134, 5/10/1917.

Date	Unit	Relieved by	Moving to	Route	H.Q. at	Remarks.
Sept. 1917 5/6th	27th Bn.	17th Bn (Portion) 1 Coy in line to be relieved by 19th Bn	Trenches in D.27.c.	As selected by units	D.26.d.5.5.	Units going out must give way on the duckboard track to incoming troops.
"	25th Bn	19th Bn (portion)	Positions in vici- nity of WESTHOEK RIDGE.	ditto	As selected by C.O. 25th Bn.	ditto. KIT KAT is in 6th Bde sector
"	28th Bn.	17th Bn (portion)	RAILWAY WOOD trenches & BELLE- WAARDE RIDGE up to WESTHOEK (exclusive)	Left duck- board track.	ditto	Half Bn. in RAILWAY WOOD Half Bn. BELLEWAARDE RIDGE
"	26th Bn.	19th Bn (portion)	GORDON CAMP	ditto	GORDON CAMP.	Left duckboard track
"	7th ALTBty	<sup>5th</sup> A.L.F.M.Bty	ditto	most direct.	ditto	Arrange quarterings with C.O. 26th Bn.
"	7th A.M.G.Coy (less 2 sections)	5th A.M.G.Coy (2 sections)	RAILWAY WOOD	ditto	As selected by O.C.	

Units going out must give way on the duckboard track to incoming troops.

Guides from units are to meet incoming units at junction of duckboard track just West of KIT & KAT unless otherwise arranged between units

APPENDIX



S. U. A. T.

Copy No. 4

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Order No. 135

October 6th 1917.

reference sheets  
 25000000 1/10,000.  
 20000000 1/10,000.  
 23 N.E. 1/20,000.

1. The boundary between 2nd Australian Division and 6th Division is being adjusted as follows :-  
 From present northern boundary at D.22.2.5.0., along FRAS-ROULERS railway towards ROULERS (Railway line inclusive).
2. Consequent on readjustment of boundary, 7th A. I. Brigade will, on night 6th/7th October; take over that portion of the front line at present held by 199th Brigade 6th Division, and will reorganise its dispositions as under:
3. Brigade boundaries will be :-

RIGHT : SANS SOUCI (exclusive - St. JOSEPHS INST. (inclusive) - along ZONNEBEEK-BAODSEINDE Road to junction at D.22.2.6.5., thence to D.22.2.40.64 - through N.W. corner of DAINA WOOD to road junction at B.13.2.15.95.

LEFT : The FRAS-ROULERS railway (inclusive as for Divisional Right Boundary.

4. (a) 27th Battalion will take over the front line from the 2/6th Manchester Regiment, with the same dispositions.  
 (b) 25th Battalion will take over the present support line from the 2/5th Manchester Regiment.  
 (c) The 26th and 28th Battalions will move up into reserve position, and will take over positions at present held by 17th Australian Battalion, including the platoon S.F.  
 (ii) The present available strength of 26th Battalion will be attached to 28th Battalion, and will come under Command of Lieut. Colonel J. TRAVERS, D.S.O.  
 (iii) Major F. CURRIE, D.S.O., 26th Bn. will collect and reorganize all details of 26th Battalion from Battalion transport lines forward.  
 (d) (i) The 7th A.M.G. Coy will take over positions at present held by 204th Machine Gun Coy in the Brigade sector, emplacing not more than 5 guns in this area.  
 (ii) Captain BUNNELL on arrival, will assume Command of the guns in Brigade sector.  
 (e) O.C., 7th A.L.F.M. Bty will take over the Trench mortar positions at present held by 199th Brigade T.M. Battery.
5. (i) Relief to be completed by 5 a.m. 7th inst.  
 (ii) Completion of each relief to be notified to Brigade H.Q. immediately when completed.

*Handwritten signature*

217  
250  
212  
150

## APPENDIX

S.P. 26 B. 1 L.G.  
 Right 42 D 3 L.G.  
 Centre 51 C 3 L.G.  
 Left 45 A 3 L.G.  
 ( 2 )

23  
 8  
 13  
 4  
 49

Raf 99  
 Bde H.

(iii) On completion of the relief, the G.O.C.,  
 7th A.I. Brigade will assume Command of the sector.

(iv) Subject to the terms of this order, all  
 details of reliefs will be arranged mutually between  
 C.O.'s concerned.

6.

Rations for tomorrow's consumption will be  
 sent forward in limbers as far as SANS SOUCI, where units  
 will send ration parties or a guide to lead limbers to  
 rendezvous where ration parties will be waiting.

7.

7th A.I. Brigade H.Q. will remain at D.26.c.1.5.  
 but will move into that portion of dugout at present  
 occupied by 199th Brigade.

8.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 4 P.M.

## Copies to :

1. 25th Bn.
2. 26th Bn.
3. 27th Bn.
4. 28th Bn.
5. 7th M/G Coy
6. 7th A.L.F. Bty
7. B.M.
8. S.C.
9. G.O.C.
10. Major CURRIE.
11. 2nd Aust. Div. 'G'
12. " " " 'Q'
13. 199th Brigade
14. 5th A.I. Bde
15. 17th A.A.S.C.
16. B.F.O.
19. Bde Bomb Officer.
20. 7th Field Coy
21. 7th Field Amb.
- 22 to 25 Spare.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No. 9.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.From 6 a.m. 5th to 6 a.m. 6th October 1917.NOTE : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Infantry operations were confined to strengthening and improving our new positions.

At 2.30.p.m. and at 3.45.p.m. our Stokes mortars successfully bombarded an enemy strong post at D.29.b.9.2.

Our artillery maintained the usual harassing fire on known enemy strong points, roads, tracks, and centres of activity.

At 6.53.a.m./6.56.p.m., S.O.S. barrages were put down in response to signals from the front line. No hostile infantry counter-attacks developed.

ENEMY SHELLING.

Throughout the day hostile shelling was very light, consisting mainly of very high bursting shrapnel on BROODSEINDE RIDGE, and 15 cm H.E. in ZONNEBEKE and D.28. b.

At 7.5.p.m. the enemy placed a heavy barrage on our front line, and 10 minutes later the western slopes of BROODSEINDE RIDGE in squares D.22.d., and D.28.b. were heavily shelled. By 7.30.p.m. enemy fire had practically ceased.

This is the first occasion on which our new front line has been shelled to any appreciable extent by the enemy. Most of the fire came from north-easterly and south-easterly directions.

In reply to our practice barrages at 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. the crest of BROODSEINDE RIDGE was heavily shelled throughout the period our own barrage was down.

PATROLS.

A patrol located a party of enemy about 12 strong at D.23.d.3.5. Lewis gun fire was opened and enemy dispersed.

An enemy Strong post was located at D.23.d.4.2.

Patrols report that DAISY WOOD is strongly held by the enemy - apparently by detached strong posts.

FLARES.

Throughout the night most of the enemy flares appeared to come from a line approximately 300 yards from our own front line.

About 11 p.m. enemy fired WHITE flares from D.23.d.4.2. which were answered by a series of DOUBLE GREEN flares which were repeated along the whole Divisional front.

TRENCH MORTARS.

A hostile mortar-position not yet located-is reported to be firing pineapple bombs on to our communication trench at D.23.c.3.9.

P.T.O.

Hold

-2-

ENEMY 'PLANES.

Enemy aircraft were not very active during the day, except at 8 a.m. and between 4.p.m. and 4.30.p.m., when several 'planes flew over ZONNEBEKE and immediate vicinity.

MOVEMENT IN ENEMY LINES.

At intervals during the day parties of from 2 to 4 of the enemy were seen to be moving about D.23.b.6.9., carrying timber. Our snipers firing on them claim 3 hits.

At D.23.c.5.4., a party of 4 enemy were seen during the morning. They were fired on by our snipers and two were observed to fall; the other two disappeared into a shell hole or portion of an old trench.

Hostile Machine Guns and Snipers. Were extremely active throughout the night sweeping the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE.

*L. J. L. M. Call Capt.*  
 Lieut Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 2nd Australian Division.

## 1a. Appendix to 2nd A.Div I.S.No.9.

EXTRACTS FROM 2ND ARMY and 1ST ANZAC CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES  
\*\*\*\*\*

1st ANZAC Corps Summary, 5:10:17.

Prisoners of War. A total of 34 Officers and 883 ~~other ranks~~ have been captured in the operations which commenced yesterday morning.

Trophies. The following trophies have been secured by the Corps in the last two days:-

Machine Guns	-	70.	
Trench Mortars	-	11	(5 - 6" in emplacement at D.22.d.05.35).
Field Guns.	-	6	(Two 7.7 cm. at D.29.a.1 5.75 in excellent condition in emplacements with ammunition).
Flammenwerfer	-	2	
Bomb Machines	-	2.	
Telephone Set	-	1.	

2nd ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Features of Yesterday's Operations. The principal feature of the operations was the enemy's assembly for attack in front of POLYGOON WOOD just at the time we made our own. That he suffered extraordinary losses by our assaulting troops and barrages is now well known, and the effect of this on the moral of the enemy's troops in this locality is evidenced in many ways.

The manner in which the enemy threw in his various units promiscuously on all parts of the battle front is especially significant. This has usually been his habit in operations of this nature, but the mixture and lack of cohesion, along with the consequent confusion, have been much more marked than on previous occasions and tend to indicate a more pronounced deterioration in organization as well as in moral.

The action of his artillery throughout the day has also been unusual in that it was not only feeble but very scattered in its efforts. The lack of regular barrages or organised destructive fire was noticeable, in fact he seemed to be prepared with no well defined scheme of artillery defence. His recent withdrawal of guns to positions further back has, as was expected, caused considerable disorganisation, and he does not appear to have got them properly into operation in their new groupings before the attack as their action, especially on the northern front, has been spasmodic and lacking definite objectives.

As to the enemy's forces, it appears that of the six divisions opposite this Army front which have had very heavy fighting and severe losses, the equivalent of at least three divisions may be considered to have suffered so badly as to be counted out. As he had put practically two divisions in each of the three sectors and had a large proportion of their battalions up to the front when our attack occurred, a large and varied assortment of prisoners was obtained. These almost without exception speak of the terrific effects of our bombardment both before and after zero and display a marked decrease in moral.

In general, yesterday's battle is a definite distinct defeat which the enemy will not easily explain and which will doubtless have very far-reaching effects at this critical period of the war and season.

P. T. O.

- 22 -

1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Examination of prisoners of the 5th Gren. Regt., 4th Guard Div. Views on the attack. Prisoners ascribe the success of our attack chiefly to the fact that their own artillery, when putting down a barrage preparatory to their own attack, fired short, inflicting heavy casualties on their own men. No notice was taken of signals and this demoralized the men even more than our subsequent barrage.

The general opinion expressed was that no attack was expected for the next two or three days, whereas all preparations had been made for a counter-attack on the line lost on September 26th.

This is borne out by prisoners of other regiments captured.

2nd ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, 4;10:17.

Prisoners' statements. An analysis of the statements of, and conversations with, prisoners taken on the 26th and 27th September shows that the following are the prevailing opinions among the rank and file of the enemy:-

1. The prisoners had thought that climatic conditions would prevent anything in the way of serious operations after the end of August, and that the state of the ground would prevent the movement of artillery in particular.
2. So far as the prisoners know, the intention was to hold up the British advance west of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE and occupy the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE line for the winter.
3. This plan was upset by the rapidity of the British advance; it was impossible to continue working on the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE Line, owing to our shelling.
4. There are at present no organised lines of defence in rear.
5. The rank and file of the German Army have little confidence in their ability to hold the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE in face of a serious attack.
6. Work on back areas is being concentrated on road systems in rear of MOORSLEDE.
7. The WERCKEN - HOOGLADE Line is intended as a "holding-up" position only, and not as a permanent line of defence.
8. There is a general opinion that, if driven from the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, a line of defence for the winter will be constructed east of ROULERS. They have heard of a canal or river as a likely one. (GENT-BRUGES? Derivation de la Lys?).
9. Considerable distrust of the moral of the rank and file is evident.

The above opinions only reflect the opinions of the junior ranks, and must be accepted with reserve.

P.F.O.

99  
SECOND ARMY, 4:10:17. (Continued).

Order of Battle. Prisoners could give no information. They stated that there is a great deal of confusion amongst battalions, regiments and divisions, and that troops are pushed in anywhere where they are needed irrespective of sectors, and one regiment may be reinforced or supported by troops of a regiment not belonging to the same division.

2ND ARMY SUMMARY, 4:10:17.

Information from Captured German Map. A captured German map of the YPRES Group area, dated 21st September, 1917, shows the following projected lines of defence:-

1. A line called the FLANDERN III STELLUNG, running north and south crossing the HOOGLUDE - WESTROOSEBEKE road about one mile south-west of HOOGLUDE and passing east of OOSTNIEUWERKE through VIERKAVENHOEK and just east of LEDEGHEM. Photographs already show a tracing of the northern part of this line, which has been named the "ROULERS Line." An "Artillerie Schutz Stellung" is projected about a mile in rear of this line running roughly parallel with it.
2. A line called the "MOORSLEDE RIEGEL" runs from the DADIZEELE Line to the new ROULERS Line (FLANDERN III STELLUNG) leaving the former south of MOORSLEDE and joining the latter just south of LEDEGHEM.
3. A line called the "BECLEAERE RIEGEL" leaves the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE line south-east of ZONNEBEKE and joins the PASSCHENDAELE - TERHAND Line at TERHAND.

The other projected lines correspond to the description given in G.H.Q. Summary of the 24th September.  
 The trench traced just east of BECLEAERE is an artillery Schutz Stellung.  
 The DADIZEELE Line is also called an Artillerie Schutz Stellung.  
 The PASSCHENDAELE - TERHAND Line is named "FLANDERN II STELLUNG."  
 The map shows a considerable amount of wire, more especially around WESTROOSEBEKE etc., which is not discernable from photographs but which is probably actually erected.  
 Maps will be issued in due course with all information derived from this map contained thereon.

1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Names of places. The following names have been approved:-

- Ref. Sheet 28. Depression running N.W. through J.3.b. and D.27.c. - BRANDS GULLY.
- For spur running east through D.27.d. and D.28.c. and S.E. through J.4.b. - GLASGOW SPUR.

P.T.O.

TRANSLATION of captured German document - Orders for intended counter-attack on our position at 6 a.m., 4:10:17.

4th Guard Infantry Division.

29:9:17.

Ia. No. 2586.

S E C R E T.

P L A N S.

For the execution of an attack, the objective of which is the S.W. edge of ZONNEBEKE, the ridge S.E. of ZONNEBEKE, and the Western edge of MOLENAARELSTHOEX.

I. The objective is noted on accompanying sketch. The height 715 is necessarily included, also the ridge stretching thence south-eastwards.

Following advantages will thus be gained:-

1. The enemy's direct observation of our position South of ZONNEBEKE is prevented.
2. He loses the possibility of cover for massing troops for an attack.
3. We gain forward interval from the, to us, important observation posts on the BROODSEINDE - IN de STER Ridge.
4. We regain a large portion of ZONNEBEKE.
5. We get observation on the country west of ZONNEBEKE.
6. Our infantry positions will be improved, so that the front line will no longer be in the marshy ground, but on the presumably dry ridge.
7. The supports for the front line can be placed on the eastern slope of the ridge and close up to the front line.
8. There is a probability of capturing material and prisoners, thus strengthening the moral of our troops, and weakening that of the English.

II. ATTACK TROOPS.

(a) Infantry: The frontage of the attack is about 1,600 metres. Four battalions are considered necessary for this. The number of necessary assault troops of the Assault Battalion will be stated, as soon as it can be ascertained how many old concrete dug-outs still remain within the objective. For the capture of the Western portion of ZONNEBEKE, four assault sections would undoubtedly be required.

P.T.O.



- 5a -

(b) The quantity of requisite artillery and ammunition is set out in the accompanying scheme of the Divisional Artillery Commander. The Division concurs with these suggestions.

(c) Minenwerfers. It would be necessary to employ one M. W. Coy. on each flank of the attack, each with 8 medium T. M's and 8 light T.M's of the Infantry Regiments. 100 rounds of ammunition per T.M. would be necessary.

To expedite the delivery of this ammunition to the T.M's, several columns of pack animals should be attached.

### III. DIRECTION OF ATTACK.

The attack must be led by strong flanks, particularly from ZONNEBEKE and MOLENAARELSTHOEK. The success of the attack depends largely on the reconnaissance of our present own and enemy's front lines by airmen.

### IV. TIME OF ATTACK.

On the day following the attack (raid?) of the "Gabain" group against POLYGONE WOOD. Assault 6 a.m.

V. As far as can be judged by the map, it seems desirable to regain possession of the heights, 500 metres West of ZONNEBEKE; this, however, depends upon results of a reconnaissance on the spot in the 20th Divisional sector, and on the result of the proposed operation.

YPRES GROUP.

(Sgd.) V. Alt-Stutterheim.

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- 6 a -

1st ANZAC Corps SUMMARY, 5:10:17.PRISONERS STATEMENTS. 5th Gren. Regt. 4th Guard Division.

Composition of Companies: There appear to have been no Landsturm or Landwehr in the Regiment, all the latter having been picked out and sent back to be utilised as frontier guards, etc. Nearly the whole trench strength was comprised of 1917 class and a very small proportion of 1918 class. The returned wounded and reservists were mostly retained for transport duties.

Equipment of Enemy Troops. A cursory examination of enemy dead in our left Divisional sector reveals that the enemy's troops were exceptionally well equipped with brand new gear. Each man carried a patent cooker, some of which had the seals still unbroken. Water-bottles were filled with coffee and every man carried articles essential to storm troops. The majority of the troops were of a good stamp, their ages varying from 23 to 30 years.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.Information from Artillery prisoners.

1. Army Field-artillery reserves are now used in a similar manner to our Army Field Artillery Brigades.
2. Detached field guns are placed in the crater area and fire on infantry only.
3. Owing to frequent movement of batteries, a large number are now firing practically from the open, it being almost impossible to compete with construction of concrete emplacements.
4. Forward communication for F.O.O's to field batteries has been very difficult and in some cases impossible; hence much of the apparent disorganisation of enemy fire.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

New German "Minenwerfer" Shell: The examination of captured charges for a medium Minenwerfer has disclosed the introduction of the following:-

- (a) A 1917 pattern shell (Model 1917).
- (b) An increase in the weight of the charges Nos. 2 - 6 and a new full charge called No. 7 of 192 grammes (the original full charge, No. 6, weighed 154 grammes).

This points to an increase in range and to the possible introduction of a new pattern of medium Minenwerfer. Prisoners should be examined with reference to the above.

New Gas Shell. A 15 cm. gas shell of the usual 1912 n/A pattern has been found to contain Phenyl carbylamine chloride, which is probably made from the action of chlorine on phenyl mustard oil. The vapour resulting from this liquid has an irritating, unpleasant smell of mustard oil, and is a moderately powerful lachrymator. It is entirely different from "Yellow Cross" gas, which is, however, generally known as "mustard gas."

P.T.O.

- 7a -

FIRST ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17,

Prisoners' statements. Gas Shells are fired from the T.M. They are distinguished by 2 yellow bands round the shell.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Results of Bomb raids. A prisoner states that, on the night of the 20th or 21st September, our aeroplanes dropped bombs in the neighbourhood of LICHTERVELDE and hit an ammunition train. On the following day, the prisoner saw that the whole train had been demolished and the lines broken.

FIRST ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Miscellaneous. The Germans have the following form which they require prisoners to fill in:-

1. Write your name here.
2. Write the number of your Battalion here.
3. Write the number of your Division here.

All ranks are warned that the enemy cannot compel questions 2 and 3 to be answered.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.The Calling up of 1919 and 1920 Classes.

1919 CLASS. The class as a whole was mustered throughout Germany in March and April and was called up during May and June.

In Baden and Alsace (XIV. and XV. Corps Districts), a certain number of recruits of this class were mustered in January, and called up in January and February, 1917.

1920 CLASS. Boys of the 1920 class have been mustered and called up for auxiliary service (HILFSDIENST) in certain Corps Districts. The 1920 class appears not to have yet commenced its military training.

\*\*\*\*\*

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.  
6th October, 1917.

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SECRET

APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEHEADQUARTERS  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE

202/27.

Date

October 7th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
M/Gun Coy,  
T.M.Bty.

The following barrages will be carried out on  
October 7th and 8th, 1917.

October 7th. 6.15 a.m. to 6.54 a.m.  
11.30 a.m. to 12.12 p.m.

October 8th. 6.10 a.m. to 7.2 a.m.  
4.00 p.m. to 4.42 p.m.

ACKNOWLEDGED

*H. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*File*

7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE FROM 6 a.m. 6/10/17 to 6 a.m.

7/10/17.

OUR OPERATIONS.

The 7th A.I. Brigade relieved a Portion of the 199th Brigade from D 23 a 6 7 to D 17 a 4 1 during the night. Relief complete by 6 a.m., this morning.

PATROLS.

Patrolled 300 yards in front of our line without coming into contact with the enemy. Nothing of importance occurred.

ARTILLERY.

Quiet all day. Our newly sited field batteries carried out registration shoots and the heavies harrassed the enemy back areas.

ENEMY SHELLING

The vicinity and East of ZONNEBEKE was subjected to intermittent shelling throughout the day. THAMES WOOD was heavily shelled with 8.9's. intermittently from direction of MOORSLEDE. Movement on the BROODSEINDE RIDGE invariably drew 77mm. fire from direction of BROEGENBROODHOEK.

FLARES

most of the flares during the night were sent up from rear of DAISY WOOD and D 17 b, but they were not so freely used as usually.

ENEMY DEFENCES

There is much movement observed in a clump of bushes on the crest of the ridge at D 13 c 3 4 which is suspected of being a strong Point. There are very few 'Fill Boxes' ahead of our line, but there are numerous clumps of bushes each of which appears to conceal machine Posts. There is no wire visible from ground observation, but it cannot be stated with any certainty whether the various woods are wired until Patrols have been through them.

AIRIAL

Enemy planes were fairly active especially at about 5 P.m. when six planes hovered over our front line at a height of 900 feet for about half an hour.

There was also considerable aerial activity during the night.

MACHINE GUNS AND SNIPERS

fairly quiet. No casualties reported.

84

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Garry, Major,  
Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

7

## WIRELESS PRESS.

6/10/17.

BRITISH OFFICIAL REPORTS, London, 5/10/17, 10.15 a.m. During the night the enemy heavily shelled our new positions east of YPRES, but has made no further counter attack. Our troops have been engaged in organising the captured positions. A hostile raiding party endeavoured to enter our trenches last night north of GOUZEAUCOURT, but was driven off with loss by our rifle and machine gun fire. Three other raids were attempted by the enemy in the neighbourhood of LENS. All three raids were repulsed, in one case after stiff fighting.

10.30 a.m. No infantry fighting of importance has taken place on the Battle Front today. Our troops have consolidated their positions. There is nothing to report on the remainder of the British front. The number of prisoners taken since yesterday morning is 4,446, including 114 Officers.

On 4th inst. the weather was almost impossible for flying but in spite of the rain, low clouds and exceptionally strong wind, our artillery machines watched our advancing troops and reported their positions and movements of the enemy. Some of our fighting scouts flew over and attacked troops, transport and guns from the air. One of our machines is missing.

WESTERN FRONT. A War Correspondent, describing the new British advance, says that the enemy had himself prepared a tremendous

attack the same morning for which he had brought up an additional 5 divisions, of which 3 were in the front line, one being the 4th Guards Division. His intention was to recapture ZONNEBEKE, sweep us back to ZEVENKOTE and take from us all the POLYGON WOOD area to the MENIN ROAD. We attacked at 6 a.m. while it was still half dark. Our attack utterly surprised the Germans, who calculated that we would not be ready for 2 days. Their attack was intended to cover a front of 3 km. with ZONNEBEKE-GORNER. We attacked on a front of 12 km, from POELCAPELLE to near GHELUVELT. When our preliminary bombardment began, it was terrific. When the infantry went forward the Germans on most of the line were simply overwhelmed and ran or surrendered, the result being that behind, the disorganisation of his ranks was such as we have never before encountered. Here and there on the line were clusters of concrete forts or solitary blockhouses, these were points where resistance was mostly anticipated, but so unexpected was our attack that the redoubts surrendered as soon as the first bombs burst on the doors. The most important part of our advance was from ZONNEBEKE to BROODSEINDE. There was short hard fighting on the way thereto, but BROODSEINDE offered little difficulty, and very large numbers of prisoners were taken from this part of the line. The Germans would not have yielded this to us if they had been able to prevent this, BROODSEINDE being the final core and critical section of the ridge. There was sharp fighting at other points, but everywhere our objectives were attained, and though resistance delayed us at some points nowhere was there any real failure. German losses were colossal. One German unit lost one third in killed and wounded before the rest surrendered. It would be difficult to praise too highly the perfect organisation of our attack and spirit and dash of our men.

FRENCH OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE. The Germans attempted to surprise us during the night in the CHAMPAGNE to the east of the BUTTE de SOUAIN and in Upper Alsace near MICHELBACH. Violent artillery actions on the right bank of the MEUSE, in the neighbourhood of BEZONVAUX and HILL 344.

GERMANY German Admiralty reports the sinking by their submarines of a new British Sailing Vessel and armed British Steamer 3885 tons. Fear of aerial reprisals has caused the German public much concern, minute instructions having been issued to the public at COLOGNE and other large towns in the Rhenish provinces. The Museum at Cologne has been closed and the pictures removed to a place of safety.

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APPENDIX.

7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Copy No.

SECRET.

ORDER N.O. 136.

7th October 1917.

Reference Sheets BUCHANAN and PASCHENDALE 1/10,000.

1. The 7th A.I. Brigade will be relieved in Left Brigade Sector 2nd Aust. Div. by 5th Aust. Infy. Brigade tonight 7/8th Oct. in accordance with accompanying move table.
2. (i) 2 Sections of 7th M/G Coy at Present with 5th A.I. Bde will be relieved by the 6th A.M.G. Coy and rejoin 7th Bde.  
(ii) Guns at Present in the Left Bde sector will remain in and be increased to a total of 8 on the withdrawal of guns in Para 2.  
(i) the whole coming under command of G.O.C. 5th A.I. Bde.
3. i. On relief 7th A.I. Brigade will be disposed in depth from ZONNEBEEK to RAILWAY WOOD.  
ii. Command of Left Brigade Sector will pass to G.O.C. 5th A.I. Brigade on completion of relief.  
iii. Relief to be completed by 4 a.m. 8th inst.  
iv. Completion of each relief to be notified to Brigade Headquarters in code by Priority message.  
v. Location on new Headquarters to be sent at same time as completion of relief is reported.
4. All details of relief will be arranged mutually between C.O.'s concerned.
5. Advanced Brigade Headquarters will remain at D 26 c 1 3.
6. A C K N O L D G E.

*Message*

Major,  
Brigade Major,  
7th Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 3 P.M.  
Distribution -

- |            |                      |                  |
|------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Copy No. 1 | 25th Bn.             |                  |
| 2          | 26th Bn.             |                  |
| 3          | 27th Bn.             |                  |
| 4          | 28th Bn.             |                  |
| 5          | 7th M/G Coy          |                  |
| 6          | 7th A.L.T.M. Battery |                  |
| 7          | B.T.O.               |                  |
| 8          | Staff Capt.          |                  |
| 9          | B.M.                 |                  |
| 10         | G.O.C.               |                  |
| 11         | 5th Aust. Infy. Bde. |                  |
| 12         | 6th Aust. Infy. Bde. |                  |
| 13         | 2nd Aust. Div.       |                  |
| 14         | 199th Bde.           |                  |
| 15         | 14th A.I. Bde.       |                  |
| 16         | 7th Field Coy A.E.   | 19/20. Lab Diary |
| 17         | 7th Field Amb.       | 21. File.        |
| 18         | 17th A.A.S.C.        | 22/25. Spare.    |

7



7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

March Table to accompany 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 136.

7/10/1917.

Date	Unit	Relieved by	Moving to	Route	Remarks
Sept 17. 7/8th	27th Bn. (Front line)	17th Bn.	RAILWAY WOOD	most direct	
"	25th Bn. (Support)	20th Bn.	" "	" "	To be completed in daylight if possible
"	26th Bn. (reserve)	18 Bn	BELLEWAARDE RIDGE	" "	
"	28th Bn. (reserve)		18th Bn	WESTHOEK	" "
"	7th A.M.G. Coy (less 5 guns)	6th A.M.G. Coy	* WESTHOEK (except 3 guns to Left Bde Sector)	" "	(i) O.C. 7th A.M.G. Coy will arrange to carry out reliefs of gun crews left in the line with 5th A.I. Bde
"	7th A.D.I. Bty	5th A.D.I. Bty	RAILWAY WOOD	" "	(ii) O.C. of detachment coming under orders of G.O.C. 5th A.I. Bde, will report for instructions.
Guides to be arranged mutually					

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No. 10.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 6th to 6 a.m. 7th October 1917.NOTE. : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.Artillery.

Harassing bursts of fire were carried out on tracks, ~~wand~~ woods, and ground between CHINA WOOD and FLINTE COPSE.

Patrols. Our patrols were active along the Divisional front during the night.

One which left our lines at D.29.b.0.9. encountered a party of 12 Germans about D.29.b.25.99. Fire was opened and hostile party scattered. It is not known if casualties were inflicted or not.

Another patrol left our trenches at D.29.b.16. and worked up to D.23.d.4.0. They report a hostile M.G. active at about D.23.d.2.2., and 4 others at about D.24.c.0.2.

Prisoners. Under cover of our practice barrage at 6.15 a.m. (7th) an enemy post in D.23.d. was rushed and 1 N.C.O. and 12 o.ranks captured and brought back to our lines. Prisoners belong to the 448th and 450th I.R. (233rd Div).

ENEMY SHELLING.

Square D.28. was shelled intermittently throughout the day, as was also the road running N and S along the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE. Most of the shells were 15 cm and 10.5 cm H.E., with a small proportion of 7.7 cm shrapnel.

Movement on the crest of the ridge almost invariably drew 7.7 cm fire from the direction of BROOGENBROODHOEK.

ZONNEBEKE Church and THAMES WOOD were shelled at intervals during the day with 15 cm H.E.

In our back area squares J.7.a. and b., I.12.b. and d., were shelled at intervals with 7.7 cm and 10.5 cm, and 15 cm.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Machine Guns. Hostile machine guns are active firing from CHINA WOOD (D.24.c.)

4 M.Gs about 15 yards apart fired on one of our patrols from about D.24.c.0.2.

Another M.G. was located at D.23.d.2.2.

M.G. at D.23.d.35.35. (prisoners statements)

Listening Posts. Were located at D.23.d.13 and D.23.d. 7.5.

New Work. Men were seen digging in E.19.b. and d.

Strong Post. Suspected at E.13.c.3.4.

Wire. No wire is visible on our front from ground observation, but it is probable that many of the small clumps of bushes and woods on our front are wired.

Guns. A battery of four guns has been located at E.20.c 7.3.

Another battery of four guns was observed firing on a T.B. of 98 from O.P. at D.28.c.15.20.

P.T.O.

-2-

MOVEMENT IN ENEMY'S LINES.

A great deal of movement has been observed in and around a clump of bushes on the crest of the ridge at about E.13.c.3.4.

Machine guns have been reported firing from about this point.

In front of our Left Bde there are numerous clumps of bushes many of which appear to conceal enemy posts.

Between 7 and 9 a.m. several parties of about 20 men each in small groups moved from cross roads D.24.d.25.75, to D.30.b.3.9.

At 11 a.m. a party of 30 men near a pill-box at D.23.d.10.75 were fired on by our Lewis guns, and three casualties inflicted; party disappeared. A few minutes later about 10 of them re-appeared carrying a Red Cross flag. Our Lewis guns fired on them, and they again disappeared.

At 1 p.m. 10 men were seen moving from EFFECT COPSE (D.24.d.9.1.) towards D.24.central.

During the day small parties of from 3 to 4 were moving to and fro at E.13.c.2.7., and E.19.d.2.9.

At 3.30 p.m. several men were observed at E.19.a.8.7.

At 4 p.m. 3 horse wagons were seen towards MOORSLEDE on road at E.9.central. *MOVING.*

Snipers. Enemy snipers and M.Gs were active throughout the night firing on the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE.

Flares. The enemy fired a number of RED and GREEN flares at 12 midnight. Nothing followed. Throughout the remainder of the night DOUBLE YELLOW flares were sent up.

AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Enemy 'Planes were fairly active during the day.

Between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. 8 'planes patrolled our front and support lines.

Between 5.10. and 6.25.p.m. several flights of about 6 planes each, flew up and down our front and support lines, and dropped several WHITE flares.

In each case our M.Gs opened fire without any noticeable results.

At 3 a.m. an enemy 'Plane dropped bombs in D.28.b.

MISCELLANEOUS.

There is a large sandy pit at D.23.d.05.10.

*J. H. M. Call Capt.*  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.

Examination of Prisoners - Appendix - attached.

APPENDIX.

-8-

No. 10.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS OF <sup>(448th</sup> ~~450th~~ I.R. (233rd Div) captured in D.23.d. at 6.15. a.m. 7th Oct. during our practice barrage.

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Prisoners stated that their Division was relieved by the 36th Div. in ST QUENTIN Sector, and left there on the 1st Oct. They were trained up to ROULERS where they spent the 2nd ~~inst~~. On the 3rd ~~inst~~, they were bussed to MOORSLEDE, and marched up into reserve in E.14.b. on night 4/5th.

448th I.R. went into the line in front of DAISY WOOD, night 5/6th, relieving the 5th FOOT GUARDS and elements of the 211th RIR. They have all four companies in the line with the 1st Bn in close support, and 1 Bn in reserve in E.14.b.

450th I.R., 3rd Bn, 12th Coy, came into the line at 10.30.p.m. night 6/7th, relieving the 5th BAV.I.R.

Order of Battle N.to S.

450th I.R. 448th I.R.

The 449th I.R. is in reserve, but will, according to prisoners, relieve the 448th I.R. in the line tonight.

450th I.R. 12th Coy, is commanded by Lieut HEINSCH, and has a trench strength of about 75 men.

The front line consists of a series of shell holes held by infantry with 3 Light M.Gs per Coy sector.

Prisoners state that they had no intention of counter-attacking us, but were told by their officers that we were now digging in, and they must do likewise. Some prisoners stated that no further attacks by us were expected, while others stated that they were expecting further attacks by us.

Prisoners stated that 2 days ago they saw some men of the 211th R.I.R. (45 Res Div) in MOORSLEDE. They also saw one battalion of the 94th I.R. in E.13., and were told that the 82nd RIR. were near. This seems to indicate that the 22nd Res Div will be coming into the line just north of our sector.

They further stated that MOORSLEDE is full of troops, and the MOORSLEDE - DROOGENBROODHOEK Road is always crowded with troops at night.

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la.

Appendix to 2nd Aust Div Int Summary No. 10.EXTRACTS FROM 2nd ARMY and 1st ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY 6-10-17Prisoners of War.

The total number of prisoners captured since 6 a.m., 4th October is 34 officers and 1,057 other ranks.

Miscellaneous.

The following are extracts from captured enemy documents.

Additional order for the attack of October 3rd.

Units will advance with fixed bayonets and will attack with loud shouting of "Hurra".

Experience has proved that the English have never been able to withstand an attack of that sort.

Special attention is drawn to the fact that the English always respect the Red Cross.

A stretcher-bearer will therefore walk ahead of stretcher-bearer parties, and will steadily wave a large Red Cross flag.

2nd ARMY SUMMARY. 6-10-17.Enemy's Rear Lines.

Prisoners report that the wire of the PASSCHENDAELE TERHAND Line in 28 E 200 is quite good, standing about 4-5 ft high and being about 20 yards deep.

Information from Captured Documents.

Transfer of Cavalry to Infantry. Extract from letter dated 9/9/17 : - "Anton Zeller, the proud Uhlans, has had to put away his uniform and go to the Machine Guns at LANDAU. That's "a bit of a come down". All the Uhlans have been transferred to the Infantry or Machine Guns.

Rewards. - Regiment unknown - "N.C.Os. and men who take a prisoner will be promoted for bravery and can start tomorrow for 14 days leave. In addition I refer to the rewards already published."

Losses. - 20th Division.

A prisoner (Platoon Commander) of the 12th Coy. 77th I.R. (20th Div) states that his Coy had been reduced from a trench strength of 110-120 to 24 during the 6 days preceding our attack. These casualties were entirely due to our artillery bombardment and included several men buried and suffering from shell shock who were sent back by the company commander. Prisoner states that this reduction in the strength was not abnormal in the Coys holding the front line. He further states that casualties in the STADEN-ZONNEBEKE Line were apparently greater. The Bn Commander of the IIIrd Bn in the front line preferred not to be relieved on the 3rd inst as he considered the front line safer than the support position.

The 20th Div seems to have had an exceptionally high percentage of casualties, both in killed and in prisoners; and to have been practically wiped out with the exception of those elements which escaped from the STADEN-ZONNEBEKE Line, though these probably suffered heavy losses from our barrage in escaping.

(Continued)

2a.

1st ANZAC SUMMARY 6-10-17.TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from orders of 5th Guard Inf. Bde., 29th Sept 1917

Tomorrow, according to prisoners' statements, there will be a battle of first importance.

Regiments are to make preparations for complete readiness for battle, and for the protection of ways of communication.

At the Commanders' conference today, mention was made on all sides of the fact that the counter-attacks of reserve and storm Divisions usually come too late in cases of a hostile attack with a limited objective, and that the losses caused in this way are out of proportion to the success gained. In many cases the counter-attack hardly reached the front line then held; heavy casualties were suffered and the whole thing was a failure, as our enemy contented himself with the objective already gained.

His gain in ground was secured by his numberless machine guns, which he immediately built in, by his protective waves following close behind the attackers, who dug themselves under the latter's protection. He was enabled by this means to beat off our counter-attack.

It has therefore proved itself necessary to strengthen the front line in order to make possible the repulse of the enemy's troops, and command of the occupied shell hole line, here a matter for its own garrison.

Our garrison must therefore, as far as possible, avoid being scattered at the time of an infantry attack, so that the exact line of our forward position may remain unbeknown to the enemy, and his fire may lift from the shell holes lying in front of our line, or, in the case of a narrow interval between the trenches, while the enemy is making preparation for an attack, he may be rushed with bayonets and bombs, which a thinly held post line is not in a position to carry out.

In all sectors, the dispositions are to be made in such a way, that 6 companies occupy the front line and just behind the front line, while the other half of the Regiment is distributed further back in the open outside the principal zone of fire.

A strongly held front line demands the establishment of numerous '08 M.Gs. Two M.G. Companies of the Regiment must be distributed in the front line and the area immediately behind it, while the 3rd M.G. Company takes up the line of the emergency garrison and the area occupied by the rear 6 companies.

The new fighting tactics of the enemy, wherein he sets a very limited objective to his attacks, compels us to change our policy, which has been to defend any extensive breaks of our line with subsequent operations.

Regiments will test their organisation with this end in view, and will report how circumstances permit this policy to be carried out. Report as to action taken to be sent in at once.

Brigade orders of today's date regarding the explicit principles for defence are to be altered in accordance with these orders.

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(Continued)

- 3a -

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY - 6:10:17.

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THE GENERAL SITUATION.

The enemy's actions yesterday and to-day lead still further to the conclusion that he has been very seriously demoralised by our attack of the 4th. The large number of prisoners taken by this Army from an area representing the front of three Divisions and the casualties known to have been inflicted on him as evidenced by the killed and wounded found within our own lines are, in themselves, sufficiently serious; but, in addition, there is a mixture of regiments and the accompanying fact of our taking prisoners from nearly every company of the Divisions represented.

Other signs of the enemy's disorganisation are:-

1. The re-arrangement of his guns and their re-establishment further back or to the flanks of former positions.
2. The movement of his wireless stations.
3. The inevitable reliefs of some of the shattered divisions now known to be proceeding.

Probably the best signs of the enemy's demoralisation lie in the fact that he has as yet attempted no serious counter-attack with large forces. It is true that various small local counter-attacks were made by some of his battalions in the afternoon and evening of zero day, but only one of these (about REUTEL) even reached any serious proportions. In this respect he is notwithstanding the operation which he himself initiated south of ZONNEBEKE simultaneous with our attack - not following the counter-attack policy which he had evidently laid down for himself in the event of our further advance.

The extent to which he attempted his large attack has now been disclosed by captured documents. It appears that a large attack involving several divisions had been planned for the morning of the 3rd instant on a very wide front with objectives extending from the South side of POLYGONE WOOD to ZONNEBEKE (2 miles) arranged in two sectors. The failure, however, of their furious efforts to drive in our line about CAMERON COVERT on the 30th September and 1st October necessitated not only abandoning the southern sector of the main attack but its postponement 24 hours to daybreak of the 4th, when it met with such a disaster.

It is therefore evident that not only were the effects of our attack so great, but that the enemy had become so committed to his own plan of attack in front of BROODSEINDE Ridge that he was unable to convert the situation into anything but a defensive action, not only for hours but for days after.

The train movement yesterday and to-day has been abnormal on those lines tributary to this front, but this is to be expected under the circumstances, as doubtless reliefs and evacuation of wounded is proceeding with all haste. It is however, difficult to conceive what confusion may probably exist in sorting out his units near the front, mixed as they were, and in properly supplying and moving them.

P. T. O.

- 4a -

The past 24 hours there have been several signs that have indicated uncertainty on the part of the enemy as to organising his line of defence, especially between BECELAERE and the ROULERS Railway. His machine-gun and rifle fire is erratic and his artillery continues to change rearward and to the flanks in a manner which seems to indicate some new defensive policy in connection with the KEIBERG Ridge; his Wireless stations too have been significantly silent in this locality and some have moved back. It is possible that he is getting his guns into a favourable position on the flanks to infilade and bombard the BROODSEINDE Ridge while at the same time to anticipate the possibility of our further advance here. It is to be expected that he will make a counter-attack of large proportions somewhere in this locality, but how soon and with what troops it would be difficult at present to conjecture. It is also to be expected that he will continue to attack in the vicinity of BECELAERE.

The abnormal train movements which continue this afternoon and which now seem to be more than would be warranted by ordinary reliefs and evacuation of wounded, would appear to indicate the arrival of fresh reserves in considerable numbers. On this account it would be reasonable to expect that the counter-attacks indicated above might be put in within the next 48 hours.

As to his garrisons and his reserve divisions, there is not much that is definite at present, except that the Divisions which have had the worst losses are being relieved. So far as is known, no new reserves have as yet got close up to the battle front, but it is most likely that several divisions are now either up or en route from the South, and more - like the 19th Reserve and the 20th - may still be expected from the Russian front.

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2nd Aust. D. H. Q.

7th October, 1917.

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Officers 7/10/17.

Line

Transport

Reinfts Camp

Headquarters

Lieut Col R.J.A. Travers ✓  
Lieut W.E. Grose ✓  
Capt J.M. Harper ✓  
Lieut G. Meysiey - Hammond ✓  
Lieut A.F. Walters ✓

Lieut Johnnie Sinclair ✓  
Lieut J.E. Brown ✓

A Company

Lieut H.M.G. McIntyre ✓  
Lieut H.F.L. Tozer Saboteur ✓  
Lieut A.E. Baty ✓

Lieut C.R. Walsh ✓

Lieut F.L. Goules ✓  
Lieut J.Z. Blair ✓

B Company

Capt J. Roydhouse ✓  
Lieut W.L. Boundy ✓

Lieut W.A. Smiley ✓  
Lieut D. Martin ✓  
Lieut F.B. Kellon ✓

C Company

Lieut H. Stovorty ✓  
Lieut A.H. Carlisle ✓  
Lieut A. Getty ✓

Lieut W. Leavers ✓  
Lieut F.W. Leake ✓

Lieut A.R. Venton ✓  
Lieut M.E. Paterson ✓

D Company

Capt G.A. Hargrave ✓  
Lieut W. Davies ✓

Lieut A.E. Gabry ✓

15

6

7

Paterson - Hargrave  
Venton - Baty  
Smiley - Carlisle

99

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE APPENDIX.

October 8th 1917.

ADDENDA to Preliminary Instructions No. 1. Series 32

Para 2. Insert :-

- (i) Mobile guns of 7th A.M.G. Coy will move up to vicinity of old Machine Gun H.Q. at D.22.c.4.f. by Zero hour.
- (ii) Personnel of 7th A.L.T. Bty will move up to vicinity of Brigade H.Q. by Zero plus 1 hour.

O.S.C.

of the above units will report to Brigade H.Q. when the unit is in its new position.

Anti-aircraft guns will be mounted as follows :-  
 1 Lewis gun at HUBLE, near Callar at D.27.c.90.85. by "B" Battalion.  
 1 Lewis gun at Railway Arch at D.26.b.9.4. by "C" Battalion.

In addition to the above, each Battalion will detail 1 mobile Lewis Gun exclusively for anti-aircraft duties during the various phases of the operation.

A. Boase

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

File

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 8th 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE for 24 hours ending 8 a.m. 8/10/17.

RELIEFS. The 7th A.I. Brigade was relieved in the front line during the night by the 5th A.I. Bde, and withdrew to Reserve area as per 7th A.I. Bde Order No. 138.

Relief reported complete at 6.30 a.m.

OPERATIONS. Our patrols were out covering the relief, and maintaining touch with flank units. No special reconnaissance was carried out.

ENEMY ARTILLERY. Replied to our practise barrages by bombarding neighbourhood of THAMES WOOD with 5.9's from direction of DROOGENBROODHOEK, and a mixed barrage on crest of the BROODSEINDE Ridge and S.W. corner of ZONNEBEKE. These barrages lasted from 12 to 15 minutes.

ENEMY MACHINE GUNS AND SNIPING. Very quiet on our front, but some activity in Right Brigade sector.

FLARES & S.O.S. S.O.S. Signals were sent up along the whole front at 5.40 p.m. last night, and our barrage was immediately opened. The barrage evidently broke up the attack, as the Huns did not get closer than 400 yards from our outposts. Further news is awaited about this matter, and particulars will be forwarded when same come to hand.

Enemy barrage on our front line was fairly heavy, but West of the ridge shelling was normal.

ENEMY DEFENCES. Much movement was observed throughout the day on PASSCHENDAELE Ridge, but there is nothing at present to indicate that the enemy has properly organised his defence yet. No wire to speak of is visible on our front, and his strong points consist of earthworks in clumps of bushes etc.

GROUND. The ground is of course wet at present, but much better ahead of our front for troops to pass over than that over which we have already passed. It is well grassed, and this should render it better for walking on. There is a rather boggy locality well in rear of S.E. of DAIRY WOOD.

MISCELLANEOUS. The Intelligence personnel of this Brigade has been reduced by one half through casualties, which accounts for the meagre information sent through.

During either hostile or our own shelling of the front area at night, yellow sprays and double orange flares are sent up by the enemy freely, and an occasional red flare, but the result of this cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty.

(signed) A.J. ROASE, Major,  
For G.O.C., 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 8th 1917.

HEADQUARTERS, 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	261131
Date	

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 Machine Gun Coy,  
 T.M. Battery.

Attached please find sketch map showing location and nature of enemy barrages, for information. Commanders of troops moving in the forward area should avoid as far as possible these localities, in order to avoid unnecessary casualties.


*A. J. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*File*

*Enemy Barrages*

# Enemy Barrage Map.



Ref: Map Zonnebeke  
Scale: 1:10,000

## APPENDIX.

SECRET.

Copy No. 14

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

October 8th 1917.

## Preliminary INSTRUCTIONS No. 1. Series No. 3.

Reference Sheets (SLOBLAERE )  
(PASSCHENDALE) 1/10,000.

1. (i) The 1st Anzac Corps in conjunction with the Corps and Army to the North, will advance at a date and time to be notified later.
- (ii) The 2nd Australian Division will carry out the advance on the 1st Anzac Corps front.
- The 6th A.I.Bde on the right, and the 5th A.I.Bde on the left will carry out the attack on the 2nd Aust. Div. front.
- The 7th A.I.Bde will be held in Divisional Reserve.
- (iii) The 197th Bde, 66th Division (2nd Anzac Corps) will attack on the left of 5th A.I.Bde.

2. The attached map shows Brigade and Divisional boundaries and objectives.

3. The operation will be carried out in two stages, viz:
- (i) The advance to the RED LINE (1st Objective)
- (ii) The advance to the BLUE LINE (2nd Objective)

4. (a) At ZERO hour units of 7th A.I.Bde will be disposed as under:

A. & B. Battalions :	TOKIO SPUR D.27.a,c,d.
C. & D. " :	ANZAC SPUR D.26.d. - J.2.b - J.3.d.

- (b) At ZERO plus 1 1/2 hours :-
- |               |                                    |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| "A" Battalion | about line D.28.b.5.2.-D.28.d.1.3. |
| "B" " "       | " " " " D.22.c.6.2.- D.22.c.4.7.   |
| "C" " "       | " " " " D.28.c.4.6.- D.28.a.0.5.   |
| "D" " "       | between TOKIO and ANZAC.           |

NOTE:-

"A" Battalion	28th Bn.
"B" " "	26th Bn.
"C" " "	25th Bn.
"D" " "	27th Bn.

Reconnaissances will be made forthwith.

5. (a) The 2nd Aust. Division will be covered by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Aust. Div. Artilleries - 1st and 4th (C.1. & C.2 groups) covering the 6th A.I.Bde; and 2nd (D. Group) covering the 5th A.I.Bde.
- (b) The barrage will be put down for four minutes on the opening barrage line. It will then move forward to the RED LINE at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes.
- The RED protective barrage which will be placed 200 yards in advance of the RED LINE will lift at ZERO plus 100 minutes. It will then move forward at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes to the BLUE LINE.

g will follow

- 2 -

6. MACHINE GUNS.  
 (a) Machine Gun Instructions No. 1. Series No. 3. have been issued to O.C., 7th A.M.G. Coy.  
 (b) The 22nd A.M.G. Coy and half of each of the 5th, 6th, and 7th (6 guns) A.M.G. Coys will be employed for barrage work as per Machine Gun Instructions.  
 (c) Remainder of each Company is at the disposal of each Brigadier.
7. Success Signals will not be used, but capture of an objective will be reported by message.
8. (a) Signal Instructions will be issued later.  
 (b) Cable Head will be MOULIN FARM.
9. ENGINEERING. Platoon Strong Points are being constructed by attacking Brigades under Engineer Supervision as follows :-  
 Left Brigade : (D.17.d.4.8.  
 ( Astride Railway at D.18.a.7.7.  
 Right Brigade: D.23.b.4.2.
10. PARIS time will be sent out twice daily to units.
11. All prisoners of war will be sent to Brigade H.Q. D. 26.c.1.5. where the Divisional Intelligence Officer will be stationed.  
 Brigade Intelligence Officer will arrange to provide necessary Intelligence personnel to assist the Divisional Intelligence Officer in interrogating selected prisoners.  
 Divisional Prisoners of War Cage is at SHRAPNEL corner.
12. LIAISON. Captain J. ROADHOUSE, M.C., 28th Bn. is detailed as Liaison Officer from 2nd Aust. Division with 66th Division.  
 Brigade Liaison Officers with 5th and 6th A.I. Brigades will be detailed later.
13. HEADQUARTERS.  
 2nd Aust. Div. Advanced H.Q. YPRES RAMPARTS.  
 66th Div. H.Q. : MENIN GATE, YPRES.  
 5th A.I. Bde : D.26.c.1.5.  
 6th A.I. Bde : SANS SOUCI J.2.a.3.6.  
 7th A.I. Bde : D.26.c.1.5.
14. Units are to reorganize and complete to 200 rounds S.A.A.; 2 Bombs, 48 hours' rations, and 4 sandbags per man.
15. Contact patrol arrangements will be similar to those for the two previous attacks.
16. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

*A. Boase*

Major, Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Inf. Brigade.

Issued to Sigs at 11.45 am

For distribution  
 See separate sheet.

## APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEDistribution : PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS No.1. Series 5.

- |        |                    |       |                          |
|--------|--------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| No. 1. | 25th Bn.           | 15.   | Staff Capt.              |
| 2.     | 26th Bn.           | 16.   | Bde Bomb Officer         |
| 3.     | 27th Bn.           | 17.   | " Sig. "                 |
| 4.     | 28th Bn.           | 18.   | " I.O.                   |
| 5.     | 7th A/G Coy        | 19.   | C.R.A.                   |
| 6.     | 7th A.L.F.M.B.     | 20.   | C.R.E.                   |
| 7.     | 2nd Aust. Div. 'G' | 21.   | 7th Field Coy.           |
| 8.     | " " " 'Q'          | 22.   | 7th Field Amb.           |
| 9.     | 5th A.I.Bde        | 23.   | 14th A.I.Bde             |
| 10.    | 6th A.I.Bde        | 24.   | War Diary                |
| 11.    | 6th Div.           | 25.   | " "                      |
| 12.    | 197th Bde.         | 26.   | File                     |
| 13.    | G.O.C.             | 27/30 | Spares.                  |
| 14.    | B.M.               | 31.   | A.D.M.S.                 |
|        |                    | 32.   | Capt. J. ROYDHOUSE, M.C. |
|        |                    | 33.   | Liaison Off with 5th Bde |
|        |                    | 34.   | " " " 6th Bde            |



30  
14  
44  
52  
124


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150  
60

68

82

File with operation papers 109

SECRET



Ref: Map. Polygon Wood. Scale - 1:20,000.

To accompany Preliminary Instructions No 1 Series 3

G.O.C.  
7th Aust. Inf. Bde.

APPENDIX.

Sir,

Report on Operations 1/2nd to 8/8th October 1917.

The Battalion marched from the CANAL AREA at 9.45 p.m. 1/2nd Oct and took over Front Line (from RAILWAY to ZONNEBEKE LAKE ) from the 53rd Aust. Infantry ( 3rd Aust. Div) Headquarters of Battalion at ZONNEBEKE REDOUBT on the night 2/3rd Oct. The 25th Battalion relieved us at 9.30. p.m. and the 28th then moved back to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE leaving one Officer per Company and a percentage of Specialists with the 25th Battalion. The Casualties while holding the line for the 24 hours were :-

Killed 1 Officer (Lieut CONROY) 3 O/Ranks  
Wounded 31 do

At BELLEWAARDE final orders were received for the attack on BROODSWINDE . The Battalion supplied the following carrying parties :-

4 Officers and 100 O/Ranks carrying for 28th Batta &  
4. do 100 do moving Brigade Dump

forward from the HUNLE to MOULIN FARM after the 1st Objective had been captured. This left with the Battalion 13 Officers and 217 O/Ranks. all told with 16 Lewis Guns.

At ZERO hour on the 4th Oct. the Battalion as above had arrived at WESTHORK and at ZERO plus 30 minutes moved forward to jumping off lines of the 26th Battalion. ST. JOSEPH RIDGE with Headquarters at ZONNEBEKE REDOUBT . Casualties were received here from the heavy shelling. Capt KING (Adj't) Capt GLYDE and Lieut HARRIS were all wounded getting men under cover.

At about 10.30 a.m. the situation on the Front Line being very indefinite the G.O.C. Ordered me to go forward and make the best dispositions possible in conjunction with the C.O's 26th & 28th Battalions. Both asked me for support and Lewis Guns with teams were sent up to the Front Line (26th Batta ) and to the Support Line (28th Battalion). I reported to the G.O.C on return and remained at Bde Hqrs until dusk when in accordance with Brigade instructions 261/193 I went forward again and in consultation with the C.O.s of the 26th, 28th & 27th Battalions the following dispositions were made, and the Line reorganised as follows :-

26th Battalion and one Coy 27th Batta under Major CURRIE, D.S.O, 26th, held Front Line. 25th Bn support line. 27th Batta (less one Coy) in Strong Point ( constructed under supervision of Engineers) and holding the Line in reserve.

28th Batta in close support to 27th Batta in line  
D.22.c.2.6 , D.22.c.25.30

Headquarters with 27th Batta at D.22.c.25.30 .

The Battalion remained in this position until the night of 5/6th Oct. when they were relieved by the 17th Batta A.I.F and moved back to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE.

During this Stunt the Battalion suffered approximately 25% casualties. The Carrying Party suffering heavily.

On the 6th inst in accordance with Brigade Order No.135 the Battalion reorganised and moved forward to position previously occupied and took over from the 17th Battalion.

The available strength of the 26th Battalion were attached to 28th under my command and the two Battalions at 9. a.m. 7th Oct. consisted of 450 all ranks approx.

Early in the evening of the 7th Oct. the enemy shelled our positions very heavily but fortunately casualties were light

On the night 7/8th Oct in accordance with Bde Order No.136 the battalion with 26th attached were relieved by the 18th Battalion A.I.F.

99  
The 28th Moved to BELLEWAARDE RIDGE and Major CURRIE D.S.O again assumed command of them. The 28th Batta moved to WESTHOEK. This relief was not complete until 9.30 a.m. 8th Oct

At 3. p.m. a party of 100 all told were detailed to carry for cable burying. This party returned at 7. p.m. and immediately reorganised and were issued with Bombs, S.A.A, etc, & for operations in accordance with Bde Order. On morning of 9th Oct. At 4.30. p.m. I proceeded to Brigade Hqrs with state and verbally informed the G.O.C that the men were extremely tired and that the available strength was only 150 all told.

On arriving at Brigade I found that an alteration in disposition had been made and had to reconnoitre the new position I did not return to the Batta until at WESTHOEK until 11.30 p. and having seen the G.O.C 6th Bde ( under whose order the Batta came after Zero hour) at once reorganised into 4 Companies each approx 30 O/Ranks with One Lewis Gun.

At Zero hour 9th Oct. the Battalion after a very exhausting march due to the rain and mud arrived at point of assembly. Hqrs with 23<sup>rd</sup> Bn Hqrs.

According to orders of the 6th Brigade one Coy was at the disposal of the each Battalion Commander of the 6th Bde if required. The C.O's of the 21st, 23rd and 24th Bns each reinforced their front with the 28th Coys and one Coy was left which after supplying stretcher bearers consisted of 2 Offices and 16 O/Ranks.

At mid-day orders were received that the Batta was being relieved in daylight by a Batta of the 10th Bde A.I.F. As this was impossible owing to the general mix up I proceeded to Bde Hqrs after arranging with each C.O of the 6th Bde to relieve the Coys of the Batta after dark.

I reported to the G.O.C's 7th and 6th Bdes and then on night 9/10th after making all arrangements re guides both for ingoing and outgoing troops proceeded to Infantry Barracks YPRES.

The 28th Battalion were finally relieved and in small parts reached YPRES Barracks by 9 a.m. on 10th Oct.

Attached please find list of casualties also state showing present strength and recommendations for gallant conduct.

I desire to state that I had to work under adverse conditions and after the Adjutant was wounded on 4.10.17 had practically no knowledge of the officers and men left in the Battalion whatever. The Assistant Adjutant Lieut GROSSE reported from the Transport Lines and his energy and devotion to duty was most marked but he also was handicapped.

In conclusion, Sir, I beg to state that I cannot speak too highly of the Officers, N.C.O's and men of the Battalion who one and all showed their loyalty to you and me under most exceptional circumstances carrying out their duties splendidly under such adverse conditions.

*J. Travers*  
.....Lieut-Col.  
T/Commanding 28th Battalion A.I.F

In the Field

12th Oct. 1917

APPENDIX.

28th BATTALION A.I.F.

STRENGTH 12th October 1917.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O/Ranks</u>
Present with Unit	29	646
On detachment	2	116
Total strength of Unit	<u>31</u>	<u>762</u>

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

Period 1st to 10th October 1917.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O/Ranks</u>
Killed in Action	1	44
Wounded	8	102
Missing	4	7
Total	<u>9</u>	<u>153</u>

*J. Travers Lt Col  
2/cds 28th Bn.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.No. 262/39  
Date  
Copy No.

SECRET.

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Oct. 10th 1917

REPORT ON OPERATIONS. Period 4th October to 9th October 1917.

Reference maps: SCULLAR 1/10,000.  
Sheets 28 N.W. & N.E. 1/20,000.

## 1. DISPOSITIONS.

(a) On day prior to attack, units of the 7th A.I. Brigade were located as follows :-

Advanced Brigade H.Q.	..	D.26.c.1.3.
near brigade H.Q.	..	RAILWAY DUGOUT.
25th Battalion	..	LINE, (H.Q. D.26.d.53.55)
27th "	..	SUPPORT. (H.Q. KIT & KIT J.1.d.3.7)
		2 Coys in vicinity J.1.b.80.70.
		2 Coys WESTHOEK RIDGE.
28th "	..	BELLEVAARDE RIDGE.
26th "	..	GORDON CAMP (CANAL AREA, TPRES)
7th A.M.G. Coy.		4 Guns in Line. H.Q. and remainder at RAILWAY DUGOUT.
7th A.L.T.M.B.		Dug in on MÜHLE RIDGE D.27.c.8.8.

(b) For the attack, units formed up on the night 3/4th October as under :-

25th Battalion	on line approx. D.27.b.65.25 - D.21.d.1.1.
26th "	on line approx. D.27.c.90.75 - D.27.a.15.50.
27th "	on line approx. J.2.a.0.3. - D.25.d.80.13
28th "	3 Coys WESTHOEK RIDGE. 1 Coy in trench at J.1.b.80.70, 1 " Carrying for 25th Battalion.
7th A.M.G. Coy.	H.Q. D.26.b.6.2. 1 Section holding the MÜHLE - St. JOSEPHS RIDGE. 1 Section to support each of 25th and 26th Battalions in the capture and consolidation of 1st and 2nd Objectives. 1 Section in Brigade Reserve in vicinity of Brigade H.Q.
7th A.L.T.M.B.	H.Q. DRAUGHT HOUSE, D.27.c.25.53. 2 Mortars replaced to deal with machine Gun positions at D.21.d.43.46 and D.21.d.65.23. 4 mortars to accompany 25th Bn. to 1st Objective, and afterwards be avail- able for 26th Bn. if required. 2 mortars in Brigade Reserve at D.27.c.8.8.

Note  
No map

Full J.

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2. BOUNDARIES & OBJECTIVES, were as shown in attached map. Objectives were allotted to units as follows :-

RED LINE	(1st Objective)	25th Battalion.
BLUE "	(2nd Objective)	26th Battalion with 27th Battalion in close support.

3. FORMATIONS As for battle of MELVIN ROAD, except that 25th Battalion was allotted 1 Company of 26th Battalion for carrying, so that a larger number of "moppers up" could be detailed to clean up the ruins of ZONNEBERG and the number of "fillboxes" in the vicinity.

4. FORMING UP.

25th Battalion moved into jumping off position early (before 11 p.m.) to a cld showing up in the bright moonlight on the forward slope, as would have occurred if they had waited until the latter part of the night when the moon had got into the west.

Other battalions being further to the rear, and not on the forward slopes, were assembled by 5 a.m.

All positions of assembly had been selected after a careful preliminary reconnaissance and study of the normal Boche barrages, as was done for the previous operation, and the value of this reconnaissance was again thoroughly demonstrated by the comparatively light casualties sustained before ZERO - in spite of the fact that hostile shelling was much heavier than usual, owing to the hostile preparation for an attack on the sector immediately on our right.

5. ACTION OF UNITS.

1st Phase. At 6 a.m. our artillery and machine gun barrage opened, and at the same time, two previously emplaced mortars opened a hurricane bombardment on the hostile machine gun positions at D.31.d.43.46 and D.31.d.45.23., and smothered them.

The attack was launched to time in spite of the fact that an S.O.S. had been sent up on 2nd A.I. Brigade front at about 5.55 a.m., owing to the enemy having formed up for an attack on our line between POLIGON OOD and ZONNEBERG.

Our attack however, just preceded the enemy attack, and after a little work with the bayonet, the enemy, who were thoroughly disorganized and demoralized by our barrage, began to surrender freely.

By 7.10 a.m. prisoners had arrived back, and were identified as the 212th A.I.A., which was one of the regiments detailed for the attack.

27th Battalion began to move up in close support of 26th Battalion, to D.22.central.

The wire with 25th Battalion was cut at 6.40 a.m., but from reports of wounded, everything appeared to be going well. Our troops followed the barrage closely, and quickly overcame any opposition which was offered by isolated groups of the enemy.

At 7.35 a.m. wounded confirmed the report that 25th Battalion were on the RED LINE and were consolidating.

- 3 -

By 7.57 a.m., Brigades on both flanks reported that they were on the RED LINE and in touch with us.

At 7.50 a.m. a forward Brigade Dump was being established at MOULIN FARM.

#### 2nd PHASE.

The 26th Battalion had moved forward at ZERO in rear of 25th Battalion, passing through a heavy barrage in the neighbourhood of ZONNEBEEK, and suffering rather heavy casualties in doing so.

On capture of the RED LINE the 26th Battalion reorganized under cover of the protective barrage, and moved forward up to the barrage. Practically no opposition was encountered until the line of the North and South road through BROODSLEIDE was reached. Here there was a fair amount of sniping and heavy machine gun fire from DAISY LODD and the undergrowth to the west of it.

Owing to this opposition, and the fact that the best tactical position was on a line between 40 and 100 yards east of the BROODSLEIDE Road, the 26th Battalion dug in on the line as shown in attached sketch. The strength of the 26th Battalion in the front line was then about 200 rifles and 2 Companies of the 27th Battalion (approx. 100 rifles) were pushed up to fill in the gap between 26th Battalion and 22nd Battalion on the Right. Touch was also obtained on the Left with 41st Battalion North of the

Road Junction at D.25.a.4.7.

At 12.40 p.m., 19th Battalion came under the Command of the G.O.C. 7th A.I. Brigade, and were moved up in Reserve to line D.27.a.1.2. - D.27.c.5.6, with Headquarters at D.26.c.55.55.

#### 6. CONSOLIDATION. (Vide attached sketch)

(i) On capture of the RED LINE, 25th Battalion immediately began consolidation by connecting up shell-hole positions, and putting out a line of wire.

(ii) A platoon Strong Point was dug and garrisoned by 27th Battalion under Engineer supervision, at D.22.b.90.35.

(iii) On capture of BLUE LINE, a communication trench was immediately put through by 27th Battalion over the crest of the ridge between (approx) D.22.d.8.8. and D.25.c.5.9.

(iv) A continuous line was constructed in an old Boche trench, and shell-hole posts pushed out ahead.

(v) On the night 4/5th October, Battalions were re-organized, and one Company of the 27th Battalion withdrawn to Support position.

#### 7. ACTION OF MACHINE GUNS & TRENCH MORTARS.

Four machine guns were detailed to cover the advance and consolidation of each of the 25th and 26th Battalions on the 1st and 2nd Objectives respectively. The guns for 1st Objective got few targets, but the guns for the 2nd Objective were used with effect on enemy massing in DAISY LODD, and also on hostile machine guns which were causing trouble from both flanks. One section was emplaced on St. JOSEPHS RIDGE, and supported the attack until its fire was masked by the advance. One section remained at Brigade Headquarters as Reserve.



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Two French mortars dealt with hostile machine guns at D.21.d.43.48 and D.21.d.65.93 from ZERO to ZERO plus 3, and were successful in knocking out the crews.

Four guns moved forward to the 1st Objective and dug in on the Left flank.

Two guns were held in reserve at MUHLE RIDGE.

8. BRIGADE MORTARS.

Were again used for dealing with suitable targets during the operation, and were pushed forward independent of Battalions.

9. COMMUNICATIONS.

Prior to the attack, the buried cable had been laid as far as ZONNEBEEK CHURCH, and communications were maintained in accordance with the principles laid down in S.S. 138.

There was a noticeable improvement in the use of visual, which was used between Advanced Brigade H.Q. and Brigade Forward Station almost continuously. Some Battalions however, still did not make sufficient use of this means of communication, and in fact did not use the Brigade Forward Station as much as they should have, for rendering frequent reports to Brigade H.Q.

The Barth Induction set was blown out before it could be got into position.

10.

ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER ATTACK.

At 3.30 p.m. S.O.S. was sent up on a sector on our right, and also on the 11th A.I. Brigade sector. No attack materialized.

At 5.30 p.m. enemy were reported to be concentrating in DAISY WOOD, and again at 6.25 p.m. They were dispersed by machine gun and rifle fire.

At 6.35 p.m. enemy were reported moving down road from direction of PASSCHENDABLE.

At 6.45 p.m. S.O.S. was sent up on sectors on both our flanks, and on our own sector at 6.46 p.m. Artillery opened, and no attack materialized.

At 7.15 p.m. all quiet on our sector.

At 9.57 p.m. S.O.S. along the whole front. Enemy attack dispersed.

S.O.S. on 3rd Australian Divisional front several times during the remainder of the night, but no action on our front.

11. HOSTILE SHELLING.

About 5.30 a.m. 4th October, enemy shelled old front line heavily, and also MUHLE RIDGE, besides scattering 5.9's in the back area.

At about 5.55 a.m. shelling became intense.

About 6 a.m. he lifted on to MUHLE RIDGE and later confined his retaliation mainly to the duck-board tracks and railway, moving back to old front

- 5 -

line at 6.37 a.m.

At 7 a.m. hostile shelling became scattered and rather lighter.

At 8.6 a.m., enemy barrage appeared to be mainly on the jumping off line (25th Battalion) and for 500 yards forward of it.

At 8.37 a.m. enemy got on to RED LINE and shelled it continuously during the morning, decreasing somewhat about 10.4 a.m.

At 1.7 p.m. hostile artillery fire was heavy on BLUE LINE, which was shelled intermittently during remainder of tour.

The vicinity of ZONNEBEKE, THAMLS OOD, and the RED LINE were most frequently shelled.

### 13. RELIEFS.

- (i) On the night of 5/6th October, 7th A.I. Brigade (less 2 sections 7th A.M.G. Coy) was relieved by a portion of 5th A.I. Brigade, and on relief was disposed as under :-

Brigade H.Q.	remained at	D.26.c.1.3.
27th Battalion	moved to	trenches in D.27.c.
25th "	"	" WESTHOEK RIDGE.
28th "	"	" RAILWAY OOD and
		BELLEVAAR DE RIDGE.
26th "	"	" GORDON CAMP.
7th A.L.F.M.B.	"	" IPRES (Post Office)
7th A.M.G. Coy	"	" WESTHOEK RIDGE.
	(less 2 sections)	

- (ii) On the night of 6/7th October, consequent on re-adjustment of boundary, the following moves took place:

- (a) 27th Battalion took over front line from 2/6th Manchester Regiment, between 5th A.I. Brigade and IPRES - SCULERS Railway.
- (b) 25th Battalion took over Support Line from 2/5th Manchester Regiment (approx. along road from D.23.a.40.65 North West to Railway)
- (c) 26th and 28th Battalions (composite under Command of Lieut. Colonel J. TRAYNOR, D.S.O.) to reserve position on RED LINE.

- (iii) On night 7/8th October, 5th A.I. Brigade relieved 7th A.I. Brigade which moved into Divisional Reserve into the following positions :-

27th Battalion	RAILWAY OOD.
25th "	BELLEVAARDE RIDGE.
26th "	WESTHOEK
28th "	WESTHOEK
7th A.L.F.M.B.	RAILWAY OOD.
7th A.M.G. Coy.	WESTHOEK and vicinity of
	D.26.b.6.2.

- e -

13. ACTION HILST IN DIVISIONAL RESERVE.

At 5.20 a.m. on 9th October :

- (a) 28th Battalion had moved forward to trench at D.29.a.1.6 - D.22.d.7.3, and was placed under the orders of G.O.C., 6th A.I. Brigade.
- (b) 25th and 26th Battalions had moved to TOKIO SPUR D.27.a., c, and d.
- (c) 27th Battalion to ANZAC SPUR D.26.d. - J.2.b.
- (d) 6 guns of 7th A.M.G. Coy were handed over to D.M.G.O. for barrage work. 8 guns were kept as mobile reserve at D.22.b.6.2.

At 6.50 a.m. 25th and 26th Battalions had moved to line D.22.c.9.5. - D.22.c.7.7. and were placed under the orders of G.O.C. 6th A.I. Brigade.

27th Battalion to TOKIO SPUR D.27.a., c and d.

At 8.55 a.m. a report was received from 28th Battalion that 1 Officer and 30 o/ranks had been sent forward to reinforce QUAD (24th Bn) and had established a Strong Point at D.23.b.1.5.

At 9 a.m. 6th A.I. Brigade moved 26th Battalion up to occupy old front line, and were using 50 men of 25th Battalion as a carrying party.

At 10.35 a.m. On receipt of a telephone message from Lieut. Colonel BRIDGES, D.S.O., G.S.O.1, 27th Bn. was instructed to occupy the old front line North of BROODSEINDE - MOORSEINDE Road in D.25.a. and c., and was placed under the orders of G.O.C. 6th A.I. Brigade.

At 10.40 a.m. A report was received from 6th A.I. Bde that 28th Battalion had been put in to reinforce attack on DAISI OOD.

At 11.10 a.m. 25th Battalion (less carrying parties) was ordered up to occupy old Support Line (RED LINE)

A part from supplying carrying parties, Battalions remained in these positions until the relief of 7th A.I. Brigade on the night 9/10th October by 45th Battalion, when Battalions and Trench Mortar Battery moved back to GORDON AREA (PRES)

The 7th A.M.G. Coy remained in the line until the night 10/11th October, when they were relieved by the 13th A.M.G. Coy, and the mobile reserve guns were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 6th A.I. Brigade. Two of these guns only were used, and they were sent forward to occupy positions in the front line at 1.30 p.m. 10th inst.

14. CAPTURES.

In the operation on the 4th October, the following were captured :-

<u>PRISONERS:-</u>	5 Officers	244 o/ranks.
<u>MATERIAL :-</u>	Machine Guns	12.
	Trench Mortars	6

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15. CASUALTIES. From 1st to 11th October 1917.

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing	
	Off.	o/r	Off.	o/r	Off.	o/r
7th A.L.F. Bty	-	-	-	8	-	-
7th A.L.F. Coy	-	11	3	54	-	3
25th Battalion	3	43	11	250	-	17
26th Battalion	2	38	8	286	-	40
27th Battalion	3	45	9	135	-	4
28th Battalion	1	44	8	102	-	7
	9	140	39	725	-	71

16.

## LESSONS LEARNED.

The following points were noted as being worthy of consideration for future guidance :

1. The minimising of Casualties at jumping off positions and during the approach to same, as a result of careful previous study of enemy's habits and barrages, and consequent selection of the best jumping off positions.
2. The plan of the Barrage was, in my opinion, bad, and was evidently laid down without sufficient regard to the action of the Infantry. If the Infantry are to work to the best advantage, and with the minimum of loss, it must be able to follow the barrage closely. This is extremely difficult to do, and at the same time maintain direction if the barrage is not parallel or nearly so to the objective.  
The result of the bad plan was that the barrage was ragged and irregular. Some batteries or guns seemed to open later on the extreme left, and caught our men. It is hard to know exactly what happened here, but we had casualties from our own barrage, which appeared to be uncertain and ragged.  
It is suggested that Infantry Officers be consulted if it is thought necessary to depart at all from nearly parallel lines to the objective.
3. The disorganization was considerable owing to the broken and swampy ground and the barrage. All attempt at line was quickly abandoned, and the attack developed into an irregular mass of small columns. This however was quite effective owing to the aggressive spirit of the men, and good leadership on the part of junior officers and the N.C.O.'s.  
Reorganization was difficult and slow on the forward slope, and impossible in daylight.
4. Great difficulty appeared to be experienced in determining the actual line finally held, and reports were very contradictory and mostly wrong. Some special arrangements might be made beforehand for a special reconnaissance by expert officers to determine this point. This will be done in future by this Brigade.
5. Reports were again meagre, and all means for communication were not fully availed of. Visual was much better, and used more than last stunt, but there is still room for much improvement.
6. Reports on the condition of trenches etc. were proved to be misleading. The communication trench through the ridge was reported by an officer to be six feet deep; with the exception of a few yards it was only about four feet deep. It was also reported to be a good trench, whereas it was by no means such.

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7. S.O.S. The new arrangement providing for a time limit was, in my opinion, very successful, and must have saved thousands of rounds of ammunition. The S.O.S. was most widely used particularly on our left. On this Brigade front, 3 S.O.S. only were reported by our Observers. One of these only is acknowledged, and the Battalion in the line absolutely deny having fired the other two. I still do not think there was sufficient cause for firing the S.O.S.
8. The machine gun positions for the mobile guns were well selected, and no casualties to guns occurred. 5 out of the 8 barrage guns however were destroyed. The Brigade Staff made most careful reconnaissance of the area for positions for the Infantry, and the information thus gained has proved most valuable. This is of course at the disposal of the D.I.G.O., and might be of use to him, he not perhaps having the same opportunities for such.
9. The Hurricane Barrage put up by the Trench mortar Battery on machine gun positions at D.21.d.43.45 and 65.23, was most effective. It was laid down at ZERO plus 1, and ceased at ZERO plus 3. Later reconnaissance showed that the enemy crews had been killed by this barrage.
10. Specialists from the Camp at CALSTRE were used for fatigues, and as Stretcher Bearers. This I think is wrong, and is destructive of the principle on which the CALSTRE Camp is based.
11. There was a tendency to push beyond the BLUE Line simply to gain ground. In most cases this ground was of no tactical use, and the pushing forward left the line at a tactical disadvantage, inasmuch as a line nearer the crest was the better tactically, and the forward line only made communication and support more difficult, and placed more troops on the forward slope than was necessitated by the tactical situation, more or less at the mercy of enemy artillery and machine guns.
- I take it the duty of a Commander capturing a final objective is to select and consolidate the best tactical position in the vicinity of that line, and make it good. If there are tactical points in front, the possession of which is important, he should occupy them, but an advance beyond the best tactical position merely to gain ground of no tactical value, should be deprecated.

*Alan Watson*

Brig. General,  
Commanding 7th Australian Infantry Brigade

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APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
262/45
No.....
Date.....

October 16th 1917.

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 Machine Gun Company,  
 T.M. Battery.

The attached 2nd Army "FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS  
 OF 26th September and 4th October" are forwarded for your  
 information and distribution.

*7th*

*John* Major & Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECRET.

SECOND ARMY.  
**FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS,**  
 26th Sept. and 4th Oct., 1917.

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**Tactical.**

1. The increased use of the rifle has been a feature of the recent fighting.

So far as it has been possible to obtain an estimate, Battalions which had the most fighting used about 70 rounds per rifle and 25 magazines per Lewis Gun. In one Brigade Sector where 580 German dead were buried, it was noticed that most of them had been killed by rifle or Machine Gun fire.

2. Stokes Mortars pushed forward with the attack were found of value on at least two occasions when strong points had to be captured. On the two occasions referred to, bursts were obtained just outside the door of the dug-out and the inmates then surrendered. Direct hits on the dug-out itself had no effect.

3. The principle of allotting one Battalion in a Brigade to one objective and making this Unit responsible for clearing its own area and consolidating in depth was found to work well, as there was not the same risk of confusion arising as there is when more than one have to attack the same objective. Provided the width of front allotted to a Brigade is not too great, this plan appears to be most satisfactory.

**Equipment.**

1. Smoke Rifle Grenades were not extensively used. There is no doubt that they may be very useful, but it is essential that a certain number should be available for training men in their use while they are out of the line.

2. Very little use was found for Mills' Grenades except to bomb an occasional "pill box." One bomb per man would appear sufficient in the present form of fighting.

3. Hales rifle grenades were found very useful, especially where the enemy used machine gun fire from the roof of a dug-out or "pill box."

4. It is generally agreed that the new S.O.S. rifle grenade is the best thing of its kind that has been issued.

5. In some units as many as 220 rounds S.A.A. per man were carried in the attack. It is calculated that an extra 50 rounds per rifle are required and should be sent up early on the night of the Attack Day to forward dumps.

In addition, about 300 rounds per Stokes Mortar are required in forward dumps.

**Communications.**

1. Visual was largely used and the Lucas Lamp was very successful.

2. Lines were difficult to maintain, and the expenditure of cable was considerable.

3. Runner Routes were marked by flags at 100 yards interval but it was found that this distance was too great and the flags were knocked down. White tape was also used and found of great assistance. A combination of white tape and flags is suggested.

4. Relay posts were not always satisfactory owing to their being manned by men of different units. It might be preferable to make each unit responsible for manning relay posts in its own area and getting back all messages from the front through them.

5. Pigeons were very largely used and generally successful. The pigeon message map was found to be a considerable help.

**Artillery.**

1. One Brigade only, found the barrage rather too slow. It is sometimes difficult for the Infantry to know where the barrage is when the shrapnel is bursting high and there are few, if any, ground bursts.

2. The smoke barrage, to mark the objective, was most useful. It should be made slightly thicker and it is suggested that it might be possible to employ coloured smoke for the purpose.

**Approach March.**

In some formations where unexpected obstacles were met, there was a danger of troops not reaching their Assembly Positions in time. An average rate of even  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles per hour is only possible if the going is good. Wherever possible, duckboards should be covered with wire netting. Slippery duckboards are a hindrance more than a help.

**Assembly Positions.**

Where tapes are used to mark assembly positions, some mark should be put on the tapes to distinguish between the various lines, e.g. :—

- 1st Line—Attach small pieces of wood.
- 2nd Line—Attach wire rings.
- 3rd Line—Knots in the tape, etc., etc.

C. H. HARINGTON, *Major-General,*  
*General Staff, Second Army.*

12th October, 1917.



## APPENDIX.

1st ANZAC No: G.130/174.

SECRET.

2nd Army,

G.796

14th October, 1917.

Reference Second Army printed Notes on Operations,  
No. 3, 26th September to 4th October : -

Artillery.

The sentence; "It is sometimes difficult for the  
Infantry to know where the barrage is when the shrapnel is  
bursting high and there are few, if any, ground bursts",  
should be deleted.

This was a comment by one Brigade only and is in  
no way universal.

(Sgd.) C.H. HARRINGTON,  
M.G.G.S., Second Army.

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X101344

APPENDIX.

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Copy No. 4

Order No. 139.

October 24th 1917.

Reference maps - Sheet ~~28~~ 28, 1/10,000.  
28 N.E. 1/20,000

1. The 2nd Australian Division will relieve the 5th Australian Division in the right sector of the Corps front between 25th and 28th October 1917.  
The 7th A.I. Brigade (less 7th A.M.G. Coy) will relieve the 15th A.I. Brigade on the day 27th inst., and the night of 27/28th October.  
The 7th A.M.G. Coy will relieve the 15th A.M.G. Coy on the night 26/27th October.
2. (a) The relief and necessary moves will be carried out in accordance with the attached March Table and further orders to follow.  
(b) Maps showing disposition of Forward Brigade, and overland routes etc. have been issued.
3. Para 2 of 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 138 is cancelled, and the following substituted :-  
The 7th A.I. Brigade will be responsible for the defence of the front system including the defences on the eastern slope of the BROODSBLADE RIDGE, the RIDGE itself, and westwards to LONIC SPUR.  
The 5th A.I. Brigade will be in Support, and will be quartered at HALF AN HOUSE, and S. AN AREA, but will be prepared to move forward and occupy BISHOPK and ANZAC RIDGES in case of need.  
The 6th A.I. Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve in the DICKBUSCH AREA.
4. The Machine Gun Company will receive separate orders for the machine Gun defence.  
The 7th A.M.G. Coy will find :-  
(a) direct fire defence guns (eleven)  
(b) anti-aircraft guns for the front system (two)  
(c) machine Gun Coy reserve (three)  
  
There will also be an S.O.S. group posted under the orders of the D.M.G.C. but in direct touch with the Commander of the brigade in the line, and under his orders for S.O.S. work.  
The reserve machine Guns of the Company will remain at BELGIAN CHATEAU, which will be the D.M.G. Headquarters with the Machine Gun personnel, instead of going to the Reinforcement Camp.
5. Reference 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 138 -  
The 7th Field Company A.E. will be affiliated with 7th A.I. Brigade in the front system.
6. Subject to the terms of this order, the relief will be carried out by mutual arrangement between the Commanders concerned.

*al*

- 2 -

Until the Divisional relief is completed, troops on arrival in or forward of the DICKLUSCH AREA will come under the Command of the G.O.C. 5th Australian Division for tactical purposes.

7. Administrative orders will be issued separately.
8. Completion of relief will be reported by wire in code to Brigade H.Q. at J.l.d.3.2.
9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*H. Lee*

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade

Issued to Signals at 11 am

Copies to :-

1. 25th Bn.
2. 26th Bn.
3. 27th Bn.
4. 28th Bn.
5. 7th A.L.I.B.
6. 7th M.G. Coy.
7. 2nd Aust. Div "G"
8. " " " "Q"
9. 15th A.I. Bde.
10. 7th Field Coy A.I.
11. A.D.M.S.
12. 5th A.I. Bde
13. 6th A.I. Bde.
14. S.F.O.
15. G.O.C.
16. B.M.
17. S.O.
18. Area Commandant (STELWOUDE)
19. " " (SWAN AREA)
20. File
- 21 to 23 War Diary
- 24 to 26 Spare.

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

MARCH TABLE to accompany Brigade Order no. 159.

October 24th 1917.

Date	Unit	<del>From</del> From	To	Route	Remarks
1917. Oct. 25th.	7th A.M.G. Coy	STEENVOORDE	BELGIAN CHATEAU	-	By bus from STEENVOORDE SQUARE at 8 a.m. 25th inst.
" 26/27.	-do-	BELGIAN CHATEAU	FRONT LINE	ZONNEBEKE B. & Anzac duckwalks.	Come under command of G.O.C. 15th A.I.Bde until completion of Brigade Relief.
" 26th	7th A.I.Bde (less 7th A.M.G. Coy)	STEENVOORDE	SWAN AREA	-	By train from ABEELE to YPRES, thence by route march.
" 27th	27th Bn.	SWAN AREA	Right Support Battalion.	HELLES duckwalks.	To be completed in daylight.
" 27th	25th Bn.	" "	Left Support Battalion.	ZONNEBEKE - B. & Anzac duckwalks.	To be completed in daylight.
" 27/28	7th ALTMB.	" "	Front Line - - -	- - - do - - -	
" 27/28	28th Bn.	" "	Right Batta- lion Front Line	HELLES duck- walks.	
" 27/28	26th Bn.	" "	Left Battalion Front line.	ZONNEBEKE - B. & Anzac duckwalks	

Distances to be maintained between units when moving by road west of YPRES :-

800 yards between Battalions and other units.  
400 " " Transport, horsed units, and other troops.  
200 " " Companies.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 25th 1917.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS to accompany  
7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 139.

Ref. Sheet 27 & 28 1/40, 000.

5.30  
6.0.0

1. The Transport will move brigaded under the Command of Captain J.C. LITTLE, to pass Road Junction at R.33.d.50. by 11 a.m.  
On arrival in the new area, the transport lines will be situated near CAFÉ BELGE.  
There will be no baggage wagons from the train, but units' stores will be carried by motor transport. Probably two lorries per Battalion will be available.
2. K.I.S. There will be no dump in STEINVOORDE. Units will arrange to carry all stores, and these will be dumped under canvas in the vicinity of the transport lines.
3. When units embuss, they will carry packs, waterproof sheet, and two blankets in the busses. On arrival in the new area, packs and one blanket will be dumped at the Brigade Kit Store.
4. Advanced parties of 1 Officer and 2 N.C.O's will meet the Staff Captain at CAFÉ BELGE tomorrow 26th inst. at 10 a.m.
5. All area stores will be handed to Area Commandant tomorrow and receipts obtained. A copy of these receipts will be forwarded to Brigade H.Q. by 12 noon on 27th inst.
6. Billets must be left in a clean and sanitary condition. Certificates will be obtained that they are clean.  
Units should leave a small party under an officer, to clean up. These parties will then march to US AN AREA.  
Units will arrange for the officer left behind to ascertain whether there are any claims, and if so, to settle them if they are reasonable. The Interpreters will be available to assist units.

6.30  
6.30  
1.1.17

Captain, Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*Handwritten mark*

SECRET.

Copy No. 4

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 25th 1917.

ADDENDA 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 139.

Reference maps Sheet 27 & 28, 1/40,000.

1. The 7th A.I. Brigade (less 7th A.M.G. Coy) will move on the 26th inst. to SWAN AREA by bus, and not as stated in 7th A.I. Brigade Order No. 139.  
The 22nd A.M.G. Coy will move with the 7th A.I. Bde and proceed to BELGIAN CHATEAU and take over the S.O.S. barrage guns on the 27th inst.
2. The embussing point is on the CASSELL - ABELLE Road. Head of column K.34.c.9.4.  
Units will reach the embussing point at the following times :
 

23th Battalion	8.00 a.m.
25th "	8.20 a.m.
26th "	8.40 a.m.
27th "	9.00 a.m.
7th A.L.T.M.B.	9.20 a.m.
Brigade H.Q.	9.25 a.m.
22nd M.G. Coy	9.30 a.m.
3. Each unit will detail an officer to act as embussing officer, and to report to Captain A.V. GALLASCH at the embussing point at 7.45 a.m. tomorrow 26th inst. (7th A.L.T.M.Bty and Brigade H.Q. to send an N.O.).
4. The de-bussing point is H.30.d.5.3. facing South - Sheet 28.
5. Reference Administrative Instructions issued today.  
(a) The transport of the Brigade will pass the starting point at 7.30 a.m.  
(b) Advanced parties will meet the Staff Captain at 9 a.m. at CAMP BELGE, H.29.b.8.6. Sheet 28.
6. On arrival in SWAN AREA units will at once get in touch with units of the 15th A.I. Brigade whom they are relieving in the forward brigade area, and make arrangements for the relief on the following day.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*K Lee*  
Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 6.30 p.m.  
Distribution as for Bde Order 139,  
plus 22nd A.M.G. Coy.

*gr*

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APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
4/123
No.....
Date.....

October 27th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.

In future the work at present being done by 19th Bn. on Light Railway Construction will be carried out by a Battalion from the Brigade in reserve. One day will be allowed for the Battalion to bathe and rest after it comes out before going on to the work.

6th Bde will arrange to relieve the 19th Bn. on 29th inst., the relieving Bn. commencing work on morning of that day.

*Shed*  
*7th Bn.*

*ea*

*7*

*LeHannin*

Captain, Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
238/85	
No. ....	Date 27th 1918

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 27th 1918

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy  
T.M. Battery.

The following copy of letter from Corps is forwarded for information :-

" The following translation of a German document bearing no date nor origin, is forwarded for information :-

" STORAGE OF GAS TRENCH MORTAR BOMBS.

Fuse parts and bombs to be kept separate.  
Gas masks to be put on the moment a slight smell is noticed.

Damaged gas bombs - any brown liquid or greenish white salt deposit to be immediately covered with earth, or as case may be, bury deep in ground.  
Masks always to be worn.

Articles of equipment damaged by liquid from gas bombs are to be buried - in every case they are to be taken off at once.

Underlined as above in the original German manuscript copy:

NOTE. This may refer to the use of Yellow Cross (Mustard Gas) in German Gas Trench Mortar Bombs!

*A A B*

*Lee*

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde



## APPENDIX

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEHEADQUARTERS,  
7th AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No. 5/41

Date.....

October 27th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy  
T.M. Battery.

As the recaptured ground held by us at present was at one time fought over by French troops, it is possible that French soldiers graves may be discovered. If any such be discovered, will units please notify this office, who will forward the information to French Mission.

7  
Adjutant  
er

W. Hansen  
Captain, Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

SECRET.

APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 27th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.

HEADQUARTERS, 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
No. <u>267/2</u>
Date <u>26/10/17</u>

A patrol reports having reached the vicinity of Edge Copse, from which they were fired on. Between our posts and EDGE WOOD no enemy were encountered.

Another patrol moved out in the direction of JUSTICE WOOD, and found no enemy until approaching the WOOD. They were then fired on by a machine gun in the WOOD.

Patrols report no enemy in CELTIC WOOD. There are several pill boxes there, two of which are in good condition.

The enemy appears to have practically abandoned the low ground between our line and the KEIBERG DROOGENBROODHOEK RIDGE. This ground must be constantly patrolled and reconnoitred in view of an advance to the RIDGE which will be certain to take place when the line on our Left advances. The patrolling must be enterprising, and must have for its object in addition to reconnaissance of the ground, the determining of the enemy's advanced positions. To do this, patrols must gain touch with the enemy and endeavour to ascertain the strength of his posts.

In view of the nature of the S.O.S. barrage, the swampy nature of the low ground in front, and the consequent unlikelyhood of enemy attack across this ground, it is not considered advisable to make gaps in the barrage. Patrols will therefore ignore it altogether. In the unlikely event of the barrage coming down while they are out beyond it, they must lie "doggo" until an opportunity occurs for them to come in.

*[Signature]*  
Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

X

or

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

.....

G.323  
FOR OFFICIAL USE  
ONLY

Headquarters, 27th October 1917

SUMMARY OF SITUATION WIRES RECEIVED.26th October 1917.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 11.15 a.m. Situation at 9.30 a.m. appears to be as follows. 3rd Canadian Division left on RED dotted line V.23.d.2.4 but not in touch with 63rd Division. Centre on BELLEVUE SPUR. Right forced back to original line. 4th Canadian Division gained objectives and attempting to help right of 3rd Canadian Division forward. 1st Aust. Division captured DECLINE COPSE on right flank of 4th Canadian Division. Supports being sent up by 3rd Canadian Division to maintain centre on BELLEVUE SPUR. Opposition encountered from CREST FARM and pill box D.5.e.9.5. 5th Division attack on POLDERHOEK WOOD and CHATEAU appears to have been successful. Reports from Left Lde 7th Division towards GHELUVELT appear favourable but right Brigade held up about BERRY COTTIS and LEWIS HOUSE.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 12.25 p.m. Following from 5th Army timed 11.45 a.m. Situation report. 18th Corps reports VARLEY FARM and MORAY HOUSE captured. Our troops seen advancing on high ground near SOURCE TRENCH. 14th Corps reports contact aeroplane shows our troops on line V.14.b.4.5 to RUBENS FARM otherwise no progress made. Germans reported in unusual strength on whole front.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 1.20 p.m. No further reports from Canadian Corps front. On 10th Corps front 5th Division hold POLDERHOEK WOOD and CHATEAU. 7th Division were counter attacked near GHELUVELT and are back on original line with left flank advanced along railway in J.22.c and a. in touch with 5th Division.

FROM 1st ANZAC, timed 6.6 p.m. Evening report. Objectives consolidated. Enemy replied to right Division barrage by barraging front and support lines. Barrage then deepened and gradually decreased till situation became quiet 11.30 a.m. Shelling of Left Division Sector normal during day, but increased to heavy bombardment on forward area at 4 p.m. YPRES occas ionally shelled by heavy calibre H.V. gun. Total captures reported 72 prisoners, 4 Machine guns.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 6.55 p.m. Following wire from Adv.G.H.Q. timed 5 p.m. begins Situation report. Our troops have made no progress south of the MENIN ROAD, but north of that road we have captured POLDERHOEK WOOD and CHATEAU. North of the YPRES-ROULERS railway we have taken our final objectives south west of PASSCHENDALE on a front of 1,200 yards. Further north we have advanced our line on average distance of 500 yards on the whole front of attack except on the extreme left astride the YPRES-STADEN railway where no progress has been made. The heavy rain has made the ground almost impassable in many places. We have taken prisoners from 14 different German Regiments.

26th October 1917.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 7.15 p.m. Situation appears to be as follows. 3rd Canadian Division by successful operations this afternoon have captured LAAMKEEK DAD trench and BELLEVUE spur, and Canadian Corps line runs from about V.28.c.5.4 in touch with 63rd Division via D.4.b.5.9. Posts thence to D.4.d8.4 thence includes DAD TRENCH and LAAMKEEK to valley of RAVSBEEK. 4th Canadian Division from about D.11 central due east to D.12 central thence by D.12.c.5.5 to DECLINE COPSE D.18.a.4.6 with posts pushed out towards TIBER and TIBER COPSE. 1st Australian Division hold DECLINE COPSE. 5th Division situation is not clear. POLDERHOEK CHATEAU was captured this morning and many Officers and men taken out of it but it is not yet clear whether WARWICKS who took it were not driven out later when elements of BORDERS DEVONS and GORDONS were driven out of GHELUVELT. Situation of R.W.KENTS who made at flank on railway in J.22.a is also not clear. A little ground was made by the right brigade of 7th Division, but BERRY COTTS and LEWIS HOUSE are in enemy hands. Over 300 prisoners estimated so far.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 10.15 p.m. Canadian Corps report situation quite satisfactory. 4th Canadian Division have repulsed heavy counter attack successfully and have readjusted line across neck between D.11.central and D.12.c.5.8. with posts pushed out in front. 3rd Canadian Division also repulsed a heavy counter attack which left 60 more prisoners in their hands. There are no Germans west of the road from D.4.d.10.5 to V.28.c.9.2. Prisoners should be fully 500.

27th October 1917.

FROM 1st ANZAC, timed 6.24 a.m. Morning report. Right Division report situation unchanged. Intermittent shelling throughout area. Left Division report situation quiet in front area. Rear areas shelled at intervals. Situation on left still obscure. Canadians report reoccupation of DECLINE COPSE 8th Battalion A.I.F. report still hold by enemy. G.O.C 2nd A.I. Brigade gone forward to investigate.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 6.30 a.m. Morning report. Situation unchanged. Intermittent shelling in the neighbourhood of ZONNEBEKE, otherwise quiet night. Enemy holds POLDERHOEK CHATEAU. We successfully discharged gas opposite WARNETON last night.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 8.25 a.m. Following from Advanced G.H.Q. timed 10.30 p.m. Situation report. Heavy fighting has taken place during the day in GHELUVELT but our troops have been driven back from the village by hostile counter attacks. POLDERHOEK CHATEAU was captured this morning and many prisoners taken out of it, not clear whether our troops still hold it. The right Division of the Canadian Corps have established themselves on a line 1,000 yards south west of PASSCHENDAELE in front of their final objective. Our troops have also consolidated a line on the BELLEVUE SPUR 1,500 yards west of PASCHENDAELE. The First French Army have established themselves on the north side of the St.JANS BEEK east of the BIKSCHOOTE - DIXMUDE road. About 800 prisoners have been taken.

-3-

27th October 1917.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 8.50 a.m. Continuation of morning report.  
Canadian Corps improved their line further last night by establishing forward line in pill boxes along road from D.4.b.C.2 to cross roads at D.5.c.1.6 on BELLEVUE SPUR. 18 machine guns captured in this line of pill boxes.

FROM SECOND ARMY, timed 10.20 a.m. First French Army renewed attack this morning. Right Division has advanced its objectives. Left Division has passed its first objectives. Feeble hostile artillery retaliation. Objective lines not known here.

*H. L. M. Callaghan*  
Lieut.-Colonel  
General Staff  
Second Australian Division.

99

SECRET  
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APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Memorandum No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS	24
7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	217/14
Date	

October 27th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

Pending the issue of a Defence Scheme by the Division, the following general principles will be followed :-

(1) The line is to be held even if flanks are threatened. It must be remembered that troops in rear are ready to deal with such a situation, and that the task of such is made surer by front line units holding on.

(2) The policy is one of defence, but this must not be interpreted as purely passive. The enemy must be denied NO MANS LAND by vigorous and aggressive patrolling. He must be denied as far as possible, observation, by our sniping. He must be harassed by snipers, indirect machine gun fire, and by raids if he occupies posts of any importance.

(3) The problem is a modified Outpost scheme, and the principles appropriate to such will be applied as far as possible. Listening posts will be established at night in advance of the line of piquets (the present front line posts). The piquet line will be the line of resistance.

This system will give all the features necessary for the holding of the position, viz. a system of sentries, piquets, supports, and reserves.

Units should be disposed in depth, with supports and reserves, ready to reinforce or counter-attack.

The most probable direction of enemy attack is from PASSCHENDALLE, the boggy nature of the low ground on our direct front making an attack from that direction improbable.

The present positions of the troops have been selected mainly to avoid casualties. This of course is of great importance, but the tactical requirements must also be fulfilled.

A note on work to be undertaken will be issued later, after consultation with the Engineers. In the meantime, wiring should be completed, and the work of connecting up posts and making or improving communications with the rear, pushed on.

All work must be as inconspicuous as possible, and carried out free from enemy observation.

27 7

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

## APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 28th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy,  
T.M. Battery.

HEADQUARTERS,  
7th AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.


No. 217/16  
Date.

Each Battalion will forward to reach Brigade H.Q. by 10 a.m. on 31st inst. a map of the front system showing :- M.G. Coy & T.M. Bty to give co-ordinates instead of ~~map~~ map )

1. Existing trenches, works of defence, and wire entanglements in (a) the front line posts and the front line.  
(b) the support posts and M.G. positions.  
(c) the regimental reserve line on TOKIO SPUR.
2. Positions of H.Q. of Battalions and Companies in the <sup>Bde Sector</sup> ~~line~~ front, also M.G. Coy and L.T.M. Bty.
3. Communications, duckboard tracks and mule tracks.
4. Position of dumps.
5. Positions of R.A.P.'s.
6. (a) Dugout accommodation,  
(b) Shelter "

It is possible that some of this information was taken over on relief, but it is necessary that it should be checked and verified, and any new work added.

*Palmer*  
Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.



APPENDIX

BRIDGE

GOVERNMENT

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APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	217/15
Date	

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

H.Q.,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
M.G. Coy,  
T.M. Bty.

October 26th 1917.

Units will stand to at the following hours daily :-  
4.30 a.m. to 6.30 a.m.  
4.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m.

The practice of "Standing to" has evidently been misunderstood, or not carried out correctly in the past. Not only should every officer and other rank of the garrison be in the best position and be quite prepared to repel an enemy attack, but it also serves as a drill. At the same time it serves as a suitable occasion on which to have a complete roll call and inspection.

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*[Handwritten Signature]*

Major A/Brig de Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*[Handwritten Initials]*

HEADQUARTERS,  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Date. 26/10/17

SECRET7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEBrigade Memorandum No. 3.

October 26th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Battalions.

PATROLLING.

Last night's patrol reports seem to indicate a lack of definite object.

Patrols of 1 Officer and 5 o/ranks patrolled our front at a distance of about 500 yards.

In the first place, the strength of the patrol would appear inadequate, especially if, as will be the case, patrols have to go out for considerable distances. There is a danger of the patrol being cut off and mopped up - a favourite trick of the Hun. These patrols should be strong enough to put up a fight if attacked. 20 to 25 o/ranks would be necessary. In such cases they should consist of expert scouts, three or four flankers, connecting files, and a supporting body in rear. A Lewis gun has been found useful with the supporting body.

The patrol should be set a definite task or tasks. Specific questions should be set, the answers to which the patrol has to find. For example :-

"A patrol of ----- will move out from ----- at ----- p.m. and will proceed as far as the X Roads at D.30.d. to examine CELTIC WOOD and JUSTICE WOOD & DAME WOOD. The following information is specially required :

- (1) Are the above localities occupied by the enemy.
- (2) If so, what is the estimated strength.
- (3) What is the nature of the intervening country
- (4) Are there any obstacles to an Infantry advance - if so, what is their nature.

The patrol will return by ----- a.m. "

*John Harrison Capt*  
Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

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7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

No. 1.

October 28th 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE from 4 p.m. 27/10/17 to 6 a.m. 28/10/17.

Reference Map Sheet 28.

1. OPERATIONS. The 7th A.I. Brigade successfully relieved the 15th A.I. Brigade in the forward area by 8.45 p.m.

PATROLS. (a) At 11 p.m. a patrol of 1 Officer and 5 o/ranks went out from D.29.b.25.25. and made their way to D.29.b.55.25, thence to N.W. corner of CELTIC WOOD, returning to D.29.d.30.35 at 12.30 a.m. Nothing was seen or heard of the enemy.

(b) Two patrols each of 1 Officer and 5 o/ranks patrolled our front to a depth of 500 yards between 1 a.m. and 3 a.m. No enemy patrol was encountered. Flares were fired by the enemy laterally from approx. 800 yards in front of our line.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.

3. ENEMY SHELLING. Normal throughout the period. BR OODSEINDE ridge and its rear slopes were intermittently shelled throughout the night. From 9.50 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. enemy shelled our Supports and WESHOEK RIDGE with .77's and 4.2's, with a few gas shells mixed, from direction of DROOGENBROODHOEK. REMUS WOOD was occasionally searched with .77 c.m. shrapnel.

4. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Quiet. No patrols encountered, nor has any movement been seen.

5. ENEMY DEFENCES. Machine guns fired at intervals from CEMETERY WOOD (J.6.a.8.5. approx)  
Sniping - nil.

6. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY. At 6.15 p.m. four enemy planes flew over our Support lines for a short time, returning to their own lines. At 2 a.m. four planes passed overhead going East. At 5.30 a.m. enemy balloon up to N.N.E.

7. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Nil.  
behind lines.

8. MISCELLANEOUS. Fire observed in direction of DROOGENBROODHOEK. A number of enemy searchlights active behind his lines. Condition of ground 400 yards in front of our line is fairly good. CELTIC WOOD and CEMETERY WOOD appear to be wet and very boggy.

*J. B. Ormer*

Captain, for G.O.C.,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX.

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS,
7th AUSTRALIAN
INFANTRY BRIGADE.
262/44
.....
Date.....

October 28th 1917.

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 M/G Coy  
 T.M.Bty

Herewith one copy of "Further Notes on Operations"  
 issued by 2nd Army.

*n*

*Ed*

*W. Lee*

Major, Brigade Major  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

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No. 5. Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECRET.

## Second Army.

### FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS.

#### 1. Pace of Barrage.

Where the going is heavy, as has been the case of late, a rate of 100<sup>x</sup> in 8 minutes has been found about correct.

#### 2. Use of Grenades, etc.

Hand and rifle grenades have on the whole taken a minor place in the operations, but whenever resistance on the part of the enemy was determined they were immediately required. Rifle grenades have been especially useful where a flank becomes exposed, in clearing snipers from shell holes, etc.

Another instance is quoted of where they were used to prevent the enemy from digging in near the line on which our troops were consolidating.

The value of the No. 27 Grenade has been further proved for masking the advance of troops on a strong point.

#### 3. Supplies of S.A.A., Grenades, etc.

(a) Instances of a shortage of S.A.A. occurred, but this was sometimes due to uneven distribution, and a suggestion is made that coloured or marked sandbags containing 250 rounds each should be used.

(b) The value of keeping forward dumps of S.A.A. and grenades away from other dumps was amply demonstrated. Large dumps or ones which were constantly used were eventually spotted and shelled, and the ammunition, etc., lost.

#### 4. Machine Guns.

Further stress is laid on the necessity of providing some cover for belt filling.

Over heavy ground, in order to lighten the carrying, ammunition boxes were opened and the contents carried forward in bandoliers.

#### 5. Snipers.

Evidence shows that more use might be made of snipers with telescopic sights. Many opportunities presented themselves and might have been taken advantage of by men well placed on commanding ground, in positions which can be selected beforehand.

#### 6. Communications.

The positions of all H.Q. must be fixed as early as possible in order to permit of the best arrangements for communication being made, and once fixed they should not be moved without very good reason.

In all cases where the positions of the stations admit of it, communication should be opened at least on the day previous to the attack, if not sooner.

During recent operations runners were found to be practically the only means of communication in front of Advanced Brigade H.Q.

The clear marking of all H.Q. and routes for runners still require more attention.

#### 7. Roads and Tracks.

Permanent maintenance parties are required for duck board tracks in forward areas. Unless they are in good repair they seriously hamper movement in the dark.

Very careful arrangements, supervised by Officers and N.C.Os. capable of enforcing their orders, are required for traffic control.

Boarded tracks and roads should have a riband on the outer edge to prevent men and vehicles slipping off into the deep mud.

Mule tracks must be separate from foot tracks. Duck boards are frequently damaged by the passage of pack animals alongside them.

#### 8. Date of Assembly.

In cases where the approach to the assembly position is liable to become excessively difficult in the event of bad weather, it would seem advisable to reduce the number of troops to be moved up on the last night to the lowest number possible by taking over the trenches on the previous night and closing up the remainder of the assaulting Brigades into whatever cover is available.

20th October, 1917.

C. H. HARINGTON, Major-General,  
General Staff, Second Army.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.From 6 a.m. 27th to 6 a.m. 28th October 1917.NOTE. Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Heavy bursts of fire were opened according to programme on enemy tracks and known centres of activity between 8.45 p.m. and 8.51 p.m., and between 9.10 p.m. and 9.16 p.m.

Our artillery co-operated in an Army barrage at 8.50 a.m. (28th inst)

Throughout the 24 hours the usual harassing fire was maintained on enemy tracks, roads and activity centres.

Patrols. At 11 p.m. a patrol consisting of 1 officer and 3 other ranks left our line at D.29.b.25.25, and moved out to FLINTE FM (D.29.b.58.28), and thence southwards to the N.W. corner of CELTIC WOOD (D.29.d.7.6), returning to our lines at D.29.d.30.35. at 12.40 a.m. Nothing was seen of the enemy.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

Was fairly quiet throughout the 24 hours, except for the period from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m., when battery positions in J.8.b. and c were heavily shelled.

Between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. 77 mm mustard gas shells were fired into the valley between WESTHOEK and ANZAC Ridges. At the same time the two Ridges were shelled by 15 cm and 10.5 cm from the direction of WATERDAMHOEK and MOORSLEDE.

Gun flashes were observed during the afternoon as follows -

From.	Time.	Bearing	Remarks.
O.P. at J.8.b.61.85.	12.45 p.m.	91°	15 cm How.
O.P. at J.8.c.75.93.	1.0 p.m.	93°	Bty 15 cm How.
O.P. at J.8.c.75.93.	3.15 p.m.	90°-95°	{ 1 sec 15 cm How 1 Bty 10.5. do 1 gun 10.5 cm.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

A hostile machine gun has been reported active from CEMETERY WOOD (J.6.a.8.5.)

ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Enemy aircraft were active during the day, and the earlier part of the night flying over our forward area and over YPRES.

At 10 a.m. a large formation of I.A. flew over our lines at an altitude of about 5,000 feet towards YPRES, but were driven back by our A.A. and M.G. fire.

MISCELLANEOUS.

At 3 a.m. a large fire was observed in the direction of DROOGENBROODHOEK.

Throughout the night enemy searchlights were active.

Flares. During the night the enemy fired a number of flares from several points along a line about 800 yards east of our front line. These flares were fired, not out over No Man's Land, but in northerly and southerly direction.

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADEBrigade Memorandum No. 4.

October 28th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

With reference to the action of units in the event of an attack by the enemy while the front line should be held as lightly as possible so as to minimise losses, there should be sufficient strength to hold the line, taking into consideration

- (a) The strength of our S.O.S. barrage,
- (b) The condition of the ground over which the enemy attack must ~~must~~ be made,
- (c) The strength of our own position, natural and artificial.
- (d) The morale and apparent policy of the enemy

Reinforcement of the front line should be very rare. Should our front line be penetrated, supporting troops must hold the enemy in check by fire and local attacks, until reserves are available for counter-attack.

An attack directly on our front is very unlikely. Raids however are quite probable. Such raids can be defeated with certainty if proper vigilance is exercised. To this end we must dominate NO MANS LAND by patrols, and ensure sufficient warning being given by listening posts.

If the enemy attacks it will most probably be with the object of pushing our troops off the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, and the attack would be made on the troops on our left. In the event of such an attack, all units will "stand to" Supports and Reserves will be ready to move at once.

In the event of the attack succeeding in breaking our line on the ridge, the following action will be taken :-

(a) The 2 Support Companies of the Left front Battalion will occupy the high ground approximately on the line of the Road through D.23.d., 23.c.

(b) The Left Support Battalion will move to the vicinity of BROODSBIJDE GRANTARY, where it will deploy and attack through the 2 Companies of the Left front Battalion along the Ridge and restore the line.


The above units will act on the initiative of the senior officer of the unit on the spot if telephone communication with Brigade is cut.

(c) The Right Support Battalion will move in rear of the Left Support Battalion to RETALIATION FARM, where the C.O. will get into communication through the Forward Brigade Station, with Sde H.Q. He will keep in close liaison with the Left Support Battalion, and should the situation demand, and telephone communication is broken, he will assist that Battalion in its counter-attack, notifying Sde H.Q. of his action.

The C.O., 7th A.M.G. Coy will proceed with all reserve guns and dispose same for the defence of the line occupied by the 2 Supporting Companies of the Left Front Battalion.

The C.O. 7th A.L.T.M. Bty will dispose all available guns so as to put down a barrage in front of the position occupied by the 2 Supporting Companies of the Left Front Battalion.

The next most probable line of enemy attack is from the direction of GHELVELDT. This is not likely, but in such a case units will "stand to" and the Right Front and Support Bns will be prepared to form a defensive flank on the line approximately of the Road along North Edge of POLYSON WOOD - J.5 central. The Left Support Bn. will remain in Reserve.

  
Major, 1/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade

HEADQUARTERS  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE  
No. *500/34*  
Date

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

SECRET

Brigade Memorandum No. 3.

October 28th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
I.M. Battery.

The Brigade in the line is responsible for the anti-aircraft defence of the area from the front line to, and including TOKIO SPUR.

The 7th A.M.G. Coy, i.e. the Machine Gun Company in the line at present, will provide two anti-aircraft guns as follows :

- 1 Vickers gun at J.4.b.6.7. *to be notified later*
- 1 " " at D.39.c.9.3.

Anti-aircraft defence for artillery is provided for under Corps arrangements.

- J.3.c. group 2 Lewis Guns 1st Anzac Cyclist Bn.
- J.3.b. " 2 " " " " " "

These four Lewis guns are attached to the Forward Brigade for administrative purposes and discipline, but will be under the command of the D.M.G.O.

Each Battalion will be responsible for the defence of its sector against enemy aircraft. Lewis Guns will be posted and reliefs arranged. All such detachments will be provided with written instructions regarding their duties.

Brigade H.Q. will be informed of the number of guns and location of positions by 8 a.m. 29th inst.

Positions will not be chosen forward of the crest of the BROODSIDE RIDGE. *guns were scattered but not to such an extent that they cannot be readily collected*

RIGHT LINE BATTALION : back to, and including road from J.4.d.8.8. to D.28.c.3.0.

LEFT LINE BATTALION : back to and including road from D.28.c.3.0. to D.28.a.0.2.

RIGHT SUPPORT BATTALION : back to and including road from J.8.d.8.8. to J.3.b.3.4.

LEFT SUPPORT BATTALION : back to and including road from J.3.b.3.4. to J.2.c.9.0.

The C.O., 7th A.M.T.M. Battery will utilize his guns for anti-aircraft defence. Positions chosen and the number of guns will be forwarded to Brigade H.Q. by 8 a.m. 29th inst.

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

*Shee*

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.



APPENDIX.

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7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	215/12
Date	

October 29th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Company,  
T.M. Battery.

On the night 31st October/1st November, the following will take place :-

- 25th Battalion will relieve ~~26th~~ - 26th Battalion, commencing 6.30 p.m.
  - 27th Battalion will relieve 28th Battalion, commencing 9.30 p.m.
- Necessary reconnaissances will be made, and details of relief arranged mutually between C.O's concerned.

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*Relee* Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

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7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 29th 1917.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy,  
T.M. Battery.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	17/49
Date	

SALVAGE

There is a good deal of material to be salvaged in this sector.

Units will make a special effort to get as much of this material salvaged, as possible. For this purpose the following areas are allotted :-

RIGHT & LEFT Battalions in the line from North and South boundaries back to a line along road from BRICK KILNS, D.28.a.2.8. to J.4.d.8.7.

SUPPORT BATTALIONS will clear the area back to road from ANZAC to POLYGONVELD.

Salvage from the area will be dumped at GARTER POINT and carried back by returning pack animals to a location to be notified later.

Units will render a statement daily by 10 a.m. as to the amount of material collected.

*W.H. Hanson*  
Captain, Staff Captain,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde.

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4th Co. Camp  
Lest. Aug. 13 14  
Daily 6 1/2

APPENDIX

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7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
M. Gun Coy,  
T.M. Bty.

October 29th 1917.

The following copy of letter from 2nd Brigade R.F.C. is forwarded for information :-

" O.C. 2nd Wing will detail two R.E.8's from each Corps Squadron to patrol their respective Corps front line at a low altitude from dusk to dark every day, weather permitting.

O.C., XI Wing will advance the starting hour of his first patrols (North and South) so as to enable pilots to reach our front line at dawn, or as soon after as the type of machine used permits. Our front line will be patrolled at a low altitude until it is fully light. Patrols will then proceed to a rendezvous well within our lines, gain a sufficient height, and continue their normal patrol.

The last patrols of the day will gradually descend and close on our front line as light fails. They will quit the line in sufficient time to land by daylight.

Duties of all the above are -

- (a) To attack any E.A. approaching our lines at a low altitude.
- (b) To attack with M.G. fire and bombs (R.E.8's only to carry bombs) the enemy front line garrison"

*R. Lee*

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

## APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS,  
7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 29th 1917.

Headquarters,  
28th Battalion.

The C.O. Right Front Battalion will, in addition to any other patrols he may arrange for, send out a patrol to the X Roads at D.30.d., and if reached, occupy it with a standing patrol, which will be withdrawn at dawn and posted at dusk daily.

CELTIC WOOD and JUSTICE WOOD will be reconnoitred.

The following information is specially required :-

- (1) Are CELTIC & JUSTICE WOODS, and X ROADS D.30.d. occupied by the enemy.
- (2) If so, in what strength.

It is considered that the enemy has only sentry groups West of the HENTEBECK. There might however be a piquet at the X Roads.

*P. Lee*  
Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde.

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HEADQUARTERS, 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	275/13
Date	

Copy No. 4

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 29th 1917.

map ref. SECLAN Sheet 1/10,000.  
Sheet 28 N.W. 1/20,000

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTIONS - RELIEFS.

1. The 22nd A.M.G. Coy will relieve the 7th A.M.G. Coy in the line on the night of 30/31st October; relief to commence as soon as dark enough to conceal movement.
2. The 4 guns etc. of the 7th Coy at present in use with 22nd Coy will be taken over and manned by the 5th Coy.
3. On completion of reliefs the 7th A.M.G. Coy will return to their rear Coy H.Q. and remain in Reserve.
4. Subject to the terms of these instructions the reliefs will be carried out by mutual arrangement between Company Commanders concerned.
5. Completion of reliefs will be reported to Brigade H.Q. in code.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*J. Lee*

Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 9.15 p.m.

Copies to :

- |                   |                   |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1. 25th Bn.       | } for information |
| 2. 26th Bn.       |                   |
| 3. 27th Bn.       |                   |
| 4. 28th Bn.       |                   |
| 5. 7th M/G Coy    |                   |
| 6. 7th A.L.T.M.B. |                   |
| 7. 22nd M.G. Coy  |                   |
| 8. 2nd Aust. Div. |                   |
| 9. 62nd Bde       |                   |
| 10. 2nd A.I. Bde  |                   |

CONFIDENTIAL

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

No. 2.

October 29th 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE from 6 a.m. 28/10/17 to 6 a.m. 29/10/17.  
reference map Sheet 29.

## 1. OPERATIONS.

Our patrols were active during the night.

(a)

A patrol of 1 Officer and 8 o/ranks went out from our lines at 9.30 p.m. at point D.29.d.25.25, working in direction of D.30 central. On reaching point D.30.c.25.80 approx. an enemy sniper opened fire from direction of D.30 central. A number of white flares were fired from eastern edge of CELTIC WOOD, and a machine gun opened up from approx. D.30.c.50.65, without causing casualties.

The ground in this neighbourhood is badly churned up and the shell holes full of water, the condition getting worse on moving East.

(b)

A patrol of 1 Officer and 8 o/ranks moved out from J.5.b.30.75 working towards JUSTICE WOOD. The WOOD was not penetrated, but no movement was observed in the vicinity.

(c)

A party of 1 Officer and 12 o/ranks left our lines in the vicinity of FLINT COPSE at 10 p.m. and returned at 2 a.m. Broken trenches were passed about 20 yards North of FLINT COPSE in a very broken and boggy condition, and showed no sign of recent occupation. No wire was seen in the vicinity. Continuing approx. East through ANVIL WOOD and then to the road at D.30.a.8.8. still no signs of wire or occupation were seen, and the party was prevented from reconnoitring further owing to our artillery activity. The boggy nature of the country in the valley would make it almost impossible to keep troops there.

(d)

Another patrol of 1 Officer and 12 o/ranks left D.29.a.9.3. and patrolled to a depth of 800 yards. All pill boxes in this vicinity were entered and found to be unoccupied. The party then reconnoitred TABLE WOOD and found same unoccupied. Searching as far as D.24.c.8.7. our artillery prevented further progress.

(e)

A standing patrol of 1 N.C.O., 6 men and a Lewis Gun was established at approx. D.24.c.central at 11 p.m. and returned at 4.45 a.m. A machine gun was in action well behind TABLE WOOD and flares were fired from this locality.

## 2. ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Desultory shelling was maintained over practically the whole of our area throughout the day and night, consisting of 5.9's, 4.2's and .77 H.E. and shrapnel, with a considerable quantity of mustard and lachrymatory <sup>7's</sup>. The shelling is most intense when his balloons are up & almost any movement draws fire, particularly around GARTER POINT and WESTHOEK RIDGE. Full details of the day's shelling are attached.

## 3. ENEMY ATTITUDE.

Except for his artillery activity, the enemy appears to be adopting purely defensive tactics, sniping and machine gun activity being at a minimum.

## 4. ENEMY DEFENCES.

See patrol report. No new defences have been discovered from ground observation.

- 2 -

5. AIRCRAFT. Extremely active on both sides. During the morning flights of enemy aircraft were observed to drop from the low lying clouds, fly around at a low altitude, and disappear. Although there was considerable fighting in the air, no planes were seen to be brought down.  
Eleven enemy balloons were observed during the day.
6. MOVEMENT. The smoke from a train is constantly seen behind the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, and a bearing will be taken on the place.
7. FLARES. Red flares were used freely during the night, and were usually followed by a few rounds of H.E. on our front line area.  
Yellow clusters are usually sent up when our artillery becomes active.
8. MISCELLANEOUS. Fires caused by our artillery were observed at approx. D.30, K.1, and E.19.  
The ground is rapidly drying, but shell holes are still full of water.  
Enfilade fire from 5.9 battery constantly came from 48° T.B. from J.4.b.88.60.
9. WORKS. The duckboarding, wiring, and connecting up of front line posts is well in hand, material having been taken up and work proceeded with during the night.  
A line of posts each capable of holding one platoon has been dug from D.23.c.8.5. to D.23.c.0.6. forming a defensive flank.

*G. Barry*  
Lieut., For G.O.C.,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.



*Handwritten signature*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No 14.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 28th to 6 a.m. 29th October 1917.

NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Our artillery, according to programme, put down two bursts of fire in depth 1,000 yards east of S.O.S. line, and co-operated in an Army barrage at 5.15 a.m. this morning.

Intermittent searching and sweeping fire was maintained on tracks, communications, and centres of known hostile activity on the Divisional front.

A suspected enemy M.G. post at  $\left. \begin{array}{l} D.24.c.9.9. \text{ and } 9.1., \\ D.24.b.8.4. \text{ and} \\ \text{enemy posts at} \end{array} \right\}$  were shelled.

Patrols.

(a) A patrol of 1 officer and 8 other ranks went out from our lines at 9.30 p.m. at point D.29.d.25.26, working in direction of D.30.central. On reaching point D.30.c.25.80 approx. an enemy sniper opened fire from direction of D.30.central. A number of white flares were fired from eastern edge of CELTIC WOOD, and a machine gun opened up from approx D.30.c.50.65, without causing casualties. The ground in this neighbourhood is badly churned up and the shell holes full of water, the condition getting worse on moving east.

(b) A patrol of 1 officer and 8 o/ranks moved out from J.5.b.30.75 working towards JUSTICE WOOD. The WOOD was not penetrated, but no movement was observed in the vicinity.

(c) A party of 1 officer and 12 o/ranks left our lines in the vicinity of FLINT COPSE at 10 p.m. and returned at 2 a.m. Broken trenches were passed about 20 yards north of FLINT COPSE in a very boggy condition, and showed no sign of recent occupation. No wire was seen in the vicinity. Continuing approx East through ANVIL WOOD and then to the road at D.30.a.8.8. still no signs of wire or occupation were seen, and the party was prevented from reconnoitring further owing to our artillery activity. The boggy nature of the country in the valley would make it almost impossible to keep troops there.

(d) Another patrol of 1 officer and 12 o/ranks left ~~D.29.e.9.3. a~~ and patrolled D.30.a. ~~to~~. <sup>52</sup> All pill boxes in this vicinity were entered and found to be unoccupied. The party then reconnoitred TABLE WOOD and found same unoccupied. Searching as far as D.24.c. 8.7. our artillery prevented further progress. *D.23 d. 05 40*

(e) A standing patrol of 1 N.C.O., 6 men, and a Lewis gun was established at approx D.24.c. central at 11 p.m. and returned at 4.15 a.m. A machine gun was in action well behind TABLE WOOD and flares were fired from this locality.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

WESTHOEK and ANZAC RIDGES and VALLEY between intermittently shelled by 5.9's and 4.2" Hows. from direction of POTTER (JEBURG and WATERDAMHOEK, and roads and tracks in the forward area searched intermittently by 5.9" Hows. from direction WATERDAMHOEK. Between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m., J.17. was heavily shelled by 5.9" Hows. from direction 100-120° from J.17. central. Some high bursts of shrapnel were also put over that area.

Between 1.45 and 5 p.m. J.8.c. was shelled by 5.9" How. from 37° 50' T.B. from J.8.c. 7.9.

Between 10.40 p.m. and 1.30 a.m. WESTHOEK RIDGE and valley in J.8.a. and b received intense bombardment of 4.2" Hows (Gas shells, mustard.) Otherwise only intermittent light shelling during the period.

-2-

HOSTILE ARTILLERY ( Continued)

Gun flashes were observed as follows : -

<u>FROM.</u>	<u>TIME.</u>	<u>TRUE BEARING.</u>	<u>REMARKS.</u>
D.29.a.35.30.	11.30 a.m.	83°	
D.29.c.60.58.	3.0 p.m.	80°	15 cm. gun.
D.29.c.60.58.	5.20 p.m.	52° 30'	10.5 cm.
J.4.b.88.60.	Intervals during day.	48°	15 cm. How.Battery.

ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

At 8.30 a.m. 8 enemy planes were active flying over our front line system. They were engaged by Machine Gun fire from the ground and flew back over their own lines on the approach of several of our scouts.

At 10.45 a.m. 10 enemy planes flew at a low altitude over area I.17. This area was later on heavily shelled.

MOVEMENT.

No movement was observed in enemy's lines on account of the haze which made observation difficult.

FLARES. During the night the enemy sent up a large number of single red flares. These were usually followed by a few rounds of H.E. on our front line system.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Enemy balloons were observed as follows:-

<u>FROM.</u>	<u>TIME.</u>	<u>TRUE BEARING.</u>
D.29.a.35.30.	5.30.a.m.	92°
do	6.30.a.m.	92°. 114°. 44°. 66°. 63°.
do	3.40.a.m.	47°.

At 9.25.p.m. a large enemy dump was set on fire in MOORSLEDE. During the night fires were seen in K.1. and E.19.

*J. L. M. Tall*  
 Lieut Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 2nd Australian Division.

ANNEXE follows.

SECRET

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Copy No. 4

Order No. 140.

Reference Map BECELAERE 1/10,000.      October 30th 1917.

1.            The following inter-battalion reliefs will take place on the 31st October/1st November.
2.            The 27th Battalion will relieve the 28th Battalion in the front line (Right Sub-sector), commencing at 9.30 p.m.  
  
              The 25th Battalion will relieve the 26th Battalion in the front line (Left Sub-sector) commencing at 6.30 p.m.
3.            All maps, air photographs, trench stores etc. will be taken over.
4.            Works policy and system of patrolling will be carried on by the incoming units.
5.            Subject to the terms of this Order, details of relief will be arranged mutually between Commanding Officers concerned.
6.            Completion of relief will be reported to Brigade H.Q. by Code.
7.            ACKNOWLEDGE.

*J. E. Lee*  
Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Issued to Signals at 9.15 p.m.

## Copies to :

1. 25th Bn.
2. 26th Bn.
3. 27th Bn.
4. 28th Bn.
5. F.M. Bty
6. 22nd M.G. Coy
7. 2nd Aust. Div.      "G"
8.    "        "        "      "Q"
9. 5th A.V. Bde
10. 6th A.I. Bde
11. 3rd A.I. Bde
12. 62nd Bde.
13. 5th A.M.G. Coy
14. B.M.
15. to 17 War Diary
18. File.
- 19/20 Spare.

*Blk*

No. 3.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 30th 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE from 6 a.m. 29/10/17 to 6 a.m. 30/10/17.

I. OPERATIONS.

(a) PATROLS. A party of 1 Officer and 20 o/ranks with Lewis Gun left our lines at 10 p.m. from J.5.b.30.75, and proceeded along road to junction at D.30.c.05.30, where it split into two sections and thoroughly searched CELTIC WOOD. No enemy were encountered or hostile movement observed until parties emerged from the N.E. corner of the WOOD, when a Machine Gun opened fire from about D.30.c.80.80. Flares were fired from about D.30.c.80.90. Pill boxes and huts in the WOOD were examined and found to be badly smashed and uninhabitable.

The ground in the valley running through D.29.b. and D.30.c. is slightly boggy but not impassable.

Patrol then moved east along the road as far as D.30.c.7.4., then turned South and moved into JUSTICE WOOD. Enemy were found in strength along Eastern edge of WOOD, notably from D.30.d.14.10 to J.6.b.25.90.

Main road to KEIBERG is in good condition, and the ground passable. Pill boxes were discovered in good condition as follows :

- 1 at D.29.f.7.4.
- 3 at D.30.c.8.7.

(b) A party of 1 Officer and 9 o/ranks proceeded from D.29.b.25.05 at 10 p.m. and moved in a N.E. direction for 500 yards, then South towards CELTIC WOOD and S.E. corner of D.29.b. No enemy were encountered and nothing of interest observed.

The ground passed over was extremely swampy and a large area is impassable.

(c) Another patrol of 1 Officer and 22 o/ranks with Lewis Gun started from D.29.a.9.8. at 9.30 p.m. and moved E. and N.E. in tactical formation until CHINA WOOD was reached. This was searched and nothing discovered but a quantity of trip wire. The ground was very wet but passable.

The party then moved towards ANVIL WOOD, and on approaching this they were fired on by machine gun from approximately D.30.a.9.8. Flares bursting into two reds were fired from this place, which brought a light artillery barrage down between our line and CHINA WOOD. Flares were fired for some time and the machine gun continued firing.

A machine gun and flares then opened up from the rear of TABLE WOOD.

Owing to machine gun activity and the extremely bright night, it was considered inadvisable to go further, so after engaging the enemy with Lewis gun, the party withdrew.

The ground North of CHINA WOOD is rapidly drying up and is passable for troops.

(d) 1 Officer and 20 men with Lewis Gun left our Left flank to examine BUSY WOOD and TABLE WOOD and to establish a standing patrol at D.24.d.2.7.

moving along the DREGENBROODHOEK road until the

the/

edge of TABLE WOOD was reached. Machine Guns then opened fire from approx. D.24.c.75.60 - D.24.a.5.1. - D.24.c.f.9.

Golden flares bursting into two reds were fired from these places, which brought an artillery barrage on the line BUSI WOOD - along MILITARY Road - and back towards CHINA WOOD.

Three of the enemy were observed moving in vicinity of M.G. at D.24.c.75.60, who disappeared as soon as our patrol was discovered.

The standing patrol was eventually posted at D.24.c.2.6. and withdrew at 4 a.m.

The following information was elicited - TABLE WOOD is occupied by enemy. BUSI WOOD was shelled by enemy - therefore is unoccupied.

Roads passed are in good condition.

2. HOSTILE SHELLING.

A general decrease during the day. Towards dusk our duckboards, GARTER POINT, WESTHOEK RIDGE were fairly heavily bombarded with 5.9's .15 cm and a liberal quantity of gas shells.

Details of shelling are attached.

3. ENEMY AT ITUDE.

Less aggressive than usual. Machine guns and sniping at a minimum. See patrol reports.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES.

See patrol reports. At intervals bursts of indirect fire came from direction of CEMETER. Rd.

5. AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Great activity was observed throughout the day on both sides. Hun planes constantly flew over our forward area at very low altitude, dropping light bombs and firing on our troops with M.G.'s, but were quickly driven off by our A.A. M.Guns. Towards dusk the activity increased until 24 enemy planes were over our lines at once, and although numerous duels took place, no planes were driven down.

6. BALLOONS.

Five enemy balloons were seen at intervals during the day.

7. MOVEMENT.

Observation post is suspected in tree at E.19.c.8.

8. MISCELLANEOUS.

Battery flashes were seen from O.P. at J.4.b.88.60 as follows :- 31° True, 97° True, 99° True 108° True.

Our Stokes Mortars were busy engaging hostile planes, and it is anticipated that with practice, good results will be obtained.

*J. H. H. H.*  
Lieut., for G.O.C.,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

APPENDUM.

WORKS. Front line posts are being duckboarded, wired, and connected up. This work will be completed as soon as the necessary material is available.

Duckboards between WESTHOEK RIDGE and the front line have been repaired.

*Heard*

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS  
 7th AUSTRALIAN  
 INFANTRY BRIGADE.

No. 39  
 Date. 27

October 30th 1917.

Headquarters,  
 26th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 Machine Gun Company,  
 T.A.Sty.

The following stores are available in this area  
 at present :-

On Sleeper Road where duckwalk (new) crosses, approx. J.7.b.2.3.

Barbed Wire	35 coils
Corkscrews (long)	25
" (short)	10
French Wire	10 coils

At approx. J.7.b.4.3. where Light Rly crosses :

Barbed wire	40 coils.
-------------	-----------

At J.7.b.5.4.

Barbed wire	46 coils.
Corkscrews (long)	10 bundles.

At J.7.b.7.4. near WESTHOEK.

Barbed wire	24 coils.
Corkscrews (long)	14 bundles
" (short)	10 "
French wire	10 "

At J.7.b.8.4.

Barbed wire	30 coils.
-------------	-----------

At HANNABEKE Dump J.2.b.5.1.

Barbed wire	68 coils.
Corkscrews (long)	20
French wire	(50) coils

At CABLE HEAD Dump J.3.b.3.2.

Screw pickets medium, 37.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
 Captain, Staff Captain,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No. 15.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.From 6 a.m. 29th to 6 a.m. 30th October 1917.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Harassing fire was maintained upon enemy communications and occupied localities, particular attention being paid during the day to reported enemy posts, and during the night to the MOORSLEDE - BROODSEINDE and the KEIBERG - DAME HOUSE roads.

Minor bombardments were carried out on posts D.50.c.3.8, D.24.c.8.3, and D.24.c.15.60.

At 5.50 a.m. this morning the Creeping barrage commenced in conjunction with Army operations.

(a) Patrols. A party of one Officer and 20 Other Ranks with Lewis Gun left our lines at 10 p.m. from J.5.b.30.75 and proceeded along road to Junction at D.30.c.05.30, where it split into two sections. and thoroughly searched CELTIC WOOD. No enemy were encountered or hostile movement observed until parties emerged from the N. E. corner of the wood, when a machinegun opened fire from about D.30.c.60.80. Flares were fired from about D.30.c.60.90. Pill boxes and huts in the wood were examined and found to be badly smashed and uninhabitable. The ground in the valley running through D.29.b. and D.30.c. is slightly boggy but not impassable. Patrol then moved east along the road as far as D.30.c.7.4, then turned south and moved into JUSTICE WOOD. Enemy were found in strength along eastern edge of wood notably from D.30.d.14.10 to J.6.b.25.90.

Main road to KEIBERG is in good condition, and the ground passable. Pill boxes were discovered in good condition as follows:-

- 1 at D.29.d.7.4.
- 3 at D.30.c.8.7.

(b). Another patrol of 1 Officer, and 22 Other Ranks, with Lewis gun started from D.29.a.9.8. at 9.30 p.m. and moved east and N.E. until CHINA WOOD was reached. This was searched and nothing discovered, but a quantity of trip wire. The ground was very wet but passable. The party then moved towards ANVIL WOOD, and on approaching this they were fired on by M.G. from approx. D.30.a.9.8. Flares bursting into two reds were fired from this place which brought a light artillery barrage down between our line and CHINA WOOD. Flares were fired for some time and the M.G. continued firing.

A M.G. and flares then opened up from rear of TABLE WOOD. Owing to M.G. activity and the extremely bright night it was considered inadvisable to go further, so after engaging the enemy with Lewis Gun and rifles the party withdrew.

(c). The ground North of CHINA WOOD is rapidly drying up and is passable for troops.

(e). A party of one Officer and 9 Other Ranks proceeded from D.29.b.25.05 at 10 p.m. and moved in a N.E. direction for 500 yards, then south towards CELTIC WOOD and S.E. corner of D.29.b. No enemy were encountered, and nothing of interest observed. The ground passed over was extremely swampy, and a large area is impassable.

P.T.O.

(d). One Officer and 20 men and a Lewis Gun left our left flank to examine BUSY WOOD and TABLE WOOD and to establish a standing patrol at D.24.d.2.7.

Moved along the DROOGENBROODHOEK road until the edge of TABLE WOOD was reached, M. G's. then opened fire from approx. D.24.c.75.60 - D.24.a.5.1. - D.24.c.6.9.

Golden flares bursting into two reds were fired from these places which brought an artillery barrage on the line - BUSY WOOD - along MILITARY ROAD - and back towards CHINA WOOD.

Three of the enemy were observed moving in vicinity of M.G. at D.24.c.75.60, and disappeared as soon as our patrol was discovered.

The standing patrol was eventually posted at D.24.c.2.6. and withdrew at 4 a.m. Roads passed are in good

condition. HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

#### HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

This was quiet during the day. From 11-30 a.m. to 1.30pm. an 8" How. and two 5.9 Hows. were firing on J.8., J.1., J.2., and D.26, the 8" How. being on T.B. 1250 from J.8.c.75.93. At 3 p.m. J.8.a. was lightly shelled by 5.9 How. on T.B. 980 from J.8.a.4.4. At 1.25 p.m. a 5.9 How. opened on J.8.c. on T.B. 1250 from J.8.c.7.9, and this continued intermittently during the afternoon.

WESTHOEK and ANZAC RIDGES were intermittently shelled during the afternoon, and some scattered fire from 4.2 and 5.9 Hows. searched the tracks in the forward area occasionally during the day.

During the night WESTHOEK RIDGE and east valley lightly shelled by 5.9 Hows. from direction of WATERDAMHOEK.

Between 6 p.m. and 5 a.m. the battery positions in J.8.b. and c. and J.3.c. were heavily shelled by 4.2 Hows. with gas (garlic) from the direction of POTTERIJEBRUG.

YPRES received a few 4.2 M. V. shells from the south-east during the morning.

J.17.c. and I.17.d. were shelled intermittently throughout the day.

Gun flares were observed on T.Bs. 31° 97° 99° and 108° from O.P. at J.4.b.88.60 during the day.

Flares of 10.5 cm. or 15 cm. How. Battery observed on T.B. 98° from D.29.c.5.6.

At 1.45 p.m. Infantry observers reported a 15 cm. battery firing from E.16.c.7.7. Artillery observers informed.

At 2.15 p.m. gun was observed firing from approx. K.4.c.0.2. At 3.30 p.m. a gun was observed firing from E.15.c.5.5.

#### ENEMY ATTITUDE.

Throughout the 24 hours hostile artillery and machine guns were decidedly less active than usual, as were also his snipers.

#### ENEMY DEFENCES.

Enemy M. G's. located at:-

D.30.c.6.8 - D.30.a.9.8 - D.24.c.75.60 -  
D.24.c.6.9 - D.24.a.5.1.

Flares were also fired from all these points.

Enemy located in strength along eastern edge of JUSTICE WOOD, particularly from D.30.d.14.10 to J.6.b.25.90.

An O.P. is suspected in tree at E.19.c.8.5.

#### MOVEMENT IN ENEMY LINES.

3 men were observed at D.24.c.75.60 by one of our patrols. They disappeared before fire could be brought to bear on them.

Throughout the day parties each about 6 men strong were seen constantly moving from K.2.b.1.6 to buildings at E.28.a.1.4.

At 2.30 p.m. 3 mounted men rode from K.2.b.1.6. to E.28.c.1.4.



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APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	271/23
Date	

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 30th 1917.

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 Machine Gun Coy  
 T.M. Battery.

The G.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Reinforcement Camp reports that several requests have been forwarded direct for personnel to be sent to rejoin their units. In future all such applications must be submitted to this office, as otherwise such requests will not be complied with.

*C. H. Hansi*

Captain, Staff Captain,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*Sid*  
*7*

APPENDIX.

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

October 30th 1917

Brigade Memo.No.5.

Headquarters,  
25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
Machine Gun Coy,  
T.M.Bty.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.	
No.	230/58
Date	

Casualties have been heavy from GAS, and it would appear as if the Box Respirator was not used quickly enough, or when used, was taken off too soon.

More gas discipline would appear to be necessary.

It must be remembered that this is the first real experience of gas this Brigade has had for a very long time, and so supervision is more necessary than may be later. Men must be taught to group when using the respirator, and tests of the atmosphere must only be made by one of the group who is selected as being more or less of an expert.

In the case of mustard gas, many casualties are caused by the gas being carried on mens' clothes. Such men should not enter dugouts until the gas has been got rid of.

As the means of protection against gas are ample, large numbers of casualties in any unit will indicate bad discipline and training.

*R. Lee* Major, A/Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*Bid* *A*

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

APPENDIX.

October 30th 1917.

Headquarters,  
27th, 28th Bns.)  
22nd A.M.G. Coy ) For information.  
5th A.M.G. Coy )

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Date <i>21/10/17</i>

The 12/13 Northumberland Fusiliers, the Left  
Battalion of the Brigade on our Right, will be relieved  
on the 31st October/1st November by the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. *acknowledge*

*H. Lee* Major, A/Brigade Major  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*7*

99

APPENDIX.

HEADQUARTERS 152  
 7TH AUSTRALIAN  
 INFANTRY BRIGADE.  
 No. 217/19  
 Date

SECRET

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 31st 1917

Headquarters,  
 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th Bns.  
 I.M. Battery,  
 22nd A.M.G. Coy

There has been an unusual slackening of ar tillery activity on the part of the enemy all along the Army front during the last 24 hours, and it is thought that it may portend a concentration of guns with a view to an organized attack on a considerable scale either this evening or tomorrow, or even later. Under these circumstances it would be advisable to make immediate ar arrangements for thinning out so as to minimise losses. The following measures should be taken :

1. Patrols sent out : *(To return before dawn)*
- (a) in direction of BUSI WOOD, and TABLE WOOD, with standing patrol on road leading to D.24.d.
  - (b) To CHINA WOOD and ANVIL WOOD and in direction of Road Junction D.30.b.30.90.
  - (c) To CELTIC WOOD and JUSTICE WOOD with standing patrol on Road leading to X Roads at D.30.d.
  - (d) Any other patrols considered advisable by C.O's of front line Battalions.
2. Front line posts of Right Battalion connected up as has already been done by the Left Battalion.
3. Platoon posts to be prepared in front of our front line posts but West of the ENEMY S.O.S. bar rage line. These posts to be occupied in case of heavy enemy shelling of our own front line.
4. Support Battalions will select positions for extra accommodation and will dig in. These positions will be selected with a view to as great a dispersion of Companies and avoidance of casualties, as is compatible with reasonably rapid concentration for counter-attack. The Left Support must aim at the disposal of the whole of the Battalion in the vicinity of ANZAC. Any material required will be requisitioned for at once.
5. Arrangements should be made so that working and other parties should be able to take cover during the most likely periods, viz. 4.30 p.m. to 6 p.m. and 4 a.m. to 7 a.m.

*R Lee*  
 Major, Brigade Major,  
 7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

*page 1142*

*X*

Ref. Map BECELAERE 1/10,000

October 31st 1917

7TH AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE

No. 200

38

## 1. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE

1. The Brigade in the line is responsible for the anti-aircraft defence of the area from the front line to and including TOKIO SPUR.

2. (a) Battalions have posted Lewis Guns in the following positions (1 Lewis Gun in each)

Right Line Battalion	J.5.a.10.90 J.4.b.78.18.
Left Line Battalion	D.28 central. D.28.b.00.75. D.29.a.30.85. B.29.a.50.00.
Right Support Bn.	D.28.c.7.0. D.28.c.4.8. J.4.a.70.65. J.4.a.9.5.
Left Support Bn.	D.28.c.1.4. D.28.c.25.45. D.28.c.25.55. D.28.c.10.85.

(b) The L.T.M. Battery has placed two Mortars in each of the following positions :-

1. J.5.a.7.7.
2. D.29.c.5.6.
3. D.23.c.15.10.

(c) The Machine Gun Company in the line has anti-aircraft guns in the following positions :

1. J.4.b.6.3.
2. D.28.b.75.85.

3. (a) Unit Commanders concerned will arrange for the relief of gun crews, who will be provided with written instructions regarding their duties. Each position will have a reserve of ammunition.

(b) Unit Commanders will change the positions when the safety of the detachments necessitates a change. Brigade Headquarters will be informed at once of any such changes.

(c) Gun crews will be notified of other anti-aircraft positions in their vicinity.

4. Machine and Lewis Guns forward of the BROODSEINDE Ridge will not fire at enemy aircraft unless a very favorable opportunity is presented.

*H. Lee*

Major, Brigade Major,  
7th Australian Infantry Bde.

Copies to :

1. 25th Bn.
2. 26th Bn.
3. 27th Bn.
4. 28th Bn.
5. T.M. Bty
6. 22nd M.G. Coy
- 7/8. 2nd Aust. Div.
9. 5th A.I. Bde
10. 6th A.I. Bde
11. File

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No 16

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.From 6 a.m. 30th to 6 a.m. 31st October 1917.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Our artillery actively carried on harassing fire upon enemy centres of activity, and continued with a series of minor bombardments.

At 11.15.a.m. a Zone Call was received and responded to for a hostile battery at E.20.d.70.35. The result is unknown owing to poor visibility.

At 12.35.p.m. a hostile working party between E.20.c.00.54. and E.19.b.30.80. were engaged, and dispersed by our fire.

During the afternoon a reported Sniper Post at D.30.central was engaged, and bombardments of reported hostile strong points at D.24.d.42.00 to D.24.d.0.7., D.30.d.45.60. to D.30.d.45.90., and D.30.b.51.29 to D.30.b.51.21 were carried out.

A machine<sup>gun</sup> position at D.30.c.50.65, also received bursts of fire at irregular intervals.

At 5.15.a.m. this morning, an Army barrage was fired according to programme.

Patrols.

(a). A patrol of 1 officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point J.5.b.30.75, proceeded eastward and established a post at J.6.a.30.75. Flares were fired from D.30.central and D.30.d.25.30. No hostile movement was observed. The ground was very wet and slippery and in some places boggy. Post was withdrawn at 5 a.m.

(b) A patrol of 1 officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point D.29.d.3.4. Patrol worked through CELTIC WOOD to point D.30.c.45.70. Flares were fired from approx.D.30.c.60.90, and also from a post about 100 yards to N. Patrol then moved south to point on road at D.30.c.40.30, where a post was established. No machine<sup>gun</sup> or rifle fire was heard at all. A further examination of pill boxes in CELTIC WOOD obviously shows that they have been purposely destroyed to render them uninhabitable. No enemy movement was observed, and post was withdrawn at 2.45.a.m.

At intervals during the night CELTIC WOOD was searched with 77 cm and 4.2" shrapnel, each salvo being followed by a pair of RED flares fired from D.30.central.

(c) A patrol of 1 officer and 20 o/ranks, with a Lewis gun, left our line at D.29.a.9.8. at 9.30 p.m. CHINA WOOD was searched and no trace of enemy found. Patrol then moved eastward and were not fired on by machine gun from D.30.a.9.8. as was the case the night previous. Two men were seen near this point moving northward. M.Gs were fired from ANVIL WOOD about D.30.a.8.8. Patrol remained for 1½ hours near point D.30.a.9.8., but no further enemy movement was observed. They returned to our lines about 2.30 a.m.

(d) A patrol of 1 officer and 16 o/ranks, with a Lewis gun, left our line at 9.30 p.m. at point D.25.d.3.5., to proceed to cross roads at D.24.d.2.7. When about 300 yards from our line enemy shelled patrol with 77 cm, and a M.G. firing from D.24.c.75.60. held them up. Two M.Gs also opened fire from direction of TABLE WOOD. The enemy's attitude proved that patrol's movements could be seen, as each time they moved the M.Gs opened fire. Patrol withdrew to D.23.d.8.6, and searched the ground in the vicinity.

A post was established at D.23.d.6.5. which withdrew at 4.30 a.m., and reported no enemy movement seen.

P.T.O

-2-

HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

This was fairly quiet during the period. ANZAC and WESTHOEK RIDGES and the VALLEY between occasionally shelled lightly by 5.9" and 4.2" Hows from direction between MOORSLEDE and POTTERIJEBRUG, chiefly from the WATERDAMHOEK Group.

About midday the forward slopes of BROOSSEINDE RIDGE were searched with 77 mm and 10.5 cm shrapnel, with occasional bursts of 15 c.m. H.E. from direction of MULLENHOEK.

During the afternoon, tracks in the forward area, particularly the cocduroy road through J.8.a and b, and J.3.c, received intermittent attention from the same Group, and occasionally from a 5.9" How at TERHAND. A 5.9" H.V. gun fired into J.2. between 2 and 5 p.m. I.27.d. was shelled at intervals by 5.9" Hows from the south-east.

During the night only desultory shelling of ridges and tracks in the forward area. Between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. enemy fired over 300 gas shells into area J.4.b. and J.5.a.

AERIAL ACTIVITY.

There was a marked decrease in enemy aerial activity during the day. At 5 a.m. 5 E.A. flew over squares J.7.a and c. Later on this area was heavily shelled with 21 cm H.E. from a S.E. direction.

At 5.30 a.m. 2 E.A. flew along our front line and dropped a number of WHITE flares. They were actively engaged by our machine and Lewis guns.

At 7.20 a.m. one of our planes crashed in D.27.b.

MOVEMENT IN ENEMY'S LINES.

About 8 a.m. enemy troops were observed apparently massing at E.13.b.8.6. They were engaged by our artillery and dispersed.

At 9.25 a.m. 4 men appeared at E.19.d.8.4., and walked south along a track, disappearing at E.25.b.8.1.

At 10.5 a.m. 3 mounted men were observed at E.16.a.5.5, moving into MOORSLEDE. This road is camouflaged in places, but not very effectively.

At 11.19 a.m. a man appeared running away to the S.E. from building at E.28.c.8.9. Our artillery were shelling this building at the time.

At 12 noon 4 men left the buildings at K.4.a.30.65, and walked down track towards front line as far as K.3.b.35.85, then on to K.3.a.85.45, where they crossed a creek, disappearing at K.3.a.7.4.

At 12.5 p.m. 2 men left building at K.5.a.0.1., and disappeared at K.4.b.3.7.

At 1.50 p.m. 3 men were observed to enter dugout at E.19.d.85.40. They appeared anxious to avoid observation as they were practically crawling for about the last 50 yards.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Suspected O.P. at E.19.c.8.5. consists of a platform fixed in a tree.

M.Gs were reported active during the night from J.6.b., D.30.a.8.8., D.24.c.75.60., TABLE WOOD.

Flares were fired during the night from D.30.central., D.30.d.25.30., D.30.c.6.9., D.24.c.6.1., D.30.a.8.8.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Red Cross flags can be seen at E.19.b.35.86., E.21.d.75.70., E.9.d.8.5. (approx), and flying from a tree at F.22.d.6.3.

Hostile gun flashes were observed on T.Bs of 86° and 71° from O.P. at D.29.a.35.30., and T.Bs of 83° and 94° from C.P. at J.5.b.25.80.

At 7.25 a.m. a loud explosion occurred in the direction of PAS...

*Handwritten:*  
Lt Col  
General Staff  
2nd Aust Division

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AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Both our own and enemy aircraft were very active throughout the day. Enemy planes constantly flew over our forward area at a low altitude dropping light bombs and opening M.G. fire on our troops. These were all actively engaged by our A.A. guns and Machine guns.

At 2.30 p.m. 10 enemy planes flew over our lines as far back as YPRES and dropped bombs in the vicinity of ZILLEBEKE and in I.14.c. and smoke signals when over I.17.

About 6 p.m. 24 enemy planes crossed our lines flying westwards.

Balloons. 2 enemy balloons were observed at 7.10 a.m. on T.B. 107° and 117° from O.P. at D.29.a.3.2.

At 1.20 p.m. an enemy balloon ascended on a T.B. of 91° from O.P. at D.29.a.3.2. This balloon was pulled down at 1.40 p.m.

MISCELLANEOUS.

At 1.30 p.m. a train was seen moving along line from DADIZEELE to KANTERHOEK.

At 2.35 p.m. a large dump at approx. E.21.b.9.1. was observed to be on fire.

A large Red Cross flag can be seen flying from a building in the centre of WATERDAMHOLK (approx. E.21.d.95.00).

*J. J. L. M. Ball Coy*  
 for Lieut-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.



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ANNEXE.To 2nd Australian Division Intelligence Summary No 14.NOTES ON AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

4.B.430. D.24.c. The small line of posts running from the S.E. corner of TABLE WOOD to the BROODSEINDE-MOORSLEDE Road still appear to be occupied. Also a line running from D.24.c.98.68 to D.24.d.42.00

4.B.447. E.14.a.c.d. 15.c. A fairly good piece of trench can be seen running from E.14.d.50.46. to E.14.d.66.25.

4.B.436. E.21.c.d. 26.b. 27 a and b. A new trench appears to be in construction from E.27.c.20.67. towards 45.40. It appears very ragged and is really formed by linking up certain shell holes. A small piece can also be seen at 43.62. Some movement has taken place round these shell holes which have previously been used by troops bivouacing.

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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 4.

## 7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

October 31st 1917.

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE from 6 a.m. 30/10/17 to 6 a.m. 31/10/17.1. OPERATIONS.

PATAOLS. (a) A patrol of 1 Officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point J.5.b.30.75, proceeded eastward and established a post at J.6.a.30.75. Flares were fired from D.30 central and D.30.d.25.30. No hostile movement was observed. The ground was very wet and slippery, and in some places boggy. Post was withdrawn at 5 a.m.

(b) A patrol of 1 Officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point D.29.d.3.4. Patrol worked through CELTIC WOOD to point D.30.c.45.70. Flares were fired from approximately D.30.c.60.90, and also from a post about 100 yards to North. Patrol then moved South to point on Road at D.30.c.40.30, where a post was established. No machine gun or rifle fire was heard at all. A further examination of pillboxes in CELTIC WOOD obviously shows that they have been purposely destroyed to render them uninhabitable. No enemy movement was observed, and post was withdrawn at 2.45 a.m.

At intervals during the night CELTIC WOOD was searched with .77 and 4.2 shrapnel, each salvo being followed by a pair of red flares fired from D.30 central.

(c) A patrol of 1 Officer and 20 o/ranks with a Lewis Gun left our line at D.29.a.9.8, at 9.30 p.m. CHINA WOOD was searched and no trace of enemy found. Patrol then moved eastward and were not fired on by machine gun from D.30.a.9.8. as in the night previously. Two men were seen near this point moving northward. Machine guns were fired from ANVIL WOOD about D.30.a.8.3. Patrol remained for 1½ hours near point D.30.a.9.8. but no further enemy movement was observed. Patrol returned to our lines about 2.30 a.m.

(d) A patrol of 1 Officer and 16 o/ranks with a Lewis Gun left our line at 9.30 p.m. at point D.23.d.3.5. to proceed to X Roads at D.24.d.2.7. When about 300 yards from our line enemy shelled patrol with whizbangs and machine gun firing from D.24.c.75.60. held up patrol. Two machine guns also opened fire from direction of TABLE WOOD. The enemy's attitude proved that patrol's movements were seen as each time they moved, the machine guns opened up. Patrol withdrew to D.23.d.8.6. and searched ground in vicinity. A post was established at D.23.d.6.5. which withdrew at 4.30 a.m. to report no enemy movement seen.

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2. HOSTILE SH ELLING. During the morning it was heavier than usual, but fewer gas shells were used. About midday the forward slope of BROODSEINDE Ridge was searched with .77 and 4.2 shrapnel, with occasional .15 c.m. from direction of MOLENHOEK. Between 9 p.m. and midnight D.28.d. and D.29.c. were intermittently shelled with shrapnel and 5.9. Towards 1 a.m. activity increased, more than 300 gas shells being distributed over area J.4.b. and J.5.a. Details of shelling attached.
3. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Fairly active during the day, but quietening down considerably during the night.
4. AERIAL ACTIVITY. Notable decrease of hostile activity on this sector. Two machines flew along our line dropping white flares at 5.30 a.m. During the day isolated planes made their appearance for a short time only. As a result of A.A. gunfire one of our planes was forced to land near ZONNEBEKE.
5. ENEMY DEF ENCES. During the night short bursts of machine gun fire came from J.6.b. Observation post consisting of a platform fixed in tree has been verified at E.19.c.8.5.
6. BALLOONS. Nil.
7. MOVEMENT Troops were observed apparently massing at E.13.b.8.6 approx. and were dispersed by our shelling. Several of the enemy were seen moving about in the vicinity of PASSCHENDAELE Church carrying timber. They were dispersed by our shelling.
8. MISCELLANEOUS.  
Explosions. Loud explosions from direction of PASSCH ENDAELE bearing 24° true from J.4.b.88.60. at 7.25 a.m. Red Cross flag observed in position on rough shelter E.21.b.75.70. No movement visible.  
Battery Positions Taken from point J.5.b.25.80. 83° true, 94° true. Battery position located between X roads E.21.c. and CEMETERY E.21.d.

*J.R. [Signature]*

Captain, for G.O.C.,  
7th Australian Infantry Brigade.

28th Battalion A.I.F.

CASUALTY LIST. Covering Period 27th October - 2nd Nov. 17.

WOUNDED

3287	Tiplady	J.W	Dvr	28.10.17
G 5928	Thomas	A.J		29.10.17
G 2189	Mullins	J		do
G 2186	Mullins	V.H		do
G 5591	Etherington	R.B		do
G 1723A	Bruce	R.A		do
G 1724	Bruce	E		do
G 6344A	Knox	H.T		do
G 606	Coolahan	A	Sgt	do
G 309	Hamley	J.V	Cpl	do
G 4478	Matthews	A.J		do
G 3681	Prosser	G		do
G 4233	Shaw-Walker	K.D		do
G 4668	Atkinson	J.P		do
G 4304A	Heaven	R		do
G 5348	Dunn	A.E		do
G 6397	Richards	H		do
858	Humphreys	W.J		28.10.17
2146	Emery	J.W	Sgt	do
1791	Townsend	W.G	Cpl	do
4700	Cooper	E		do
G 5310	Arnold	R	Cpl	29.10.17
3305	Wear	A.C	"	27.10.17
2393	Harwood	W		do
G 5781	Pritchard	J.H	Sgt	do
G 4498	Newton	A.T.L		do
G 6659	Urquhart	W		30.10.17
G 1994	Sands	F.S		do
G 2344	Baron	B.E	Dvr	do
1682A	Parker	W		do
6095	Hutchins	F.H		do
1915	Cusack	M.P	Sgt	do
4288	Rehm	E.F		31.10.17
261	Chamberlain	B.G.S		do
1939	Golding	G.B		do
G 5869	Harrison	T.J		do
5211	Bridson	D		do
G 5822	Chambers	J.T	L/C	29.10.17
3078	Crutickshank	R	Cpl	31.10.17
G 6051	Brandis	S.J		30.10.17
G 5433	Smith	J.F		29.10.17
G 6366	Miller	A		30.10.17
G 694	Selleck	F.P		do
G 5929	Thorp	H.A		1.11.17
G 915	Lafferty	W	Dvr	do
G 907	Walsh	J.P	"	do
G 903	Herdsmen	W.E		do
4657	Johnston	T		29.10.17
G 5396	Lennon	H.J		1.11.17
G 5097	Simpson	A.P		2.11.17
3124	Hardie	A.L		do
5933	Thomas	J.H.C		do
4395	Cain	H		do
1795	White	C	L/C	do
6408A	Burnett	A		do
G 1907A	Bath	L		do
G 5867	James	W		do
G 4686	Brown	A.W.J		do
2181	Maddern	W.T	L/C	27.10.17

KILLED

542	Ward	J.H	Cpl	28.10.17
4566	White	H.M	L/C	do
5715A	Hughes	W.H		do
3130A	Mildwaters	R.G.H		do
4544	Steere	S.H		do
6562	Clark	P.H		do
5409	Martin	H.J	L/C	do
6371	Newbury	C.H.W		do
534A	Henderson	E.T		31.10.17
5616	Jones	J.R		do
6321	Greig	A.P		do
399	Brazier	O		30.10.17
4526	Ritchie	A.L		28.10.17
4500	Orr	J.E		1.11.17
440	Curtis	J	Dvr	do
287	Granger	W.G.R	Cpl	2.11.17
1508	Ayling	H.E		do
3158A	Stevens	A.H		do
4794	Smith	J.A.T		1.11.17

OFFICERS. WOUNDED

Lieut J. Stuart-Sinclair	29.10.17
" A.E. Gaby (Gas)	do
" D. Martin	30.10.17

DIED OF WOUNDS

Lieut J. Stuart-Sinclair	29.10.17
3305 Cpl Waer	A.C 27.10.17
2181 L/C Maddern	W.T do
1723A Bruce	R.A 30.10.17


DATE	KILLED		WOUNDED		GASSED	
	O	OR	O	OR	O	OR
1917						
Oct 27				3		2
28		9		5		
29			2	1		19
30		1	1	3		6
31		3		5		1
Nov 1		3				5
2		3		5		4
Total	1	19	3	22		37
		SINCE DIED OF WOUNDS		SINCE DIED FROM GAS		
			1	1		2

99

<u>DEPARTURES.</u>	<u>for OCTOBER.</u>	
	<u>0.</u>	<u>O/R.</u>
7th Tng Bn.	3	10
Wounded	16	141
Killed	2	42
Missing	-	18
Transfers.-		
13th		1
16th		1
27th		1

ARRIVALS.

7th Tng Bn	1	10
Wounded	1	58
Missing		3
Supernumery List	1	
Seconded List	2	
Officers Cadet Bn	1	
Deserter		1
Transfers		2
1st		2
5th		
14th	1	1
19th		12
24		2
25		
Reinforcements		69
7th		10
15	1	1
16		91
21st		12
25th		2
30th		



5th Battalion, A.I.F.

1st OCTOBER		MEASURES
0	0	7th Tpt Bn
10	2	Wounded
141	15	Killed
53	2	Missing
15	-	Transferred



1st OCTOBER		ARRIVALS
10	1	7th Tpt Bn
88	1	Wounded
53	1	Missing
1	1	Superintendy
1	1	Loss
2	2	Wounded List
1	1	Officers Under
1	1	Deserter
2	2	Transfers
2	2	1st
2	2	2nd
1	1	14th
10	10	15th
2	2	24
2	2	25
38	38	Retired
10	10	7th
1	1	15
1	1	16
61	61	1st
12	12	2nd
2	2	3rd