


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/57/19 PART 2

Title: 40th Infantry Battalion


October 1917 Appendices



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APPENDIX XIV



operation on 4.5/10/17

Scale 1:5000

Richard

40th Bn

Appendix XIV
22

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

152

100

152

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40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

APPENDIX ^{IV} Scale 1:5000

Part Map 28

Alm. Prinschank Capt.

Copr. N^o 4.



152


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APPENDIX. XIV 101

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
4-5/10/17

40th BATTALION, AIF



MAP SHOWING "A" DAY OBJECTIVES

SECRET No



March 1930
130
100
140
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Appendix ~~x~~ y


40th Bn

Oct: 1917

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

Scale 1/10,000

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.
BATTLE ALBION
A.I.F.



alteration to barrage in consequence
 of post line being in rear of AUGUSTUS WOOD
 & not in front as reported

3rd AUS DIV
 N 170 B
 11/10/17

40th BATTALION A.I.F.
11/13/17

Barage
11-13/17

40th BATTALION A.I.F.
11/13/17

***** DISTANCE BOARD *****

| NO. | NAME | TIME |
|-----|------|------|
| 1 | ... | ... |
| 2 | ... | ... |
| 3 | ... | ... |
| 4 | ... | ... |
| 5 | ... | ... |
| 6 | ... | ... |
| 7 | ... | ... |
| 8 | ... | ... |
| 9 | ... | ... |
| 10 | ... | ... |
| 11 | ... | ... |
| 12 | ... | ... |
| 13 | ... | ... |
| 14 | ... | ... |
| 15 | ... | ... |
| 16 | ... | ... |
| 17 | ... | ... |
| 18 | ... | ... |
| 19 | ... | ... |
| 20 | ... | ... |
| 21 | ... | ... |
| 22 | ... | ... |
| 23 | ... | ... |
| 24 | ... | ... |
| 25 | ... | ... |
| 26 | ... | ... |
| 27 | ... | ... |
| 28 | ... | ... |
| 29 | ... | ... |
| 30 | ... | ... |
| 31 | ... | ... |
| 32 | ... | ... |
| 33 | ... | ... |
| 34 | ... | ... |
| 35 | ... | ... |
| 36 | ... | ... |
| 37 | ... | ... |
| 38 | ... | ... |
| 39 | ... | ... |
| 40 | ... | ... |

1917 DISTANCE BOARD

1917 DISTANCE BOARD

1917 DISTANCE BOARD

1917 DISTANCE BOARD

SECRET


APPROXIMATE

BRITISH

INDIA

LINE

OCT 17



PASSCHENDAELE

German Trenches corrected to 27-9-17.

Parts of Sheets 20 & 28

EDITION I A


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ARMY BARRAGE MAP
October, 1917.

CONVERSION TABLE

| MINUTES | HOURS |
|---------|------------------|
| 65 | 1 hour 5 mins. |
| 71 | 11 |
| 83 | 23 |
| 130 | 2 hours 10 mins. |
| 136 | 18 |
| 146 | 24 |
| 152 | 25 |
| 162 | 26 |
| 168 | 28 |
| 174 | 29 |
| 182 | 3 hours 2 mins. |
| 190 | 10 |
| 196 | 18 |
| 206 | 26 |

--- CORPS BOUNDARY
..... DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY



SECRET.

ARMY BARRAGE MAP
October, 1917.

CONVERSION TABLE

| MINUTES | HOURS |
|---------|------------------|
| 65 | 1 hour 5 mins. |
| 71 | 11 |
| 83 | 23 |
| 130 | 2 hours 10 mins. |
| 136 | 18 |
| 146 | 24 |
| 152 | 25 |
| 162 | 26 |
| 168 | 28 |
| 174 | 29 |
| 182 | 3 hours 2 mins. |
| 190 | 10 |
| 196 | 18 |
| 206 | 26 |

SECRET

Appendix + v2

400
Feb 1917

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1917

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

SECRET

ARMY BARRACKS, W.L.

October 1917

CHARTERED


8th Div

Operations on 4-5/10/17

POLYGON WOOD

EDITION I. A.

German Trenches corrected to 4-9-17



F.S.Co. 1026 5-917

Yards 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 Scale 1:20,000

Printed by H.M.S.O. Advanced Section, A.P. 16 55

no. 1 appendix
4 viii
Polygon Wood

40th Bn A.I.F.

4.10.17.



40th BATTALION, A.I.F.



4. 10. 1917.

To Ofc 40th Bn Details
From Ofc 10th Brig Details

The C.O. 3rd Australian Div.
Concentration Camp desires to
congratulate your Battalion on
the Medal it furnished to day.
It was exceedingly smart
and well turned out.

C. J. Peterson

Ofc 10th Brig Details.

40th BATTALION, A.I.F.

Dear Sirs

Ch

8/10/17

Appendix ~~XIX~~

40th Bn A.I.F.
Oct. 1917.
Asst. Capt.

II ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 8 p.m. 9th October 1917.CONFIDENTIAL - THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHES.PART I.
INFORMATION FROM OUR OWN FRONT.1. OPERATIONS.

At 5.20 a.m. we attacked in conjunction with Corps on both flanks. Owing to extremely bad weather conditions movement of troops up to their assembly positions was attended with the greatest difficulties and several units were actually late in starting. In spite of this, however, we have made considerable progress and have advanced our line over a very difficult piece of country.

According to the latest information our right division has gained their entire final objective. The situation of the left, however, especially in D 3 a is still obscure. The attached map shows our approximate present front line.

At 5 p.m. a two-seater enemy contact aeroplane escorted by two fighting machines, called for flares by dropping one white light. These were answered from the ground by a number of white rockets which burst into two white stars, and which were observed by one of our machines to be roughly on a line through D 12 a and D 5 d and b. It can therefore be assumed that this is the present enemy front line.

2. PRISONERS.

The estimated number of prisoners captured exceeds 300, but up to 6 p.m. only 3 officers and 131 O.Rs. had reached the Corps Cage. In addition to the above 2 O.Rs. were admitted to C.C.S. up to 12 noon.

Total number of prisoners captured by the Corps from 28th Sept. up to 6 p.m. 9th October:-

| | | | | |
|----------|----|---|-------------|--------|
| Officers | 69 | - | Other Ranks | 2,304. |
|----------|----|---|-------------|--------|

3. ENEMY ACTION DURING THE ATTACK.

Very little information is available, but the two outstanding features would appear to be:-

- The absence of organized counter-attacks.
- The fact that for the first time hostile shelling of our front positions has been reported from the S.E.

The enemy barrage came down this morning at 5.25 a.m. - chiefly on our support and reserve lines - but was very erratic.

At 6.10 a.m. D 17 b and d were heavily shelled and throughout the day the whole Corps forward area has been intermittently shelled though not heavily.

4. AIRCRAFT.

In spite of bad flying conditions a good deal of contact work was successfully carried out by the Corps Squadron.

At 3.10 p.m. 8 E.A. crossed our lines and attacked six of our machines. One E.A. fell in flames and one of ours appeared to crash soon after, probably in D 11.

5. ENEMY MOVEMENT.

Corps observers report a considerable amount of movement over the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE in small parties throughout the day more especially about 11.30 a.m., otherwise no abnormal movement has been reported.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.....

6. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

The attached map shows in detail as far as has been elicited from captured prisoners, the enemy's dispositions opposite our front at Zero. It will be seen that this division (the 195th) which only came into the line on the 6th and 7th, has reverted to the former German method of holding the line, i.e. in considerable depth with the actual battle zone comparatively lightly held. This is further confirmed by officers who denied any knowledge of recent changes in tactics, though they admitted that there had been considerable discussion as to whether the immediate large scale counter-attacks, hitherto ordered by the German Higher Command, had proved an effective policy. From the attached map it will be seen that throughout the division both front line and support battalions were disposed in a similar way, i.e. three companies in front and one in support. The support battalions were roughly 1,000 yds. behind the front, the reserve battalions being east of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE about another mile in rear. Each front line battalion had a frontage of approximately 1,000 yds. making a company frontage of nearly 350 yds. which the officers thought excessive, though their companies were well up to strength (trench strength about 120). The fact that practically no prisoners of the support battalions have been captured would appear to indicate that these battalions made no effort to counter-attack to regain any of the ground lost.

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

Several of our machines report an exceptionally large fire which started in ROULERS at 4.45 p.m. apparently caused by our artillery fire.

Small recurring explosions were also observed at W 27 c 3.1 on the 8th.

9th October 1917.

(Sgd) F. P. NOSWORTHY Major
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS OF 195TH DIVISION.

1. MOVEMENTS.

The 195th Division was relieved in the LE CATELET sector on 30th August. Went into hard training at INCHY where they remained throughout September. 5th October entrained at CAUDRY, passed through COURTRAI and detrained at ISEGHEM on night 5/6th.

2. RELIEFS.

The 8th Jager Regt. relieved 77 I.R. (20th Div.) on night 6/7th. The 6th Jager Regt. relieved 9th Bav. I.R. (4th Bav. Div.) on night 7/8th.

The 233rd R.I.R. relieved 5 Bav. I.R. (4th Bav. Div.) on night 8/9th.

The whole division was therefore fresh this morning.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE (N. to S).

6th Jager Regt. - 8th Jager Regt. - 233rd R.I.R.

4. COMPANY STRENGTHS.

The Div. was made up to strength while at rest, the new drafts being apparently composed chiefly of returned wounded but a small proportion of the 1919 Class were included.

Company Trench Strengths now average 100-120.

5. LOSSES.

None of the units from which prisoners were captured appear to have had excessive losses during the relief, moreover prisoners of the 233rd R.I.R. (astride the ROULERS railway) all state that they suffered little or no loss this morning from our barrage which apparently opened in rear of them. (Note:- This, of course, only refers to the three companies which were holding the actual front line and who were apparently much closer to our front line than was suspected).

It was considered that the distribution of very small parties in shell holes minimised artillery losses.

6. MACHINE GUNS.

Division appears to have been equipped with an extra supply of light machine guns, the 233rd R.I.R. has six light M.Gs. per Coy.

7. MORAL.

The moral of the division must be considered as good though the men, as usual, seem heartily sick of the war. An officer who had been with the 233rd R.I.R. since its formation said that a year ago he would have been very sorry to have been captured but now he is rather glad.

8. UNITS IN REAR.

A large number of troops is reported to be in rear, but definite identifications could not be obtained and prisoners are not of the opinion that there was any concentration such as might foreshadow offensive operations on their part. One officer stated that they were relying very largely on the weather to arrest our advance.

WARNING.

Handwritten signatures and dates: "In H.W." and "11/10/17"

INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS (continued).9. WARNING OF OUR ATTACK.

The great majority of prisoners state that our attack came as a complete surprise. One N.C.O., however, of the 8th Jager Regt. stated that Brigade Observers had reported troops massing on the afternoon of the 8th and that a state of special vigilance had been ordered.

LIST OF PRISONERS CAPTURED AND PASSED INTO CORPS CAGE
up to 6 p.m. 9-10-17.

195th Division.

| | <u>Officers.</u> | <u>O.Rs.</u> |
|--|------------------|--------------|
| 6th Jager Regt. (5th Jager Bn.) 3rd Coy. | | 1. |
| 8th " " (16th Res. Jager Bn.) 1st Coy. | | 2. |
| 8th " " (4th Res. Jager Bn.) 3rd Coy. | 1 | 15. |
| 8th " " do. 2nd M.G. Coy. | | 2. |
| 8th " " do. 3rd do. | | 1. |
| 233rd R.I.R. 5th Coy. | | 12. |
| do. 6th Coy. | | 34. |
| do. 7th Coy. | 1 | 36. |

16th Division.

29th I.R. 10th Coy. 11.

233rd Division.

449th I.R., 1st Coy. 1 7.

Total 3 121.

APPENDIX XIX^a

*Narrative of Operations
During 4-5 Oct 1917*

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Appendix XIX
APPENDIX XIX
out 1917

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,
9th. October, 1917.

G.386/396.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ON 4TH. OCTOBER, 1917.

During the night 3rd/4th. October, our attacking Troops moved to their assembly positions, and Brigades reported all in position by 4 a.m. The night was cloudy and overcast, slight drizzling rain falling during the three hours prior to ZERO. This continued after ZERO as a driving mist. Heavy enemy shelling took place prior to ZERO, but few casualties were reported.

At 6.0 a.m., the attack was launched on a 1,000 yards front, spreading out to 1,200 yards at the BLUE LINE.

At the jumping off place, the line extended from ZONNEBEKE Station on right to DOCHY FARM on left.

The 2nd. Australian Division prolonged the line on the right, and the New Zealand Division on our left.

The two objective lines for attack were :-

- (a). RED LINE from D.22.b.50.35 (N.E. of THAMES WOOD) to D.15.b.80.00 (N.E. of BORDEAUX FARM.)

The 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade (Brig.-General CANNAN, C.B.) on the right attacked with the 43rd and 42nd Battalions, the latter leap-frogging through during a 12 minute halt of the barrage, and halting on the RED LINE.

The 10th. Aust. Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General W. R. McNICOLL, D.S.O.) on the left attacked with the 37th and 38th Battalions, the latter leap-frogging through during the 12 minute halt of the barrage, and halting on the RED LINE.

The first objective was gained by 7.5 a.m. according to Time-Table.

- (b). BLUE LINE from D.23.a.70.80 to D.10.d.35.00.

The 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade on the Right attacked with 44th and 41st Battalions, the latter going to the final BLUE LINE and consolidating.

10th. Aust. Infantry Brigade on the Left attacked with 39th and 40th Battalions, the latter going to the final objective and consolidating.

The attack commenced at 8.10 a.m. and the final objective was gained by 9.2 a.m.

The fighting was very severe in places during our advance especially during capture of high ground in D.17.c. and D.16.b. The going was very bad and slow in vicinity of RED LINE.

The 44th Battalion dug in on a line 200 yards behind the BLUE LINE, and at 10.30 a.m. we were able to report Right Brigade digging in on BLUE LINE.

At 2.3 p.m. a counter-attack developed on our front in 3 waves from CEMETERY in D.17.a. It was dispersed by artillery and rifle fire. The BLUE LINE was subjected to heavy shelling but consolidation was proceeding well, and strong points covering BLUE LINE had been commenced.

(1).

F.T.O.

10th BATTALION, AIF

In. other
cb
11/10/17

H.

(2).

9/10/1917.

The CEMETERY at D.17.a. and DAISY WOOD (D.23.a.) were used by enemy for concentrating for counter-attack, but our Artillery dispersed these concentrations.

A small counter-attack developed against the 40th. Battalion, but was dispersed by Stokes Mortar and Lewis Gun fire.

Captured prisoners state that enemy had intended to attack us at 6.5 a.m., and his 5.30 a.m. barrage was preliminary to that attack. The assembling troops were, however, caught in our barrage at 6 a.m. and suffered very severe casualties.

The appearance of our troops added more confusion, and the enemy became hopelessly entangled in our troops and gave up in most cases without much resistance.

During the morning, visibility was very bad owing to drizzling rain, and aeroplanes were not active.

Total prisoners that passed through our Cage, 24 Officers and 1014 ranks. We captured 2 Granatenwerfer, 4 Trench Mortars and 70 Machine Guns.

Our casualties were :-

| | Officers. | O. R. |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------|
| 11th. Brigade (Right Assaulting Bde) | 31. | 610. 757 |
| 10th. " (Left " ") | 24.26 | 830. 834 |
| 9th. " (Support Brigade). | 4.3 | 220. 108 |

The enemy troops opposite us were the 77th and 79th Regiments of the 20th Division, and the 5th Gren. Gard. Regiment and 5 Foot Gds. Regiment of the 4th. Guards Division. The 212th. R.I.R. of the 45th. Division were attacking through these troops when our attack opened.

On the whole hostile artillery fire throughout the day was weak and erratic, although final objective was heavily shelled.

Jack Lambden

for Captain.
General Staff.

Appendix ~~nr~~

10th Inf Bde

Oct 1917

40th Bn

1/10/17

Reference Ammunition
for L.T.M.s attached to this unit

① In conference with
O/C 10th T.M.B. this evening.
Doubt arose concerning
the supply of stakes
ammunition. It appears
some question has arisen
whether this ammunition
will be passed up thro'
Bn dumps in the same
manner as other supplies
and stores or not? I under-
stand the C.O. of the Bn takes
the view that this ammuni-
tion would be carried by
Special L.T.M. and in parcels.
The O/C Battery informs me
he has not sufficient person-
nel to do this carrying (2000 lbs).

Can the matter be
placed beyond doubt please.

L/1.

Richard H. Lee
in camp

10th Aust Inf Bde

40th Bn

2/10/17

Stramp Point.

Recommending
that the services of the
10th Field Coy Engineers be
made available for the
construction of one or
more Stramp Points in
this Bn forward Sector.
An all round command
Post is required at approx-
imately B 16.6 25.75.

Consolidation &
Platoon Stramp Points will
be immediately com-
menced by Infantry of
course.

Richard H. Lee

H/2

APPENDIX. XIXa

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R.W.Z.

R.W.C

4/10/17

12 noon Report

Situation. Satisfactory.

Consolidation. Proceeding well.

Flanks. Am in touch with Right and Left Battalions.

Strength. Very difficult indeed to estimate - Believed to be approximately 350.

S.A.A. & Stores. Very short indeed. Two boxes of S.A.A. now coming from 38th. It is urgently needed also wire and tools.

R.A.P. Not yet established vicinity Ben H.A. S.P's are needed. I have sent back to locate M.O.

Blue line. Map showing

line now being consolidated, herewith.

Alford
Lans

L/8

R. W. Z.

R. W. C.

4/10/17

5 o'clock Report -

Situation Improved.
 Consolidation. Very well
 advanced but no wire has
 been available today con-
 sequently the line is not
 wired except where use
 has been made of existing
 enemy wire.

S. A. A. & stores. Scarcely
 any have come forward
 today. Some S. A. A. has been
 received and the situation
 is relieved but more is
 needed.

Conditions

Drek + food.

McPherson
 Camp

N/10

R. W. Z.

R. W. C.

4/11/17

Situation Report 8 hrs

Situation - Quiet - at 7.20 hrs

S.O.S signal was fired along the whole front. In view of enemy's actions during the day and the reduced strength of my companies I asked the 39th Bn to stand in readiness to go to the blue line if required & the 38th Bn to move forward. I took this course because of the length of time necessary for 38 Bn to travel in view of the condition of the area. I however cancelled the request before any movement was made. Enemy attacking troops were opposite the Bn front and apparently the

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Counter attack was broken by our barrage
Prisoners of War.

At 2 hrs today C.S.M. BODEN and three men snatched up a dug out on barrage line and secured 70 prisoners including a Lt Col.
Papers & Maps
Two sets of papers herewith.

McLond H. Co
Camp

4/11.

Patrols are out tonight on patrol front inside S.V.S. barrage line.
R.C.

R.W. 2

R.W.C

5710917

Situation Report 2/11/16

1. Situation quiet with intermittent enemy shelling.
2. Officers from Relieving Bn have reported and have been shown over sector.
3. Two abandoned "Witz" - bang" guns are reported abandoned just beyond our barrage line. It is not certain they can be got.
4. Thirteen machine guns were captured but of these six have been removed & I have not the Regd numbers. Two French mortars, 81mm, Set, Listening Set, Telephones etc. Quantities of stuff were left by prisoners etc in concrete pill boxes one

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One of these shelters appears to have been 11.2. of higher command and a whistle marked 20 Inf Div was found in a case in it.

A large quantity of letters, papers, and maps have been forwarded to Brigade.

I am enclosing the whistle referred to above and a few more papers herewith.

Richard W.C.
Camp

2/16

To: Lt. C

H.O. 1st Battr

Sir

The following is a narrative of mopping up done by 709 Platoon A Coy. When almost at assembly point one man was wounded by shell fire when Battr moved off after zero hour my platoon got mixed with 99th Battr on top of first ridge a strong point had been passed by the people in front so with half platoon + mopped same up it contained 4. four M.G. + about 15 Bosch we moved along down the ridge + cleaned up several small dugouts sent back about twelve men We moved along with 99th + mopped up stub shell holes on top of next ridge we were well over to left of Battr frontage + started across towards the right + mopped up a big strong Pt with four machine Guns

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- + about twenty Bosch we sent a few prisoners back from there This is known as Hamburg Redoubt We moved along from there across Wab trench + out in front of our objective + posted a Lewis gun well out in front with a good field of fire at D. 17 A 3.2. at 9.30 AM. at 10 AM. Sgt in charge sent runner in to say Bosch was coming down road + a gap in hedge showed them passing in approx. half platoons I sent a second Lewis Gun out + also the Vickers Gun for about half an hour this party did excellent work The Barrage had almost ceased in this locality occasional shells dropping short one Lewis Gun team was partly buried so decided to withdraw the whole on to line of consolidation A message was sent to Battr H.Q. that enemy was moving for a counter attack at D. 17 A. 5.4. The Artillery came on to them about 11 AM + dispersed them

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A. Coy assisted B. Coy to dig in on blue line + took over from pill box at 16. B. 9. 3. to A 17. 5. 0 + joined up with left flank of 41st Bn at 5 PM. Dug a shallow trench that night; completed same next day. Enemy made an attempt to come across at 9 PM. A Lewis gun was put on to skyline; Artillery opened up later + had no further trouble. Hand over to Manchester on the night of 6th + got out without any casualties on the way.

I am your Obedient
 Alfred H. Stan 274
 A Coy
 40th Bn.

Narrative of Attack
B. Coy 40th Balm

We reached the jumping off lines at 4.15am and got the company into position during the time from then until zero fairly heavy shelling was experienced but no casualties resulted. As soon as the barrage opened the company moved forward and kept as close to it as possible control here was very difficult as the men of the four battalions became mixed up. The first objective was passed with few casualties. On moving towards the second objective the men were inclined to ease off to the right owing

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the ground on the right being very wet and difficult to pass over, but during the long halt of the barrage this was remedied to a certain extent. A number of our guns seemed to be firing short and several casualties occurred on the barrage moving on again the men kept close up to it still moving in artillery formation the platoons being well in hand. On passing the second objective fairly heavy machine gun fire was experienced on gaining the third objective the men were got over to the right of the sector again and were there extended into wave formation. Heavy machine gun fire

was coming from a ~~pit~~
dugout at Hamburg, and
from Dal trench. A party
was sent round the right
side of Hamburg and one
of the other companies sent one
to the left and captured the
machine gun and crew.
Small parties were then
sent up to Dal trench in
short pushes and on
reaching the dugouts there
the enemy surrendered. The
company then moved on
to the final objective and
commenced to consolidate
it. The moppers up went out
and mopped up the dugouts
out in front of the line and
cauldron post were sent
out about two hundred

yards. At about 10.30 am
a number of the enemy were
seen to be collecting in rear
of the cemetery a word was sent
back and the artillery was
advised and succeeded in
dispersing them. After this
it was quiet until about
2 pm and consolidation
was well under way when
when the enemy were seen
moving down from
Passchendaele towards the
New Zealand sector and by
7 pm about a brigade was
observed there the S.O.S. was
sent up and they were
dispersed. At this time our
Lewis gun ammunition was
getting short and difficulty
was had in getting any
up as it had not arrived

at the rear dump but sufficient was obtained from other companies. No wire was to hand so we made use of what enemy stuff we could obtain and manage to get some up in front of our line. During the night the S.O.S. was sent up several times both on our right and left but no enemy were observed in front of our line. ~~At~~ Some of our guns were falling very short and caused a number of casualties in our line. Just before dawn a barrage was put down without any S.O.S. During the 5th it was generally very quiet. Several enemy were seen moving about in the vicinity

of Passchendaele and right on the left of the New Zealand sector; numbers of stretcher bearers and a Red Cross wagon were observed collecting wounded. Enemy aircraft were very active during the day, they were engaged when possible with Lewis guns. Consolidation was proceeded with and a good line dug. Just at dark the S.O.S. was sent up from the brigade on the right but we observed no enemy. At 10 pm our relief arrived. At this time the enemy artillery was fairly active but ~~it~~ it was falling just behind our line. Just as we were moving out the barrage came down again so the company was taken back into the

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line. During the last few hours in the line the enemy artillery was fairly accurate in place but he did not seem to have more than a couple of batteries firing. Our chief difficulty while in the line was in getting supplies forward.

8/10/17

J. R. Rogers
of 2 Coy.

To Adj. 40th Bn.
A. J. H.

Operations from 4-5/10/17.

The Battalion left leaping-off trench at 6 a.m. C Coy. was Bn. reserve, & moved in 1/2 Coys. in lines of sections, in rear centre of Bn. It was a safe formation under fire, & allowed for easy ^{quick} movement to any pt. if necessary.

The formation was kept well until after 37th Bn. objective was reached. Then the swampy ground caused men to lose direction, & platoons became scattered. It was here we sustained the first casualties since leaping off, as hitherto enemy's barrage had been weak, ill-directed & spasmodic.

Ten minutes before we reached 38th objective, 1/2 the Coy. was sent to support B Coy, at request of Capt. McVilly. This left us little more than one platoon, most of whom had strayed into N. Z. sector. During the hour halt I reorganized them, & afterwards they followed 2nd wave.

A lot of confusion was caused at the long halt by 39th Bn. going too close to our barrage. Then they had to withdraw. This example was followed by many of the troops in rear, & it was with great difficulty they were reorganized.

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While 38th Bn. were consolidating, we first came under m.g. fire, which proved more troublesome than all their artillery till we consolidated. From here till final objective, I attached myself to "D" Coy. on the left, as our main aim was to get our men back from N. Zs. into our own sector.

After we passed 39th objective, our chief difficulty was to direct the men onto their proper objective, as they tended to stray into the N. Zs. or into "B" Coy., leaving a big gap intervening. This was gradually regulated, however, before we reached final objective.

We found some difficulty in locating the final objective, owing to lack of prominent landmarks. Finally we dug in just in front of the line originally intended. If it had been possible, we should have preferred going 100x further & taking cemetery & strong pt. opposite "A" Coy. As it was, though, we were subjected to much annoyance from our own artillery.

Counter attacks did not develop until the night of 5th inst. The S.O.S. was in great demand during 4th inst., but nothing definite occurred.

Supplies. Stores in great demand, e.g. Stokes ammunition, water, etc., were not forthcoming.

For the last 24 hrs., as "C" Coy. was in support, I was attached to "A" Coy. We joined up with 41st Bn. on the right, & "D" Coy. on the left. It was apparently the easiest sector to hold, as, after

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consolidating, we did not come into contact with enemy
~~(artillery)~~ & were comparatively little troubled with
~~the~~ our own artillery.

M. Whitaker, Lt.

6th Coy.

4th Div. Bn. A.I.F.

[A large rectangular piece of lined paper is pasted onto the page. It contains a handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to be "G. H. B." followed by a flourish. The signature is written diagonally across the lines.]

Summary of Operations
4th & 5th October 1917

"D" Company left camp at about 6 pm on the 3rd October and reached our bivouac at 8 pm. They rested until about 11.30 pm. We proceeded by "R" route to the Brigade Assembly point - arriving there at about 4 am on the 4th instant without casualties. While on the Assembly point the men took advantage of the shell holes for cover.

At zero we moved off towards our objective so as to get clear of the enemy's barrage which we anticipated would come down on the Assembly point.

Immediately on advancing the other battalions did not appear to move as quickly as we had resulting in our own mixing with the battalions for the 1st, 2nd & 3rd objectives.

The platoons were being reorganised immediately on passing the first objective and were in

order before we reached the 2nd objective. We had no casualties up to the 1st objective. Owing to the marshy state of the country we advanced in sections in oblique formation - making it easier to advance. We halted for one hour at the 38th battalion objective and rechecked our organisation. We were in touch with the N.Z. troops on our left.

Moving forward to the 39th battalion we came under heavy machine gun fire under which we advanced in sectioned rushes to avoid casualties.

Approaching our objective we received considerable attention from a Pill Box on the N.Z.R. front and also from Hamburg redoubt. By means of a flanking attack we captured the Pill boxes which contained two machine guns. In the meantime "D" Company had dealt with Hamburg redoubt. We received considerable annoyance from a position just in front

3

of Stamburg redoubt which we
ignored fire on from our Lewis
guns and held it by working
round in rear. This position
also contained two machine guns.
We then commenced to
consolidate on the blue line -
at first we were inconvenienced
by snipers on our front. These
were disposed of by snipers up
and the work of consolidation
proceeded unhindered.

Owing to the N.Z.'s having
suffered rather severe casualties
they were unable to hold the
whole line allotted to them and
as our men had also suffered
some casualties we did not
dig in on the exact line laid
down previous to commencing
operations but made an "L"
shaped trench from Dagger
trench to the N.Z. position in
rear of a very swampy piece
of ground over which it was
practically impossible for troops
to advance, and was thus
able to hold a much longer
line with the men at my

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4

disposal. It also gave a
splendid field of fire and also
able to give enfilade fire across
the N.Z. front and the remainder
of our Battalion front by Lewis
guns.

After consolidation we received
no casualties whatever from
enemy fire but suffered from
our own artillery barrage despite
the fact that we hit flares when
called for the R.F.C.

On the morning of the 5th
my patrol reported movement
of enemy on our front & S.O.S
was fired. Nothing further
happened until 7 pm on the
5th when at least a Brigade
of the enemy were observed
advancing over the ridge to
the north of our position. The S.O.S
was fired. Nothing further happened.

We were relieved by an
English Regiment at about 11 pm
on the 5th inst.

Rations arrived on the morning
of the 5th inst but only 1 petrol
tin of water.

8/10/17

W.B. Riddick
Capt
etc. S. Coy

APPENDIX XIX^b

*Narrative of Operations
during the 12-13 Oct 1917*

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APPENDIX XIX



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

FIFTH PHASE - YPRES BATTLE - COMMENCING ON 12/10/1917.

Narrative of Operations.

Reference Maps: 1/20,000, Sheet 28 N.E.
" " Sheet 28 N.W.
1/10,000, Sheet 28 N.E.1.

DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF DIVISION.

After the relief of the Division on the morning of the 5/6th October, Units were disposed as follows :-

| | | |
|-------------------|----|---|
| Artillery | .. | In the Line |
| Engineers | .. | In YPRES, with C.R.E's Office at Ramparts. |
| Pioneers | .. | Cavalry Barracks, YPRES. |
| 9th. A. I. Bde | .. | WINNEZEELE |
| 10th -do- | .. | YPRES South Area |
| 11th -do- | .. | BRANDHOEK No. 3 |
| Field Ambulances. | | With Brigades & on CORPS duty; H.Q. WINNEZEELE, H.16.central G.12.b.7.7 |

CONCENTRATIONS OF UNITS.

On the morning of the 9th. October, the 11th Brigade moved up to the POTIJZE Area and took over from the 190th Brigade of the 66th Division on the night of 9/10th October.

On the night of the ^{10th} 9th. October, the 9th Brigade moved up by train and established itself in the concentration area at CAVALRY FARM.

On the morning of the ^{11th} 10th, the 10th Brigade moved into - bivouac at HUSSAR FARM.

By the morning of the 11th. the Field Artillery had moved forward, but owing to bad weather conditions and the heavy state of the roads, the whole of the "Heavies" were not in position.

Field Ambulances had taken up battle positions. Field Companies and Pioneer Battalion were situated in YPRES.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

Headquarters of Units. Divisional Headquarters were at Ramparts, YPRES, and Headquarters for Brigades were arranged - 10th Brigade at LEVI COTTAGES, D.21.a.7.4; 9th and 11th Brigades at D.26.a.35.75.

Communications. Divisional Headquarters was connected with Brigades by a buried cable; communication forward of Brigades consisted of ground lines, visual, pigeons and power buzzers.

Supplies. Ammunition for the Divisional Artillery was drawn from a dump at I.5.a.4.7 and carried by pack mule to gun positions.

(1)

J.O. ed

- 2 -

S.A.A., Grenades, etc. Dumps were established as follows:-

Main Divisional Dump at POTIJZE, I.3.d.2.4
Advanced Dumps at CAMBRIDGE ROAD, I.5.a.4.8, and
ZONNEBEKE ROAD, I.5.a.3.6.
Forward Emergency Dump at D.26.b.8.f.

Brigade Dumps were afterwards established at D.16.d.2.5.,
D.21.a.6.5, and D.21.a.7.4.

R. E. Material. R. E. material was drawn from Main Dump at
I.7.c.9.5, YPRES, and carried by Field Coy. First Line and Pack
Transport to an advanced dump at D.26.a.9.5.

Water. A filling point was established at CAMBRIDGE ROAD,
I.5.a.4.8, with a rear filling point in YPRES, I.8.a.9.9. No.2
Water Column acted as a reserve and was available in case of
extreme emergency.

Rations. No reserve dumps were formed, but one day's ration
which is normally carried by supply wagons of Train, was issued
to Units.

Medical. Advanced dressing stations were taken over at
POTIJZE, I.4.a.8.2, and at Prison, YPRES.

Routes of Evacuation. Routes of evacuation of casualties
from 10.0 a.m. on 11th. October, were as follows :- From Regi-
mental Aid Posts ^{through Railway Posts} at LEVI HOUSE, D.21.a.6.3 and MITCHELLS FARM,
D.20.c.2.2, - to FROST HOUSE, D.25.a.7.2, thence by Horse Ambul-
ance or Ford Motor Ambulance to advanced dressing station at
POTIJZE, I.4.a.8.2, or in the event of the A.D.S. POTIJZE being
destroyed, casualties to be evacuated to advanced dressing sta-
tion, Prison, YPRES, thence to C.M.D.S. at G.5.d.7.3. Walking
wounded were to be directed to BAVARIA HOUSE, C.30.o.6.5, and
from there transferred to light railway to the CORPS Walking
Wounded Collecting Post, The MILL, VLAMERTINGHE, H.8.a.9.9. If
train was not available, walking wounded were to be directed to
MILL COT Divisional Walking Wounded Collecting Post, I.5.a.1.7,
and from there to be conveyed by motor busses to The MILL, -
VLAMERTINGHE.

Horse ambulances were to be pushed as far forward as possible,
and if able to go as far as ZONNEBEKE Station, cases to be carried
along the road to LEVI COTTAGE, D.21.a.6.3, thence to A. D. S.
POTIJZE. LEVI COTTAGE was well equipped with stretchers, blan-
kets, dressings, splints, comforts, etc., for use in the forward
area. At this post, the Medical Officer in charge of the forward
area was stationed; arrangements for dumps of stretchers, etc.,
forward of this post were to be made by him as the tactical situa-
tion allowed.

Straggler Posts. Straggler Posts were established as follows:-
First Line - I.5.a.2.7, north end of CAMBRIDGE ROAD;
I.11.b.3.6, Railway, CAMBRIDGE ROAD.
Second Line - I.7.a.6.3, Bridge 9; I.7.c.4.7, Bridge 10
YPRES I.13.a.7.3, Bridge 13; I.8.b.1.1, MENIN ROAD
I.8.b.1.8, THOUROUT; I.8.a.4.8, NORTH GATE.
Straggler Collecting Station - Prison, YPRES.

Prisoners of War. Collecting stations were established at MILL COT. Prisoners were transferred to the Divisional Cage at YPRES Prison.

Identifications. (During the morning of the attack, prisoners were examined at MILL COT, but later in the day examination was carried out at YPRES Prison.)

Details Camps. The Transport lines and Details camps of the Brigades were established in the POTIJZE Area.

ORGANISATION OF UNITS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.

Infantry Brigades. Brigades were organised for the fight with the following approximate strengths :-

| | | | |
|----------------|-------------|------|-------------|
| 9th. A. I. Bde | 79 Officers | 1939 | Other ranks |
| 10th. -do- | 64 " | 1800 | " |
| 11th. -do- | 75 " | 1800 | " |

Trench Mortar batteries were left at the disposal of the Brigade Commanders. Machine Gun Coys. were distributed as follows:- 9th & 10th. A.M.G.Coys., less 8 guns and teams, were left in the hands of their respective Brigadiers. Eight guns of each of the 9th and 10th. Coys., with the whole of the 11th. and 23rd A.M.G.Coys. acted under the orders of the D.M.G.O., and were used for barrage work.

Engineers. One hundred men from the Infantry were attached to each Field Coy.

A.A.M.C. A total of 224 Infantrymen were attached to the A.A.M.C. as extra stretcher bearers.

REVIEW OF SITUATION AT 12 NOON ON 11th. OCTOBER.

Assembly Tape Line and Approach Routes. The 11th. Brigade, on taking over, found the line was not held as supposed; they therefore pushed forward and established a line - D.17.b.25.30, D.17.a.75.80, D.10.d.80.00, D.10.b.50.00. In order to meet this new situation, the Tape Line was laid out from D.17.c.6.1 to D.10.d.0.6, and two additional lifts were arranged in the barrage, viz., to Z plus 4 and Z plus 12.

One track was prepared by the Engineers up to the Tape Line for each Brigade. All arrangements were complete, and Brigades were ready to move off.

Information concerning enemy distribution & land to be crossed.

Enemy Defence Organisation. The position of the enemy opposite was somewhat obscure owing to no organised front line having been taken over, and the Division, coming direct from back area, having little knowledge of the front, - but it was thought that he was holding various strong points, with his usual shell hole defence between. The strongest of these were considered to be DECLINE COPSE, VIENNA COPSE, TIBER, DETECT CROSSING, CREST FARM and GRAF WOOD.

PASSCHENDAELE itself was believed to be strongly held.

It was thought that the enemy would attempt to put into practice his new policy of defence, i.e., holding front line strongly, but he would probably be disorganised after the attack on the 9th.

Identification, Strength & Morale of Enemy. The 195th Division, consisting of the 5th JAGER Regiment, 5th JAGER Regiment and 233 R.I.R. was known to be opposing us, though its exact dispositions had not been ascertained.

Information gained from prisoners of this Division showed that it was relieved in the LE CATELETE Sector on 30th August; went into hard training at MONCHY, where it remained throughout Sept., On 5th. October entrained at CAUDREY, passed through COURTRAI and detrained at ISEGHEM.

On the night of the 5/6th October, the Division was made up to strength while at rest; new drafts, composed chiefly of returned wounded, - but a small proportion of the 1919 Class - were included. Company strength would average 100 to 120. It did not appear to have suffered during the relief.

The Division had probably been equipped with an extra supply of light machine guns - the 233rd R.I.R. having six light machine guns per Company.

As this Division was in the front line during the attack on the 9th October, it is probable that it suffered serious casualties, and that its morale had also suffered to some extent.

Terrain. The valley about AUGUSTUS WOOD was in a very marshy condition and considerable difficulty in crossing it was anticipated. The right bank of the PAVEBEKE was considered to be impassable for a breadth of 200 yards.

On the right, although the surface of the ground was greasy, on account of rain, the going was expected to be fairly easy.

Wire. It was not anticipated that any quantity of wire would be met with.

Artillery. Apparently the enemy had succeeded in withdrawing a considerable amount of his artillery. It was anticipated that we would mainly be affected by fire from guns concentrated along the ridge north of PASSCHENDAELE, east of it about Squares W.25., E.1., E.2., and about MOORSLEDE.

Possible Counter-attacks. It was thought that he might launch counter-attacks from PASSCHENDAELE or from the direction of MOORSLEDE.

Enemy Barrage. No information could be obtained to show where the enemy barrage might be expected to come down in answer to our opening barrage.

DIVISIONAL TASK.

Three objectives were to be captured :-

- RED V.28.c.8.2. D.11.a.80.90. D.18.a.95.75.
- BLUE V.28.d.90.80 V.29.a.30.40. D.5.b.70.30
- GREEN V.29.b.30.50. V.30.b.00.10.W.25.c.0.4.

The main feature was the capture of PASSCHENDAELE VILLAGE.

FLANK DIVISIONS.

The Fourth Australian Division operated on our right flank, with the New Zealand Division on our left.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

The Division attacked with the 9th A. I. Bde (Right) and the 10th A. I. Bde (Left) in the Line, and the 11th A. I. Bde in reserve. Troops of the reserve Brigade were to be withdrawn to the West of the Tape Line by ZERO.

It was arranged that the New Zealand Division should have their Right Brigade reserve close up in order to assist, if required, in the capture of PASSCHENDAELE VILLAGE.

The New Zealand Right Brigade was also prepared to assist in the capture of GRAF WOOD.

In the event of the 10th Brigade not being able to advance through PASSCHENDAELE VILLAGE, the reserve Battalion of the 9th Brigade would take up the role of "C" Battalion of the 10th. Brigade, in order to fill the gap on the GREEN Line and join hands with the New Zealanders. In this event, the New Zealanders also agreed to extend their right.

"B" Battalion of the 10th Brigade was reinforced by one Company from the "D" Battalion of that Brigade, in order to assist in mopping up the village of PASSCHENDAELE.

"A" Battalion was ordered to reorganise and go forward, to be employed if necessary.

"C" Battalion was not intended to take any part in the capture of PASSCHENDAELE.

The 10th Brigade Reserve Battalion was to be held in readiness in the vicinity of AUGUSTUS WOOD.

No departure from the normal was made in the order of the Battalions of the 9th. Brigade. The Reserve Battalion of this Brigade was to move forward to the vicinity of HEINE HOUSE, D.11.c.

The 11th. Brigade was withdrawn and held in reserve in the area D.20 b. and d. and 21.a. and c.

Barrage. Five barrages, 200 yards apart, were arranged

APPENDIX XIV

| Barrage | Armament |
|---------|-----------------------|
| "A" | 18-pdrs |
| "B" | 4.5 Hows. and 18-pdrs |
| "C" | Machine guns |
| "D" | 6" Hows. |
| "E" | 8", 9.2 and 60-pdrs |

Owing to the local alteration previously mentioned, the first four lifts of the barrage were of 4 minutes duration each. This meant that the Infantry must cover the first 500 yards in 16 minutes, and from that time move at the rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes.

Consolidation. The Infantry were made responsible for establishing good continuous trenches along the GREEN and BLUE lines, commencing with a system of posts, latitude with regard to the exact positions being allowed them in order that they might secure the best field of fire. They were also responsible for the construction of a series of strong points, echeloned in depth. Brigades indented on the C.R.E. for the minimum number of personnel required to assist in the construction of these posts.

Maintenance of Touch. In order to maintain touch, small parties were detailed to move with adjoining formations, establishing touch with flank-units as follows:-

- 10th A.I. Bde with New Zealand Division -
- (a) on RED Line.
 - (b) Cross Roads, D.6.a.82.35
 - (c) Junction of roads, D.6.b.50.35
 - (d) on GREEN Line.

- 9th A.I. Bde with 12th A.I. Bde -
- (a) on RED Line
 - (b) DETECT CROSSING.

Arrangements for touch between Brigades was arranged by the Brigades concerned. In the event of gaps occurring, they were to be filled by troops moving up from behind.

Maintenance of direction. Maintenance of direction was assured by Officers specially detailed, working on compass bearings, with one or two men to keep direction. The approximate compass bearings of the sun at sun-rise was noted prior to ZERO and communicated to the troops.

Destination Patches. The attacking Brigades wore the normal distinguishing badges. The Companies of the attached Battalions of the Reserve Brigade wore Company distinguishing badges.

S.O.S. The S.O.S. signal was to be inoperative between ZERO hour and ZERO minus 10 mts. Counter-battery, however, was to be available up to and after ZERO.

Machine Guns. The guns in the hands of the D.M.G.O. were formed into two barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun batteries, each pair of batteries commanded by the senior officer.

These guns were organised as follows :-

| | | | |
|---------------|---|-----------------|---------|
| No. 1 Barrage | - | 9th A.M.G.Coy. | 8 guns |
| | | 10th do | 8 do |
| | | 23rd do | 16 do |
| No. 2 Barrage | - | 11th A.M.G.Coy. | 16 guns |
| | | 23rd do | 16 do |

The guns were to be placed in positions as follows:-

- (1) One battery - D.16.d.2.6
do D.16.a.70.25
do D.15.b.70.40
do D.15.b.50.50
- (2) 11th A.M.G.Coy. One battery at about D.5.d.9.2
do do D.12.a.10.85
23rd do do D.12.c.35.15
do do D.12.c.4.7

The O.C. of the 11th A.M.G.Coy. arranged to move his guns forward close behind the Infantry. The 23rd A.M.G.Coy. had instructions to cease fire in first barrage at ZERO plus 3 hrs and move forward to the second barrage position.

Engineers. Engineers, less those used by Brigades for construction of strong points, were in the hands of the C.R.E. and were to be engaged on the construction and making of tracks and the improvement of roads.

Pioneers. Two Coys. of Pioneers were allotted to the C.R.A. for the construction and maintenance of artillery roads; the remainder worked with the Engineers under the orders of the C.R.E.

OPERATIONS.

Synchronisation of Watches. Watches were synchronised twice daily with CORPS and with Brigades by an Officer from Divisional Headquarters, who took his watch around to Headquarters of Units. The watches of the Battalions taking part in the attack were also synchronised by a Staff Officer from Divisional Headquarters just prior to their moving off on the approach march.

ZERO. ZERO was ordered for 5.25 a.m. on the 12th October.

Approach March and Assembly. In accordance with instructions issued, Brigadiers made their own arrangements for the approach march.

Right Brigade. The first Battalion of the 9th Brigade left CAVALRY FARM at 6.0 p.m. on the 11th. The operation was successfully carried out, though rain fell throughout the night, rendering the track east of POTSDAM very difficult. In addition, the Railway line was heavily shelled and the tape line had disappeared in places. A considerable number of casualties were

were suffered on this portion of the track, as well as on the right of the Assembly position, near the CEMETERY. Gas shells also were being used, but no casualties were reported for this period. The 9th Brigade reported all Battalions in position at 3.0 a.m.

Left Brigade. The 10th Brigade commenced its approach march at 10.0 p.m. The vicinity of the track was intermittently shelled with gas shells and H.E., but few casualties were suffered, except at D.16.b. where one Battalion was seriously affected. The track was in good order, so that this Brigade was not so seriously affected by the weather as was the Right Brigade. At 4.0 a.m. the assembly was complete.

THE ATTACK.

Right Brigade. Throughout the advance to the RED LINE, heavy machine gun fire was encountered from the direction of BELLEVUE and MEETCHBELE on the left flank, and from TIBER and TIBER COPSE on the right.

The enemy put down a heavy 5.9 barrage from the CEMETERY through the centre of AUGUSTUS WOOD at ZERO plus 8.

Two machine guns were firing from DECLINE COPSE on the right of the railway onbankment. This position was mopped up as the Battalion advanced.

While digging in on the RED LINE, the Battalion was greatly harassed by machine gun fire from the railway on the right flank. A party detailed captured this position.

Casualties were very heavy, especially in Officers. On this account the advance to the BLUE LINE was carried out by the remainder of the two assault Battalions, reinforced later by the Battalion from the RED LINE. During this advance, the left flank was badly cut up by machine gun fire from PASSCHENDAELE and the ground about CREST FARM.

Consolidation was commenced, but it was rendered almost impossible by machine gun fire from the immediate front and from the direction of PASSCHENDAELE. The line was also exposed to direct fire from artillery firing at a range of 500 yards and upwards.

From ZERO hour, touch with the Brigades on the left and right was lost and could not be established. Withdrawal was therefore ordered and the Brigade withdrew to our original line.

Left Brigade. On account of the sodden and broken nature of the ground, the going was very heavy. The first objective was gained by 7.0 a.m. in spite of heavy machine gun fire from BELLEVUE SPUR on the left flank. All Battalions had suffered so heavily from this enfilade fire that it was found impossible to go on. The remaining portions of the three assaulting Battalions therefore carried on with the work of consolidation.

As The Division on their left had not advanced, touch could not be obtained, and when later in the day the enemy appeared to be working in behind their left flank, along BELLEVUE SPUR, the Battalions withdrew to our original line and linked up again with the left flank Division.

CASUALTIES.

| | | Off: | O/R. |
|---|-----------|-----------|------|
| <u>Assaulting Brigades</u> - 9th A.I.Bdo | .. | 60 | 1308 |
| | 10th -do- | 41 | 1053 |
| <u>Reserve Brigade</u> | 11th -do- | 13 | 526 |
| Total casualties for Division, for period 11th-21st. October | | 126 | 3182 |

PRISONERS.

Total prisoners captured by the Division were 16 Officers and 335 other ranks. The enemy troops captured belonged to the 233rd R.I.R. (357th and 358th Pioneer Coys. attached to 233rd R.I.R.), 449th I.R., 8th JAGER Regiment, including 16th and 24th JAGER Battalions, and 5th BAVARIAN Reserve Division.

GENERAL.

Following are the main features which militated against the complete success of the operation :-

1. The approach march was carried out under most trying conditions, with the result that the strain told on the troops even before they reached the Tape line.
2. The initial rate of the barrage, due to the necessary local adjust previously mentioned, was too fast considering the marshy broken state of the ground and the inclement weather. The troops were therefore not able to keep up to the barrage, with the result that the enemy had time to bring his machine guns to bear after the barrage had passed over.
3. The barrage was reported by both the Infantry taking part and by an Aeroplane Observer, to be very weak.
4. The failure of the Division on our left to take BELLEVUE SPUR caused almost the whole of our advancing troops to be exposed to very heavy enfilading machine gun fire from this flank.
5. To maintain advantages gained under such conditions, a great deal depended on Leaders. Both Brigades suffered very heavy casualties in Officers and N.C.Os. from the outset.

S. Jackson.
Captain,
for Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff.

PWP.

12-13/10/17

10th Australian Infantry Bde

Holt Bn
8710/17

Ref: L/21 Operations

The following supplementary information is furnished from company reports to the Bde.

The first objective was passed with few casualties moving towards the second objective the ground on the right was very wet and a general tendency set in to drift towards the left - during the long halt this was almost wholly remedied and was finally adjusted on moving on. Troops were still moving in small artillery formation. On passing second objective heavy machine gun fire was encountered. On gaining this objective

troops were shaken out into wave formation. Heavy machine gun fire was coming from HAMBURG and from D.A.B. trench. Launch parties were sent round the right and left and the strong point with two machine guns + crews captured. Parties were sent against D.A.B. trench in sharp rushes. The dugouts there were captured with their machine guns + crews. Consolidating parties moved to BLUE LINE and commenced consolidation. This was hindered by snipers and M.G fire until the forward area had been fully cleared with bayonettes etc. At 10.30 a number of enemies were seen to be assembling in CEMETERY. Artillery action was called for. Consolidation was proceeded with under

fairly comfortable circumstances from this time.

There was some sniping and a little snipeage M.B. fire from the right front. The following evening (7 pm 5/10/17) considerable enemy movement was noticed upon PASCHENDALE HILL towards divisional front. Report was submitted.

Earlier in the day, Red X ambulances were seen passing along the PASCHENDALE ROAD.

On the early morning of 5/10/17 enemy aircraft reconnoitred the Battalion position, flying low. These were unsuccessfully engaged by H.G. fire.

Lewis Gun fire was largely used to cover consolidating troops. Effective fire was brought to bear upon the enemy & repeatedly. At 9 pm

on the 4/10/17 a party of the enemy attempted to come across and was entirely dealt with by H.G. fire.

Some confusion was caused at the long halt by the leading Bn getting too close to the barrage and having to come back. This phase seems to have been well handled and re-organised.

The concrete "Pill Boxes", of which there are a good many, were very little damaged by shell fire. They were manned by 2 to 4 M.G. guns & crews. When these places were finally reached the enemy elected to surrender rather than fight. Many dead Boche are to be seen outside these structures.

H/24

Richard Stone
Lieut

Operation 11-13th, 1917

The ~~main~~ approach march along
ZOVNEBLOK Road was very slow
and with long and numerous halts; on the
track progress was steady until the last
mile, when halts were very numerous. Some
gas-shells fell near Kwick, giving off a gas
with a mustard-smell, and for half a
mile it was advisable to wear the front piece
of the S.B.R. with one pulling on the full piece.
This caused no delay.

The 40th Bn. had instructions to form up on a 200
yards front in the centre of the Brigade sector; on
arrival at the assembly point, Lieut. Penny who
had been taking the assembly positions earlier in
the night, reported that our position had been tapped
but that it was just behind a thick uncut belt of
wire which ran across the right two-thirds
of our sector, in front of which were the 37th
extended over the whole sector. I therefore
instructed him to guide the battalion to the

2
left third of our sector, when there was a
clear 200 yards unobstructed by wire,
and to explain the changed position to Company
Commanders. But in the circumstances it was not
possible to make clear to all ranks the change
from the disposition they had been told to expect.
We had to rely on the 37th who were reported by Mr Penny
as being across the whole front, to give us a line
to look on at the jump off.

There was a fair amount of shelling on the ~~traps~~
assembly position, and rain also fell steadily. The men
for the most part rolled themselves in W.P. sheets
and closed during the long wait for zero hour. The
shelling under the circumstances was harassing. It seemed
a mistake to choose an assembly position almost
identical with the line of D.A.B. trenches, ~~and~~
the Road through LAAMKOK which was evidently
the object of his artillery fire.

The general advance took place promptly at
zero hour. There was the inevitable mix-up
of battalions and waves at the outset; and
in this case there was no opportunity to
straighten out. The barrage could hardly

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to ~~be~~ seen; even in full daylight with careful observation, I was unable to place it with certainty; and under the circumstances of assembly we were almost entirely dependent on the barrage to guide us to position. Early in the very beginning of the advance we came under heavy machine gun and rifle fire with a good deal of shelling and suffered heavy casualties. This made it necessary to work by shell-holes, and re-organization into lines and waves was consequently almost impossible. Some of the M.G. & rifle fire came from dug-outs close by, and these were cleaned up by those nearest to hand. In this way most of D Coy were engaged in mopping up positions in Augustus wood and on the left flank, which were in the 37th mopping up area. These dug-outs gave a good haul of prisoners, who were mostly set to work to help or carry out our wounded. In the course of the mopping up all organization of waves was lost. If the position of these

strong points had been known by ~~us~~ ^{us}, it would have been possible to clean them up with much less loss and much less confusion to the attack-organization.

M.G. & sniping fire was still heavy after the mopping up was done. It came for the most part from the strong points across the Ravbeck on the Bellona Ridge, but some ~~was~~ M.G. fire came from ahead from near West Farm. Casualties continued heavy; sections were often reduced to one man, and our troops reached the vicinity of the Red Line in twos and threes of all companies of the Brigade mixed together. The remains of three platoons of D Coy reached the position, but the fourth was diverted across the Ravbeck and used up in cleaning up strong points on the side slope of the Bellona Ridge, in the N.2. Sector. The position of the forward troops at the first

5

long hall of the barrage turned out to be not
the Red Line but a line parallel to and
about 200 yards to the West of it, marked
along the centre of the sector by a hedge on
rising ground and a line of deep shell holes on
the ~~far side~~ side of it, looking like the
remains of an old trench. This line of
shell holes gave cover from reverse fire from
Bellevue, but turned out to be a mark for
enemy artillery.

At 7.45 am, when the barrage should
have been halted for over an hour, - but
was in fact practically non-existent - there
was only a handful of troops of all battalions
on that line. No more were coming up,
and at 8.15 I took the responsibility of
deciding not to continue the advance
with the small numbers available but
to dig in on that line and hold it on

6

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for further instructions. There was no sign
of a N.Z. advance on our left, and we
were badly exposed to enfilade and reverse
fire from strong points on the Bellevue Ridge.
I sent a runner to Bⁿ Hqs at Butts Wood
with a message to the Adjutant. I was
not aware then, nor until evening, that a
forward Reserve Line had been established.
The want of pigeons was a serious handicap
at this time & subsequently.

Further investigation showed that the total
number of the 10th Brigade on the forward
line was ~~about 150~~ about 150 with a few
of the Bde men ~~incorporated~~ in it; and on the
right ~~the front of~~ our line was continued
by the 9th Bde, who reported however
that their right flank was in the air,
as our left flank was. About 9.30 am

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part of our line marked by a prominent tree came under heavy shell fire, and I withdrew back this part for about 50 yards, ~~at day in~~ where we dug in again. Sniping continued persistent from Bellona Ridge, and heads had to be kept down. Some very good digging was done under these conditions. Later in the morning, numbers of the enemy began to dribble along the skyline of Bellona Ridge from west-east, and down the side slope behind our left flank. Our position seemed to me untenable with both flanks in the air & exposed to enfilade fire from Bellona Ridge; and with a chance of being cut off by the enemy coming behind us from Bellona. Moreover there was a steady drift back from the line occupied by the 9th Bde on our right, which did not seem under effective control. I discussed the situation

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in conference with the officers of other battalions present, and in the absence of instructions in reply to my 8.40 message decided to order a gradual withdrawal to our jumping off point, where we should be able to ~~make~~ make contact with the N-2. divⁿ on our left. I reported this decision & the reasons for it to Bn HQ at 10.15 by C. S. M. Boden, who had been wounded early in the action but remained on duty. All men in the line were warned of the move, and small groups moved off under orders at intervals beginning from the right. Two officers went back with the first party to supervise the digging in on ~~the same position near the jumping off line~~ or near the assembly position. The withdrawal was spread out over an hour but was observed and occasioned a good deal of M.G. and Artillery activity by the enemy, who distinctly

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followed groups of 4 or 5 each H-E., - but our casualties were negligible. About 3 pm when the withdrawal was almost complete, the enemy shelled the position heavily, but ~~there~~ ~~was~~ ~~only~~ ~~one~~ ~~or~~ ~~two~~ ~~light~~ ~~artillery~~ ~~hits~~ ~~in~~ ~~range~~ - was a little long and no harm was done. The ~~the~~ withdrawal was completed by 3-30 pm and ~~the~~ ~~front~~ digging in on the new line had made good progress. On arriving back I sent out a patrol to make and keep touch with the N.Z. division, and ~~sent~~ ~~out~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~detachment~~ ~~of~~ ~~Mr~~ ~~Swann~~ ~~&~~ ~~Mr~~ ~~Mill~~ ~~to~~ ~~send~~ ~~out~~ ~~parties~~ ~~to~~ ~~collect~~ ~~the~~ ~~wounded~~ ~~over~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~we~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~operating~~ ~~in~~. There was fairly heavy intermittent shelling on our new position & also about the one we had evacuated, but casualties were few. The night was quiet

On the next day, both sides were fully occupied in getting in wounded, and men who had been bogged through exhaustion & unable to evacuate themselves, - we in our own sector and the enemy in the N.Z. sector. There was a consequent cessation of ~~the~~ enemy M.G. fire but shelling was continued intermittently. A number of men from isolated positions, shell-holes & dugouts came in during the night and early morning, bringing up the Bde strength to about 400.

Instructions for relief were received during the afternoon; guides were sent to the 11th Bde and ^{Brigade} a dump of S.A.A, tools & furnished and handed over to the relieving Brigade. I relieved the 37th, 38th, & 39th Btlts in daylight, & some of the 40th. But the last relieving Coy. went astray, and

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the 31st of the 40th had to stand by for
2 hours until the supporting batteries was
in position. As it was then dark, the
40th moved out in one column & had some
difficulty in finding their way on the track.

The men had been employed fully during
the day in stretching bearings in very heavy
ground; and the depth of mud on the track
in the dark made the march back very
exhausting; a number of men had to be
helped out of every bad place, halts were
frequent & progress very slow; but the
column kept together & only one man was
left behind before reaching the main road.

We reached our Barrack at 2.30 a.m.

The following officers of the 40th Bⁿ reported to me
in the forward line & therefore worked unceasingly
& gave me every possible help in directing the
various observations, :- Lieut. Barrard, Lieut. McIntyre
Lieut. Swann and Lieut. Mills

J. G. D. C.

Adjutant, 40th Bn.

As platoon commander of No 4 during the recent operation my report is as follows: -


The men were eager to attack and were in great danger of being caught by our own barrage.

Confusion was soon evident and all battalions fused into each other, apparently with only one objective - FINAL.

Personally, with Lt GRANT, I observed that pill-boxes immediately in rear of our line of advance would give serious trouble we went with a section of men to capture the one we saw on our left flank. Then from this we saw others. After taking one of them Lt GRANT was hit and I rushed forward and took two others making a total of over 60 prisoners.

From absolute shortage of ammunition in two of these pill-boxes I should conclude that our attack was a complete surprise to them.

The resistance was not over-strong.



and, as prisoners, their demeanour was all that could be expected.

I observed that the greatest danger of captured pill-boxes is the cover they afford men who give way to the sense of safety and hesitate when they should go forward.

These being all the points threatening and actually on our sector frontage. I called the men and went forward to assist in consolidating the 40th Bn's objective - where I remained until the withdrawal of the men.

I asked several men why they were retreating and the answer was in nearly every case "An officer told us."

Later on I superintended the consolidation of the rear line under orders of Major GIBLIN.

The failure seemed to lie with the Brigade responsible for the left sector where Dimpers and M. guns caused so many casualties along the whole front.

J Chamberlain 2/11/17
A. Coy. 40th Bn

Narrative 17-13/10/17

of the operation of the 12th Bn

At 9 pm. on 11.10.17 B Coy fell in for the approach march which was completed successfully by 3.30 am 12.10.17. On the way the enemy shelled the area lightly with H.E. and gas shells (the latter from the small I took to be mustard gas). There were no casualties on the approach march. From 3.30 am to 5.25 am on the 12.10.17 we lay in rear of the platoons of C Coy on the bunker ~~area~~ the enemy shelled our position consistently with H.E. but most of the shells fell behind us about ~~1/2~~ 1/4 mile short. There were no casualties in C Coy. At 5.25 am 12.10.17 our barrage opened and we advanced. Within the first 500' the 37th 38th and 40th Btns appeared to be telescoped into one another this was mainly due

II

in my opinion to, 1. the rear Btns moving off too soon after Zero II and the leading Btn being held up by Enemy M.G. fire. When we reached the first wood the hostile M.G. fire became very concentrated from our right front and I led such of the Coy, as were with me round to the left flank of the wood a M.G. then opened on us from the left (apparently in the N.Z. sector on the other side of ~~RAE~~ RAVE BEEK). My Coy Sgt Major was shot through the head and three other NCO's were killed. Numbers of men fell apparently hit by M.G. bullets and the remainder of us pushed on coming round AUGUSTUS WOOD and entering it from the West. We captured the Pill Box and sent back about 20 prisoners to the rear. By about 6.30 am

III

I reached the western edge of HAALEN WOOD none of my Coy were with me at this time, two platoons having worked round to our extreme right flank (according to previous orders). Coy H.L. being together with my two left platoons later dispersed or rendered casualties by m.g. fire.

When I reached HAALEN WOOD I collected some men belonging to A Coy (3 in number) I then moved along a line running between HAALEN WOOD and DECK WOOD. Some of the 5th and 30th Btn. were consolidating near the edge of HAALEN WOOD I also saw some of the 9th Bde one of my Platoon Cmdrs (Sgt Nichols) reported to me with about seven men and I set them to work consolidating the

IV

left of the position. It was reported to me that Major Giblin had arrived at the line and I at once reported to him. We found that enemy shells were falling very close to our position and as the line of our consolidation coincided too closely with old enemy trenches we started a new line about 40' in rear. At about 9.30 Am. we became certain that both our flanks were in the air but hoping that the people on our Right and left would eventually come up continued to dig in though it was deemed inadvisable to advance further. At about 12.30 pm one of our platoons asked for flares which were accordingly given. A good deal of trouble had been given by snipers and m.g. during this

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V

part of the operation and now the enemy commenced to shell our position more heavily some shells apparently coming from our right flank. A conference of officers was held and it was decided that owing to the fact of both flanks being in the air and to the increased enemy activity both with snipers m.g. and H.E. which latter seemed to point to a possible counter attack it was advisable to go back to get touch on the flanks. Major Giblin ordered the men to go back in small parties this manouvre was carried out successfully and by about 5 pm we took up a position slightly in advance of the sunken road. I was ordered out ~~at~~ on the afternoon of 13.10.57.

VI

The enemy barrage appeared to me to be ill directed and not heavy he seems to have misjudged our positions being always well behind us. Our Barrage seemed much lighter than usual and was not very accurate I saw about 20 shells which fell short some by as much as 100'.

Manard Lt
Of Bloor

16/10/57

(1)

12-13/10/17

Report of operations of 12th inst. -

On the 11th inst. at 9 P.M. the Battalion moved from ~~the~~ HUSSAR FARM. B. Coy being in rear of Battalion + my platoon 2:7 being in rear of the Company - During the approach march we were lightly shelled with H.E. + Gas shells, the shells were apparently mustard gas - B. Coy suffered no casualties - at 3.30 A.M. on the 12th inst. we took up our position on the jumping off line, B. Coy being lined along the side of SUNKEN ROAD; 2:7 Platoon being on the extreme right of section a portion of C. Coy were in line in front of us. During the two hours wait we were shelled with H.E. most of it falling just in rear of our position my platoon suffered no casualties -

at 5.25^{A.M.} the Barrage opened + in my opinion was very light. The three Battalions went over precisely in a bunch, 37th 40th + 38th being mixed together almost from the start, in my opinion a stated time should be given to each Battalion when to move -

Immediately the Battalions went over a heavy M.G. fire was opened on us

(2)

+ we suffered a large number of casualties, the fire appeared to come from the pill box in AUGUSTUS WOOD and a pill box on the ridge on our left flank, I saw 15 to 20 Germans come out of the pill box in the wood - after the shrapnel points in the wood + to the left of it were ~~also~~ cleared the only M.G. fire we experienced appeared to be coming from the ridge on the New Zealand Brigade front. I worked along the extreme right of our flank (as previously mentioned) but had lost most of my men, & got out of touch with them, I gathered some 37 + 38 + 40 ± B.M. men + moved along + arrived at the Red Line + put the men on to consolidation work, on coming up I saw 2 or 3 9th Brigade men, but could not get in touch with 9th Brigade flank.

At a conference of officers it was decided - owing to both flanks being in the air & being under heavy fire, some of it appearing to come from our right flank, ~~it was~~ to withdraw to a position in rear where we could get in touch with both flanks.

(3)

This was done as ordered by Major Gilpin, the men going back to the new position in parties of 2 or 3, & was successfully completed by 5 P.M. When I arrived back Colonel Henderson was in charge of consolidating the new position - which was in part of ~~new position~~ the SUNKEN ROAD - Col. Henderson ordered me to collect all men & to put them to work in the new line, this I did, after having collected a party of 70 or 80 men, the men being a mixture from all the Battalions in the Brigade - During the night the enemy shelled us fairly lightly, but he did not appear to have our range - Between 5 P.M. & 7 P.M. on the 13th with us were fairly shelled, his range being very accurate -

about 10 P.M. we were relieved by the 11th Brigade & after a heavy march moved ~~Hussar~~ HUSSAR FARM about 2 A.M. on the 14th inst. The weather during the whole operation was very wet, consequently the mud was very difficult to negotiate, especially in the advance -

G. R. G. July 21st 1915
O/C. 2nd B.C.

16-10-17.

~~12/13/10/17.~~

To Adj. 40th Bn.

Herewith please find report of our attack at 5.25 A.M. on the 12th inst.

The Bn. moved off from Kusanas Farm at a little after 9 p.m. on the 11th October in single file in this order :- H.Q.s ; 2 platoons of "A" Coy ; 2 platoons of "C" Coy ; "D" Coy ; 2 platoons of "A" Coy ; 2 platoons "C" Coy followed by "B" Coy in reserve, and the whole proceeded along the Zonnebeke Rd. As we turned off to the left to get onto "K" track we were met with gas-shells but they only caused a little halt & inconvenience. I noticed two men of "D" Coy calling for help and supposed they had been struck by a shell of some description. However we pushed on and the track was in a fairly good condition. As far as I know we arrived at the sunken road, an assembly trench, with no casualties except the two mentioned. We reached this spot I think at 3.15 A.M. on the 12th inst.

We were rather crowded + not in an correct formation as the ground, wire, + mud would not allow this. It commenced to rain steadily + the men put on their ground sheets + laid down wherever possible. Things were not too bright lying in the mud with the rain pouring down + then the Boche started shelling us fairly heavily. However when the zero time 5.25 am. came round we were all ready + when the barrage commenced we advanced + extended out as the men were too bunched up. I noticed one incendiary shell explode + knock several men down almost before we had gone 20 yds. This was on my left + it was light enough to see them. The barrage in my mind was too light + the machine guns were very poor. We sustained several casualties from a pill-box immediately in the wood in front of us but it was soon rushed + prisoners (estimated 20) were taken. All units seemed mixed up, 37th, 38, 40th Bns who of the Bde. We met very little opposition except from a large pill-box on the top of a ridge to our left which the N. L.s had to capture. The Boche sniped a bit from there + killed or wounded

a great number of our men. We reached the 37th objective + commenced to dig in. ~~Some~~ ^{Some} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~men~~ ^{men} however went on + some even went into Paeschendaele, Cpl. Charles worth from my coy. being one of them. He told me ^{after} if we could have got a couple of machine guns + a few men on the ridge it could easily have been held. On our left flank however nobody could be seen. The morass in the gully was almost impossible to pass + when walking was most strenuous. I went almost to Crest Farm but as no one or very few appeared to be advancing I went back to where the 37th were consolidating. Still no one appeared on our left flank + as we were being heavily shelled + flanked by machine gun fire we were ordered to go back in small parties to where the 39th Bn were that is in our jumping off trench. I think this occurred at about 4 o'clock p.m. on the 12th. Here we stayed for the night + improved our line. We were shelled off and on all night. We remained in this line all that day (13th) + with the untiring efforts of Lt. Jackson I think that all the wounded were brought in. At about

10 o'clock we were relieved by the 41st Bn
 + were led home by Major Gublin along K
 track which was in an awful condition.
 Some of the men had a trying time strugg-
 ling along as the mud was easily over
 one's knees in many places. We arrived
 back ^{at 2:30 a.m. 14th.} at Hussar Farm with approx. 100 men
 although I believe a similar number had
 arrived there some time ago. Almost every-
 one was ~~knocked~~ ^{tired} out as it had been a
 very severe test. We were also deeply dis-
 appointed at not gaining any objectives but
 conditions were against us, especially on our
 left flank. The damage barely affected the
 pull boxes at all.

I regret to say that with regard to the
 time movements happened I am absolutely
 at a loss as to their correct time. To know
 when they really did happen.

R Swain and Lt
 "C" Coy
 40th Bn.

Bn Hq was situated at Berlin wood.
Forward Bn signal station moved off behind
the 38th Bn. At Waterfields the forward
sta was set up and got into communication
with Bn Hq by lamp at 7.45. This was kept
up until ~~Sta~~ was withdrawn to line of consolidation
at 6 pm on ^{12th when} the station was moved
to line in rear. Communication between
Bn Hq and fwd station was maintained
throughout. In every case Coy ligs
became casualties before stns could
be opened.

Communication was maintained with
Bde throughout by telephone & Visual.

Narrative of Operations 12th inst.

13 Platoon, D Company, 140th Bn

Appendix 12-13/10/17

During the approach march 2 men in the platoon became casualties owing to hostile shelling, otherwise we reached our Assembly Position unhindered.

We lost no men from the shelling of the Assembly Position, whilst awaiting zero hour.

At zero hour we went over and shaped a course to take us just to the right of Augustus Wood so as to give us the direction towards Passchendaele. From what we could see of the barrage here it was very weak and hard to follow, and also it was

unable to discern the waves of the troops in front of us.

Passing Augustus Wood troops in front of us appeared very much aground some enemy dugouts ahead, there being in my opinion over 100 men bunched in a very small area. In the Wood itself I could see none of our troops, and as the people in front and ourselves received considerable attention from snipers located there, I diverted my platoon and mopped up this wood, accounting for between 25 and 30 of the enemy in this operation. On emerging from the Wood casualties in the platoon were considerable, owing to Machine Gun and Sniper fire which appeared to come from

APPENDIX XIX

③

well to our left, consequently we eased our pace of advance somewhat, and shortly afterwards took up a position in shell holes for nearly an hour before continuing our advance; what could be seen of the troops to our front and flanks along likewise. At 8.30 am we resumed our advance, the platoon now being 1 Officer & NCOs and 5 men strong, and gained a position in line with the remainder of the Company, one NCO and 2 men were wounded getting to this position. With the remainder we commenced construction in an old enemy trench but withdrew 50 yds later on owing to hostile shelling. In this new position we linked up our irregular line of shell holes and were joined in doing so

④

by some men from other Companies in the Battalion, also 2 men from the 9th Brigade. We held this position till 2 pm, when orders were received to withdraw to our jumping off point, this we did by moving a little out of our sector to enable us to get in some 9th Brigade wounded men, whom we took to the 37th Battalion RAP.

On arrival with the wounded men at the 37th Battalion RAP I noticed a considerable number of men withdrawing beyond this point, and with the assistance of Cpl W Walker I here collected about 100 men, chiefly of the 9th Brigade, and occupied a line of shell holes further forward, and sent to Major Gribble for instructions. I received orders to link up a

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⑤

gap between the 9th and 10th Brigades with the men under me, and as so, the men shortly afterwards being taken over by officers of the 38th and 39th Battalions. I then proceeded to my own Battalion sector accompanied by the remaining members of my Platoon, and en route came across a party of about 30 men of the 37th Bn, without an officer, and at a loss as to what to do. I organised these men and took over a sector to the left of the 38th Bn which we consolidated.

During the night of the 12/13th I sent out parties to collect wounded on our front, principally under Cpl Walker, and was able to get several wounded men in. I also came

⑥

across several stragglers from various Battalions and attached them to my sector. During the morning of the 13th, I reorganised the men under me, returning various men to their respective Battalion sectors, keeping under myself the men of the 37th Bn and the 4th Coy of my own Platoon. I occupied these men in further consolidating our position and in getting in wounded from our front and the vicinity. In the afternoon of the 13th, I handed over my sector to an officer of the 37th Bn, and reported by it to my Battalion with the remainder of my Platoon.

John West
 Platoon Leader
 13th Platoon
 40th Bn AIF

APPENDIX XIX

R.W.Z. copy

R.W.C

13/10/17

Forwarding a report
of personal reconnaissance
by Lt B. J. JACKSON, Sig. Officer
of this unit.

The report contains
valuable information re
enemy dispositions and
those of the N.Z. Division
on our left.

M^r JACKSON went
out to search for an officer
of the BN (L. GRANT) who was
believed to be wounded in
Enemy Territory: he found
the body of this officer & as
stated located & brought in
7 Australians during the
whole operation his conduct
has been very magnificent


Richard R.C.

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
No 17.

MESSAGE MAP.

APPENDIX XX 166



Trenches corrected to 27-9-17.



Printed by No 2 Advanced Section, A.P. & S.S.

TO:—

44M 11122314

No.

210

1. I am at..... (Note:—Either give Map Reference or mark your position by a 'X' on the Map on back.)

2. I have reached limits of my Objective.

3. My Platoon is at..... and is consolidating.

4. My Platoon is at..... and has consolidated.

5. Am held up by (a) M.G. at..... (Place where you are).
(b) Wire at.....

6. Enemy holding strong point.....

7. I am in touch with..... on Right
..... on Left.

8. I am not in touch with..... on Right
..... on Left.

9. Am shelled from.....

10. Am in need of—

11. Counter Attack forming at.....

12. Hostile (a) Battery active at
(b) Machine Gun
(c) French Mortar

13. Reinforcements wanted at.....

14. I estimate my present strength at..... rifles.

15. Add any other useful information here:—

HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION
716122
10th BATTALION, A.I.F.

Date..... 1917.

Name.....
Platoon.....
Company.....
Battalion.....

(A). Carry all maps or papers which may be of value to the Enemy.


(B). Give no information if captured, except the following, which you are bound to give:—

Name and Rank.

(C). Collect all captured maps and papers and send them in at once.

A.I.F. as reference document

SCALE 1:5,000.

VILLAGE OF
PASSCHENDAELE

Scale 1:5,000.

PASSCHENDAELE.

(Reference attached 1/5,000 map and 1/10,000 Sheet Zonnebeke.)

1.—TOPOGRAPHICAL.

The village of PASSCHENDAELE which is built on sandy soil stands on the summit of the PASSCHENDAELE—BROODSEINDE ridge. The village is possibly commanded by the village of MOORSLEDE, which stands on high ground some 3,000 to 4,000 yards to the East. There is good observation both East and West from points North and South of the village on the WESTROOSEBEKE—BROODSEINDE roads.

2.—ROADS.

All the roads leading from the village are pavé or metalled with the exception of that which runs North-West to the OOSTNIEUWKERKE road at W 19 c (Sheet 20).

3.—STREAMS.

There are only small streams near the village. The RAVEBEEK and the PADDEBEEK to the West; the BROUBEEK to the South and the OUDEGODBEEK to the South-West, have channels of small width and depth and contain practically no water in the summer months.

4.—WATER SUPPLY.

There are good wells in nearly every house, with water at a depth of 32½ feet to 35 feet. There are three artesian wells. (1) In the Bouquet brewery, D 6 b 44; (2) Near a road at D 12 a 88.90; (3) Facing the house at D 6 d 82.27. The water in them is not at all good. There is a perennial spring of good water at E 1 c 05.62. It is rather hidden and hard to find. There is another spring on the other side of the road.

5.—BUILDINGS.

The following are the most important buildings with the strongest cellars. These cellars (except No. 14) are vaulted, the vaulting being as a rule one or more feet above ground level, with the result that in many cases the cellars have a considerable field of fire. (Numbers correspond to those on plan):—

1. *Estaminet.*
 2. *Doctor's House.* Two vaulted cellars.
 3. *Dwelling House.* Strong cellar. If houses opposite are destroyed, it has a field of fire towards South-west.
 4. *Dairy.* Cellar has field of fire towards the South-East as far as DROOGENBROOD-HOEK and MOORSLEDE roads. View to West less extended.
 5. *Windmill.* Masonry. Very strong. Walls 1 m. 20 thick. About 80 m. high.
 6. *Windmill House and Storehouses.* Strong cellars beneath dwelling house at North corner. Cellar beneath storehouses.
 7. *Estaminet.* Strong cellars.
 8. *Vicarage.*
 9. *Dwelling House.* Cellar. Has a field of fire towards South-West.
 10. *Curate's House.*
 11. *Convent School.* Two very strong vaulted concrete cellars. Has a field of fire towards South-West.
 12. *Notary's House.* Very large cellar.
 13. *Dwelling House.* Large cellar.
 14. *Brewery.* Small cellar (wooden roof) under grain stores. Small cellar under North-West part of brewery. Wooden roofed cellar under East part of dwelling houses; partly vaulted cellar under West part.
 15. *Flour Mill.* Cellar beneath West corner.
 16. *Boys' School.* Master's house. Cellar beneath North corner. At D 6 b 8.0 is a large vaulted cellar, 9 × 4 metres, under the field.
 17. *Brewery.* Vaulted cellars beneath dwelling house and part of brewery.
 18. Strong vaulted cellars.
 19. Very strong cellars.
 20. Large and very strong brick building with good cellars. Thirty yards N.W. of barn at E 1 a 2.2 is a large disused cistern, used as a beetroot cellar.
 21. Strong two-storey brick building with good cellars.
 22. Vaulted cellar, 3½ × 3 × 2 metres.
 23. Two vaulted cellars.
 24. Open well, 18 metres deep, 4 metres diameter.
 25. Good perennial spring.
 26. Three Artesian wells.
 27. *Church,* modern, built of brick, very strong. No crypt or cellars.
- There are many other houses having vaulted cellars.
The above information is taken from the statements of refugees.

Revised to October 6th, 1917. From further statements by refugees, etc.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
-----Divisional Headquarters,
5th. October, 1917.QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BY PLATOON AND
COMPANY COMMANDERS.

1. Did the system of rushing every enemy position, whether shell hole, trench or pill box, immediately it is seen, work all right?
2. What kind of fire were the enemy able to open on you (M.G., Rifle - Artillery) as you advanced? From what places?
3. How far were you from the nearest of the shells of our barrage as you advanced behind it?
4. Did you notice our own M. G. Creeping barrage at all? Was it a help?
5. Did the enemy fight in odd parties of a few men? Or did he try and collect into parties of a platoon or more to oppose you? Did he put up a decent fight? Did you use your bayonets?
6. Did he sham being dead?
7. How long afterwards was it before he began to shell you? Did he shell any particular place especially?
8. Was it easy to keep up with the barrage? Any alterations suggested?
9. Were the moppers-up and carriers sufficient?
10. Did the Germans resist and fight after our leading wave had passed over them?
11. Were you checked at all at any point? Where? What by?
12. Was the plan of using smoke by Artillery, to mark halts, a good one? Was it obvious?
13. Are there any parts of the scheme of attack which you would like altered if we had to do a similar attack again?
14. Did you use your pigeons? Any need to do so?

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

IN RE: [Name]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COURT

On [Date], [Name] was arrested at [Location] and taken to the [Location] where he was held in custody.

[Name] was arrested on a charge of [Charge] and was held in custody at [Location] until [Date].

[Name] was arrested on a charge of [Charge] and was held in custody at [Location] until [Date].

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Robert Greer
Officer

