

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/30/28

Title: 13th Infantry Battalion

February 1917



AWM4-23/30/28

13 Bm

48.

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
1917			
Feb. 1 st	SWITCH TO 7pm	15 th Battalion (in front line) attached strong points N. 21 d 4 1/2, 7 1/4 and N. 21 d 8 1/2, 5 1/2 but	
		were driven out just before dawn.	
Feb. 2 nd	to	Relieved 15 th B ⁿ in front line. Relief complete	} APPENDIX
		by 8.50 pm.	} No. B. 22
" 3 rd	POSSUM RES -	Received orders for attack to be delivered	
		on night 4/5 th Feb.	
Feb. 4 th	"	Preparations for attack. See	APPENDIX B. 23
		attack launched 10.2 pm after 2 minutes	
		tarnage.	
Feb. 5 th	"	7pm "D" Coy 16 th B ⁿ (Capt. AHEARN) relieved	
		"A" Coy 13 th B ⁿ on the right	
" 6 th	"	Completed saps from GREASE TRENCH	
		to captured line.	

D.398/9.14.—C.11056.

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
7-2-17	GUEUDECOURT SECTOR	Holding line with 3 Coys + one Coy of 16 th B ⁿ attached. "A" Company detached to 16 th B ⁿ .	
8-2-17	do.	do.	
9-2-17	do. 9.15pm	Relief by 46 th B ⁿ completed. Moved to MELBOURNE CAMP, MAMETZ	} APPENDIX No B.24
10-2-17	MAMETZ	Resting.	
11/21-2-17	do.	Training and fatigues	
22-2-17	do. 8am	Lt Col. J. M. A. DURRANT, D.S.O. assumed command of 4 th Bde vice Pdr-Gen BRAND, absent on leave. Major D. G. MARKS, M.C. administering command of Battalion	
	Jan	Moved to Billets in RIBEMONT	} APPENDIX B.25

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.		
23-2-17	RIBEMONT	Training hours — 9.30 am to 11.30 am.			
to		1.30 pm to 3.30 pm.	Introduction		
28-2-17		of new organisation set out in S.S. 1919.			
28-2-17		Strength of Battalion including attached, on 28-2-17.			
		OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS		
		(incl. Attached)	22	701 718	723
		Detached	6	82	88
		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>783</u>	<u>811</u>
<p>for <i>as per major Fred. Cundy a.g.</i></p>		Evacuations & Training	See	<u>APPENDIX B.26</u>	

13th BATTALION ORDER No. 1Headquarters,
29th January, 1917.

Ref. Map:--- GUEUDECOURT, 1:10,000,

(1) The 13th Battalion will relieve the 15th Battalion in RIGHT Battalion Sector of Brigade front on night 2nd/3rd February 1917. The relief to be complete by 10 p.m.

The disposition on completion of relief to be as follows:-

13th HEADQUARTERS. - POSSUM RESERVE.

"A" Company. - Right of front line and dugouts at CHALK PIT. One (1) Platoon, (roughly 24 other ranks) to be left in deep dugouts in WATLING STREET.

"B" Company. - Left of front line. (Less two (2) Platoons in POSSUM RESERVE.

"C" Company. - PILGRIMS WAY.

"D" Company. - BULL'S ROAD.

(2) The following parties are to be warned for duty before moving up:-

"A" Company. Carrying rations and water to CHALK PIT:-
1 N.C.O. and 20 men from WATLING STREET. Rations etc. from CHALK PIT on to be handled by men located there.

"B" Company. Carrying rations and water to left Company:-
1 N.C.O. and 20 men from platoons in POSSUM RESERVE.

"C" Company. Daily water fatigue:- 1 N.C.O. and 20 men
Company ration fatigue - 1 N.C.O. and 6 men
Party No.10 - 1 Officer and 30 O.R's.
Party No.11 - 1 Officer and 30 O.R's
Party No.15 - 1 N.C.O. and 10 men

"D" Company. Company ration fatigue - 1 N.C.O. and 6 men
Party No.11 (a) - 1 Officer and 50 O.R's
Party No.16 1 1 Officer and 50 O. R's

Brigade Headquarters have been asked that after the relief Party No. 19 should work at CHALK PIT instead of at 14th Battalion Headquarters.

(3) Companies to send up a representative in daylight on 2nd February to take over trench stores. Receipts to be given and copy of inventory forwarded to Battalion Headquarters with least possible delay.

(4) Completion of relief to be signalled using E.A.B. CODE No.1.

Issued at

Copy No.1

2

3

War Diary

O.C. "A" Coy.

O.C. "B" Coy.

Capt.
Adjutant, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.

Copy No.4 O.C. "C" Coy.

5 O.C. "D" Coy

6 I.O. and R.M.O.

7 Sig. Off., L.G.O.

8 Brigade Headquarters.

Reference Map: GURUD COURT 1:10,000

appendix B 23

4/2/1917

1. On night 4th/5th February the 13th Battalion will capture and occupy enemy trenches from M22 c 05.65 to M21 b 25.05 also the communication trench from M21 d 49 to M21 b 50. Bombing Stops will be established at M22 c 05.65, M21b 25.05, M21 b 30.05 and M21 b 50.
2. Two Companies 14th Battalion will be in support in (a) SHIRT TRENCH & GIBBASS TRENCH and (b) POSSUM RESERVE.
3. There will be a heavy bombardment of enemy's rear trenches and gun positions to cover the operation. The 4th A.L.T.M.I., and 4th A.L.G. Coy. also, are assisting.
4. Zero time will be 10 p.m.
5. Opening Artillery barrage will be two (2) minutes from zero time.
6. Company frontages on objective will be:-

"A" Coy.	M 22 c 05.65	to	M21 d 8 1/5
"C" Coy.	M 21 d 8 1/5	to	M21 d 77
"E" Coy.	M 21 d 77	to	M21 d 4 1/8
"D" Coy.	M 21 d 45.85	to	M21 b 25.05
7. Bombing Platoon will work with "E" Company.
8. Jumping off frontages will be:-

"A" Coy.	M22 c 1.3.	to	M21 d 8.3.
"C" Coy.	M21 d 8.3.	to	M21 d 55.45.
"E" Coy.	M21 d 55.45	to	M21 d 25.65.
"D" Coy.	M21 d 25.65	to	M21 d 00.85.
9. The Battalion will assault in two waves - the second wave consisting of Lewis Gunners and 20 carriers per Company carrying grenades.
10. After the position is captured "A" Coy will dig a communication trench from M22 c 05.65 towards Shell Crater near trench M223. "D" Coy will dig a communication trench from M21 b 25.05 towards trench M 215. "E" Coy. will improve the communication trench from M21 d 45.55 to M21 d 45.70.
11. Pass Word is BRISBANE.
12. In addition to S.O.S., the following signals will be used:-
 GREEN VERY LIGHT "Objective gained".
 RED ASTEROID ROCKET "Counter Battery work required"
13. Battalion Headquarters at CHALK PIT.

(Sgd) A. F. DAVIS, Captain.
 Adjutant, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.

Issued at 4 p.m. to:-

Copy No. 1. War Diary

2. C.O. "A" Coy.

3. "B" "

4. "C" "

5. "D" "

6. Bombing Officer

7. Signalling Officer

8. Lewis Gun Officer.

9. 4th Aus Inf. Bde.

10. 14th Battalion

Copy No. 11. 4th Aus. Div. Artillery

12. 4th A.L.G. Coy.

13. 4th A.L.T.M.I.

14. 15th Aus. Inf. Bde.

15. 16th Battalion.

REPORT ON OPERATIONSCARRIED OUT BY 13th BATTALION, A.I.F.STORMY TRENCH, N.E. OF GUEUDECOURTNIGHT OF 4th/5th FEBRUARY, 1917.

Reference Map - GUEUDECOURT 1/10,000.

PART 1.

1. On 3/2/17 I received orders to attack the position at STORMY TRENCH, with 13th Battalion, on the night of 4/5th February, 1917.
2. The objective was the same position as that attacked by two Companies of 15th Battalion on night 1/2nd February, 1917.
3. Instructions were issued me by the G.O.C. 4th Aus. Inf. Brigade at 8 p.m., which were confirmed in writing by 4th Aus. Inf. Brigade Order No. 61 of 3/2/1917.
4. I immediately assembled my Company Commanders at Battalion Headquarters and explained their orders, which I afterwards confirmed in writing the next day. - See 13th Battalion Order No. 12 of 4/2/17 attached.
5. The two Company Commanders who were not familiar with their frontage then went up to the front line and made a personal reconnaissance of "No-man's Land" with the Brigade Major.
6. Realising the great difficulty would be to hold the position against counter-attack, I asked for 20,000 Mills Grenades, 1000 rifle grenades and strong artillery support. During daylight of 4th, 12,000 grenades were carried up into SHINE TRENCH and GREASE TRENCH and 8000 in reserve at CHALK PIT. I arranged for each Company to have 20 carriers, who would carry over the bombs to the captured position immediately it was taken. The rifle grenades I calculated would effectually deal with the enemy's bombers throwing egg bombs.
7. During the 4th the Officers explained to the men full details of the attack, and prepared their men for the attack. All Officers and N.C.O's who had not seen the position went up to the front line in daylight and reconnoitred it over the parapet.
8. At 4 p.m. on the 4th I once more assembled my Company Commanders at Battalion Headquarters and went over every detail of their orders.
9. The disposition of the Battalion on 4th February was as follows:-

"A" Company:	Two platoons in SHINE TRENCH & advanced posts. One platoon in WATLING ST. One platoon in CHALK PIT.
"B" Company:	Two platoons in GREASE TRENCH. Two platoons in POSSUM RESERVE.
"C" Company:	PILGRIMS WAY.
"D" Company:	BULLS TRENCH.
10. During daylight on the 4th, the platoons of "A" Company and "B" Coy. which were not in the front line were sent up in small parties of two or three men.

(Continued)

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11. After dark "A" Company closed to its right to its jumping off place, "C" Company went up VIVE ALLIY to its place, "B" Company closed to its right and "D" Company went up FUGITIVE ALLIY to its jumping off place in GREASE TRENCH.
12. At 8 p.m. I moved my Headquarters to CHAIN PIT, and 10 minutes prior to zero time I had received word that the Battalion was in position for assault, and everything was quiet.
13. At 9.57 p.m. the Artillery fired a few rounds to warm the guns, and at 10 p.m. the barrage commenced. Our assaulting wave immediately "hopped over the top" and moved across "No-man's Land" in an unbroken line, which approached as close as 5 or 6 yards to the barrage, so excellent was the shooting. On the way over an enemy Maxim gun in "No-man's Land" was captured, and the crew killed or wounded.
- At 10.2 p.m. the barrage lifted and our men rushed in on top of the trench. Most of the Germans were in their dug-outs and on the left they surrendered freely, but on the right they showed fight, and hand to hand conflicts took place, although this did not last long. About 40 Germans were killed. While advancing in the moonlight Captain Murray ("A" Company) saw that the wire in his front was very strong; this was expected and his Company swung to the left and passing round the wire rushed into the trench, which manoeuvre, however, prevented them getting as far to the right as ordered. A smart bombing attack was made on the right flank at once by 10 or 12 German bombers but the right bombing section dealt with it, completely wiping out the party.
- At 10.6 p.m. the first of several green flares went up indicating that the position was captured. Our losses in the assault were very slight indeed.
- On the way across "No-man's Land", which was an average width of 150 yards, an enemy Maxim gun was captured and all its crew killed or wounded. At 10.9 p.m. the enemy barrage came down, a fierce and terrible concentrated fire mostly on "A" Company, CHAIN TRENCH, GREASE TRENCH, VIVE ALLIY, and FUGITIVE ALLIY. This fire died away at about 10.40 p.m.
- At 10.15 p.m. two prisoners of 10th Co. 362d. Regt. were brought to Bn. Headquarters, and a wire was at once despatched to Brigade Headquarters to establish identification, which reached G.H.Q. within one hour of zero time.
- At 10.50 p.m. the right flank was fiercely attacked by enemy bombers, the first shower of bombs killing and wounding 7 out of the 9 bombers at the bombing stop. The S.O.S. was sent up, and a beautiful barrage was forthcoming in 30 seconds. The enemy made 5 separate attacks here at short intervals, but every attack was beaten off by our Mills bombs and rifle grenades with heavy loss. When these attacks had failed the heavy shelling recommenced.
- At 10.58 p.m. the left flank was attacked by bombers and the S.O.S. sent up. Again our barrage was down in 30 seconds; this attack was easily repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.
- At 11.30 p.m. I received a report that two machine guns in "A" Company had been blown out by shell fire - two new guns in reserve at CHAIN PIT were quickly sent to "A" Company.
- The messages from Company Commanders informed me that the work of consolidation, covered by Lewis Guns and bomber escorts, was proceeding as fast as the hard frozen ground would permit.

(Continued)

Page 3.

All the Companies had gained their objectives, and were in touch, but "A" Company was being fireceely shelled, and was losing heavily. The carrying parties were working feverishly getting the bombs across to the new position, and seeing they were losing heavily from the enemy barrage fire, the Company of the 14th Battalion in support lent their aid, and magnificiently supplemented the work of my carriers.

"D" Company on the left reported that they could not find the saps they were ordered to block (next day it was apparent that these were of no great depth) and I ordered Captain Bone to work along STORMY TRENCH to his left as far as the barrage would permit; this brought my left flank further to the left than was intended, but this did not turn out to be a disadvantage, and an excellent bombing block was put in.

At 11.50 p.m. I received word from Murray that he was being bombed from the right, and after ascertaining from him the exact map location of his right, I arranged for Artillery fire to sweep up CLOUDY TRENCH to its junction with SUNRAY TRENCH. This fire proved very effective, and the enemy lost very heavily indeed, as his stretcher parties proved next day. But the shelling of "A" Company continued, and at 12.45 a.m. on 5/2/17 I succeeded in obtaining a sound bearing to the 5.9 battery which was doing so much damage, and sent it through to the Heavy Artillery. This proved to have the desired effect.

At 3 a.m. "A" Company was again attacked by swarms of bombers, and the S.O.S. went up. Our Artillery again put down a barrage in less than a minute, and it was reported to me afterwards by Captain Murray that this barrage inflicted great loss on the enemy.

The enemy's attacks were made with great determination, and he made most strenuous efforts to get back this most important position. But "A" Company fought in a manner beyond all praise. The personnel of the bombing section on the right in the second counter-attack - which was really five separate attacks delivered at short intervals - had to be twice renewed in about 15 minutes owing to casualties. This Company went over the top 140 strong and in 24 hours lost 92 (including 1 Officer killed and 2 Officers wounded) but they remained victorious and saved the situation. This is undoubtedly due to the fighting qualities of their gallant Commander (Captain W.H. Murray, D.S.O.) whom I have recommended for the V.C.

At 5.10 a.m. Murray reported that he was suffering heavy losses from 4.20. But the dawn eventually arrived, the line was still held, and the enemy's fire slackened off.

The morale of the men was wonderfully good, but "A" Company had suffered cruelly, their trench was a shambles, and it was arranged for them to be relieved on night 5th/6th, which was done with only three casualties.

The captures in the enemy trench, which is 600 yards in length, 8 feet deep, and contains many deep dugouts, are as follows:-

- 2 Officers (one of whom died of wounds).
 - 75 Other Ranks
 - 1 Maxim gun
 - 2 Granatenwerfer (pineapple bomb throwers)
- also many rifles, bayonets, ammunition, etc.

(Continued)

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Our Gasualties are - up to noon on 7/2/17 - as follows:-

	Officers.	Other ranks	Total	Remarks.
Killed	2	41	43	
Wounded	5	167	172	2 slightly
Missing	5	18	18	None were captured
	<u>7</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>233</u>	

The names of the Officers killed are Captain W. Macdonald and 2nd Lieut. G.A. Bentley.

PART 2.

1. Fighting strength of the Battalions in the assault:-

Coy. etc.	Rifles	Lewis Gunners	Bombers	Total
"A"	94	19	36	149
"B"	92	19	36	147
"C"	104	19	36	159
"D"	126	19	36	181
Bombers.	-	-	35	35
	<u>416</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>671</u>

- The devotion to duty, the keenness, fighting spirit and courage displayed by the Officers N.C.O's and men is beyond all praise. Only two men (runners) have reported themselves shell-shocked, and not a single one in "A" Company which was so badly knocked about.
- The bravery and devotion to duty of "C" Company, 14th Battalion, in support, was most commendable, and their carrying of bombs over to the front line largely contributed towards success.
- The shooting of the Artillery was wonderfully good. The assaulting wave was actually able to get to 5 or 6 yards from the barrage, which previously I have often said was impossible. The prompt barrages when the S.O.S. signal went up reflects the greatest credit, and give the Infantry the greatest of confidence in them. By the time my observers at Bn. H.Q. had called S.O.S. to the telephonist, and the latter had telephoned to the first battery, it was already firing. My greatest gratitude is tendered to Lt.-Col. Waite M.C. (the O.C. No.1 Group Artillery) for the excellent spirit in which he controlled his fire for me. There could not have been closer and better co-operation between Artillery and Infantry. I would suggest that in all operations of this kind the O.C. Artillery and O.C. Infantry should work from the one Headquarters, as on this occasion. The 18 pounders put the enemy trench mortars out of action as soon as their first barrage opened.

(Continued)

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The counter-battery work was observed to be distinctly good, excellent results being obtained, despite the fact that I was not able to give the Heavy Artillery enough information to stop all the shelling on my right flank.

5. The lesson learnt from the 15th Battalion attack was to have an ample supply of Mills bombs. The plan of placing so many of these close in the "jumping off" trench, to prevent the necessity for carrying parties having to carry them up through heavily shelled communication trenches, worked excellently.

6. Every man carried six grenades in his pockets. "A" Company, 140 men, carried more than 2000 bombs over to the captured trench in the two waves, made up as follows:-

a. On the man, 6 x 140	840
b. 36 Company Bombers 20 to 24 each in addition	720
c. 20 carriers with 24 each	480

Total 2,040

7. The heavy losses suffered by bombing sections proves that every man should be well trained in bombing, commencing in his recruit course. I would suggest also that in each Company there should be a Corporal Instructor in bombing; in addition to the N.C.Os in the bombing platoon.

8. The Mills bomb proved to be very effective, far superior to the German stick bomb, especially on the hard frozen ground.

9. The position gained is 600 yards in length, and is an excellent trench, 8 feet deep. It affords excellent observation for more than a mile in rear of the German line. It contained 16 dugouts, with accommodation for men as follows:-

1	-	5 men
2	-	5 men
3	-	5 men
4	-	10 men
5	-	15 men
6	-	25 men
7		15 men
8		10 men
9		6 men
10		10 men
11		6 men
12		5 men
13		6 men
14		10 men
15		5 men
16		10 men

Total

149

10. The green flare signal - objective gained, worked well. The S.O.S. signals were not good, since two out of three failed to work. I would suggest that the manufacture be improved. I also suggest that we should have a signal to stop our Artillery fire. If the S.O.S. is fired by mistake, such a signal would prevent great waste of ammunition; also if

(Continued)

our guns are firing short, this signal would save lives and prevent much damage to our trenches.

11. The Mills Rifle Grenade proved wonderfully successful. It beat the Germans every time, always demoralizing them. Their egg-bomb throwers have no chance against this grenade. I calculated on our bombers dispelling such bombing attacks by this means, and events amply justified that belief.
12. The steel helmet with the chain "burnisher" over the face was tried by some of our men in this fight, and I can report most favourably on it. It did not prevent the men doing their work, and undoubtedly saved one man's eyesight from a splinter.
13. The bayonet was too much for the Germans in this fight, they either surrendered or fled when called on to face it.
14. In this minor operation the enemy made every use of the advantage he possessed of being able to concentrate a great number of guns on a comparatively small sector.
15. The Lewis guns did excellent work. I had 12 in the attack, 3 per Company. During daylight on the 4th the gunners removed all oil and grease from the working parts and put kerosene on the metal; thus there was no thick oil to freeze and the guns fired excellently. But the very cold weather reduces the efficiency of the Lewis Gun by approximately 30% owing to the extra number of stoppages that occur.
16. I would draw attention to the fact that the Germans had a Maxim Gun in "No-man's Land".
17. The German prisoners thought the Battalion was a specially selected and trained party of raiders. Another prisoner, a Corporal, said he knew we were Australians because we got in the trench so quickly after the barrage lifted.
18. The work of consolidation is very difficult in this frosty weather. Pick handles break, the axes get blunted, and the work is painfully slow. Ground that is broken by shell fire freezes solid to a depth of 3 feet.
19. The early identification of the unit opposed to us was made a special feature.
20. In order to get silently to their places and avoid suspicious noises before the attack, the men were ordered to tie sand-bags over their feet, and the movement thus made no noise on the duckboards. This plan worked well. The bags were taken off for the "hop over" to avoid getting caught in the wire.
21. Although we only had 26 hours notice of the attack, the men have never been so well prepared for one, and knew more of the details of what they had to do than ever they have done before. The reconnaissance of the ground by all Officers and N.C.O's proved invaluable.
22. Two telephones were run over to Company Commanders as soon as possible after the capture of the position. This saved runners, and the quicker communication of information was of great service.

(Continued).

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23. Every man in the Battalion carried one day's iron rations, a full water-bottle, and wore his greatcoat; the pockets of the latter hold a lot of grenades. The greatcoats saved the men from the severe cold.
24. Covering the consolidation by a screen of Lewis Gunners, with bombers as escort, worked well.
25. The first wave carried a number of picks and shovels, but sufficient for requirements were found in the captured trench.
26. During the consolidation an overhead traverse was constructed on the left flank which has proved most useful in stopping the enemy's observation of a long straight part of the trench.
27. The fire of the 4th A.L.V.L.B., 4th A.M.G. Co., and 15th A.M.G. Co. was most useful.
28. The unsatisfactory burning of the cartridges for the 2-inch mortars nearly resulted in the wire on our left not being cut. This is a vital matter. Some of the bombs failed to travel half way to their objective, and were a frightful danger to the mortar crews. They were very brave men to stick at it the way they did in order to cut the wire for us.
29. After the position was captured, the O.C. 4th A.M.G. Coy. reconnoitred the line, selected two Vickers gun positions, and the guns and crews were sent across and put under cover in the dugouts.
30. The bombing stops were made of barbed wire and French wire which the bombers carried for the purpose. Such stops are quickly made and give no cover to the enemy from view or fire.
31. The enemy wire was cut and easily passable except for about 75 yards on the right flank.
32. I have recommended the following for the VICTORIA CROSS:-

Captain H.W. Murray, D.S.O.	"A" Company.
No. 3136 Corporal Withers R.B.	"A" Company
2435 Private Robertson B.	"A" Company.

(Sgd) J.M.A. DURRANT, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Colonel.
C.O. 13th Battalion, A.I.F.

SECRET.

Copy No.

13th BATTALION ORDER No. 13.

Reference Map - Gueudecourt, 1/20,000.

9th February, 1917

- (1) The 46th Battalion will relieve the 13th Battalion Sector of front line on night 9/10th February, 1917.
- (2) Front line companies will have three (3) guides each at CHALK PIT by 5.30 p.m. to-night.

(3)	<u>Company</u>	<u>Relieved by</u>
	"D" Coy. 16th Bn.	"B" Coy. 46th Bn.
	"C" Coy. 13th Bn.)	"C" Coy. 46th Bn.
	"B" Coy 13th Bn.)	
	"D" Coy. 13th Bn.	"D" Coy. 46th Bn.

- (4) All trench stores, gum boots etc. will be handed over ~~to~~ and a receipt taken. Company Commanders are responsible that no gum boots are taken out of the line.
- (5) Completion of relief will be reported to Battalion Headquarters by Trench Code.
- (6) The incoming companies will reach the front line at intervals of one hour.
- (7) If out going units meet incoming units in the communication trench they will go overland to make way for them.
- (8) Hot tea is available at Cook-house in PILGRIMS WAY.
- (9) The 13th Battalion units will go from there to "C" Group, MAMETZ - out last camp there - now being relieved by the 45th Battalion.
- (10) The cooks will have a hot meal at MAMETZ.
- (11) There will probably be trains running for our men from Brigade Headquarters to Quarry Siding.
- (12) O.C. Companies will see that all ranks reach MAMETZ properly equipped.
- (13) Pass Word is FREEMANTLE.
- (14) Acknowledge.

(Sgd) A.W. DAVIS, Capt.
Adjutant, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.

Issued at 10.30 a.m. to

Copy No.1	War Diary
2	"A" Company
3	"B" do
4	"C" do
5	"D" do
6	"D" Company 16th Bn.
7	46th Battalion
8	4th Aus. Inf. Brigade.
9	Senior Major.

13th Australian Infantry BATTALION ORDER No. 14

Reference: - ALBERT (Combined Sheet) 1/40,000.

1. The Battalion will move to RIBEMONT on Thursday the 22nd February, 1917, via MEAULTE - DERNANCOURT - BUIRE, remaining there for about a fortnight.

The Battalion will pass the starting point WILLOW SIDING at 9 a.m. on 22/2/17 in following order:-

Signallers & Runners

"D" Company.

"C" do

"B" do

"A" do

Bombers, Pioneers & Observers.

Stretcher Bearers, A.M.C., & H.Q. Details.

Transport.

2. DRESS. - Full marching order. One blanket and waterproof sheet to be carried on the man, steel helmets ~~XXXX~~ to be worn, felt hats carried looped on left shoulder.
3. 100 Yards interval will be maintained between Companies.
4. Mid-day meal to be carried on the man. Cookers to march with Companies. Halt will be made for mid-day meal before entering BUIRE, cooks will then proceed to RIBEMONT under Quartermaster.
5. Sick Parade - 22/2/17 - 7 a.m.
Breakfast - 7.30 a.m.
6. Billeting party will report to A/Staff Captain at Town Major's Office RIBEMONT at 11.30 a.m. on 21/2/17.
7. The second blanket per man, and all Officers' gear will be dumped at head of Company lines by 7.30 a.m. sharp on 22/2/17.
Blankets to be rolled in bundles of 20 and distinctly labelled with Section, Platoon and Company.
8. All braziers and lamps to be returned to Q.M. Store by 7 a.m. 22/2/17.
9. Transport Officer will ensure that water carts and cookers are filled.
10. O's. C. Companies and H.Q. Unit Officers will render certificates as to the condition of huts now occupied, to reach Battalion Orderly Room by 5.30 p.m. 21/2/17.
Quartermaster will render a list of all Area Stores to be handed over by 5.30 p.m. 21/2/17.
11. O.C. "D" Company will detail a Rearguard of 1 Officer (Lieut Morgan) and 12 other ranks, to march in rear of Transport. O.C. Rearguard will not pass any man on the road but will, with the R.M.O., inspect and report on all stragglers.
Only those whom the M.O. passes as Medically unfit to march any farther will be permitted to get into the Ambulance wagon (if available).

(Continued)

13th Battalion Order No.14. Page 2.

12. Huts are to be left in a perfectly clean and sanitary condition. Platoon Commanders will hand the following certificate to their Company Commanders before marching out:-

"Platoon huts inspected by me after vacation and certified clean and clear of all arms, equipment and clothing".

The Company Commander will verify as many of these reports as time will permit.

O's.C. Companies & H.Q. Details Officers will, on arrival at RIBEMONT, hand these certificates to Battalion Orderly Room.

13. On arrival at RIBEMONT all Companies and H.Q. Units will report to Battalion Orderly Room in writing as follows:-

..... Coy. (Date)

- (1) Number of men who fell out on line of march.
 (a) With permission (b) without permission.
 (2) Number of men who were brought in by Rearguard.


The above report is to reach Battalion Orderly Room thirty (30) minutes after arrival in new billets.

14. Before marching out, the Senior Major and R.M.O. will inspect the Camp now occupied.

15. O's C. Companies and H.Q. Units will render a marching out state to reach Battalion Orderly Room by 8 a.m. sharp 22/2/17.

16. Signallers will transmit Brigade time to Headquarters Officers and Company Commanders at 8.30 a.m. 22/2/17.

17. Acknowledged.


 Capt.
 Adjutant, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.

Issued at:

Copy No.1	"A" Company
2	"B" "
3	"C" "
4	"D" "
5	4th Aus. Inf. Bde.
6	L.G.O. & Sig. Off.
7	Q.M. & Transport Off.
8	Grenade Off. & I.O.
9	War Diary
10	Senior Major
11	R.M.O.
12	R.S.M.
13.	C.O. & File.

APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY. No. B. 26

Strength of Battalion on the 1st February, 1917

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Rationed	25	838	863
Detached	6	153	159
Attached	2	6	8

Date	To Hospital	Reinfts.	Wounded	Rejoined	Killed	Missing.
1st	3		3	1		
2nd	5		1	12		
3rd	7		1	3		
4th	9		3	4	2	
5th		<i>St Kell</i>	3 Of. 56		1 Of. 15	<i>N. MACDONALD</i> 1 Of. 15
6th		<i>St Pulling</i>	37		1 " 4	<i>2/lt Bentley</i>
7th	6	<i>St Linn</i>	51		21	
8th	6		8		8	6
9th			16	1 Of. <i>St. Browne</i>		
10th	2		2 Of. 12			
11th	19	<i>2/lt Thornley</i>	15		3	
12th	7	<i>2/lt Nugent</i>	40	20		
13th	6					
14th	2			5		
15th	64			4		
16th				1 Of. 20	<i>bapt J. Wells.</i>	
17th	8			10		
18th	2			4		
19th	1			12		
20th	2			3		
21st	9			4		
22nd				4		
23rd	6			8		
24th	1 Of: 2	<i>St Mills</i>		4		
25th	11			32		
26th	1 Of. 1	<i>St Morgan</i>		6		
27th	3			8		
28th				8		

Strength of Battalion on 28-2-17

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Rationed	20	696	716
Detached	6	82	88
Attached	2	5	7