

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/4/2 Part 3

Title: General Staff, General
Headquarters, Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force

May 1915



AWM4-1/4/2PART3

G.S.R. 129.

Monsieur le General de Division d'Amade,
Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire francais d'Orient.

1st May.

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you will continue to consolidate and strengthen your position and to make all preparations for the advance on ACHI BABI, which I hope it will soon be possible to undertake, but which must await the complete disembarkation of your fighting troops.

It will be of great assistance to this advance if you can now straighten out your line by throwing forward your right flank to the high ground (Square 169 N; 169 T) overlooking the KEREVES DERE. Will you please have this line reconnoitred and inform me whether you can carry out the task without the necessity of a general action and without endangering your present position.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd:) IAN HAMILTON,

General,

Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

G.S.R. 129.

SECRET.

General Headquarters,
Medtn. Exped. Force.
1st May, 1915.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR G.O.C., A. & N.Z. ARMY CORPS.

1. Until you receive further orders no general advance is to be initiated by you against the objectives referred to in the Secret Instructions for the A. & N.Z. Army Corps dated 13th April 1915. But this is not to preclude any forward movements which may be usefully undertaken with a view to occupying such points as may facilitate your advance against the aforesaid objectives hereafter and meanwhile compel the enemy to maintain a large force in your front. By this means you will relieve pressure on the troops in the southern portion of the Peninsula, which is your present role.
2. Subject to the proviso in para. 3, you should at the same time complete your disembarkation and make all necessary preparations for the general advance, about which further instructions will be issued to you in due course.
3. With reference to your message of 30th April, a proportion of your horses may be sent back to Alexandria as you suggest, but you must carefully guard against making your force immobile in case the opportunity for some forward movement should arise before the horses can be recalled.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General,
C. G. S.
Med. Ex. Force.

Translation.

From:- G.O.C., French Expeditionary Force.

To:- G.O.C., Division.

Headquarters of SEDD-EL-BAHR.

1st May, 1915.

ORDER.

It appears from the report rendered this evening at 7 p.m. that the ground between the actual line and the course of the KEREVES-DERE is very feebly held.

Moreover in order to facilitate the next general offensive movement in an Easterly direction, the G.O.C. in C. considers it necessary that the French right flank should be advanced and firmly established on the heights above mentioned, which dominate the KEREVES-DERE. Consequently a reconnaissance will be made of these heights either by an advance by night or by a forward movement in the early dawn.

This reconnaissance will be followed closely by supports, so as to be able, after having crushed the feeble resistance, to occupy the position attained.

The troops on the reconnaissance will be supplied with tools and plain wire entanglements.

In my opinion, there is no necessity of this simple reconnaissance to develop into a general action.

The latter is not contemplated in the present orders.

In order to avoid this becoming a general action, I consider it necessary to limit it strictly to the front parallel to the KEREVES DERE, and contained between hill 300 and the sea. The troops on the flanks have been warned.

CORPS EXPEDITIONNAIRE
D' ORIENT

Au Q.G. de SEDD UL BAHR, le 1er
Mai 1915.

Etat-Major

3^o BUREAU

No.7 ZM.

Le General de Division d'AMADE,

Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient

a Monsieur le General Sir IAN HAMILTON,
G.C.B. D.S.O.

Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire de la
Mediterranee

a bord de l' "ARCADIAN".

Mon General,

En reponse a votre lettre G.S.R.129 du 30 Avril,
j'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte de ce qui suit:
Conformement au desir axprime par M.de General HUNTER WESTON,
Commandant la 29eme Division, le point de liaison de la
ligne francaise avec la ligne anglaise a ete reporte
jusqu'en un point situe legerement au Nord de la route de
SEDD UL BAHR a KRITHIA (vers le second 0 de la cote 200-
carre 169)1).

La defense de cette ligne est assuree par mes
troupes depuis hier 30 Avril au debut de l'apres-midi.

J'ai inspecte hier cette ligne et me suis rendu
en ce point. J'ai constate que la defense du Secteur
francais etait assuree dans de bonnes conditions, ainsi que
la liaison avec les troupes anglaises.

La zone de manoeuvre affectee au Corps
Expeditionnaire Francais etant desormais reportee jusqu'a la
route precitee, je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir
bien decider que cette route pourra etre utilisee, aussi
bien par les equipages anglais que par les equipages
francais, pour tous les mouvements d'equipages necessites
par le revitaillement des troupes.

J'ai l'honneur d'etre avec respect,

mon General,

votre obeissant subordonne,

(Sgd:)

CORPS EXPEDITIONNAIRE
D' ORIENT

Au Q.G. de SEDD UL BAHR, le 1er
Mai 1915.

Etat-Major

3^o BUREAU

No. 7 HM.

COMPTE-RENDU DES EVENEMENTS

DE LA NUIT DU 30 Avril-1er Mai.

A 20 h. le 30 Avril et a 0 h.30 le 1er Mai, se sont
montrees des reconnaissances ennemies s'approchant
jusqu'a 600 metres. Certaines atteignaient l'effec-
tif d'une demi-Section. - Les deux fois, un feu d'In-
fanterie et d'Artillerie a ete ouvert, et les elements
ennemis ont disparu rapidement.

Pertes: 4 Blesses, dont 1 grave.

P.O. Le Chef d'Etat-Major,

DESCOINS.

A Monsieur le General Sir IAN HAMILTON, Commandant en
Chef le Corps Expeditionnaire de la Mediterranee

a bord de l' "ARCADIAN".

5271

PERSONAL AND SECRET.

4. 5. 15. 4.30 p.m.

LORD KITCHENER.

No.M.F.200. 4 May. Fighting again last night AAA 29th Division repulsed attacks without much loss and with heavy loss to enemy AAA Had I an unmixed British Force enemy would be playing my game by these assaults AAA But in the French Section the Turks broke through the Senegalese who are worthless and penetrated into the position for a time AAA Eventually enemy were driven out with heavy losses but the morale of the French troops is shaken and still more so the morale of their higher command AAA The amount of ammunition they fire away is alarming AAA As result of serious talk with Damade am reducing his sector and giving him three battalions Naval Division to put in his front line AAA This division has been doing well AAA East Lancs. Brigade should arrive tonight and I have so far managed to keep Cox's Brigade intact despite all appeals AAA The times are anxious but I believe enemy's cohesion should suffer more than our own under these repeated night attacks AAA I suppose 2nd French Division will come at full not economic speed AAA

(Sgd:) IAN HAMILTON.

5272

FROM:- Lord Kitchener.

TO:- Sir Ian Hamilton.

4403.Cipher.

4.5.15.

Desp. 11.30 a.m.
Recd. 9.45 p.m.

Your M.F.198. I hope the 5th will see you sufficiently reinforced to push on to ACHI BABA at least, as time will enable TURKS to bring reinforcements and make unpleasant preparations for you. The Australian and New Zealanders will have had reinforcements from EGYPT by then and if they hold their position with Naval Division could give you a good many men for the advance. MAXWELL wiring regarding situation on Canal says "I see no reason for anxiety at present but any failure on HAMILTON'S part will make critical situation all over MOSLEM world therefore we should take legitimate risks to avoid this."

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

No. Ga. 312.

Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 5th May, 1915.

From:- General Officer Commanding
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

To: General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

MEMORANDUM.

1. With reference to Para. 2 of your G.S.R.129 of 1st May, I wish to bring to your notice that I am at present unable to land any more animals than I now have on shore owing to difficulties of water supply, and that owing to lack of room I consider it inadvisable to land more vehicles, I am of opinion, therefore, that I have carried out as much of my disembarkation as is feasible in the present circumstances.
2. As regards Para. 3 - the Transports carrying my Army Corps each hold the horses and vehicles of one or more distinct units, so that I cannot send back a proportion to Alexandria without sending back the whole. As, however, the rate of disembarkation at this beach is likely to be slow, and several days will be required to clear Infantry transports of vehicles, I consider that I can send back all animals now in the transports, provided arrangements for rapid re-embarkation at Alexandria can be made by you. All these horses have been on board since April 15th, and many of them since April 1st., and have in consequence deteriorated considerably. It is therefore most desirable that they should be landed otherwise they may become useless for all practical purposes.
3. I attach Tables showing -
 - "A". The transports I propose sending back, with the number of horses in each. These are arranged in order of urgency of despatch judged by the numbers and the state of the horses, and also by the state of the water and victualling arrangements on the transports.
 - "B". Shows the same transports arranged in the order of urgency in which they should be re-embarked, if Divisions are to be completed without confusion.
4. The transports, with the exception of A16, A17, A18, A19, A20, A21, A24, A30, A32, A34. (Battery ships), and A35, A37, and A40, (which carry units not immediately required), should come back here. I can arrange to

have

have them despatched from here so as to ensure the order of re-embarkation being adhered to, but I should like the importance of re-embarking in the order given, and of embarking the horses in their original Transports, to be impressed on the Embarkation authorities at Alexandria, to avoid confusion in disembarkation, and delay in completing Divisions in animals and vehicles.

5. It will be seen that the total animals to be returned is about 6,1000. Will you please arrange with Base for accommodation and victualling of these animals. They have their own attendants and supervising Staff, but I would suggest that a Staff be drawn from the mounted units of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps now in Cairo, to make the necessary arrangements and to ensure that the animals when landed are properly exercised and cared for.

6. Though I wish the transports, with the exceptions mentioned above, to return to Kaba Tepe when their horses have been landed, I would suggest that before doing so they should be revictualled as if for all personnel and horses, so as to avoid delay when they return to Alexandria for the horses.

(Sgd:) W.R. BIRDWOOD,

Lieut.-General,
Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

"A".

STATEMENT OF TRANSPORTS
TO LEAVE FOR ALEXANDRIA
in order of leaving.

Serial No.	Transport.		Number of Horses.	Horses belonging to:-
1	Submark	A 35	361	Reserve Park.
2	Clan McCorquodale	A 37	49	Divl. Ammn. Col. in part.
3	Saldanha	A 40	200	Hdqrs. and No. 1 Co. Aust. Divl. Train.
4	Armadale	A 21	340	F. A. Bde. Ammn. Col.
5	Novian	A 12	317	Horses of 2nd Infy. Bde.
6	Nizam	A 5	341	S. A. A. Amm. Col. A. S. C. part of F. Amb.
7	Minnewaska	A 11	520	Horses of A. C. Hdqrs. Divl. Hd. qrs. Train, and Infantry.
8	Indian	A 16	488*	Artillery Horses.
9	Cardiganshire	A 18	509*	Artillery Horses.
10	Itria	A 20	152*	Artillery Horses.
11	Californian	A 32	450*	Artillery Horses, F. Amb. and Inf. Horses.
12	Surada	A 34	266	Artillery Amm. Col: Train.
13	Australind	A 30	243	Artillery Horses: Infy, 1/Line Horses: Ambulance Horses.
14	Ascot	A 33	226	Infantry Horses: Train Horses.
15	Annaberg	A 27	76	Infantry Horses.
16	City of Benares	A 9	340	Infantry: F. Amb: Engineers.
17	Mashobra	A 13	240	Infantry: F. Amb: Engineers.
18	Atlantian	A 17	282*	Artillery Horses.
19	Karoo	A 19	388	Artillery Horses.
20	Katuna	A 24	313	Artillery and Infantry Horses.
21	Goslar	A 26	284	Engineers: F. Amb. and Train Horses.

Serial No.	Transport.		Number of Horses.	Horses belonging to:-
22	Suffolk	A 4	54	Infantry Horses.
23	Malda	A 2	179	Infantry Horses.
24	Ionian	A 1	46	Infantry Horses.
25	Devanha	A 3	79	Infantry Horses.
26	Lake Michigan	A 8	80	Infantry Horses.
27	Achaia	A 22	68	Infantry Horses
28	Itonus	A 23	16	Infantry Horses (Casualty ship)
29	Lutzow	A 25	130	Divl. Hdqrs. Horses.
30	Haidar Pasha	A 28	88	Infantry Horses.

* Number on board before ships left for Helles Cape.

Numbers now on board depend on numbers taken off there.

"B"

ORDER OF URGENCY IN WHICH TRANSPORTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK.

Serial No.	Transport.		Horses and vehicles of:-
1	Indian	A 16	Artillery.
2	Atlantian	A 17	Artillery.
3	Cardiganshire	A 18	Artillery.
4	Karoo	A 19	Artillery.
5	Itria	A 20	Artillery.
6	Armadale	A 21	F.A.Bde. Amm. Coln.
7	Surada	A 34	Artillery: Amm. Coln. Train.
8	Californian	A 32	Artillery: F.Amb: Infantry.
9	Australind	A 30	Artillery: Infantry, 1st Line: Ambulance.
10	Katuna	A 24	Artillery and Infantry.
11	Ionian	A 1	Infantry.
12	Malda	A 2	Infantry.
13	Devanha	A 3	Infantry.
14	Suffolk	A 4	Infantry.
15	Nizam	A 5	S.A.A. Amm.Coln. A.S.C.: part of F. Amb.
16	Lake Michigan	A 8	Infantry.
17	City of Benares	A 9	Infantry: F. Amb: Engineers.
18	Minnewaska	A 11	H. C. Hdqrs.: Divl. Hdqrs. Train: Infantry.
19	Novian	A 12	2nd Infy. Bde.
20	Mashobra	A 13	Infantry: F.Amb: Engineers.
21	Lutzow	A 25	Divl. Hdqrs.
22	Goslar	A 26	Engineers: F.Amb: Train.
23	Achaia	A 22	Infantry.
24	Itonus	A 23	Infantry (Casualty ship)
25	Annaberg	A 27	Infantry.
26	Ascot	A 33	Infantry: Train.
27	Haidar Pasha	A 28	Infantry.

Serial No.	Transport.	Horses and vehicles of:-
28	Saldanha	A 40 Hdqrs. and No.1 Co.Aust. Divl. Train.
29	Sudmark	A 35 Reserve Park.
30	Clan McCorquodale	A 37 Divl. Amm. Coln. in part.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

May 6th 1915.

G.S.

I have forwarded this information to G.O.C. EGYPT (and to Base Commandant) and asked the former to make the necessary arrangements, if he is notified by wire that these ships are being sent to ALEXANDRIA.

Will you let us know when a decision on this point has been arrived at. I understand that G.O.C. ANZAC has been told how the matter stands.

(Sgd:)

Col.,

A. Q. M. G.

6/5/15.

To be substituted for Enclosure No.1 to Memorandum No.49 L
of 12th April 1915.

COMPOSITION OF SQUADRONS. 4th MAY 1915.

"Queen Elizabeth" (Fleet flagship)
"Doris")
1 T.B.D.) attached to Fleet flagship.

1st Squadron.

"Euryalus" (Flag)
"Implacable"
"Cornwallis"

2nd Squadron.

"Queen" (Flag)
"Canopus"
"London"
"Prince of Wales"
"Triumph"
"Majestic"
"Bacchante"
"Dartmouth"
"Ark Royal"
"Manica"

3rd Squadron.

"Swiftsure" (Flag)
"Agamemnon"
"Goliath"
"Vengeance"
"Lord Nelson"
"Prince George"
"Albion"
"Dublin"
"Talbot"
"Minerva"
"Sapphire"

4th Squadron.

"Jaureguiberry" (Flag)
"Charlemagne"
"Henri IV"
"Askold"

5th Squadron.

(Gulf of Smyrna)

"Wear"
"Welland"
"Triad"
"Gazelle"

"Amethyst" (Captain D)
"Adamant" (Submarine depot ship).

NOTE.

The destroyers will be organised by Captain D as circumstances require, French destroyers being detailed for Dardanelles patrol every third night.

2. Fleet sweepers and trawler minesweeping vessels will be organised by Captain S.

3. "Sapphire", shown in 3rd squadron, is to revert to the orders of Captain S as soon as her services can be spared.

(Sgd:) J. M. de ROBECK,
Vice Admiral.

"QUEEN ELIZABETH"
4th May 1915.

R E P O R T.

FROM:- G.O.C., CORPS EXPEDITIONNAIRE.

TO:- GENERAL COMMANDING, M. E. F.

The night of the 4/5 May was comparatively quiet. During the early part of the night, attacks on our right flank and on the R.N.D. battalions on our left were easily repelled.

The Corps Expeditionnaire occupies the same position as yesterday.

Reinforcements of 1180 men landed during the night.

(Sgd:) Chef d'Etat Major
Descoins.

AMENDMENT TO FORCE ORDER NO. 5 DATED 5TH MAY, 1915.

Para. 3, line 9 - 10, for "the left flank of his right
battalion" read "the right flank of his right battalion."

(Sgd:) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
C. G. S.
Med. Ex. Force.

G. H. Q.

5th May 1915.

FORCE ORDER NO. 5.

General Headquarters,

5 May 1915.

1. The enemy against whom we have been continuously fighting during the past ten days is known to have suffered very severe losses, more especially in the course of the recent night attacks. His troops now occupy a defensive position on and in front of the ACHI BABI Ridge, running roughly south-east to north-west, and hold the line of the KEREVES DERE and KRITHIA village.
2. The advance against the ACHI BABI position will be resumed on May 6th at 11 a.m. The main attack will be developed from the west and south-west by the left wing of the force.
3. The Corps Expeditionnaire will operate on the right, with its right flank on the coast, and its left flank in touch with the right of the 29th Division.

The 29th Division, reconstituted for this operation as shown in the attached Order of Battle, will operate on the left, its right in touch with the Corps Expeditionnaire and its left on the coast.

G.O.C. 29th Division will be responsible for the direction of the advance. The left flank of his right battalion will be directed along the stream running through square 169.H.7., H.2., C.5., C.3., 176.Y.7., Y.2., T.3., and thence on the eastern point of ACHI BABI PEAK square 177.N.1.

G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire will be responsible for the maintenance of connection between his own left and the right of the 29th Division.

4. The Composite Division constituted as in the attached Order of Battle (less the Composite Naval Brigade) will form the General Reserve, and will be in concealed positions about 1000 yards north-west of the stone bridge on the SEDD-EL-BAHR -- KRITHIA road, 168.Z.4., by 5 a.m.
5. The 29th Division will move forward with one battalion between the Corps Expeditionnaire and the stream running through squares 169.H. and C. and 176 Y and T. as previously described in paragraph 3. The right of the remainder of the Division will be directed in the first instance on the south-east edge of KRITHIA village.

In order to fill the gap thus formed between the right battalion of the division and the remainder of the division, the Composite Naval Brigade will man the trenches at present occupied by the 88th Brigade. The Motor Machine-gun Squadron Royal Naval Division will take up a position near the SEDD-EL-BAHR -- KRITHIA road immediately on the right flank of this brigade.

G.O.C.

G.O.C. 29th Division will arrange to have sufficient troops echeloned in rear of the right of his main advance moving up the valley of the stream running through square 176.V.8., W.4., W.3., S.5., to deal with any attempt which may be made by the enemy to counter-attack down the valley on the left bank of that stream. He will also dispose the Motor Machine-gun Squadron with especial view to its employment in repelling any such counter-attack as may be attempted.

6. The Corps Expeditionnaire reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade will have as its first objective the line square 169.D.1., D.6., D.9. and thence crossing the KEREVES DERE to the coast north-east of the mouth of that stream. During this movement the 2nd Naval Brigade will be echeloned in rear of the French left.

As soon as the line given as the first objective has been reached immediate steps are to be taken to strengthen it, special attention being paid to the spur in square 169.D., west of the KEREVES DERE, which will form a point d'appui. This line must be secured throughout the operations at all costs as it will be the pivot on which the whole movement depends.

The Corps Expeditionnaire will not advance beyond this line until the 29th Division has taken KRITHIA village.

G.O.C. 29th Division will be responsible for informing the G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire as soon as KRITHIA village is in his hands.

The Corps Expeditionnaire, until the time arrives for its further advance, will be so disposed as to bring the heaviest possible fire to bear against the enemy on the southern slopes of the ACHI BABI ridge.

7. As soon as KRITHIA village is in the hands of the 29th Division, the further advance against ACHI BABI PEAK will be undertaken. The right flank of the main body of the 29th Division will be directed on the eastern point of the PEAK, thus gradually closing the gap between it and the right battalion of the division.

The Corps Expeditionnaire will advance simultaneously against the ridge running south-east from ACHI BABI PEAK to the sea still maintaining connection with the right battalion of the 29th Division and still holding the position across the spur in square 169.D. west of the KEREVES DERE.

8. The synchronising of the movements ordered is of the highest importance. The advance as ordered in paragraphs 5 and 6 will commence on both flanks precisely at 11 a.m. A Staff Officer from Quarter General, Corps Expeditionnaire, and from each Division, will attend at W Beach Barrel Pier at 7 a.m. on the 6th, where they will correct their watches with General Headquarters time, which will be given them by a General Staff Officer of G.H.Q.

9. Communications between General Headquarters and the Corps Expeditionnaire, the 29th Division and the Composite Division, will be established by the General Headquarters Signal Company.

Visual Communication between Headquarters 29th Division and Quartier General Corps Expeditionnaire will be established by G.O.C. 29th Division.

10. G.Os.C. Corps Expeditionnaire and 29th Division will concert arrangements for the mutual support of their respective movements by flanking artillery fire when opportunities occur, and for this purpose artillery liaison officers will be appointed by the G.Os.C. concerned.

The fire of supporting ships will be directed in accordance with the arrangements already made with the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Squadron.

11. An officer of the Q.M.G's. Staff, General Headquarters, will be on the SEDD-EL-BAHR -- KRITHIA road, near the stone bridge at square 168.Z.4., by 11 a.m. He will undertake the organization of all traffic on the road, both French and English, during the course of the operations, especially in respect of the passage of ammunition and supplies.

12. General Headquarters will be on H.M.T. "Arcadian".

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
Chief of General Staff, Med.Ex.Force.

COPY OF TURKISH DIVISIONAL ORDERS.

APRIL 7th.

1. A Fifth Army has been formed from the Army Corps and Divisions mentioned below, with their Headquarters at Gallipoli, and under the command of Liman von Sanders. The Third Army Corps is in the Gallipoli Peninsula, the 15th Army Corps South of Chanak Kale, the Fifth Division at Yenekeui and the neighbourhood, and to the West of Sharkeui, the independent Cavalry Brigade South of Keshan, and in the neighbourhood of Pounar. Third Army Corps is detailed for the defence of the Peninsula commencing from the Bulair lines. The Seventh Division is detailed to cover and watch the district from the Bulair lines as far as Deliyani Harbour.

2. The Broussa Field Battalion of Gendarmerie is detailed to cover and watch the portion Kuyun Harbour (exclusive), Aghildere (exclusive). The Headquarters of this Battalion will be at Tourshun. It will be controlled by the Ninth Division and will be attached directly to the Army Corps. Important information will be communicated to the 9th and 19th Divisional Commanders at Maidos.

3. The 19th Division forms the General Reserve and will be employed in the Gallipoli and Maidos zones, or else on the Anatolian side, in accordance with the disembarkation operations of the enemy. Until the arrival of the Field Gun Battalion which belongs to this Division, the 4th Q.F. Field Gun Battery belonging to our Division has temporarily been given over to the command of this Division (i.e. the 9th).

It will be convenient for one regiment and the Field Battery of this Division to be in the Bifali? district, and for the other regiment to be in the neighbourhood of Map Tepe, while the remainder of the Corps is at Maidos.

4. The 9th Division is detailed for the defence and protection of the forts and batteries on the European shore of the Dardanelles, and for the southern portion of the Peninsula commencing from Aghil Dere (inclusive).

5. The section commencing from Aghil Dere (inclusive) as far as the left of four 18-centimetre gun position (Pellamont luk) in the neighbourhood of Kaba Tepe (inclusive) will be covered and defended by the battalion which will be sent from the 27th Regiment, and this section will be named Kaba Tepe section.

The Field Battery will again be sent to a concealed position E of Ari ? Point, and this battery will be under the command of the Officer commanding this district. The Mantelli ? and Nordenfelts (guns) which are at Kaba Tepe, and the 15-centimetre heavy battery (consisting of four guns) are under the Officer commanding this district. For the protection of the guns against a sudden attack, a special force must be detailed.

6. The zone which lies outside the area from the left of the four gun positions (15-centimetre) on the Pellamuk line as far as Sari Tepe point will be covered and defended by 2nd Battalion, 25th Regiment, which is called the Kum Tepe zone.

The

The two 15-centimetre guns which are on Hill Chamlar to the North of Kum Tepe and the Nordenfelt guns in the neighbourhood of Kum Tepe are under the Officer Commanding this regiment.

For the protection of the guns against sudden attack of the enemy, separate force should be detailed to the fronts of Kum Tepe shore and the 15-centimetre positions, and along places where the enemy may disembark wire entanglements will be made. O.C. Zones will cause to be brought sufficient amount of wire from Kilia Pier. They will detail one section of the Fortress Company for this work, and during two days with the help of the Infantry in the neighbourhood will complete wire entanglements in front of the protection which has been placed in front of the heavy batteries.

7. The O.C.'s. Kaba Tepe and Kum Tepe zones are attached directly to the Division for fatigue duties, and to their regiments for other purposes.

8. Commencing from Sari Tepe point (inclusive) the Southern portion will be defended by Two battalions of the above regiment, the M.G. company, and by the Fortress Company which has been temporarily detached (less 1 section) and by the Q.F. Battery No. 10 (?), the whole under the command of the Officer commanding 25th Regiment. Although the Field Battery, which is in a concealed position on Hill No. 85 towards Kum Tepe, is under the command of Officer commanding 25th regiment at first, it will be employed towards Kum Tepe, and if the Sedd el Bahr zone has need of it, it will at once be summoned and employed there. Therefore the above battery must combine operations with the Kum Tepe units. The 25th Regiment will send one of its Battalions to the Tekke Burnu-Sedd el Bahr line, and will detail one company which will be responsible for the defence of the Point d'appui, no matter how heavily attacked it is. This battalion must place its reserves amongst the trees in the Dere, the other battalion (of the 25th Regiment) will place its M.G. companz between Kerte and Sedd el Bahr in a suitable position in reserve. These battalions will send out one section each towards places favourable for the enemy's disembarkation to the North of Teeke Kivi, also towards Morto Bay and Domouz Dere. The defence and protection of this zone, and the taking of measures to prevent an initial disembarkation of the enemy being very important, they will meet the enemy's attempts to disembark from the North and from Morto Bay with searching fire, and if necessary they will pass to the attack with the bayonet with all their forces. The four point d'appui which are being made at Tekke Burnu and Sedd el Bahr will be promptly completed, and the wire entanglement which is being sent to-day will be placed all round the point d'appui.

9. The 27th Regiment (less one battalion), the Machine Gun Company and Mountain Battery under my direct command will remain in reserve tomorrow morning in the camp (under canvas) in the olive grove to the West of Maidos.

The O.C. of the camp is the O.C. Regiment.

There will be a movement of troops in regular order from Mal Tepe to the new camp.

10. The 26th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment of Field Artillery and the Field Ambulance

Company

Company in Seraphim directly under my command will be in reserve and will remain in the camp. The O.C. camp is the O.C. 26th Regiment.

11. In order that their training and efficiency may not be impaired, the Battery on Hill No. 85 and the Battery placed at the disposal of the Forts in the protection of the mine fields will exchange duties for a week at a time with the Battery at Seraphim.

12. The Broussa Field Gendarmerie Battalion arrived after being relieved on the coast last night not having had any sleep, will rest to-night and will go to their zone to-morrow morning and take it over, and the battalion belonging to the 27th Regiment will come to the camp to the West of Maidos. The 27th Regiment will send one of its battalions from near Mal Tepe to-night to take over the Kaba Tepe zone.

The 2nd Battalion of the 25th Regiment and the Battalion of the 27th Regiment will be responsible for the positions in the Kaba Tepe and Kum Tepe zones respectively.

13. The Regimental and zone commanders will inform me when handing over has begun and when completed, and of the arrival of the units at their positions, and will send in sketches of the dispositions by to-morrow evening.

14. The independent Battalions detailed for duty on the coast will be relieved by their regimental battalions in rear during the week, in orders from me. The detachments in charge of the shore must frequently be relieved by those in rear.

15. The roads leading up to the positions occupied, as being most favourable for the disembarkation of the enemy, will be pointed out and will be kept in good repair by the units detailed for the protection of the coast and their reserves.

16. The zones of units and unoccupied intervals will frequently be visited by patrols, and during engagements an officer will be sent, if necessary, to establish complete communication, and units will keep each other informed of their movements.

Regimental commanders will always send copies of any important orders they may issue. Units in front without telephonic communication with those in rear will establish signalling communication.

17. The units sent forward for observation and protection near the coast will be supplied with hand bombs from the units in reserve.

18. Patrolling and relieving must be noiselessly conducted and in such a way as to avoid being seen by the enemy.

(Signed) COL. HALIL SAMI.

DIVISIONAL ORDERS.

Headquarters, 19th Division,

Maidos (undated).

1. Reliable information has been received that the enemy has commenced Naval operations with strong disembarkation forces. Information states that General Hamilton is in command of the Allied Expeditionary Corps, consisting of eighty thousand men, and that General d'Amade is in command of the French forces and has arrived at Tenedos. It is stated that up to now forty thousand French soldiers have been brought up, and the fifty thousand Australians from Mudros Island and the Island (New Zealand) troops have also arrived, and at least five hundred Cretans who have been taken over by the French and are being paid as guides, have started from Peiraeus in the Messageries' steamer under the command of Gryparis.

2. Upon the order of the Acting Commander-in-Chief the measures for the defence of the zone containing the fortified positions, and the dispositions of the troops present in the forts, have been communicated, as below, by the Officer Commanding the fortified positions.

(b) The European zone - The Officer Commanding is the Commanding Officer of the 9th Division, Colonel Halil Sami Bey. The force of occupation of the above zone is the whole of the 9th Division and the Battalions of the Brusa Field Gendarmerie. The defence and observation of the zone against every attempt of the enemy to land is entrusted to the 9th Division.

(c) The Anatolian zone - The Officer Commanding the zone is the Officer Commanding Division, Colonel Refet Bey. The force of occupation of the above zone is the 10th Division Nizam.

3. The 19th Division will be ready at Maidos to advance either towards Gallipoli or for transportation to the Asiatic zone and the 72nd and 77th regiments will return to Eski Konak and to their Headquarters, while the 26th and 27th regiments will occupy the areas allotted to them on the shore with all possible speed.

To this end the 27th regiment will take the place of the 72nd regiment by tomorrow evening. The changing of the sentries along the shore is to be carried out by degrees and, as far as possible, the greatest care must be paid to its being done in such a manner as to be unseen by the enemy.

The 72nd regiment will return to their billets at Maidos by tomorrow evening.

The 26th regiment will evacuate the billets of the 72nd regiment, which they are occupying at Maidos, by noon tomorrow and the regiment at five o'clock afternoon must have reached Krithia.

The

The pickets in rear that it is possible to change in the daytime will be carried out, but the changing of the advanced units along the Sedd-el-Bahr shore will be carried out at nightfall. The arrival of the 77th regiment at the Headquarters at Seraphim at dawn on the 25th is desirable and the details of its transmission must be arranged in accordance therewith.

4. The 26th and 27th regiments will communicate to me when they have handed over their zone and the 77th regiment will communicate to me its return to Konak and their Headquarters.

(Signed) G. O. C. 19th Division,
Caimakan Mustafa Kemal.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS No. 170.

To O.C. 3rd Battalion.

Article 1. Orders of the Division will be carried out as above.

Article 2. The regiment will march to-day to Krithia, in the afternoon, and take up its former position. In the afternoon the regiment will be drawn up in quarter column on the cavalry parade ground.

(Signed) The O.C. 26th regiment.

25th March.

Communicated to Nos. 2, 3 and 4 Battalion Commanders of the 26th Regiment.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS, No. 181.

Addressed to O.C. No. 3 Battalion 26th Regiment.

KRITHIA, April 25th.

The enemy's disembarkation operations have become more serious.

Article 2. The 9th Divisional Commander has taken over the command of the Maidos section, and has come to Maidos and the units of the division on the Anatolian shore are also coming to the European side.

Article 3. The 9th division and the 25th, 26th and 27th Broussa Field Gendarmerie Battalions, the 9th regiment Field Artillery, the Fortress Company, the Cavalry Squadron and other auxiliary units who are included in the line of defence will oppose the enemy's disembarkation along the Sedd el Bahr portion of the Peninsula from Kuyun Liman and along the line Morto Bay, Domouz Dere and Tenker Dere. In case of necessity, advantage will be taken of the covering fire of the howitzers on the Kosholou shore. The Field Battery at Seraphim Chiftlik will remain there and form the reserve of the division. At Kum Tepe on our right is the 25th regiment.

Article 4. The 19th division concentrated at Maidos will form the general reserve of the line of defence. One regiment of this division is at G.H.Q. at Seraphim Chiftlik.

Article 5. The machine gun company of the 26th and 27th regiment, the howitzer battery 10/5 of the 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment Field Battery Artillery, one Fortress Section, two troops of Cavalry, all directly under my own command, and commencing from Sari Tepe Burnu inclusive through the Sedd el Bahr Peninsula, Domouz Dere, Tanker Dere as far as Manqis (?) inclusive will oppose the enemy's disembarkation operations within the zone. One battery of No. 2 Battalion of the 9th regiment Field Artillery will be under the command of O.C. 25th regiment.

Article 6. The defence of that portion of the line from Tekke Burnu to the Mills at Sedd el Bahr will be taken over by No. 2 Battalion and No. 3 Battalion is responsible for the defence of the Morto Bay zone. No. 4 Battalion will be in reserve at Krithia.

Article 7. From No. 2 Battalion:- One Company will be in the zone from Tekke Burnu to Ai Tepe, one company in reserve in rear of this company, one section of this company at Ertogral, one section in the trenches opposite Krithia, and between Ertogral and Sedd el Bahr, one section at Kharab Kale (Tott's Battery), one company in the trenches in front of Hovan Battery, one section of a company detailed from the 3rd Battalion in reserve behind Kharab Kale, one company to be placed in Hakin (?) Dere near Kel Chiftlik to the north of Sari Tepe and Krithia, one section at Chamluk in such a position as to be able to occupy, in case of need, the trenches to the north of Morto Bay. The remainder in the trenches along the side of the road to the west of Morto Bay. One section of No. 4

Battalion

Battalion in reserve behind Kharab Kale which will be responsible for the defence and observation of the Dere to the north of Domouz Dere.

Article 8. The machine gun section of the 27th regiment will be in the rear of Kharab Kale and will form the reserve of the Sedd el Bahr zone.

Article 9. The Senior Officer Commanding of the two battalions in the Sedd el Bahr zone will assume the command in case of necessity until my arrival. In this manner the machine gun section will be jointly used for the purposes of the defence of the zone from Tekke Burnu to Hissarlik.

Article 10. Both the Field and Howitzer Battery will be so placed as to fire against Morto Bay, Sedd el Bahr, and the well between Sedd el Bahr and Ertogral, Tekke Well and Tekke Burnu, and the front of their positions will be prepared by O.C. No. 2 Battalion of the 9th Field Artillery Regiment.

Article 11. If a counter attack be made against the enemy the O.C. Division announces in his orders that he is convinced that a very serious disaster will be inflicted on the enemy in the assault which he has made by sea up to now. This conviction is strengthened by the endurance and success which has been displayed by our soldiers under the shells of the enemy fleet off Sedd el Bahr. Everybody may be convinced that however many troops the enemy may try to land and however heavy the fire from his guns may be, it is absolutely impossible for the enemy to succeed. Let officers and men be absolutely convinced that there is no possible going back when the safety of the Fatherland is at stake and the glory of victory is upon us. Officers commanding units should act with the greatest coolness and must pay especial attention to not calling on their reserves prematurely, because if they draw their reserves before being quite sure at which spot the enemy is making his real landing, and dissipate them in unimportant places and in places where the enemy is only making a feint attack, the danger of finding themselves weak at the really important spot is obvious. In the event of the enemy being successful in landing at one spot no time should be left him to co-ordinate and concentrate his forces, but it will at once be passed to the attack with reserves in the rear and he will be rushed into the sea. Let officers commanding units take care to have in hand reserves to employ for such an eventuality.

Article 12. Officers commanding units in order to protect themselves from the fire of the enemy fleet will construct defences, trenches and local obstacles. They will take advantage of every favourable opportunity to continue strengthening their positions. The greatest attention must be paid by all to keeping up communications. To-night the 2nd Battalion will make every endeavour to complete communications (two lines of) which are being made between Tekke and Krithia. It must be completed by to-morrow evening. The 3rd Battalion will construct a communication road as far as the concealed road from Kanleh Chesme in order that the reserve may come up to the west and north of Morto Bay.

Article 13.

Article 13. Half of the Sanitary Company is at Seraphim Chiftlik. The Divisional Field Hospital will be established on Cham Burnu. In case of need a portion of the Sanitary Company will hasten up to the Sedd el Bahr zone.

Article 14. If the ammunition of the M.G. Company runs out, it will be filled up from the ammunition supply on Elchi Tepe (Achi Baba). Information should be passed to this latter.

Article 15. O.C. Units will continually keep up communication with one another. Artillery, as far as possible, must let me know to what extent they can give any assistance should it be required, to the Anatolian shore.

Article 16. The name of Soulian detachment is Melga. The detachment will be known by the number of the regiment.

To-day up to mid-day the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions will send me a sketch of their dispositions. (The area to be sketched by each Battalion is here given but is not clear).

Communicated to O.C.'s. 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions of 26th regiment, to the 2nd Battalion of the 9th regiment, F.A. and to M.G. section of the 27th regiment in writing.

Signed by O.C. 26th Regiment.

Bimbashi. ?

TURKISH PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE OPERATIONS OF
24TH AND 25TH APRIL.

1. The pass word to-day (no date given) is Chak.
2. Officer Commanding 9th Division is Colonel Halil Sami.
3. To O.C. No. 3 Battalion: 25th regiment has come and is about to charge - hang on. Signed, Bimbashi, 26th regiment, 4.15 p.m. 25th April.
4. To O.C. No. 3 Battalion:- (1) There are three torpedo boats to the north of Helles Light House and one cruiser at Tekke Burnu, another cruiser is coming straight from Tenedos to Tekke Burnu. (2) In the morning an enemy aeroplane went in the direction of Krithia and came back. Signed O.C. 9th Coy. Capt. ? From De Totts Battery 4.15 p.m. 24th April.
5. To O.C. 3rd Battalion. - The submarines are still drawn up in line between Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale and are advancing. From Lt. ? No. 9 Coy. Sedd el Bahr 7.30 p.m. 23rd April, 1915. To O.C. No. 3 Fortress Battalion.
6. To O.C. No. 3 Battalion. - The 25th regiment is coming up, hang on. No. 7 Company of 2nd Battalion has come up to Tekke Burnu. Captain ? has been skilled and the Company has suffered incredible losses. From O.C. No. 27 regiment, Major ? 2.45 p.m. 25th April.
7. O.C. No. 3 Battalion 26th regiment. - There is a battleship to the west of Tekke Burnu and another battleship and a torpedo boat opposite the Lighthouse, also the four torpedo boats which have been told off for Tenedos. From Captain Idris, O.C. Outposts No. 11 Coy. Tekke Burnu, 23rd April.
8. To O.C. 10th Coy. Kanli Cheshme. - (1) Four torpedo boats are visible in front of Tenedos. (2) Nothing further to report in my section. From Officer in Charge, Minto Bay, 23rd April.
9. To the Major.- There is firing at Krithia Heights, that is to say, on my right. Let me know what I am to do, we have no communication and we do not know who is on our right; if it is possible, send word to the regiment. Please tell me what I am to do.. From Captain Sabahedin, 25th April (no time) Note "Y" Beach?
10. To Officer No. 3 Battalion. Two battleships after going up and down at great speed in front of Tekke Burnu, have gone straight off to Chift Dere. With the exception of two torpedo boats some way out from Sedd el Bahr there is nothing else to be seen. O.C. No. 9 Coy. 5 p.m. 24th April.
11. O.C. No. 3 Battalion. - (1) To-day three submarines have been between Kum Kale and Sedd el Bahr. (2) There is a submarine in front of C. Helles Lighthouse,

one in front of Tekke Burnu, and another in the Straits.
(3) To-day four enemy aeroplanes came from Tenedos and went towards Krithia. After a short time they returned in pairs. Before they started, two torpedo boats, one battleship and one cruiser went at great speed in same direction. (4) The pass word "Chak" has been communicated to Sedd el Bahr and Ertegral Fort. Signed O.C. 9th Battalion, 23rd April.

12. - To O.C. Battalion, Cheshme. - To avoid the losses caused by enemy aeroplanes at Maidos, owing no doubt to the large number of troops they see there, transport and other traffic is to be suspended during the day. Signed ? 23rd April.

13. My Captain. - The enemy's infantry is taking cover at the back of the Sedd el Bahr gun defences, but the rear of these gun defences cannot come under fire. It is certain that the enemy have landed in Sedd el Bahr - however, with the 20 or 25 men I have with me, it will not be possible to drive them, (the enemy) off with a bayonet charge because I am obliged to spread my men out. Either you must send up reinforcements and drive the enemy into the sea or let us evacuate this place because I see it is absolutely certain that they will land more men to-night. Kindly give this information to O.C. Battalion.

Sixteen boxes of ammunition out of eighteen have come.

Send the doctors to carry off my wounded, alas! alas! my Captain for God's sake send me reinforcements because hundreds of soldiers are landing. Hurry up, what on earth will happen, my Captain. From Abdul Rahman, (No date or time.)

FORCE ORDER NO. 6.

General Headquarters.

7th May 1915.

1. The attack will be resumed tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. precisely, and will be pressed with the utmost possible vigour.
2. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade will take the place of the New Zealand Brigade in the Composite Division, and the New Zealand Brigade will join the 29th Division.
3. G.O.C. Composite Division will be prepared to move up one brigade to a convenient position on the left of the line held by the Composite Naval Brigade, in square 169.A. and will also be prepared, in case of the advance of the Composite Naval Brigade being ordered, to have its trenches taken over by another brigade of his Division.
4. The G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire will continue to consolidate his position in 169.D., and will endeavour to extend his right across the KEREVES DERE as ordered in Force Order No. 5, para. 6. His further advance will be governed by the progress of the attack on KRITHIA as already described in Force Order No.5, para. 7.
5. General Headquarters will be established at Hill 114 at 10 a.m. tomorrow 8 inst.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major General,
C. G. S.
Med. Ex. Force.

5273

FROM:- Sir Ian Hamilton.

TO:- Lord Kitchener.

No. 207.

7.5.15.

10.48 p.m.

During a long day's fighting failed to get the TURKS properly on the run or to make good ACHI BABA AAA But we have improved our position on the right where the FRENCH have captured trenches and on the left where just before sunset General MARSHALL with 87 Brigade relieved the Lancs. Territorial Brigade and pressed the enemy back nearly up to KRITHIA AAA Attacking again to-morrow AAA Please tell Prime Minister his son is progressing well and doctor hopes will not have stiff joint.

From
General d'Amade,
To
General Headquarters.

9th May, 1915.

Despatched 2.28 p.m.
Received 2.46 p.m.

The G.O.C. my 1st Division informs me that large bodies of Turks are moving from ACHI BABI along the telegraph line towards Hill 236 AAA The enemy's dispositions lead me to think that my right is threatened with a serious attack AAA My reserves having been employed since last night in guarding the positions then occupied I now have no troops to reinforce my front if attacked. AAA My defensive line is as you know seriously weakened by the constant fighting of the last two days and the resulting heavy losses AAA I therefore ask for fresh British troops in support in the Sector between telegraph line and the sea in order to be prepared for attack AAA At the same time I consider that a flank attack from the British section would be the best reply to such an enemy attack AAA The French losses in yesterday's attack were about 2,500.

S E C R E T.

Copy No. 10.

FORCE ORDER NO. 7.

General Headquarters,

9th May 1915.

1. The enemy are known to have suffered heavy casualties in yesterday's action.
2. The allied line of trenches will be held as follows:-

29th Division is responsible for the line from the western coast to the KRITHIA nullah inclusive. Composite Division for the KRITHIA nullah exclusive to a point on the left bank of the nullah running parallel and south of the KRITHIA road, just east of the 3 of 300, where it will connect with the French left. The Corps Expeditionnaire is responsible for the line from this point to the southern coast.
3. The Corps Expeditionnaire has been ordered to return the 2nd Naval Brigade today to the Composite Division.
4. The Manchester Brigade and Lancs. Fusilier Brigade are withdrawn from the command of the G.O.C. Composite Division and from 5 p.m. today will come under the command of the G.O.C. East Lancashire Division, who has arrived at CAPE HELLES.
5. The East Lancashire Division will form the General Reserve. It will bivouac in concealed positions in square 168.Y. north-west of the stone bridge on the KRITHIA road. It must be prepared to man the rear trenches in the right Section if required at night as support to the advanced line. These trenches are situated in square 169.A.G. and M. with their right resting on the fork of the nullah which flows parallel to the KRITHIA road, near point 200.

(Sgd:) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
C. G. S.
Medtn. Exped. Force.

Vice Admiral,

Commanding Eastern Mediterranean Squadron.

H.M.T. "Arcadian",

10th May, 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to enquire your views as to the possibility of making an aeroplane attack upon the Turkish powder factories at Makrikeui on the coast of the Sea of Marmara south-west of Constantinople.

I understand that these are the only factories possessed by the Turks, or at any rate, the only factories of any importance. If, therefore, a successful bomb attack could be made, the operation might have important results.

The factories stand by themselves and are easily recognisable according to my information. The Chief obstacle is the distance from Cape Helles. I should be obliged if you would consider whether an attempt might be made to attack them with any prospects of success.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd:) IAN HAMILTON,

General,
Commanding Med. Ex. Force.

Monsieur le General de Division d'Amade,
Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire francais
d'Orient.

10th May,

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter written at 7 a.m. today, and received by me at 2.30 p.m., laying before me in full detail the situation in which the Corps Expeditionnaire finds itself at the close of a fortnight of fighting as arduous, perhaps, as any that has ever fallen to the lot of the French or British armies.

I would assure you that I realise most fully the special difficulties which have confronted the fine Corps under your command. The gallant manner in which your troops have faced and surmounted those difficulties has daily increased my appreciation of the honour which the position of their Commander confers upon me.

The severe losses which the Corps Expeditionnaire has suffered without loss of discipline or moral bears witness to the fact that it has very fully maintained the glorious traditions of the French Army. All portions of the Expeditionary Force have been highly tried. You will not be unaware that the losses in the infantry of the 29th Division have also amounted to between 50 and 60 per cent, while the casualties among the officers have, I regret to say, reached a much higher proportion. No one can deplore these losses more than I, but it has needed a great effort to establish ourselves in a position from which to take the next step towards the accomplishment of the great task confided to us; and I cannot sufficiently express my high appreciation of the way in which you and your gallant troops have applied yourselves to its accomplishment.

I need hardly say that your letter fully answers my G.S.R. 129 of today, which need not have been written had I received your letter at an earlier hour.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

General,
Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

POSTE DE COMMANDEMENT DU PONT DE PIERRE.

10 Mai, 1915. 7 a.m.

Le General d'Amade Commandant le Corps
Expeditionnaire Francais au General Sir Ian Hamilton
G.C.B., D.S.O., Commandant en chef.

Mon General,

Engagees depuis quinze jours et quinze nuits, sans aucun repit, a la defense du secteur ou paraissent se concentrer tous les efforts offensifs de l'ennemi, les troupes du Corps Expeditionnaire francais ont subi des pertes considerables, et se trouvent aujourd'hui trop diminuees aussi dans leurs moyens d'action militaire, pour que je ne vous signale tout specialement cette situation.

Tant qu'il ne s'est agi que de l'honneur de combattre sur un secteur particulierement expose et dans des conditions qui exigeaient seulement l'endurance, l'opiniatrete et l'esprit de sacrifice des troupes francaises, celles -ci ont pu tres aisement suffire a leur tache. Mais a partir du moment ou les pertes sont telles qu'il va devenir impossible aux troupes francaises de continuer a garder victorieusement le terrain que nous avez confie, il est de mon devoir de vous demander un alligement de leur service. Il est egalement de mon devoir de provoquer des mesures qui nous permettront de ne pas voir disparaitre nos effectifs, et de continuer a fournir a nos vaillants allies le concours que nous leur devons.

Depuis le debut de la campagne en Orient les pertes subies par les diverses unites d'Infanterie dans la 1^{re} Division s'elevant.

Brigade Metropolitaine (au 8 Mai)	
175 cme d'Infanterie =	30 officiers, 1628 h.
sur un effectif initial de	
	57 officiers, 3237 h.
Regiment de marche d'Afrique =	
	37 officiers 1410 h.
Brigade Coloniale (au 5 Mai)	
4e Coloniale	18 officiers 914 h.
6e "	20 officiers 944 h.

Je n'ai pas sous la main les pertes de la Brigade Conoliale du 6 au 8 Mai.

Depuis le 8 Mai a 17 h jusqu'au 9 a la meme heure 2000 blesses environ ont encore ete evacues du front.

On peut affirmer qu'en tepit le l'arrivee des renforts venus de France les effectifs de la 1^{re} Division ont subi un dechet de 50 o/o en ce qui concerne le, troupe, 66 o/o en se qui concerne les officiers.

Les

Les 2 Generaux de Brigade ou faisant fonctions, 2 Colonels sur 4, le presque totalite des chefs de Batn. et des Capitaines ont ete mis hors de combat.

Le Tableau ci dessous qui donne, a le date d'aujourd'hui, le situation du Commandement des grandes unites de le 1r Division est tres caracteristique =

Brigade Coloniale	-	Lt.Col.Vacher.
4e Colonial	-	Chef de Batn.Bock.
1e Batn.	-	Capne. Fierard.
2e Batn.	-	Capne. Foulon.
3e Batn.	-	Lieut. Grosse.
6e Colonial	-	Chef de Bn. Niboreau.
1re Batn.	-	Capne. Goetz.
2e Batn.	-	S.Lieut. Morin.
3e Batn.	-	Adjudant Anche.
Brigade Metropolitaine	-	Lt.Col. Nogues.
175e Regt.d'Inf.	-	Chef de Batn. Jeanin.
1re Batn.	-	Lieut. Bonnant.
2e Batn.	-	S.Lieut.Briguet.
3e Batn.	-	Lieut. Basse Astaix.
Regt.de marche d'Afrique	-	Lt.Col.Nieger.
Batn. de 3e Zouaves	-	Capn. Prevot.
Batn. du 4e Zouaves	-	Lieut. Fabre.
Batn. de le Ligion	-	Lieut. Salomon.

Cette situation montre le faiblesse du haut commandement dans toutes les unites. Dans les compagnies l'encadrement est assure dans des conditions ausse precaires, en ce qui concerne les officiers par des nouveaux promus, a raison d'un S.Lieut. par Compie., en ce qui concerne les S. Officiers et Caporaux dans des conditions plus insuffisantes encore.

C'est au moment ou l'encadrement demanderait le plus de solidite afin de maintenir les unites, dissociés par les pertes, dans le sentiment de la discipline et du devoir que les cadres sont reduits dans d'aussi inquietantes proportions.

Le droit de nomination a titre temporaire pour le duree de la guerre que m'est confere pour les grades jusqu'a Lieut. Colonel inclus me permet de remedier en partie a cette crise; mais en meme temps que la consommation ne diminue pas la source se tarit bien vite a pu, au debut, me permettre de trouver quelques officiers Je suis amene a m'adresser aux ressources de France, et c'est un procede tres long.

Monsieur le General Bailloud Comt. la 2e Division m'ecrit ce qui suit, a la date du 10 Mai 7h. matin.

"J'ai l'honneur d'appeler votre attention sur la
"situation excessivement grave dans laquelle se trouve
"aujourd'hui la 4m Brigade mixte qui n'est plus
"actuellement en mesure de satisfaire a la tache que
"vous lui avez fait l'honneur de lui confier. Cette
"brigade a arrivee en 2 echelons le 7m Mai 1 Regiment
"a 3000h (2 Bataillons blancs, 1 Batn. Senegalais)
"le 8 Mai 1 Regiment a 2000h. (1 Batn. blanc. 1 Batn.
"Senegalais). Des le 7 Mai cette brigade a ete
"engagee et les combats aux quels elle a pris part

se

"sesont continues sans interruption de jour et de
"nuit, pendant le 7, 8, 9, et la nuit du 9 au 10.

"Aujourd'hui 10 Mai la Brigade est maitresse
"des positions que vous lui aviez donne l'ordre
"d'enlever et elle occupe le front que vous lui
"aviez assigne. Mais ses effectifs qui au debut
"etaient de 5000 h.se trouvent reduits de moitie.

"Les officiers ont ete atteints dans des
"proportions telles qu'au lieu de 3 officiers par
"Cie.il n'y en a plus qu'un au maximum, en general
"sous Lieut. Les 2 Colonels ont ete blesses et
"evacues; 3 Chefs de Batn. sur 5 ont ete tues ou
"blesses; 12 Capitaines sur 20 ont ete tues ou
"blesses. Le dechet est le memo en ce qui concerne
"les sous officiers.

"Cette situation, tres dangereuse avec une
"troupe blanche s'aggrave encore de ce fait que les
"troupes noires ont plus besoin que les autres
"d'etre solidement encadrees.

"Dans ces conditions j'ai le honneur de vous
"rendre compte qu'il m'est mate-riellement impossible,
"avec des effectifs reduits de moitie de conserver
"le front total que vous nous aviez assigne quand
"nous avons des effectifs doubles.

"Je demande en consequence qu'il soit reduit
"dans la proportion que vous voudrez bien, dans votre
"haute experience des hommes ce des choses, determiner.

"S'il m'est permis de formuler une proposition
"a ce sujet, je me rallie a celle presenter par le
"Gl. Simonin avec le quel je viens de m'entertener
"sur le Terrain de la situation et qui demande que
"son front soit arrete a la ligne telegraphique
"sur la quelle s'etablerait a l'avenir la gauche de
"brigade et la droite des Troupes Anglaises.

(Signe.) BAILLOUD."

Au point de vue Terrain d'action des forces
alliees il peut etre divise en 2 Secteurs, l'un qui
s'etend du Golf de Saros a la cote 300 (169.D.1) l'autre
qui va de cette cote 300 aux Dardanelles, vers
l'embouchure du Kereves-Dere. Ces 2 Secteurs presentent
le meme developpement lineaire. Le premier est occupe
par les forces britanniques, le second par les forces
du Corps Expeditionnaire francais.

Le premier pourrait etre denomme Secteur de
Krithia, parce que ce village marque son centre. Le
second porterait l'appellation de Secteur du Kereves-
Dere, parce que ce ravin en jalonne tout le front.

L'experience de ces quinze jours a montre que les
Turcs, dans leurs attaques incessantes utilisaient les
cheminements de la haute vallee du Kereves-Dere, et
soutenus par une puissante organization defensive
(Tranchees Mitrailleuses) creee sur les pentes orientales
de la vallee, mettaient a profit ses couverts pour
approcher de nos lignes. Ainsi favorises par le
terrain du Kereves-Dere au point de vue tactique, nos

adversaires

adversaires sont naturellement portés à exploiter cette même zone au point de vue stratégique. En effet l'objectif actuel étant les Dardanelles, les Turcs sont amenés à s'établir en forces sur cette rive plutôt que sur le Golfe de Saros.

Ces considérations se trouvent d'ailleurs confirmées par le fait d'expérience qui montre que le secteur du Kereves-Dere n'a pas un seul instant, depuis 15 jours, cessé d'être le théâtre d'une lutte acharnée.

Pour rendre hommage à la vérité il convient d'ajouter que les navires de guerre ont fourni un précieux appui en canonnant la vallée de ce cours d'eau. Mais en raison du caractère sinueux et couvert de la vallée dans sa partie inférieure, en raison du fait que la haute vallée et la vallée moyenne échappent aux vues, l'action des canons de la flotte est nécessairement restreinte.

Les conditions topographiques du secteur français s'ajoutent donc aux conditions tactiques et stratégiques pour imposer un effort plus lourd aux troupes chargées de sa défense.

De cet ensemble de faits, qui n'a pas marqué de solliciter votre attention, résulte la nécessité de réduire, dans la mesure que vous trouverez juste et conforme au but poursuivi par les forces alliées, la tâche incombant aux troupes françaises.

Cet allègement pourra s'opérer de telle façon que vous jugerez la meilleure pour l'ensemble des grands intérêts militaires dont vous êtes seul juge. Il pourra s'opérer soit par une réduction du front comme le suggère le G1. Bailloud dans telle ou telle portion du secteur français de manière à nous attribuer un front proportionné à nos effectifs réduits et nous permettant par un échelonnement en profondeur de donner quelque répit à nos troupes.

On pourra aussi le réaliser par voie d'alternance entre les secteurs. Soit enfin par une combinaison des divers moyens.

Quel que soit le procédé employé, l'allègement procure aux troupes françaises n'est demandé qu'en raison d'une nécessité d'ordre majeur, et uniquement pour leur permettre de continuer à remplir à votre satisfaction la tâche glorieuse qui leur incombe, à côté de leurs vaillants camarades de l'Armée alliée.

G1. d'Amade.

To:- East Lancashire Division.
29th Division.
Composite Divisions.

10th May, 1915.

On the night of 11/12th May the East Lancashire Division will take over the whole of the British front line except that portion held by the Indian Brigade AAA The arrangements for this move will be made direct between the G.O.C's. of the divisions concerned AAA The Indian Brigade will hold their portion of the line permanently arranging for their own Reliefs of the front trenches AAA From seven p.m. on the 11th May the Indian Brigade will come under the command of the G.O.C., East Lancs. Division for tactical purposes while that division is holding the front line of trenches AAA The units withdrawn from the front line trenches on the night of the 11/12th May will be bivouacked in positions selected by the G.O.C's. the Divisions concerned in consultation with each other AAA C.G.S. will meet G.O.C's. Divisions at 29th Division Headquarters at 10 a.m. tomorrow to arrange details and settle any points for discussion.

Addressed, 29th Division, Composite, East Lancs. Division.

G. H. Q.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

10th May, 1915.

Chief of the General Staff,

I attach certain notes of the recent landing at Cape Helles for your information.

I should like to take this opportunity of ^{say} that the Naval personnel and the Military Landing Officers have all worked splendidly.

The Plymouth Marine Battalion, and the "Anson" and "Drake" Battalions have also done excellent work.

Captain Cobban has been of the greatest use to me during the past fortnight.

(Sgd:) A. W. ROPER,

Brigadier General, R.E.

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

NOTES ON LANDING NEAR CAPE HELLES.

1. The bombardment before the landing had little or no effect on the Turkish trenches and obstacles. The entanglement on "W" Beach was practically intact when we landed.
2. I would suggest that on future occasions the War ships, from which troops are actually landed, should follow the example set by H.M.S. "Implacable". This ship came in alongside her tows till within a few hundred yards of the shore, keeping up a heavy fire as she did so. The men in her tows landed without a shot being fired at them.
3. Owing to the opposition encountered and difficulty of communications, the Principal Beach Master and the Principal Military Landing Officer were unable at first to superintend the work of landing on "X" and "V" Beaches, and had to remain at "W" Beach, where they were landed.
4. Except as regards the landing of infantry etc., from cutters, the division of a Beach into Landing places seems useless.
5. The party of 1 Non-Commissioned Officer and 16 men (see page 48 Manual) per landing place is quite insufficient to clear the beach. When the horse boats were coming on shore loaded with vehicles the only practicable arrangement was to pool the men available and drag the vehicles off by large parties of men. It was found that the horses were of little use for hauling vehicles up from the beach. This was partly due to the incompetence of the drivers and partly to the horses being soft after their long detention on board ship. Mules were better than horses but manual labour was certainly the best.
6. I see no advantage in detailing the military parties referred to in page 42 of the Manual for each landing place. It would I think be better to have 100 men for each beach of 6 (or fewer) landing places, with an extra platoon for every 3 extra landing places.
7. Reliefs should certainly be arranged. During the recent landing the men had to work continuously, varied by intervals of fighting and of carrying ammunition up to the firing line. During the first night we were so pushed that a Post Captain of the Navy was himself carrying boxes of ammunition up from the Beach, while the Royal Army Medical Corps personnel had to be employed landing a battery of Artillery.
8. More Engineers are needed. We had only one Company less a Section.
9. The General Officer Commanding 29th Division was desirous that all supplies etc., should be conveyed to the

top

top of the Cliff. This of course entailed much extra work, which would not be necessary on a flatter shore.

10. An elaborate programme was got out by the 29th Division, showing the order in which the different personnel, animals, stores, etc., should be landed. This was not adhered to.

11. Owing to the opposition encountered at "V" Beach, certain personnel etc., were diverted to "W" Beach.

12. The Principal Beach Master and Principal Military Landing Officer were not kept informed of what was being sent ashore at the different beaches, or when it might be expected. Information sent us often proved wrong. I would urge the importance of keeping the Principal Beach Master and Principal Military Landing Officer fully informed.

13. Owing to the piecemeal way in which Units came ashore, it was found impossible to keep any record as to who had been landed. If it could be arranged, it would be desirable that a statement should be sent with each boat or lighter giving the contents and the ship from which they come. Clerks would also be necessary.

14. At least 1 man per 2 animals should be sent with each horse boat. This is especially necessary when the harness or saddlery is sent in bags and the animals are not properly harnessed.

15. Instructions should be given that poles and swingletrees must be sent ashore with the vehicles to which they belong. Great confusion was caused by this not being done. The difficulty of landing the vehicles was also much increased thereby. In other cases the vehicles were loaded in the boats with the poles away from the shore so that they had to be taken off backwards.

16. At first there was a great scarcity of Medical Officers on shore to attend to the wounded.

17. The Provost Marshal and Military Police should be landed early.

18. A Corps of civilian labourers would also be of great use.

19. Army Service Corps and Army Ordnance Corps personnel were needed to look after supplies and ammunition.

20. Forage should not be put at the bottom of a lighter in which there is several inches of dirty water.

21. At first the Naval authorities considered that piers would be rather in the way; but later on when supplies and ammunition were being sent where in large quantities, they pressed for their construction.

A Barrel Pier, constructed of rather indifferent 54 Gallon Casks proved of the greatest value, but I think if any further landings are contemplated early notice should be given, so that good casks could be obtained, and these should preferably be 100 Gallon Casks.

22. Similarly if further landings are intended, the provision of extra Well's lights and flares should be seen to.

23. Efforts should be made to avoid the great delay that occurred on this occasion after the landing of the covering party, before the arrival of the Main Body.

24. Some difficulty occurred about men being transferred to Fleet Sweepers from the transports. In some cases, I believe, this was done the evening before the landing, with the result that they had little or no sleep and no hot meal before landing. In other cases, when they were not transferred to the Fleet Sweepers till the morning of the landing, there was considerable delay.

25. The order about Naval personnel appearing in blue on the beach should be cancelled, as it very soon became a dead letter.

26. The time table prepared beforehand showed that the 29th Division, should be disembarked in about 60 hours.

The time actually taken was about 10 days, though we had excellent weather and all branches of the service worked well.

Brigadier General, R.E.

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

General Headquarters.

10th May, 1915.

FORCE ORDER NO. 8.

General Headquarters,

11th May 1915.

1. The General Commanding wishes to congratulate all ranks on their magnificent work of the last fortnight. He feels sure that the heroism displayed by the troops at the disembarkation, and during the subsequent operations, will send a thrill of pride throughout the whole British Empire when the story becomes known to the public.

The arduous work of the past fortnight has, however, necessitated a brief pause to recoup, refit and prepare for fresh exertions.

2. Owing to the numerous and well planned entrenchments now held by the enemy in the vicinity of ACHI BABI and also at KABA TEPE, the operations in the immediate future will approximate more to semi-siege warfare than to open operations in the field.

Further progress must now be made by continuous and systematic attacks on certain portions of the hostile line rather than by a general action involving the advance of the whole line at once.

The first step in this nature of warfare is to consolidate effectively our own position against hostile attack by strengthening and improving trenches. The second step is to assume the offensive against the enemy, and gain further ground in the Peninsula.

3. The front trenches should form one continuous line; this facilitates the reinforcement of any threatened position without casualties being incurred when crossing open ground, and also enables portions that are shelled by the enemy to be temporarily vacated. Such portions should be at once reoccupied if threatened by hostile infantry attack, or directly the shell fire ceases.

Every trench must be carefully traversed. Support trenches should be dug from 150 to 250 yards in rear of the front line trenches. Support trenches should be linked by strong supporting points, or small redoubts, the garrisons of which will not leave these positions but assist in the recapture of any portion of our front trenches which may be lost by bringing fire to bear on such trenches and thus facilitating the advance of our infantry from our support trenches.

It is the duty of the troops in these support trenches to recapture at once with the bayonet any portion of the front line of trenches which may be temporarily lost.

4. The position of the machine guns in the front line trenches must be carefully chosen with a view to bringing effective flanking fire to bear on any hostile attack. Alternative positions should be constructed. For the purpose of testing the mechanism, machine guns should never fire more than single rounds, so as not to disclose their position. In case of hostile attack their position will then come as a surprise to the enemy and full benefit will be derived from their use.
5. While work on the trenches is being carried on, every effort should be made to locate the exact positions of the hostile trenches. Although considerable progress can be achieved in this direction by day yet, as a rule, this can be effected with fewer casualties by the means of night reconnaissance. The information so obtained should be placed on a map by the staff of the higher formations. These maps can then be pieced together by General Headquarters and a fairly accurate idea can thus be obtained of the hostile positions. Plans can then be made for the capture of one or more of these positions consecutively.
6. Commanders should foster the offensive spirit by every means in their power and every effort should be made to gain ground at night by sapping, or by advancing and then digging in, but care must be taken by previous reconnaissance to ensure that trenches thus constructed are not under hostile enfilade firing when daylight appears. Such digging parties must be covered by a firing party. Picked shots should be selected in each company to deal with enemy snipers.
7. As regards the artillery the hostile area in front of the trenches should be divided into areas. One or more batteries should be detailed for the purpose of affording assistance if required to our infantry in each of these areas in case of attacks by the enemy. When our trenches are in close proximity to (i.e. within about two to three hundred yards of) the hostile trenches this is most important. Artillery observation officers in such cases must be located night and day in the infantry trenches, and the batteries must be carefully on the hostile trenches. In case of a hostile attack the remaining batteries, which should have also been previously registered, make a wall of fire from 200 to 500 yards in front of those of our trenches which are being attacked with a view to preventing any supports reaching the enemy.

As the front held by our troops is comparatively small it is necessary that as many batteries as possible should be able to fire on the area in front of any portion of our trenches.

The heavy guns should be reserved as a rule for offensive operations against hostile trenches and artillery, on which they should be carefully registered as soon as these have been located.

8. Telephonic communications are all important. If possible all lines from observing stations should be duplicated or triplicated and laid with connecting cross lines.

Artillery lines should be labelled with a triangular, and infantry lines with a square shaped, disc to facilitate the linesmen identifying their wires especially in the dark.

Infantry must on no account ever approach the artillery observation stations, the concealment of which is of the greatest importance.

Directly hostile trenches have been located artillery will be registered on them.

Both in attack and defence in this nature of warfare the secrets of success are good co-operation between infantry and artillery, and efficient communications.

9. If another offensive in the immediate future is now prepared for on the above lines, the General Commanding feels sure that the capture of the ACHI BABI position will be certainly and speedily achieved and will lead to further victory by the army under his command, the fine fighting qualities of which have already achieved success under conditions hitherto considered impossible.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,


Major-General,
C. G. S.
Medtn. Exped. Force.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION.

Gallipoli Peninsula.

12th May 1915.

For details of Artillery telephone see separate sheet.



REFERENCE

Air Lines ——— Cables - - - - - Morse →
Submarine Cables ——— Vibrators +
Wireless Stations (W) Telephones →

Note: Not drawn to scale.

Printing Section.
C.M.R.M.F.


App x . 2 .

May 12th

ARTILLERY TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION

Gallipoli Peninsula

12th May, 1915.



REFERENCE

R.A. Cables —————
Signal Service Cables - - - - -

Notes: Not drawn to scale.

Printing Section
G.H.Q. M.E.F.

App 2 -

May 12th,

SPECIAL ORDER.

General Headquarters.

12th May, 1915.

For the first time for 18 days and nights it has been found possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the fire fight. During the whole of that long period of unprecedented strain the Division has held ground, or gained it, against the bullets and bayonets of the constantly renewed forces of the foe. During the whole of that long period they have been illuminating the pages of military history with their blood. The losses have been terrible, but mingling with the deep sorrow for fallen comrades arises a feeling of pride in the invincible spirit which has enabled the survivors to triumph where ordinary troops must inevitably have failed. I tender to Major-General Hunter-Weston and to his Division at the same time my profoundest sympathy with their losses and my warmest congratulations on their achievement.

IAN HAMILTON,

General.

FORCE ORDER NO. 10.

General Headquarters,

13th May, 1915.

1. When the units which have been engaged in the recent operations are rested the line will be held by the Expeditionary Force as follows, viz:-

<u>Name of Section.</u>	<u>Limits of Section.</u>	<u>Troops.</u>	<u>Length of Line.</u>
First Section.	{ From - Western Coast } { To - A point 300 yards N.W. of KRITHIA nullah }	29th Division (including 29th Indian Infantry Brigade attached.)	1600 yards about.
Second Section.	{ From - A point 300 yards N.W. of KRITHIA nullah } { To - The nullah (inclusive) in Square 169 C. }	East Lancashire Division	1500 yards about.
Third Section.	{ From - The nullah (exclusive) in Square 169 C. } { To - The telegraph line. }	Royal Naval Division.	700 yards about.
Fourth Section.	{ From - The telegraph line. } { To - Eastern Coast }	Corps Expeditionnaire Orient.	2100 yards about.

The New Zealand Brigade will be in General Reserve.

2. It may be found necessary later to retain one Brigade of the East Lancashire Division in General Reserve. In making the above distribution this has been allowed for in the fighting strengths of units.

3. The nights on which the line will be taken over in accordance with the above order will be notified later.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
C. G. S.

Medtn. Exped. Force.

The Vice-Admiral,

Commanding Eastern Mediterranean Squadron.

13th May 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to enquire whether it would be possible for aircraft to find a suitable landing place for occasional use on Xeros Island.

If this were possible, it might be useful as a point from which to carry out air raids on various important localities in the directions of Constantinople and Adrianople, such as the powder factories at MAKRIKEUI, the supply depots at SHARKEUI, the railway junction and bridge at UZUN KEUPRI, and MALGARA where a concentration of troops is reported.

The three first-named points are of especial importance. MAKRIKEUI is the only Turkish cartridge factory. At SHARKEUI are the enemy's principal supply depots. The destruction of these places might prove of great importance to the success of our operations. If serious damage could be done at UZUN KEUPRI it would much hamper the enemy in moving troops and supplies towards the peninsula from Adrianople or from Constantinople.

In connection with the above, I should also be glad to have your views as to the practicability of making sea-plane raids from the Gulf of ADRAMYTI, aimed at PANDERMA and BALIKESR. Any considerable damage done to the railway at those points would place an obstacle in the way of the movement of hostile troops towards the peninsula from the SMYRNA and SOMA districts.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd:) IAN HAMILTON, General,

Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

FORCE ORDER NO. 11.

General Headquarters,

13th May 1915.

EXPENDITURE OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

1. The expenditure of artillery ammunition during the recent operations has been considerable. During the present period of comparative inactivity it is necessary to husband our resources in this respect.
2. As regards 18 pdr. and 60 pdr. ammunition, only what is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of our position or for the purpose of retaliation should be used; and, where possible, the 15 pdr. guns should be fired in preference to the 18 pdr.
3. 6" Howitzer and 4.5" Howitzer ammunition should be most carefully economised and should as a rule only be expended when co-operating with infantry, in a definite tactical enterprise.
4. In case of attack by the enemy the expenditure of ammunition can only be governed by the one principle of the amount necessary to defeat the attack, but even at such a time the necessity for economy of ammunition should never be lost sight of.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
C. G. S.
Medtn. Exped. Force.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 13th May, 1915.

My dear General,

Possibly it was never promised meanwhile it is more useful elsewhere.

Many thanks for saying I am to get back my Australian Brigade tomorrow, and I trust it will be followed the next day by the New Zealanders. I much hope that I am later on to get the Indian Brigade, which I know you originally intended I should have, and which would, I cannot help thinking, be of special use in this very hilly and broken country. I know of course that since I was to have had the Indian Brigade to complete my second division I have got my two mounted brigades from Egypt. These are however only by way of reinforcements to existing infantry brigades, and as such I would have much preferred to use them, but as they have been sent with brigade staff, etc., this is now impossible. They have, however, had no real infantry training, and the two brigades between them only number about $\frac{3}{4}$ of an infantry brigade, viz - 2,900 men.

Why left?
Right is the way we want him to go vide instructions.

I feel I want more troops to try to get into a better position than I now occupy, as what I have is by no means satisfactory on the lower slopes of this big hill. Where I am, I am absolutely blind, as it is impossible to scout through this thick scrub - the sea-planes can never give me any movements of troops in this scrub, and I am overlooked all round. We have necessarily had to stay here all this time, as we have not been strong enough to advance, and I have only been able to consolidate myself and dig in. In the meantime, the Turks have been digging in all round me, and now have two and three continuous rows of trenches right away round everywhere, excepting my extreme left flank, and I anticipate the greatest possible difficulty in breaking through these. With the Indian Brigade, I should hope to be able to make a sweeping movement round my left, and direct an attack with its left in the direction of Biyuk Anafarta, and its right on point 971 (Square 234). If I could take this and hold my left on 971 with a position running down the top of that ridge, I should feel in a satisfactory position, as I should overlook the whole of the valley towards the Straits.

It is quite possible even with the Indian Brigade I might not be able to effect

all

all I want, as, though it looks a tiny bit on the map, yet when you come to look at it from the coast you realise what a great long stretch of mountain it is, and even if I get it, it may be almost more than I can hold for I fancy it would sure to be attacked heavily. If however I can get it, I should hope to get some of the enemy's guns, which I fancy are located somewhere about 239 Q. and V. There is also one point to remember about it, that on the 971 ridge we might be subjected to heavy gun fire from the Straits. That, however, we should have to face and dig ourselves in.

I do not know if you have any definite plans after you get the Achi Babi position, which I much hope may be taken before long. It strikes me, however, that using my force as a bridge head here, it might be advantageous to land a really large force under its cover, and get a position covering Kilia Bay. If we could get big guns on to such a position, we ought with luck to be able to cut off communications, certainly by land and probably by sea, though to do that, we should want to fix up a search light which I fear would be a great target to the enemy's big guns.

Yours ever,

(Sgd:) W. R. BIRDWOOD.

Notes. Indian Bde. doing most useful work where it is - when it has finished that work it may be wise to send it to Anzac. At present Anzac is the holding force & is doing Yeoman Service in that capacity.

SECRET.

Copy No. 13.

FORCE ORDER NO. 12.

General Headquarters.

14th May 1915.

1. With reference to Force Order No. 10 of 13th May the 29th Division will take over the section of the line allotted to them on the night of 16/17th May.
2. The Royal Naval Division will take over their section of the line on the night of 17/18th May.
3. Please acknowledge receipt of this order by telegraph.

(Sgd:) W.P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
C. G. S.
Medtn. Exped. Force.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 14th May, 1915.

My dear General,

In case you should hear I have been hit, I write just a line to tell you I am really all right. Life in what we call "Quinn's Post," our most advanced line at the head of our little valley, Square 224,C, had become intolerable. The Turks are right on top of us there, and though we drove them out one night last week, we had as you know to retire again. They have now got very bold, and have been throwing a tremendous lot of bombs into our trenches doing us a lot of harm. I therefore went up there this morning to devise an attack for tonight, by which I hope we shall turn them out. I am afraid we may not be able to hold their trench, as they can enfilade it from both sides, but we can quite hope to get all that may be in it with the bayonet, and take over their local supply of bombs. Having done this I hope to destroy their trench and prevent them from worrying us quite so much.

I was up in Quinn's trench, which is only about 30 yards from the Turks, and was prospecting through my periscope. Stupidly enough I forgot the top of these parapets is often not bullet proof, and a rascal opposite sent a bullet along which got me on the top of the head, but only just made a furrow which the doctor tells me only goes just as far as the bone, and has not hurt it in any way, so I am thankful to say I am quite all right.

Yours ever,

(Sgd:) W.R. BIRDIE.