AWM4


Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries, 1914-18 War

Flying Corps

Item number: 8/1/2

Title: 2nd Brigade, Royal Flying Corps

May 1916



AWM4-8/1/2

WAR DIARY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. May: 1916 Positions of Ulmits 2ª Wing. . . BAILLEUL Squadrons. Nº3/47 Nº 16. LA GORGUE . 36A. L. 33. Hite Balloon, Nº 2 LOCRE " 28. 1128. c. 91 Nº 9 . . . TOURETTPARMENTIET " averaft Park. 200 army AP. HAZE BROUCKE . . 27 V.27

WAR DIARY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. Summary of Events and Information 200 Paragrach R.F.B. Remarks and references to Appendic 1 nay 1916 OXELAETRE 12 Frice nome clouds, 4 Fight wook place & Segrave (191604) Hostele aircraft munnally active on 2 rearmy front expecially 2 na Fine anvincing climated latter some rain. Investon & Arrespond 300 overcart all day on hortile aucraft seen. 4. Fine come clouds very harry in places. 2 Fights. 2" dient & G. Reychman put + L'IR Semistru observer in a BE2C were attached by a FORKER, and whot down the acrophune fell in flames at U28, c 5, 2 doth were last uns prevented carrier out orders by the thich has which witerferred with observation. 5. Feer morning cloudy afternoon, Successful work was done with artillery swentern Harrets being range

WAR DIARY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. Time early choudy later. Capt ATP TILLIE 8/Scoten Refles

WAR DIARY Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. Summary of Events and Information 29 Baccacte PES Remarks and references to Appendice W4H1-463 400.000 - 974 H.&J.Lid. Forms C. 2118/102

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.


(Erase heading not required.

- propared in likelitescript.					
	May 1916 Summary of Events and Information 2 " Brugade RFG Remarks and references to Append				
	Fine but hazy. H. A. very active. Capt James (7) L'Uked (0) were shot work during Photographic Recommences of LILLE defences about seen to land near ZANDVOORDE (Poshed 28) a German on achive that lander heride it ans seen to turn over on landing. A. F. E. while on palot uns attached (2° Francis P. 4° % Caton 0") by 2 H. A. the pilot although nominand, hought his machine safely buch & landed at POPERINGHE Fine morning but hazy. No H. A'S deer seen.				
24	Hazy morning low clouds train 100 7116 Softs carried out successful night recommaissance to LILLE and COUTRAL. Rain low clouds all day for clouds more of the day. Our clouds and mixty.				
(73989) W4141 463, 400,000, 9/14, H.&	Holier & Partilleup!				

WAR DIARY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. of *	Date No. Type Sc	luadron	Pilot	Observer	Ref. Map		Hour at which reconnais mee	
1. 24,	/5/16 2056 BE2c No	0.16 Cpt	Davidson	2/Lt. King.	36	10 a.m.	2.45 a.m.	
TIME	PLACE			OBSERVATION			Page	
1.15 a.m.	Aerodrome		real landma			our only	No.	
1.45 a.m.	BOIS DE BIEZ			no roads or streams visible, no sign of				
1.50 a.m.	near DON.		LILLE seen	LILLE seen outlines with small lights.				
2. 0 a.m.	LILLE.		lighting ce	lighting centred mainly round the GARE DU NORD. LA MADELEINE				
				7 large lights & ST. tations not standing			ge light	
2.10 a.m.				en entering LILLE fr apparently stationar		line.		
4.15			One passen	ger train seen leavi	ng LILLE.			
				Signed	H.M.King,		bserver.	

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483

SECRET C.C. II Wing, R.F.C. O.C. MI Wing, R.F.G. The following instructions with regard to Reconnaissances are issued -Subject to special requirements, the main points upon 1. which information iscrequired are :-Activity on roads and railways The state of the enemy's organizations in rear of the front, i.e. changes in the siting and mumbers of transport and supply parks, refilling points, hutments, dumps of material or supplies. Work on rear lines of defence. It should be remembered that mere figures of rolling stock at stations are of little value, in comparison with observations of movements of trains; it will, therefore, as a rule, be sufficient to observe the lines joining these stations, without making a minute inspection of the stations themselves, unless entraining or detraining operations are suspected to be in progress.
It is most important that any considerable movements of troops towards or away from the British front should be detected and closely watched from start to finish. It is probable that the enemy carries out all movements of troops as far as possible by night, but that his operations are considerably hampered during the summer months by the few hours of darkmoss available. Consequently, the most favourable day hours for recommatusance of roads and railways will be those immediately after dawn and before nightfall. The fellowing will be the Army Recommaissances from to-morrow inclusive, not more than one, as a rule, being carried out (a) FROMELLES - HAUBOURDIN - LILLE - ROUBAIX - MOUSCRON - RONCO LINSELLES - QUESNOY& (b) COMINES - MENIN - COURTRAL - ISECHEM - ENCELARINE. (c) ZONNESERE - ROULERS - LICHTERVELDE - TROUROUT - CORTEMARCE FOREST of HOUTHULST. Instructions were as to which Recommaissance is required will be issued by Brigade Headquarters by 8 p.m. the previous day. If possible each Reconnaissance should have always the same Observers; so that any changes etc. in the area may be more easily pecognisad. These Recommaissances as given are intended as a general indication only, and the route will constantly be varied so that the enemy will not get to know the line too well In the Field, 22nd. May, 1916. Royal AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483 Headquarters

Royal Flying Corps.

REPORT on GENERAL ATTACK by 2nd BRIGADE, M.F.C. (Ref.O.O. No.4 d/d 16th.May 1916)

G. 14-24

The morning promised well at 4 a.m. the weather was fine and clear and orders were issued for the attack to take place.

The recommaissance machines left at 4.45 a.m. the attacking machines at 5 a.m. and the Scouts of No. 20 Squadron at 5.45 a.m.

Towards 5.30 a.m. the weather began to get cloudy and soon after 6 a.m. it was evident that clouds would prevent the attack being carried out entirely. The Northern Recommaissance and attack did not cross the line, weather being too bad, and all machines except for one of No.6 and one of No.5 returned to their aerodromes about 6.40 a.m., the missing machine of No.6 landed near LILLERS at 6.45 a.m. and left for No.6 aerodreme after filling up with petrol etc. That of No.5 landed near AIRE. The Scouts of No.29 also returned having seen the Northern Recommaissance doing so.

The Southern Recommaissance was carried out as the weather in this area was batter, though somewhat cloudy for good observation. The Southern attack machines also carried out their role. All the above returned safely to their respective aerodromes, with the exception of a machine of No.16. This latter landed near LILLERS and later proceeded back to No.16 aerodromes.

No hostile machines were encountered by the reconnaissance, though two or three were sighted. The Southern attack viewed one hostile machine only, over MENIN. This machine was about 3,000 feet below and came up through clouds; on viewing the attacking machines, it quickly disappeared into clouds again. Two of the Scouts (II Wing) who were acting independently had indecisive combats. The Reconnaissance machines and Southern attack machines returned to their aerodromes are about 7.30 a.m.

It would appear from the work that was successfully carried out that aircraft there is at the present time little activity of hostile maskings in the Second Army front. This may, however, possibly be due to the vestber conditions.

Comdg. 2nd Brigade, R. F. C

OPERATION ORDER, No.4

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483

figigh their reconnaissance escorted by several German machines, who do not loave them until they reach the limes, and the hestile A.A. come into action. The iden is take advantage of these s possible. If the butile machines can be driven across to our side . Artillery will co-operate and ongage all hostilo A.A.in front of general achemo of attack. The area in front of Corps will be under the observation of patrols and wireless machines. initiated by any one machine, not necessarily the leader. The inialator will fire his red light and attack; and the remainder AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1004483

O.C. XI Wing Royal Flying Corps.

if possible :- _

No.1 Reconnaissance -

Ø.

9.

WESTROOSEBEKE (To include if possible, observation stations reported at V 17 Central)

No.2 Reconnaissance -

(a) Special attention to be paid to road and railway movement, and to the absence or otherwise of evidences of navigation on the BYS generally an far as CCURTRAI.

It has been reported that navigation on this river had been stopped by the enemy. Photographs however, taken on April 24th, showed fifteen barges alongside a wharf in WERVICO. This point apparro to be the present head of navigation and attention should be directed to confirming this or otherwise by noting whether barges are to be seen further upstream.

(b) Photographs of :-

COURTRAI. New sidings reported at H 51 b 2.8 (20) SPORTER BY WERVICO SUD


The above should not be allowed to interers with the "scheme of attack" as laid down in Operation Order, as this is the primary objective of the recornalesance.

In the Field, 16th.May, 1916.

Erigade Najor. 2nd Brigade, R. F. C.

SECRET

1.



O.C. II Wing, R.F.C.

O.C. XI Wing, R.F.C.

Reference attached letter, which will not be sent to Squadrons, the G.O.C. wishes you to go carefully

this matter and organize in Squadrons some system by which a check may be kept on all expenditure of petrol.

As a guide the following suggestions are made :-

- (a) Visits of Observers to Batteries should be made at certain specified times, say morning and evening, and that all Officers to see Batteries should proceed at these times.
- (b) All cars, tenders or lorries proceeding out to report at O.R. before so doing, and the route and nature of duty to be entered up.
- (c) Some forethought to be exercised in probable requirements so that it will not be necessary, unless for special reasons, to despatch several vehicles during one day to the same place.
- (d) No vehicle to go out unless on military duty. If food, papers etc. are required from any place, they must be obtained when a vehicle is proceeding out on duty to that place.
- (e) Staff Officers of H.Q. units visiting Squadrons to do so whenever possible, in the same car.
- (f) Care tonbe taken that vehicles proceeding on duty with loads, should not be allowed to come back empty if there is anything to come back later in the day.
- The G.O.C. wishes copies of all Squadrons orders on this subject to be forwarded to Brigade H.Q.
- 4. Your attention is drawn to G.R.O. 1111 dated 26.8.15.

In the Field, 8th. May, 1916.

Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, Royal Flying Corps. SECRET C O P Y A letter has recently been received from the War Office regarding the necessity of making every possible effort to economise in the consumption of Putrol. It is stated in the latter that "this question during the last few weeks have become "an urgent and almost vital one; it is not an "exaggeration to say that there is a real danger of an "actual shortage of Petrol chiefly owing to increased "demands from all Fronts." Several circular letters on this subject have already been issued, and I am aware that reduction in the consumption has already been effected, but the urgency indicated in the War Office letter above referred to makes it imperative that further efforts should be made permanently to limit the use of Petrol to services which are absolutely indispensable. I am therefore to request that you will again examine this question so far as your command is concerned with a view to further reduction both as regards the issue as well as the use of motor vehicles of all descriptions, and it will have to be considered how far any authorisation that may have been given in a few instances for the issue of petrol on repayment will have to be restricted or even stopped. I should be glad if an early report could be furnished showing in what directions you consider further enonomy in your command can be affected, both by the restriction of the use of Petrol, and by increased use of Horse in lieu of Mechanical Transport. It should be impressed on all concerned that the only way of ensuring economy in the use of Petrol is to make periodically a close scrutiny and analysis of the records of mileage and petrol expenditure ordered to be kept by C.R.O. 1111 of 26-8-15. (Sd) R. C. Maxwell. Lieut-General, G.H.Q. Quartermaster General, British Forces in France. 2.5.16. Addressed to :-G. O. C. First Army. Second Army. Third Army. Fourth Army. Reserva Corps G. H. Q. Troops I. G. C.

ORGANIZATION of ROYAL FLYING CORPS with SECOND ARMY.

One Brigade of two Wings.

(Reference attached map, 5a HAZEBROUCK).

2nd Brigade. G. O. C. Brigadier General T.I.Webb Bowen.

Bde Major. Major R.J.Armes

Staff Captain. Captain R.D.de Q.Child

XI Wing.

(Lieut-Colonel F.W.Richey Commanding.

(No.20 Squadron (F.E.2 b's) 1Scout Martynside

("29 " (De Haviland Scouts)

(2nd Army Aircraft Park.

0.8.6/19

Officer Commanding


No. Squadron, R.F.C.

No aeroplane will fly over the area enclosed by CLAIRMARAIS - CAMPAGNE - BLENDECQUES - LONGUENESSE - St.MARTIN au LAERT (Ref. Sheet 5a 1/100,000) after dark. Anti-aircraft defences have orders to treat aeroplanes flying over this area after dark as hostile.

In the Field, 29th. November, 1915.

(Sd) R.J.Armes, Major, G.S. 2nd Wing, R.F.C.

= * = * = *



O.C. II Wing, R.F.C.

O.C. XI Wing, R.F.C.

Reference above, and my 8/1851 (d) dated 1st. instant. Please note that this order is now cancelled.

In the Field, 5th. May, 1916. Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, Royal Flying Corps.



O.C. II Wing, R.F.C.

Reference monthly photography

of Corps Areas.

Please note that the present dividing lines between "Squadron areas" are cancelled. The dividing line will be that of Corps.

The Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern boundary of the whole Second Army "Corps area" remains the same.

In the Field, 6th. May, 1916.

Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, Royal Flying Corps.

O.C., 2nd Wing, 41 Royal Flying Corps. All Wireless Stations with Batteries will start listening in for hostile aeroplane calls as 10 soon as any shelling takes place in their vicinity unless:-(a) They are in communication with one of their own Squadron machines at the time. (b) They know that a machine of their own Squadron is in the air and signals may be expected at any moment. Reports in accordance with the following headings will be arranged for between Corps and Squadrons:-Date. Exact time. Whether shelling appears to be registration or otherwise. (d) (e) Nature of shells. Battery suspected of firing - or approximate direction from which shells are coming. Map reference(1/40,000) of spot shelled. Calls picked up, with wave-length and any details identifying them as aeroplane calls or otherwise. It should ne noted that information under (c), (d), (e), and (f), should come from an R.A.Officer of the Battery. (Sgd) R.J.Armes, In the Field. 7th May, 1916. B.M., 2nd Brigade, R.F.C.

2nd Brigade, R.F.C.

120

- Reference my I.G. 145 of 29th. April, to all Corps, of which a copy w as forwarded you.
- It is understood that Capt. Wright, R.E. and your 2. Wireless Officer have been in consultation and have decided that it will be possible for all R.F.C. wireless sets with batteries, as soon as any shelling takes place in their immediate vicinity, to listen for German aeroplane calls for space of five minutes, then turning on to pick up our own calls again.
- 3. It is understood that this procedure would be very unlikely to lead to any of our aeroplane calls being missed. On the other hand, it might prove of estimable value to us in enabling up to connect the calls from hostile aeroplanes with hostile batteries that are firing on ours.
- I shall be glad if you will let me know if this has 4. your approval.

(Sgd) B. Walcot, Capt. for Major-General, G.S. Second Army.

6th.May,1916.

=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=

21/1963(G) H.Q., 2nd Army. (Intelligence)

There is no objection to this, subject to the reservations embodied in attached order, a copy of which is attached.

> (Sgd) T.I.Webb-Bowen, B.G., 2nd Bde, R. F. C.

7/5/16.


O.C. XI Wing, R.F.C. (for information)
O.C. No. 20 Squadron.

ZEPPELIN NIGHT ATTACK.

Para 4. If Zeppelins are reported by G.H.Q., or other reliable authority to be in the Second Army area, your machine will proceed to patrol the line St.OMER - AUDRICQ if you consider weather conditions favourable. Your Pilot will not stay on the ground until he can see a Zeppelin from CLAIRMARAIS.

In the Field, 1st. May, 1916. Brigade Major, End Brigade, Royal Flying Corps.

approaching the Second Army area, the machine will be brought out, (vide In/5557 dated 15.2.16 pera 4 (2). In all other cases



COMPIDENTIAL.

1st Army (Intelligence).

Snd Army.

Ath Amny

è

Gavalry Corps (Intelligence)

RaFaG.

O.C.Wireless.

D.A. S.

the Armies will, in future, be sent automatically by Signals to the following offices only:-

All moti-aircraft guns in Armies.

Hrigads)

Division) To which the unit ori

J.M. Q. Intelligence.

Anti-siroraft Oun Section.

The decision as to whether further formations should be warned will, in future, be made by the Corps, the Army and U.H.Q., each working in its own scheion. That is to say, the Corps will decide whether the Corps on either side should be warned, the Army will decide whether the Armies on either side (including French troops) should be warned, and G.H.Q. (Intelligence) will decide as to warning French G.H.Q., Helgian and French Missions, L. of G., etc.

- has been revised in accordance with the above, and will shortly be issued to all concerned.
- 3. In the mountaine, please issue orders for the procedure outlined above to be adopted.
- from other sources will be disseminated by G.H.Q. (Intelligence) by means of telephone messages of telegrans; in the latter case the message will be addressed to the formation or office concerned, and will be signed "G.H.Q. Intelligence". This procedure is intended to differentiate between:-
 - (1) Zeppelin messages from the troops which necessarily depend on various factors which are not always definite
 - (B) Information recarding hostils sirables which is obtained at G.H.Q. from sources which may be accepted as definite and reliable.

15/2/16.

(SE) J. GHARTERIS. Brigadier-General. General Starr.

Smil Army.

II Corps. Srd Division.

V Corps. Snd Brigade, R.F.C.

XIV Corps. Southern H.A.Group.
Canadian Corps. 2nd Army Troops.

- contained in GDS 382 regarding the reporting of hostile Airships. It is of particular importance that the form of message given below should be strictly adhered to, as, if clear indications of the airship's location are not given, what little time is available for dealing with it is lest.
- Reports of the proximity of hostile Airships will be reported in the asual manner with the least possible delay by the unit or individual observing them, to Artillery or Infantry Brigade Readquarters.
- form shown below. This message will be treated as "Priority" and repeated sutematically by Signals in accordance with the instructions laid down in Is/5537 of 13th instant.
- Zoppelin moosages from Brigade Headquarters:-

To:- Zeppelin.
Zeppelin moving(compass direction of towards.....) over(place) at(time).

number of the sheet must be given as well as the number of the square, but it will often be quicker to indicate the position of the airship by reference to some large town or other important locality.

a not to aeroplanes or captive balloons.

sufficient copies of this minute are forwarded to permit of distribution on the following scale:-

Cor Kajor-General, G.G.

10/8/16

8.

Combats in the Air.

Squadron: No. 29.

Type and No. of aeroplane: de Havilland Scout.5977.

Armament: One Lewis Bun.

Pilot: Lt Segrave.

Observer: Nil.

Locality: YPRES.

Date: 1st May, 1916.

Time: 7.20.a.m.

Duty: Patrol.

Height: 10,500 ft.

Remarks on Hostile machine: Type, armament, speed, etc.

Apparently an Aviatik biplane, and not as fast as the de Havilland except when nose diving.

Speed about 80 m.p.h.
Armament: - Machine Gun.

Narrative.

Lt Segrave states:-

Three drums were fired, the range being about 80 yards. The Ferman Observer who was behind, only fired about seven rounds altogether.

The machine did a left handed spiral and landed in a field 200 yards on the South of the road In Square J 29. I followed it down to 5000 ft. and saw it hit the ground; it did not crash.

I think the observer must have been shot and the pilot wounded.

I was using tracer bullets, and I was above and behind him when firing.

(Sgd) L.Dawes, Major, R.F.C. Vommanding No. 29 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. (MW)

т**о** н.Q., (Sgd) Т.I.W-В.

let Printing Co., R.E. 3.H.Q 2103

