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No. 44.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y.

15th March 1916.

1. TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE, WITH REFERENCE TO THE
FIGHTING ROUND VERDUN.
2. THE SENUSSI FORCES IN THE WESTERN DESERT.

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1. TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM G.Q.G. FRANCE, dated 11/3/1916.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE VERDUN DISTRICT.

5th March. The enemy made a fruitless attack between the wood at HAUDROMONT and DOUAUMONT fort. The enemy bombarded, to the West of the MEUSE, the village of MORTHOMME and the OIE hill: In the WOEVRE, HAUDIMONT and FRESNES were also bombarded. North of VACHERAUVILLE our artillery dispersed the enemy concentration near the woods of FOSSES and LOUVEMONT.

6th March. The enemy artillery was very violent in the Woëvre, especially in the direction of FRESNES, and also on the West side of the MEUSE. After many unsuccessful attacks the Germans occupied the village of FORGES. Their attempts to debouch from the village and advance against the slopes of the hill of OIE were frustrated.

7th March. To the West of the MEUSE the enemy, following the railway, reached REGNEVILLE and carried hill 265. The CORBEAUX wood also was captured and a portion of the CUMIERES wood. At the end of the day our line passed by BETHINCOURT, the high ground near MORTHOMME and the slopes of the high ground Southwest of CUMIERES wood. On the East of the MEUSE the enemy gained a footing in the HARLAUMONT redoubt which was immediately retaken. In the WOEVRE the Germans occupied FRESNES. All these attacks were pushed to the utmost by very large numbers, the enemy suffering considerable loss.

8th March. We repulsed some very violent attacks directed against BETHINCOURT, and we recaptured the greater part of the CORBEAUX and CUMIERES woods; the enemy only being left in occupation of the Eastern fringe. All the attacks that were directed against our positions Southeast of DOUAUMONT fort were also repulsed. We recaptured the HARDAUMONT redoubt.

9th March. We consolidated our positions in the CORBEAUX and CUMIERES woods: and we repelled two attacks of the enemy to capture BETHINCOURT. To the East of the MEUSE the fighting was very severe in the DOUAUMONT and VAUX sector, and all these very violent enemy attacks were successfully repelled. The enemy entered the village of VAUX, but were driven out of it at the point of the bayonet. The attacks of the enemy, made in massed formation, against our trenches at the foot of the hill, which commands the fort of VAUX, were all of them beaten back. The loss inflicted upon the enemy in the course of this day's fighting was enormous.

10th March. The Germans threw more than a Division in an attack against the woods at CORBEAUX and CUMIERES. After many checks, and at the cost of most formidable losses, the enemy recaptured the position that we had recaptured on the 8th of March. Two attacks to the West of DOUAUMONT were held up. An attack that was being organised against our trenches at the foot of the hill by the fort of VAUX was not permitted to develop.

To sum up :-

First: Since the 4th of March the situation remains unchanged on the East side of the MEUSE. The enemy still occupies the

line North of the hill of POIVRE - DOUAIMONT - East of VAUX - DAMLOUP. The variations in the line, resulting from the daily fighting, does not make any great alteration. In every case the efforts of the enemy have been brought to a standstill by our energetic defence.

Second: The German attacks to the West of the MEUSE have been directed, without cessation, against VERDUN. They have been made under conditions that are favourable to the enemy and the advantages that he has gained are not altogether surprising. The village of FORGES stands in a swampy valley and is very difficult to defend. It was not organised as part of the main advanced position, and was only held by a small force. Hill 265 became untenable when the enemy advanced along the right bank and exposed it to enfilade fire. During the course of these three days of violent attacks, the enemy has lost troops to the equivalent value of an Army Corps.

Our troops now hold strong positions on the following line:

From the high ground near MORTHOMME - CORBEAUX wood - CUMIERES wood, and the highest part of the hill of OIE. All the enemy's attacks directed against this line have been frustrated, and he has not even gained a momentary advantage.

2. THE SENUSSI FORCES IN THE WESTERN DESERT.

The following extracts are taken from the Cairo Bulletin and give some idea of the Senussi forces on the Western Desert. The statements were elicited during the cross-examination of (a) Jaafar Pasha, (b) of Yuzbashi Senussi Abdulla, both of whom were captured during the recent engagement at AGAGIA. (a). Jaafar says the morale of the troops is excellent up to a certain point

certain point, but that they are undependable, especially the Egyptian Beduin, to carry out orders. The machine-guns and armoured cars are most feared; the Naval guns had a certain moral effect which has now worn off and are not considered dangerous. Jaafar is very bitter against the Egyptian Arabs who can not be depended upon to hold a position assigned to them or to obey orders.

The plan of campaign at the start was to have the forces operating independently, one to go along the coast thence to MOGHARA and WADI NATRUN, the other through SIWA to the Oases there to stir up trouble in Upper Egypt while Ali Dinar rose in the South. Jaafar was to lead the Northern Army. He did not think personally that he would ever get into Egypt, unless the Canal campaign was successful nor was it any part of the Turco-German plan to do more than immobilize in Egypt as large a force as possible.

Sayed Ahmed, though by nature a coward, has severe megalomania and sees in himself the Sultan of North and Central Africa and the Khalifa of the Arabs. Neither of those programmes appeal to the Turks and they are naturally violently opposed to the latter. Jaafar does not think that even within his own immediate sphere of influence his power is as great as it was and ridicules the pretentious claims he now advances.

He considers that Sayed Ahmed has treated the British shamefully and that he never had any intention of keeping the peace as soon as he thought he was in a position to move. He is violently incensed against Sayed Ahmed who invariably left the field at the first shot, taking with him an entirely disproportionate part of the forces to act as bodyguard.

All the above information was freely given by Jaafar Pasha who seems very satisfied with his present position.

He has, according to his own account, suffered considerable hardships owing to want of food and rest and great anxiety owing to the incompetence and unreliability of his subordinates. On more than one occasion he has had to carry out reconnaissance himself with only one orderly to accompany him and has more than once narrowly escaped capture by our patrols and armoured cars. He was not very well informed of our forces or intentions. We anticipated a night attack on MATRUH on 25. 12. 15 by attacking him first, and though they were apprehensive of an attack at HALAZIN (not HAZALIN) owing to the aerial reconnaissance, the first information they had was the appearance of our force.

Jaafar not unnaturally exaggerates his difficulties and our numbers and depreciates his own forces, but he gives the impression of speaking the truth and of being a brave man who was alive to the dangers he had to face and prepared to fulfill his mission at any cost.

(b). Yazbashi Serussi Abdulla is a Western Arab aged 18 years who was educated in a school at CONSTANTINOPLE. Four months before hostilities he left CONSTANTINOPLE on leave to go to DERNÄ. He came via ALEXANDRIA from where he was conveyed by Coastguard's cruiser to DAFIA. He was stopped at SILLUM and was requested by Sayed Ahmed to remain and serve with him, which he not unwillingly did.

He considers the force at 'AGAGIA in the engagement of the 26th February to have been as follows:-

Total force 1,900 at AGAGIA composed as follows:-
1000 Tripolitan Arabs divided into four battalions of
250 men each under Jaafar Pasha.

1st Battalion (model or Numuna) under Senussi Abdulla
(prisoner)

2nd Battalion (model or Nunuma) under Taher Effendi,
(Western Arab)

3rd Battalion (Ordinary) under Senussi of Asbili,
(Western Arab)

4th Battalion (Ordinary) under Saleh el Senussi
(Western Arab)

(The first two Battalions are armed with Turkish rifles,
and the other two with Russian rifles)

900 Aulad Ali divided into four Battalions under
Fawzi Bey.

1st Battalion	under	Hassan Eff.	(Turk)
2nd	"	"	Gelal Eff. (Turk)
3rd	"	"	Mohamed el Naveb (Western Arab)
4th	"	"	Ghaleb (Turk)

(Armed with various rifles)

stated
Prisoner/that the 900 Aulad Ali were kept in reserve
and did not take part in the fight.

At SOLLUM, in addition to the above there 1,000 ill-
trained levies composed of Tripolitan Arabs and Aulad Ali.
All under Tarek Bey and Guma Bushnak (Western Arab)

This brings the total strength to 2,900 of which
prisoner thinks 1,200 were Aulad Ali.

Prisoner thinks it very possible that more men are
coming from SYRT, JALO and GEDABIA (South of BENGHAZI) but
they will be untrained. Sayed Ahmed has the best troops in
the Army with hi at SIWA. As regards other information his
statements agree with those of Jaafar Pasha.

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No 45.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

16th March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R.F.C. RECONNAISSANCES IN SINAI.

2. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

1. R.F.C. RECONNAISSANCES OF SINAI during the week 6th - 13th inst.

No 1 Section.

A machine from 17 squadron reconnoitred NEKHL. On approaching a smoke bomb was fired as an alarm signal. On arrival the aeroplane dropped 100 lb bomb from 3000 feet above ground, burst in middle of town, to left of large Mosque; effective. Dropped 20 lb bomb from 3000 feet above ground. Burst just to left of middle house, of the three houses N. of camel stables. Was fired on by A.A. gun several times, but was not hit. The reservoir N.E. part of town evidently full. After dropping 100 lb bomb and as long as NEKHL was in sight on return journey, could see clouds of smoke rising from where bomb fell; apparently indicating that fire had broken out. Could see no tents in or near the town, but saw about 8 lines of 12 dark circles apparently old tent sites. Saw very few men in or near town. Evidently all under cover or away on patrol.

The machine returned to SUEZ safely.

For the rest constant reconnaissances of the area established negative results.

One machine came down and was wrecked some 3 miles S.W. of BIREL GIDDI but pilot and observer escaped, unhurt, and walked into our lines.

No 2 Section.

In the immediate front there is nothing to report.

A reconnaissance of HASSANA on 14th elicited that a distinct moral ascendancy has been gained over the local garrison. On the approach of the machine a large number of men and camels made for the hills to the S.E. and scattered.

One 20 lb bomb was dropped but did no damage.

Fire from rifles and an anti-aircraft gun fire was maintained against the aeroplane. The reservoir, consequent on the bombing it has frequently experienced, is now being roofed over with wooden planks (apparently). The Buildings (2) are progressing but slowly, and as a whole, there does not appear to be much great change in HASSANA.

The reconnaissance of JIEJAJA on 10th March was met by hostile fire and our machine was hit several times. On 11th retaliation was carried out effectively, with 7 bombs, one of which dropped within a yard of the triangle which is apparently part of the well-boring plant.

No 3 Section.

The thickening of hostile patrols in the KATIA district has apparently died away, and the situation is normal.

Constant R.F.C. reconnaissances have observed a certain number of small parties of the enemy among the palm-groves and it is confirmed that the enemy are digging new wells at MAGEIBRA. ~~mo~~ SEIFIG, and probably also at EL ABD and SALMANA.

Several "camel enclosures" and structures with canvas roofs (presumably not for camels as camels thrive better in the open) were also observed South of EL ABD.

2. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA. The menacing attitude of the Bulgarians towards the Greeks has become increasingly marked, and information has been received of affrays with Greek frontier posts, where Bulgarians have crossed the neutral zone.

Greek troops were hurried up from the 6th Division at SERRES and two Greek regiments and 500 sailors are now reported to be in re-occupation of the frontier posts, East of DEMIR HISSAR.

The concentration of troops in the XANTHI district continues, and according to deserters' reports the German 103rd Division arrived complete on March 4th West of DOIRAN relieving Bulgarian troops who moved East. There has been an increase of German strength on the frontier, and it appears that only the 105th German Division remains with two or possibly three Bulgarian Divisions on the Roumanian frontier.

If this information is to be relied on it may indicate the expected forward movement by the Bulgarians upon KAVALLA at an early date. It is also significant that the Germans are able to keep troops on the Greek frontier, and to employ them in action that may probably cause Greece to join the Allies at an early date.

The effect of VERDUN is perhaps already causing the enemy uneasiness, and forcing him to try and obtain a success elsewhere, even if it be but the defeat of Greek troops, in the DRAMA-KAVALLA district.

From all sources of information there appear to be the following Austro-German troops co-operating with the Bulgarians on the Anglo-French front, (including Albania.)

IN ALBANIA. The 57th and 59th Austrian Division.

forming the 18th Army Corps.

The 47th, 53rd and 62nd Austrian Divisions

forming the 19th Army Corps.

The 13th Army Corps is also reported to be at SCUTARI with the 7th Division. Ten to fifteen thousand Albanian irregulars are co-operating with this force which has for its objective the Italian Army at VALONA.

AT MONASTIR. Some Austrian Cavalry and the German 146th Infantry of the 101st Division.

MONASTIR to GEVGELI. Remainder of 101st Division - Regiments

45th and 59th, 201st Field Artillery Regiment and 101st Foot Artillery Battery.

GEVGELI-DOIRAN. 103rd German Division, composed, of 32nd - 71st Regiments and 116th Reserve Regiment, having as its third Battalion one battalion of the 85th Landwehr regiment, the 205th Field Artillery regiment and 103rd Foot artillery Battery.

Two Cavalry regiments believed to be the 23rd Dragoons and another regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Division.

DOIRAN-STRUMNITZA.

The Alpine Corps consisting of five German Infantry regiments, so far not identified. Some Bavarian units are thought to be part of this Corps.

XANTHI district. Two German Infantry regiments, one regiment of cavalry (unidentified).

Throughout the line there are various German and Austrian artillery and technical troops.

Reported to be on the Macedonian front, but not located - 5th Uhlans, 6th cuirassiers, 3rd Jaeger Battalion, 50th Infantry regiment, 12th Ersatz Reserve, 84th Reserve regiment, and the 22nd Rifle Battalion.

The 105th Division is on the Roumanian frontier; and the 11th Bavarian, 25th Reserve and 6th Divisions are all now definitely located on the Western front.

The German troops in the GEVGELI-DOIRAN sector are busy improving the trenches and defensive works. For the present there is no sign of any enemy advance taking place from this direction.

The fact that troops have been recalled from the Roumanian frontier indicates that the Germans no longer fear any immediate action on the part of that country.

The number of German troops in the Balkans is clearly not sufficient to keep the Bulgarians in hand and to threaten Roumania at one and the same time. The discontent of the Bulgarians has possibly forced the Germans to maintain their maximum strength on the Greek frontier, but the number is insufficient to warrant any attempt to expel the Allies from their position at SALONIKA.

The German Staff are therefore at present devoting all their attention to perfecting the defensive lines along the Greek frontier. This scheme does not have the same attraction to the Bulgarians as it does to the Central Powers since that defensive position will have to be occupied by the Bulgarian troops, who now feel satisfied with the conquests they have made and chiefly ~~the~~ desire to be released from military service and made free to return to their farms. There is however in the Bulgarian Army a strong section who feel that Bulgaria's claim to KAVALLA should be satisfied at this time. It is questionable whether the Germans will be anxious to give their support to this plan, which, if it does nothing else, will probably result in the entrance of Greece on the side of the Allies. At the same time, the Central Powers, knowing the present condition of the Greek Army, would not hesitate to violate Greek territory if the Bulgarians would subsequently agree to carry out the German policy. It must be the intention of the German Staff to contain the Allies at SALONIKA with as few German troops as possible, and if the Capture of Cavalla will satisfy Bulgarian ambition, the consequent entrance of Greece may ensure that the Bulgarian Army will remain on the frontier if only to defend the newly acquired territory. Greece may therefore find that her policy has earned neither the thanks of her Allies nor the respect of her Allies' enemies.

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No 46.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

17th March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. THE SITUATION IN TURKEY.

2. METHODS OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AT VERDUN.

SITUATION IN TURKEY.

1. Reports have recently come to hand indicating that a belief in a pessimistic situation in Turkey is unwarranted.

The Government is stated to have the situation well in hand, and there is going to be no revolution or disaffection on any large scale. Financially there are difficulties of course but the morale of the army, - the main thing - remains high.

In the Caucasus, no fresh hostile formations have as yet been located by our Allies in the firing line. The capture of BITLIS has accounted for stores and ammunition in some quantity but not for many field troops, so that excluding the 34th Division which was captured practically en bloc in ERZERUM the Turks still have the remains of Divisions 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37 wherewith to fight. Of these the 36th was driven out of BITLIS: and Halil Bey's force of 22 Battalions (including probably the 13th Division) is now, by prisoners reports, some 30 miles South of MUSH.

The situation in Mesopotamis remains unchanged. The presence of the 2nd Division in this area is confirmed, and prisoners believe that portions of other regiments which followed the 2nd Division from Europe turned North, either towards the Caucasus or possibly towards KAANIKIN. There thus remains located in this area the Turkish Divisions 2. 35. 38. 45, 51, 52.

In Arabia the exact dispositions of Divisions 21. 22. 39 and 40 are known in detail.

There has been a general exodus from South Syria. The R.N.A.S.S. reports indicate but few troops. The 23rd Division is located by regiments in Sinai, and there seems to be about one division in BIR SABA. In view of the

fact that O.C. BIRSABA is BAGHET, who commands the 3rd Division, it is possible that this is the 3rd Division. Divisions 5 and 8 cannot be accounted for, but there may still be one Division (say 44) in the JERUSALEM area, and 41 in ALEXANDRETTA. As regards SMYRNA and the Anatolian coast, the naval bombardment is apparently having an effect and no movement of troops away from this area is indicated. Division 48 is in SMYRNA district. The whole of the 46th Division had not arrived on 2nd March, though portions were there; and similarly, only 3 battalions of the 49th Division had, on that date, arrived, though the remainder of the Division was expected.

There is no news of the move of the 27th Division from the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles.

Very fortunately some men and an officer of the 26th Division were blown out to sea from SUVLA towards the end of February, and came to shore on LEMNOS where they were captured. A detailed examination of the officer elicits the fact that about the middle of February there were on the Peninsula Divisions 9. 11. 24. 25. 26. 42 and possibly others. The men agree as to the large numbers at that time there, but are not able to confirm the presence of any division except their own - the 26th.

Russian sources have added the 7th Division to this number, and it has been stated that 7 and 9 were moved out of the Dardanelles towards end of February. A traveller from THRACE adds, on 13th March, that 7 and 9 are now up at KIRK KILISSE, and together with 8, compose the III corps. This may be possible if we accept Cairo's view that the presence of 8 at BIR SABA was never very definitely established.

As to 24, 25 and 26 we have never had any definite news and it is quite reasonable to suppose that they may still be on Gallipoli.

42 has recently been reported by Russian sources of unknown reliability to have moved from the Dardanelles to SIVAS, and the same source also reports the 43rd as having gone with it. The 43rd was tentatively, in the absence of definite news, located in Syria, its place of formation: but if we accept a report that a Division destined for the Egyptian front had been brought back to HAIDAR PASHA, there is a possibility of the truth of the 43rd having gone to SIVAS via ESKISHEHR. But the statement should be treated with reserve, at any rate for the present. Possibly these are the 2 Divisions which were reported by the Russian G.S. to have arrived at ANGORA in company with the 10th.

The presence of the 11th Division is news and is hard to reconcile with the various reports that placed 11 with 12 at KONIA, whence they were reported to have proceeded to the Caucasus. But the 12th has been also reported by an agent to be still in Europe and it is therefore possible that a mistake in the identity of the 2 divisions which were at KONIA has been made. Further information will be eagerly expected regarding these two divisions as well as regarding the 20th about which there are also many conflicting reports.

For the rest 4 and 6 are believed to be in THRACE together with 14 and 16. 49 and 50 are still in CONSTANTINOPLE.

Of the remaining two Divisions of the Turkish Army, the 15th and 19th are both reported to be en route for the Caucasus, though neither has yet materialised on that front.

2. METHODS OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AT VERDUN.

The following account of the recent ^{German} attacks in the VERDUN region has been received from the French General Headquarters: - 27/2/16 at the War Office.

The 18th Corps attacked on the evening of the 21st February in the region of the BOIS DES CAURES. At the beginning of the engagement it had four regiments in front line - the 81st, 87th, 115th, 117th - as well as two regiments in reserve - the 80th and 116th. It may be assumed that these two regiments were engaged during the attack of the following days. Prisoners belonging to the 80th regiment were taken on the 24th February.

The 18th Corps appears to have attacked by *divisions* in line, each division keeping a regiment in reserve.

From the little information which has been gathered about the 7th reserve corps, it appears probably that the whole of this Corps was engaged on the 22nd February on the front HAUMONT - BRABANT. According to a deserter of the 57th reserve regiment, this regiment appears to have been in reserve to the division on the left (13th Reserve Division).

On the 23rd February the whole Corps was engaged in the attack on SAMOGNEUX. It appears probable that the 7th Reserve Corps attacked in the same way as the 8th, viz. by divisions in line, with a regiment in reserve to each division, and that it put all its regiments into the fight on the following day.

On the 21st February the 3rd Corps put into the fight in the HERBEOIS area the 6th Division, and one regiment (12th) of the 5th Division. The two other regiments

of the 5th Division were apparently in reserve. The plan of attack of the 3rd Reserve Corps could, therefore, not have been the same as that of the 18th and 7th Reserve Corps.

Up to the present no prisoners of the 15th Corps have been reported. There is therefore no proof that this Corps took part in the engagement. It is however possible that certain of its elements were engaged in the direction of ORNES.

The 5th Corps which appears not to have been engaged during the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, put elements of at least the 10th Reserve Division into the fight on the 24th of February.

There is no fresh information concerning the 192nd Brigade.

To sum up it may be concluded that the attacks of these last few days were carried out by four corps which were supported by very powerful artillery. The method of attack appears to have been as follows:-

A very heavy, although relatively short artillery bombardment on all parts of the French line which were to be the objects of attack, for instance, the whole length of the BOIS d'HAUMONT and of the BOIS DES CAURES was bombarded over a depth of 1000 metres. Before attacking, the Germans sent out strong officers' patrols (50 men) to the French lines in order to ascertain the result of the bombardment.

The attack itself was carried out in successive waves about 80 to 100 metres apart. Each attack had a definitely limited objective where it was to stop; further progress was to be carried out by the unit in reserve.

The infantry had received orders not to persist in

attempting to overcome obstacles which had not been destroyed by the artillery.

Every party which had come to a stop was to wait for a fresh artillery bombardment ~~before~~ advancing again.

To conclude, the following principle seems to have been observed: to use the infantry as little as possible and to rely mainly on the artillery.

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No 47.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

18th March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. THE NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OF SMYRNA.
 2. INTELLIGENCE FROM SMYRNA.
 3. INTERROGATION OF A TURKISH OFFICER CAPTURED
AT LEMNOS.
 4. EXTRACTS FROM ROMANIAN PRESS.
-

1. EFFECT OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF SMYRNA ON February 8th and 9th.

AT KARA KAYA Battery No 16 four shells burst near the battery but fell short. One damaged one of the ammunition stores of the barbette on the East of the battery. If it had exploded fifty yards to the West it would have done considerable damage.

At ST. GEORGES a coffee house and ammunition store which contained about 25 cases of rifle cartridges were destroyed and damage done to several buildings. The field kitchen with all utensils as well as the surrounding buildings were destroyed.

The telephone station and part of Hamdi Bey's house and office in which the plans of the mine-field and other plans are kept, and situated below battery No 16; were destroyed.

At HENDEK one of the underground passages and some of the trenches protected by barbed wire were destroyed.

The CASUALTIES suffered were: soldiers killed, about 100: wounded about 200. Horses 30 or 40 killed: a flock of sheep destroyed.

During the bombardment the gunners were kept at their posts but were considerably demoralised.

Orders have been received from CONSTANTINOPLE forbidding any person to leave the Smyrna district by sea, as owing to the accuracy of the fire the Military Authorities believed that passengers had supplied information as to the positions of the guns.

On the 23rd February the effect of the bombardment was:

At YURLA, the Greek school, which was used as a barracks, the

Greek Church and several houses were destroyed.

BATTERIES No 13 and 17 and HENDER SEARCHLIGHT, No 21 and DYNAMO were not damaged.

The underground chamber No 22 containing rifle cartridges and several trenches with barbed wire entanglements were damaged.

In BATTERY No 14 one gun and ammunition store damaged.

A number of shells were fired at a small cottage in a vineyard about 400 yards in front of the battery but there is nothing of military importance in this building.

In BATTERY No 15 three shells fell in front of the battery but did no damage.

In BATTERY No 16 eight shells fired at this battery exploded right under a 9 inch gun in the centre barbette and damaged it (?) the gun.

In BATTERY No 20 one 6 inch gun was damaged.

In the SEA FORT the North West side of the fort was destroyed and considerable damage done to the Southern part: many shots fell short. The ammunition for this fort is reported to be stored near the mosque behind the fort. Several shells exploded near the barracks and mosque but only did small damage.

On the 14th February the German aeroplane which had been to Long Island returned. Several shots fired by the British had struck the car and wings of the machine.

Of the bombs dropped by the French aeroplanes at Paradise on the 17th February, one fell 93 metres and the other 400 metres from the German machine. The German aviator removed his Q.F. gun and fired on the aeroplanes from the Grand Stand.

2. INTELLIGENCE FROM SMYRNA.

The German Wireless operators at DEVELIKEUI have been relieved of their codes and all messages received are now sent to the Smyrna Headquarters to be decoded by the General Staff.

From a reliable source it is reported that 1,800 men have been picked from the 48th Division and from the recruits in training in Smyrna and have been sent to AFIUM KARA HISSAR for the Caucasus.

The 10th Division which was under orders for Smyrna for rest and reorganisation, was inspected by their new G.C., Topal Ali BEY who reported the men fit for service. The 10th Division was thereupon ordered to the Caucasus. They commenced to leave Constantinople for the Caucasus front on 3rd February.

3. INTERROGATION OF A TURKISH OFFICER CAPTURED AT LEMNOS.

Mohmed Fahri, son of Sakri Effi. Lieutenant.

Aged 21, a native of Constantinople, now serving in the 76th Machine Gun Company of the 76th Regiment, 26th Division, 6th Army Corps.

Stationed at KENETCH TEPE, Headquarters of his Division at TCHAM TEPE, and that of the Army Corps believed to be at CHANAK.

Gives the following explanation of his presence at LEMNOS.

A party of four men in a small punt were engaged in removing the wood from a pier at BUYUK KEMIKELI ISKELESSI (North point of Suvla Bay) when a sudden squall of wind blew them out to sea. He and four other men were sent to their rescue in another punt but found themselves carried away by the wind and were unable to get back. This happened about 1 p.m. They drifted along all night and all the next day and landed in the evening after about 36 hours in the boats.

During the night two submarines were sighted.

All the men gave the same explanation, and insisted on the fact that they were not deserters. Most of them said they knew nothing about handling an oar, and after trying some time to pull back to the shore gave up and folded their arms expecting to be drowned.

The Division next to the 26th on the Peninsula was the 11th. Other Divisions on the European side were 9th, 24th, 25th, 42nd. There may have been more.

The Officer gave the following further information.

He had been on the Peninsula for about three months. Before that he was stationed in ADRIANOPLE. Was in reserve when the evacuation of Suvla took place. Believes there about 100,000 troops still in the Peninsula including a large number of Germans and Austrians who man the most of the guns and machine guns.

Guns of 24 c/m and 18 c/m have been mounted at Suvla.

Food is good and plentiful and the pay regular. A large stock of clothing has lately arrived from Austria. There is an ample supply of ammunition.

Machine guns were brought to Turkey in submarines. This was told him by the O.C. his Company.

They received very little news but had heard that heavy fighting was in progress in the Caucasus. He had not heard of the fall of ERZERUM. Two items of news received lately were that a French dreadnought had been sunk off HAIFA by a Turkish submarine, and that a British aeroplane had been brought down in the Turkish lines in MESOPOTAMIA.

When in Constantinople about five months ago he had seen ten submarines lying in the Golden Horn.

Had a brother in the Turkish Navy who had been trained in England.

Could see himself that the Germans are using Turkey as an instrument to serve his own ends, but that was not the general opinion of his comrades. All are however tired of the war.

G.H.Q. note:

From an interrogation of the men, it appears that the 76th Regiment is composed of Arabs. The Kurds were from a Labour Battalion, temporarily attached - One of them said he belonged to the 6th "ISTIKHAM" of the 26th Division and it is doubtful if this means the same labour battalion as the other men. ISTIKHAM usually means R.E. and the officer's explanation of there being a 6th R.E. Battalion with the 26th Division was that it was a "new organisation".

4. EXTRACTS FROM ROUMANIAN PRESS.

Extracts from Roumanian Press dated 7th March.

JOURNAL BALKAN. Permission has been granted to export 5000 trucks of salt to Turkey in return for other goods.

Roumania has pharmaceutical materials and dressings for army requirements for 5 years.

Bulgaria is making an inventory of all mines and mineral water supplies in newly occupied territory.

EPINCA. 80% of the Roumanian Army is now on the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian (?) frontier.

German successes at VERDUN would change Roumanian views and Government.

ADEVARUL. At CITRIS (unidentified) the magazine for the supply of the Varna and Burgas garrisons has been blown up.

Large supplies of ammunition from Germany had lately arrived at the magazine.

Many Bulgarian and German deserters are arriving daily in Roumania.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 48.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

19th MARCH 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. R. F. C. RECONNAISSANCES IN SINAI UP TO 18. 3. 16.
2. SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.
3. THE ATTACK ON THE VERDUN SALIENT, WITH COMMENTS
BY THE FRENCH G. Q. G.

1. R. F. C. RECONNAISSANCES.

No. 1 Section.

The enemy have been able to get our wrecked machine away.

An excellent series of photographs of NEKHL and surroundings was taken by a machine of No. 17 Squadron.

The reconnaissance reports:-

"I only saw one tent and about half a dozen Arab shelters scattered about. People ran out of NEKHL as soon as they saw me coming. When I passed over the town the first time, there was no one in the streets, and I should say not more than 150 people running about outside. The big tank North of the fort was full, and there are apparently several small tanks under the wall West of the big cistern, one of which has overflowed and is flowing out into the sand West of the wall. There were trenches along the GEBEL EL GHARRA, N.W. of NEKHL, and gunpits. In the old gunpits trenches stretched intermittently from THILMET EL THAMAMAT to W. EL ADAM, and across the WADIS EL ARISH - ABU ALYANA and ABU TAREIFIA. I did not see any trenches in the WADI EL ARISH North of the town.

"I thought there were much fewer troops in NEKHL than had previously been reported."

(G.H.Q. NOTE., An agent today reports only 1 Turkish Officer and 20 Turkish soldiers in NEKHL. There is apparently a big decrease in the local garrison).

In No. 2 Section there is nothing to report.

In No. 3 Section it is apparent that the enemy's patrols in the neighbourhood of BIR EL ABD have been strengthened. Signs are not wanting that the enemy is thinking of making a permanent stay in the neighbourhood: fresh wells are being dug and huts are being erected.

2. SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

LONDON. 16th March. Official.

General Lake reports that the column sent on the 11th March to drive out the Turks from advanced positions they occupied on 10th March bayoneted a considerable number of Turks and then withdrew with 2 Officers and 50 men prisoners.

EUPHRATES LINE.

G. O. C. NASIRIYAH reports that his punitive measures of the 9th February have produced an extraordinary good effect on the tribes.

The Shawolat, Qaraqol and Bani Richab are all now reported to have joined Khayun against us on the 7th Feb. Reports now speak of 12,000 as having been engaged against our force on that day. The figure is high and in great excess of General Brooking's own estimate. But if all the tribes, as reported, were implicated they could have mustered 17,000 and 18,000 men.

MIZHER Bey is reported to have paid compensation to the Azairich for their village burnt by us on 9th Feb. Also to have issued ammunition to that expended by the tribesmen on the 7th Feb.

TIGRIS LINE.

Corps estimate the enemy strength on left bank at and in support of the HANNAH position as between 10,000 and 11,000. This reduction of 1,000 from our estimate of 12,000 is they think due to casualties from sickness and desertion.

3. THE ATTACK ON THE VERDUN SALIENT.

Further information concerning the German attack on the Verdun salient is as follows:-

(1) FRONT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK.

The original front held by the units which took part in the attack extended from the MEUSE to just north of LES EPARGES, a length of about 27 miles.

The infantry attack began on the 22nd February on the German right, from the MEUSE to HERBECQIS. The front of

attack was extended on the 24th February to WARCQ and on the 26th February to MANHUELLES.

(ii) INFANTRY DISPOSITIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ATTACK.

The German line, from right to left, was held as follows:-

THE MEUSE.,
 13th Reserve Division, VII R. Corps (14th Reserve Division in reserve).
 XVIII Corps (2 Divisions).
 III Corps (2 Divisions).
 XV Corps (2 Divisions). (V.R. Corps in reserve).
 Bavarian Ersatz Division, and
 5th Landwehr Division.

The regiments of the V.R. Corps had been relieved some days before the attack by the VII R., XVIII and XV Corps. Each regiment of V.R. then formed at least one storming battalion from its best men, and these battalions were identified, from the 24th February onwards, as reinforcements to the VII R., XVIII, III and XV Corps.

According to prisoners, the 192nd Brigade was in reserve to the north of VERDUN, and men of the 113th Division were said to have been seen in reserve in the FRESNES area on the 24th February.

(iii) DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK.

The 21st February.- General artillery preparation, particularly intense on the front of the XVIII and III Corps. (Strong officers' patrols were sent out on the front of these corps during the night of the 21st/22nd February to find out the result of the bombardment).

The 22nd February.- Infantry attack by five divisions from the MEUSE to HERBEBOIS.

The 23rd February.- Re-organization of the attacking units, resulting in the regiments which had been in reserve being put into the line.

The 24th February.- Renewal of the attack by the five Divisions, supported on the left by the entry into the fight of the two Divisions of the XV Corps on the front MAUCOURT-WARCQ.

The 28th February.- The 5th Landwehr Division, which had already come into action on the 25th February in following up the French rearguards retiring to the "HAUTS DES MEUSE", was reinforced by the Bavarian Ersatz Division, which attacked on the front RONVAUX-MANHEULLES.

The 1st March.- The 14th Reserve Division, VII R. Corps relieved the 13th Reserve Division before this date, and was identified in the fighting on the POIVRE hill.

The total number of divisions identified in the fighting is therefore 10, reinforced by special battalions from two other divisions.

Of these 10 Divisions 9 had been resting for a considerable period, the XVIII Corps since October, the VII R. Corps, XV Corps and the Bavarian Ersatz Division since December. The 5th Division, III Corps, had not fought since the French offensive in Champagne in September 1915, and the 6th Division had been resting since its return from Serbia in December. (? January).

With reference to the above the following further notes concerning the German offensive have been received from the French G. Q. G.:-

German opinion seems to be depressed and disappointed that the gains attained in Verdun are not more in proportion to the losses that have been suffered. Proof of this is afforded by the efforts that are being made by the German General Staff to endeavour to induce the country to

believe that it was the French who took the offensive.

The number of deserters who surrendered in our lines in the days before the attack largely increased, and from their statements it appears they were told that the object of the German attack was to capture Verdun and compel France to conclude a separate peace.

Deserters also declare that the German officers, to encourage troops and improve their morale, used to explain the invincible theory of the proposed attack, which was to extend over a period of 10 days. The artillery preparation would be so effective that the German troops would be able to advance against Verdun as if on parade.

The German Government still appear to believe that the attack on Verdun may yet be brought to a successful conclusion. Germany has set all her hopes, both military, diplomatic and political, upon this result. A failure would be considered by German opinion as a great disaster.

A report of a riot taking place in Berlin at the beginning of March, which had to be dispersed by the Police using firearms, has been received.

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No 49.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

21st March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.
2. TURKISH PRESS EXTRACTS.
3. INFORMATION FROM TURKISH PRISONERS CAPTURED
BY THE FRENCH.

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1.

SITUATION IN MACEDONIA.

There is no change in the position of the enemy in Macedonia.

The two German "reconstituted Divisions" 101st and 103rd are engaged in improving the Bulgarian defensive works. A French report states that a German infantry battalion entered DOIRAN on the 17th. Two companies continued their march in a South Westerly direction and having crossed the frontier came under fire from the Greek outposts. This report at present lacks confirmation.

Deserters give some interesting reports of the German troops. The 103rd Division is said to be about 11,000 strong. The three regiments that form the 205th Brigade, Commanded by General Auer, are the only infantry of the Division. Each regiment has an attached company of six machine guns, and each battalion an attached "mountain detachment" also of six machine guns. Besides these artillery units organised for the requirements of the country the 13th regiment of mountain artillery of the 4th mountain group is with this Division in addition to the five field and two heavy batteries of the 205th Artillery regiment.

There is only one regiment, the 122nd, guarding the Vardar line from NISH to GEVGELI, the rest of the 105th Division being in position on the Roumanian frontier.

Of the 101st Division the 59th and 45th Infantry regiments are in the Vardar valley district, the Headquarters of the 201st Infantry Brigade being at BOGDANCI, East of the river.

The 146th Regiment probably remains at MONASTER until relieved by the Alpine Corps when it may

be expected to rejoin the rest of the 101st Division in the centre.

The Alpine Bavarian Corps is now reported to be in the VELES-MONASTIR area. There are no further details regarding its composition beyond that it is composed of five regiments thought mostly to be Bavarian. The 2nd and 3rd Bavarian Reserve Jaegers are reported, and various machine gun detachments.

The ordinary recruits of the Prussian or Saxon armies could not be readily drilled or organised for Alpine work. The Bavarian 11th Division (21st Brigade) composed of the 3rd, 22nd and 13th (Reserve) regiments, was combined with the 105th German Division to form the 4th Reserve Corps in Serbia. The 101st Division has now been incorporated into the 4th Reserve Corps possibly releasing the 11th Bavarian Division to form the nucleus of this Alpine Corps.

It is said that the ages of the troops forming the 4th Reserve Corps range from 17 to 40. Many of the men belonged to the Landsturm, and after being rejected several times for active service, were taken to depots for three months training and incorporated in these "reconstituted Divisions". It is quite clear that the Germans relied more on the moral support that these German troops would have than upon their fighting efficiency. The German losses in Serbia are said to have been insignificant, and the whole campaign is looked on by the Germans in the light of an "excursion party". The Bulgarians did all the fighting once the Danube had been forced by those active and good reserve German Divisions now again with the German Army in France.

These German troops in Macedonia are not likely to inspire the Bulgarians ^{with} any high hopes of their valuable co-operation in an attack on SALONIKA.

It is easy to understand that the chief interest of the German Staff must be to place the Greek frontier in a thorough state of defence, and to induce the Bulgarians by the promise of future gains to hold the Allies contained in SALONIKA. The many reports of Bulgarian discontent that the Germans were treating Bulgaria as conquered territory appears to be based upon fact since prisoners state that all goods are requisitioned on sight and only paper money is used for payment.

Difficulties in transport seem still to render the supply of the army difficult and the roads about VELES are reported to be in a deplorable condition. With troops of this type and the Bulgarians growing tired of the war neither Roumania nor the Allies need fear any violent enemy offensive unless the Germans and Austrians adopt the policy of withdrawing additional troops from other theatres.

2. TURKISH PRESS EXTRACTS.

SUPPLIES. The stock of wheat in ADANA is exhausted and attempts are being made to obtain supplies from EREGLI, KONIA and NIGDEH.

Flour is at present cheaper than wheat owing to the fact maximum prices for sales of flour have been fixed by the authorities.

CONSTITUTION. At a well attended sitting on 14th February the Chamber voted a further restriction of its authority by an amendment of the constitutional law empowering the Government "in case of need" to order a dissolution and re-assembly in four months after new elections.

At the same time the Chamber voted that members' salaries be increased from £T300 to £T500 per session. The Chamber probably thought that it was as impossible to reduce its authority as to increase its pay.

RECRUITS. Moslems and non-Moslems of the 1312 (1896-7) class are to report on 18th February with winter clothes and five days food.

OFFICERS. Twentyfive midshipmen have been sent to Germany for training in the German Navy.

FINANCE. On 14th February the Senate passed the Bill under which £T 7,240.000 of notes are to be issued instead of £T 6.000.000.

On 15th February the Chamber discussed the 1916-7 budget which was given out as follows:-

Expenditure	£T 39.700.000
Revenue	<u>25.000.000</u>
Deficit	<u>£T14.700.000</u>

It was proposed to make up this deficit by

- (1) Increased tax on spirits and new taxes on the following:
Cigarette paper, matches, playing cards, sugar, petroleum, tea and coffee.
- (2) Treasury bonds, temporary advances, current accounts and loans.

INFORMATION FROM TURKISH PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH.

Information from two prisoners captured off SAIDA (through French sources).

At SAIDA no troops - trenches only, a little way inland. At SALIHIYE (near SAIDA) 4000 troops with German Officers. Great Distress at SAIDA, people dying of starvation. Along the coast there are small posts of redifs, as formerly.

The "Canal Army" is returning to Jerusalem and Damascus.

75 mines were raised by the Turks from Beyrouth
harbour: the work was done by divers who cut the anchoring
and wires with files.

The submarine that came to Beyrouth was seen by one of the prisoners: it was about 60 metres long and carried two guns. It lay up under the Ottoman Bank.

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No 50.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

22nd March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. TURKISH DISLOCATIONS.
2. EXTRACTS FROM GREEK PRESS.

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1. TURKISH DISLOCATIONS.

In Summary No 46 of March 17th and in the first line of page 264 it was stated in error that Baghet was Commander of the 3rd Division. This should have read 23rd Division of course, but other evidence places the second Division on the Sinai front as being the 3rd, so that, the general deduction of there being two Divisions, the 3rd and 23rd, remains good.

These are all that remain. The others, 43rd and 44th and possibly 5th have been drawn off North and it is stated that they are to proceed to the KHARPUT area under Djemal Pasha to re-inforce the Turkish right wing. They ^{might} well pick up 41 too, from ALEXANDRETTA, on their way. Local opinion in Sinai states that they have been drawn North to repel an English invasion of Syria.

No information has yet been received from our Russian allies as to the arrival of any fresh forces on their front: nor is there any change in Arabia, but the Indian Expeditionary Forces in BASRA are of opinion that another Division has arrived at BAGDAD. It will be interesting to see whether this is, after all, the 13th Division. There is no change in Smyrna as far as is known. The arrival of the remainder of 49th from Constantinople is not yet reported. Three Battalions only are located in ST. GEORGES but we may presume by now that the rest have arrived, leaving in Constantinople, whence the 49th came, the 47th and 50th Divisions.

The 27th Division remains apparently at CHANAK and 42nd and 43rd are reported en route to SIVAS from the Dardanelles. 10 has been reported some time ago as having arrived at ANGORA, 15th en route.

On Gallipoli there remain still 24th, 25th, 26th.

In Thrace the presence of a Corps composed of 7th, 8th and 9th Divisions is confirmed from another passenger, but there is no certainty yet that this information is correct. We may also believe the presence of 1st, 4th and 6th, 14th and 16th in this area, ^{from} but lack of information as to their movements elsewhere.

Heavy troop movements have been reported through LULE BURGAS for three days prior to 17th inst, and this may portend the movements of some of these Divisions to another point.

As regards the other Divisions, concerning which there is even a greater element of doubt, the locations of 11th of 12th and 20th is still uncertain. All have been reported or are believed to have been en route for the Caucasus. Similar to the 19th, but reports are to hand from Greek sources which indicate that 19th has never left Europe.

2.

EXTRACTS FROM GREEK PRESS.

"MACEDONIA" (Venizelist).

13th March 1916. The Macedonian situation.

It is reported that Portugal will send an army to the Salonica front, receiving compensation in the form of a large grant of German colonial territory.

About the middle of next week two Serbian regiments are expected to arrive from CORFU; they will be stationed at VASILIKA. The refugees Committee has notified British H.Q. that 2000 refugees are willing to be used for various services of the Allies.

Bulgaria and Turkey. Athens 12th. London telegrams confirm the serious differences between Germans and Bulgars which have sprung up. The former unable to place an army in the Balkans to attack the Anglo-French, insist that the Bulgars should do so with their full force. The Bulgars, fearing the Allied Army and the attitude of Greece, refuse. Ferdinand's position is seriously shaken and he is afraid to return to Sofia. Athens 12th, News from Constantinople states that the

Armenian volunteers, who have formed themselves into corps and accompany the Russian Army, are taking revenge for the Turkish atrocities and slaughtering the Moslem population. The Greeks often intervene with the Russians and save the Moslems. The Porte is thinking of requesting the Ecumenical Patriarchate to ask the Russians to have pity on the Turkish population.-Athens 12th. Constantinople telegraphs that Turkey will hurriedly send to ANGORA the Army of Thrace and Smyrna and the Sea of Marmora and will call up all those liable to service in order to stem the tide of the Russian advance. But before these forces arrive the Russians will have seized all the strategic points, will unite with the British and will reach ALEXANDRETTA.

- One morning last week proclamations were found posted in the streets of Constantinople, insisting on the peril of the Empire and urging the people to turn out of authority the Young Turks and Germans. These posters were at once seized by the police, all printing offices have been searched and numerous arrests have been made.

SERBIA. Athens, 12th. A Greek just returned from Serbia reports that the Austro-Germans have collected the Serbs who are capable of bearing arms from 16 years old and upwards and confined them in a Hungarian town. The Austrians treat the Serbs very well, thinking they will retain the territory they have won. They have appointed local demarches, specially chosen from among the Hebrews. It was stated in Serbia that Austria and Bulgaria had fixed the Morava as the frontier between them. Relations are very strained between Germans, Austrians and Bulgars.

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No 51.

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

23rd March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1

1. SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

2. WESTERN DESERT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

1. SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

Information from Russian sources shows the Turkish force which was defeated near KERMANSHAH to have been composed of odd battalions from the 2nd, 45th, 51st and 52nd Divisions.

A MUKATTAM telegram states that General Aylmer has begun a general retreat after the attempt to envelope ES. SINN. The Turks claim to have pursued and to have reached the British fortified position at JEMZIR HILL.

The following notes on captured Turkish trenches were compiled by an officer and Sergeant of the Black Watch.

(i) Turkish trenches - About 6 ft. deep with fire step traversed every 8 yards, parapets about same height as parapet. Dugouts hollowed out of sides of trench and covered with waterproof sheets. A little timber was seen, but no corrugated iron. There appeared to be a support line about 300 yards behind front line.

(ii) Communications. - On the Turkish right there was a communication trench leading back to support line. No other communication trenches were noted, but there was a ramp line into the front line trenches about every second traverse.

(iii) Obstacles. - There was a barbed wire fence 3 ft. high about 30 yards in front of the Turkish front line. Two strands on wooden poles about 10 yards apart. As far as could be seen this had not been cut by our artillery fire, but it offered no serious obstacles.

(iiii) Machine guns. - There were two machine guns in the trench. One we were able to use on the Turks, the other was out of order - We disabled them both before leaving the trench.

(V) Bombs.- We took up about 30 bombs, cane-handled pattern. There were several missfires. The Turks appeared to have any amount of spherical cast-iron bombs with a fuse which was lit with a match and burned for about seven seconds. Every Turkish soldier appears to carry one of these, for one was found in every pack examined.

We blocked a traverse on our left but not one on our right.

(VI) General.-- There was an officer on the parapets of the trench with a revolver (we thought he was a German) apparently keeping the Turks in the trenches.

As far as we could see, our artillery fire had had no effect on the trench.

A political officer reports on 18th March that speaking generally the attitude of certain tribes West and North of the HAMMAR Lake has lately become more hostile. Enemy agents have been busy among these tribes and appear to have met with some success. Friendly Sheikhs have warned the political officer that matters might come to a head at any time, and that our points at HAKIKA, SUK, and SAFHA junction would probably be attacked, in which case armed river steamers would appear to be necessary.

In private letters dated 14th February General Brooking speaks of the tribes in NASIROYAH district being very unsettled, he says that the situation resembles that of last September only is more aggravated, all eyes being turned towards KUT.

He does not consider however that these tribes would make any serious attack, except perhaps against a retreating force.

Reports state that the Arabs expect the Turks to retire from SINN at any moment owing to shortage of supplies, and that the Turks intend bringing a force down and forming a camp on the North side of the HAMMAR Lake.

The enemy's strength, regulars, below BAGHDAD is given as 30,000. This report is probably fairly reliable.

Our estimate of the Turkish strength at HANAH - SINN - SHUMRAM on 16th February 1916, is as follows:-

2.500	35th Divisi -on
2.100	
4.000	45th Division
4.000	51st "
6.800	52nd "
2.000	Gendarmerie
2.000	Mounted Brigade.
3.200	Drafts arrived BAGHDAD first half January.
7.500	2nd Division
1.700	Estimate of rejoined casualties (SHURRAN)
1.200	Estimate of rejoined casualties ex SHURRAN
	(i.e. from Baghdad on 9th February)
<u>37.000</u>	

Deduct casualties
6th, 7th, 8th Jany.

" 14th Jany.

21st Jany. 8.500

28.500 Reckoning none of the 1st Div.as having arrive

1.000 Deduct on account of typhus and other wastage.

27.500

2. WESTERN DESERT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, from 15th to 21st
March 1916.

SOLLUM was re-occupied unopposed on 14th inst, The enemy having hurriedly left BIR WARR the previous night, after destroying all ammunition that it was not found possible to remove. The armoured car division caught up the retreating enemy on 14th, inflicted heavy casualties, captured all the guns and machines guns and destroyed all the supplies of ammunition that were being taken West. The assistance of the motor road to DERNA was of great assistance in this raid, but the road would soon cut up under heavy traffic. Many hundreds of Beduin with their families and belongings were passed before the enemy was reached and it is evident that the occupation of Sollum in force has finally arrested any further activity in this area.

NURI is believed to have gone South to join SAYED AHMED and the advance of re-inforcements from Tripoli is also reported, but such a force could not arrive for some considerable time and so far the Tripolitan as opposed to the Cyrenaican Arabs have not shown any remarkable readiness to move far away from their own areas.

By a brilliant dash to BIR HAKIM AKDAR, 120 miles West of SOLLUM, the armoured cars succeeded in rescuing 91 survivors of H.M.S. "TARA" and "MOORINA" who were in a miserable condition through want of food, clothing and medical comforts. Nuri has expressed willingness to allow supplies to be sent them by us and the bad faith of Sayed Ahmed is sufficiently shown by the fact that he kept back a letter from General Maxwell to Nuri on this.

subject and also stated that our prisoners were to the West of JAGHBUB, obviously with the idea of causing us to believe that they were out of all possible reach.

In the South Sayed Ahmed is variously reported to be at SIWA, GIRBA and en route to the Oases, which, with the exception of KHARGA, are according to the latest information still occupied by the enemy. The total Southern force does probably not reach 3.000 including Beduin and the inhabitants in SIWA. According to JAAFAR Pasha the plan of campaign in the South was to threaten the Nile valley and lend support to a movement further South against the Sudan. The proportion of Turkish Officers with the Southern Force is small, the ^{supplies} for any considerable force or period insufficient, and the objective difficult to reach unobserved, so that a withdrawal to SIWA or even farther West to be nearer supplied from Tripoli and CYRONAICA is not impossible.

The rescue of our prisoners has deprived Sayed Ahmed of a trump card in any peace negotiations he may attempt to open.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

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I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y .

24th March 1916.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. SITUATION IN THE BALKANS.
2. PRESS EXTRACTS ON THE SAME.

1. SITUATION IN THE BALKANS.

Contrary to expectation it appears that the demands made by the Central Powers on Roumania were moderate. Information from Bucharest confirms the impression that the Germans were determined to gain a decisive victory at VERDUN, and allowed Roumania to understand that the result of such a success as they anticipated would be to render any Allied operations later in the year impossible, either in France or the Balkans. The interventionist party in Roumania also believe that the Central Powers were surprised at the attitude of the Roumanian Government in adopting so firm a policy, and were not prepared to face the risk of 600,000 Roumanian troops being thrown into the scale against them.

The failure of the Germans and the steady pressure of Russian troops on the Austrian positions in Galicia are having their effect. The Roumanian Government however free they may feel from the danger of the menace of the Central Powers will at any rate delay taking any part in the war until the Russian offensive is well advanced.

The success of General Ivanoff and the Russian Southern Army continues. By forcing the Austrians back across the Dniester and occupying the high ground at ZALESZCZYKI the enemy positions commanding CZERNOWITZ, 28 miles to the South, are rendered still more insecure. At this time of year the snow though thawing is still lying deep in all the Carpathian passes. The Germans have assisted the Austrians in improving their communications,

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but it is more than doubtful whether the Austrians can rely on any further support of German troops. The Russians will encounter a series of strong positions before the line of the Pruth can be gained.

According to recent intelligence the efficiency of the Austrian troops has suffered as a result of a winter spent in trenches amidst most severe weather conditions. The Roumanian and Russian Governments are now in close accord, and the concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia will be the most satisfactory reply to the threat of Bulgarian and German troops on the Danube.

The Bulgarian Government have expressed no desire to attack Roumania, and the Central Powers appear to recognise that it is by diplomatic rather than military methods that Roumania can be induced to maintain her present attitude.

Greece is understood to be on the verge of bankruptcy, and having failed to get help from the Central Powers she is now trying to raise a loan from the Entente.

The government have proposed to alter the positions of the Greek troops in Thrace on the plea of assisting the Allies. The position of the present Government in Athens is most unstable and the Venezelist party are urging the immediate demobilisation of the Army and a complete understanding with the Allies which would result in a solution of most of the difficulties.

Bulgaria has now called up the remainder of the 1916 class, and continues to permit men of over 45 to return to their farms. Under German supervision the Serbian prisoners are being employed in sowing crops both in Serbia and Bulgaria. The German are reported to be showing the Serbian peasants every consideration being anxious at all costs to get as much produce from

their occupied territories as possible. With characteristic thoroughness the latest agricultural machinery has been sent from Germany and the peasants provided with transport facilities on the net-work of railways that have been made. Only paper money is in circulation. This is but one of the many instances that show the anxiety of the Germans to retain their hold on occupied territory both in Poland, Belgium and the Balkans by impressing upon the civilian population the equally efficient character of the civil administration as of the military organisation. The methods employed by the officials and the hide bound regulations that form part of the system cause great individual discontent in the Government Departments of these new German territories. The people tired of war and dreading a second campaign over their soil may welcome a system of Government that would be an improvement upon what they previously were accustomed to and which would save them from the horrors of war. This is part of the German scheme for weakening the offensive campaign of the Allies, and for retaining under their control the results of their victories.

2. PRESS EXTRACTS ON THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS.

The special correspondent of the "BERLINER TAGEBLATT" in Athens forwards an account of an interview with the Greek Prime Minister in his paper.

From it we may learn that M. SKOULODIS is of opinion that the Greek nation has behaved like heroes, and that the Allied occupation of Salonika is a positive nightmare to all Hellenes. "We hope and trust" declared the Prime Minister, "that Germany will insist that Bulgaria shall never violate Greek integrity. Otherwise troubles

might arise. But in any case the world will never see us departing from neutrality, whatever may arise!-

(Note:- The telegraphic summary of the above interview as published in Berlin reported M. SKOULOUDIS was of opinion that he would sooner see the Bulgarians in Greece than the Allies.

Extracts from censored telegrams.

Journal du Caire.

Servian Legation in Athens denies that there are negotiations for a Serbo-Bulgarian peace.

At AHRAM.

In the GEVGELI sector French and German patrols are in constant contact.
