

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Flying Corps

Item number: 8/4/10 Part 2

Title: No 1 Squadron, Australian Flying
Corps

October 1918



AWM4-8/4/10PART2

E 33/101
OCT 1918

FAB.



WAR DIARY.

OCTOBER 1918.

APPENDIX 8.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

ORIGINAL.

Confidential.

E 33/102
OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—3rd October, 1918.

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

0730-1030.

30 bivouacs and two bell tents apparently deserted at KUTEIFE (25 miles North-east of DAMASCUS on HOMS Road). No movement north of KUTEIFE as far as Point 4390. (Ref. Map, 1:250,000).

1030-1320.

230 Cavalry at ZAHLE. 40 H.T., 50 cavalry going north on ZAHLE—BAALBEK Road. RAYAK Station burnt. 200 R.S., no engines. 70 H.T., no horses. Aerodrome gone. 100 infantry going north on BAR ELIAS—RAYAK Road. 100 cavalry, 200 infantry, 30 H.T. at BAR ELIAS. (R.A.F. 3-10).

1130-1400.

Trench, 3 bays, one mile south-west of BIR ABU EZ ZERKA, facing south. Trench, 7 bays, a mile south of WADI TESH, facing road junction. 300 cavalry watering at KEFREYA (M.8). Apparently submerged gun-boat at BEIRUT and cigar-shaped submerged boat south-west corner of harbour. Ref. Map 1:125,000 SAIDA. (R.A.F. 3-10).

A captured German Sketch Map shows a new bridge (described as the "New LITANI Bridge") approximately one mile north of JISR EL KARAON. This is confirmed by air photographs. The bridge reported by R.A.F. on 2nd October as having been destroyed is the new bridge and not the old JISR EL KARAON Bridge.

B.—AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

A captured document shows that the enemy having taken an air photograph of certain of our practice trenches, discovered, on comparing this with a photo of a Turkish post in the Coastal Sector, that the practice trenches were an exact duplicate of the Turkish post. They were thus able to foresee an attack on the post.

C.—GERMANS.

A Strength return for the 1st September, 1918, shows the German and Turkish troops serving under the YILDERIM Group to have been as follows:—

RATION STRENGTH.			
Germans	828 officers, 14,807 O.R.
Turks	12 " 3,009 "

ANIMALS.
6,800.

FIELD STRENGTH.			
(All Germans).			
Infantry	114 officers, 2,576 O.R.
Cavalry	2 " 90 "
Pioneers	7 " 359 "
		123	3,025

SERVICEABLE ARTILLERY.

7.7 cm. field guns	8
10.5 cm. howitzers	14
7.7 cm. A.A. guns	5
7.5 cm. " "	2
2.2 cm. " "	4

SERVICEABLE AIRCRAFT.

Aeroplanes	28
------------	-----	-----	----

Note.—The field strength does not include personnel of the machine-guns, artillery, motor transport, flying units, or signals.

Captured documents.

D.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

Prisoners were taken at DAMASCUS on 1st October from the 6th and 7th Cavalry Regiments and the Mule M.I. Bn.

E33/102A

OCT 1918

OCT 1918

2.—CILICIA.

23rd DIVISION.

This division was still in the TARSUS-MERSINA area 10 days ago. Only the Divisional M.G. Coy. came south and was captured at DAMASCUS. (P/W, this unit, 2-10).

41st DIVISION.

This division was still in the ALEXANDRETTA area 10 days ago. Its regiments are only 1 Battalion strong. (P/W, 23rd Div. M.G. Coy., 2-10).

Comment.—For the low strength of units of this division, compare I.S. 428, para. 1.

3.—ANATOLIAN RAILWAY.

Owing to deterioration in rolling stock on the ANATOLIAN Railway, traffic has been considerably disorganised and reduced to about 1 train per day. The Turks have made urgent representations to Germany for new rolling stock. A number of waggons have since been sent and four new locomotives were to arrive in CONSTANTINOPLE on August 14th. (Agent, 13-8).

4.—CONSTANTINOPLE AREA.

(i.) GERMAN TROOPS.

According to information obtained from a Greek Contractor who supplies all German military troops in CONSTANTINOPLE, the total number of Germans at present at CONSTANTINOPLE and the BOSPHORUS is between 11,000 and 12,000.

There have been no recent arrivals of German troops in CONSTANTINOPLE. (Agent, 13-8).

(ii.) TURKISH TROOPS.

The Turks are now retaining in CONSTANTINOPLE all picked recruits and are completing units in CONSTANTINOPLE, THRACE and the DARDANELLES with the best available men. Practically no troops are being sent south except drafts of about 600 to 700 weekly. The CHATALDJA Defences have been gradually strengthened since the end of March. Officers and men have been sent specially to superintend this work. (Agent, 13-8).

5.—MESOPOTAMIA.

Estimated strengths of the VI Army on 30th September.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	M.G's.	Combatants.	Rations.
EUPHRATES GROUP	1165	630	9	26	2460	3200
TIGRIS GROUP	3465	120	59	100	7200	10725
KIRKUK GROUP	1740	310	26	40	3935	5820
SULEIMANIYEH GROUP	720	50	4	10	1030	1460
ROWANDUZ-PASSOVA GROUP	1840	80	8	40	2710	4430
MOSUL (VI ARMY H.Q's.)						
L. of C. and JEBEL SINJAR	335	350	24	24	2945	5580
TOTAL VI ARMY	9265	1540	130	240	20280	31215

6.—TURKISH OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE, 1-10-18.

"Palestine Front.—Our troops are engaged south of DAMASCUS with the enemy, who has pressed forward beyond EL KUNEITRA. We are fighting at KISWE (15 kilometres S. of DAMASCUS with advancing hostile cavalry. The territory west of DAMASCUS to the coast is clear of the enemy. Quiet prevails on the other fronts."

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

3rd October, 1918.

[No. 430]

Confidential.

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—4th October, 1918.

E 33/103

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN AND PALESTINE FRONT.

A.—CAPTURED ENEMY OFFICERS.

The following enemy officers (higher than regimental commanders) have been captured during operations:—

Col. SABET SAMI	...	Commanding 19th Division,	8th Army.
Col. ISMAIL RUSHDI	...	16th	8th
Lt.-Col. ZIA RASHID	...	53rd	7th
Lt.-Col. SERID SIRREY...	...	24th	4th
Col. von SCHIERSTAEDT	...	Composite Div.,	4th
Lt.-Col. ALI VEHBI	...	MAAN Det.	4th
Major SHEVKI ALI GHALIB,		C.G.S.,	22nd A.C.

B.—ORGANISATION.

According to an Army order, dated 11th May, 1918, the following artillery units were struck off the Turkish Order of Battle:—

2nd/5th Artillery Regiment.		
1st and 2nd/13th Artillery Regiment.		
2nd/14th Artillery Regiment.		
1st/43rd
1st/47th
1st/54th

(Captured document).

Comment.—All the above were in the YILDERIM ARMY GROUP.

C.—GERMANS.

Reference I.S. 430 para. 1.C. the Turks mentioned are Turks serving with, and rationed by, German units.

D.—RATION STRENGTHS.

The following details are taken from a captured document, dated 1st or 17th September, 1918:—

UNITS.	Ration Strength.		Daily Supply.		
	Men.	Animals.	Food. tons.	Forage. tons.	Total tons.
8th Army	39,783	17,817	28	53'5	81'5
7th Army	28,575	10,815	20	32'5	52'5
JORDAN GROUP	5,223	2,324	3'5	7	10'5
PALESTINE Menzil (4 g/c)	4,958	1,877	3'5	5'5	9
4th Army	21,899	6,601	15'5	20	35'5
	100,438	39,434	70'5	118'5	189

Comment.—The above figures are probably exaggerated. Captured supply officers state that when rendering indents ration strengths are liberally estimated as otherwise sufficient rations to feed the troops are not forthcoming.

2.—ASIA MINOR.

It is reported that during July and August 1,200 gas masks were sent from the Vth Army Headquarters, to the XX1st Army Corps and were distributed amongst units of the 57th Division. (Agent).

Comment.—This may denote that it was intended to move this division or part of it to one of the fighting fronts. There has been no subsequent indication that it has moved from the ADALIA area.

3.—REPATRIATED PRISONERS.

The "LLOYD OTTOMANE" of 13th August stated that the Turkish Commission for the repatriation of Turkish prisoners in Russia would shortly leave for ASTRAKHAN *via* BATUM, and would work in conjunction with the German Commission already in ASTRAKHAN. Liberated prisoners were to be sent by sea *via* ODESSA and CONSTANZA. Up to this date 1,800 prisoners had arrived from Russia *via* NOVOROSSISK, and a certain number had returned from the UKRAINE and ROUMANIA, through the services of the Turkish Commissions at ODESSA and CONSTANZA.

Compare I.S. 384 and references.

E 33/10 3A
- OCT 1918

4. CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

Extracts from YILDERIM flying reconnaissance and Air Photographs report for period 1st to 16th September, 1918.

"The situation on the Palestine Front has not changed in the period under review.

Results of air reconnaissance.—In the tactical area of the Coastal Sector, the situation has not altered substantially since the reconnaissance of the 12th and 15th August. In the area SHEIKH MUANNIS-COAST-JAFFA-HATTA Bridge, 4 to 5 battns. were identified in bivouacs, and a new camp of 40 tents south of the mouth of the NAHR EL AUJA confirms the presence of a further 6 battns.

In the area NEBRAKH SABIEH-MULEBBIS, an increase in the troops and camps has taken place.

In front of the left group of the 8th Army there was no reconnaissance. The infantry camps in the hills both sides of the NABLUS-EL BIREH road showed no change on the 13th September since the last reconnaissance. Between EL BIREH and RAMALLAH the old bivouac camp for 2 battns. has gone. Just north of it, north and south of the EL BALUA pond a new bivouac camp of 3 battns. altogether has appeared. East of RAMALLAH, a big new camp of 126 bell tents is reported presumably occupied by workmen for the light railway station and embankment which have been begun there. Otherwise on the whole, the troops and camps in the BEITUNIA-EL BIREH-RAMALLAH area showed only unimportant re-grouping without change of strength.

In the hills between the NABLUS-EL BIREH Road and the JORDAN Valley, where biggish camps of troops were reported in the area RAMMUN-EN NEDSCHME by agents, no camps have so far been observed.

In the JORDAN Valley, according to report of the 13th to 15th September inclusive, in the camps both sides of the JORDAN the presence of another 10 to 12 battns., and about 45 squadrons must be accepted.

Even in this sector, the camps have not apparently changed in strength.

The permanent infantry camps at BIR SALEM and EL KUBEIBEH remained unchanged with 2 battns. each, while at LATRUN an increase of the infantry to 4 or 5 battalions (inclusive of AMWAS) has to be recorded. In the Coastal Sector, near BEIT DEJAN and ZERNUKA, 12 squadrons, believed to be Indian, remain encamped and unchanged. The two other cavalry camps south of KH. SURAFEND and west of DEIRAN have decreased, the first from 8 to 5 squadrons, the latter from 11 to 6.

West of the WADI SURAR Railway Station, a new biggish cavalry camp has appeared, in which 7 sqns. were observed. Part of the camp was obscured by clouds. Near LATRUN 3 to 4 sqns. were reported.

Traffic.—On the 4th and 15th September, the traffic on the roads and railways in the long distance reconnaissance sector was small.

RESULTS OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHS.

In the big camps in the strategical area there has been no important change in the course of the period under report. At WADI SURAR and LATRUN an increase of about 100 tents is confirmed. In and about JERUSALEM some of the camps have decreased, others have increased. The general strength has remained as before.

Summary.—No great alteration in the enemy's troops could be observed. A re-grouping of the enemy's cavalry forces in the rear area seemed to be in course of execution or to have been already carried out."

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

4th October, 1918.

[No. 431]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT.—3rd October.

The British have advanced North of St. Quentin, and have captured SEQUEHART, RAMICOURT, GOUY and LE CATELET. 2,000 prisoners were taken.

The enemy is continuing to withdraw between LENS and ARMENTIERES and the British line now runs East of DOUVVIN, ILLIES and AUBERS. LENS has been captured. North-west of RHEIMS, the French have reached the line of the AISNE and the AISNE-MARNE Canal.

CHALLERANGE and ORFEUIL in the ARGONNE have been captured.

Confidential.

E 33/104
OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

for 24 hours ending 2200—5th October, 1918.

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

(i.) 0600-0900.—130 R.S. and one engine without steam at RAYAK. Most of R.S. on broad gauge. 27 R.S. burnt. 70 H.T. without horses. Hospital intact and no change at Aerodrome. No movement anywhere.

At MOALLAKA 120 Cavalry and 8 R.S. Two culverts on the ZAHLE-BEIRUT railway damaged. (R.A.F. 5-10).

(ii.) RAYAK was evacuated on the 2nd inst. JEVAD PASHA, G.O.C. VIII Army, and JEMAL PASHA, G.O.C. IV Army, with about 800 Germans and 300 Turks left for the north after destroying the supply depots and rolling stock. (Refugee from RAYAK, (5-10).

(iii.) It is reported that all Coast Defence Artillery has been withdrawn from LATAKIA, TRIPOLI and BEIRUT. (Agent, 5-10).

B.—AVIATION.

According to a YILDERIM Aviation report for period 1st to 16th September, 1918, flights could only be made over a small area owing to an exceptional lack of pilots. On an average there were 20 machines ready to start daily, but only sufficient crews for 14.

On the 3rd and 4th September 20 new machines arrived at ARMY FLYING PARK F from GERMANY. Between the 1st and 16th September 11 machines were sent from the Park to the front, 13 were fitted up and two were repaired. There arrived from the front 8 machines, of which 4 were useless, 3 to be broken up, and one to be sent home.

On the 16th of September there remained 76,000 litres of benzine and 11,000 litres lubricating oil.

C.—MAN POWER.

The following is an extract from a telegram from German L. of C. DAMASCUS, regarding Labour recruiting dated 14th September.

“Of 500 men without arms, which recruiting Bureau at DAMASCUS had to arrange for, only 30 men have been procured up to now. Of these, after deducting sick, etc., only 9 are available.” (Captured document).

2.—CAUCASUS.

PERSONALITIES.

A captured message from ENVER Pasha to the G.O.C. YILDERIM, dated 8th of August, informs him that the following officers have been sent to be Turkish representatives with the Government of the new CAUCASIAN Republics :—

MIRALAI ABDUL KERAM formerly O.C. XII A.C.—GEORGIA.

FERIK MAHOMMED ALI formerly G.O.C. I. A.C.—ARMENIA.

NURI PASHA, O.C. Moslem Forces in the CAUCASUS—AZERBAIJAN.

MIRALAI IZZET PASHA formerly O.C. Dardanelles Group—North CAUCASUS.

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from instructions issued by Ministry for War BERLIN on lack of discipline in connection with the transport of reinforcements, dated 22nd July, 1918.

Offences connected with the Transport of reinforcements have increased in spite of repeated warnings and orders, and have occasioned great inconvenience. It is imperatively necessary to put a stop to this. The strictest measures are to be taken.

Everywhere insubordination is shown to Draft Conductors and their personnel, station commanders, and railway officials. Orders and regulations are ignored, and in many cases open resistance, and even actual attacks on superiors, have occurred.

The reasons why this insubordination has got the upper hand are as follows :—

Superiors and inferiors do not know one another. The escorts are too weak; in particular there are too few energetic officers. There is a want of support of the Draft Conductors by the various ranks of the draft itself, and the behaviour of the N.C.O.'s. is careless and indifferent. Officers often fail to give Draft Conductors the required support.

E 33/140A

OCT 1918

The following are the most obvious remedies :—

- 1.—Assembly of N.C.O's. and men available for drafting on a parade ground or other convenient place, where a draft can be kept under strict discipline and under a permanent command until its departure.
- 2.—The names of unreliable elements to be given to the Commander and later to the Draft Conductor.
- 3.—Careful choice of Draft Conductors.
- 4.—Appointment of a large number of Officers and a strong escort. In future all Officers going to the front are to be used as Draft Conductors, with the exception of those under special orders from the Highest Commands.
- 5.—Instruction of the draft before departure with reference to their conduct on the journey, sharp warning against misbehaviour, and threats of severe punishment. Point out that punishments in the Field are served in Military Prisoners' Companies.
- 6.—Cases of disobedience before the departure of the draft are to be tried as quickly as possible by the General Command, and the delinquents sent immediately to the Field for posting to a Military Prisoners' Company.
- 7.—No man of the draft must be in possession of live ammunition.
- 8.—Posting of strong permanent guards at supply and railway stations where long halts are expected (after consultation with the L. of C. Staff Officers). Unreliable drafts to be duly reported at each stop by the Draft Conductor.
- 9.—Closed carriages (goods trucks) are to be used for men under arrest, and energetic N.C.O's. placed over them.
- 10.—Immediate drastic action on the first attempt at insubordination will produce a salutary effect on the men during the rest of the journey.
- 11.—During the journey prisoners must not travel with the other reinforcements. Their Divisions must be notified and they must be handed over for trial, and later despatched to a Military Prisoners' Company. Attachment to the draft begins with the taking over by the Draft Conductor.
- 12.—The chief thing is, that no man should feel for a moment that he is not under supervision. If necessary, resistance should be broken by force of arms. (Telegraph if assistance required).

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

5th October, 1918.

[No. 432]

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

RAYAK—HOMS (Distance 90 miles).

E 33/105
OCT 1918

This route was very little used previous to the War beyond BAALBEK, but has become an important enemy line of communication, as is instanced by the numerous depots and halting places shown on captured German maps.

From SHTORA to BAALBEK this is an excellent chaussee road, and beyond BAALBEK it is a metalled road throughout to HOMS, but no information is available as to the character of the road and very little detail as to the nature of the country through which it passes. More than half of the distance is pretty level going, whilst the remainder consists of the ascent to BAALBEK, the highest point on the route, and the long descent through the valley of the ORONTES between the LEBANON and the ANTI-LEBANON. The road follows the north-eastern slopes of the latter and crosses many small torrents between which there are liable to be some steep gradients. From captured German maps, there appears to be an alternative route from TEL ESH SHERIF to BAALBEK, following closely to the line of the railway, thus reducing the distance by about 2 miles. This route is classified as cleared and graded, and passable for all traffic, but not metalled.

The route is divided into the following sectors, suitable for movement of cavalry :—

1.—RAYAK—BAALBEK (18½ miles).

From RAYAK the new road across the LITANI to ABLAJ is followed, and from here the chaussee road to BAALBEK. The route leaves the base of the LEBANON at TEMNIN and traverses EL BUKAA towards the north-eastern slopes of the ANTI-LEBANON, re-crossing the NAHR LITANI by a bridge at TEL ESH SHERIF, where the route also crosses the railway. From this point it begins to ascend to BAALBEK, but the only steep gradients are believed to be just near TAIBE.

BAALBEK (3,670 ft.) is a village of 5,000 inhabitants and is of considerable historical interest. It was also an important enemy depot, including Remounts, Transport depot, field bakery, casualty clearing station, convalescent camp, disinfecting station, small supply depot and a Point Commandant.

A captured Turkish map shows a route following closely to the railway from RAYAK to TEL ESH SHERIF; thence *via* TALHIE, joining the main road again one mile south-west of BAALBEK.

2.—BAALBEK—LEBWE (18½ miles).

From BAALBEK the descent commences and is fairly rapid as far as MAKHNE, beyond which the railway is crossed twice in the next two miles. Between this point and LEBWE the road crosses eleven small mountain torrents, but no information is available as to whether these are bridged.

At LEBWE there is a Field Bakery, small supply depot, casualty clearing station, quarters for troops, and Post Commandant.

3.—LEBWE—EL KAA (18 miles).

In this sector the valley is at its narrowest; the country is rough and barren and practically timberless—which remark also applies to sector (2). The most important village on this route is RAS BAALBEK. From here the road skirts along the foothills, still descending, and crosses a stream just before EL KAA.

Similar depots exist as at LEBWE.

4.—EL KAA—KUSSEIR (16 miles).

The soil improves here and the country is slightly cultivated. The road gradually descends to the plain and passes only one small village (ZERAA) before reaching KUSSEIR, which is a large village, half Moslem and half Greek Christian.

Similar depots exist as at LEBWE.

5.—KUSSEIR—HOMS (19 miles).

From KUSSEIR to HOMS is a level road over a cultivated plain, dotted with small poplars not more than 15–16 feet in height. The road follows closely to the line of the railway and at KATTINE approaches close to the HOMS Lake (BAHRET KATTINE), which is six miles long and two miles broad and connected to HOMS by an aqueduct.

Just beyond the station, which is the junction for TRIPOLI and RAYAK, this route joins the TRIPOLI—HOMS road and enters the town from the west.

Water along route
RAYAK—HOMS.

E 33/106
= OCT 1918

1.—RAYAK—BAALBEK.

KARAK.—From this point there is very little water in the foothills, and in the plain which follows them, until BAALBEK is reached.

BAALBEK.—A copious spring of excellent water, rising one mile north-east of the town. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 60 cubic metres in summer and winter, in 24 hours.

2.—BAALBEK—LEBWE.

NAHLE.—Situating by a small mountain torrent, which flows into the Nahr LITANI. (The village is $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to east of road).

LEBWE.—About a mile east of the village, copious springs, known as NEBK EL ASY, burst from the hills. They are the most southern sources of the ORONTES. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 60 cubic metres summer and winter, in 24 hours.

3.—LEBWE—EL KAA.

RAS BAALBEK.—A good spring here. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 70 cubic metres in 24 hours, summer and winter.

EL KAA.—A tributary of the ORONTES crosses the road here. There is no information as to whether it is perennial, but the existence of enemy depots here implies that there is a permanent supply of water.

4.—EL KAA—KUSSEIR.

EL KUSSEIR.—At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a pump with a maximum capacity for 200 cubic metres in 24 hours, from a well yielding 50 cubic metres in 24 hours, summer and winter.

5.—KUSSEIR—HOMS.

HOMS.—Unlimited water perennially from the River ORONTES. At the station, a reservoir containing 85 cubic metres and a pump with a maximum capacity for 200 cubic metres in 24 hours, from a well yielding 60 cubic metres in summer and 100 cubic metres in winter, in 24 hours.

There is probably abundant water in the whole of this sector from irrigation canals from the ORONLES.

BEIRUT—RAYAK, via SHTORA (distance 37 miles).

This route, except for the last three miles from ABLAJ to RAYAK, was at one time an exceedingly good class chaussee road. It is 23 ft. wide, well engineered and drained, and has no bridges; but in 1914 it was in very bad repair, the sector between MEZRRA MAHMUD (mile $8\frac{1}{2}$) and mile 25 being specially bad. Since this date it is reported that it has been repaired in parts, but as it was not a main line of communication for the enemy, it is probable that not much attention has been given to this road. The sector from ABLAJ to RAYAK is a recently made road, concerning which no information is available at present.

The first half of the route consists of a steady climb to the head of the Pass through the LEBANON (altitude 5,000 ft.), and the second half of a rapid descent to SHTORA, from where it traverses a Plain (EL BUKAA) to RAYAK.

The metre-gauge Railway from BEIRUT to RAYAK follows close beside the route throughout its length.

It is divided, for the purposes of description, into the following sectors:—

1.—BEIRUT—AIN SOFAR ($14\frac{1}{2}$ miles).

This sector consists, except for the first $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile, which is level, of a steady ascent, with one or two short level stretches. On leaving BEIRUT the road skirts the side of MOUNT ST. DIMITRI, and then ascends the valley of the NAHR BEIRUT. It passes through richly cultivated country for the first $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to HAZMIE, where a steep ascent through barren hilly country continues as far as JAMHUR (mile $6\frac{1}{4}$). Between HAZMIE and JAMHUR, on the left of the road, is the very steep valley of the NAHR BEIRUT, the northern sides of which are precipitous and covered with pines. Beyond JAMHUR the road first follows a narrow hog's-back, and then winds up a steep ascent among pine woods, leaving AREYA on the left, and crossing the railway line, which is in a deep cutting, by an iron lattice bridge. From here the country becomes more rocky and barren, and the road in 1914 was very much broken away on the lower side, leaving barely room for two vehicles to pass. The road continues to ascend by an easy slope, following a narrow and rocky ridge, with extensive views on either side, to KHAN SHEIKH MAHMUD, where a road branches south to ALIYE. From this point it is cut along the northern side of the ridge some 50 ft. below the summit, and has a very steep drop into the valley of the NAHR HAMMANA on the left; midway between KHAN SHEIKH MAHMUD and BHAMDUN STATION it passes through a narrow neck between two abrupt knolls; thence along an almost level stretch to RUISET, and by a gradual ascent to AIN SOFAR. The latter is a straggling village (altitude 4,500 ft.) of some 60

OCT 1918

houses, consisting chiefly of private residences, hotels and cafes, and the Casino Ain Sofar is stated to have accommodation for some 300 people and very large rooms. This stretch from BHAMDUN to AIN SOFAR is the only suitable place for a camping ground between BEIRUT and SHTORA. There is considerable accommodation in houses at RUISDET and AIN SOFAR; and water is plentiful.

2.—AIN SOFAR—SHTORA (13½ miles).

The country through which this sector passes is practically uninhabited, bare, with very little cultivation, almost timberless, and the ground is stony and rough. The road rises steadily and crosses the railway on the level just before reaching KHAN MUDEIRIJ. From the latter it rises in a series of zig-zags to DEIR EL BEIDAR, about a mile beyond which the summit of the Pass is reached. On the left is the JEBEL KUNEISSE, rising to some 6,600 ft. above sea level, and on the right is the lower range of JEBEL EL BARUK. From here the road descends steeply to EL BUKAA, winding round the southern slopes of JEBEL KUNEISSE; and just beyond KHAN MURAD a fine view is obtained of the BUKAA, with MOUNT HERMON some distance to the south. Some of the hairpin bends between KHAN MURAD and MREIJATT Station are very sharp. From the latter the descent becomes easier, and a little before reaching SHTORA the road traverses a richly cultivated plain.

SHTORA is a vine-growing centre, with several large farms in the neighbourhood. Plenty of water is available here from the stream which runs through the village. There are also suitable sites for camping.

3.—SHTORA—RAYAK (9 miles).

The whole of this sector is level going over a very good road which skirts the eastern slopes of the mountains. From SHTORA the road crosses the stream mentioned above by a bridge, just beyond which there is a branch on the right leading to DAMASCUS. The road continues through open country, with many vineyards, to MOALLAKA and ZAHLE, the latter village being separated from the first by the width of a street only. The road is here joined by the alternative road from BEIRUT *via* BEKFEYA and ZAHLE. From here to RAYAK the ground is entirely devoid of cover. The road crosses various small watercourses, and at the village of ABLAJ leaves the BAALBEK road and turns right across the plain to the important junction of RAYAK. No information is available as to the condition of this portion from ABLAJ, but it is shown on captured German maps as the road used by all road transport from RAYAK to HOMS or RAYAK to BEIRUT. The NAHR LITANI which this road crosses, is, at this point, a narrow sluggish stream and furnishes no obstacle to military movement.

Water on route.

BEIRUT—RAYAK.

1.—BEIRUT—AIN SOFAR.

JAMHUR.—At Station, reservoir containing 50 cubic metres and a spring yielding 30 cubic metres in summer and 60 in winter, per 24 hours.

AREYA.—At Station, a reservoir containing 50 cubic metres, and a spring yielding 30 cubic metres in summer and 70 in winter, per 24 hours.

AIN MASHRAA.—10½ miles from BEIRUT (not marked on map), a good spring. No details as to yield, but there are summer residences in this vicinity, which seems to point to a fair supply.

ALIYE.—Station (½ mile to S. of road), reservoir containing 50 cubic metres and a spring yielding 30 cubic metres in 24 hours, summer and winter.

BHAMDUN.—Station. A reservoir containing 50 cubic metres and a spring yielding 30 cubic metres in summer and 50 in winter, in 24 hours.

AIN SOFAR.—A good spring and small water supply by pipe line from MUDEIRIJ. At Station, a reservoir containing 50 cubic metres and a spring yielding 35 cubic metres in summer and 100 cubic metres in winter, in 24 hours.

2.—AIN SOFAR—SHTORA.

KHAN MUDEIRIJ.—A small spring 200 yards beyond the Khan. No information available as to source of pipe line.

MREIJATT.—Good water. At Station, a reservoir containing 50 cubic metres and a spring yielding 30 cubic metres in summer and 80 in winter, in 24 hours.

SHTORA.—Abundant water from a spring situated to S. of JEDITA, which flows through village as a copious stream.

3.—SHTORA—RAYAK.

SAADNAIL.—Copious spring by threshing floors; suitable for troops.

MOALLAKA.—At Station, a reservoir containing 100 cubic metres, and a spring yielding 100 cubic metres in summer and winter, in 24 hours.

RAYAK.—At Station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a pump with a maximum capacity of 160 cubic metres in 24 hours, from a well yielding 180 cubic metres in summer and 250 cubic metres in winter, in 24 hours.

G.S. "I." (c),
G.H.Q.,
4-10-18.

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT.

E 33/108

- OCT 1918

Summary for Week ending 5th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT G.H.Q.

		Differences from previous week.
1.—Temperature.		
MEAN OF WEEK	75	—2
MEAN MAXIMUM	88	0
MEAN MINIMUM	66	—2
HIGHEST RECORDED on Sept. 30	91	+1
LOWEST RECORDED on Sept. 30	61	—5
2.—Humidity.		
MEAN OF WEEK	66	—1
HIGHEST RECORDED on Sept. 29 at 0800	88	+1
LOWEST RECORDED on Sept. 30 at 1400	33	—18

3.—Wind.

The 0800 readings varied from S.E. to S., those at 1200 from S. to S.W., at 1400 from W.S.W. to W.N.W., and at 1800 from W. to N. inclusive. Half the observations, including all those at 2000 were "calm," and the wind only twice exceeded "very light."

4.—Rainfall.

No appreciable quantity fell at G.H.Q. There were traces on the morning of the 2nd, and the night of 3rd/4th. Rain was however distinctly visible on the hills on the 2nd and 3rd, and was reported at JAFFA on the morning of the 2nd.

Summary for Week ending 5th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT JERUSALEM.

		Differences from previous week.
1.—Temperature.		
MEAN OF WEEK	68	—1
MEAN MAXIMUM	81	—2
MEAN MINIMUM	61	0
HIGHEST RECORDED on Sept. 29	86	—1
LOWEST RECORDED on Oct. 5	59	+1
2.—Humidity.		
MEAN OF WEEK	68	0
HIGHEST RECORDED on Oct. 2 at 1400	100	+5
LOWEST RECORDED on Sept. 30 at 1400	16	—10

3.—Wind.

Calm at 0800 on September 29th, 30th, and October 1st; also at 1400 on the 5th. All other observations, either W.N.W. or N.W. with force either "very light" or "light."

4.—Rainfall.

0.12 inches measured for the 24 hours ending at 0800 on the 3rd.

Confidential.

AMS
E33/100

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—6th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN & PALESTINE FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

1015-1235.

Trenches at BEIRUT unoccupied. No movement between BEIRUT and ZAHLE.
(R.A.F., 6-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

146th GERMAN REGIMENT.

The Regiment was in the KOSSOVO area until beginning of 1918, when it moved to CONSTANTINOPLE *en route* for Palestine. Before leaving KOSSOVO the men were medically inspected; those found unfit for service in the tropics were transferred to other German units in Macedonia and their places filled by fit men from those units.

No details of the 146th Regiment were left in Macedonia.

Since leaving Macedonia small drafts have been received from NEUHAMMER.

The 1st Bn. was the first to proceed to CONSTANTINOPLE; it was followed by the 2nd and 3rd. The Battalions left for Palestine during the end of April and early May, 1918.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions proceeded direct to AMMAN and remained in the AMMAN-JORDAN area until the present operations. Previous to these operations the 3rd Bn. was at ES SALT, with one company near SHUNET NIMRIN. The 1st Bn. was on the extreme left flank and formed part of the Composite Division.

The 2nd Bn. on its arrival in Palestine proceeded to BIDIEH. Until mid-September the battalion remained W. of the JORDAN—generally in the Coastal Sector. About the middle of September the battalion, which was then in line at ARARA, received orders to move to East of JORDAN and proceeded to ES SALT *via* NABLUS. From ES SALT the battalion moved to the WADI SIR and thence to AMMAN, where part of the 1st and 2nd Bns. were captured. The remainder of the Regiment proceeded to DERRA.
(Prisoners, 146th Regt.)

C.—ORGANISATION.

MOTOR TRANSPORT.

On 1st June there were the following motor lorry units in SYRIA:—

205th Column	(22 lorries)	—HOMS-TRIPOLI.
504th Park	(17 „)	—MUSLIMIE-ALEPPO.
703rd Column	(11 „)	—KATMA.
712th „	(14 „)	—MOALLAKA.
715th „	(20 „)	—DAMASCUS-RAYAK-BEIRUT.
731st Depot	(6 „)	—MOALLAKA.
751st Park	(7 „)	—BAALBEK-RAYAK.

There were also 15 lorries at ALEPPO. (Captured document, 1-6).

NOTE.—Compare I.S. 427, of 30th September.

D.—ENEMY AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.

It is shown by captured documents and air photos that the British camps were photographed, and tents and shelters carefully counted. It was mainly by this means that the enemy estimated the number and movement of units. Generally speaking the estimates were inaccurate. On annotated photographs, camel and other transport lines were repeatedly shown as camps of infantry units.

Weekly diagrams prepared for the YILDERIM Headquarters indicate that particular attention was paid to the WADY SUKERIER, WADY SURAR JUNCTION, LUDD, RAMLEH and LATRON areas.

Little interest appears to have been taken in the British trench system, but battery areas were frequently photographed.

2.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from instructions issued by War Office, BERLIN, dated 28th August, 1918:—

1.—Men who are tried by Court-martial for refusal to go into the Field are to be sent at once to the proper prisons for posting to one of the military prisoners' companies with the armies on the Western Front. In carrying out sentences it is to be particularly noted, that immediate despatch into the Field is ordered. If appeal is lodged, the prisoners should be sent into the field and the appeal be referred to the competent authority for further consideration.

2.—If it seems necessary that the sentence should be worked off in the field, then such men must be taken under secure guard (see No 34) to the nearest army. The Army, being duly advised, sends them to a formation which is under observation, and arranges for quick trial and posting to a military prisoners' company.

E33/109A

OCT 1918

3.—It is recommended that especially unreliable elements should be kept in confinement during transit, if possible by making use of locked goods trucks. Whenever available, covered goods wagons with barred windows should be used. In some cases the railway is in the position to supply a few prison vans, but there are not many of these. As the ventilators on the goods wagons are small, it will be necessary in very hot weather to open the locked wagons at the halts. Careful watch is to be kept at these times.

It is necessary to get into touch with the railway authorities in good time for the preparation of suitable wagons.

4.—Individual prisoners of war returning from Russia or Roumania, who have not committed any crime, but are of undoubted bad influence, will be taken under safe escort to the Field Recruiting Depot of the division to which they previously belonged, if the Division is on the Western front. If their division is not in the west, they will be taken to the Depot of another division which it is desired to reinforce. Divisional and Field Recruiting Depots are to be duly advised as to the reason for the transfer.

5.—Discipline requires that in no case should postponement of punishment be allowed in the case of men sentenced for refusing to go into the Field. Where punishment had already been deferred the postponement is to be cancelled by the proper legal authority; with the possibility of sending the convicted men into the fighting zone with a Military Prisoners' Company, there is no reason for the postponement of punishment.

v. STEIN,
15th September, 1918.

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

6th October, 1918.

[No. 433]

8181126
La
Confidential.

E 33/110

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—7th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

(i.) 5 two-seater aeroplanes and 3 scouts on aerodrome at HOMS.

No enemy movement between RAYAK and HOMS.

The railway between RAYAK and HOMS clear of rolling stock but the line appeared to be intact. There were 80 R.S. at HOMS. (R.A.F., 7-10).

(ii.) Inhabitants of RAYAK report that there are now no enemy troops south of HOMS.

(iii.) 500 to 600 cavalry and about 1,000 officers and men of the 146 (German) Regt., accompanied by 8 heavy guns, passed north through RAYAK between 30th Sept. and 2nd October. (Contractor, ZAHLE, 6-10).

(iv.) A baggage escort of 60 men of 3/146th German Regt., which left DAMASCUS on 30th Sept., was attacked by Bedouin east of RAYAK. Prisoner believes that he alone escaped alive. (P.W. 3/146th German Regt.).

B.—AVIATION.

The remains of 30 destroyed aeroplanes were found on the RAYAK aerodrome. (Descorps, 7-10).

C.—CAPTURED COMMANDERS.

Prisoners taken near KISWE on 29/30th Sept. include the officers commanding 3rd Cavalry Division, 6th and 8th Cavalry Regts., and 32nd and 78th Infantry Regiments.

D.—PERSONALITIES.

LIMAN von SANDERS arrived at RAYAK from DAMASCUS about 25th Sept. and left by train for the north on the same day. (Contractor, ZAHLE, 6-10).

E.—RAILWAY TRANSPORT.

An undated captured document gives the following table for calculating loads of trains:—

Per truck—25 German soldiers with kit.
or 35 Turkish soldiers
or 8 small horses
or 10 2-wheeled waggons
or 5 4-wheeled waggons.

Comment.—This probably refers to the narrow gauge lines S. of RAYAK.

2.—MESOPOTAMIA.

A.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

The 6th Division has been broken up. (Captured document, 7-8-18).

B.—GERMAN MACHINE-GUNS.

The German Machine-Guns are being withdrawn from the VIth Army. (Captured document, 15-9-18).

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(i.) The following are extracts from the register of correspondence received by YILDERIM Headquarters during period 7th July to 19th Sept., 1918:—

DATE.	SENDER.	SUBJECT.
25th July...	... 4th Army ...	Poor quality of drafts.
19th August	... O.C. HAIFA—NAZ-ARETH zone	Pursuit detachments being formed to arrest deserters.
22nd August	... Chief L. of C. Inspector	Brigands at DAMASCUS, RAYAK, and BAALBEK.
22nd August	... 4th Army ...	Officers who deserted to JEBEL DRUSE.
5th September	... 2nd Army ...	Camel Brigade to be formed on EUPHRATES front.
9th September	... Chief L. of C. Inspector	Bridge to be built over EUPHRATES.
15th September	... War Office ...	No artillery available for YILDERIM.

E33 / 110 A

OCT 1918

(ii.) Extract from a confidential memorandum, undated and unsigned, circulated to German Sections of 4th, 7th, and 8th Armies, Asia Corps, Staff 201st Infantry Brigade, and German Staff Inspection :—

“Recent events necessitate my pointing out that all German officers, even when on short walks, should have a weapon on them, so as not to be in a defenceless position in case of attack.

It is of course understood that the weapon is only to be used in cases of extreme need.”

(iii.) Extract from Yilderim Daily Orders, 21st July, 1918 :—

“The consumption of benzine in the Army Group during June exceeded the supply sent by 200 tons.

The reserves at the front are at present exhausted and only great economy can prevent an absolute famine.”

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

7th October, 1918.

[No. 434]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT.—5th October.

A captured enemy order directs that owing to the heavy losses in Foot (heavy) Artillery material, Army and Divisional Heavy Batteries will be limited to 3 guns each while in position.

BALKAN FRONT.—7th October.

The enemy in ALBANIA is preparing to make a stand on the SKUMBI River towards which the Italians are moving. The disarmament of Bulgarian units is proceeding without incident. The Bulgarian moral is bad; officers are unable to control their men, who are throwing away their arms and endeavouring to return to their homes as soon as possible.

Confidential.

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—8th October, 1918.**

E 33/111

- OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN AND PALESTINE FRONT.

A.—ENEMY FORCES.

It is reliably reported that on the TURKISH troops evacuating BEIRUT, they were attacked by men of the LEBANON and lost some guns and ammunition.

B.—RETREAT FROM AMMAN.

Four trains were despatched north from AMMAN between 23rd and 24th September. The first train carried officers of the 4th and 14th Turkish Aeroplane Companies and a quantity of furniture. The second train carried JEMAL PASHA and documents of the IVth Army and II A.C. These two trains reached MAFRAK but returned to KALAAT EZ ZERKA owing to the Arabs having destroyed the line further north. JEMAL proceeded to DERRA by aeroplane.

The third train left at midnight 24/25 September for ZERKA, with the O.C. II A.C. The fourth train left on the morning of the 25th September, but only reached a point 4 kilometres N. of AMMAN. (Officer prisoner, Turkish Railways, DERRA-MAAN).

C.—EFFECT OF BOMBING.

Most of the transport of the 7th Army was destroyed during the retreat by bombs from British aeroplanes. (P.W., 7th Army Transport).

Aeroplanes caused great damage to transport of the 66th Regt. during retreat from ES SALT to AMMAN. (Veterinary officer, P.W., 66th Regt.).

D.—MORAL.

37th DIVISION.

A whole company of 109th Regt. deserted while on the way to this front. The men were recaptured and sent under escort to NABLUS. Two N.C.O's. were shot in public. The officers of the Company were not recaptured. (P.W., 7th Army Attack Bn.).

E.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

9th & 11th CAVALRY REGIMENTS (Composite Div., VIII. A.C.)

These regiments were sent on the 23rd September to JISR ED DAMIEH to cover the retreat of troops from NABLUS, and did not proceed to AMMAN with the rest of the Composite Division. (Supply officer P.W., Composite Div.).

Comment.—Above explains why no prisoners from these regiments were captured at AMMAN.

2.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

1.—Extract from letter from Colonel CHUKRI, Commander 25th Turkish Division, to G.O.C., V Army, dated 27th Sept. 1916, referring to fighting in DOBROUDJA.

“The losses up to 26th Sept. amount to :—

Officers—3 killed (including 2 battalion commanders).

14 wounded (including 10 Company commanders).

Men—799 killed, 1,236 wounded.”

2.—Extracts from Yilderim Artillery Report for period 15th–30th June, 1918 :—

“Aeroplanes are seldom available for artillery work, and then only in limited numbers, owing to their employment on other duties. Even these cannot be taken full advantage of, nor daily gun flash observation flights carried out owing to the shortage of personnel and material.

In the Coastal Sector the activity of the enemy observation balloon makes things very uncomfortable, as it commands the gently undulating country for a great distance.

The shortage of material and ammunition is extremely serious in the Turkish artillery. Urgently required spare parts, glycerine etc., demanded months ago and often sent under the charge of personnel, have disappeared during the railway journey.

At the artillery repair works, DAMASCUS, 9 Schneider field guns, could not be repaired for nearly nine months as the reserve parts, repeatedly demanded, were not delivered.”

3.—Extract from letter dated 18th Sept., 1918, apparently written by a General Staff Officer :—

“As you are aware, the military situation has not improved, the supply of men and materials becomes more difficult day by day, and the number and material preponderance of the British ever greater. Various signs point to the fact that we shall soon be face to face with serious events. The British attack will not be delayed much longer. I welcomed your peace suggestions warmly, but would they bring us nearer to the longed for object? By the time that you receive this letter the decision will already have taken place. It is really time an end was reached.”

B 33/114 A

OCT 1918

4.—Extract from telegram from O.C. Yilderim Flying Corps, to Flying Liaison Officer, 7th Army, dated 2nd September, 1918:—

“The present conditions as to aeroplanes make a further decrease of flying activity necessary. By order of the army group the 301st Flight will discontinue operations in front of the 8th Army.”

5.—Extract from letter, dated 26th June, 1918, from H.Q., Guards Infantry Division (Western Front), Yilderim, asking for the return of an officer:—

“In the fighting since 21st March, 1918, the 4th Regt. Foot Guards has lost an excessively large number of officers. There is a great shortage of senior officers suitable for the command of battalions. To keep up efficiency it is necessary to call back to the regiment all senior officers who formerly belonged to it.”

6.—Extract from letter from War Office, BERLIN, to Yilderim, dated 25th June, 1918:—

“The great need of officers at home necessitates that demands for officers for TURKEY be reduced to a minimum, and that a strict supervision by the Ministry of War of the officers to be sent out.”

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

8th October, 1918.

[No. 435]

Confidential.

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—9th October, 1918.

E 33/112

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

BAALBEK Station, and roads and railway for 10 miles to the north clear of enemy.

20 cavalry and 20 infantry moving north 6 miles north-east of KHAN ARUS (BEIRUT, 1/120,000 Sq. G.1.).

5 miles South of RIBLE (HOMS, 1/125,000, J.8.) 80 cavalry and 150 infantry travelling north; at RIBLE road and railway bridges intact.

HOMS.—About 200 cavalry and 300 infantry scattered. One hangar, and four machines on aerodrome. 100 R.S. (R.A.F., 9-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

Unit.	Location.	Source.	Remarks.
7th Cavalry Regt.	—	Prisoners from Unit.	Prisoners state that greater part of regiment escaped north from Damascus.
13th Cavalry Regt.	H.Q. at URFA (115 m. N.E. of ALEPPO).	" " "	Prisoners taken at Damascus state that 2 squadrons (approx. 200 strong) were at RAYAK about mid-Sept.

C.—RETREAT OF GERMANS FROM RAYAK.

Between 26th September and 2nd October, not more than 3,000 Germans, including wounded, left RAYAK for north by train. (Station master, RAYAK, 8-10).

D.—AVIATION.

The 30 burnt machines found at RAYAK consisted of 5 Pfalz, 6 D.5.A. Albatross, 18 C.3. Rumplers, and 1 C.4. Rumpler. In addition to these, stores of wings, under carriages, engines and bombs were found. (R.A.F., 9-10). (c.f. I.S. 434 of 7th Oct., para. 1.B.).

E.—ORGANISATION.

(1.) On 25th September the strength of the RAYAK Zone, L. of C. Inspectorate, in whose area were included BEYROUT and BAALBEK, amounted to 281 officers and 3346 O.R.'s.

The above strengths include two garrison battalions, each about 200 strong. There were only 1039 rifles (of all descriptions) and 2 M.G.'s available. (Captured document, 25-9).

Comment.—No mention is made of 43rd Division.

(2.) On (apparently) the 14th July, the strengths of the following units were as under:—

1/66 Regt.	7 officers, 179 men.
1/146 "	9 " 122 "
2/152 "	13 " 147 "
3/152 "	8 " 158 "

To arrive at the approximate fighting strength, 10% to 15% was to be deducted from the above figures. (Captured document, ? 14-17).

(3.) On 20th September, there were three railway defence companies in the ALEPPO Zone, L. of C. Inspectorate. They were distributed as under:—

1st Coy. RAS EL AIN—JERABLUS	...	3 officers, 190 O.R.'s.
2nd Coy. JERABLUS—MUSLIMIE— RADJUN (N.W. of ALEPPO)	...	126 "
3rd Coy. ALEPPO—HAMDANIA (south of ALEPPO)	...	3 " 129 " (Captured document).

E33 / 112A
OCT 1918**2.—CAUCASUS.**

A Military College for the AZERBAIJAN Republic has been founded at GANDRY (ELIZAVETOPOL) by Nuri Pasha. Ali Ihsan Bey has been nominated Director, and 120 cadets were enrolled in the first 20 days. (Turkish Press, 26th July).

Comment.—Nuri Pasha, Enver Pasha's brother, is O.C. MOSLEM Forces in the Caucasus, and is Turkish representative with the AZERBAIJAN Republic.

Ali Ihsan Bey commanded the XIII A.C. in MESOPOTAMIA in 1916-17, and was reported to have taken over the command of the IV A.C. in the CAUCASUS late in 1917.

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(i.) Extract from a strength return (undated) of Turkish Pioneer Units with the IV. Army:—

PIONEER UNIT	FORMATION TO WHICH ATTACHED	FIGHTING STRENGTH	RATION STRENGTH
7th Coy. ...	24th Inf. Div. ...	31	69
63rd Section. ...	3rd Cav. Div. ...	14	17
5th Coy. 6th Bn. ...	48th Inf. Div. ...	45	65
5th Coy. 2nd Bn. ...	Sirri Bey's Div. (composite)	62	71
Cav. Pioneer Detachment.	Schierstadt's Group. ...	20	30
5th Coy. 4th Bn.)	II Army Corps. ...	79	109
3rd Coy. 1st Bn.)			
Mule Mounted.)			
Pioneer Section.)			
		48	56
		72	83

(ii.) DISBANDED DIVISIONS.

Extract from correspondence of Turkish postmaster at NAZARETH referring to disposal of postal papers of disbanded Divisions.

54th Division Disbanded	...	Date of entry 11th June, 1918.
59th Division Disbanded	...	„ „ 17th Aug., 1918.
42nd and 52nd Divisions Disbanded	...	„ „ 8th Sept., 1918.

(iii.) TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS—DISCIPLINE.

Extract from an Army Group Order, dated 6th July, 1918:—

“Owing to indiscreet telephone communications on the part of supply officers and others, movements of troops, which I had intended making during the last few days, and which should have been kept strictly secret, have become known previously. I point out to all German Officers that such telephone communications may lead to incalculable harm. Thousands of human lives often hang upon the absolute secrecy maintained regarding the intentions of the command, especially in this country, which is overrun with agents, by whom all information about troops and their movements are at once communicated to the enemy.

I make all commanders responsible that no communication whatever regarding the movement of troops or intentions, be made over the telephone. Moreover they must see that no discussion of that nature takes place, even with neighbouring formations or superior authorities, without my express approval.

Any Officer disregarding these instructions will be dealt with by court-martial and immediately removed from the war theatre.”

(Signed) Liman von Sanders.

(iv.) MORAL.

Extract from a letter to the G.O.C. IV Army, unsigned, dated 29th September, 1918:—

“To-day, at 11.30, while 30 men were being conducted from the L. of C. Base Details to the Transport Depot, escorted by 4 armed guards, they were forcibly taken by the population and released in the Fusalla Quarter. Two policemen who were on the spot, instead of interfering, rather assisted the people. At 1400 the populace attacked the L. of C. Base Details and released 150 men. The guards refrained from using their arms in order to avoid worse consequences.”

Comment.—This apparently refers to DAMASCUS.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

9th October.

E 83/113

OCT 1918

BEIRUT—TRIPOLI (Distance 58 miles).

This route follows close to the edge of the sea throughout the majority of its length, working about six miles inland a little before reaching TRIPOLI in order to avoid the rough promontory of RAS EN NATUR, though there is an old track, possible for wheels, running across this promontory. It is reported that in 1914 it was a first-class chaussee road throughout, but there seems some doubt at the present time as to the condition of the portion of the route round RAS ESH SHEKKA, where the mountains come right down to the sea and the road is cut along the edge of the cliff. It has not been used by the enemy as a line of communication, but as it runs throughout through the LEBANON, it is liable to be in good condition, as this Government are known to expend considerable money and labour on keeping the roads in their district in good repair.

The route is difficult to divide into sectors for marching, as there are very few areas where it is possible for any number of troops to camp; and in the northern half water is scarce in the summer.

For about the first 40 miles the road is bordered on either side by enclosed cultivation, except where it passes through the villages, and no deviation is possible in the whole of this sector from the main road itself. As far as JEBEIL a light railway runs from BEIRUT, which would be of valuable assistance for supplies; also stores could be landed at JUNIE, TABARJA, JEBEIL and BATRUN.

There are a number of bridges on the route, all of which are reported to be in good repair. They are built of stone and will take motor lorries, but these should only cross one at a time, as the bridges are reported to be rather poorly constructed and unable to take a load of more than six tons. The approaches to these bridges in some cases are rather steep and winding.

1.—BEIRUT—MAMELTEIN (Distance 15 miles).

The road runs due east from BEIRUT for $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to JEDEIDE, crossing the NAHR BEIRUT by a 3-arched stone bridge, wide enough for two vehicles to pass. The road throughout this sector is well metalled and some 24 ft. in width. Just beyond JEDEIDE there is another bridge over the NAHR EL MOT, and a third over the NAHR ANTELIA, where the road makes a slight curve inland. At NAHR EL KELB (mile 9), the river is crossed by a large stone bridge, with a cafe at either end. Higher up is a small ancient bridge of three arches, fit for pack transport only. The village of DABAYE, one mile before the NAHR EL KELB, is a summer resort from BEIRUT and there is an hotel and several cafes here. Between DABAYE and the NAHR EL KELB the shore is banked to the sea and is so narrow that there is only just room for the road between the cliffs and the sea. At AINTURA a good road branches to the right. At mile $11\frac{1}{2}$ the large and prosperous village of SARBA is passed, with room for only one row of houses between the road and the sea. Crossing the WADY AINTURA by a 2-arched bridge, JUNIE (a town of some 3,000–4,000 inhabitants), is reached at mile $13\frac{1}{2}$. Troops were landed in 1840 by Commodore Napier in JUNIE BAY, and it should be possible to bring supplies for troops by sea to this point. The road continues along the JUNIE BAY to MAMELTEIN, just beyond which it swings inland a little, allowing space for camping between the road and the coast.

2.—MAMELTEIN—JEBEIL (Distance 10 miles).

About two miles beyond MAMELTEIN the road is cut into the surface of the cliff and mountains fall sheer to the sea, beyond which the road ascends over the promontory, returning to the coast at TABARJA, a small port for native sailing craft. From here to JEBEIL the country is less cultivated and the road crosses three bridges before reaching the NAHR IBRAHIM, which is itself crossed by a new iron bridge. Further up the stream there is another bridge, possible for pack transport only. The rest of this sector to JEBEIL follows close to the sea, crossing three bridges, of which the second is a double-arched bridge over the gorge of the NAHR FIDAR. JEBEIL itself is a rapidly growing town of about 3,000 inhabitants, and there are a bazaar and two native hotels. The oldharbour is silted up and only small coast traffic is carried on. There is a landing place at a small cove to the north of the town. The light railway from BEIRUT, which has followed the road throughout its course to this point, has its terminus here.

3.—JEBEIL—BATRUN (Distance 11 miles).

The road passes no villages of any size and keeps close to the edge of the coast, with hills rising up very steeply on the right. There are plantations of olive, mulberry and fig trees and small fields of barley and wheat, etc., for the first four miles, beyond which the country becomes less cultivated. The road passes over eleven bridges, the largest being those over the WADY HELLWA and the NAHR MADFUN. BATRUN is a small and miserable town with a population of about 4,000, chiefly Christians and has a small harbour.

4.—BATRUN—BESHMEZZIN (Distance 12 miles).

From BATRUN to BESHMEZZIN two routes can be taken, one following the coast round the rocky promontory of RAS ESH SHEKKA, in some places being cut through the rock itself, with windows on the shore side; and the other *via* MUSEILLEHA, crossing the NAHR EL JOX by a bridge just before reaching the village. Information is uncertain as to which of these two routes is the better. Originally the cross country road was merely a

OCT 1918

rough cart track, but it is stated that it has been recently repaired and is now in better condition than the coast route, which is said to be in very bad repair along the northern side of RAS ESH SHEKKA. The roads join again at the NAHR EL ASFIN and continue to SHEKKA, which is a small village in a cultivated plain; and from here the new chaussee road inland to BESHMEZZIN is followed. From SHEKKA an old track leads along the coast *via* KALMUN, joining the main road just south of TRIPOLI. It is probably now only fit for pack transport. Around BESHMEZZIN the country is more open, affording more room for camping and there are several fairly large villages in the neighbourhood where accommodation should be available, but no detailed information is to hand.

5.—BESHMEZZIN—TRIPOLI (Distance 10 miles).

The road passes through BUTERAM, about one mile from BESHMEZZIN, and thence in a northerly direction through the most fertile district of the LEBANON. At ABU HALKA, a Customs Post, there is a bridge over a deep gorge; thence over a wide sandbank and by a sharp descent through olive plantations to TRIPOLI.

WATER SUPPLY on Route.

BEIRUT—TRIPOLI.

A deserter states that there is a good supply of water along the route, mostly from wells which are used to irrigate gardens. These gardens are said to be found at intervals of not over three hours journey.

From BEIRUT as far as the NAHR IBRAHIM there is an abundant water supply from perennial rivers. From this point to TRIPOLI there do not appear to be any large perennial streams, and the water supply apparently comes from wells or springs along the route, about which little is known.

1.—BEIRUT—MAMELTEIN.

NAHR BEIRUT.—When used for irrigation the river yields only about 330 g.p.h.; otherwise the yield is very abundant.

NAHR EL MOT.—A little beyond this stream an irrigation canal system begins, which runs first on one and then on the other side of the road. The canal is 4ft. wide and of an average depth of 4ft. In the next $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles about 40 branch canals, 3ft. wide, pass under the road.

AIN FRESHLI (south of ANTELIAS).—A considerable spring of water, which is said to cause colic.

AIN FAUWAR.—A spring with a very abundant yield. Estimated at about 40,000 g.p.h.

ANTELIAS.—At least 560,000 g.p.h. The stream, which comes from springs in the hills, is used for drinking purposes and for irrigation.

DABAYE.—No river or spring. The BEIRUT Water Company have a power plant here, and get their water supply from the grotto of JAITA. After filling the reservoirs of BEIRUT, about 650,000–750,000 g.p.h. run waste to the sea, as much as required being used by the inhabitants of DEBAYE for irrigation and drinking.

NAHR EL KELB.—The river yields about 650,000 g.p.h. One of the sources of this river is the spring in the grotto of JAITA, which also supplies BEIRUT.

SARBA.—There is a spring near the Tramway Station. Water is very scarce and brackish.

JUNIE.—Slightly brackish water from wells which are mainly worked by saqia. The yield is abundant. There are several small springs by the sea. Fresh water can be found in the sand near the sea at a depth of one foot, or less.

2.—MAMELTEIN—JEBEIL.

TABARJA.—A mile to the north there is a well by the road side, containing a small supply of good water.

NAHR IBRAHIM.—The water is very good in quality. The stream yields about 2,340,000 g.p.h.

3.—JEBEIL—BATRUN.

BATRUN.—The water is very bad here. No further information with regard to this sector.

4.—BATRUN—BESHMEZZIN.

NAHR EL JOX.—The water does not reach the sea in the driest months of the year. In the hills, nearer the source of the river, water flows perennially.

There is no further information with regard to this sector.

5.—BESHMEZZIN—TRIPOLI.

NAHR KADDISHA (ABU ALI).—The river flows through TRIPOLI and yields about 560,000 g.p.h., when not used for irrigation. It is a sacred river, rising from the melting snows of the LEBANON, near the cedar forests of BESHERRI. In addition to this river, there are several small springs in the vicinity of TRIPOLI.

**Water along route
RAYAK—HOMS.**

E 33/115

OCT 1918

1.—RAYAK—BAALBEK.

KARAK.—From this point there is very little water in the foothills, and in the plain which follows them, until BAALBEK is reached.

BAALBEK.—A copious spring of excellent water, rising one mile north-east of the town. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 60 cubic metres in summer and winter, in 24 hours.

2.—BAALBEK—LEBWE.

NAHLE.—Situating by a small mountain torrent, which flows into the Nahr LITANI. (The village is $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to east of road).

LEBWE.—About a mile east of the village, copious springs, known as NEBK EL ASY, burst from the hills. They are the most southern sources of the ORONTES. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 60 cubic metres summer and winter, in 24 hours.

3.—LEBWE—EL KAA.

RAS BAALBEK.—A good spring here. At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a spring yielding 70 cubic metres in 24 hours, summer and winter.

EL KAA.—A tributary of the ORONTES crosses the road here. There is no information as to whether it is perennial, but the existence of enemy depots here implies that there is a permanent supply of water.

4.—EL KAA—KUSSEIR.

EL KUSSEIR.—At the station, a reservoir containing 42 cubic metres and a pump with a maximum capacity for 200 cubic metres in 24 hours, from a well yielding 50 cubic metres in 24 hours, summer and winter.

5.—KUSSEIR—HOMS.

HOMS.—Unlimited water perennially from the River ORONTES. At the station, a reservoir containing 85 cubic metres and a pump with a maximum capacity for 200 cubic metres in 24 hours, from a well yielding 60 cubic metres in summer and 100 cubic metres in winter, in 24 hours.

There is probably abundant water in the whole of this sector from irrigation canals from the ORONLES.

BEIRUT—RAYAK, via SHTORA (distance 37 miles).

This route, except for the last three miles from ABLAJ to RAYAK, was at one time an exceedingly good class chaussee road. It is 23 ft. wide, well engineered and drained, and has no bridges; but in 1914 it was in very bad repair, the sector between MEZRAA MAHMUD (mile $8\frac{1}{2}$) and mile 25 being specially bad. Since this date it is reported that it has been repaired in parts, but as it was not a main line of communication for the enemy, it is probable that not much attention has been given to this road. The sector from ABLAJ to RAYAK is a recently made road, concerning which no information is available at present.

The first half of the route consists of a steady climb to the head of the Pass through the LEBANON (altitude 5,000 ft.), and the second half of a rapid descent to SHTORA, from where it traverses a Plain (EL BUKAA) to RAYAK.

The metre-gauge Railway from BEIRUT to RAYAK follows close beside the route throughout its length.

It is divided, for the purposes of description, into the following sectors:—

1.—BEIRUT—AIN SOFAR ($14\frac{1}{2}$ miles).

This sector consists, except for the first $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile, which is level, of a steady ascent, with one or two short level stretches. On leaving BEIRUT the road skirts the side of MOUNT ST. DIMITRI, and then ascends the valley of the NAHR BEIRUT. It passes through richly cultivated country for the first $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to HAZMIE, where a steep ascent through barren hilly country continues as far as JAMHUR (mile $6\frac{1}{4}$). Between HAZMIE and JAMHUR, on the left of the road, is the very steep valley of the NAHR BEIRUT, the northern sides of which are precipitous and covered with pines. Beyond JAMHUR the road first follows a narrow hog's-back, and then winds up a steep ascent among pine woods, leaving AREYA on the left, and crossing the railway line, which is in a deep cutting, by an iron lattice bridge. From here the country becomes more rocky and barren, and the road in 1914 was very much broken away on the lower side, leaving barely room for two vehicles to pass. The road continues to ascend by an easy slope, following a narrow and rocky ridge, with extensive views on either side, to KHAN SHEIKH MAHMUD, where a road branches south to ALIYE. From this point it is cut along the northern side of the ridge some 50 ft. below the summit, and has a very steep drop into the valley of the NAHR HAMMANA on the left; midway between KHAN SHEIKH MAHMUD and BHAMDUN STATION it passes through a narrow neck between two abrupt knolls; thence along an almost level stretch to RUISET, and by a gradual ascent to AIN SOFAR. The latter is a straggling village (altitude 4,500 ft.) of some 60

NOTICE.**Table of Corrections to the Times of Sunrise and Sunset.**

E 33/116

- OCT 1918

Reference "Table showing rising and setting of the Sun and Moon at RAMLEH, October 1st to December 31st, 1918," issued under G.S.361/81 of 27th September.

This table gives the amount in minutes to be added or subtracted from the times of Sunrise (R) and Sunset (S) at RAMLEH to make them applicable to the following towns:—

DATE.	DAMASCUS.		BEIRUT.		ALEPPO.		ALEXANDRETTA	
	R.	S.	R.	S.	R.	S.	R.	S.
Oct. 1
Oct. 16
Nov. 1
Nov. 16
Dec. 1
Dec. 16
Jan. 1

EXAMPLE.

To find the times of Sunrise and Sunset at BEIRUT on December 16th:—From the table we see that at RAMLEH the Sun rises at 6 hr. 34 min. and sets at 4 hr. 38 min. The corrections to these times, to make them applicable to BEIRUT, are +3 and -8. Consequently at BEIRUT, on Dec. 16th, the Sun rises at 6 hr. 37 min. and sets at 4 hr. 30 min.

The corrections to the times of rising and setting of the Moon are of the same order as those for the Sun, but are not progressive, and the differences are not sufficiently large for a new table to be issued.

Separate copies of the table of corrections are not available for issue.

General Staff (Intelligence),

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

9th October, 1918.

[No. 436]

Confidential.

E 33/117

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—10th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

(i.) Homs Station, 40 R.S. stationary, 4 engines; 50 infantry; 1 aeroplane on its nose in the aerodrome. 4 H.T. moving south $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of station. (R.A.F., 10-10).

(ii.) Tripoli.—No enemy movement or tentage seen, or fire experienced. (R.A.F., 10-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

UNIT.	SOURCE.	REMARKS.
Rayak Garrison Bn.	Prisoners from units.	This unit was newly raised and was to have consisted of 3 Companies, but the 3rd Coy. was not formed. The 1st and 2nd Companies (about 500 strong) were the last units to leave Rayak and on arriving at Baalbek were attacked and taken prisoners by the local inhabitants.

2.—TURKISH MUNITION FACTORIES.

There are reported to be five Mmunition Factories in Turkey:—

No. 1 at Constantinople (2,500 employees—most of whom Germans); manufactures guns, M.G's., rifles, shells, S.A.A. and bombs. This factory was constructed on the lines of those in Germany.

No. 2 at Damascus (500 employees with German overseers); output of 2,500 rounds S.A.A. per diem and large quantities of shells and bombs, also repairs to damaged guns, etc.

No. 3 at Brussa (250 Turkish employees); shell cases, rifles and S.A.A.

No. 4 at Aleppo (250 employees with Germans and Austrians in charge); besides filling shell cases, and turning out S.A.A. and bombs, repaired all guns, etc., from Mesopotamia.

No. 5 at Smyrna (150 employees, all Turks) was opened during the Dardanelles campaign—it fills S.A.A. cases sent from Constantinople.

Two thirds of the explosives used were imported from Germany, the remainder being made in Turkey, mostly at Constantinople. (Officer prisoner, 7-10).

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

A.—COAST DEFENCE IN ASIA MINOR.

Extracts from a report by a German Officer on Coast Defences in the area South of Smyrna, dated 10th October, 1917:—

(i.) THE BATTERY AT RUM-CHANGLI.

The two shielded guns (Mantelkanone) had a crew of 9 men all told. The battery commander was a Corporal, who was incapable of any artillery exercise. The first exercise, to fire at a ship to the North-East of Samos, fell through because the right gun *cannot* fire in this important direction, which fact had not been noticed before, as the gun had never been used.

This was reported quite calmly, with the excuse that because of continual changes in, and lack of, personnel and the quantity of other work, practice could not be thought of.

At the second target, enemy in front on the beach, the right hand gun again could not fire in that direction on account of the "overgrowth." When the men recognised the complete helplessness of the battery commander, they took no more notice of his confused orders.

(ii.) THE BATTERY AT DIP-BURUN (AJA GEORGIJ).

The two mountain-guns are in deplorable condition. If a gun is pushed with the finger, the whole mountain shakes.

There is an armourer in Smyrna who has often been "asked for." Accuracy is impossible with such neglected guns. I alarmed the battery and practised with the Battery Commander and 6 men. On first taking aim their helplessness was apparent, and I risked the question, "Have you ever practised before?" To my astonishment the Battery Commander at once replied "Never," we have too much work and too many changes for that." The Infantry Detachment Commander confirmed this.

The battery has also, in spite of the nearness of Samos, no anti-aircraft ammunition; in spite of this the Battery has reported firing on aeroplanes.

There is no man there at present who could fire at an aeroplane, least of all the Battery Commander.

E33/117A
D

OCT 1918

(iii.) THE BATTERY AT TOMATIA.

In front of this Battery I found a good wire net and the whole place showed that it had once been in good hands, now it is badly neglected. In practising only one of the guns was manned. This was all the worse as there was 1 Officer with 11 men present. The Officer told me that he always fired one gun on principle, because it was so much more convenient, in view of the continual change of personnel, and the number of Arabs who did not understand Turkish orders.

When I asked him if he *never* fired the other gun, he replied that when he had fired "enough" with one gun, he and the guns crew "sprang over" to the other gun, but always only to fire *one* gun. This officer through sheer laziness *never* had fuzes fixed.

(iv.) THE BATTERY AT AK-KEVI.

With this battery great care must be taken that the ground does not favour an overturning of the guns. As this occurs in close fighting, I had a sharp shot fired, whereupon the gun jumped into the air and rolled down the slope. Unfortunately preparations for aeroplane fighting were totally lacking here also. The battery can only with great difficulty assemble 7 pack animals, including one for the Battery Commander. As the transport of guns alone requires 3 animals, it is obviously impossible to bring a single shell into position. The provision of 4 additional pack animals is absolutely necessary to bring the first required ammunition, otherwise the battery does not exist as artillery.

Of the last 6 men joined there was *unfortunately* not a single artillery man. They came completely unarmed and unequipped.

(v.) It *must* be made the duty of the Infantry to pay more attention to the Artillery, and help them out with men whenever they can. A pioneer Officer must be sent from Aivalik. The V Army has on its Front of over 2000 km. not more than half a dozen really experienced engineers and Pioneer Officers. The Infantry should also help the Pioneers. Scarcity of wire is complained of, but at Kalamaka I found 40 rolls lying on the grass which nobody had ever heard of. At Kalanaki the trenches do not require wiring as they are well protected in front by well placed pitfalls.

B.—DISCIPLINE.

Summary of extracts from crime sheets of German Soldiers in Damascus, January to May, 1918. :—

Insubordination to superiors.	7 cases.
Drunkenness	1 "
Refusal to obey an order	2 "
Disobedience of orders	7 "
Losing Government property	3 "
Selling " "	1 "
Damaging " "	3 "
Taking money from inhabitants of the country	1 "
Improper conduct when in charge of a lorry	3 "
Not saluting a superior	4 "
Taking a prostitute into barracks...	2 "
Losing arms	2 "
Leave breaking	1 "
Quitting his post when on sentry	1 "

These crimes cover a period for about the first five months of 1918. They are not isolated, and should thus be accepted as symptomatic of the discipline amongst the German troops in Damascus. Many other crime sheets for the same offences have been destroyed. The punishment awarded in nearly every case was from 1 to 5 days "Mittleren arrest," sometimes rising to 14 days, and in the case of the man who quitted his post when on Sentry, to 21 days.

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

10th October, 1918.

[No. 437]

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

E 33/108

DAMASCUS—HOMS. (By Road, distance 97 miles).

OCT 1918

A prisoner of war states that:—

"The DAMASCUS—HOMS road has not been used for some time, because it is infested with armed deserters and brigand Arabs. It is overgrown with grass, but otherwise is in quite good condition. In the ravines there are piles of stones lying ready for the construction of viaducts."

This road passes, for a considerable portion of the way, over the DERB EL HAJ, the old Pilgrim way from ALEPPO to MECCA; but since the construction of the railway from HOMS to RAYAK and thence to DAMASCUS, it has not been so much used, and consequently has not been kept in the same state of repair as previously. It is metalled in the Turkish sense for the majority of the way, and in 1911 there was a curious break between NEBK (mile 50) and BUREISE (mile 63), where it is not metalled and passes over hard and stony ground. It is fit for horse transport throughout and believed to be possible for motor transport, with certain parts which would be difficult.

It passes over the fertile plain north of DAMASCUS; thence for several miles in a narrow valley between mountain ranges; then *via* a small plain just north of NEBK; and, after passing over the eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon, for the last 10 miles, traverses the level and cultivated plain south of HOMS.

There are no very difficult gradients, the principal obstacles to military movement being the narrow gorges between KUTEIFE and NEBK, and the scarcity of water on certain sectors.

The route can be divided into the following four sectors:—

1.—DAMASCUS—KUTEIFE (25 miles).

The well metalled chaussee 24–30 feet wide and ditched on either side, leads north over a fertile plain as far as KHAN AYASH, crossing the NAHR TORA (a large canal) by a bridge at mile 2. At KHAN AYASH the road ascends steadily up the valley between rocky hills, following a dry wady, until at mile 22 it crosses a bare col between the high rocky mass of JEBEL THENIET ABUL ATA and the craggy ridge of the JEBEL EL KARN to the east. From here it descends slightly to KUTEIFE (2,790 feet), a village of some 500 well-built houses. It is situated at the south-western end of the SAHL JERUD, which is a well cultivated plain and would afford good camping ground.

The only other place of importance on this sector is DUMA (mile 11), a large village, where there was a Turkish supply depot.

2.—KUTEIFE—NEBK (25 miles).

Leaving KUTEIFE the road ascends gradually over the plain, crossing a dry wady by a bridge, and then enters a gorge at KHAN MAZHE. This gorge continues to KHAN ARUS, broadening out in places to a narrow valley some 200 yards in width, along which runs a dry shingly wady. The gorge, or ravine, continues from KHAN ARUS right up the WADY MUSAKHAMIN, a distance of some six miles from KHAN MAZHE. The ravine ceases here and the road crosses bare stony uplands, reaching the highest point on the route (4,390 ft.) $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of KUSTUL, to which place there is a gentle descent. Here there is a little cultivation, and a small plain continues to NEBK with bare stony hills on either hand.

The country on this sector is the roughest and wildest on the route, but the road is metalled, and though probably now in very bad repair, should still be fit for horse transport and possibly for lightly loaded lorries. At NEBK there was a Turkish supply depot, and it is the most important village on the sector, consisting of some 500 well-built stone houses.

3.—NEBK—HASIE (22½ miles).

Leaving NEBK the road crosses an undulating plain; then ascends a bare slope to the foot of the Anti-Lebanon; descending again slightly to the village of KARA. Between here and BUREISE the road passes several dry watercourses, one of which is bridged by a 3-arched stone bridge. From NEBK to BUREISE the road, as stated above, is unmetalled, but it passes over hard stony country and is easily passable for wheels. From BUREISE it again becomes metalled, and just beyond the village there are two culverts of three 10ft. arches. The hills now encroach towards the road, which winds among low hills of stones and gravel, crossing several more dry wadis. Just before HASIE the country opens out and becomes less hilly, but undulating and stony. HASIE (2,375ft.) is a small village of about 50 stone houses.

4.—HASIE—HOMS (24½ miles).

Except for the first five miles from HASIE, which is hilly country, the road passes over a wide, broad and cultivated plain, extending to the River ORONTES on the west and on the east to the desert hills some 12 miles distant. The country becomes less stony, more fertile, and for the last two miles before reaching HOMS passes through a belt of vineyards. This sector is the least difficult on the route, and should certainly be possible for all transport, though the surface of the road is reported to be in a bad condition.

The Town of HOMS.

HOMS has a population of 70,000, of whom about 25,000 are Christians and 23,000 Orthodox Greeks. The town stands on an open plain close to the River ORONTES, surrounded by a belt of gardens and watered by canals.

It is a considerable centre for Bedouin trade and has large industries of Weaving and Dyeing and Silk and Cotton stuffs; and good grazing is found in the river valley and in the surrounding plain.

E 33/119

It is the meeting-place of three principal routes; one from HAMA on the north, another from TRIPOLI on the west; and the third from DAMASCUS on the south. To this should be added a fourth route which follows the line of the railway from RAYAK via BAALBEK.

There are no natural features which lend themselves to the defence of the town and the country in the neighbourhood is open for manœuvre. The gardens along the ORONTES, however, afford much cover.

A German route report states that:—

ACCOMMODATION, etc.—Camping grounds are ample in neighbourhood of the town and river. Firewood not available, as the whole supply was used for railway fuel. There is a "Khan" in the town suitable for a veterinary hospital for 200 animals. No civil hospital.

STORAGE.—The barracks and a "Khan" were fitted up as supply stores, and have loading and unloading platforms (presumably for motor lorry transport) and there are factories.

A military bakery existed, capable of baking for 2,000 men daily. There are several mills on the River ORONTES, and each week 4 wagon-loads of meal were sent to DAMASCUS.

DAMASCUS—HOMS (water available along Route).

General.—The road runs along the edge of the desert and the water supply is poor. The presence of large cisterns at intervals along the route is alone sufficient evidence of this.

The best water supply is found at AIN NEBK (mile 50). There are also said to be good springs at KUTEIFE, AIN ET TINE and KARA, and a good supply of water at HASIE.

Possibly during the winter, water would be available in the numerous water-courses which the road crosses.

1.—DAMASCUS—KUTEIFE.

HARISTA EL BASAL.—A canal runs alongside the road, which leads through olive groves and gardens.

DUMA.—A large village surrounded by vineyards and dense cultivation; therefore probably good water supply.

KHAN EL KUSSEIR.—A canal with a good flow is crossed, 6–8 feet wide and 1 foot deep. Further on an underground water-channel coming from the hills to the east, is crossed.

KUBBET-I-ASAFIR.—After leaving this place, three rock cisterns are successively passed:—

- (i.) 10 ft. square with six inches of water.
- (ii.) A small cistern; now probably dry.
- (iii.) A rock cistern covered over, 60 ft. x 12 ft., reached by steps.

Contained 6 ft. of water during spring.

KUTEIFE.—Water from a good spring north of the village. To the east, at ER RUHEIBE, there are hot springs.

2.—KUTEIFE—NEBK.

KHAN ARUS.—There is said to be a little perennial water here in the ravine.

AIN ET TINE.—A good spring in a valley to the west of the road. There is a mill by the road side. About a mile further on along the road, two cisterns are passed. The first is small and dry; the second is 10 ft. square and contains a scanty supply. About two miles further on another cistern, 10 ft. square, with 2 ft. of water in spring, is passed.

KUSTUL.—Water from cisterns or an underground channel usually dry. Poor supply.

AIN NEBK.—A large spring in the valley, yielding an abundant supply. The best water supply on the road. The water is led through a stone basin 20 feet by 15 feet, by 2 feet 6 inches deep, close alongside the road. Lower down it is led to a pool for animals.

3.—NEBK—HASIE.

KARA.—Water from a plentiful spring at the north-east corner of the village, led into a pond.

AIN EL ALAK.—A small spring to the east of the road.

BUREISE.—Water from a small spring led into a trough by the road side.

HASIE.—Water from a large underground channel to the east, which flows into two masonry-lined ponds 30 yards square, close to the road. Half a mile to the south, there is an underground cistern cut in rock and reached by a flight of steps. It measures 40 ft. by 10 ft., and contains 6–8 ft. of water in spring.

4.—HASIE—HOMS.

SHAMSIN.—Water from cisterns.

SHIMSHAR.—Cisterns in village. $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles to the north, there is a masonry cistern 17 yds. by 6 yds., and 10 ft. deep in spring. The water is fairly good.

HOMS.—Unlimited supply from the River ORONTES.

G.S. Intelligence,

G.H.Q.,

10th October.

Confidential.

E 33/120

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—11th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

150 Camel troops moving N.E., 5 miles south of Kustul (Homs, 1/125,000, O.19), and 50 men halted by a water hole, 1 mile south of the Village. (R.A.F., 11-10).

B.—ORGANISATION.

The Mule Mounted Infantry Regiment, which joined the II Army Corps in June, 1918, was composed of 250 men, all volunteers, enrolled in the Aleppo area for the collection of tithes and gendarmerie work. On orders being received to proceed to the Palestine Front, 100 of the men obtained their discharge on the plea that they enrolled for gendarmerie work and that as refugees from the Russian Frontier they were exempt from military service. The remaining 150 were sent to Amman. (Officer P/W, M.M.I. Rgt., 10-10).

2.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(i.) Extract from return of Survey Detachment 27, dated 15th September, 1918:—

“Total strength, 22 Officers and 203 men, of whom 1 Officer and 72 men were Turks. Headquarters of the Detachment was at Damascus, with sections at Nazareth, Tul Keram, Nablus and Es Salt. There was also a Geological Section.”

(ii.) Extracts from a German's diary headed 'Notes on the East,' undated:—

“The amount of theft which goes on is incredible, everything which is not under lock and key vanishes. The Arabs and Turks too, seem to find a use for everything, but above all else they covet arms and horses. On our journey from Constantinople to the front 6 out of 40 rifles were stolen, despite the fact that every soldier had to sleep with his rifle beneath him. The thieves don't keep these for themselves, but make off to the revolted Bedouins, from whom they receive as much as 2-3,000 marks for a Rifle or a Carbine. One night my revolver was stolen from my saddle holster, I had only just dismounted and walked a short distance away. The thieves were two vagabonds—one of whom we caught, the other got away with the revolver. The one we captured was a Turkish soldier, one of the numerous deserters who frequent the hills in thousands and issue out by night intent on robbery. The number of these deserters is estimated at 170,000, and the towns are powerless against them. When a Turk gets tired of the Army he deserts. On the present Sultan's ascension to the throne it was made known that all deserters who reported within a fortnight would not be punished. One can hardly wonder that so many desert. Their pay amounts to 2 marks per month, and their clothing and rationing is miserable. They live in rags and tatters, and one hardly ever sees a soldier decently dressed, for the Government spends precious little on their upkeep; everywhere money and all sense of cleanliness are lacking. Were the soldiers but fitted out as we are, they would make fine troops.”

(iii.) Extract from a letter from the Assistant Director of personal Services at the Turkish War Office to the C.G.S. V Army, dated 9th May, 1916:—

“As a result of the war the increase in the numbers of German officers and men has caused a corresponding increase of 'incidents' between them and Ottoman Officers and men. Among others the cases of Majors Jacobi and Paiker and Sergt. Konigen, particulars of which are given on the attached report, have arrived in quick succession. Henceforward, in Courts-Martial, formed by the Military Committee for the trial of such cases, Ottoman Officers will also participate. This arrangement is for the duration of the war.”

Major Jacobi Bey.—As a result of a quarrel with the Officials of the Bozanti Telegraph Office, the Superintendent of the Office died.

Major Paiker Bey.—Assaulted and cruelly beat in public two of the policemen belonging to the Unit who were guarding the telegraph line at Geukso.

Sergt. Konigen.—Caused the death of one of the men employed in the Shevkihiya Coal mines by beating.

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

11th October, 1918.

[No. 438]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT.

Since 8th August, the British Army has fought and defeated over 80 German divisions, many of them two or three times over.

In the fighting of 8th and 9th October, on the Cambrai-St. Quentin Sector, 30 German divisions were identified.

E 33/121

Water on JAAUNEH—RAYAK Road.

OCT 1918

The following is an extract from a report which was captured at NAZARETH. 10
by a German Field Officer, and dated July 27th, 1918:—

“The water conditions and distances on the new road are as follows:—

	Km.	
JAAUNEH	0	Pipe from ROSH PINA.
WADY WAKKAS	6	Water in wady.
AIN EL MELLAHAH	16	Spring.
AIN YAHUBAH	21	“
AIN TALHAH	36	“
MUTALLAH	42	“
2 kms. S. of JUDEIDE	61	“
5 “ N. “ “ “	68	“
EL LIYE	88	Water pipe.
SAHMUR	98	Stream 30 minutes away.
JISR EL KARAON	108	Stream.
SAGHBIN	113	Spring.
EL KHIRBE	122	Spring.
KAB ELIAS	137	Brook.
SHTORA	142	Brook.
ABLAJ	152	Water pipe from a spring.
RAYAK	160	Water cisterns and springs at Railway Station.

There is good water in the Wady WAKKAS. Between AIN MELLAHAH and JUDEIDE there is also a good supply. Between JUDEIDE and JISR KARAON there is little water. From the JISR KARAON to RAYAK there is a plentiful supply. SAHMUR must be ordered to improve the road to the NAHR LITANI, where animals are watered, so that much time is not wasted going there and back. The spring 5 km. N. of JUDEIDE to the W. should be fitted up for drinking water purposes. The strong spring 2 km. S. of JUDEIDE should be fitted up as a drinking place for troops passing through.”

Confidential.

RMS

E 33/122

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—12th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—WESTERN ANATOLIA AND DARDANELLES.

A captured Order of Battle of the Vth Army, dated 1st January, 1918, gives the following strengths and grouping of troops:—

I.—14th Army Corps, Dardanelles Group.

	Rations.	Rifles.	M.G.'s.	Guns.
60th Div. (185, 186, 187 Regts.) ...	6240	4020	79	Nil.
61st Div. (188, 189, 190 Regts.) ...	5980	2800	44	16
55th Div. (168, 170, 171 Regts.) ...	8320	4060	53	24
Group Troops ...	16950	570	4	Nil.

Note.—Decauville railway and Torpedo Detachments are included in Group Troops.

II.—21st Army Corps, Aidin area.

	Rations.	Rifles.	M.G.'s.	Guns.
57th Div. (135, 175, 176 Regts.) ...	8190	3240	54	20
Coast Guard Regts. (6 Bns.) ...	3950	2810	8	Nil.
Corps Troops ...	5040	70	4	8

III.—17th Army Corps, Smyrna area.

47th Div. (12, 147, 148 Regts.) ...	4330	3080	39	8
56th Div. (172, 173, 174 Regts.) ...	6970	4350	47	24
Corps Troops ...	12870	3630	8	4

IV.—5th Army Troops.

49th Div. (153, 154, 155 Regts.) ...	6950	3130	54	8
Garrison Bn. ...	1090	780	4	A/A 1

Comment.—Contact has already been obtained with the 12th Regt. and the 1/148th Regt. in Palestine, and reports indicate that further units of the 47th Division are *en route* for this front. The Garrison Battalion shown under "Army Troops" is probably the Panderma Garrison Battalion, which arrived in Palestine in June, and was with the Composite Division East of Jordan.

2.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from correspondence found in the Headquarters of Liman von Sanders at Nazareth:—

"To the H.Q. V. Army.

Our relations with Bulgaria are on a sure footing. The basis of a military alliance has been prepared.

(Signed.) Enver, Acting C.-in-C."

8-6-15.

[Note.—(1) Bulgaria invaded Serbia on 11th October, 1915.]

(2) Great Britain declared war on Bulgaria on October 13th, 1915.

To the Acting C.-in-C., Enver Pasha,

H.Q. 5th Army.

Text of telegram from Zaki Pasha in Berlin.

"Our Dardanelles victory has caused great joy in Germany. The newspapers have embellished their leading columns with big letters regarding the great victory. I was invited to visit Falkenhayn, the C.G.S., who first heard about the victory from the Emperor; the latter called him to the telephone and asked him to convey to me his compliments and congratulations. The Military Attaches of the friendly powers were present. They have all asked me to convey to your Excellency their congratulations on the victory of the Ottoman Army.

Gen. H.Q.,

21st Dec., 1915.

(Signed) Zaki Pasha."

Letter dated 21st Dec., 1915:—

To General Liman von Sanders,

G.O.C. V. Army,

1. Judging from the present situation I should not be surprised if the Rumanians were to lean towards Russia.

2. In such an eventuality, as I have already informed you, the 15th Army Corps will be sent to the Rumanian frontier. Should this prove insufficient, the 48th Division of the 4th Army Corps, and a Division of the 1st A.C. will also be sent.

E 33/122A

OCT 1918

3. The Greeks naturally will side with the Entente, not directly against us, but against the Bulgarians, in conjunction with the Entente. In that case I shall send the 17th Army Corps as well.

4. I shall place these forces under your command.

5. I beg you to keep this decision exceedingly confidential and consequently to make preparations only in a very quiet way.

(Signed) Enver,
Acting C.-in-C.

G.H.Q.,
June 17th, 1916.

[Note.—Rumania declared war on Germany and her Allies on 27th Aug., 1916.]

To Enver Pasha,
Acting C.-in-C.

I consider it a very great honour that you intend to place me in command, should the situation which you regard as probable materialize, and shall be proud to accept the position.

(Signed) Liman von Sanders.

17-6-1916.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

It is reported that German troops are being withdrawn from Russia and Finland to the Western Front. Allied troops are now within 5 miles of the Lille-Valenciennes-Avesnes-Hirson railway and are threatening the whole of the enemy's line on this part of the front.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

12th October, 1918.

[No. 499]

EB3/237
[Signature]

- 9th Coy. 12th Pioneer Bn. (with 8th Army).
- 4th Coy. 12th Telegraph Bn.
- 41st Bearer Coy.
- 41st Field Hospital.
- 42nd Field Bakery.

(D) CORPS TROOPS.

- 10th Depot Regt., 3 Bns.
- 20th Depot Regt., 2 Bns.
- 3rd and 4th Pioneer Depot Coys.
- 2nd Depot Battery (Personnel only).
- Bearer Coy.
- 3rd Coy., 12th Telegraph Bn.
- Depot S.A.A. Column.
- 76th, 77th, 78th and 79th F.A.A. Columns.
- 81st, 82nd, 85th Supply Columns.
- 83rd and 84th Heavy Supply Columns.

- Independent Cavalry Bde. {
 - 1st Cav. Regt., 4 Sqdns, 1st M.G. Troop, 4 M.G.'s.
 - 13th Cav. Regt., 4 Sqdns, 5th M.G. Troop, 4 M.G.'s.
 - 1st Batt. 1st F.A. Regt., 4 75 mm. Fld. Guns.
 - 8th Batt. 4th F.A. Regt., 2 75 mm. Mtn. Guns.

Comment.—1 Bn. 132nd Regt. and 2 Sqns. 13th Cav. Regt. were identified by contact at Damascus recently. The remainder of the 13th Cav. Regt., together with the 1st Cav. Regt., formed the 1st Composite Cavalry Regiment in March, 1918, which, together with the two machine-gun troops, moved down the Euphrates to Haditha, where it has since remained.

EXTRACT from Captured Documents.

UNIT.	COMPOSITION. (18-2-18).	Ration Strength. (2-1-18).	Rifle Strength. (6-2-18).
43rd Inf. Divn.	Mevlevi Regt., 2 Bns., 539th, 540th and 541st Coast Defence Bns.		1452
23rd Inf. Divn.	{ 68th Regt., 3 Bns., 544th Coast Defence Bn.	2686	864
	{ Ayas Detachment, 69th Regt., 2 Bns., 4/130th Regt.	1594	517
41st Inf. Divn.	{ 3/131st Regt., 1 and 4/132nd Regt., 2/138th Regt., 538th Coast Defence Bn.	3062	1054
44th Inf. Divn.	{ 139th Regt., 2 Bns., 2/140th Regt., 159th Regt., 2 Bns., 527th Coast Defence Bn.	2267	673

E 33/124

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

LOSSES OF THE VII ARMY SINCE NOVEMBER, 1917.

10th February, 1918.

OFFICERS.

MEN.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured.	Missing.	Died.	Deserted.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured.	Missing.	Died.	Deserted.	Total.	
1st Division	1	8	13	8	—	—	30	55	139	54	339	7	931	1525	From Novr. '17 to 8th Jan. '18.
24th Division	23	33	14	35	—	1	106	498	920	141	1319	14	631	3523	" " " 29th Dec. '17.
158th Infantry Regt.	5	12	3	—	—	—	20	130	280	32	129	4	424	999	" " " 8th Jan. '18.
IIIth A.C. attached troops.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	8	22	—	—	52	" " " " "
26th Division	27	61	24	23	—	8	143	337	1024	104	1204	—	247	2916	" " " 29th Dec. '17.
53rd Division	34	51	18	60	—	—	163	288	1197	5	723	—	297	2510	" " " 15th Jan. '18.
XXth A.C., H.Q. and attached troops	—	—	6	—	—	1	7	2	22	31	25	—	—	80	" " " " "
19th Division	15	40	—	6	—	—	61	472	1524	2	358	—	94	2450	Including total losses of old formations comprising 61st and 1/32nd Regts.
1st Attack Bn.	2	5	—	6	—	—	13	86	292	—	93	—	8	479	From Novr. '17 to 24th Jan. '18.
3rd Cavalry Brigade... ..	2	1	1	—	—	—	4	11	43	16	8	2	83	163	" " " 29th "
7th Cavalry Regt.	1	2	—	—	—	—	3	9	29	—	5	—	34	77	Total losses.
72nd Inf. Regt.	1	8	—	—	—	—	9	111	209	267	83	—	—	670	Losses of the Regt. while attached to the XX A.C. and before rejoining its Division.
Total	111	221	79	138	—	10	559	1999	5701	660	4308	27	2749	15444	

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT.

E 33/125

± OCT 1918

± OCT 1918

Summary for Week ending 12th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT G.H.Q.

1.—Temperature.

		Differences from previous week.
MEAN OF WEEK	77	+2
MEAN MAXIMUM	90	+2
MEAN MINIMUM	67	+1
HIGHEST RECORDED on 9th	96	+5
LOWEST RECORDED on 6th and 10th	66	+5

2.—Humidity.

MEAN OF WEEK	69	+3
HIGHEST RECORDED on 7th at 2000	86	-2
LOWEST RECORDED on 10th at 1400	37	+4

3.—Wind.

Each day the wind tended to veer from W. to N. as the day progressed. Calms were frequent at 0800 and 2000. No wind recorded was greater in velocity than "light."

4.—Rainfall.

Nil.

Summary for Week ending 12th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT JERUSALEM.

1.—Temperature.

		Differences from previous week.
MEAN OF WEEK	74	+6
MEAN MAXIMUM	87	+6
MEAN MINIMUM	67	+6
HIGHEST RECORDED on 10th	95	+9
LOWEST RECORDED on 8th	58	-1

2.—Humidity.

MEAN OF WEEK	48	-20
HIGHEST RECORDED on 6th at 0800 and 2000	94	-6
LOWEST RECORDED on 10th at 1400	14	-2

3.—Wind.

The most frequently recorded wind direction were N.N.W. and N.W. Calms occurred at 0800 on 7th, 8th and 11th, and at 1400 on 7th and 8th. On the 9th the wind blew from points between S.E. and N.N.E., and on the 10th from points between E.S.E. and N. No velocity higher than "light" was recorded.

4.—Rainfall.

During the week 1'05 ins. of rain fell, made up as follows :—

'15"	during 24 hrs. ended 0800 on 6th.
'04"	" " " " 7th.
'86"	" " " " 8th.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

Route Report TRIPOLI—HOMS.

(Distance 57½ miles).

E 33/126

OCT 1918

This is a well metalled chaussee, 24-30 ft. in width, passing through a very sparsely inhabited area, and comparatively little used during the war for military purposes; but passing through the Lebanon district, it is like other roads in that area, kept in fair repair. It is the only Pass from west to east through the Ansarie mountains or Lebanon range, with the exception of the road from Beirut to Damascus; in fact, it follows the valley of the Nahr el Kebir, which forms the division between the two ranges mentioned above.

For the first 13 miles it follows a narrow Coastal plain and is never more than one mile from the sea. It then runs north-east across a cultivated plain known as the Sal Akhun for a distance of 10 miles. From here the country becomes stony and barren and somewhat difficult, movement being confined to the road itself until it debouches from the hilly country into the plain in which Homs stands.

Generally, it is a steady ascent to seven miles from Homs, where the road reaches a height of 1,830 ft., beyond this dropping about 300 ft. into Homs.

It crosses at least 12 bridges over the larger streams or wadis, and in addition crosses numerous small wadis.

The embankment of the broad gauge railway from Tripoli to Homs (the rails of which have been removed by the Turks during the War), crosses the road ten times during its course and follows fairly close to the road for most of the distance.

Very little recent information is available with regard to this route, except the statement that the road is in good order.

The route is divided into the following sectors, which should give suitable distances for marching, the end of each sector being arranged as far as possible where water is believed to be available and where there are suitable sites for camping.

SECTOR 1.—TRIPOLI—KHAN ABDI (distance 9½ miles).

Crossing the bridge over the Nahr Abu Ali at the north end of the town of Tripoli, the road leads north-east, with olive groves on either side, rising to a steep little bluff on the right. The road throughout this sector is almost level, with the exception of a low rocky spur from the Jebel Turbul at mile 3½. Beyond this the road passes over a small cultivated plain and deviations could be made to either side. At mile 6¾ it enters a fringe of gardens in the neighbourhood of El Minie, consisting of mulberry and orange groves. At mile 8¾ the road passes between low stony mounds and descends fairly rapidly to the Jisr Nahr Berid, a good masonry bridge. The road ascends over a small flat-topped spur from the hills to the old Posting Station of Khan Abdi. Here the road is absolutely on the beach, which is shingly and perfectly feasible for landing. It is exposed to the north-west and west, but is sheltered from the south-east. About 700 yards beyond the khan the road forks, the main road continuing northward along the shore, whilst the branch to the right leads to the village of Aarka. At the 'V' formed by this branch there is level ground suitable for camping between the two wadis shown on the map.

SECTOR 2.—KHAN ABDI—SHEIKH AYESH (distance 13½ miles).

If the site mentioned above is used for camping, this distance would only be about 12 miles and is over level going throughout. From the Khan the road follows close to the sea, crossing two bridges over small streams, to the Nahr Aarka, which is crossed by a stone bridge (Jisr Araa) of one 30ft. arch. Just beyond the bridge a good unmetalled track, followed by the telegraph, continues up the coast to Ladikiya. The remainder of this sector is across the Sal Akhun Plain, and passes no villages of any size on the route. The road crosses the Nahr Akkar by a 3-arched stone bridge, and reaches the Post Station of Sheikh Ayesh, which is in an old stone kharr with stabling accommodation for 30 horses, and an inner court-yard 80 yards square. Camping sites could be found anywhere in this neighbourhood on either bank of the Nahr el Kebir, which flows close to the road at this point.

SECTOR 3.—SHEIKH AYESH—JISR ASWAD (distance 12½ miles).

This sector passes through a rough, stony and mountainous country, with small patches of cultivation and a few scattered trees. After leaving Sheikh Ayesh, the Nahr el Kebir is crossed by a high-backed stone bridge of 40 ft. span. The road commences to rise fairly steadily, dropping slightly to the Nahr el Hassan, which is crossed by a stone bridge of three arches. It then climbs 750 ft. in the next seven miles, winding up the valley of the Nahr el Hassan, with steep and rugged hills on either side. After Tell Telef the country becomes a little less stony, and then descends slightly to Jisr Aswad, beyond which is a small cultivated plain formed by the big bend of the river. The bridge is of four 25 ft. arches, and the stream is some 60-70 yards wide.

SECTOR 4.—JISR ASWAD—Bridge north of KOZLAHI Station (distance 9 miles).

The El Bukaa Plain is about 2½ miles wide between the Jisr Aswad and the Jisr Ahmar and is well cultivated, with very steep hills on the south; and to the north of the road, the area is liable to be marshy in the winter and spring, but dry during late summer. After the Jisr Ahmar (a bridge of four 15 ft. arches) the road enters a small valley and ascends steeply, rising 500 ft. in about 3 miles. The Posting Station of Hadidi, about ½ mile short of the summit, is a good stone building round three sides of a court-yard, with stabling for 80 horses; and the village consists of some 30 stone houses ¼ mile to the north, and is surrounded by vineyards. There is a sharp descent and ascent to and from the Achan Keupri, a bridge of four arches over the gorge of the Nahr el Kebir; and beyond the bridge the road crosses the watershed between the Orontes and the Nahr el Kebir, and reaches due north of Kozlahi station the bridge over the first tributary of the Orontes, which flows into

Lake Homs. Here there appears to be the best space for camping between the El Bukaa Plain and Homs, the slopes of the hills on either side of the stream not being very steep, though rather stony. There are three villages in the neighbourhood, surrounded by gardens.

SECTOR 5.—Bridge north of KOZLAHI station—HOMS (distance 13 miles).

This sector passes over several low spurs from the Ansarie range and is slightly winding and undulating, but much easier going than the two previous sectors. These spurs are covered with loose stones, but cultivated in parts, and there is fairly good grazing. Beyond the Post Station of Khirbet et Tin the road starts to descend to the valley of the Orontes, and the country in the vicinity is open, stony and bare of cover. $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles before reaching Homs, the Orontes is crossed by a bridge 500 yards long, which is ~~part~~ partly a causeway and partly a dam to hold up river water for irrigation canals. There are two mills on the bridge and the roadway here is 24 ft. wide. Immediately beyond the bridge the country is intensely cultivated and the road passes through gardens, enclosed by high banks and hedges. Just before reaching the town itself, the railway from Rayak is crossed.

For details with regards to the town of Homs, see Route Report, Damascus—Homs, issued with I.S. of 10th October.

TRIPOLI—HOMS.—Water available along Route.

GENERAL.

There is a good water supply from several perennial streams and from springs on the first two sectors of this route. Between Hadidi and Homs the streams are liable to be dry in summer, but it is probable that there will be some water in the latter part of October. In winter and spring, pools collect in the hollows, and water is abundant throughout the whole route.

SECTOR 1.—TRIPOLI—KHAN ABDI.

MILE.

- 2 Sh. Bedawi.—A spring containing sacred fish. Easily accessible from the road. The basin is 22 yards in diameter, surrounded by a concrete wall. There is a strong perennial flow. The stream is 18"-24" deep and six feet wide, with a rapid current.
- $8\frac{3}{4}$ Nahr Berid.—A perennial river, used largely for irrigation. When thus used, the yield is about 20,000-30,000 g.p.h.; at other times the yield is about 100,000 g.p.h. In spring the river is 50 yards wide and 18"-24" deep. Rapid current.

SECTOR 2.—KHAN ABDI—SHEIKH AYESH.

MILE.

- 13 Nahr Aarka.—A rapid stream, in spring 30 ft. wide and one foot deep. Believed to be perennial, though very small in late summer.
- 18 Nahr Akkar.—The river has a gravelly bed and is 50 yards wide in spring and 18" deep. The plain here is stated to be well watered and fertile, but no details are available of source of supply.
- $21\frac{1}{2}$ Sheikh Ayesh.—A spring of good perennial water near Khan el Beit.
- 22 Nahr el Kebir.—The river at the Jisr Ayash is 30-50 yards wide and 18" deep, but below the bridge it is considerably deeper, with steep clayey banks.

SECTOR 3.—SHEIKH AYESH—JISR ASWAD.

MILE.

- 33 Tell Telef.—Water from a perennial spring.
- $35\frac{1}{2}$ Jisr Aswad. (Nahr el Kebir).—The river here is 60-70 yards wide and 2ft. deep, over a gravelly bottom. Probably there is less water in summer, but the river is believed to be perennial at this point.

SECTOR 4.—JISH ASWAD—Bridge north of KOZLAHI Station.

MILE.

- 38 Jisr Ahmar.—The river here is 40ft. wide and 2ft. deep in April, with banks of gravel and clay 15-20ft. high. 700 yards beyond bridge is an irrigation canal which takes off from the river higher up.
- $40\frac{1}{2}$ Hadidi.—A well, water 10ft. below surface. Perennial and of good quality.
- $42\frac{1}{4}$ Achan Keupri.—The fourth and last crossing of the Nahr el Kebir, which is believed to be perennial. Water ~~certainly~~ available if any recent rainfall.
- $44\frac{1}{2}$ Stream which flows into Lake Homs is described as a good stream in a stony bed, 10-12ft. wide and 2ft. deep, nearly dry in summer.

SECTOR 5.—Bridge north of KOZLAHI Station—HOMS.

MILE.

- Several streams in this sector, between that last mentioned and the Orontes; dry in summer.
- 54 The Orontes River—Plentiful water of good quality, *above* the town.
- $57\frac{1}{2}$ Homs.—Water of doubtful quality, but unlimited in quantity even in the driest months, is brought from the river Orontes in canals to water the gardens. There are several wells 25-50ft. deep, with hand pumps, but the water is slightly brackish.

General Staff (Intelligence),

G.H.Q., E.E.F.,

12th October, 1918.

Confidential.

RAIS

E 33/128

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—13th October, 1918.**

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIA.

LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

0730—1030, 12th Oct.

(i.) Barracks at Homs empty. No military movement observed in Homs.

70 cavalry moving North at Tel Bise (5 miles N. of Homs). 400 infantry and 150 cavalry at Er Rastan (10 miles N. of Homs), and 4 miles further north 475 troops—all moving north.

At Hama 1 scout on landing ground south of town. Two trains (24 and 32 R.S.) at and north of station. No steam up.

At station 4 engines, 28 M.T., 15 H.T., and 400 men scattered. (R.A.F., 12-10).

0945—1130, 13th Oct.

(ii.) 20 cavalry moving east at Sheikh Ayash (20 miles N.E. of Tripoli). The Jisr Araa Bridge (12 miles N.E. of Tripoli) appears destroyed. (R.A.F., 13-10).

(iii.) Homs—Hama.—It is reported that on 7th October, there were 2000 infantry (including 300 Germans) at Homs. These were expecting to retire northwards at any moment. All supplies had been sent to Aleppo. (Inhabitants).

(iv.) All troops, Gendarmes and Coastguards have been withdrawn from the Tripoli—Ladikiya area. (Agent, 25-9).

2.—ALEPPO & CILICIA.

(i.) On 5th Oct. Jemal Pasha, G.O.C. 4th Army, was at Aleppo in command of a force consisting of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with from 20—30 guns and 10 aeroplanes. (Inhabitants).

Comment.—Until confirmation is received, the above figures for the infantry and cavalry should be regarded as exaggerated.

(ii.) Aleppo.—Prominent inhabitants of the city have been secretly advised to leave. (Agent, 25-9).

(iii.) L. of C.—German L. of C. Headquarters, previously at Damascus, have been transferred to Aleppo. (Agent, 25-9).

(iv.) Muslimie.—German aerodrome, a large depôt, and a German M.T. Park. Chassis of motor lorries have been adapted for use on the railway between Muslimie and Aleppo owing to scarcity of engines. (P/W, at Muslimie, 27/9).

(v.) On 22nd Sept., 50 motors, carrying German and Turkish soldiers were hastily despatched from Aleppo to Alexandretta, as it was reported that the British had landed or were about to land there. (Agent, 25-9.)

(vi.) Casualties.—Numbers of wounded and sick arrive Aleppo daily from the south. Certain parts of the city are being cleared of the civil population and set aside for use as hospitals. (Agent, 25-9).

3.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

During the latter part of September the 2nd Bn., 133rd Regt., 2nd Bn., 140th Regt., and the 264th Heavy Battery arrived in the Aleppo area. (Refugee).

Comment.—(a) The 2nd is the only battalion of the 133rd Regt. which now exists.

(b) The 264th Heavy Battery consists of two 10.5 cm. and 2 10 cm. guns.

4.—CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

(i.) Extract from a letter from the Chief of the German General Staff, dated 29th April, 1918:—

“Secret printed matter even when kept in locked trunks has frequently been lost. Every officer is responsible for secret documents entrusted to him and must carry them on his person; further it has again been reported that during private telephonic communications, information is being given concerning events in the theatres of war. The duty of silence, even to ones own family, does not seem to be sufficiently observed.

The same applies to communications by letter. I request that regulations be laid down forbidding such communication, and that they be made known to all officials in the army at regular intervals.

Consciousness of duty should prevent officers from infringing this prohibition.

(Signed) LUDENDORFF.”

[P.T.O.]

E 33/12877
OCT 1918

(ii.) Strength return of German troops and attached Turks in the Yilderim Group, dated 1st Sept. (see I.S., 430 of 3-10), shows the following differences from that of August 15th :—

Ration Strength.

Germans decrease of 197 officers and men.
Turks " " 33 " "

Animals.

Decrease of 200 animals.

Field Strength.

Decrease of 430 officers and men.

Aircraft.

Increase of 1 serviceable aeroplane.

(Captured document, 30-8).

Comment.—Apparently a number of men have been transferred from the Field strength to detached duties as the greater part of the number shown in the decrease of Field strength have remained on the Ration strength.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

13th October, 1918.

[No. 440]

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

Yilderim Intelligence Officer.

E 33/129
- OCT 1918

B. No. 4522.

SECRET.

H.Q's.,
11th February, 1918.

**COMPARISON OF OPPOSING FORCES.
FIGHTING STRENGTHS.**

ENGLISH.				TURKS.			
Infantry Divisions	8	Infantry Divisions	8
Cavalry	"	...	3	Cavalry	"	...	1
Camel Corps	1				
Independent Cavalry Brigade	1	Independent Cavalry Bde.	1
Battalions	96	Battalions	79
Squadrons	99	Squadrons	28*
Field Batteries	83	Field Batteries	57

FIGHTING STRENGTHS.

ENGLISH.				TURKS.			
Bn. = 500 Rifles = approx.	...	48,000		Bn. = 225 Rifles = approx.	...	18,000	
Sqn. = 100 Sabres = "	...	9,900		Sqn. = 50 Sabres = "	...	1,400	
Guns	...	332		Guns	...	228	
M.G.	...	2,088		M.G.	...	660	

7th ARMY FRONT.

ENGLISH.				TURKS.			
3 Inf. Divs. = 36 bns. =	...	18,000		4 Inf. Divs. = 42 Bns. =	...	9,500	
1 Cav. Div. = 27 Sqns. =	...	2,700		16 Sqns. =	...	800	
Guns =	...	120		Guns	...	22 Batts. =	88
M.G. =	...	756		M.G. =	259
In Reserve.				In Reserve.			

8th ARMY FRONT.

ENGLISH.				TURKS.			
In Line.				In Line.			
2 Inf. Divs. = 24 Bns. =	12,000 men.			3 Inf. Divs. = 27 Bns. =	6,100.		
1 Cav. Div. = 27 Sqns. =	2,700 "			4 Sqns. =	260.		
Guns =	84.			Guns, 31 Batts. =	124.		
M.G. =	516.			M.G. =	292.		
In Reserve.				In Reserve.			
3 Inf. Divs. = 36 Bns. =	18,000 men.			1 Inf. Div. = 10 Bns. =	2,300 men.		
1 Cav. Div. = 27 Sqns. =	2,700 "			8 Sqns. =	400 men.		
1 Camel Corps = 12 Sqns. =	1,200 "						
1 Cav. Bde. = 6 Sqns. =	600 "						
Guns =	128.			Guns = 4 Batts. =	16 guns.		
M.G. =	816.			M.G. =	109 guns.		

(Signed) Lubeke,

Captain and Intelligence Officer.

* This figure is queried by recipient of the documents, IaP, probably Major von Papen.

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

VII. ARMY.

5th January, 1918.

Losses in officers and men.

III ARMY CORPS.

(27th-29th December, 1917).

	Officers.					Men.					
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured.	Deserted.	Total.
1st Inf. Div. ...	1	1	10	18	30	76	185	267	341	—	869
19th Inf. Div. ...	5	13	—	—	18	139	333	218	18	—	708
24th Inf. Div. ...	5	15	15	1	36	62	209	559	68	—	898
TOTAL ...	11	29	25	19	84	277	727	1044	427	—	2475

[P.T.C.]

E33/129

VII ARMY.—Losses in officers and men (*continued*). — OCT 1918

XX ARMY CORPS.

(12th-29th December, 1917).

	Officers.					Men.					
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured.	Deserted.	Total.
26th Inf. Div. ...	8	13	—	—	21	78	19	152	13	13	275
53rd Inf. Div. ...	2	9	6	—	17	54	165	—	—	99	318
72nd Inf. Reg. (att. to the A.C.)	—	1	—	—	1	19	35	11	83	—	148
7th Cav. Regt. (5 sqns).	1	1	—	—	2	—	16	4	—	14	34
TOTAL ...	11	24	6	—	41	151	235	167	96	126	775

COMMENT.

The above period covers the unsuccessful Turkish attack on Jerusalem of 27th/28th December, the brunt of the British counter-attack falling on the III Army Corps, which sustained over 2,500 casualties in three days.

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

LOSSES OF THE VII ARMY 9th/11th MARCH, 1918.

Officers.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Prisoners.
1st Inf. Div.	5	8	—	—
24th „	3	11	9	2
158th Inf. Regt. } III A.C.	2	5	—	—
26th Inf. Div.	1	5	—	1
Attack Bn.	—	4	—	—
53rd Inf. Div.	5	9	—	—
	16	42	9	3

Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Prisoners.
1st Inf. Div.	26	80	83	2
24th „	70	186	273	7
158th Inf. Regt. } III A.C.	41	99	40	14
26th Inf. Div.	39	77	19	—
Attack Bn.	21	38	66	6
53rd Inf. Div.	27	135	—	—
	224	615	481	29

Summary.—Killed	240
Wounded	657
Missing	490
Captured	32

1419 to which about 200 must be added for reports yet to be received.

Comment.—This return covers the general advance in the hills west of the Jordan, in which about 300 unwounded prisoners were taken.

Confidential.

AMS
E 33/130
OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—14th October, 1918.

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

The remnants of the Turkish Armies from Palestine are reported to be concentrating at Aleppo; the whole force there is said to be 32,000 strong (Ration strength).

Endeavours are being made to organise a defensive line through Vudehi (8 miles South of Aleppo) and about 1,000 troops under Jemal Pasha have been left at Homs to delay the British advance, while work is being carried out on these defences. (Agent, 13-10).

Comment.—The total of 32,000 at Aleppo would include units from the XII Army Corps, the 37th and 47th Divisions and the large number of technical and L. of C. troops of the Aleppo area together with those withdrawn from the South.

CORRECTION.

In I.S. 440 of 13th October, para. 3. 264th Heavy Battery consists of two 105 mm. guns only. Two 100 mm. guns of an unspecified battery arrived at Aleppo, however, on 25th September.

2.—CONSTANTINOPLE.

A prisoner who left Constantinople on 22nd Sept., reports that German troops there consisted mainly of technical troops and marines. The Turkish population regard them as police.

3.—BALKANS.

The Balkan train does not run any more.
(Turkish W/T Press, 11-10).

Comment.—This refers to the Berlin-Belgrade-Sofia-Constantinople express, which formerly ran twice a week.

4.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

IMPERIAL AND ROYAL ORIENT CORPS.

A. During the winter of 1917/18 the Austro-Hungarian Command organized a composite force for employment in Palestine, known as the "Orient Corps." This consisted of some 5,500 infantry, 3 batteries of artillery, motor transport and other technical units, amounting in all to nearly 9,000 men. Detailed composition is shown below. The force was to concentrate at Belgrade, from which place it was originally intended to move eastwards about the end of February, 1918.

Early in February, however, a careful survey of the transport conditions between Constantinople and the Palestine front was made by the Yilderim staff and it was decided that (i) it was important for the Pasha II reinforcements (146th Inf. Rgt., 11th Res. Jaeger Bn., etc.) to arrive at an early date; (ii) the special demands for separate rationing for the Austro-Hungarian forces could not be entertained; (iii) the supply situation was such that part of the transport hitherto allotted to troops would in April have to be devoted to the forwarding of supplies; (iv) the improvement in workshops would cause a greater efficiency in railway transport by June. Consequently it was suggested that the Orient Corps should commence its eastward journey during the latter half of June; then it would there be concentrated on the Palestine front by the middle of September.

However, owing to the severe reverse sustained by the Austro-Hungarian forces during their June offensive in Italy, part of the Orient Corps was diverted to that theatre, and was identified on the Piave in June. In July it was withdrawn from the Piave, and sent to Albania, where part at least remained in the middle of September. (Compiled from captured documents).

IMPERIAL and ROYAL ORIENT CORPS.

Telegram dated 16th January, 1918.

Composition.	Officers.	Men.	Horses Pack Animals.	Vehicles.	Guns.
Staff Headquarters troops* Mtn.	55	400	177	45	8 Mtn. 4 Fld. Hows.
Telephone Coy., H.Q.'s Section of train.					
Infantry and March Companies.	130	5300	960	400	
Mtn. Arty. with 2 Amm. Columns.	16	570	365	36	
2 Supplementary Field Howitzer Sections.	2	90	50	16	
Engineer Company.	9	390	140	10	
Train Headquarters.	5	19	13	3	
Mtn. Train "Ersatz" Company.	3	146	89	11	
4 Wheeled Echelons.	8	376	660	390	
2 Pack Echelons.	4	234	412	—	
Remount Depot.	3	159	30	15	
Mountain Bakery.	3	182	96	43	
Mountain Supply Depot.	10	112	79	—	
Mountain Bearer Column (Medical).	4	102	67	6	
Field Hospital.	7	78	21	14	
Motor Transport Troops.	10	428	—	—	
60 3-ton Lorries.					
50 2-ton Lorries (attached to troops and establishments).					
10 Baggage cars, 6 Ambulances.					
11 Passenger cars, 6 water (or petrol-Tr.) vehicles.					
4 trailers.					
TOTAL in round figures ...	270	8600	3160	990	

150 Motors, 12 Guns.

[P.T.O.]

Confidential.

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—15th October, 1918.**

E33/131

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

A force of some thirty thousand men (Ration strength) is reported to be concentrating at Vudehi (about 8 miles S. of Aleppo) under the command of Col. Kiazim Bey.

A draft of about 750 men arrived at Aleppo on 6th October. (Agent, 15-10).

Comment.—See report in I.S. 441, of 14th October, and comment thereon. Kiazim Bey was formerly C.G.S. Yilderim Army Group.

2.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

(A) A reserve company of 4th Austrian Inf. Regt., 50 strong, was sent to Damascus in July, 1918, where it was employed on guard duties at the railway station. (P/W, 4th A.H. Inf. Regt., 1-10-18).

(B) 2nd Battery, 41st F.A. Regt., consisting of 4 75 mm. Krupp Field Guns, formerly stationed East of Bailan village, left this place on 24th September, and arrived at Damascus on 30th. All the N.C.O's. and men deserted at Aleppo, owing to the chaos prevailing there. The officers remained with the battery, and the guns were man-handled at Rayak and Damascus by any troops who happened to be at hand.

1st Battery, 41st F.A. Regt., consisting of 4 field guns, was (24-9-18) on the high ground north of Bailan, commanding the road from the west.

While in position at Bailan, there had been no practice in the 2nd Battery either in firing or fuze setting. No alternative positions or range boards had been prepared.

The 2nd Battery had a personnel of only 36 N.C.O's. and men. (Off. P/W, 1st Bn., 41st F.A.R., 15-10).

(C) 41st DIVISION.

H.Q., 41st Division—BAILAN.

Note.—20-25 carts with Divisional Headquarters, of which some were used to supply Coast Defence troops.

2/131st Regt.—Hills E. of Alexandretta.

(Previous to 21-9-18).

1 and 4/132nd Regt.—Reserve to Coast Defence troops.

“ “ “

2 or 3/133rd Regt.—Antioch.

“ “ “

538th Coast Guard Regt.—300 strong, with 4 M.G's. Finds posts along Coast (frontage not known).

The 132nd Regt. consisted of the Headquarters and 1st and 4th Battalions.

Strength of 1st Bn.	...	14 Officers, 150 O.R.
---------------------	-----	-----------------------

“ “ 4th “	...	9 “ 41 “
-----------	-----	----------

Each man was armed with a Mauser rifle.

There was a regimental M.G. Coy. and two battalion Coys. each of 4 heavy M.G's. The Regimental M.G. Coy. was attached to the 1st Bn., giving this unit a total of 8 M.G's.

The M.G. personnel of the 4/132nd Regt. consisted of 2 Officers and 17 O.R., which allowed of only two of the guns being used.

Of the men of the 132nd Regt., about half were fit, the remainder convalescents recovering from wounds or sickness. (Off., P/W, 4/132nd Regt., 15-10).

3.—PERSONALITIES.

Jevad Pasha, G.O.C., VIII Army, is reported to have left Aleppo for Constantinople on 4th October. (Agent, 15-10).

4.—CONSTANTINOPLE.

It is reported that the Germans attached to the Staffs of the various Turkish Ministries have resigned and that the German General Staff has been transferred from Constantinople to the Dardanelles. (Agent, 11-10).

5.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

PERSONAL.

General Staff,
7th Army.
15th Feb., 1918.

To

Field Marshal von Falkenhayn,
Commanding Yilderim Army Group.

“ In reply to your Excellency's personal letter of 9th Feb. I desire to bring the following points to your notice:—

(1) My personal conviction as to the expediency of unifying the command of the front, the importance of which is further emphasized by your Excellency's concurrence, has grown stronger.

The military observations of the Vice-Generalissimo being fundamentally concerned with questions of inspection duties within the Army Command, the increase by a third, of the present front of 60 kilometres could not seriously interfere with the proper discharge of these duties. So long as we have at our disposal the means of travel from Nablus to any point in the VIII Army area and to return within one day, and have at the Army H.Q. the necessary number of competent officers, I am of the opinion that we should meet with no difficulty in supervising and inspecting such extension of the front as may be made, as thoroughly and as satisfactorily as the existing line, whereas at present a trip to the Jericho front (which is attached to the 4th Army) and back, involves very great difficulties and much loss of time, owing to the difficult country to be traversed.

[P.T.O.]

E 33/131 a

OCT 1918

(2) As to the question of training and discipline, this is a matter that has to do with the existence in sufficient numbers of reserves, drafts and instructors.

In the first place we need reinforcements from a recruiting zone allotted to the Army. We also require depot units with a sufficient number of instructors. At present the Army does not possess such an organisation.

The second problem is that of concentrating certain forces in rear of the line and of training these forces. With this object in view the 19th Division was withdrawn behind the line and efforts were made to give the men a thorough training; but this division having recently been sent to join the 8th Army, it has been impossible in the 7th Army to withdraw any other division or even a unit from the line for the purpose of training.

The third problem is that of training and drill at the front as far as it is possible or practicable. This is a question that directly concerns army corps and divisions, so that the army at present only concerns itself with the question of training Attack Battalions and with instruction in Machine Gunnery. However, to form reserves and special units out of an Army whose total strength, including a cavalry division, does not exceed 6000 rifles, and which has a 60 kilometre front to fortify and defend, and to have these units trained behind the lines, is out of the question. It is even doubtful whether the men withdrawn to reserve will have their much needed rest. If, in conformity with your orders, the cavalry division were relieved by the reserves of the III Army Corps, and were to be withdrawn behind the left of the 8th Army, all that we should have left to defend our front would be the units in line; for the 1st Division, which has been reduced to the strength of a battalion and whose moral has suffered terribly, and the other units of the III Army Corps, have received no substantial reinforcements, except for details and deserters, to make up for their terrible losses in the December battles. The enemy on the other hand, during the last month and a half has secured Jerusalem and railway communications, and by building new roads and repairing existing ones to the firing line, has succeeded in capturing a strong position from the 7th Army and is in a position to undertake an important offensive.

(3) That the Nablus-Jerusalem area and the Coast Zone are closely allied and interdependent has been amply proved by the course of events and by the lessons of experience. The neglect or loss of one is sure to endanger the other or even bring about its fall. In view of this close relationship, I consider it absolutely essential that these two fronts be placed under a single command. When one considers that the rationing and reinforcement of the 20th Army Corps is carried out by the 4th Army *via* Amman, and that the main duty of the 20th Army Corps is to defend the Jordan Valley and Hejaz Railway against any attack from the West, it is easy to see that the command of the Jericho front could most conveniently and advantageously be handed over to the 4th Army. In that way the objection raised by the Vice-Generalissimo to the too long a front would be removed.

(4) I therefore propose that the 20th Army Corps be attached to the 4th Army, which together would be better under a single command, in as much as they are closely allied in so far as the specific task they are expected to accomplish is concerned. I further propose that the 3rd Army Corps and the 8th Army be united under one command. This I am sure will solve the question of the L. of C. and recruiting zones and other similar questions.

(5) The reason why Orders of Battle have not yet been compiled is that, as above mentioned, on a front which is too narrow to hold two armies, we have been compelled to send units to and fro from one part of the line to another owing to enemy pressure. Should my proposals be accepted, it is clear that this difficulty will be removed. In that case, even if it were occasionally necessary to detach a unit from the Army, as soon as the cause creating this necessity was removed, it would be an easy matter to restore the unit to its original position.

(6) The separation of the Palestine L. of C. into two parts could have its advantage. This L. of C., which even in its present form is incapable of managing its affairs properly, would become worse by such a division. The unification of command which I have proposed would save your excellency this trouble. The needs of the Army cannot be met by an inefficient L. of C. alone. A Supply and Recruiting Zone proportionate with the strength and situation of the Army is needed.

(7) I perceive that this article was not properly translated. My object in recommending a Military Zone was that in the rear areas of the Army, owing to their distance from the L. of C., any cases arising would suffer owing to there being no courts-martial available, and would have to remain unsettled indefinitely, raising serious difficulties on questions of discipline. Full particulars on this subject were given in my letter of 14th February.

(8) I understand that this article was not properly translated. When I was at Aleppo, I saw to my regret that some of my inferiors, by special favour of the War Office, had brought many officers of their own choice with them in spite of their having resigned, causing many vacancies in the headquarters. Not only have I received no such favours from the War Office but they have been causing many of my officers, both at headquarters and in units, to tender their resignations.

To avoid any misunderstanding on this matter let me summarise:—

An Army Commander, who is charged with the arduous work of checking the onslaughts of the enemy and of repulsing their attacks, has been deprived of his legitimate rights and abandoned to a state of great helplessness, with units disproportionate in strength to the front he has to defend. I am therefore compelled to demand an improvement of the situation. If, in spite of your approval, the Group should fail to settle this matter, I must beg you to be good enough to submit this petition to the Vice-Generalissimo in accordance with the third article of his order.

(Signed) FEVZI, Maj. General,
G.O.C. 7th Army.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

15th October, 1918.

[No. 442]

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

E 33/132

- OCT 1918

SPECIAL NOTE.

TOPOGRAPHICAL.

References Syria series, 1:250,000, Ladikiya and Alexandretta sheets, it should be noted that these Maps are not compiled from an accurate survey and it is known that the relative positions of many of the smaller places, and minor topographical features, are incorrect. The railway especially is liable to be inaccurate. The form lines on the Alexandretta sheet have no pretension to be correct contours, but are merely an indication of the formation of the ground.

Route Report HOMS—ALEPPO.

(Distance 110 Miles).

This is the old Diligence route and also follows the line of the ancient Derb el Haj and has been the main thoroughfare from Palestine to Northern Syria for centuries.

The majority of the route is not metalled, but the surface has become hardened through long use and in parts it has been lightly metalled recently. Beyond Hama the road traverses, alternately, dreary plains and cultivated areas. It is undulating throughout, and with the exception of one bad sector of about four miles (8 miles south of Aleppo), it is fairly well drained and is stated to be fit for motor transport at all seasons. The bad sector mentioned above becomes very muddy, but even in the worst part of the winter has not stopped motor traffic on this route, which was used by the enemy as a main Line of Communication from north to south.

There are no serious obstacles to military movement and the country is of a much less rugged nature than that south of Homs.

There are three large bridges and a few culverts; but very few wadis cross the route, consequently the road is not liable to "wash-outs" in the rainy season.

The route is divided into five sectors, which should be suitable for Cavalry and which coincide with halting places and depots shown on a captured German map.

SECTOR 1.—HOMS—HAMA (distance 28 miles).

This sector passes through a very fruitful district, with numerous stretches of corn land; with no trees or shrubs; and no gradients of any note, the steepest being at the crossing of the Wady el Aswad and the River Orontes, just beyond Er Rastan. The latter is a small town on a slightly elevated and wide stretching rocky foundation, and was a small Gendarmerie Post and Supply Depot. There is a khan in good order; and a German Route Report states that there are 450 "Konaks" (literally, large stone houses). Good sites for camping in the immediate neighbourhood; but no firewood is available. Just beyond the town, the road crosses the River Orontes, which here runs in a deep chasm, by a very old stone bridge of 12 arches.

No other villages of note are passed before reaching Hama, which is a town of some 50,000 inhabitants lying in the valley of the Orontes, which is here very deep. The town is built on the banks of this valley, on either side of the river, and it is very hot and unhealthy in summer. The inhabitants are principally Moslems; there are some 2,000 Christians. According to the German Route Report, there are many buildings suitable for storage, including a khan used by the enemy for a Veterinary Hospital; a large khan previously occupied by troops; another khan suitable for a Hospital; and a fourth suitable for a Supply Depot. There are very little grazing facilities in or around the town and the report states that forage for horses must be carried. A small supply of firewood is available. This was a comparatively important minor military centre when occupied by the enemy, chiefly for L. of C. and transport purposes.

SECTOR 2.—HAMA-KHAN SHAIKHUN (distance 20 miles).

The road, on leaving Hama, continues to the east of the railway, and not as shown on the map, to just short of Zor Defai, where there is a level crossing.

Beyond this village it passes under a railway bridge of six arches and continues east of the line to Kumhaneh. This sector of the road passes along a narrow and steep wady, and motor lorries can only pass at two points.

From Kumhaneh the road continues due north to the Station, five metres west of which it crosses the railway line by a level crossing.

The country now traversed consists of an open and partly cultivated plain, and the only points of interest on the road, before reaching Khan Shaikhun, are the villages of Taiyibe and Murik. The latter is not marked on the map, but is situated just to the west of the road at mile 44½.

Khan Shaikhun is a large Arab village of some 1,200 inhabitants with a L. of C. Depot and a Telegraph Station. Very little grazing. 300 "Konaks." No fuel. Health conditions good. Government building and two khans suitable for storage. Many good sites for camping in the immediate vicinity.

SECTOR 3.—KHAN SHAIKHUN—MAARIT EN NAAMAN (distance 15 miles).

The road now leaves the broad valley of the Orontes and ascends a valley leading towards the Jebel Riha Range, highest point about 3,000 ft. There are no steep gradients, except a short descent towards El Hish, where there are one or two zigzags. The road on this sector is entirely unmetalled, but is not liable to deterioration in bad weather.

From El Hish to Maarit en Naaman it is almost level going, through flat, stony country. The latter place has a population of about 6,000; was a considerable L. of C. Depot, with a Turkish Hospital, and accommodation for troops and about 200 horses.

E 33/133

SECTOR 4.—MAARIT EN NAAMAN—SHEIKH AHMED (distance 26 miles).

The road passes just to the east of the village and skirts the edge of the hills to Khan Sebil. No wadis are crossed and the road passes over gently undulating country to the village of Maardibse, some 15 minutes to the right of the road. Here also is a Supply Depot of the same size as that at Khan Shaikhun. There are two bad patches in the road just previous to Khan Sebil, which would require a certain amount of repairing, but stone is available close at hand and very little labour is required to obtain it.

From Maardibse to Seraikin there is a slight descent, but the road on the whole is quite good, though inclined to become muddy in wet weather.

From here to Sheikh Ahmed the road is practically level for six miles and having no natural drainage, is liable to become muddy in the winter. The remainder of the distance to Sheikh Ahmed is of a stony nature, except for one small sector immediately before the latter village, which becomes muddy very quickly after rain, but is not liable to delay traffic for any considerable time. The village has about 400 inhabitants and was a small L. of C. Depot. There is no grazing and very little fuel.

SECTOR 5.—SHEIKH AHMED—ALEPPO (distance 21 miles).

This is the worst sector on the route, lying in lower ground falling towards the valley of the Kuwaik, the river which runs through Aleppo. The road crosses the latter first about five miles from Sheikh Ahmed, beyond which it ascends over stony ground for about three miles to Kalada. Here the road drops fairly rapidly again to the valley and passes Khan Tuman on the left.

The portion of the road by the bend of the river just before reaching Khan Tuman is liable to become very difficult in muddy weather and would require metalling if it is to take any considerable amount of motor transport. Stone, suitable for road repairs, is not available in the immediate neighbourhood and would have to be transported some four or five miles.

Beyond Khan Tuman the road passes over hilly country, with fairly steep ascents and descents, and several fairly sharp bends, to the village of Marafe. The road again becomes bad as far as the bridge over the Kuwaik, 1½ mile South-West of Aleppo; beyond which it becomes an excellent metalled road.

Aleppo is a town of some 200,000 inhabitants, the buildings being chiefly of stone, and stands on a number of small heights surrounded by hills, with the river Kuwaik flowing on the west. There are several Hotels and shops for foreign goods, and the place is more civilised than most Turkish towns.

Water available along Route.

GENERAL.

There appears to be a good supply of water along this route, but the supply is largely localized in the villages, and the intervening country is barren and waterless.

Springs and wells (worked by buckets or hand pumps) are the main reliable sources of supply; and there appears to be an inexhaustible quantity of water at a depth varying from 60 to 200 ft. below the surface.

The many cisterns in the district are reserved for summer use and a moderate supply of water is always to be found in them. Where there are no rivers or large springs, each village has its cisterns, which are available for public use, but it should be noted that the water is not likely to be very much in excess of what is required for the local inhabitants. Some of these cisterns are reported to be 25-30 ft. long, and 20 ft. deep.

SECTOR 1.—HOMS—HAMA.

Mile.

0 Homs.—It is doubtful if the water of the Orontes is fit to drink. There are several wells, 25-50 ft. deep, with hand pumps. This water is slightly brackish.

8½ Telbise.—There is an ancient reservoir and about 10 wells, 25-50 ft. deep. (Water here is not so brackish as at Homs).

14 Er Rastan.—Very good and abundant water from a spring 300 yds. east of the khan near the bridge; the water is led to the khan in ½" pipes with open cocks. It is possible for troops to bathe in this district.

There is no important water supply between Er Rastan and Hama.

28 Hama.—The Orontes flows in canals through the town, and water can be pumped by hand by Persian water wheels in the gardens, but should be boiled before use.

Water from the Orontes is pumped by a petrol or charcoal engine to the Railway Station, where there is a big reservoir connected to a distillation plant.

In the Christian quarter there are three wells, each 110-125 ft. deep with hand pumps.

E33/134

= OCT 1918

SECTOR 2.—HAMA—KHAN SHAIKHUN.

Mile.

- 84 Kumhaneh.—
 38 Taiyibe.—
 44½ Murik.—
- } Have rain-water cisterns, several of which are provided with hand pumps.

48 Khan Shaikhun.—There is an abundant supply of good water from many springs and wells. The largest individual supply is from a well at the old khan, east of the road. Depth of water in this well is 30-35 ft., and a new reservoir with a capacity of 7,600 gallons is fed by hand pumps.

SECTOR 3.—KHAN SHAIKHUN—MAARIT EN NAAMAN.

57 Marhatat.—Near a new Gendarmerie Post, 300 yards east of ruins, there is a well with hand pump, containing 3-4 ft. of excellent spring water.

63 Maarit en Naaman.—Seven good wells, 110-125 ft. deep, with reservoirs (11,000-18,000 gallons capacity) and troughs. At the Mosque there is a good well; and another at Bir Arais, just outside the village. This place is very fertile and good vegetables, etc., are produced in large quantities.

SECTOR 4.—MAARIT EN NAAMAN—SHEIKH AHMED.

67½ Babila.—A well 70 ft. deep, worked with buckets.

72 Khan Sebil.)
 77 Maaridibse.)

— Many rain-water cisterns, several with hand pumps. Small water supply, barely sufficient for inhabitants.

82 Seraikin.—Numerous cisterns and a well 180 ft. deep, with about 25 ft. of good water, near the old khan. Water is drawn in leather buckets worked by horses. There is a reservoir of 1,800 gallons capacity.

89 Sheikh Ahmed.—A well 170 ft. deep, worked by donkeys, gives a fair supply of good water; part of which is used to fill a reservoir with troughs connected for watering animals. There are good springs at Afis, Djib Kas and Abu Sanza.

SECTOR 5.—SHEIKH AHMED—ALEPPO.

— Kasabieh.—(West of the road, on a hill)—A well, 170 ft. deep, worked by buckets, and a reservoir of 1,800 gallons capacity.

— Zirbe.—(About 1½ miles west of road).—Good water from five wells about 60 ft. deep, of which the largest has two winches.

101 Tuman.—Drinkable water can be obtained at water mill near the khan south-west of village; and at a spring, reached by a path, one mile to the east.

— Kh. Maarati.—
 — Tell Ramuse.—

} Small supplies of good water.

110 Aleppo.—Guide books state that drinking water is derived partly from the river and partly by a conduit from Heilan, three hours north.

Since the outbreak of war the Germans have constructed a pipe system from Ain Tell, about six miles east, on the road to Bab, which feeds the "fountains" in the town with excellent water. There are said to be several hundred of these "fountains" in Aleppo.

A peculiar sore, known as "Aleppo Boil," or "Aleppo Button," is supposed to be caused by some unwholesome substance in the local water.

General Staff (Intelligence),
 G.H.Q., E.E.F.,

15th October, 1918.

Confidential.

RMS

E33/135

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—16th October, 1918. = OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

0750-1055. 16th. Homs.—200 infantry, 70 loaded camels and 20 cavalry moving north 5 miles north of town.

Er Rastan.—20 cavalry entering from south; 200 troops $\frac{1}{2}$ mile north of town.

Hama.—Station buildings intact. 30 R.S. and 10 burnt R.S. 300 camels and horses south of station. 200 infantry and 70 cavalry south and 50 cavalry east of town. (R.A.F., 16-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANIZATION.

(i.) The 41st Divisional Transport consists of 90 emaciated camels, and of 20-25 carts each drawn by two mules. (Officer, P/W, 4/132nd Regt., 13-10).

(ii.) 37th DIVISION.

When in the Caucasus, the 110th Regt. consisted of 3 Bns. (each of 4 Infantry Coys.) and a Regtl. M.G. Coy. Ration strengths of battalions averaged 500 men. Just prior to leaving Batum the 4th Coys. of each battalion were abolished and replaced by a M.G. Coy.

The 1st and 2nd Bns. left Batum in the Reshid Pasha and arrived at Tuzla (Constantinople) within 80 hours. The 3rd Bn. arrived at Tuzla 8 days later and the 111th Regt. 10 days later.

The 109th Regt. was already at Tuzla when the 110th Regt. arrived.

The division remained at Tuzla for just over a month and each battalion received a draft of about 125 men (recruits, recaptured deserters, etc., apparently from the 9th Depot Regt.).

The 1st and 2nd Bns. 110th Regt., less their M.G. Coys., left shortly after the 109th Regt.

The 3rd Bn. was to follow 8 days later. P.W. does not know what happened to their M.G. Coys., but they did not accompany Bns.

On arrival at Damascus, the 1st Bn. proceeded south; the 2nd Bn. remained.

The G.O.C. Division is Kiazim Bey. O.C. 110th Regt. is Mumtaz Bey.

On leaving Batum all arms were taken from the men and no arms were issued to them till they arrived at Damascus.

During the month they stayed at Tuzla, the only marked movement was of Germans going to Constantinople. Three trains passed Tuzla going east daily.

(iii.) 10th DIVISION.

The 10th Division relieved the 37th Division in the Batum area. (P.W. 2/110th Regt., 16-10).

(iv.) The following ships are running between Batum and Constantinople:—

Kara Deniz.
Ak Deniz.
Gul Jemal.
Reshid Pasha, and three others known to P.W. as,
Bez Melan.
Gozel Direk.
Sham Postassi.

(P.W., 2/110th Regt., 16-10).

2.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

H.Q.
4th November, 1917.

ARMY ORDER.

(1) The necessary removal of the army reserves to the Tel Esh Sheriah area and east thereof, makes it advisable to avoid the enemy attack at Gaza.

(2) The following withdrawals will take place by the morning of 6th November:—

(a) The 7th Division to a line behind the Wady el Hesy, from near its mouth to the Tumrah-Beit Jerjah road inclusive, covered by infantry with single machine-guns.

(b) The 3rd Division to the Beit Hanun—"Biegel" position, east of Beit Hanun, in order to close the gap between the 7th and 54th Divisions.

The left flank of the 3rd Division will be west of Hill 123 (8 Km. S.E. of Beit Hanun). One battalion and two batteries will be pushed forward from the 3rd Division into the "Aleppo" position, to hold the ground south of Beit Hanun, so as to operate before the right wing of the 54th Division and to repulse any turning attack on the 54th Division. G.O.C. XXII A.C. will order the withdrawal of this covering party from the "Aleppo" position to the Beit Hanun position when the situation requires it.

(c) The 53rd Division to Corps Reserve in the area north-east of Beit Jerjah.

[P.T.O.]

E33/136A

OCT 1918

(3) As a preliminary to the withdrawal of the artillery, during the night of 4th/5th November, one 10 cm. battery will withdraw to the western outskirts of El Mejdal in order to flank the Coastal Sector, and one 10 cm. battery will move to the area south of Beit Jerjah to operate against the "Aleppo" position.

It is very important that these two 10 cm. batteries should take their ammunition with them, as there is a shortage of this ammunition.

Further, two 15 cm. batteries in the neighbourhood of Hill 123 will withdraw to the left wing of the Corps. In addition, the 15 cm. battery, which requires repairs, and, as far as possible, a few field batteries, will also be withdrawn.

(4) During the night of 5th/6th November the remainder of the artillery, if possible the trench mortars, and the infantry will withdraw, so that at daybreak on 6th November only detached posts and machine-guns will yet have to evacuate their positions; and the bulk of the infantry will be out of the area of effective fire.

(5) On the 5th November the enemy must be deceived as to our intentions by lively infantry and artillery activity; all ammunition which cannot be brought back is to be fired.

Local successes on 5th November will facilitate the withdrawal.

(6) It is of the utmost importance that the retirement should be kept secret, so that should the enemy attack before the retreat of the infantry, he will find them fully prepared for defence.

(7) The supply and issue of ammunition to batteries in their new positions will be regulated by Lt.-Colonel Molrew of G.H.Q. Motor lorry columns will be placed at his disposal by the army.

(8) The G.O.C. will notify his future Headquarters as early as possible, so that G.H.Q. may make the necessary telegraphic connections.

(9) The 7th Division in the Wady Hesy position, will, by its outposts south of the Wady Hesy, cover us as far as possible from fire from the sea. No large detachments are to camp together.

(10) One officer from each battalion of the 3rd Division will report to Major Schrömbgens of G.H.Q. at 11 a.m. on 5th November at the brook in Beit Hanun for instructions as to the Beit Hanun and "Aleppo" positions. These officers will not be informed of the reasons for their reporting until they meet Major Schrömbgens.

(11) The boundary line between the XXII Corps and the 54th Division will be:— Hill 123—Nejed—El Huleikat, the above mentioned places being in the XXII A.C. area.

(12) Wells.—7th Division, Herbieh, in the Wady Hesy, Burberah, Nalia.
53rd Division, Beit Jerjah, well east of Beit Jerjah, Ejje, Khurbet Erzeh.
3rd Division, Beit Hanun, Tumrah, in the wady near Tumrah, Nejed, Simsim, Bureir military well.

The wells in Gaza are to be destroyed, and the motors to be rendered unfit for use.

(13) Baggage and Train.—Area El Mejdal—Julis—Beit Duras all inclusive.

(14) The 54th Division will send its transport and train to Burier (civil wells and new well north of Bureir).

(15) Ammunition which can neither be withdrawn from Gaza nor fired, is to be buried. The infantry will bring with them as many sandbags and entrenching tools as possible.

(16) The Beit Hanun hospital will move to Beit Tima, and use the well at El Huleikat.

(17) The Commandant of Beit Hanun, with the Kadri company (note—of Mevlevi Regt.), will move to Jebalieh on the night of 5th/6th November.

(18) Telephone instruments and material will, as far as possible, be dismantled and brought back.

(Signed) Von KRESS.

To the,
XXII Army Corps.

Correction.—In the army order, issued to the XXII A.C. this evening, the following corrections should be made:—

- (1) In para. 7, for "issue of ammunition" read "allotment of ammunition."
- (2) In para. 10, for "battalion" read "regiment."

Comment.—For above order, Map Palestine—South, 1/168960, should be consulted. Hill 123 (metres) is marked on map as Hill 405 (feet), square C22.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

16th October, 1918.

[No. 443]

E 33/136

= OCT 1918

**Translation of a Draft Agreement for Officers joining the
German Military Mission to the Turkish Army.**

(Undated.)

German Military Mission for
Re-organisation of the Imperial Turkish Army.

AGREEMENT.

Between His Excellency Cavalry General Liman von Sanders, in his capacity as Chief of the Military Mission for re-organisation of the Imperial Turkish Army on the one hand, and Herr on the other, the following is agreed:—

ARTICLE 1.—Herr will serve with the Imperial Turkish Army in the rank of of If a higher rank is granted him in Germany, the same shall take place in the Turkish Army, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Military Mission to the Imperial Turkish War Ministry. With regard to the rank of Brigadier or Divisional General, the Chief of the Military Mission has the right to make or not to make such recommendation.

The pay of the new German rank will be paid from the month following publication in Germany.

Allowances due to his Turkish rank will be paid him regularly and in weekly instalments at the rate of Turkish pounds per month.

In the event of his being sent to the Provinces, he receives for travelling expenses a sum equivalent to twice the sum laid down in the Turkish Empire for payment as travelling expenses to officers of similar rank. In cases of a change of station, the Chief of the Military Mission is empowered to refund to him such expenses as he considers proper and necessary.

ARTICLE 2.—The period of service shall be 3 years. The Chief of the Military Mission, however, has the right to terminate the contract with consent of the Chief of the Military Cabinet of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany—always with 120 days' notice. It is understood that such termination shall only be ordered in case of bodily, military or other unfitness for his post in the Imperial Turkish Army.

ARTICLE 3.—Upon expiration of this agreement it may be again renewed by consent of both contracting parties. The application for renewal will be addressed directly and only to the Chief of the Military Mission.

ARTICLE 4.—If, in the discharge of his duties, or as a result of, or in connection with such discharge, he suffers a misfortune or contracts an illness, which causes his invaliding and makes him unfit to perform his military duties in Turkey, he is to receive a life pension of a sum corresponding to one third of his pay.

In the event of death from the above mentioned causes, his widow is to receive half of this pension, and upon her death the pension is paid to the children, until the youngest reaches the age of 21 years. These pensions shall be paid regularly, even if the payees live abroad.

In case of a difference of opinion as to the meaning of the above points, a mixed commission shall be appointed; three doctors to be appointed by the Turkish War Ministry, and three by the Chief of the Military Mission, whose vote will decide, if there be an equality of opinion.

ARTICLE 5.—Before Herr comes to Turkey, he receives as travelling allowance, if unmarried, the amount, and if married, double the amount, of one months pay (see No. 3 of the appendix).

He receives the same sum for his return journey to Germany on the termination of his contract. In the event of a renewal of the contract, this latter sum will only be paid on the termination of the new contract.

ARTICLE 6.—In the event of his committing an offence or any other punishable act, he is to undergo in Turkey the punishment laid down for the same offence, in the German Regulations for Military Punishment.

ARTICLE 7.—He is to wear the Turkish uniform corresponding to his rank and branch of service.

ARTICLE 8.—By his obligation for service in the Turkish Army, his status as a German subject and Prussian officer shall not be affected, and he enjoys, as before, all rights which this status allows him.

ARTICLE 9.—He shall receive his pay and rations from the day on which he reports to the War Ministry in Constantinople or garrison to which he has been posted.

ARTICLE 10.—The Imperial German Government reserves the right, in case of the Prussian Army taking part in a war in Europe, to recall its officers. The pay agreed upon shall thereupon only be paid up to the day preceding recall.

ARTICLE 11.—The Imperial Turkish Government allots Herr for the period of his contract, an Officer-Interpreter as "Mouavin" who is master of the German language, or failing this, French.

ARTICLE 12.—General Liman Von Sanders has the duty of protecting the interests of in case of a non-fulfilment of the above articles by the Imperial Turkish Government. The Chief of the Military Mission, however, bears no personal or other responsibility towards on the ground of the above contract.

ARTICLE 13.—The relations between the Chief of the Military Mission and its members, as well as between the members themselves, shall, so far as not fixed by the agreements of and, be fixed by General Liman Von Sanders.

ARTICLE 14.—All the contracting parties accept all the Articles of the above agreement and the attached appendix to Article 13.

Done in duplicate in on

.....
Cavalry General and Chief of the
Military Mission.

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

E 33/137

Agreement between General Liman von Sanders and the Turkish Government.

(Dated 20-7-17.)

20 OCT 1918

WAR MINISTRY.
No. 11231/17 A.I.T

BERLIN,
20-7-17.

In agreement with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field and the Military Cabinet, the attached additional Articles to your Agreement with the Turkish Government have been compiled, in accordance with your Excellency's proposals and the wishes of the Turkish Minister for War.

The War Ministry accordingly requests Your Excellency to effect the ratification of these additional Articles by both parties to the Agreement.

The Military Plenipotentiary has received a copy, and will support Your Excellency at the conclusion of the agreement.

Notification of conclusion of the agreement is requested.

(Signed) Von Stein.

To the Royal Prussian Cavalry General and Chief of the German Military Mission, His Excellency Liman Von Sanders, Constantinople. (Through Foreign Office).

To
Army Group Command "F,"
Constantinople.
(Through Foreign Office).

The previous contract between His Excellency Liman Von Sanders and the Turkish Government is attached.

Further, the agreement concluded on 18-11-16 between the Allied Higher Army Command as to the mutual relationship of the allied troops is enclosed for information and handing of a copy to the leader of Expeditionary Force.

Further reference will be made to the All-Highest Cabinet Order of 25-6-17, communicated in letter No. 10357/17 A.I.T, of 3-7-17, whereby the Army Group Command, together with all the German officers, etc., detailed to it, and all German formations under its orders, is independent of the German Military Mission.

(Signed) Von Stein.

AGREEMENT

relating to the Provision of a
German Military Mission for the purpose of Re-organisation
of the Imperial Ottoman Army.

Between the Imperial Ottoman Deputy Minister for War, the Naval Minister General Mahmud Pascha, Excellency, acting in the name of the Imperial Ottoman Government, on the one hand,

and

the Royal Prussian Lieutenant-General Liman von Sanders, Excellency, on the other hand, in the interests of the development and improvement of the Imperial Ottoman Army, the following agreement is concluded:—

(1) The Royal Prussian Lieutenant-General Liman Von Sanders, Excellency, is appointed to the Imperial Ottoman Army for the term of 5 years with the rank of Cavalry General (Birinji Ferik) and with the title, as well as with the powers and duties, of Chief of the Military Mission, and in addition exercises for the said period command over the I Army Corps.

The aforesaid is member of the Highest War Council.

He will consequently have a voice in all the discussions on the following questions, even when the decisions require a majority:—

- Discipline, promotions, gratuities and forms of punishment.
- Organisation, re-organisation, manoeuvres and training.
- Military equipment, clothing, affairs of Commissariat and Supplies.
- Medical, veterinary and remount services.
- Levies and discharges.
- Preparations for mobilisation, and fortifications.
- Statistics.
- Questions of railways, telephones and telegraphs.
- Traffic (railway), aeroplanes and balloons.

In addition, the aforesaid is Director in Chief of all Military Schools, Military Cadet Units, Instructional Regiments and Training Camps, as well as all foreign officers in the service of the Imperial Ottoman Army.

(See attached agreement.)

In individual cases where, in units, foreign officers have Ottoman officers as their superiors, their conditions of service will be specially regulated.

(2) Cavalry-General Liman Von Sanders has sole authority during the 5 years of his agreement, to engage the foreign officers necessary for the Imperial Ottoman Army, to decide upon their employment, or to dismiss them.

E33/137A

OCT 1918

(a.) The fixed monthly income for the various ranks shall not exceed :—

Lieutenant (in his own country)	...	40 Turkish Pounds.
Captains	60 " "
Majors	80 " "
Lieut.-Colonels and Colonels	100 " "
Generals	125 " "

They also receive, apart from this, the rations and allowances corresponding to their Ottoman rank.

As travelling expenses, on the signing of their contract, and also as return travelling expenses, on expiration of contract, those who are unmarried shall receive each one month's pay, and those who are married two months'.

(b.) The monthly pay of Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders shall be fixed at 275 pounds Turkish, which sum shall include all allowances.

For the above pay and travelling expenses [(a) and (b)] a yearly credit of 50,000 Turkish pounds shall be paid into a bank for the above named General, while the rations and allowances shall be issued separately.

Adjustment of account shall take place at the end of every year. The above named sum may not be exceeded. If at the end of the year any sum remains over, it shall be refunded to the War Ministry.

In the event of Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders, by reason of the fulfilment of his duties or his obligations, by misfortune or wounds, being so disabled that he must give up his service in the Ottoman Army, a single settlement shall be paid him in lieu of pension to the amount of his yearly pay=3,300 Turkish pounds.

If as a result of such misfortune, death should occur at once or within six months, then instead of 3,300 pounds, 4,950 pounds shall be paid to his widow or children.

The pensioning of other officers is dealt with in the attached draft of agreement.

(3) For the holding of a course of instruction (practical and theoretical) for the promotion of senior Turkish Staff Officers to General's rank, for General Staff Rides, special exercises and war games, a special sum of 50,000 Turkish pounds a year shall be paid into a bank, as travelling money for the officers under Cavalry General Liman von Sanders and various other needs of the aforesaid General.

(4) The Imperial Ottoman Government allows Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders the following powers :—

(a.) The Imperial Ottoman officers placed under the orders of the aforesaid General for training purposes can only be transferred to other employment with the consent of the General.

(b.) Imperial Ottoman officers who are to be sent to Germany for training, can only be selected and decided upon by the aforesaid General.

(5) Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders will arrange the necessary programme of tests for promotion. The officers forming the promotion and examination board shall be selected and nominated by the Highest War Council.

(6) Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders ranks next after the Imperial Ottoman War Minister. Should, however, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army be senior to the aforesaid General, the latter ranks immediately after the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, so that Cavalry-General Liman von Sanders is thus either the second or third highest officer in the Imperial Ottoman Army.

(7) Cavalry-General Liman Von Sanders has the right, on notifying the Imperial Ottoman War Minister, to inspect in Turkey, units, garrisons, fortresses, railways and other transport.

From the moment of his entry into the service of the Imperial Ottoman Army, the aforesaid (General) will take over the duties of operations and inspection, and performs his duties "confidentially."

(8) Cavalry-General Liman Von Sanders undertakes the theoretical, elementary and advanced training of all General Staff Officers of the Imperial Ottoman Army in Strategy, Tactics, Administration, and Supply.

(9) The aforesaid General receives the disciplinary powers of a General Officer Commanding.

(10) For the agreements to be concluded by the aforesaid General in the name of, and on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman Government with foreign officers, the articles included in the above agreement, as well as those in the attached draft agreement, will be taken as a basis. Deviations therefrom are only permissible within the bounds of the financial and other stipulations.

(11) In the event of the Imperial German Army taking part in a war in Europe, the Imperial German Government can dissolve the contract of the Chief, as well as those of all members of the Military mission.

In such event, pay shall be issuable up to the day of departure; for cost of return journey only half the agreed sum shall be paid.

(12) Both parties to the agreement bind themselves to conscientious and loyal fulfilment of all the above stipulations from the moment when this agreement is completed and sanctioned by the Irade of His Majesty the Sultan, and they hereby support this with their signatures.

(Signed) Mahmoud.
15/28 October, 1913.

(Signed) Liman Von Sanders,
Lieut.-General and Commander
of the 22nd Division.
14/27 November, 1913.

Confidential.

E 33/138

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—18th October, 1918. = OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

0830-1130. 17th. Hama.—30 cavalry moving north. 14 R.S. at station including 10 destroyed and 10 R.S. $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to south. No engine. Station buildings on fire. Trenches north of the town apparently unoccupied.

Kumhaneh (6 miles N. of Hama).—16 R.S., no engine.

Kans (13 miles N.E. Hama).—70 black and white shelters.

Kaukab.—No movement for 10 miles north of village. (R.A.F., 17-10-18).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

According to a refugee, about 700 infantry and 2 guns belonging to the 2nd Bn. 111th Regt., 2nd Bn. 148th Regt. and 209th Heavy Battery arrived at Aleppo during the last week in September.

C.—ORGANISATION.

(a) On 2nd October II Army was requested to furnish, as early as possible, 20 heavy and 20 light machine-guns for despatch south for the Yilderim forces. (Document, 2-10).

(b) Yilderim G.H.Q. on 29th September wired urgently to Aleppo for 100 1st Class and 200 2nd Class Iron Crosses. (Document, 29-9).

(c) On 30th September there were no explosives in either the German or Turkish Depots at Aleppo. The 4th Baghdad Railway Construction Section, however, had available for issue $1\frac{1}{4}$ tons of dynamite, together with cartridges, detonators and fuze. (Document, 30-9).

D.—MOVEMENT.

On 29th/30th September, the Turkish force engaged at El Mezze was commanded by Col. Ismet Bey, formerly O.C. III Army Corps, and withdrew during the night by the Barada Valley. The 2nd Caucasus Cavalry Bde. withdrew east of Damascus, while the 3rd Cavalry Division formed the right flank of the force near El Mezze. (Document, 30-9).

2.—CILICIA.

A.—ADANA.

A weak Depot Regiment, belonging to the 23rd Division, mainly used for capturing deserters. (P/W, 125th Regt., 16-10).

Comment.—The 20th Depot Regiment, consisting of 2 battalions, was at Adana in February, 1918.

B.—COAST DEFENCE.

About January, 1918, 400 volunteers were enrolled in the Adana District for the purpose of defending the Coast from Ayas to the northern corner of the Gulf of Alexandretta. The men were all over 50 years of age, and half were on duty at a time, spending 3 days on guard and three days on their farms. They were armed with Mausers, but had no machine-guns or guns. Recently the majority are reported to have been discharged as over age or deserted. (P/W, 16th Div. Hqrs., 16-10).

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(i.) Telegram to Kiazim Bey, C.G.S., 5th Army.

War Office,

Dec. 1st, 1915.

Vahib Pasha informs me that Liman Pasha, in disregard of the proper procedure, issues orders direct to his (Vehib's) subordinate commanders, and that if this continues it will be impossible for him (Vehib) to continue his duties.

(Signed), Enver,

Acting C.-in-C.

(ii.) Extract from a letter marked "Personal" from Lieut-Col. Muhammed Khairi, O.C. 26th Division, to O.C. 26th F.A. Regt., dated 23rd August, 1918 :—

"It has been reported that the British will take the offensive on a very large scale a few days before the Kurban Feast. By endless instigation and devilish sedition they have been trying to induce our men to desert, and further to weaken our army by various means, such as purchasing arms and animals from men employed in our supply and transport service. It has been proved that some men of the 53rd Division who came to visit their comrades in the 76th Regt., told the N.C.O.'s of the Regiment that the men of their division were going to desert on the day of Bairam; the N.C.O.'s in their turn went about spreading the news and inviting men to do likewise.

The culprits were arrested, and handed to be court-martialled and severely punished as a warning to others. It is therefore necessary that all officers should be exceedingly watchful and exercise the utmost rigour and severity in dealing with their men and in no way tolerate the spreading of such sedition in their area. They should strictly prohibit

E33/138A

OCT 1918

communication between their men and those of the neighbouring divisions, and even between the regiments of their own division. No one should be allowed to visit back areas unless provided with a permit. Men coming from neighbouring divisions should at once be arrested and returned to their units without being allowed to communicate with our men. When necessary, for the purpose of inter-communication, officers or reliable N.C.O.'s should be employed.

This order has been communicated in writing to the Commanders of Infantry Regiments 59, 76, 78, 32, and Artillery Regt. 26, Divisional Attack Coy. and Engineer Coy. It must not be communicated to Clerks and rank and file."

Comment.—Kurban Bairam began on 16th September.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

18th October, 1918.

[No. 445]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

A.—WESTERN FRONT.

The critical situation of the German Reserves is emphasised by the fact that all the enemy divisions engaged in the fighting in Flanders on 14th and 15th October have been previously engaged on this Front since 28th September.

B.—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Conditions in Bohemia.—The following extracts from Austrian local papers are of interest in connection with the unsettled state of Bohemia:—

(1.) The "Tiroler Landeszeitung" of the 17th August quotes the "Reichenberger Zeitung" to the effect that the suffering population of the manufacturing districts of Bohemia has been obliged for some time past to barter necessary articles of clothing to obtain a few kilos of potatoes or flour from the Czech farmers. The Czechs are now demanding rifles and ammunition in exchange for food. It would not be strange in these times, the writer continues, for a sporting man to procure a shot-gun in this way; but the fact that rifles and ammunition are being collected in different parts of Bohemia seems to show that the Czech nationalists are acting on a prearranged plan, under instructions of some central organisation. The paper thinks it wise not to say more at the moment about this new move of the Czech nationalists, but it would be culpable negligence not to call the attention of the authorities to it.

(2.) The "Venkov," of the 27th August, gives information in the same sense, and quotes from the "Deutsch-Bohmische Tagespost" a rumour that quantities of hand grenades have been stolen from a munition works near Pilsen. The exact number is not known, but it is said to reach 70,000. Readers of this paper who find this difficult to believe are reminded by the writer of thefts of war material which took place a short time ago at Tepliz. The "Venkov" refrains from comment; the facts, it says, speak for themselves. (The "Venkov" is the organ of the Czech agrarians).

Note.—It seems clear that stores of arms and ammunition are being laid up in Bohemia for use in a Czech revolution. It is curious, however, that the facts are allowed to be published, or that those in charge of the movement let them become known; and this suggests the possibility that the Czechs are inclined to make no secret of their preparations in order to terrorize the government with the threat and appearance of revolution; while they would only have recourse to open rebellion when all other means of coercion had failed.

8181700
TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

E 33/139

Changes in the ? Yilderim Order of Battle.

- OCT 1918

(July 30th, 1918).

ARMY GROUP.

1. According to War Office order of 29-6-18, the 80th Field Artillery Regt. will be formed from 2/47th and 3/57th Field Artillery Regts. which are now at Constantinople, and will be attached to the 37th Division.

2. As the number of machine-guns in the 37th Division is not shown, they have been inserted according to establishment.

3. The 24th Artillery Regt. which belonged to the 25th Division and which is now at Constantinople, has been attached to the 47th Division in place of the 47th Artillery Regt. by order of the Vice-Generalissimo, dated 5-7-18.

4. The 11th German Jaeger Bn. is now in transit to Constantinople, and has been struck off the Order of Battle.

5. The following units which were promised from Germany are not being sent, and have therefore been struck off the Order of Battle:—

- 1st German Mountain Battery.
- 7/9th and 7/2nd Heavy Artillery Bns.
- 1704th Signal Coy.
- 1724th Wireless Coy.
- 64th and 634th German Bearer Coys.
- 701st Divisional Signal Detachment.
- 201st, 203rd, 207th, 208th German M.G. Coys.

6. The 96th German Ammunition Column has been disbanded.

7. The 16th Motor Ambulance Column has been disbanded and its personnel and equipment handed over to the 761st Motor Ambulance Column.

8. The crew of the 6 German Machine-guns formerly shown in the Haifa Coast Zone have been returned, and the M.G.'s given to 1/67th Regt. which now has 8 M.G.'s.

9. The Naval 10 cm. gun which has arrived, has been allotted to the Haifa Coast Zone, and two batteries have been transferred to the Depot Battery in the zone and to the 2/50th Arty. Regt.

10. The 44th Arty. Bn., formerly in Haifa Coast Zone, has been disbanded and its Mantelli guns given to 347 and 348 Batteries. (War Office order, of 7-7-18).

11. The two batteries of 7.7 cm. calibre which formerly were shown in reserve, have been transferred to the 7th Army.

12. The "Mannshak" Battery will be sent to the Palestine Front, and has been included in the Order of Battle.

13. According to a communication from G.H.Q., dated 22-5-18, the 17th Battery (four 15 cm. Hvy. Hows.), the 264th and 265th Heavy Field Batteries (10.5 cm. guns), and the H.Q.'s of 40th Heavy Artillery Bn., have been transferred to the Group and added to the Order of Battle.

14. The Signal Sections of the 25th and 42nd Divisions have been transferred to the 4th Army and have been shown under this Army.

15. The 301st and 221th German Bearer Coys. have been struck off the Order of Battle, as they are not being sent from Germany, as promised.

16. The 131st and 133rd Ambulance Columns have been given to Insp. L. of C. Palestine, and are therefore not shown.

17. The 44th and 124th Sound Ranging Sections and the 170th and 177th Flash Spotting Sections, have been placed under the orders of the Group.

18. One Austrian Mtn. Arty. Bn. with its ammunition columns, two Bearer Columns, one Field Dental Laboratory, one Bearer Column, 10 Mountain Ambulances, the 123rd Bakery Column and a Motor Lorry Column of 20 lorries, are ready to leave Austria, and have been included in the Order of Battle.

EIGHTH ARMY.

1. The Camel Coy. previously shown in the 46th Division has been disbanded owing to shortage of camels, and the men have been distributed among the units of the 46th Div. for Sanitary duties.

2. A Composite Regt. numbered 17th Composite Regt. has been formed from the 3/17th, 2/74th and 3/75th Regts. and given to the 46th Division.

3. The three 10 cm. Composite Batteries formerly shown under the Army troops, and now with the 7th Division, have been renumbered 31st Bn. (War Office Order dated 7-7-18).

4. The 2nd Battery Depot Artillery previously shown under Army Troops is now under the orders of the 13th Depot Regt. at Nazareth, and has been struck off the strength of the 8th Army.

5. 8 Guns of the 1/15th Field Arty. Regt. one gun of the 2/13th 2 guns of the 2/6th and 2 guns of 2/47th Arty. Regts. previously shown under Army Troops are undergoing repairs at Damascus and by degrees arriving in the Army's area. They are not shown in the Order of Battle.

6. The 300th and 302nd Flights have been withdrawn from the front and the 301st Flight has come in their place.

7. The Attack Coy. of 22nd A.C., and the Camel Section of the 46th Division, have been reformed and added to the O. of B.

E33/1397

OCT 1918

SEVENTH ARMY.

1. The 3rd Cav. Div. has been transferred to the 4th Army.
2. The 1/11th Field Arty. Regt. of the 11th Div., which was formerly equipped with 7.5 cm. guns, has been re-equipped with 7.7 cm. guns. The seven 7.7 cm. guns have been distributed as follows:—
One to the 4th Batt. of 43rd Arty. Regt.; one to the 1st Batt.; one to the 2nd Batt.; and one to the 4th Batt. of the 1st Arty. Regt., bringing these batteries up to strength of 4 guns each; the remaining three guns were handed over to Nazareth Depot Battery.
3. The formation of the 1/14th Arty. Regt., with 10.5 cm. Field Howitzers, as formerly shown under Army troops, has been abandoned, and in its place it has been decided to equip two batteries of the 2/8th Arty. Regt. with Howitzers.
4. The following machine-gun Coys. have been disbanded:—
180th, 183rd, 306th, in III A.C.
130th, 132nd, 137th, 182nd, 609th, 612th and 661st in XX A.C.
4th, 8th, 12th, of the 66th Regt.
12th of the 32nd Regt.
265th of the 24th Divn.
The Mevlevi M.G. Coy. of 32nd Regt. has been renumbered 8th Coy., 32nd Regt.
The 150th, 151st, 152nd M.G. Coys. have been given to various battalions, but their titular numbers will be retained.
The guns of the above M.G. Coys., which have been disbanded, and other M.G.'s arriving have been distributed among various Bns. and Regts.
5. The 301st Flight has been detailed to the 8th Army.

FOURTH ARMY.

1. Two Mantelli guns and 1 ordinary mountain gun, which were previously shown in the Maan Command, have been struck off the O. of B., as they are now in the area of the H.E.F.
2. A Mule Mtd. Regt. has arrived from Urfa and been placed under the orders of the II A.C.
3. The 25th Signal Section has been transferred to the II A.C., and the Signal Section of 42nd Divn. has been attached to the Army. The 50th Field Hospital and 59th Bearer Coy. have been attached to the Amman Divn.
The Signal Section, formed by the II A.C., became the 1st Section 30th Coy., and is attached to the Amman Divn.
7th, 9th, and 11th Cav. Regts. have each been given a light M.G.
4. The 168th, 176th, and 212th M.G. Coys. recently arrived, and three sections of the 123rd Regtl. M.G. Coy. have been transferred to this Army. The 123rd Regt. and 212th M.G. Coys. are in Maan Command.
A Schneider gun recently arrived has been given to the 5th Batt. of the 26th Arty. Regt.
5. The Six-gun Indep. batty. which was in the Yarmuk Valley last year is now attached to the Hauran Command as an independent unit.

HEJAZ EXP. FORCE.

1. A Section of the 2nd Signal Coy. in Medina and another Signal Section belonging to 58th Div. have been amalgamated under the title of "Independent Hejaz Signal Unit."
2. A Detachment consisting of 40 men from the 1/130th Regt. has been reported between Kalaat el Ahmar and Mudowera and is included in the Order of Battle.

Confidential.

Plus

E 33/140

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—19th October, 1918. — OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

18th. Hama.—10 cavalry 3 miles to south; 20 infantry leaving station.
Kaukab.—80 cavalry moving north.
Umerjim (46 miles S. of Aleppo).—400 cavalry horses grazing S.W. of station.
Maarit en Naaman.—14 cavalry. (R.A.F., 18-10).

B.—AERONAUTICS.

A hostile aeroplane, which reconnoitred Homs to-day, was pursued and engaged by two of our machines about 15 miles north-east of Maarit en Naaman. It was driven down and forced to land. Our machines landed and set fire to the enemy aeroplane. (R.A.F., 19-10).

2.—HEJAZ.

Sherif Zeid reports that the enemy have withdrawn from the Tebuk district as far as south of Kalaat el Akhdar. Another report states that Tebuk was entered by the Arabs on the 12th October and 200 prisoners taken.

Note.—Tebuk—380 miles north of Medina.
Kalaat el Akhdar—40 miles south of Tebuk.

3.—ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES IN NORTHERN SYRIA AND CILICIA.

VII ARMY COMMAND.

3 Composite Divisions (A. B. and C.) formed from the following :—

	Rifles.
Remnants of IV, VII and VIII Armies.	
4/132 (41), 2/110 (37), Regts. and German Units included ...	3,700
XV Corps (43rd Div.) ...	1,000
Troops arrived from North.	
Regts. 3/110 (37), 111 (37) and 148 (H.Q.) and 2 Bns. (47) ...	2,400
Composite Units from Technical Services at Aleppo ...	600
2/133 (41) and 2/140 (44) Regts. ...	300
Total ...	8,000

Note.—(A) Figures in brackets refer to the Divisions to which units belong.

(B) It is reported that troops are leaving Aleppo daily by rail for the Taurus. Up-to-date these probably have consisted of technical and non-combatant troops.

II ARMY.

23rd DIVISION.

	Rifles.
68th Regt. } 4 Bns. ...	750
544th Coast Defence Bn. }	

AYAS DETACHMENT.

69th Regt. (H.Q. and 2 Bns.) } 3 Bns. ...	450
4/130th Regt. }	

44th DIVISION.

139th Regt. (H.Q. and 2 Bns.) } 5 Bns. ...	900
159th " " " }	
527th Coast Defence Bn. }	

41st DIVISION.

3/131st Regt. } 3 Bns. ...	600
1/132nd " }	
538th Coast Defence Bn. }	
German Detachment ...	300

Total ... 3,000

4.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

A.—Extract from operation orders by O.C. Yilderim Flying Corps, dated 5th June, 1918:—

“At the moment there is an exceptional shortage of flying personnel with flights. The strength of the personnel is being reduced daily by sickness. For this reason it is essential that our resources should be taxed as little as possible and aeroplanes should be employed on reconnaissance only when absolutely necessary. The use of aeroplanes merely to confirm ground observers' reports furnishes an example of unnecessary waste of energy. Flight Liaison Officers are constantly to bring this to the notice of Army Headquarters.

(Signed) WEYERT.”

E 33 / 140 A

OCT 1918

B.—Extract from Aleppo Garrison Orders, dated 3rd September:—

“Headquarters L. of C. Section 4 has inaugurated a sporting ground east of the Baghdad Station. After the opening day, which will be announced later, the ground will be at the disposal of all such German military personnel as may stay at Aleppo. As far as duties permit, all formations are requested to allow their men to take part in all sports and competitions which may be arranged. Moreover, everything possible should be done to maintain the interest of the men.”

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

19th October, 1918.

[No. 446]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

1.—TIGRIS FRONT.

On the 18th October, a small British Column advanced from Tuz Khurmatli (20 miles N.W. of Kifri) and captured Tauq (40 miles N.W. of Kifri) which was held by Turkish Cavalry. 20 prisoners and a number of animals were taken. The enemy fled Northwards.

2.—WESTERN FRONT. 19th October.

(A) German official sources furnish evidence of a considerable amount of insubordination amongst the troops that are being transported to the line. Insubordination towards those in charge of draft-escorts, sentries and railway officials has occurred in numerous instances and the troops are said to obey neither instructions nor orders. They have not infrequently indeed even gone so far as to offer resistance, and have assaulted those above them in rank.

(B) From a report dated 9th September.

Employment of Austro-Hungarian troops:—From the statements of escaped prisoners and deserters, and other sources, it appears that Austro-Hungarian troops are replacing German troops on lines of communication in Belgium and Luxemburg. All reports agree in stating that these troops are engaged solely on labour or Garrison duty, and are not to be used for fighting.

3.—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Desertions:—Analysis of the figures for desertion during the last fortnight of August shows that of the 77 men who deserted from the Austro-Hungarian lines, 39 per cent were Czechs, and 17 per cent Ruthenes. The figures are as follows:—

Czechs	30
Ruthenes	13
Poles	}	6 each.
Slovaks				
Roumanians	}	5
Magyars				
Serbo-Croats	4
Slovenes	}	3 each.
Germans				
Italians	1

From the above it will be noticed that the majority are Czechs, and that the number of men of this nationality who deserted agrees closely with the number who were affected by Allied propaganda. The small number of Jugo-Slavs (Serbo-Croats and Slovenes) who deserted is noteworthy. The reasons given for desertion showed that 28 men deserted on account of propaganda, 24 from shortage of rations; others reasons included racial hatred (12) and war weariness (5).

Army Clothing.—According to the statements of deserters recently captured, clothing made of nettle fibre has been issued to troops in the front line; formerly this was issued only to march formations.

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT.

E33/141

OCT 1918

Summary for Week ending 19th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT G.H.Q.

		Differences from previous week.
1.—Temperature.		
MEAN OF WEEK	74	—3
MEAN MAXIMUM	86	—4
MEAN MINIMUM	64	—3
HIGHEST RECORDED on 19th	91	—5
LOWEST RECORDED on 19th	63	—3
2.—Humidity.		
MEAN OF WEEK	71	+2
HIGHEST RECORDED on 18th at 2000	90	+4
LOWEST RECORDED on 19th at 1400	47	+10

3.—Wind.

"Calms" were recorded at 0800 hrs. every morning. All wind directions varied between W. and N., and velocities between "Almost Calm" and "Light." "Calms" were recorded at 2000 hrs. every day with the exception of the 18th when an almost calm N. wind was experienced.

4.—Rainfall.

No rainfall recorded.

Summary for Week ending 19th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT JERUSALEM.

		Differences from previous week.
1.—Temperature.		
MEAN OF WEEK	68	—6
MEAN MAXIMUM	82	—5
MEAN MINIMUM	60	—7
HIGHEST RECORDED on 19th	89	—6
LOWEST RECORDED on 15th and 16th	58	0
2.—Humidity.		
MEAN OF WEEK	57	+9
HIGHEST RECORDED on 13th and 14th at 2000	89	—5
LOWEST RECORDED on 19th at 1400	20	+6

3.—Wind.

The wind directions varied chiefly between W.N.W. and N., the only exceptions being an "Almost Calm" N.E. at 0800 on the 13th, an "Almost Calm" E. at 0800 on the 18th and an almost calm E.S.E. at 1400 on the 19th. The wind velocity did not exceed "Light."

4.—Rainfall.

No rainfall recorded.

Confidential.

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—20th October, 1918.

E 33/142

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

19-10. 0940-1200. Hama.—No enemy. Railway bridge N.E. of Dahrieh destroyed. Hama-Kumhaneh Road (6 miles north of Hama).—6 H.T. and 30 cavalry moving north. Kumhaneh.—Train of 10 R.S. and 1 engine at station. 9 H.T. and 25 cavalry stationary. Umerjim.—4 R.S. 15 camels going north. 200 camels scattered to South-East. The permanent way of a railway runs N.W. from Umerjim to Maarit En Naaman, but there were no rails seen. Abuduhur (30 miles S. of Aleppo).—At station 1 R.S., and 2½ miles further north 1 engine and 2 R.S. moving N. Telejin (24 miles S. of Aleppo).—12 R.S., no engine. (R.A.F., 19-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

The remnants of the 32, 136 and 163 Regiments (53rd Division) which escaped from the Palestine front were all captured in the Damascus-Duma area. (O.C. 3/136th Regt., 18-10).

2.—CILICIA.

A.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

41st DIVISION.

On 20th Sept. one battalion 131st Regt. (probably the 2nd), 1st Bn. 132nd Regt. and two Coast Defence battalions with 10 M.G.'s were in the Payas-Sueida-Ras el Khanzir-Antioch area.

The 2/133rd Regt. (200 strong with 4 light M.G.'s.) was near Soukluk (west of Bailan). (Officer P/W. 4/132nd Regt., 18-10).

Comment.—Compare I.S. 442 of 15th Oct. para. 2.

B.—MORAL.

In the Amanus range there are reported to be over 4,000 deserters and brigands armed with Mausers. They allow no troops to move through the hills. (Officer P/W. 4/132nd Regt., 18-10).

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Translation of a letter from Fevzi Pasha, G.O.C. VII Army, to Field Marshal von Falkenhayn, dated 27th Feby., 1918:—

To the Commander-in-Chief, Yilderim (personal).

My departure for Amman, in order to take over the new command to which I was appointed by Your Excellency, as well as the spiritual and social circumstances of the new post, demand a succession of special measures, neglect of which will entail serious consequences.

Your Excellency has seen examples of the widely-distributed English propaganda, which state that they are simply and solely carrying on war against us in order to drive the Germans from the soil of Islam.

It is clear that their soldiers from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan, and India have been brought here only on this mis-representation, and with the express condition that they should fight exclusively against the Germans.

Bearing this in mind, and I regard it as very important, it is clear that the employment of officers and men in German uniform in the neighbourhood of the Hejaz Railway regarded by Moslems as sacred will favour and strengthen the British propaganda, and will increase the already treasonable convictions and fanaticism of the inhabitants.

For this reason, I shall not be able therefore to take with me to Amman the officers and men in German uniform who have hitherto been on my staff, and I shall also send the German battalion, now in the neighbourhood of Kerak to the 20th Army Corps.

I request you either speedily to replace the German Flying units and motor lorry columns now in the above named zone with Turkish officers and men, or else equip them throughout with Turkish uniforms.

I have telegraphed in the above sense to the Vice-Generalissimo.

(Signed), Fevzi,
G.O.C. of the 7th Army.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

20th October, 1918.

[No. 447]

E133/A2A
OCT 1918

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT.

The following extracts from a captured order, dated 8th August, 1918, and signed by Ludendorff, deal with the reasons for the defeat of the German Second Army:—

“1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of the tanks, and lost their heads when the tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under the protection of natural and artificial fog.

2. The fact that scarcely any positions or obstacles worth mentioning existed either in the forward battle zone, or in the villages and broken ground farther back, to make a methodical resistance possible there.

3. The fact that the available artillery, allotted to the battalions at rest and to the reserve at the disposal of the Higher Command, was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had broken through and against his tanks.

The following conclusions are drawn from these facts:—

1.—As I have already ordered in my message Ia. 9718, Secret, of the 8th August, considerably more must be done to obtain information regarding the enemy's intentions by taking prisoners, watching the ground by means of special observation posts, report centres, aerial reconnaissance and listening sets, as, owing to the present situation, we must also expect surprise attacks on other fronts. The closest vigilance is necessary at daybreak and in the early hours of the morning, as surprise attacks usually begin at this time, and because a certain lassitude is often prevalent among the men in the morning, after the strain on their nerves and endurance during the night. The supervision of the troops at this time is especially necessary, in view of our late experiences. Sufficient has been said on my part with regard to the organization of infantry and artillery in depth.

2. Far more must be done than has hitherto been the case in the construction of trenches and of defences against tanks. The dislike of the troops to trench digging must be combated by all means possible.

3.—The principle that troops, even if they are enveloped, must, if necessary, defend their battle zone for days, to the last round and to the last man, if they do not receive any further orders, appears to have been forgotten.”

Note.—The German Second Army was forced to retreat from opposite Amiens.

Confidential.

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—21st October, 1918.

E 33/143

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

20th Oct. Kaukab.—11 R.S., no engine. About 250 mounted troops scattered.

Abu Duhur.—14 R.S. No engine. No movement.

Hama-Aleppo.—No movement on roads or railway between these two places.

Aleppo.—500 troops bivouaced East of station. 300 bell tents and 8 marquees near station. 180 R.S. in 6 made up trains, 5 engines. No steam up. 80 M.T. and H.T. near station. Only slight movement at station and A/A fire.

Only short isolated trenches were observed south of town. (R.A.F., 20-10).

B.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.

(i.) During the retirement 25,000 troops passed north through Homs. (Station Master, Homs, 20-10).

Comment.—It is improbable that more than 20,000 troops moved north during the above period.

(ii.) It is reported that the Hama area was finally evacuated on 17th Oct. The last train left at 0100. Two Turkish battalions with 4 field and 4 mountain guns, 11 M.G.'s and a few Germans left in the morning. They were followed by 400 Turkish cavalry, of whom about half had arrived from Aleppo on 12th Oct. The first likely halt would be Taiyibe (10 miles N. of Hama). (Intelligent Circassian, 18-10).

2.—CONSTANTINOPLE.

(i.) A refugee who left Constantinople on 3rd October states that for 3 days previous to his departure, there had been considerable movement of troops from Constantinople towards Uzun Keupru (114 miles W. of Constantinople) and Chataldja. The Chataldja defences had been recently inspected by Enver Pasha.

(ii.) In consequence of the interruption of the Balkan train, a regular service of boats, carrying mails, passengers and goods, has been established between Constantinople and Constanza. (Turkish press).

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

21st October, 1918.

[No. 448]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT.

1. The following translation of a German Army Order shows that the enemy realizes the superiority of our troops in "No Man's Land." :—

XVII Army,
2-8-18.

"During July, the Army lost 233 men missing and captured only 47 prisoners. This shows that the British have at the present time a fighting superiority over our troops in 'No Man's Land.' Such superiority can only result in the fighting spirit of our infantry being impaired. It is also of the highest importance that the Higher Command should be kept constantly informed as to enemy's dispositions and intentions. This is best done by means of patrol enterprises. If these are carefully planned and well carried through, good results are accomplished and casualties are light.

It is my impression that the infantry is in need of more practical training in this form of fighting, and I request Corps and Divisional Commanders to devote particular attention to this."

(Signed) v. Bedow.

[P.T.O.]

E 33 / 143 A

OCT 1918

2. The following extracts from captured army and divisional orders illustrate the extent to which the moral of the German troops has been affected:—

A.—Extract from an order of the Second Army, dated the 25th August, 1918.

"It passes all comprehension that inconceivable rumours have been spread about behind the front during the last few days by people who have lost their nerve. People with anxious temperaments see everywhere squadrons of tanks, masses of cavalry and dense lines of enemy infantry. It is in fact high time that our battle-tryed soldiers spoke seriously to these cowards and weaklings, and told them of the deeds that are achieved in the front line. Tanks are no bogey for the front line troops who have artillery in close support. For instance, a battery sergeant-major with his gun destroyed 4 tanks; one battery destroyed 14; and a single division, in one day, 40. In another instance, a smart corporal climbed on to a tank and put the crew out of action with his revolver, firing through an aperture. A lance-corporal was successful in putting a tank out of action with a hand grenade.

The English cavalry, which has been engaged many times, has been shot to pieces and reduced to a skeleton force by our infantry and artillery. Our riflemen and machine-gunners never had better targets.

With regard to the enemy's infantry, stress must again be laid on the fact that in most cases they have only received drafts of 18 year old men. Therefore there are no reasons for any panic. On the contrary, the troops in the front line have never before considered themselves victors in the way that they do at present.

This Army order is to be read out to all units."

B.—Extract from an Order of the 2nd Guard Division, dated the 27th August, 1918:—

"According to reports received by Army Headquarters, the infantry of other divisions in the battle hardly made any use of their rifles. The whole defence had been left to the machine-guns and artillery. A large number of cases have also been substantiated in which companies of infantry have passed through the artillery lines, and have taken no notice of the request of the artillery to protect them. The strongest and severest measures will be taken to prevent conduct which points to such neglect of duty. By order of the Army, artillery officers are empowered to ascertain and report the name of any unit and commander refusing protection to the artillery. Men who come back from the front and are met by the military police without their arms are to be punished by court-martial."

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES

dy
Confidential.

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—22nd October, 1918.**

E 33/144

- OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

21st Oct. Aleppo.—Town Station. 400 R.S. including 4 trains of 20 R.S. facing north and 2 of 20 R.S. facing south. All had steam up. 9 other engines seen. 25 large marquees, 300 bell tents and 150 shelters seen in area. Many piles of stores scattered round station and town. 10 M.T. and 14 H.T. near station. A/A fire was experienced.

Muslimie Junction Station.—2 detached engines and 60 R.S. 30 M.T. parked. 20 bell tents and 20 shelters. 20 piles of stores. Only slight movement.

Aleppo—Alexandretta Road.—500 infantry. 10 M.T. and 20 H.T. moving north 2 miles from Aleppo. (R.A.F., 21-10).

22nd Oct. El Matkha Marsh.—200 cavalry.

Vudehi.—1,000 cavalry scattered. Trenches 500 yards long astride of railway north of village.

Aleppo.—540 R.S. 10 engines. 300 bell tents and 300 shelters. Considerable movement west of railway. West and north of station several sangars unoccupied.

Muslimie.—An aerodrome east of village, 8 machines. No hangars. (R.A.F., 22-10).

2.—CILICIA.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND IDENTIFICATIONS.

(i.) On 23rd September, there were in the Erzin area 2 battalions of the 139th Regiment (44th Div.), whose total strength was 700 men and 8 light M.G.s', the 2nd Battery of the 1/44th Artillery Regt., (of which only one gun was serviceable) and 2 10.5 cm. long Mantelli guns (on Leshi Dagh, just N.W. of Erzin). There were trenches between Erzin and Deurt Yol (to the south), and Toprak Kale (to the north).

At Osmanie there was one battalion of infantry with 4 light M.G.'s. The H.Q. of the 44th Division were also there. At Port Ayas (western coast of Gulf of Alexandretta) there was a battery of 4 naval guns with German officers, and a Turkish regiment 1,000 strong. (Officer P/W, 2nd Batt., 1/41st Artillery Regt.).

(ii.) Officer P/W from the 2nd Batt., 1/41st Artillery, now state this battery left Bailan 6 months ago and was attached to the 1/44th Artillery Regt. at Erzin. On 23rd September it left for Damascus where it was captured.

Comment.—c.f. I.S. 442 of 15-10, para. 2.

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

(i.) In early October remnants of the 1st Division and of the 24th or 26th Division were reformed at Vudehi with 3,000 recruits from Constantinople under General Ali Fuad Pasha (late G.O.C., XX A.C.). The strength of the force was estimated at 4,000 rifles. Up to 14th October no guns or M.G.'s. had been sent to this force from Aleppo.

(ii.) On 14th October the 1st Division (2,000 rifles) was reported to be moving to Katma, while the 24th (or 26th) Division was to remain at Vudehi as rearguard and garrison for Aleppo.

(Officer deserter, 1/5th Artillery Regt., 21-10).

Comment.—It should not be assumed that the above are the only troops in the Aleppo area. See I.S. No. 446, para. 3, dated 19th October, 1918.

C.—PERSONALITIES.

It is reported that Liman von Sanders Pasha left for Constantinople on 11th October after a quarrel with the Turks at Homs and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha (late G.O.C., VII Army) is in supreme command.

(Hearsay—Officer deserter, 1/5th Artillery Regt., 21-10).

D.—AMMUNITION.

By 14th October the Artillery Ammunition Depot at Aleppo had been moved to Osmanie and 50% of the S.A.A. to Bozanti.

(Officer deserter, 1/5th Artillery Regt., 21-10).

3.—ANATOLIA.

An agent reports the following particulars of the 21st A.C. at the end of August :—

The Army Corps consists of 57th Division and Corps Troops. The Corps Headquarters are at Aidin, and the 57th Divisional Headquarters at Adalia.

The Regiments of this division are disposed as follows :—

135th Regt. at Bouldur reported to be moving shortly to Aidin.

175th Regt. at Mughla—Marmarice district.

176th Regt. at Adalia.

Each of the battalions of this division supplied a draft of 70 men to bring the 47th Division up to strength before its departure for Palestine.

G.O.C. 21st A.C.—Bedri Bey.

Comment.—The above dispositions are normal.

E 33/1449

OCT 1918

4.—CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

TELEGRAM.

From (apparently) Jemal Pasha, G.O.C. IV Army.
To Vice-Generalissimo, Turkish Army at Sivas.
Date: 14/15-1-15.

The centre column, 15,360 strong (combatants and non-combatants), which forms the main body of the VIII Army Corps, left Bir Saba for the Canal on the morning of 14 January, 1915. Muntaz Bey's force, which I have placed directly under the Army, has arrived within one day's march from the Canal, off Kantara.

The 10th Division composed of 12,841 combatants and non-combatants, is concentrated between Jerusalem and Bir Saba. As soon as this division is provided with camels, it will also move along the central road.* The Hejaz Expeditionary Force composed of two infantry regiments, two mountain batteries and other units has arrived from Medina, and is now concentrating at Maan. The garrison battalion at Medina has been attached to the Expeditionary force, which, including drafts, will be approximately 4,000 strong. This force will leave Maan for Suez, *via* Akaba on the 21st January.

Thus a force composed of approximately 33,000 combatants, including the right and left wings, will take part in the attack on the Canal.

This force is now provided with 10,000 camels, in addition to the normal transport. Experience alone will show whether this is sufficient.

Before moving the main body of the VIII A.C. from Bir Saba towards the Canal, I organized advanced lines of communication between the Canal and Bir Saba and had wells sunk in the desert; also fortified L. of C. posts were organized.

The 8th Division which is *en route* from Mudania (?Mardiu) will first of all concentrate in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. Owing to considerations of supply, this division will be moved forward only after the crossing of the Canal has taken place. Then if necessary, I will move also the 36th division.

I hope that, with God's help, this force will be sufficient for the expedition.

I left Fakhri Pasha, G.O.C. 12th A.C., in Damascus, as Acting G.O.C., IV Army, to command the stationary forces. I formed two new composite divisions from depot battalions of 6th and 8th A.C.'s and the mobile gendarmerie units in the Damascus and Aleppo *valiyets*, to provide for coast defence and security of the interior. I have divided Syria, including Adana, into five military areas.

Defences have been constructed between the coast, and the railway and L. of C. for the defence of these latter. The garrison in Syria totals 40,000 men. The National Defence organisation (?Lebanon Militia) for coast defence is not included in the above. I am convinced that this force will be sufficient for the defence of Syria.

I might further add that, before my arrival at Damascus, no substantial measures had been undertaken in these matters.

Arms should be sent from Constantinople both for auxiliary organisations and depot battalions of the 6th A.C.

On the morning of the 19th January I will leave Bir Saba for the Canal, accompanied by a few Staff officers only.

I am convinced that our first duty is to carry through successfully the Egyptian Expedition. If, during the operations against the Canal, I should be killed, I beg of you, as my last wish and will, to come at all costs from Constantinople to Jerusalem to carry on this most important enterprise to a successful conclusion. I cannot think of any other but you as sufficiently able to conduct this expedition.

God help the Moslems, my brother!

* Presumably the Bir Saba—Auja Road.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

22nd October, 1918.

[No. 449]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

GENERAL.

On 19th October Constantinople sent out a message in clear Turkish to the effect that the conclusion of an armistice was probable, that Germany would probably accept all President Wilson's conditions, and that the Germans had commenced a general retreat in Belgium and Northern France.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

October 22nd, 1918.

E 33/145

ALEXANDRETTA and Surrounding Country.

OCT 1918

Map Ref.: ALEXANDRETTA 1:250,000 (W.O. edition).

THE TOWN.

The town of Alexandretta (Iskanderun) is built on a strip of sand and shingle at the South-West of the Iskanderun Bay, between the sea and a strip of marsh, which almost entirely cuts it off from the cultivated land at the foot of the hills. The town consists of stone buildings and warehouses, running east and west along the front, behind which are the native quarters and bazaars. The principal streets are well metalled, with a roadway of from 12-30 ft. in width, and in addition a side-walk of about 3 ft. in width. The population is between 12,000 and 15,000, consisting of Moslems, Armenians and other Christians.

COMMUNICATIONS.

By Rail. (a) Broad gauge.—The town is connected with the Baghdad Railway by a branch line to Toprak Kale, the line running close to the coast to the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta, where it turns due north.

(b) Light Railways.—A light railway runs from the quarries near the spring marked on map, first in a northerly and then in a westerly direction to the Lighthouse. This was used for reclamation work in connection with filling in the marshes.

By Road.—(a) North along the Coast to Payas, and thence to Missis or Toprak Kale. The road is in fair order and fit for wheeled traffic, but liable to get cut up in winter.

(b) The main road to the interior over the Giaour Dagh Mountains to Aleppo; fit for all traffic.

(c) A very rough track leading South-West along the Coast; scarcely fit for pack transport.

THE HARBOUR.

The harbour is the best on the Syrian Coast, and it offers good anchorage for fleets of the largest size at all times of the year. There are eight piers, varying from 100 ft. to 360 ft. in length, of which the new Custom House pier is the best; and in addition, there is a stone mole about 540 ft. long. The depth of water here exceeds 7 ft., suitable for steam-boats to come alongside, and a double line of rails connects with the Town Station. There is also a travelling steam crane, capable of lifting 10-15 tons, which runs on these rails.

SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

The narrow plain on which the town is built extends for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles inland, from whence it rises slightly to meet the lower spurs of the mountains. Immediately at the back of the town itself, marshes extend from a little east of the Lighthouse, round the town and north-east to fully 3,000 yards beyond the Customs Pier. These marshes are below the level of the sea and in places are only about 3" deep in water, with a thin coating of mud over a hard firm bottom; whilst in other parts they are deeper and more impassable. These marshes extend to within 100-130 yards of the shore in some places, leaving only just room for the beach, road, and railway; but there is a small open space just at the foot of the hills which would afford facilities for the movement of small bodies of troops.

Following the coast north of these marshes, the hills encroach more upon the plain, forming two small rocky promontories 3 miles and $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles respectively north of Alexandretta. Between these two, the northernmost of which is known as Jonah's Pillar, a landing could be effected, but there is a very limited space for the movement of troops here.

The country to the south-west of the town, beyond the marsh area, for a distance of 4 miles is open, and slopes up gently from the sea to the Bailan Road, much of it being under cultivation and it is dry and hard shortly after rain. There is very little cover for a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the beach, at which point plantations and coppice lands commence, with hamlets and isolated houses amongst thick undergrowth. A detour to avoid the latter would be possible by ascending the higher ground to the south, which is almost bare of cultivation. The Bailan Road, for the first two miles, runs almost parallel to the beach, gradually ascending the slopes of the long spur which approaches Alexandretta from the south. After crossing a wady, it zigzags in a southerly direction along the side of the Naulu Dagh and ascends the pass on a ridge between two wadis.

The two wadis mentioned above cross the open ground to the south-west of Alexandretta, and by ascending the beds of these wadis, the banks of which are almost perpendicular, troops could reach the Bailan Road under cover the whole distance. At this time of the year there would be very little water in the wadis.

The beach for nearly four miles south of the Lighthouse appears to be admirably adapted for landing, as it shelves rapidly, and by using gang planks, parties could disembark dry shod.

The dominating point in the neighbourhood of Alexandretta is the spur mentioned above (west of Kurtler), as this commands all the approaches to the town and covers the first three miles of the Bailan Road. Above the village of Bailan (8 miles from Alexandretta), there is a shoulder of the hill which covers the narrow defile through which the road passes just north of the village; whilst two miles further up, the head of the pass is reached. This point commands all access to Alexandretta from the interior.

THE MOUNTAIN RANGE.

This range, known as the Giaour Dagħ, is part of the Amanus Mountains, and runs more or less due north and south past Alexandretta, where it swings westward, forming one side of the Gulf of Alexandretta. It consists of a deep rugged mass of lime and sandstone, covered by a good deal of scrub, and completely shuts off the narrow coastal plain from the interior.

The Bailan Pass is the only road by which this range can be crossed without going a long way north. The lower slopes through which this passes are exceedingly rugged and abrupt, and there is little grazing; and on the south-west of the road there is a deep ravine.

The whole of this country would be very difficult for movement of troops, and almost impossible for field guns, except in the close vicinity of the road.

CAMPING SITES.

There are open spaces to the north-east of the village of Kaukard and of Karabarun, and the open slopes to the south-west of the town would be suitable for this purpose; but otherwise the space is very limited.

WATER.

There is a very good and ample supply of water. The town supply is obtained from springs of a large capacity $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile out of the town and 200 yards east of the Bailan Road, where there is a reservoir. From here the water flows naturally through pipes to all parts of the town. There are many other springs in the district and fountains on the road to the Bailan Pass.

Description of Country round ALEPPO.

GENERALLY.

Aleppo itself stands upon a number of small heights surrounded by hills, the River Kuwaik flowing past it on the west, roughly in a direction from North to South. Immediately in the neighbourhood of the town there are numerous gardens and plantations; and beyond that, for a radius of, approximately, four or five miles, especially on the west of the river, the country is of a rolling nature, fertile and cultivated.

Speaking of the country to the west of the river, for a radius of about 25 miles, one may say that, generally, it is of an undulating nature, partly cultivated, and elsewhere in the nature of rolling downs; and that wherever small hills rise above the general level, it becomes stony, especially on the eastern slopes of the ridges of Jebel Vaslei and Jebel Saman, which form a ridge some 20 miles to the west and north-west.

North of Aleppo the soil is of a reddish nature and is generally undulating, and especially in the valley of the river, is fertile and cultivated.

To the east of the river it is described as a grassy plain, probably cultivated only in the immediate vicinity of the River Kuwaik and the stream which flows into the Jebbul Geul.

To the south-east the country is less inviting and leads up to the northern end of the Jebel el Hass, a bleak and unpopulated ridge of hills. Due south there are two marshes, into the westernmost of which the River Kuwaik flows.

Generally, therefore, one may say that this country is possible for the movement of all arms, including artillery, but would be difficult in many places for transport, though nowhere would there be any serious hindrance to the movement of cavalry.

The river divides the area under discussion definitely into two sectors and it would be difficult to cross, except at the town of Aleppo or the bridges further north, as it is a sluggish stream with a muddy bottom, running between fairly deep and almost perpendicular banks.

The following information is available with regard to the various routes which lead to Aleppo in the area above described:—

1. Main route from Homs to Aleppo, *via* Hama and Maarit en Naaman. (See G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary, dated 15th October, 1918).

2. Alternative route from Maarit en Naaman to Aleppo, *via* Sermin and Maarit el Ahmar, joining Route No. 1, at Khan Tuman.

This is the route which was generally used by the caravans prior to the war. From Maarit en Naaman it follows the main road to two miles north of Khan Sebil, when it bears a little west of north to Sermin, crossing a featureless plain. At Sermin there are numerous cisterns and wells hewn out of the rock. From here the road traverses a dreary plain to Maarit el Ahmar, three miles beyond which it enters a fertile plain. There is no information with regard to water at Maarit el Ahmar, but it may be assumed that water is available in the neighbourhood of the fertile country mentioned above. From Kanatir to Khan Tuman the country in the immediate neighbourhood of the road would appear to be cultivated, though to the north it is a barren open plain.

3. At Teribe, 30 miles from Aleppo, this route from Antioch passes through a narrow valley running between limestone hills, and the track is of a stony nature. Two miles further on, it leaves the valley and enters the undulating country which leads towards the valley of the Kuwaik. At Kefr Kermin there are reservoirs and good wells; and here the track leaves the old Roman road, which it has followed for some distance. On the right the valley extends for some distance and is all cultivated.

OCT 1918

The route passes next through Kefr Tal, where there is a small pond and rain-water cisterns; and three miles further on passes a well 80 ft. deep, with good water. The road is stated to be good in this sector and possible for all arms, crossing open grassy hills.

Between Kefr Tal and Urim el Kabra the road becomes stony, but is still practicable for wheels; and at the latter place there is a good well 80 ft. deep.

2½ miles further on, Khan Tuman is reached—see Routes 1 and 2.

4. This is the most direct route from Alexandretta to Aleppo, and leaves the chaussee road at El Hamman, 39 miles from Aleppo. The route crosses a broad spur of the hills to the north and passes over open rolling downs for 2½ miles until it reaches a ford over the Afrin Su, which is here some 80—100 yards wide. It then ascends gradually over low bare hills to the village of Kastal (rain-water tank cut in the rock). It then passes through a shallow valley, which becomes a narrow winding defile; and two miles further on it passes over red clayey soil, which becomes very sticky in wet weather. About five miles, before reaching Turmanin, the track follows a stony valley, with bare limestone hills on either hand, and ascends on bare limestone boulders up a slope of 1 in 10, which is practically impossible for camel transport. This leads to the highest point on the route, and the track now descends a stony slope, after which it crosses a cultivated valley to Turmanin. Water is very scanty here and is stored in small reservoirs cut in the rock. From Turmanin the road, for about three miles, crosses a succession of limestone ridges, is waterless and bare, except for a few olive trees, and the track is very rough. Four miles from Turmanin the track passes the village of Tokat, which appears to be some two miles north of its position as marked on the map. Here there are small reservoirs of rain-water. Beyond this point the route improves, being less stony, and it shortly reaches a level cultivated plateau in the neighbourhood of Ajil. This would appear to be the same as the village marked Angel, but should be some little distance further north than as shown on the map. Beyond the village the road descends fairly rapidly, from which a gradual rise leads to the highest point of this undulating country near Khan el Asil, from which there is an easy descent into the town of Aleppo.

This route would be impassable for wheeled transport, and difficult for guns and limbers, but quite possible for the movement of cavalry.

5. Alexandretta to Aleppo.—This will be described in detail in a later report, but is a good chaussee road, passing between Minil and Deir el Jemal, over bare rolling country, and in the neighbourhood of Bianum (14 miles from Aleppo) through low, bare, stony hills, with villages on either side. As it approaches Aleppo, the country becomes of a broad, undulating nature and more cultivated.

Water in the neighbourhood of this route is rather scarce, but can be found at Tel Ajar (where there is a small stream), at Deir el Jemal, Mejer and Bianum (where there is good water available from wells).

6. Killis to Aleppo.—This route crosses cultivated hills of a reddish loam soil, over which artillery could move even after heavy rain. Between Jibrin and Arfad the road passes over bare undulating hills, which are partly cultivated; and there is another short sector at about five miles from Aleppo where the road passes over bare limestone hills; but the country in the neighbourhood of this route appears to be suitable for movement of all arms.

Water is available at Niara (distance 28½ miles) where there is a small stream, probably dry in summer; at mile 23 there are two wells and two deep cisterns; and at Tel Arfad there are several shallow wells, a spring and reservoirs. Also, between mile 8 and mile 4 there are several underground masonry tanks.

7. Akhterin-Aleppo (distance 25 miles).—At four miles South of Akhterin the road bifurcates, the western branch crossing the river at Jisr el Mudik, and keeping to the right hand bank until Aleppo is reached. Both these routes pass, generally, through gently undulating country, except for a short stretch of about five miles from Muslimie southwards, where the country is more stony and less cultivated. Both routes are possible for wheels, but the Jisr el Mudik is stated to be only 6 ft. wide and transport would consequently find some difficulty in crossing.

Water is available at Akhterin from wells, and also from the River Kuwaik at various points adjoining the route. It is stated that various "field tracks" lead westwards from Akhterin towards Killis and Sejaraz (on the road from Alexandretta to Aleppo).

8. El Bab-Aleppo.—El Bab itself is on a stony ridge, but from about two miles west, as far as Aleppo, the route passes over grassy and undulating country. No details are available as to water.

9. Meskene-Aleppo.—This route passes over similar country to No. 8. There is a good spring at Mania (25 miles from Aleppo); and at Bir Husina (no details). Between Routes 8 and 9, at a distance of about six miles from Aleppo, there is the Ain Tell, which is the source of the modern water supply to Aleppo. Should this be cut by an attacking force, it would create an immediate shortage of water in the city.

Note.—There is practically no timber in the whole of the area described above, with the exception of:—

- (a) The gardens in the immediate neighbourhood of Aleppo.
- (b) Occasional small groves of Figs and Olives round some of the villages mentioned.

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.,
22nd October, 1918.

OCT 1918

OCT 1918

ADDENDUM.

LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS. 23rd Oct. 0945-1800. E 33/148

Aleppo Station.—250 R.S. (decrease of 290 R.S. compared with the 21st inst.) including 4 made up trains. Only slight movement. Camps show decrease of 200 tents. Enemy appears to be digging new trenches about 2 miles S.W. of Aleppo. 300 bivouacs and about 1,500 scattered troops in vicinity of these trenches.

All roads N. and N.W. of Aleppo clear of movement.

Muslimie Junction.—40 R.S. 250-300 scattered troops.

Aerodrome evacuated and what appeared to be the burnt remains of three machines were on the ground.

Mashale Station.—No movement. (R.A.F., 23-10).

sh
Confidential.

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—23rd October, 1918.**

E 33/149

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

Aleppo. 14th Oct.—15 field and mountain guns are reported as 600 yards South of the Bagdad Railway Station, 4 field guns on the Citadel and 3 in Sheikh Yabrack Barrack Square. (Refugee, 23-10).

B.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.

It is reported that on 8th October the Germans commenced to leave Aleppo for Constantinople, taking with them guns, light cars and aeroplanes. On 10th October troops and supplies were at Aleppo waiting to be evacuated by rail to the north-west. (Refugee, 22-10).

2.—CILICIA.

PERSONALITIES.

According to an officer P/W the G.O.C. of the XII A.C. is Col. Fakhredin Bey and the O.C. of the 44th Division is Lieut.-Col. Mustafa Bey.

3.—CONSTANTINOPLE.

TURCO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

During the last few weeks a remarkable change has taken place in the tone of the Turkish press, which is now openly condemning Germany and the continuance of the war. The new Cabinet has expressly been formed to bring about peace.

Under Enver's regime the German troops stationed in Constantinople were split into mixed detachments of all arms and disposed so as to hold all the important tactical positions while the Turkish troops were stationed at considerable distances outside the city. One of Enver's last moves was to bring German troops to Constantinople from the Black Sea littoral. Five thousand of these, which arrived recently, were sent away by Izzet Pasha but returned later and the transports anchored in the Bosphorus. Izzet intends to garrison Constantinople and the Dardanelles with Turkish troops and he and Raouf Bey (Minister of Marine in the newly formed Cabinet) are credited with the opinion that, if the present Government is unable to obtain peace, it cannot remain in power and chaos and massacres would ensue from which the Germans would emerge as masters of the city.

Liman von Sanders is reported to have left Constantinople for Germany. (This requires confirmation. He was reported to have left Aleppo for Constantinople on 11th October. See I.S. 449). (Reliable informant, 22-10).

4.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(i) Extract from a letter from Capt. v. Arnim, Ordnance Officer, 4th Guards Infantry Division, to Major von Papen, dated 4th April, 1917:—

"Affairs in America are now becoming acute. From a military standpoint, the Americans will furnish probably only a nominal corps-in-aid, even should this arrive unscathed.

Pecuniarily it is certainly an appreciable reinforcement for the enemy. What use, however, are war declamations that are not made good?

It is to be hoped that we have sufficient U-boats to close appreciably the American-Atlantic coast, even if not thoroughly to blockade it."

(ii) The following is a translation of a telegram from Von Falkenhayn at Aleppo to Col. von Dommes (his C.G.S.) at Constantinople, dated 21st September, 1917:—

Before I reply definitely to the C.G.S., I should like to be informed on the following points:—

How can you and Lossow recommend acceptance, when you have before your eyes—

1. The continually false information furnished by the IV Army H.Q. on the military situation, on conditions of supply, and upon its communications to the rear.

2. The way in which the IV Army H.Q. mis-uses the railway for its private ends and thereby cripples it for military purposes. This is a question of a vital artery for us.

3. That to accept Jemal's proposals means handing over to him supervision of the whole of the German cash supplies with no means of control; and yet we know well enough what he will do with such a supply of cash.

4. That to accept, since the proposals are to bring even Yilderim L. of C. inspectorate under his influence, would also place the decision as to the Irak Expedition in his hands.

5. That the IV Army Commander has in no way kept his promises about Aleppo.

6. That to accept would throw all responsibility upon Germany for whatever may happen here and leave the German Commander with no possibility of organising for victory.

5.—CORRIGENDA.

Reference I.S. 449 of 22nd Oct.

(i) Para. 2. Cilicia, Sub-paras. B., C., and D. should appear under Para. 1. Syrian Front.

(ii) Para. 4. Captured Document.—Mardiu should read Mardin.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

23rd October, 1918.

[No. 450]

[P.T.O.]

E 33/149A

OCT 1918

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

A.—TIGRIS FRONT.—23rd October, 1918.

British advanced troops, moving up both banks of the River Tigris, reached within one mile of the Turkish position at Fathah, on the Jebel Hamrin (about 30 miles N. of Tekrit). Another detachment moved northwards from Tauk and occupied Taza Khurmatli (13 miles S.S.W. of Kirkuk).

B.—WESTERN FRONT.

ANALYSIS OF GERMAN PRISONERS.

Of the 57,318 prisoners captured on the British Front during August, 42,930 (officers and N.C.O's. excluded) have been classified as follows:—

Classes.	Percentages: Total prisoners captured 1st—31st August.
Active—	
1920.	0'2
1919.	16'0
1918.	13'8
1917.	11'6
1916.	9'0
1915.	6'8
1914.	4'5
1913.	2'9
1912.	2'4
Reserve	4'9
Landwehr 1st Bn.	3'2
Landwehr 2nd Bn.	1'9
Ersatz Reserve	5'5
Landsturm—	
1890-95	6'2
1885-89	5'4
1880-84	3'5
1876-79	1'7
1869-75	0'5

	100'0
Total classified.	42,930.

SHORTAGE OF RAW MATERIALS.

The following order of the Seventeenth German Army was published in the orders of the 16th Division on the 29th August, 1918:—"Exclusive measures will have to be taken immediately in order to increase the return of empties. The quantity returned bears no relation to the original material supplied. Artillery commanders will be held responsible for the return of empties, as the supplies of fresh ammunition depend upon it.

Particular attention is drawn to the gravity of the situation in regard to raw materials, on which the output of ammunition depends. When artillery is regrouped, all ammunition will be taken with it."

EMPLOYMENT OF DOGS FOR PATROL WORK.

The following is a captured order dated G.H.Q., 24th July, 1918, and signed by Ludendorff:—

Dogs have been observed in the enemy's lines, which no doubt serve to bark at our sentries, and in this way give the enemy reliable information regarding the whereabouts of our sentry posts, or as to whether the latter are occupied or not. We succeeded once in shooting a dog of this kind. No message forms or arrangements for carrying written orders were found on it. In addition, a short time ago, French instructions for the employment of war dogs were captured.

The translation of a paragraph contained therein on "Independent reconnoitring and attacking dogs" runs as follows:—

"The dogs selected are of the most vicious type. They are used on important patrols and reconnaissances and in ambush. They must always be kept on the leash up to the moment of the attack. The man in charge of the dog carries a leash 15-20 metres long, in order to allow his dog to reconnoitre in front of the patrol. As soon as a dog reports the presence of the enemy, the man in charge allows the dog to return, and reports to his patrol leader.

If the latter thinks it possible to lay an ambush, the man in charge of the dog unfastens the leash, and holds the dog by its collar.

When the enemy is near enough, the man in charge of the dog quietly orders his dog to 'seize him' and lets him loose. The dog at once falls on to one of the hostile patrol, whom he holds up until the man in charge of the dog approaches. The latter must make use of the confusion amongst the hostile patrol made by the dog's attack, and, with 3 men of his own patrol, must rush forward and fetch back the dog with the prisoner."

The question of using dogs in a similar way is being considered. Experiments are being made. The results will be communicated.

8101 130

Extracts from a Document issued by the German Admiralty Staff.

Dated—Berlin, 30th January, 1917.

RÉSUMÉ.

In discussions as to the value of ruthless submarine warfare, one will hear probably from those who oppose its renewal, something on the following line of argument:—

The result of the U-boat war will be of value only if it succeeds in starving out England. This, however, is impossible. In 1916 the wheat crop produced 1,500,000 tons. The amount of wheat used in peace was 165 kg. per head of the population, or 450 g. per head per day. The needs of the population of Great Britain and Ireland—46 million souls—were supplied for a period of 72 days by the 1916 harvest.

To the harvest of 1916, was added the supply of foreign wheat in the country assessed in the middle of September at 490,000 tons. At the present time, her position is not appreciably altered. This additional supply sufficed for a further 23 days. Further, the supplies in the hands of millers and bakers must be taken into account; the amount is not exactly known, but it would cover according to estimates, the need for a further 30 days. On the whole therefore, England had supplies for 125 days in all, at a time when her requirements were as in times of peace. This is a minimum estimate, for in the supplies enumerated above, the large quantities of wheat which the English Government has been secretly collecting during the war, are not included.

Without touching the Government stores, the supplies on hand at the time would suffice for 125 days, even consuming them as in peace time. Were the consumption rationed or limited, the supplies would last for a longer period still—about 160 days. In case of need one could utilise in addition barley and oats. The barley harvest in 1915 produced 1.5 million tons and 3.1 million tons of oats were harvested.

Before all things, however, it must be observed that great quantities of wheat are daily being brought into England. To cut off these imports would be impossible. Even with the most intensified U-boat war, so many ships would still break through the blockade, that the necessary wheat could be introduced into the country. With 5 to 6 corn ships a day, England could bring in all the wheat she requires. As 150 ships are daily *en route* for England, 5 or 6 would be certain to get through safely.

Even if England's East and West Coasts were completely blockaded, there would still remain the Channel route. To close this, would, judging by our former experiences, be impossible for our U-boats.

In the extreme case, therefore, wheat could be brought to French ports and thence through France and across the Channel to England."

"CAN THE ENGLISH AND THEIR ALLIES BE HELPED FROM OUTSIDE?"

The opponents of intensive submarine warfare are of opinion, that its resumption will cause the United States of America, and eventually under their and our opponents' pressure, the European neutrals as well, to enter into the war against us.

Would it really be of great help to our opponents, if the United States were to join their cause? Even now, America cannot deliver enough coal; how then is she to render aid in other ways on a larger scale, if the disposable tonnage is further drawn on? Apart from this, conditions in America are not normal.

The stream of immigrants to the States has ceased since 1914, and beyond this America has had to part with her population (English, Russians, Italians etc., who were liable for Military Service). The natural increase in the population of America is relatively small, owing to the peculiar condition, *i.e.*, immigration, under which its present number has been built up.

The 1916 harvest has turned out to be far smaller than that of 1915. It is generally compared to those of 1909/1913, and described as average, without it being taken into account that the population of the United States, in respect to the average figure of 1909/1913 has been added to by an appreciable number of millions, who will also have to be fed.

Should the English and French war industries decline as a result of the U-boat campaign, America is in a position to produce even more war material than hitherto and export it to England and France, provided her shipping remains untouched. She would then however, be compelled to limit considerably her export of other commodities on account of the tonnage devoted to carrying war material—thus England and France would obtain less food and so be unable to carry on the war.

America could also in time, fit out an army and send it to France, but this would entail an immediate limitation of her industrial activity and be prejudicial to our enemies. Moreover the army would have to be fitted out, maintained, and rationed from America.

According to experience that has so far been gained in this war, an American expedition of that sort would demand permanently so much tonnage, that difficulties would only become greater for our Western foe.

Beyond this, the formation of an army, if it is to be of real importance from its size, would require so much time, that the war would have been decided in our favour, before it could appear in the theatre of war.

E33/150

OCT 1918

E33/55a
OCT 1918

America can help with money. She is doing this already. But American gold is not much use if it is only despatched in small quantities, and if communications between our enemies is sufficiently interfered with.

America can also help diplomatically. This too she is doing, as already appears, after the U-boat war in its milder but more difficult form has created difficulties for our opponents.

When we are absolutely clear on the point that America can actually only help our enemies with gold and words, we can direct our U-boats on the traffic between England and North America, where the largest number of British ships can be sunk and the greatest part of the English import trade grappled with, thereby bringing the U-boat war to its full efficacy.

Yet, it will be urged, the Americans can endure war with us for a very long time! If it comes to a question solely of a war between us and America, certainly. But in the war, other lands would stand by America's side, and, as we have seen in the foregoing sections, they could not endure a sharp U-boat war indefinitely.

After a calculable space of time, they would be obliged to ask America to make peace, and, if no other way presented itself, they would be obliged to offer America something, to incline her to the fulfilment of their requests. England and France have many things to offer which can entice America, while America has nothing to expect from us.

I consider it as not out of the question, that the statesmen of England and France, while very willing to be helped diplomatically by the Americans with money and with deliveries of war material, would not be best pleased to see America herself join the war.

In the difficulties into which the U-boat war would bring them, England and France would fall very easily dependent on America, and eventually be forced to pay the price of victory, which America cannot get from Germany, themselves, in the shape of Canada, Martinique, Gaudeloupe, etc., to America.

One more objection must be met. It is declared, that the danger is still very real that America, if we fall into the war with her, would deny us after the war the raw materials that we must necessarily procure from her, and that thereby we should be economically put at a great disadvantage.

The proper reply is:—Before all else, everything depends on our winning the war. That is the best foundation too for our economic development. In an economic respect, nothing worse could happen to us than to lose the war.

Should this latter circumstance occur, we must expect to be badly treated the whole world over, even from an economic standpoint in America.

There will be no sympathy for us anywhere. It will be everywhere said the Divine Judgement has gone against us.

In that spirit we shall be met. Against it we shall be wholly defenceless.

If however we win the war, then we can determine the treatment that we must demand from an economic standpoint, also we shall stand forth so respected that the conditions under which peace has been made, will be observed.

Should the war remain undecided, the position of oversea countries will not be much better.

Then too, we shall be regarded and treated as those who set forth to conquer the world but who did not succeed.

Therefore one can only arrive at the conclusion:—We must risk everything to win the war.

America cannot stop us from reaching this goal."

Original Document found at the Yilderim Headquarters, Nazareth.

Confidential.

E 33/151

- OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—24th October, 1918.

SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS, 24th Oct.

(i.) Aleppo area.—Series of hastily constructed trenches between Merafe (6 miles S.W. of Aleppo) and Beleramun (5½ miles N.W. of Aleppo). These trenches appear lightly manned. Enemy evacuating Aleppo by Killis (36 miles N. of Aleppo) road.

Aleppo Town.—Scattered movement of about 700 cavalry near barracks.

100 R.S. and 6 engines in station. Forage stacks at Jindie on fire.

Muslimie Junction.—Four trains, loaded with troops, facing north. (R.A.F., 24-10).

(ii.) Hamdania (23-10).—About 450 infantry and cavalry left for north in morning. They were followed by a train of from 5-6 trucks.

Hamdania-Vudehi (23-10).—No troops between these stations.

(Refugees, 23-10).

Khan Tuman (9 miles S.W. of Aleppo).—Trenches manned by troops with M.G.'s.

(Deserter, 110th M.G. Coy., 23-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

(i.) The VII Army under Mustafa Kemal Pasha took over from the II Army at Aleppo on the 9th instant.

On 18th instant the 1st Division was the only division left in Aleppo; its orders to proceed to Katma were cancelled on the 17th instant.

[Note.—c.f. I.S. 449, of 22-10, para. 2.B.]

According to orders seen on 17th inst. this division, under Kor Bey, a German, was to form the rearguard at Aleppo, with the 48th Division in reserve at Katma. These two divisions now form the III A.C.

The 11th and 42 (? 24) Divisions (approximately 4,000 rifles) are at Vudehi provided with a number of M.G.'s., but only a few guns. These form the XX Army Corps under Ali Fuad Pasha, whose H.Q. are at Aleppo.

The II Army Headquarters, under Nihad Pasha, have proceeded to Adana. This army comprises the XII and XV A.C.'s., and had a total strength of about 5,000 rifles (including Euphrates Group) last August.

(Officer deserters, 22-10).

Comments.—(a) The 42nd Division was disbanded and absorbed by other formations early in 1918.

(b) The O.C. and part of the 48th Division were captured N. of Duma, see para. 1.D.

(c) See para. 3 of G.H.Q. I. Summary No. 446, dated 19th October.

(ii.) Zebil Depot Regt.

The regiment was stationed at Aleppo in the "Zebil" Hospital. Ten months ago two companies were sent away as drafts, the 3rd Coy. remained at Aleppo; its duty being to escort drafts. On 25th Sept. 180 men of this company were sent to Damascus as reinforcements and were all captured. The majority of the men were convalescents returned from hospital, also a few deserters.

(P/W this unit, 24-10).

C.—AERONAUTICS.

On 23rd September the aerodrome at Muslimie was bombed with effect. 3 enemy two-seaters which attempted to leave the ground were driven down. A later reconnoissance reported aerodrome abandoned and what appeared to be remains of three aeroplanes on the ground.

(c.f. I.S. 450 of 23-10—Para. 1. Addendum).

Subsequently 1150 lbs. of bombs were dropped on Aleppo station, direct hits being obtained on R.S. and buildings. (R.A.F., 23-10).

D.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.

48th Division.—On night 22-23 September the 48th Division evacuated its positions near Shunet Nimrin, and retired to the Wadi Zerka railway bridge where they rested on 24th Sept. They continued their retirement to Mafrak (26-9) and Deraa (27-9), marching only by night. On the same evening proceeded along the Railway to Kiswe arriving 30-9. Here they were attacked by our cavalry and retired north-east *via* Bahdiliye, east of Damascus, and south-east of Duma (evening, 1-10). A position was then taken up about 4 miles north of Duma, across the road when the greater part of the division was eventually captured by the British cavalry.

(O.C. 48th Division 23-10).

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

24th October, 1918.

[No. 451]

[P.T.O.]

E 33/15/A

OCT 1918

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

WESTERN FRONT—22nd October.

One more German Division has arrived from the East making the number of German Divisions now on this front 187.

A great wastage of German Artillery is known to have been caused by the offensives of this year, and there appears to have been a general reduction in heavy batteries from a four to a three gun basis.

8191 T30

CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

E 33/152

H.Q.,

20th December, 1917. - OCT 1918

Appreciation of the Situation.

By Major Von Papen.

The abandonment of the VII Army's intended attack? or their failure to reach their objectives, would necessitate new plans being made.

The condition of the roads during the rains and the lack of suitable means of transport can bring about a situation in which it will no longer be possible to keep the VII Army, at its present strength and in its present position, sufficiently supplied with food and munitions. Should this emergency arise, the question is, what must be done to keep up and improve the fighting efficiency of the army until operations can again be resumed?

The point to be considered is how far the VII Army, and in conjunction therewith, the VIII Army, must be withdrawn in order to provide for this contingency, and further, how far these measures will affect the progress of operations.

The sending up of supplies during the rains can only be guaranteed as far as the rail-heads (provided that the necessary supplies are brought up from the back areas). Even in the case of a further withdrawal of the VIII Army, it will still remain based on the railway. If the VII Army is also to be supplied direct by the railway, the plan of a withdrawal to the Tel Asur position must be set aside. In this position the transport would certainly have to go a shorter distance (45 km. by road), but would still not be sufficiently assured.

The Tul Keram-Nablus position must next be considered.

As a result of its favourable situation (marshes and wire entanglements), it requires the utilization of comparatively small forces from the VIII Army. The duty of the VII Army would then be, in addition to blocking the Nablus-Jerusalem road, and ensuring communication with the Jordan Valley, mainly to protect the mountain-roads between the flanks of the two Armies.

The weakness of this position lies in the fact that the railway for the VIII and rearward communication of the VII Army lies parallel and close to the Tul Keram-Nablus position.

This must lead the enemy to attempt a break-through in the mountains, thus forcing the VIII Army on to the line of retreat Kerkur-Lejjun, and the VII Army off the railway into the mountains.

However desirable it may appear to keep the Jordan Group in a position W. of Jericho, in order to hold the only Jordan crossing, this would appear to be impossible if the VII Army were withdrawn to Nablus.

The absolutely mobile forces of the enemy would be able to attack the Jordan Group from all sides, and its withdrawal across the Jordan would be jeopardized.

If, therefore, the VII Army were withdrawn, the disadvantage suffered by giving up the Jordan and withdrawing the XX Corps to the East bank must be taken into account.

The disadvantages of the Tul Keram-Nablus position, whose communications with the rear are constantly threatened, would be avoided by withdrawing the Army Group to the Carmel-Jenin position.

In this new position the railways Afule-Haifa and Afule-Jenin would act as feeders for the VIII and VII Army respectively. The roads also run at right angles to the line.

Against this advantage must be placed a greatly lengthened front. In order to hold this front the troops will have to be split up into several independent formations.

Although communications with the Jordan Group appear to be possible from the Tul Keram-Nablus position, this would not be the case from the other position on account of the distance. The principal considerations in favour of the withdrawal of the Army Group so far from the enemy are, firstly, that for a long time only small forces will be required to assure security, and secondly, that attention can be paid to the improvement of equipment and training. These considerations would not be realized, however, by the withdrawal of the Army Group to the Carmel-Jenin position.

This idea, in no case, appears to be at all feasible; for even the withdrawal of the Army Group, with the VIII Army between Acre and the Sea of Galilee, and with the VII Army on the Jordan S. of the Sea of Galilee, would involve the employment of a disproportionately large number of troops. The VIII Army would have to cover a position of 25 km.—excluding the marshes at Acre and between Kefr Menda and Ailbum—and would have to live on the country.

The VII Army would have the very difficult task of covering the railway connection W. of the Yarmuk valley, and preventing the enemy from attacking the Hejaz Railway wherever he pleases on the 90 km. between Semakh and the Jordan Group. If all the country W. of Jordan to the line Acre-Sea of Galilee were evacuated, the future prosecution of operations would have to be based almost entirely on the Hejaz Railway. The indirect protection of this railway line by the VII Army on the Jordan would thus be of vital importance, and would involve a proportionate employment of forces.

[P.T.O.]

E 33/162A

OCT 1918

As the renewal of operations in the Spring must have the recapture of Jerusalem as their object, it stands to reason that any voluntary evacuation of territory, which is not absolutely forced upon us, must lessen the chances of success.

We cannot hope, with the troops at our disposal—even if their fighting strength were to be increased—to effect a rapid and successful advance W. of Jordan on Jerusalem, in the face of an enemy, who, even if he is pressed back step by step, will destroy all means of communication behind him. As there can be no possible idea of building the railway as the troops advance, this operation would appear to afford no chance of success from the outset.

I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that, if the supply situation absolutely necessitates it, the Army Group will have to be withdrawn to the Tul Keram-Nablus position. From this position the carrying on of operations in conjunction with a strong Jordan Group is possible, without losing too much territory.

The immediate improvement of the Nablus-Beisan road in order to make it fit for wheel traffic, is essential.

It would be possible to withdraw at least 2 Divisions as an Army Group Reserve, and to place them behind the centre of the front at Messoudieh, or South thereof. Here they can be trained and easily rationed. At the same time, they would be immediately available for counter-attack in case the enemy, as anticipated above, breaks through between the flanks of the Armies.

Further forces could be collected at Jenin (Asia Corps and Macedonian Detachment) and Amman.

(Signed) PAPEN.

Original Document found at the Yilderim Headquarters, Nazareth.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

October 24th, 1918.

E 33/153

- OCT 1918

ROUTE REPORT.

ALEPPO—ALEXANDRETTA.

(Distance 96 miles).

GENERALLY.

The first portion of this route up to mile 39 was used by the enemy as their main Line of Communication. From the Jisr Afrin the main stream of traffic proceeded northwards up a road constructed during the war, leading to Islahie; whilst the route under discussion was only used for movement of small bodies of troops and supplies from the Port of Alexandretta. Previous to the war, it was a well-made chaussee road, varying in width from 10-24 ft., metalled throughout, and well-engineered over the Bailan Pass. The low lying part is raised in some places as much as 8 ft. above the Plain and on this part is too narrow in places for two lines of transport; but elsewhere, with the exception of the bridges, vehicles can pass throughout the route. The road is of a somewhat similar character to that from Damascus to Beirut and has been kept in repair by enemy labour units. Two big detours are made in order to avoid the hill country, and consequently the gradients are very easy until the pass over the Giaour Dagh.

From Aleppo (1,215 ft. above sea level), there is a general descent of a little over 800 ft. to Top Boghazi, a distance of 78 miles; whilst from the latter place the road ascends 1,600 ft. in 8 miles, and then descends to sea level in the last 10 miles of the route.

Two main rivers are crossed, and many wadis, all of which are bridged.

The route is divided into the following five sectors, suitable for cavalry movement:—

SECTOR 1.—ALEPPO—TEL AJAR (Distance 23 miles).

On leaving the town the River Kuwaik is crossed by the Azizie Bridge, and from here the road proceeds in a north-westerly direction over undulating country, with a gradual ascent to the village of Beleranum; and thence by a gradual descent over similar country for about four miles to Haritan, a small village just to the right of the road. From here to Tel Ajar there are no points of interest or military importance, the road passing through country with numerous low, bare, stony hills, rising to their highest just north of the village of Bianum. At mile 17, a 20 ft. culvert is crossed; and a mile before reaching Tel Ajar there is a bridge over a wady. If the bridge is destroyed, however, the wady is easily fordable by guns and possibly by Ford cars. Here there is open country suitable for camping, and plentiful water, as stated below. About one mile beyond Tel Ajar there is a large single-storied masonry building with a square enclosure (Kefr Altun Khau).

SECTOR 2.—TEL AJAR—AFRIN KHAN (Distance 18 miles).

This sector rounds the promontory of the Jebel Saman ridge and passes over bare, rolling country, mostly under cultivation, the road varying from 25 ft. to 12 ft. in width. At mile 25½ the village of Minil, of about 60 houses, is passed on the right; whilst the railway runs almost parallel to the road, and about a mile away, for some six or seven miles. At mile 29 the chaussee road to Killis branches off on the right; and less than two miles further on the road passes through the large village of Katma, the station being a little distance to the east. (Note.—Katma is incorrectly shown on the map as 1½ miles north of the road). A little west, and to the south of the village, is a large khan, with a big enclosure and accommodation for travellers, and stabling. Here the road passes between hills close to the railway, with a small perennial stream alongside, the valley of which it follows by a gradual descent to Jisr Afrin, passing, at mile 36 Khan Bairam, which is a building similar to the Katma Khan. A report from an Armenian Artillery officer states that the road does not cross this stream, as shown on the map, but keeps to the left the whole of the way from Katma to the Jisr Afrin. The latter in 1911 was a stone structure of two 40 ft. arches and three spans of 50 ft. girders, with a 12 ft. roadway; but this was destroyed by floods and has been replaced by a wooden bridge 40-50 metres long and some six metres above the water. In normal times the river (Afrin Su) would be fordable by carts, but is liable to flood at this point immediately after heavy rain. 100 yards beyond the bridge is the Afrin Khan, a large square enclosure of stone and mud, with stabling on three sides and on the other a two-storied building with upper rooms for travellers. There is unlimited camping space close by. Road metal is obtainable for repairs from the bed of the streams in the neighbourhood.

SECTOR 3.—AFRIN KHAN—EL HAMMAM (Distance 18 miles).

The road runs along the foot of the Kurd Dagh, with an open plain on the left, through which the Afrin Su flows. Movement of cavalry is possible anywhere on this portion of the route. Numerous wadis are crossed by strong culverts. The hills to the north of the road are very fertile, and numerous small villages are visible. The road ascends from Afrin Khan as it leaves the valley of the river and continues over gently rolling country to El Hammam. Here there is a hot sulphur spring (much used by invalids for bathing), and close to it there is a fresh water spring. It is a small village, with two khans and a cafe. The road is joined here by the direct track from Aleppo *via* Kalaat Saman; whilst the old road to Antioch, possible for wheels in summer, leads off in a south-westerly direction *via* the Jisr el Hadid. There is one large house in the village and ample space for camping in the neighbourhood.

E 33/154

OCT 1918

SECTOR 4.—EL HAMMAM-TOP BOGHAZI (Distance 21 miles).

This sector makes a big detour to the north to avoid the marshes round the lake of Ak Deniz. The route is more undulating and crosses numerous small streams. A considerable portion of this road is banked up above the plain to a height, in parts, of 8 feet, and the road varies from a width of 10 to 20 feet. Transport would have to keep, for most of the distance, strictly to the road itself. The marshes marked at the Jisr Murad Pasha are stated to be now practically non-existent. Cavalry could move on either side of the road for a great portion of this sector. There are no villages of any importance on the route, the chief feature being the causeway at Jisr Murad Pasha (mile 67). This consists of a masonry causeway 200 yards in length, with arches of 8—10 feet span, connected by a solid masonry causeway to another bridge. At mile 71½ a 12 ft. girder bridge is crossed; whilst at mile 72 the two main branches of the Kara Su are crossed by two steel bridges, the first of which is a 100 ft. lattice girder bridge, with a roadway of 14 ft., and the second a 40 ft. plate girder bridge. In the neighbourhood of these bridges the road is 5 ft. or 6 ft. above the plain. The river has a sluggish current, with a muddy bottom, and if the bridges are destroyed, it could be forded; but it would be difficult for transport, which would probably have to make a considerable detour to the north. (Note:—The information *re* bridges is from a reliable source, whilst the Armenian officer mentioned above states that they are of wood and both about 50 metres long. It is possible that the fact that the actual flooring of the bridges would probably be of wood has led to a misstatement in this case). Kirik Khan is reached at mile 75; and a stream just beyond the village is crossed by a good stone bridge. The village consists of about 60 houses, with two khans, a coffee shop, a good flour mill, a bakery, and a few small stores. There is good camping ground in the vicinity and this might prove to be a better halting place than Top Boghazi, which is reached at mile 78. This is merely a small hamlet, but plenty of water is available, and there is sufficient room for camping. From this point the chaussee road for Antioch leads off to the south, skirting the foot of the mountains.

SECTOR 5.—TOP BOGHAZI-ALEXANDRETTA (distance 18 miles).

This sector consists of a steep ascent to Bailan and a slightly easier descent to the coast. It is described as rather steeper than the Jericho-Jerusalem road, but has been used by motor traffic and is wide enough for two lorries to pass. There are numerous hair-pin bends, but the road is well engineered and reported to be in good condition. There is gravel and stone along the whole of the route available for repairs. On leaving Top Boghazi the first two miles are a gentle ascent over stony country, and at mile 84, a 15 ft. culvert is crossed and there are 200 yards of retaining wall on the upper side of the road, where the soil is of a heavy black clay. A mile further on, a guardhouse is passed and the old road from Antioch comes in on the left. At mile 86 the head of the pass is reached (1,980 ft. above sea level) and from here the road descends to the large village of Bailan, with a population (according to recent reports) of over 5,000. It is the seat of a Mudir and a favourite summer resort of Alexandretta. Just below the village the road passes through a narrow rocky cutting, and from there, descends through undulating and cultivated country to Alexandretta.

(For details of latter, see Topographical Report of 22nd inst., "Alexandretta and surrounding country.")

Alternative Route from Kirik Khan to Alexandretta.

This is the direct route over the mountains, shown by a single line on the Alexandretta 1:250,000 map. It is suitable for cavalry, but not for wheels, as the gradients are steep, and it is merely a track, there being no made road. Information is to hand to the effect that enemy troops have used this route during the war. Should movement up the Bailan Pass be opposed by the enemy, this appears to be a suitable route for an outflanking movement.

ALEPPO—ALEXANDRETTA.
(Water available along route).

GENERAL.

The rivers and streams are mostly perennial, and water is available throughout this route, though not very plentiful for the first 30 miles. There is generally abundant water in the river Afrin Su (which flows roughly parallel to the road for 25 miles, at an average distance from it of two miles), and in the small streams flowing into that river from the hills north of the road. In this sector most of the villages have good wells. In the sector where the road crosses the Giaour Dagh there is a good supply of water from the mountain streams and springs.

SECTOR 1.—ALEPPO-TEL AJAR.

Mile.		
13½	Bianum	} Good water from wells.
17	Mejer	
20½	Deir El Jemel	
23½	Tel Ajar	Perennial stream of small flow.

SECTOR 2.—TEL AJAR-AFRIN KHAN.

24½	Kefr Antun	A well with Persian wheel.
32	Katma	Plentiful water from stream. There is also a good well near the Khan.
34	Ziaret Haman	A spring and two small water-mills.
39	Afrin Khan	Abundant water from river, which is 200 ft. wide and 1½ ft. to 2 ft. deep, with a fairly swift current in spring. The bed of the stream is pebbly. The district is fertile and well watered.

E 33/155
OCT 1918

SECTOR 3.—AFRIN KHAN—EL HAMMAM.

Mile.		
43	Ziaret Abdurahman	(The shrine of Abdurahman) is beside a small stream.
47	Sheikh Abdurahman	Water from numerous small streams.
51	Jindares	Good water from a well, 5 ft. square, 30 ft. deep, faced with stone.
57	El Hammam	A good well for drinking purposes, (and strong hot sulphur spring much used by invalids for bathing).

SECTOR 4.—EL HAMMAM—TOP BOGHAZI.

60	Metalik (? Yenikeui)	A well 40 ft. deep.
61½	Ak Punar	On the old road to the right, and marked by a mound, has a fine spring.
67	Jisr Murad Pasha	Several small streams.
71	Mahmudlu	Several streams, of which the Kara Su itself is perennial.
75	Kirik Khan	A small stream.
78	Top Boghazi	A stream and well water; also a water-mill.

SECTOR 5.—TOP BOGHAZI—ALEXANDRETTA.

Mile.

- 86 Bailan Pass.—A small fountain; and there are several fountains between the Pass and Bailan Village.
- 88 Bailan.—A good supply of spring water, and several fountains north of the village, on the road to Alexandretta.
- 96 Alexandretta.—Water from springs of large capacity, about ½ mile out of the town and 200 yds. East of the Bailan Road, where there is a reservoir. The springs themselves are under cover, and the water is carried in pipes to all parts of the town. There are numerous other springs in the district.

Water on Alternative Route from Kirik Khan to Alexandretta.

This route crosses the mountains and follows the course of two streams almost all the way. Water is plentiful in winter and spring.

Alternative Routes.**ALEPPO—EL HAMMAM.**

There appear to be two routes, as follows:—

(a) *Via* Khan el Asil, Ajar (Angel) and Turmanin, description of which is given under Route 4, "Description of Country round Aleppo" (see G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary, dated 22nd October, 1918).

(b) *Via* track shown on 1:250,000 Alexandretta map to Kalaat Saman and thence to El Hammam. This route runs over open country, the soil being red clay or mud, variously reported (i.) as a very rough track through rocky country, scarcely good enough for a large number of cavalry, and (ii.) as a track possible for guns and limbers in dry weather, but liable to become heavy after rain.

The water *en route* is believed to be from cisterns only.

TOP BOGHAZI—ANTIOCH—SUEDIA.

(Distance 34 miles).

This is described as a narrow metalled road, fairly level throughout to Antioch and in good repair. It skirts the edge of the hills, with the Lake of Ak Deniz on the left. At mile 5 a stream is crossed by a wooden bridge of four spans of 30 ft. on masonry piers. In 1911 this bridge was broken, but presumably has since been repaired, but the stream is fordable. There is very little cultivation here and the population is scanty, chiefly on account of the hot and unhealthy climate in the summer. From Alakhan, at about mile 9, there is a gradual descent to Antioch, the road crossing two streams a little before reaching the town by two bridges, the first of which is a 60 ft. iron bridge with stone abutments; no details available of the second bridge.

Antioch itself (mile 17) is on the left bank of the Orontes River, which is here from 60–80 yards wide and is crossed by a stone bridge of six arches. The modern town is built within the walls of the old city and has a population of about 30,000 inhabitants.

From here onwards to Suedia the road is very difficult and practically impossible for wheels, unless very much improved since 1911, when it was reported as fit only for infantry. It follows close beside the River Orontes the whole of the way and crosses various mountain torrents. On leaving Antioch the Orontes is recrossed and one mile from the town there is a very steep gradient down to and up from a stone bridge of three spans of 30 ft., known as the Jisr el Khan. The road continues over country which is in some places stony and in others boggy, passing through the beds of hill torrents at miles 23, 25 and 28, at which latter point it is stated that a guide is necessary in order to find the road.

It is not clear exactly what course the road follows from here onwards, but it appears to pass through the Village of Wady Jarab, where it becomes a deep lane between walls and mulberry gardens.

Suedia is a little bit inland from the coast and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of the actual mouth of the Orontes. It acts as the port for Antioch. It is a scattered place, each house standing in its own mulberry garden, situated at the foot of the hills about three miles from the sea. Population numbers about 10,000, many being occupied in producing silk. It lies very low, is liable to flood in the spring and is extremely unhealthy in the summer. In the hills surrounding it there are some thriving villages and the country itself is very fertile. Fuel is plentiful. There is a small pier and a landing place about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles up stream from the mouth of the river, with a Mudir and Custom House, and a liquorice root factory. The river at the landing place is about 100 yards wide and from 3-9 ft. deep, the main channel averaging from 30-50 ft. in width and 30 ft. in depth. Ships have to lay off $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the shore to unload or receive cargoes.

OCT 1918

TOP BOGHAZI-ANTIOCH-SUEDIA.
(Water available along Route).

The route crosses several mountain streams and follows for more than half its distance close to the River Orontes and water is plentiful at all seasons.

Mile.

- 5 Khan Bedirga.—Stream flowing into the Lake.
- 11 Spring close to the right of the road.
- 15 The Kuwesie.—A stream flowing into the Orontes.

From here onwards no detail is necessary, as water is available over the whole of the Route.

ALEPPO-ANTIOCH.
(Distance 70 miles).

This route, the first 30 miles of which have been described in Route 3, "Description of Country round Aleppo," (see G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary, dated 22nd October, 1918), is stated to be passable for all arms for the first 32 miles, and for the remainder of the distance for infantry only, on account of rocks from mile 32 to mile 42; on account of mud from mile 42 to mile 54; and because the route passes down narrow walled lanes for the majority of the remaining distance.

From Teribe the course of this route is not certain, but it appears to pass through Haran and Yenishehr, thence almost due east to the River Orontes, following the right bank of the same until the Jisr el Hadid is reached. From this point it follows the double track shown on the map to Antioch.

Water is available at:—

- (a) Haran, from the Nahr el Berak.
- (b) Yenishehr, from a good well and stream.
- (c) From the River Orontes at the Jisr el Hadid, and
- (d) From a good spring about one mile East of Alieddin.

General Staff (Intelligence),
G.H.Q., E.E.F.,

24th October, 1918.

de
Confidential.

E 33/157

**G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 0800—25th October, 1918.**

- OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

(i.) Aleppo area.—Trench systems at Risawi (4 miles S. of Aleppo) and Azizie (2 miles West of Aleppo) strongly held. No other trenches occupied. Aleppo town. 100 R.S. and 4 engines. A building on fire. A.A. fire was experienced.

Mashale.—35 R.S. and 1 engine. Station destroyed.

Muslimie Junction.—Much destroyed material, including 14 vehicles, apparently M.T.

(R.A.F., 25-10).

(ii.) It is reported that the remains of 3 Turkish Divisions at Aleppo are retiring North and North-West by road and rail in small parties. It is estimated that 2,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, who reached Aleppo from South on 25th October, are holding the town.

All Germans are reported to have left Aleppo. A force which includes artillery, under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, is reported to be retiring on Katma.

(Descorps, 25-10).

B.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.

(i.) 3rd CAVALRY DIVISION.

At 1700 on 21st September the 3rd Cavalry Division, then in the Jordan Valley south of Jisr ed Damie, received orders to proceed to Beisan and cover the Jordan Bridge whilst the VII and VIII Armies crossed. The Division arrived there at 1930 on 23rd September and finding the bridge in occupation of the British took up a position two miles to the east. At midnight orders were received from the IV Army to cover the retreat of the remnants of VII and VIII Armies, who had crossed further south, as far as Mezerib which was reached on 26th September. From there the division was ordered to secure the right flank and march by Nawa and El Kuneitra. At Nawa orders were countermanded and the division retired to Kiswe, arriving on 29th September. On the same evening they left for Sasa, but could not get further than Artuz whence they fell back on Ashrafie covering two infantry divisions (21st and 11th) and took up a position on the right flank of the infantry. By 1730 on 30th September the infantry had been forced back and Damascus occupied from the north. The O.C. and Staff then surrendered—the fate of rest of the division is not known.

(O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, 23-10).

(ii.) "Yilderim Situation Report.—The enemy reported yesterday in the neighbourhood of El Kuneitra, continued their advance during night 29th-30th September through Sasa on Damascus. There was bitter fighting at Kiswe and on the high ground at El Mezze, in which the enemy employed infantry, cavalry, and guns mounted on armoured cars. The Headquarters of the IV Army came under fire. Our detachment at El Mezze, under Col. Ismet Bey (Note.—Late O.C., III A.C.) withdrew to the north along the Barada Valley during the night. No enemy movement on coast north of line Tyre-Damascus, nor east of the Deraa-Damascus Railway line. The 3rd Cavalry Division was on the right wing of the Tiberias Group. The Caucasus Cavalry Brigade withdrew east of Damascus. Our troops engaged at Kiswe have received orders to retire on Homs on losing touch with the enemy. General Mustafa Kemal Pasha has been ordered to take over the Rayak Group."

(Extract from Captured Document, dated 30-9-18).

C.—ORGANISATION.

MILITARY SCHOOLS.

Previous to the present operations there were about 240 pupils in the Military School at Damascus, who underwent a course of study, varying according to their age. Pupils then passed into the Military Academy at Constantinople on reaching the age of 18. After 4 months at Constantinople all who successfully passed their examinations, were sent to regiments. Four months later a second examination had to be passed in order to become a cadet, and after a further 6 months in the regiment a third examination in order to become a 2/Lieut.

(O.C., Military School, Damascus, 22-10).

2.—MESOPOTAMIA.

(i.) It is reported that eight 7.5 cm. Q.F. field guns and four 15 cm. howitzers left the Tigris front for Aleppo on 1st October; also that ammunition had been withdrawn from the Tigris to railhead.

(Agent and Deserters, 22-10).

(ii.) BAGDAD RAILWAY.

It is reported that the broad gauge railhead is now at Namatli (7 miles East of Nisibin). Levels have been completed as far as Demir Kapu Khan (about 40 miles East of Nisibin by road). Work east of this place has been recently discontinued.

(Deserters and agent, 23-10).

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

25th October, 1918.

[No. 452]

[P.T.O.]

E 33/154 A

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

- OCT 1918

WESTERN FRONT.

1. Effects of Artillery Fire.—The following captured order shows the effect of the Allied counter-battery work:—

“C.G.S. of the Field Army.

1st Aug., 1918.

An accurate record of the wastage in heavy and field artillery material gives the following interesting result:—

In one month the enemy's fire has completely destroyed, in round numbers, 13 per cent. of the pieces taking part in active operations. This figure clearly brings out the value of persistent counter-battery work. Consequently I request that measures be taken to ensure that on our side also all available means are employed to carry on the artillery battle with all possible energy. Attention is again drawn to the memorandum already issued to this effect with reference to the intersection of positions, the accuracy of maps, the employment of aeroplane and balloon observation, deliberate shooting with single guns, &c.

(Signed) LUDENDORFF.”

2. German Artillery Tactics.—The following extract from an order of the 10th Reserve Division, dated the 29th July, 1918, shows the measures laid down for the artillery during the withdrawal from the Marne:—

“Disposition in great depth must always be attained.

Single guns will be left in very forward positions; their task will be to engage tanks and to carry on enfilade fire. They should be in positions completely covered from view and should be absolutely ready to open fire, but they will only do so when it is definitely established that the enemy is attacking in strength.

All preparations must be made for destroying them, if necessary. The bulk of the artillery should be placed behind the main line of resistance, disposed in depth up to a distance of five kilometres. Behind this will be formed a second wave of artillery, of the strength of at least a field artillery Abteilung and one or two heavy batteries. This wave will be placed under the command of a special artillery commander. Its teams will be kept close up, and it will be in telephonic communication with the divisional artillery commander.

Its task is to come into action should unforeseen circumstances arise; this it will do either from its own position, or from a more forward alternative position.

The battle tasks of the artillery will be so allotted as to maintain its fighting powers for the longest possible time and to permit of those units being rested, whose value has depreciated.

The artillery must realize that, in the present circumstances, it forms the cornerstone of our strength in defence.”

3. Automatic Pistols.—An order of the 121st Reserve Infantry Regiment, dated the 19th August, 1918, contains the following:—

(i.) Issue to companies: 2 pistols and 6 boxes of ammunition, each containing 480 rounds (15 drums). These are to be used for purposes of training. Only half a drum will be fired at a time.

(ii.) The automatic pistol is a regular “bullet squirt” (Kugelspritze) and is well adapted for hand to hand fighting. It must, however, be entrusted only to skilled marksmen. All officers, platoon and patrol commanders, and, for the present, 6 men per company, taken from rifle sections (not machine-gun sections), will be trained in its use.

CORRIGENDUM.

Reference I.S. 451, of 24-10, para. 1.C. “23rd Sept.” should read “23rd October.”

Confidential.

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—26th October, 1918.

E 33/158
- OCT 1918
- OCT 1910

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

Aleppo, 26th October.—About 2,000 Turkish cavalry with two guns are reported to have left the town at 0700.

(D.M.C., 26-10).

Comment.—On 22nd October, air reconnaissance reported 1,300 cavalry, chiefly in small parties and scattered, between Umerjim and Aleppo.

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

(i.) The 3rd Coy., 1st Battalion, 111th Regt. (about 61 rifles strong) with 7 M.G.'s. reached Maarit en Naaman. The 1st and 2nd Coys. returned from Aleppo to Adana on 19th October. The whereabouts of the other two battalions of the 111th Regt. is not known.

(P/W of unit, 24-10).

(ii.) The 205th German Motor Lorry Column escaped from Hama to Aleppo.

(P/W 205th M.T. Column, 24-10).

C.—AVIATION.

A German N.C.O. Pilot states that on the 24th October only five serviceable reconnaissance machines remained with the force in the Aleppo area.

2.—CILICIA.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

According to a prisoner from the 132nd Regt., the 3rd Bn. of that Regiment left Alexandretta for Adana over two months ago and is still there.

Comment.—This requires confirmation, as by 18th February, 1918, this battalion had become non-existent (c.f. I.S. 439, of 12th October.—Order of Battle, II Army), but it is possible that it has since been reformed.

3.—ANATOLIA.

A P/W who left Menemen two months ago, gives the following particulars of the 147th Regt., which was then stationed at Menemen. The ration strength was 2,100, of which over 50% were over military age; the remainder ranged from 15 years old upwards and consisted of recruits and captured deserters.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

26th October, 1918.

[No. 453]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

1.—TIGRIS FRONT, 25th October.

The British Column which occupied Taza Khurmatli advanced northwards and captured Tazian Village, one mile S.W. of Kerkuk, the southern outskirts of which have been entered by patrols.

Our advance up both banks of the Tigris continues. The Turks who had retired to El Humr, on being threatened by cavalry moving down the Lesser Zab river were forced to fall back on a position covering Kalaat el Bint (4 miles N.W. of El Humr).

2.—WESTERN FRONT.

(a) Evidence has been received that in many German Regiments companies of trustworthy men have been formed with a view to suppressing any disorder which might break out on a large scale.

(b) The employment of machine-guns for close defence of artillery.—An order of the Second German Army, dated 3rd August, 1918, contains the following:—

“The correct use of the machine-guns of the artillery is of vital importance in defence. They must be so sited that not only are individual batteries protected but the whole battery area is safe-guarded by mutual support. Divisions must detail experienced machine-gun officers to supervise the general organization of artillery machine-guns, and should keep in touch with this as much as with the progress of the battery positions, and the arrangements for their close defence.”

The following extracts are taken from more detailed instructions added to the above by the LIV Corps, dated 5th August, 1918:—

“1. The battery positions must be entirely surrounded by wire entanglements, however simply. Exits must be capable of being blocked immediately, by means of knife rests or cylinders of wire prepared for that purpose. The machine-guns of the battery should be able to cover the ground in front of the wire on the enemy's side with enfilade fire.

[P.T.O.]

E 33/158 A
OCT 1918

2. The importance of close defence must be brought home to all the men. Simple tactical problems should be set, carried out and thoroughly discussed. For this purpose, infantry and machine-gun officers should be called on for advice. The lessons learnt should be communicated to all batteries.

Machine-guns are only of value to the artillery when they can be manned by the gunners themselves and when they are sited on correct principles. The gunners must be trained and exercised in the use of machine-guns. The machine-guns must be kept ready for action and not stowed away in some dug-out, or, as is sometimes the case, in an unserviceable condition. There is a plentiful supply of machine-guns in reserve to replace unserviceable weapons."

It would appear that machine-guns allotted to batteries are sometimes carried on limbers. A series of captured blue prints, issued by an Army Headquarters shows a foot artillery limber carrying machine-gun equipment disposed as follows:—

The gun, the auxiliary mounting, four belt boxes, condenser tube and condenser bag are carried in a wooden box fitted behind the driver's seat.

The case of spare barrels is carried strapped to the top of the driver's seat.

One regulation container for water supply, one belt box and two spare parts boxes are carried on the footboard, and are strapped to the seat.

The tripod mounting is strapped below the footboard. Tripod mounting—Two types of tripod mounting are shown, one with wooden and one with iron legs. The legs are 5 ft. long, the trunnions of the gun being 4 feet 10 inches above the ground level.

The following extracts are from an order of the 157th Artillery Commander (107th Division) dated 15th July, 1918, on the "Use and siting of the machine-guns of the artillery":—

I. The machine-gun in position in warfare.

(a) Artillery machine-guns are used almost exclusively for defence. There is usually one machine-gun in the battery position and one at the wagon lines; the latter is used for anti-aircraft defence.

(b) The machine-gun in the battery position. The most frequent use is for anti-aircraft work. A special anti-aircraft mounting should be constructed. Aeroplanes flying at more than 1,000 metres should never be engaged nor should they ever be engaged by night.

The most important use of the machine-gun in the battery position is engaging the enemy when he has penetrated the line in front of the battery.

The battery commander must select the machine-gun site.....The best position is about 300 m. in front of the battery and 300 m. to a flank.....Local conditions of ground must be taken into account.

II. The machine-gun in open warfare.

(a) On the march. Machine-guns must be mounted on wagons in such a manner that they can engage enemy aircraft at once. Men must be permanently detailed for this beforehand.

(b) In the battery position. As in position warfare, but somewhat nearer the guns..... They may be employed to reinforce the offensive machine-gun fire, but should be reserved mainly for defensive purposes.

(c) In the wagon lines. To be taken off the wagons and mounted at some distance from the horse lines.

(d) In rest billets. Both machine-guns should be manned in daytime.

III. The siting of all artillery machine-guns of the 107th Division is to be supervised by the Close Range Group.

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT.

E33/159
- OCT 1918

Summary for Week ending 26th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT G.H.Q.

1.—Temperature.

		Differences from previous week.
MEAN OF WEEK	75	+1
MEAN MAXIMUM	89	+3
MEAN MINIMUM	66	+2
HIGHEST RECORDED on 22nd	100	+9
LOWEST RECORDED on 20th and 26th	64	+1

2.—Humidity.

MEAN OF WEEK	52	-19
HIGHEST RECORDED on 25th at 2000	82	-8
LOWEST RECORDED on 22nd at 1400	20	-27

3.—Wind.

For the first three days the winds were Westerly or North-westerly. They veered through N. to E. on the next two days, but became Westerly again as the week closed.

At no time did the velocity exceed "light."

4.—Rainfall.

The heaviest fall was 4 m.m. (.02 in.) during the 24 hrs. ending 0800 on 23.
A trace fell during the 25th.

Summary for Week ending 26th October, 1918, at 1800,
by 7th FIELD SURVEY COY., R.E.

OBSERVATIONS TAKEN AT JERUSALEM.

1.—Temperature.

		Differences from previous week.
MEAN OF WEEK	71	+3
MEAN MAXIMUM	84	+2
MEAN MINIMUM	63	+3
HIGHEST RECORDED on 20th, 21st and 22nd	90	+1
LOWEST RECORDED on 25th and 26th	57	-1

2.—Humidity.

MEAN OF WEEK	44	-13
HIGHEST RECORDED on 23rd at 2000	83	-6
LOWEST RECORDED on 19th at 2000	22	+2

3.—Wind.

The wind blew chiefly from Easterly direction (between N.N.E. and S.S.E.), but occasionally reached North. No velocity above moderate was recorded.

4.—Rainfall.

Traces of rain fell on each of the days 22-25th inclusive.

Translation of Captured Correspondence.

E33/160

Ramle, 14-11-17. - OCT 1918

To Major von Papen.

From all accounts the remnants of the XXII Army Corps, according to Refet's statements still about 1,500 rifles, fought very bravely yesterday evening.

It is really a wonderful thing that the English cavalry did not force their way through to here; how could 1,500 men with but little artillery defend a front of 15 km., and, added to that, partly in unfavourable positions in the open?

The artillery has worn-out guns, they are no longer accurate, and there are absolutely no spare parts.

The machine-guns have no reserve barrels, a great number of them no longer work, there is everywhere a want of necessary spare parts. The trained men are mostly dead or wounded, so that the machine-guns can no longer form the backbone of the infantry, as one hoped. The night was highly interesting, officers constantly came from the front, I had a talk with each, later on will report more, verbally.

18-11-17.

Only to-day can I continue to write more. Early in the morning of the 14th came the news that Herrgott had been taken prisoner and that the enemy cavalry had broken through near Shahme. I quickly mounted Herrgott's horse which had galloped back, and which was dog-tired, and rode forth; the brute had to carry me late into the night, till I could find another, in order to look for the 54th Division. My horseholder had, of course, marched off to the North with my own horse, which was to be held ready for all emergencies.

This is just one of the little troubles that always occur when something happens.

The times with the troops were highly interesting and instructive, I hope you will shortly return here, I can put you *au courant* with a great deal, I cannot write you everything.

Senior officers from the higher staffs had to come to regimental duty for a time, though only for a few days, a few days with the company, battalion, etc., and a few days with the division. After this, perhaps, many an order that cannot be carried out will not be given, or at least, will be given in a different form.

The confidence of the troops in their leaders will be strengthened. One hears wounded men very often ask "How could this or that have been ordered?" These enquiries are not always unjustified. A short warning order when night changes are to be made, such as "54th Division to be collected near El Tireh to retire to the North, more detailed order follows."

I spent the night with the division, it was highly interesting; commander *very* energetic; saying, for example, to a regimental commander who was not forward in the fight "Where do you want to desert to?" Occasionally he flogs them here and there with his whip, which is very refreshing to witness. At the same time the man is modest and accessible to quietly suggested advice.

General Staff Officer Hakki very thorough, modest and accessible; anything proposed by him is actually carried out.

Hollaender maintains control very well through the Commander and Hakki, and besides is very dashing. Hakki was wounded in the head in the night raid at Et Tine and Wadi Surar, neither has yet the Iron Cross, II Class; the Commander is the man who, escaping from Russian captivity, made his way through America back to Constantinople.

Hakki proposed to degrade publicly those officers who showed cowardice and to make them serve as privates; I think that this remedy would be very good for this reason, that they would then get no more pay and are liable to be flogged.

One ought to begin now combing out weak formations, a battalion out of a regiment and so forth, disbanding certain parts, retaining only the good officers, placing the others in a training camp where they would be properly licked into shape, perhaps sending them to Germany, or at the least, placing them in German training commandos.

This scheme has already been promised and is in course of preparation, but would have to take place in combination with other fronts.

There are perhaps many good officers in quiet positions, who are more needed here. Exchange from here might be dangerous, as many a man might develop a yearning for a quiet front.

The Liaison again and again comes up against great difficulties. Nearly all the Turks untrained, and there is a want of the simplest intelligence; have come across this particularly in the XXII Army Corps and the 54th Division.

The telephone units are again and again deposited out in the wilds by motor lorries without money or rations, with weighty equipment (camp beds, etc.); we never hear of this and the material gets lost.

We are trying to obtain a few horses now, in order that the demolition troops may be mounted, but unfortunately on their formation, almost entirely infantrymen were taken.

The men are easily taken prisoner, and go to pieces if they have to do everything on foot, they get nervous, and, in a tight corner, do not hold out.

Dug-outs must certainly be provided, otherwise everybody will disappear in event of an air raid.

E33/1607

The map shortage is serious; the telephone troops must at least have sketches, otherwise they will never be where wanted, they understand no names and never know if a connection lies to their rear or towards the enemy.

Are there no more heliographs? Communications only through German hands, using Turks as orderlies, otherwise things will never be in order.

The countryside East of the railway is exceedingly difficult, full of boulders, entrenching impossible, Hottentot tactics are being employed. Difficult to get artillery into position as all the exits of wadis lie towards enemy. Jemal is said, however, to have mountain guns.

Section from Jimzu could not get any guns along, as only pack transport could move. This section should, for instance, unquestionably have been issued with helios.

Direct airline communication possible Jimzu-Mejdel.

If iron rations are issued, the damp in the mountains will very soon ruin them.

That the horses are in such poor condition, is due largely to the bad treatment they have had; the Turk does not off-saddle at night; I have often noticed this.

Are there no water carts either? Water question here even more important than in the South-West,* since the Turks drink an extraordinary amount of water. According to a Turkish proverb, "Two drinks of water are equal to a meal." A watercart is necessary for all movements, above all, when searching for a new position; what use is the best position if it has no water? Just as indispensable are road maps—sand, loam, slimy clay roads cannot be utilised in the wet season.

The wadi crossings must be improved by the inhabitants, banks graded, stone dams constructed. At Okahandja (? in South-West Africa) there is a dam, 500 metres long of stone and wood which did yeoman service.

In the formation of new sections, post old hands who know the conditions of the the country. In the motor lorry columns especially, the same mistakes were made as in the the South-West, with the 1st and 2nd Telegraph Regiment. Old hands in No. 1, new ones in No. 2, latter wiped out after a few months as all the horses were done. Many motor lorries would not have been ruined if the new men had known the difficulties of the ground.

In conclusion, I would ask you again to do everything to settle the question of head covering for the Germans, no caps or tropical helmets. In the two first battles of Gaza, many Germans fired on and taken prisoners by the Turks. The men never like going on with me if I wear a cap or a tropical helmet; there will be a disaster if we don't get Turkish head covering.

We need maps urgently, amongst the troops there are hardly any, it is very difficult for the men to comply with changes of march orders or even to understand them. The Turk makes far too little use of the population for road-making, trench-digging, munitions, transport of rations, and improvement of the watering places.

Are there saddlebags to be got anywhere? I wanted to bring my saddlery with me, but the War Office in Berlin said "No," there was everything here.

There is said to be a depot in Jerusalem; is that correct?

(Signed) Volte.

* Possibly South-West Africa.

This document was found in the Yilderim Headquarters, Nazareth.

sh
Confidential.

E 33/161

= OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—27th October, 1918.

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

27th Oct. Mejer (15 miles N.W. of Aleppo on Alexandretta Road). 150 infantry. 24 M.T. and H.T. Turkish hospital west of road. 2 A.A. guns, mounted on lorries, were firing. Minil (9 miles north of Mejer) 30 M.T. parked. 50 cavalry and 100 infantry. Mashale Station.—25 R.S. including 1 train of 15 R.S. facing west. 300 infantry and 150 cavalry. 100 horses in lines. 340 T.S. and S.S. 40 stacks of stores. 26 M.T. A train of 15 R.S. moving east about 2 miles west of station. Killis.—50 infantry moving north 2 miles south of town. 60 horses in lines north of station.

(R.A.F., 27-10).

(ii.) The enemy troops from Aleppo have withdrawn to a line Khan Narista (12 miles N. by W. of Aleppo)—Nubbul (15 miles N.N.W. of Aleppo).

(D.M.C., 27-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS.

(i.) Previous to operations the 48th Divisional Artillery consisted of the 8th Mountain Battery of the 7th Artillery Regiment, the 1st Battery 48th Artillery Regiment and a Mule Mounted Battery. The Field and Mule Mounted Batteries were captured at Kiswe—the Mountain Battery at Duma.

(O.C. 48th Divisional Artillery, 22-10).

(ii.) All the guns of the 1st and 2nd Bns. 26th Artillery Regiment were captured at Beisan.

(P/W, 1/26th Artillery Regt., 24-10).

C.—ORGANISATION.

(i.) RECRUITING.

Since the commencement of the war about 15,000 men, all Arabs, passed through the Recruiting Offices at Damascus. There were no volunteers amongst them, and the majority had to be enrolled by force. Men under 20 years of age were sent to the Baalbek Depot; those over 20 were drafted direct to units.

(O.C. Recruiting Depot, Damascus, 22-10).

50 men were enrolled at Nablus during period 25th July/28th August and at Tul Keram during period 28th August/19th September. They were all sent to Labour Corps Units.

(Recruiting Officer, Tul Keram, 22-10).

(ii.) The VIII A.C. Attack Coy. originally came from Panderma, and consisted of 2 officers (one of whom a cadet), 12 N.C.O.'s. and 150 privates. There were 6 heavy M.G.'s. attached. The Coy. was captured north of Damascus when retreating with the Composite Division.

(P/W from unit, 24-10).

2.—CAUCASUS.

An Officer P/W who left Batum about 7th August states that the 3rd Division was being reformed there from Moslem recruits from the occupied provinces. It was under the command of Col. Halet Bey, whose headquarters were at Adjara (unidentified), S.E. of Batum. The division was to be equipped with Russian rifles, M.G.'s. and guns.

The Batum garrison, which then consisted of the 94th C. Regiment and the 9th and 18th Depot Regiments, was under the command of Zade Jemaleddin Effendi.

Comment.—The 3rd Division was absorbed on the Palestine front early in 1918, but the Headquarters and a Cadre were reported to have gone to Constantinople. The 94th C. Regiment is probably the 94th C. Battalion, 32nd C. Regiment, 10th C. Division. The 9th Depot Regiment was probably at that time at Constantinople but had sent large drafts to Batum.

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

27th October, 1918.

[No. 454]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

1.—TIGRIS AND KERKUK FRONTS, 26th October.

Kerkuk was captured by British troops after slight opposition, the Turks withdrawing in a North-westerly direction towards Altun Keupri after burning three of their aeroplanes. The British column following up the retreating enemy has reached 12 miles N.W. of Kerkuk.

On the right bank of the Tigris, enemy transport was attacked by a raiding force of British armoured-cars 38 miles in rear of the position occupied by the 14th Turkish Division near El Humr.

2.—WESTERN FRONT.

During August and September 19 German Divisions were disbanded on the Western Front. The total number of German Divisions on this front is now 187 including 4 dismounted Cavalry Divisions. In addition there are 7 Austrian Divisions.

Correspondence between Field Marshal Liman von Sanders and
Major von Papen, Chief of Staff, IV Turkish Army.

(Letter).

4-8-18.

E 33/162
- OCT 1910
OCT 1918

His Honour, Major von Papen.

I regret to have to inform your Honour, that I am not in *any way in agreement* with the various measures recently adopted by the Chief Command of the IV Army.

The VIII Army Corps fought well and bravely under Ali Fuad Bey, and but for this the results would have been very different.

I give my criticism below:—

(1) It would have been advisable for the Headquarters of the IV Army to keep in close touch with the VIII Army Corps when a serious attack was to be delivered. I cannot in any way approve of its move northwards.

(2) The whole of the enemy operations were directed against Es Salt.

The enemy wishes to create a strategical bridgehead, whence he can advance later against Amman, Deraa, or Beisan; consequently it is necessary to retake Es Salt at all costs.

This would be difficult by day as the enemy has so many machine-guns with his cavalry, but at night it would always be possible from the North, with infantry, as the enemy has there only the two cavalry brigades (1), and later on, indeed, a fifth regiment, besides some artillery.

Only on the north is co-operation possible with the 3rd Cavalry Division, which has fought splendidly.

I recommend pushing forward a light screen of infantry on to the former battle ground at the first sign of the light failing; with this, at dusk, artillery and machine-guns should come into action.

The remainder of the infantry should be collected on the right wing, and should take Es Salt with the bayonet from the North.

Instead of that, in this morning's report, there appears a statement that the right wing of the infantry is advancing on Es Salt and that the 8th Cavalry Regt. is already there.

(3) I would suggest that in such a position there should not be so much talk of losses and shortage of water. In severe fighting of this kind, losses are inevitable. Water could be brought from Suweileh.

Other troops have had far greater losses. It is we, as Prussian officers, who are charged with the duty of pushing forward with the greatest energy, satisfying complaints as far as possible, but otherwise insisting with an iron-like resolution on our wishes.

(4) Had the VIII Army Corps taken up the flanking position which I have advised since the beginning of April, such a break-through by cavalry could never have occurred. Water can be no excuse, for there is sufficient in the Jordan, and the men's supplies could have been boiled.

(5) I recommend, in the VIII Army Corps' position, to give each cavalry post that has been pushed out, a group of infantry with a machine-gun; these can later be locally protected by barbed wire. Perhaps this cannot take place everywhere, but it must be done on the most important roads.

(6) I have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that it is necessary to close the important roads at suitable places, or at least prepare them for closing. But on the 30th April, at 7.30 a.m., the English were at Jisr ed Damie with artillery and motors, and shortly before 11 a.m. a few squadrons had arrived opposite Es Salt. I am going to send Major Effuert to Es Salt to arrange a few supporting points on decisive heights, the early completion of which I request, if possible, with the help of the inhabitants.

I beg that the above-named work may be taken in hand as soon as possible on the roads leading to Es Salt, as well as on the roads leading to Tell Hamman (2). The barricades can be watched during the day by patrols, in order not to employ too many groups. At night they must be manned, also as soon as fairly strong enemy forces are being concentrated West of the Jordan or at the Bridgehead.

(7) I recommend alternative positions being prepared for the artillery, and more use being made of dummy positions. This will lessen our losses.

(Signed) Liman von Sanders.

(Apparently draft for a telegram).

(Very Urgent).

To:—Major von Papen.

4th May, 1918.

During the night the 3rd Cavalry Division took the heights north of Es Salt, and it is now in immediate possession.

The enemy has retired in a south-westerly direction and is being pursued by a battalion and some cavalry, moving on a parallel course.

I hold you personally responsible if, through any delay on the part of Shukri Bey's column, a set back should occur.

I request an immediate report from the scene of the fighting.

(Signed) Liman von Sanders.

(1) Liman von Sanders evidently estimated each Cavalry Brigade at two regiments.

(2) Close to Ain Hamman, 3 miles S.W. of Amman.

E 33/16 2A

(The draft letter below is undated, but from contemporary correspondence is undoubtedly of about 5th May, 1918.)

Marshal Liman, Nablus.

Now that the normal situation is restored, I respectfully notify Your Excellency of the following:—

(1) The Army most emphatically protests against the untrue announcement of the VII Army that the 3rd Cav. Div. took the heights north of Es Salt. These heights are covered with dead of the 66th Infantry Regt. Only one patrol from the 8th Cavalry Regt. was there. Just as strange is the assertion of the 3rd Cavalry Division, that for two days past they have been in possession of the Western Heights, as yesterday evening the English cavalry, entirely unhindered, withdrew beyond Es Salt in the direction of El Mandesi. The 66th Infantry Regt. fought very gallantly. Its high losses prove this. If they did not succeed in beating the enemy at the exact moment desired by Your Excellency, this was due to circumstances, into which I cannot enter in a "clear" telegram. However, Your Excellency will doubtless agree that when an attack repeatedly ordered, does not develop, I should, as in duty bound, report with regard to the situation as it actually is, and should not make triumphant announcements.

Your Excellency will be satisfied with the bearing of the VIII Army Corps, which, during the foregoing weeks, has been so equipped and furnished with directions from the Army, that no doubt could prevail as to its task.

(2) Your Excellency has complained of deficient reports; in reply to this, I respectfully report that the Army Headquarters only had one telephone operator at its disposal. The rest of the personnel took part in the defence of Es Salt, and are dead, wounded or prisoners. Besides this, the Headquarters had only one line, generally out of order, which served at the same time as operation line. Your Excellency will agree that this line, when in working order, should be used first of all for the transmission of operation orders. I may add that I had only one orderly officer; all other officers, despite urgent requests, were unable to keep up with the Headquarters as they were not mounted.

The Army Headquarters working under such conditions has been for five days continuously in closest touch with its units. It left Es Salt one minute before the English forced their way in. It is evident that the limited communications of the Army Headquarters might give the impression that it was not informed as to the situation during this period, in the same way as a headquarters established in Nablus, with a great number of good lines. As a matter of fact the Headquarters were always well informed as to the situation.

(3) It must be an error if Your Excellency assumes that the Army rushed an unplanned attack against the bridge head. The Army Headquarters made no such incomprehensible arrangement, but only ordered that the infantry of the 48th Infantry Division should press forward resolutely into the old positions, and that the artillery should keep the Jordan Bridges under continuous fire.

(4) In yesterday's telegram, Your Excellency referred pointedly to my personal responsibility. From this I must assume that Your Excellency believes that I was not aware of my responsibility as Chief of Staff, and did not fulfill my duty during these days. This is the first time in my military career that this reproach has been addressed to me. Therefore I respectfully beg Your Excellency to grant my immediate relief from my present position, and to employ me as Battalion Commander on the battle front.

(Signed) Von Papen.

These documents were found in the Yilderim Headquarters, Nazareth.

dy
Confidential.

E33/163

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—28th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS.

(i.) 28th Oct. Muslimie Junction.—One engine, 23 R.S. and about 20 M.T. all appear damaged. Signs of many fires. Station destroyed.

Jisr el Mudik (9 miles N. by E. of Muslimie).—Bridge intact.

Akhterin (20 miles N. by E. of Muslimie).—One made up train of 23 R.S. with engine.

Between Azaz, Akhterin, Kullar (7 miles N. by E. of Muslimie), Muska (4 miles N. of Muslimie) and south no military movement observed.

El Kanie (4 miles S. by E. of Katma station).—10 M.T. and 30 bivouacs. Two miles further north 200 infantry and 70 cavalry.

Mashale.—500 infantry and 150 cavalry. 29 M.T. and 24 H.T. 97 T.S. and S.S. south and south-east of station. One engine and 14 R.S. One made up train of 20 R.S. with 2 engines.

Comment.—Decrease of 250 T.S. and S.S. since 27th Oct., when there were 340 T.S. at Mashale. There is no "Mashale" station, and the station in this area is known as "Katma" station.

Khan Bairam (7 miles S.W. of Katma Station).—40 cavalry. 32 M.T. and 17 H.T. The main bridge is destroyed but a temporary bridge had been erected to the south.

(R.A.F., 28-10).

(ii.) It is estimated that the enemy force holding the Khan Narista—Nubbul line is 2000 strong with 8 guns; the 111th Regt. is included in this force.

(D.M.C., 27-10).

(iii.) Reports indicate that the main force retired on Katma, and it is believed that Adana is its final destination, though inhabitants stated it to be Aintab.

(D.M.C., 27-10).

(iv.) The enemy has further retired to 1000 yards north of Deir el Jemal (18 miles N.N.W. of Aleppo) whence they command the road with M.G.'s.

(D.M.C., 28-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

(i.) The 1st Division was reformed on 7th October and consists of the 70th, 109th, and 111th Regts. The 109th Regt. was reformed from remnants of the original 109th and 110th Regts. The 111th Regt. (750 rifles) arrived on this front from Constantinople about the 2nd October.

(P/W., 111th Regt).

(ii.) German M/T Columns, 205, 506, and 703 were at Aleppo on 22nd October, under orders to proceed with supplies to Konia.

(P/W., 205 A.K.K.).

(iii.) The 205th German Pioneer Coy. (about 250 strong) was in IV Army area previous to operations. By 30th Sept. it had concentrated at Damascus, on 1st Oct. it left for Rayak and thence escaped to the north.

(P/W from unit, 27-10).

(iv.) **AVIATION.**

(a) The 1st Jagd Staffel consisted of the following machines:—

10 Pfalz one-seater biplanes.

6 Albatross one-seater biplanes.

1 L.V.G. two-seater biplane.

The Pfalz machines were sent in July to replace Albatross, as the latter were not considered satisfactory. Eight Pfalz machines escaped from Jenin to Deraa. 2 were burnt, as also was the L.V.G.

(b) The 2nd Jagd Staffel was absorbed in the 1st Jagd Staffel in May, 1918.

(c) At commencement of operations the 300th Flight consisted of only 1 L.V.G. two-seater biplane, which was at Semakh.

In August 80 men out of 120 were drafted out of this unit, which only existed in name.

(d) The 304th Flight consisted of 1 serviceable Albatross machine and 3-4 A.E.G. biplanes. 2 to 3 machines of this flight were captured by us.

(P/W, these units, 27-10).

C.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.

(i.) 16th Division.—The divisional headquarters, 47th and 48th Regts., and Divisional Artillery were all captured West of Jordan. The 2/125th Regt. crossed to East of Jordan and was captured by Arabs. The fate of the other 2 bns. 125th Regt. is not known.

(P.M.O., 16th Div., 27-10).

[P.T.O.]

E33/1637
OCT 1918

(ii.) The 1/148th and 1/151st Regts. retired through Deraa to Damascus where they were captured.

(P/W, these units, 27-10).

(iii.) The 3/109th Regt. and remnants of the 11th, 20th and 26th Divisions with one battery of field guns retired from Damascus on Hama.

(P/W, 3/109th Regt., 27-10).

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

28th October, 1918.

[No. 455]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

TIGRIS & KERKUK FRONTS, 27th October.

During the night of 26th-27th October the Turkish Tigris Group withdrew a distance of 12 miles from the position they held yesterday near El Humr, to a new position 3 miles South of Kalaat Shergat. British Armoured Cars and Cavalry are 8 miles N. of Kalaat Shergat astride the Mosul road.

On the Kerkuk-Mosul road the Turks have retired to a position 2 miles South of Altun Keupri.

Confidential.

E 33/164

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—29th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS AND POSITIONS. 29-10-18.

29th Oct. Minil.—100 Infantry and 50 Cavalry, 80 T.S. and S.S., 30 stacks of stores, 44 M.T. and H.T., 33 R.S. including 1 train of 14 R.S. facing East. Half a mile east of station 1 train of 13 R.S. A.A. fire was experienced.

Khan Bairam.—50 Infantry, 22 M.T. and H.T. Bridge destroyed but temporary bridge has been erected. 2 miles to South, 500 Infantry, 50 Cavalry and 40 H.T. moving S.W.

Kersin (4 miles S.W. of Khan Bairam).—50 Cavalry and 7 M.T. moving S.W.

Hajji Iskender (15 miles S.W. of Kersin).—Trench 1000 yards long N. and S. of road.

Omer Agha (just S. of Hajji Iskender).—100 Cavalry moving South.

Kufr Kale (8 miles N.W. of Hajji Iskender).—Trench 500 yards long on S. side of road.

Kirik Khan (8 miles East of Bailan).—Short line of trenches 1 mile S.E. of junction of roads.

Bailan (2 miles to the South-East).—100 Infantry, 200 Cavalry and 20 H.T. moving S.E. 2 hospitals in S.E. and N.W. ends of town respectively.

Alexandretta.—No movement, military or civilian. Appeared deserted. 50 rowing boats along beach. Net-work of trenches on both sides of road from Bailan to Alexandretta.

Keutu Geul (3 miles N. of Alexandretta).—The bridge $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the South has been destroyed.

Note.—All trenches reported above were unoccupied.

(R.A.F., 29-10).

(ii.) On 29th October the enemy was still holding the ridges West of Deir Jemal commanding the Alexandretta road, in considerable strength and with M.G's.

(D.M.C., 29-10).

B.—DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT & ORGANISATION.

(i.) The 701st Pioneer Abteilung (70 strong) was at Mafid Jozele at commencement of operations. On 21st Sept. it left for Deraa *via* Amman. Twelve men were sent thence to Semakh to blow up the bridge. The rest passed through Damascus on 29th Sept. having lost 21 men by that date.

(P/W from unit, 28-10).

(ii.) The following German Motor Lorry Units were captured :—

505th Park (36 lorries) in Beisan area.

705th Column (13 lorries) on Beit Hasan—Beisan road.

706th " " Beisan area.

707th " (15 ") on Tubas—Beisan road.

709th " (18 ") in Semakh area.

711th " (15 ") in Nazareth area except for 3 lorries which escaped north.

(P/W from units).

(iii.) On 18th Sept. "Heinrichs Abteilung" was formed at Damascus with personnel from various technical units and convalescents belonging to Pasha II, 146th Regt. and Flying Units. The strength of this detachment was 255 O.R's. with 4 M.G's. and two 3.5 cm. guns. It proceeded to Deraa to operate against the Arabs.

On 24th Sept. the remnants of 701, 702 and 703 Battalions, 200 strong, passed Deraa for north. On 28th Sept. Heinrichs Abteilung left for Damascus and thence to Rayak, having lost 16 men and two M.G's. Two 10.5 cm. German howitzers left Deraa with this detachment.

(P/W from detachment).

(iv.) On 1st October the only 15 remaining men of the 702nd Schuetzen Coy. left Damascus for north. All its baggage, M.G's. and automatic rifles were captured. Sixty men of the cavalry squadron, Asia Corps, also reached Damascus.

(P/W, 702nd Schuetzen Coy.).

(v.) 60 infantry, all the M.G's., and all the baggage of the 1/146th German Regt. were captured between Damascus and Rayak.

(P/W from unit).

C.—ORGANISATION.

Previous to operations the 1730th Heliograph Section (German), consisted of 1 officer, 13 N.C.O's. and 16 privates and was attached to Asia Corps.

The 1720th and 1728th Heliograph Sections (German) were expected on this front from Germany.

(P/W, 1730th Heliograph Section, 28-10).

2.—CAUCASUS.

An officer deserter states he heard that the 5th Division arrived at Erbil (46 miles E. by S. of Mosul) from Persia, on 20th October.

[P.T.O.]

E33/164A

3.—CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(a) From the C.G.S., General Headquarters.
To the C.G.S. V Army.

29-11-17.

I beg you to convey the following to His Excellency the Field Marshal (Liman von Sanders).

The Acting C.-in-C. intends to form the I and V Armies into an Army Group, under the Field Marshal's command. In view of this re-organisation I should be glad to have the Marshal's views as to whether the Kale Sultanie (Dardanelles) Group should be attached to the 5th Army, or placed directly and independently under the Army Group. Assuming that the latter course is adopted I should be obliged if you would consider the question of the L. of C. for the Kale Sultanie Group and let me know His Excellency's views on the subject.

(b) From Enver Pasha, Acting C.-in-C.
To Field Marshal Liman von Sanders.

4-12-17.

I have learned from the C.G.S. V Army of your Excellency's proposition as to the formation of a new Army, and I have deemed it necessary to put on record the following points:—

My object in proposing the formation of an Army Group, composed of the I and V Armies, was to unite under one command the zones of both armies, in view of my periods of long absence from here (Constantinople) and further to enable the I Army to receive the benefit of your vast experience in the training of troops. For various reasons I do not desire to effect so great an alteration as your Excellency proposes, unless such alteration is demanded by a change in the situation. I am thinking of retaining the I Army, which hitherto has had no complete division in its command, within its present sphere of activity and with two divisions of infantry attached to it.

I propose to retain Essad Pasha at Constantinople and to place Mustafa Kemal in command of the V Army. I consider it necessary to keep the two sides of the straits (Dardanelles) under separate commanders, and if my memory serves me you were of the same opinion.

Please let me know whether you would prefer the Dardanelles Group to be directly under your command or to have it attached to the V Army. Personally I am in favour of placing the Dardanelles Group under the orders of the Army Group, and at the same time transferring the V Army to Smyrna.

If, however, the independence of the Dardanelles Group would involve difficulties of administration, I agree to its subordination to the V Army.

The reduction of the V Army to 3 divisions is not significant. When the questions of the training and discipline of this Army are considered it will be seen that the work of the Army Commander will be sufficiently important.

(Note by Liman von Sanders).

I have not the least intention of taking over any such Army Group.

(c.) From Liman von Sanders.
To Enver Pasha.

4-12-17.

As your excellency only desires the formation of an Army Group from the point of view of the unity in training of the troops, I would most respectfully ask your Excellency, in accordance with the decision arrived at to-day, to leave the V Army as at present, under my command and attach the I Army to it for training purposes only.

COMMENT.

The Dardanelles Group had been formed by Aug., 1916 and placed under the V Army.

The I Army, which at that time probably included only the I Army Corps (Constantinople Command) appears to have been abolished early in 1918, possibly when Essad Pasha, its former G.O.C., took over the command of the V Army towards the end of February.

The above documents were found in the Yilderim Headquarters, Nazareth.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

29th October, 1918.

[No. 456]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

TIGRIS FRONT, 28th October.

The enemy made repeated, but at present, unsuccessful, attempts to dislodge the British cavalry from their position astride his Lines of Communication on the Mosul Road. The position held yesterday by his main force 3 miles South of Kalaat Shergat was captured to-day by British infantry advancing from the south.

WESTERN FRONT, 28th October.

Excluding 31 divisions which have been withdrawn during the last fortnight, after suffering heavy casualties, there now remain only 10 available German divisions in reserve, none of which are fresh, and 5 Austrian Divisions.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORT.

October 29th, 1918.

E 33/165

OCT 1918

Map ref.:—Alexandretta and Marash, 1:250,000.

ALEPPO—MARASH, via ISLAHIE.

(Distance 127 miles).

SECTOR 1.—ALEPPO—AFRIN KHAN (Distance 39 miles).

This traverses the same route as the Aleppo—Alexandretta road as far as Afrin Khan and is an excellent motor road. (For description, see G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary of 24th October, 1918).

SECTOR 2.—AFRIN KHAN—ISLAHIE (Distance 46 miles).

From this point it follows a road which is of recent construction, and the part as far as Rajun Station has been constructed during the last two years. It was used by the enemy as a main Line of Communication to Constantinople and therefore for motor transport. It follows up the valley of the Uch Dere to its watershed near Rajun, whence it drops rapidly to the valley of the Kara Su, following the latter to Salie Station, whence it turns north-west across low hills to Islahie. The railway runs close alongside for most of the distance and water would be available at the tanks at the various stations, and from the two streams which the road follows.

SECTOR 3.—ISLAHIE—MARASH (Distance 42 miles).

This route crosses the edge of a large plain, passing just west of three lakes. North of the third lake it follows the valley of the Ak Su for some little distance, which it then crosses and leads across the plain to Marash. There was a German motor lorry service on this route, which took six hours to do the journey. These were 3-ton lorries and carried wheat, barley, oil, butter and other foodstuffs from Marash to the railway at Islahie. The road is liable to be bad in the wet weather, as it crosses many wadis and passes over low-lying ground. There are no difficult gradients; and only one known bridge, which is an old 4-arched stone bridge over the Kara Su.

ALEPPO—MARASH, via AINTAB.

(Distance 126 miles).

SECTOR 1.—ALEPPO—SEJERAZ (Distance 29 miles).

This route is a first-class motor road and follows the Aleppo—Alexandretta chaussee. (For description, see G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary of 24th October, 1918).

SECTOR 2.—SEJERAZ—AINTAB, via KILLIS (Distance 50 miles).

This is a good metalled road, suitable for all kinds of traffic at all seasons. It leaves the Aleppo—Alexandretta road at Sejeraz; and thence to Killis it passes over slightly undulating country. Beyond Killis it crosses many streams, all of which are reported to be bridged; and there are no difficult gradients throughout the route.

Water is not very plentiful until Killis is reached, where there is a good supply; and beyond to Aintab there is ample supply from the various streams.

SECTOR 3.—AINTAB—MARASH (Distance 47 miles).

Reported to be an undulating metalled road, wide enough for two motor lorries abreast. Is not muddy and can be used all the year round. There are only two bridges remaining, the Sinek Dere being crossed by a shallow ford. The bridge over the Ak Su is a strong stone structure of six arches; and that over the Erkenez Su consists of six iron piers with a reinforced concrete road bed. Gradient on leaving Aintab is fairly steep, and also ascending from the Sinek Dere; otherwise no gradients to speak of.

Water is not very plentiful, except after rain, in the first part of the route; unlimited supply at Ak Su and Erkenez Su; fair supply at Marash itself.

ISLAHIE—AINTAB.

Map ref.:—Marash, 1:250,000.

(Distance 55 miles).

This is not a first-class road, but is possible for guns and limbers throughout, and H.T. in dry weather, except for the sector east of Sakchegeuzu. It follows the Islahie—Marash route as far as Dunek; then turns east over the plain for some 10 miles; thence passes over rough country and descends by the valley of the Sinek Dere to Kesik Keupri, a point on the Marash—Aintab route. From Dunek to Kesik Keupri is 33 miles.

Water is plentiful at Sakchegeuzu, Sinek Dere (in winter), and at Aintab.

E33/165A

OCT 1918

Notes on other routes from ALEPPO.

Map ref.:—Alexandretta and Meskene, 1:250,000.

(a) ALEPPO—MESKENÉ (55 miles).

A good unmetalled road, fit for motor lorries in all seasons. Largely over a grassy plain, and through well cultivated districts. Good spring at Mania (mile 25); spring and good stream at Deir Hafir (mile 29); and two wells at mile 44.

Alexandretta, Meskene and Urfa, 1:250,000.

(b) ALEPPO—BIRIJK, via AKTERIN (72 miles).

This route is passable for wheels throughout, and is believed to be possible for Ford cars. There are no bad gradients, and though unmetalled (except for the first 7 miles), the road passes over a firm road bed. It follows the valley of the Kuwaik to Akterin; thence alongside the Baghdad Railway to Jisr Sajur, whence it turns N.W. across low hills to Birijik. Water is available at—

	Miles.	
Muslimie	8	... from a well.
Akterin	25	... „ wells.
Tel Ar	31	... „ „
	36½ & 39	... „ „
Nahr Sajur	47	... „ river.
Sarikoch	59	... „ wells.
Nahr Kerzin	64	... „ river.

(c) ALEPPO—BIRIJK, via JERABLUS (91 miles).

This route leads west to El Bab (position on 1:250,000 Alexandretta sheet at least four miles too far south). Thence to Membij, a Circassian settlement. Here it leaves the ancient caravan route from Urfa, and crossing the Nahr Sajur at Tokar Kebir, reaches the Euphrates at Jerablus. From here it follows the right bank of the river to Birijik. As far as Membij it is across an undulating plain, and is possible for all wheels, though unmetalled and little used. Across the Sajur to Jerablus and onwards it is fit for G.S. wagons and Ford cars. No details as to water, except that it is scarce south of Membij.

(d) ALEPPO—BIRIJK, via KILLIS (93 miles).

This route leaves the Aintab chaussee 9½ miles beyond Killis and follows the old Turkish road to Nizib, where it is joined by a road from Aintab to Birijik. The "Chesney Euphrates Expedition" heavy wagons reached this point from Suedia (on the coast) via Antioch and Killis. From Birijik the road continues to Urfa and Diarbekr.

General Staff Intelligence,
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

29th October, 1918.

Confidential.

E33/166

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—30th October, 1918.

OCT 1918

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS & POSITIONS. 30th October.

Mardegan—Minil-el Kanie—Mulk.—Irregular trench system of short lengths—heavily manned—1500 infantry, 59 T.S.

Killis Road.—No movement.

Lelik Euyuk (5 miles S.W. of Killis).—Akhterin Roads. No movement.

At Sejeraz road junction (just S.E. of Katma).—A.A. fire was experienced.

Mashale.—40 R.S. including 2 trains, 31 M.T., 53 T.S.

Teltavil (8 miles W.S.W. of Mashale).—200 shelters, 50 cavalry moving N.W.

Barlik (9 miles S.W. of Mashale).—140 T.S.

Gondi Oba (6 miles N.W. of Teltavil).—70 H.T. and 50 M.T.

Between Gondi Oba and Rajun (5 miles N.N.W. of Gondi Oba).—40 H.T. and 50 M.T. all going N.W.

Rajun.—Train 30 R.S., with 2 engines facing west, and loaded with troops.

(R.A.F. 30-10).

B.—HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.

An enemy aeroplane was observed East of Aleppo, flying North on morning 30th Oct.

(R.A.F. 30-10).

C.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

(i.) Towards the end of September there were 2000 men (the majority of whom were Arab recruits) in the Aleppo Training Depot.

(Officer P/W., XXII A.C. H.Q., 27-10).

(ii.) GERMAN UNITS.

(a) The 305th Flight was stationed at Deraa in early September. It consisted of 8 A.E.G. machines, all of which were two-seaters. The ration strength of the flight was 200 men.

(b) The 507th Motor Lorry Column consisted of 18 lorries and 70 men previous to operations. It was stationed at Nablus.

(c) The 1703rd Telephone Detachment consisted of from 150 to 160 men, all fit for active service and armed with carbines. Headquarters were at Tul Keram and 1 section was attached to each Army.

(d) The 27th Mountain Heliograph Section which arrived on this front from Nish (Serbia) in August, had a ration strength of 30 Germans and 8 Turks, all armed with carbines. Its transport, 13 carts and 30 pack animals have been captured.

(e) The 202nd German Field Hospital was captured at Tul Keram.

(f) The 2nd Eisenbahnbausonderkommando (Railway Construction Detachment) was responsible for providing all personnel on railway lines west of Jordan. Its H.Q. were at Afule and the strength of the unit was 280 men.

The 32nd/48th Betriebs kompagnie (Railway Operating Company) had control of the railway between Deraa and Damascus.

Eisenbahnbausonderkommandos 3 and 5 (each 450 strong) were stationed at the Taurus and 6.b and 6.c (each 700 strong) at Aleppo.

(Ps/W from units).

2.—ANATOLIA.

It is reported that the following changes are about to take place in the V Army:—

(i.) The Headquarters to be transferred from Panderna to San Stephano (Constantinople).

(ii.) The XVII Army Corps with the probable exception of the 56th Division is to move to the Dardanelles and Thrace.

(iii.) The XXI Army Corps is to move up from the Aidin—Adalia area to the Smyrna area.

(iv.) The 56th Division has been re-named the Smyrna Garrison Division.

(v.) The 5th Depot Regt. is under orders to leave for Constantinople.

In addition to the above the 7th Labour Bn. left Smyrna early in October for Panderna and thence proceeded to Uzun Keupru and two Coys. of the 6th Labour Bn. are reported to have left for Chanak Kale.

The 338th Battery (4 7.5 cm. Field Guns) 63rd Battalion, 8th Heavy Artillery Regt. left the Scala Nova area early in October, their ultimate destination being Adrianople.

Between the 4th and 8th October, 3200 men are reported to have left Smyrna by rail, bound northwards.

(Agent, early October).

[P.T.O.]

E33/166 A
-OCT 1918

3.—HEJAZ.

The attached map shows the estimated distribution and strength of the Turkish forces on the southern section of the Hejaz Railway and in Medina. The 2nd Composite Force has been withdrawn from the Tebuk area to south of Kalaat el Akhdar.

General Staff (Intelligence)
G.H.Q., E.E.F.

30th October, 1918.

[No. 457]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

TIGRIS FRONT, 29th Oct., 1918.

The main Turkish force has been pressed further up-stream from the position captured by our troops yesterday 3 miles S. of Kalaat Shergat. An enemy detachment endeavouring to escape in a north-westerly direction was cut off and 1000 prisoners and much material captured.

To accompany Int: Summary N° 457 of 30th October.

E33/167

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE HEJAZ - 30th October 1918.


OCT 1918

TOTAL STRENGTH
"
4010 RIFLES.
49 M.G.'s.
64 GUNS.

50 0 50 100
Scale of Miles

58 th Division and remnants of 2 nd Comp: Force.
162 Regt (3 Bns)
1/178 "
2/178 "
3/21 "
Mule Mtd Coy:
Mobile Gend ['] mie Bn:
79 M.G. Coy
1420 Rifles.
26 M.G's.
30 Guns.

42 nd Regt: (3 Bns)
55 th " (3 Bns)
Camel Regt:
2 Mule Coys:
2 Coys: of Irregulars.
2590 Rifles.
23 M.G's.
34 Guns.



8181 T00

E33/168

Captured Document.

Commander of the Sinai Front.

Huleikat,

29-9-1917.

OCT 1918

Secret.

To Yilderim.

1.—I humbly beg to enclose herewith :—

- a. War organisation of troops under my command.
- b. Distribution of troops under my command.
- c. Statement of the strength of troops under my command.
- d. Statement of the strength of German formations under my command.
- e. Nominal roll of attached German officers under my command.
- f. Appreciation of the situation.
- g. Compilation of the latest news regarding the enemy.
- h. Review of the stock of ammunition.
- i. Plans and maps of our own and enemy's positions.
- k. Statement of stores in the Main Pioneer Depot.

2.—I had intended after the arrival of the 24th Division, to relieve the 163rd Regiment stationed in Beersheba, belonging to the 53rd Division, by a regiment of the 24th Division, and to return the 163rd Regiment to its division.

Further I wished to have the regiment of the 16th Division, stationed at Abu Irgeig, relieved by a regiment of the 24th Division. This regiment, which has been reinforced by two batteries and cavalry, is to secure the communications between Tel esh Sheria and Beersheba and is to reinforce the garrison of Beersheba in case of an enemy attack. Finally the 3rd Regiment of the 24th Division would have to occupy the position of the 16th Division. In this way it would be possible for me to collect the whole 16th Division, which with regard to equipment, establishment of columns, etc., is the best and most mobile of the divisions under my command, to the north of Tel esh Sheria as a reserve at my disposal. They would be stationed here ready, to be pushed forward in case of need to the line Kemal Tepe—Hill 230* to the east of Abu Suheban.

I unfortunately had to make these dispositions on account of the quite weak fighting strength of the 24th Division. The Division had to leave the whole of its machine-gun formations in Constantinople. It is not known where they are at present. Their quickest possible despatch is absolutely necessary.

Pencil Note:—Are on the way from Aleppo to the front.

As I consider now, as before, that Gaza is the most threatened point of the front, and believe, that besides the 3rd and 7th Divisions, another whole division will be necessary for a prolonged defence, I intend to allot the 136th Infantry Regiment, now on the march—which likewise has no machine-gun units at its disposal—to the 53rd Division.

The Chief Command IV Army has ordered, that the 19th Division should be stationed in readiness at Arak el Manshiye. I have ordered the necessary preparations for the water supply of a division in the neighbourhood of Arak el Manshiye. I beg however, to submit the proposal that this division be brought forward to Beersheba and that the defence of this place be entrusted to it. To retain possession of Beersheba is an essential basis for an offensive on our part.

Through this, the 163rd Infantry Regiment belonging to the 53rd Division, would be free, and 7 Arab battalions of the 27th Division besides. The 27th Division has no commander (Col. Ibrahim Bey is on leave in Damascus. In my opinion his nerves prevent his further employment at the front) and no General Staff Officer. The men and some of the younger officers are not bad. On the other hand, nearly all the Staff Officers and Company Commanders are quite useless. All attempts to advance the training of these gentlemen have miscarried. A battalion commander, for instance, who took over a battalion a year ago, had never up to that time been employed with troops. The 27th Division has been used during the whole duration of the war as a reserve, from which all the good and useful officers were drawn and to which in return all officers who were of no use at the front were posted. I therefore propose that the 27th Division be disbanded, and that the useful officers, men and animals be used for reinforcing other divisions.

3.—At present the most burning question on the Sinai front is that of reinforcements of officers and men.

The measures taken hitherto have shown themselves to be quite insufficient. The 12th Depot Regiment cannot anything like cover the requirements, as recruits are supplied to it only very irregularly and in insufficient numbers. Nothing has been done for the training of artillery reinforcements. Through the breaking up of the Chief Command, IV Army, General Nicolai with his proportionately big staff will be entirely unoccupied. I propose that he be charged with the regulation and training of reinforcements for the artillery, further with the reserve of material and supply of ammunition.

The Depot Squadron at Damascus cannot cover the requirements of trained reinforcements for the cavalry. An improvement in organisation will probably be necessary here too. The casualties on the Sinai front through losses, sickness, desertions, etc., amount on the average to 10–12,000 men per month. Against this are the 6–7,000 men who are sent back to the front from hospital and a few hundred reinforcements, so that the monthly loss on the average amounts to 4–5,000 men.

* Probably the hill 730 on the 1:250,000 map.

E33 / 168A

OCT 1918

I therefore return anew to my proposal, that certain regiments and divisions be broken up so as to increase the real fighting strength on the Sinai front.

4.—A further question, which urgently needs regulating, is that of deserters. According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations.

Civil administration and gendarmerie fail entirely; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery.

The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion. I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland. It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem-Ramleh-Jaffa, be formally organised under energetic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter. But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time.

5.—The question of rationing has not yet been settled. We are living continually from hand to mouth. Despite the binding promises of the Headquarters IV Army, the Vali of Damascus, the Lines of Communication, Major Bathmann and others, that from now on 150 tons of rations should arrive regularly each day from the 24th to the 27th of this month, for example: a total of 299 tons, or only 75 tons per diem have arrived.

I cannot fix the blame for these irregularities. The Headquarters, IV Army, has received the highly gratifying order, that, at least, up to the imminent decisive battle the bread ration is raised to 100 grammes. This urgently necessary improvement of the men's ration remains illusory, if a correspondingly larger quantity of flour (about 1 waggon per day) is not supplied to us. So far the improvement exists only on paper. The condition of the animals particularly gives cause for anxiety. Not only are we about 6,000 animals short of establishment, but as a result of exhaustion, a considerable number of animals are ruined daily. The majority of the divisions are incapable of operating on account of this shortage in animals. The ammunition supply too is gradually coming into question on account of the deficiency in animals. The menacing danger can only be met by a regular supply of sufficient fodder. The stock of straw in the area of operations is exhausted. With gold, some barley can still be bought in the country.

Every year during the rainy season the railway is interrupted again and again for periods of from 8 to 14 days. There are also days and weeks in which the motor lorry traffic has to be suspended. Finally we must calculate on the possibility of an interruption of our rear communications by the enemy. I therefore consider it absolutely necessary that at least a 14 days reserve of rations be deposited in the depots at the front as early as possible.

The increase of troops on the Sinai front necessitates a very considerable increase in the supply of meat from the Line of Communications area, Damascus district.

6.—The mastery of the air has unfortunately for some weeks completely passed over to the English. Apart from the withdrawal of some particularly efficient officers from Flight 300, and apart from numerous cases of sickness in this flight, frequent damage to material and the irregular supply of working material, the reason for this sudden change is to be sought in the great numerical superiority of the English, and in the appearance of a new type of machine, which is far superior to our one-seater.

Pencil Note.—This cannot be the case. The English in Flanders certainly have not bad aircraft, yet we have the superiority there.

Our aviators estimate the number of the enemy aircraft at from 30 to 40. Against this we have at present 2 two-seaters and 2 one-seaters fit for use.*

I have therefore already proposed to the Headquarters IV Army an increase of our air fighting strength, to be accelerated as far as possible. I further hold an increase of the anti-aircraft sections, and in particular, a speedy and considerable increase of anti-aircraft ammunition to be necessary.

7.—So far as I know the Headquarters IV Army has no reserve supply of material either for the Artillery or Machine-guns.

8.—As I have already taken the liberty to report, I fear that the present existing dual authority of the Military Mission and Yilderim over German officers will not be of advantage.

Pencil Note.—Has already been altered.

In relation to the Pasha formations, the furlough authority and the disciplinary power of a Brigade Commander have been assigned to me, but with regard to N.C.O.'s and men attached and belonging to the Military Mission, I am obliged to refer to the Mission in all matters (for instance, promotion to lance-corporal). Recommendations for decorations were hitherto dealt with by the Military Mission, likewise matters of reinforcement. The Pasha motor lorry units are in certain cases placed under me, and in others under the command of the motor lorry troops of the Military Mission, etc., etc.

I would be grateful, if it were possible, to obtain an unmistakeably clear ruling on this matter.

9.—Through 1½ years trying service in the desert, the working capacity of the Pasha motor lorry formations has suffered severely. Perhaps the advisability might be considered of forming, out of the existing Pasha motor lorry units—of very little working capacity—one or two serviceable columns.

In the distribution of motor lorry formations I request you to place directly under me two columns of 15 wagons each, and a number of reserve wagons, for the requirements within the sphere of my command. These columns would be stationed at Et Tine.

*Note.—During October, 1917, 56 aeroplanes belonging to the 301st, 302nd, 303rd and 304th Flights arrived in Palestine from Germany.

E33/169

OCT 1918

3.

- OCT 1918

I would further call attention to the fact, that in the event of a stronger garrisoning of Beersheba, a complete column must be detailed for the transport of wood fuel from Hebron to that place.

10. Despite our efforts we have not yet succeeded in organising a regular supply of sand bags and material for obstacles. According to information I have received, large stocks for the Sinai front must lie somewhere on the lines of communication.

The need of sand bags is exceptionally great for the right flanks of the first and second lines posted on the dunes. Likewise a further considerable quantity of obstacle material is necessary for Gaza.

In the supporting positions and along the Wadi Hesy barbed wire entanglements are entirely lacking.

In the event of our left wing being pushed forward into the line Kemal Tepe-230-Towal el Habari, the previous preparation of sufficient obstacle material is very desirable.

11. In consequence of the prevalent shortage of water in Jerusalem, I was compelled to move the 12th Depot Regiment to Hebron, although no favourable conditions for training exist there.

In the event of an enemy attack on Beersheba I intend to have El Dhahariye garrisoned by the training personnel of the Depot Regiment (about 300 rifles) with orders to apprehend fugitives and deserters, and in any case to repulse any enemy cavalry detachments which may push forward towards Hebron. I will endeavour to procure for the regiment two old mountain-guns, and if possible, some machine-guns.

12.—The state of health gives at present no occasion for particular anxiety. The cholera has nearly died out. Intestinal troubles have frequently occurred quite recently, but the number of admissions has again fallen for some days past.

The stamina of the men in general, as a result of the long continued under-nutrition, is not satisfactory. Their power of resistance against disease of any kind is low, the number of cases of sickness with fatal results is therefore disproportionately large. The IV Army has promised delivery of warm underclothing and a quantity of new bivouac sheets. The delivery of dried vegetables has also been promised in order to make the men's rations somewhat more varied.

For the production and multiplication of maps and plans there are very few means at my disposal.

Pencil note :—Nevertheless General von Kress has declined our offer to place at his disposal the Mapping Institute in Berlin. All preparations to do so had been made.

The above is apparently an unsigned copy of a letter from General Kress von Kressenstein, G.O.C., Sinai front, to the Yilderim Headquarters; it was found in these Headquarters at Nazareth.

Confidential.

E 33/170

OCT 1918

G.H.Q. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY,
for 24 hours ending 2200—31st October, 1918.

1.—SYRIAN FRONT.

A.—LOCATION OF ENEMY TROOPS & POSITIONS.

- (i.) Kefr Tibin.—Julbul area (20 miles N.N.W. of Aleppo) 98 T.S. and 100 infantry.
El Kanie.—2 lengths of trenches facing South.
Mardegan.—40 Cavalry—no movement on Killis road in this area, or in Aleppo—Mashale Road.
Katma Station.—15 R.S., including 1 train of 9 R.S. facing West., 7 M.T., 5 small lengths of trenches $\frac{3}{4}$ miles South of station, not yet completed.
Karatepe (3 miles S.W. of Mashale).—At Station to West 52 T.S. and 7 R.S.
Teltavil.—20 T.S., 3 M.T. and 14 H.T. going North.
Bailan.—One mile to South on the North side of the road 1000 yards of trench facing N.W.
Alexandretta.—No R.S. No T.S. No movement. Town apparently deserted. Trenches unoccupied, but in good condition.

(R.A.F., 1100, 31-10).

- (ii.) The enemy was still holding ridge N.W. of Deir Jemal in strength on morning of 31st October. Two guns were firing from direction of Kasim Agha ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles N.W. of Deir Jemal).

(D.M.C., 31-10).

- (iii.) An enemy rearguard consisting of infantry and cavalry is holding a line from Jisr Afrin (6 miles S.W. of Mashale) Road Junction eastward across the main road and railway. The strength of the infantry is estimated at 1,500 men.

(D.M.C., 31-10).

- (iv.) Information from refugees indicates that enemy intended to retire on Bozanti but would hold Islahie temporarily, where there were from 2 to 3,000 men and 10 guns 5 days ago. It is not unlikely that there is a strong detachment at Aintab.

(Refugees, 31-10).

- (v.) The Germans, estimated at 3,000 strong, are retiring west to Adana and include the 146th Regt. There are 5 German aeroplanes at Adana.

(Refugees, 31-10).

B.—IDENTIFICATIONS AND ORGANISATION.

GERMAN UNITS.

On 19th October the 301st Flight had 1 aeroplane left, the 303rd Flight 6 aeroplanes, the 304th Flight had ceased to exist, and the 305th Flight had 3 machines. All ten machines were very much worn.

(Officer P/W., 304th Flight).

C.—PERSONALITIES.

On 28th October Mustapha Kemal Pasha was at Islahie, and Liman von Sanders still in Asiatic Turkey.

(Refugees, 31-10).

General Staff (Intelligence)

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

31st October, 1918.

[No. 458]

INFORMATION FROM OTHER THEATRES.

TIGRIS FRONT. 30th October.

This morning Ismail Hakki O.C. Turkish Tigris Group surrendered with the whole of the 14th, the bulk of the 2nd and part of the 5th Divisions. At present the prisoners are estimated at 7000 with much material. Our Cavalry, advancing up stream, has occupied Gayyara (25 miles North of Kalaat Shergat).

WESTERN FRONT. 30th October.

Enemy divisions are now being re-employed in battle without adequate rest or re-organisation. The average interval of re-engagement of divisions has now dropped to nine days so that the training and recreation of troops is entirely prevented.

Instances have lately occurred of German divisions coming into the line with less than 1000 rifles, the establishment being 6750 rifles; furthermore, during the last six months twenty-five divisions have been disbanded to provide drafts for the remainder, while during the last month five third rate divisions have been transferred from the Eastern to the Western front.

The number of Austro-Hungarian divisions on this front has been reduced to five.

E 33/171

FAB.

- OCT 1918



WAR DIARY.

OCTOBER _____ 1918.

APPENDIX _____ 9.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ORIGINAL.

L/Z.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE.

To - ARMWING
From - AERONAUTICS G.H.Q.

E 33/172

OCT 1918

"Following from Perardua begins aaa Convey my
congratulations to Officers concerned in yesterdays
unique performance General Salmond ends".

See War Diary Appendix 5 (1 & 2).

L/Z. COPY.

Reference Ph/H/13.

O.C. 40th Wing.

Headquarters,
Palestine Brigade.
Royal Air Force.

Photography.

A letter has been received from the G.O.C., Middle East,
directing that his appreciation of the photographic work of the
Palestine Brigade is to be conveyed to all photographic personnel
in the Brigade.

The letter continues :- "I wish to take the opportunity to
congratulate the Photographic Sections of the Palestine Brigade
on the excellent work which has been done, work which has had so
much to do in the preparation of the plans which lead to the recent
successful operations."

Please convey this message to all Photographic Personnel in
your Wing.

In the Field.
9/10/18.

(Signed) A.E. Borton Brigadier-General,
Commanding Palestine Brigade, R.A.F.

Reference P/40/94.

O.C., 1st Squadron, A.F.C.

Headquarters,
40th Wing, ROYAL AIR FORCE.

The accompanying letter from the Palestine Brigade is
forwarded for your information.

Please convey congratulations to all Photographic Personnel
in your Squadron.

In the Field.
16/10/18.

(Signed) W.E. Gower Lieut.
for Lt.-Col. Commanding 40th Wing. R.A.F.

E 33/173

OCT 1918

FAB.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE.

OCT 1918

The following congratulatory message was received from the Secretary of the Aviation Comforts Fund Depot, Melbourne.

Commanding Officer,
C/o 1st. Squadron,
Australian Flying Corps,
RAMLEH.

Melbourne 25th.

Members Melbourne Aviation Depot congratulate on recent success

Williams, Secretary.

The following reply was despatched 3.10.1918.

'Your kind message conveyed all ranks all well'.

REPORT ON FORCED LANDING

E 33/174

OCT 1918

On 26th October, 1918 I left HAIFA for HAMA, following the RAYAK VALLEY North. When approaching the Southern end of the VALLEY I encountered thick, low clouds, and consequently had to fly by compass, and was driven out of my course Eastward. I ultimately came down through the clouds to locate my position, and found that I was near DAMASCUS, where I landed, with the object of waiting till the storm passed over. The weather cleared slightly and I started for HAMA again, but, before proceeding very far, met heavy rain storms and very low clouds. I was flying low between two ranges of hills and so thought it advisable to keep before the storm. I accordingly followed the VALLEY North-East, and, as soon as I got into clear weather and saw a suitable spot I landed - close to a village called TIDMORE, about 70 miles East of HOMS, where the inhabitants treated me well, supplying me with plenty of food and drink, and later they provided a donkey and a guide to enable 2A/A FARR, who was with me in the machine, to proceed to HOMS with a message regarding the location of my machine. Among the inhabitants I noticed several GERMANS and quite a number of TURKS, all of whom had apparently deserted from the enemy and were living with the villagers. They informed me that they were at AFULEH and RAYAK when these places were bombed by our machines. They could not stand it, so ran into the hills, where they had remained ever since. They did not show any feeling of hostility towards me. The inhabitants were all well armed with English and Turkish rifles, and English and ~~Turkish revolvers~~ German revolvers. There was also an 18lb. Field Gun, dismantled, together with several field cookers, which were also broken up.

The GERMANS appeared to have a good knowledge of machine guns connected with aeroplanes. One of them, while I was absent from the machine, disconnected the C.C. gear on my machine and fired the Vickers Gun by means of a piece of string attached to the trigger bar. Later one of the Natives stole the spare lock and lock out of the gun. I reported the matter to the Sheikh, who immediately made a search and found the missing article. The culprit was brought along and severely beaten on the body and soles of his feet, in my presence, and the locks were handed back to me.

The Sheikh and his followers treated me with great courtesy keeping an armed guard on the machine night and day, also giving me the best food obtainable and good comfortable quarters.

3.11.18

(Signed) N. HAZELWOOD, Lieut.

1st. Squadron, Australian Flying Corps.

E33/175

FAB.



- OCT 1918

WAR DIARY

OCTOBER 1918.

APPENDIX 11.

DAILY SUMMARY OF WORK.

ORIGINAL.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/176
1st AUSTRALIAN Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

Date 1.10.1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.Ftr.								
B.1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Recon. (Landed HAIFA)	0540	1415	4	15	✓
B.1149	Lt. Barker	W.O. Watkins	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1145	1235		50	✓
B.1149	"	Lt. Lees	HAIFA to RAMLEH	1415	1515	1	0	✓
B.1148	Lt. Blake	Lt. Maclean	Bomb Raid (Landed HAIFA)	0810	0910	1	0	✓
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1000	1230	2	30	✓
A.7200	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0810	0905		55	✓
B.1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	do.	0535	0630		55	✓
"	"	"	Reconnaissance	0745	1045	3	0	✓
"	"	"	Returned to Aerodrome	1145	1150		5	✓
"	"	"	To RAMLEH (forced landing)	1400	1435		35	✓
A.7200	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	Bomb Raid .	1015	1245	2	30	✓
B.1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Beaton	Recon. (Landed HAIFA)	0545	1500	4	20	✓
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Fysh	do.	0545	1155	4	55	✓
C.4840	Lt. Dowling	Lt. McMurray	To HAIFA	0600	0655		55	✓
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1100	1340	2	40	✓
A.7192	Lt. Sheppard	A/M Duckettb	Test	1700	1740		40	✓
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Lees	AFULEH to HAIFA	0850	0910		20	✓
"	"	A/M Balfour	Test	1645	1710		25	✓
B.1229	Major Addison	Lt. MacBain	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0530	0630	1	0	✓
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	Bomb Raid	0955	1230	2	35	✓
B.1147	Lt. Thompson	Lt. Sullivan	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0800	0900	1	0	✓
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	0950	1220	2	30	✓
						<u>38</u>	<u>55</u>	

OCT 1918

W. Addison
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

SUPPLEMENTARY
SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/178
1st **AUSTRALIAN** Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

Date See Remarks 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Mustard	Escort (Landed AFULEH)	0520	1000	3	30	29/9/18
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Lees	To KUNEITRA	0515	0700	1	45	"
"	"	"	E.A. Alarm	0730	0805		35	"
"	"	"	Reconnaissance	1500	1645	1	45	"
						7	35	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Lees	E.A. Alarm	0700	0755		55	30/9/18
"	"	" ^b	Escort to Reconnaissance	1400	1540	1	40	"
"	"	"	To AFULEH	1600	1640		40	"
						3	15	

L. W. ...
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

**SUPPLEMENTARY
SUMMARY OF WORK.**

33/178
1st

AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ Flying Corps.

Date 2/10/1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F.								
B.1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Reconnaissance	0540	1245	4	20	(Landed HAIFA)
A.7200	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	Bomb Raid	1140	1440	2	40	
"	"	"	HAIFA to RAMLEH	1450	1540		50	
B.1148	Lt. Blake	Lt. Maclean	Bomb Raid	1115	1425	3	20	
"	"	Lt. Thompson	HAIFA to RAMLEH	1450	1540		50	
B.1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	To RAMLEH (Forced landing)	1000	1045		45	
B.1149	Lt. Barker	A/M Hankin	Engine Test	1615	1645		30	
B.1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Beaton	To HAIFA	1600	1655		55	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Fysh	"	0545	0630		45	
"	"	"	Reconnaissance	0745	1015	2	30	
A.7192	Lt. Sheppard	Lt. McCann	To HAIFA	0700	0755		55	
"	Lt. Dowling	Lt. McMurray	Bomb Raid	1100	1340	2	40	
C.4840	Lt. Sheppard	Lt. Sullivan	Bomb Raid	1230	1515	2	45	
B.1229	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Weir	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0725	0815		50	
"	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Mustard	Bomb Raid & Recon.	1100	1340	2	40	
C.4627	Lt. Cameron	Lt. Fletcher	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0730	0830	1	0	
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1130	1340	2	10	
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	do.	1100	1340	2	40	
B.1147	Lt. Thompson	Lt. McCann	do.	1130	1420	2	50	
A.7190	"	Cpl. Luxton	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1610	1710	1	0	
C.4627	Capt. Smith	A/M Barlow	Test	1655	1700.		5	
						<u>37</u>	<u>0</u>	

W. W. ...
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 3rd. Oct. 1918 19 .

E 33/179
1st. Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ **AUSTRALIAN** Royal Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. B1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0620	0720	1	0 ✓	
" "	"	Lt. Vyner	Reconnaissance Strat	1130	1400	2	30 ✓	
" B1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	RAMLEH to HAIFA.	0620	0720	1	0 ✓	
" A7200	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0620	0720	1	0 ✓	
" B1149	Lt. Barker	Lt. Upton	" "	1000	1130	1	15 ✓	Landed at AFULEH for 15 mins.
" B1148	Lt. Blake	Lt. Lees	" "	0620	0720	1	0 ✓	
" B1298	Major Addison	F/Sgt. Thomas	" "	1055	1145		50 ✓	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Beaton	Reconnaissance Strat.	1030	1320	2	50 ✓	
" C4627	Lt. Kenny	A/M Hewett	Test	0930	0955		25 ✓	
" "	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Lees	Escort to Reconnaissance	1135	1415	2	40 ✓	
" B1229	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	" "	1025	1305	2	40 ✓	
" B1298	Lt. Tonkin	Cpl. Brown	Test	1530	1600		30 ✓	
						17	40	

Major Addison
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/180
1st ^{Aust.} Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

Date 4th Oct. 1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION Hrs. Mins.	Remarks
				Departure	Return		
B.F. B1149	Lt. Barker	A/M Wallace	Test	1700	1715	15 ✓	
" C4840	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Smith	To Ramleh	1135	1225	50 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	To Haifa	1545	1640	55 ✓	
" C4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	Reconnaissance	1500	1545	45 ✓	Abandoned owing to clouds.
" B1229	Capt. Smith	" Mustard	Escort to Reconnaissance	1500	1545	45 ✓	
						3 - 30	

L. W. James
Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V (P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

1st AUSTRALIAN Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ Flying Corps.

Date **5.10.1918** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.Ftr.								
B.1149	Lt. Barker	Sgt. Kilburn	Test	1030	1050		20 ✓	
"	"	A/M Harman	"	1545	1615		30 ✓	
B.1298	Capt. Brown	Lt. Finlay	Reconnaissance (Strat-)	1040	1300	2	20 ✓	
B.1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	Escort to Recen.	1040	1300	2	20 ✓	
C.4840	Lt. Sheppard	Lt. Maclean	Escort & Bomb Raid	1055	1130		35	Returned
"	"	A/M Hawkes	Test	1515	1555		40 ✓	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Fysh	Photos. & Bombs	1055	1335	2	40 ✓	
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	Reconnaissance	0625	0910	2	45 ✓	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	Escortxtc Reconnaissance	0625	0850	2	25 ✓	
						<u>14</u>	<u>35</u>	

Swainson
 MAJOR,
 Commanding 1st Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V(P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
 6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **6th. Oct. 1918** 19 .

1st. Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ **AUSTRALIAN** Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. B1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Reconnaissance Strat	0630	0900	2	30 ✓	
" B1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Lees	Escort to Reconnaissance	0630	0900	2	30 ✓	
" B1149	Lt. Barker	Sgt. Kilburn	Test	0930	0945		15 ✓	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Beaton	Reconnaissance Strat	1000	1230	2	30 ✓	
" C4623	Lt. Sheppard	Lt. MacLean	Escort to Reconnaissance	1030	1330	3	0 ✓	
" A7192	Lt. Dowling	-	RAMLEH TO HAIFA	1320	1420	1	0 ✓	
" "	"	-	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0905	0955		50 ✓	
" C4840	Lt. Sheppard	Cpl. Matulich	Test	1515	1600		45 ✓	
" A7190	Capt. Smith	A/M Grange	Test.	1135	1205		30 ✓	
" B1229	"	Cpl. Luxton	"	1410	1430		20 ✓	
" "	"	"	"	1515	1545		30 ✓	
						14	40	

J. W. Hamer
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **7th Oct. 1918** 19 .

Aust.
~~XXX~~
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

1/2.
E-33/183
1st

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. A7200	Lt. Blake	-	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0545	0635		50 ✓	
" "	" "	A/M Titterington	RAMLEH to HAIFA (via AMMAN)	0930	1130	2	- ✓	
" B1298	Capt. Brown	Lt. Lees	Escort to Reconnaissance	1000	1225	2	25 ✓	
" B1285	Lt. Adair	" Vyner	Reconnaissance	1000	1225	2	25 ✓	
" B1149	" Barker	A/M Turner	Test	1345	1415		30 ✓	
" B1278	" Peters	Lt. Traill	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0545	0635		50 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	RAMLEH to AMMAN	0700	0750		50 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	Reconnaissance	0900	1130	2	30 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	AMMAN to RAMLEH	1210	1300		50 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1730	1815		45 ✓	
" A7192	Lt. Dowling	Solo	Special to RAMLEH	0545	0635		50 ✓	
" "	" "	"	RAMLEH to AMMAN	0845	0940		55 ✓	
" "	" "	"	AMMAN to HAIFA	1345	1450	1	5 ✓	
" C4623	" Headlam	Lt. Lilly	Reconnaissance	0620	0915	2	55 ✓	
" C4840	" McGinness	Solo	Special to RAMLEH	0820	0905		45 ✓	
" "	" "	"	RAMLEH to AFULEH	1130	1215		45 ✓	
" "	" "	"	AFULEH to HAIFA	1510	1530		20 ✓	
" B1223	" Lukis	Lt. Beaton	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0530	0635	1	5 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	Reconnaissance	0725	1000	2	35 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1605	1715	1	10 ✓	
" C4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	Escort to Reconnaissance	0620	0900	2	40 ✓	
" C4627	" Nunan	" Weir	Mine searching	1245	1500	2	15 ✓	
" B1287	" Tonkin	" Climie	Special Duty	0530	0600		30 ✓	Forced landing TULKERAM
" "	" "	" "	TULKERAM to HAIFA	0830	0900		30 ✓	
" B1229	Capt. Smith	" Mustard	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0530	0700	1	30 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	E.A. Alarm	0715	0845	1	30 ✓	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1600	1715	1	15 ✓	
" B1287	Lt. Tonkin	A/M Balfour	Test	1435	1500		25 ✓	

						36 - 55		

[Signature]
Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/184
1st Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ AUSTRALIAN Flying Corps.

Date 8.10.1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1149	Lt. Barker	A/M Harman	Test	1520	1530		10 ✓	
A.7200	Lt. Adair	" Keritz	To AFULEH & Return	0920	1220		45 ✓	
"	"	" Doig	do.	1300	1715		45 ✓	
C.4840	Lt. Cameron	Lt. MacLean	To RAMLEH	0915	1005		50 ✓	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1235	1335	1	0 ✓	
EX4623								
C.4627	Col. Williams	A/M Hewett	To RAMLEH	1235	1335	1	0 ✓	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1530	1620		50 ✓	
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	To DAMASCUS	0530	0645	1	15 ✓	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1600	1715	1	15 ✓	
B.1229	Capt. Smith	Lt. Mustard	To DAMASCUS	0915	1045	1	30 ✓	
"	"	"	To RAYAK	1430	1505		35 ✓	
"	"	"	RAYAK to HAIFA	1655	1815	1	20 ✓	
						11	15	
						1	35	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 2.10.1918.</u>								
A.7190	Lt. Barker	Cpl. Luxton	Test	0800	0830		30 ✓	Commanding 1st Squadron, AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS
"	"	Cpl. Payne	Special Duty to TULKERAM and return	0900	1200	1	5 ✓	
						1	35	

LKB
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

FAB.

Army Form W. 3077.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/985
1st.AUSTRALIAN
XXXXX
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

Date 9th. Oct. 1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. B1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Bomb Raid (Landed at DAMASCUS)	0620	1605	2	50	
" B1149	Lt. Adair	A/M. Hankin	Test	1500	1510		10	
" B1284	Capt. Brown	Sgt. Chadwick	AFULEH to HAIFA	1200	1220		20	
" B1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	Bomb Raid	0615	1715	2	15	Landed at DAMASCUS
" C4623	Major Addison	Lt. Finlay	KNEITRA to HAIFA	0845	0930		45	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Cpl. Bond	HAIFA to KNEITRA	0630	0720		50	
" "	" "	" "	KNEITRA to HAIFA	0855	0945		50	
" A7192	" Dowling	Lt. MacLean	To DAMASCUS	0615	0720	1	5	
" "	" "	" "	Bomb Raid	0900	1155	2	55	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1350	1505	1	15	
" C4840	" Cameron	" Vyner	To DAMASCUS	0615	0725	1	10	
" "	" "	" "	Bomb Raid	0900	1200	3	0	
" "	" "	" "	KNEITRA to HAIFA	1645	1750	1	5	
" C4623	" Lukis	A/M. Baker	Test	1630	1710		40	
" B1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	Bomb Raid	0655	0735		40	Returned, engine trouble
" "	Capt. Smith	A/M Balfour	Test	1050	1125		35	
" A7190	" "	" Southerden	"	1025	1030		5	
" "	" "	" "	"	1540	1545		5	
" B1147	Lt. Thompson	" Prentice	HAIFA to RAMLEH	1005	1110	1	5	
" "	" "	" Kempton	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1430	1540	1	10	
" C4627	" Headlam	Lt. Lilly	To Damascus	0615	0730	1	15	
" "	" "	" "	Bomb Raid	0930	1215	2	45	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1620	1730	66 1	10	
						28	0	
			SUPPLEMENTARY 8.10.1918.					
" C4623	Major Addison	Lt. Finlay	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0940	1055	1	15	Special duty
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to KNEITRA	1700	1745		45	
						2	0	

Stoddard
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

OCT 1918

JM

Army Form W. 3077.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 10.10.1918

 33/186
 1st AUSTRALIAN Royal Flying Corps. Squadron

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Bomb Raid	0600	1510	4	20	Landed DAMASCUS
A.7200	Lt. Adair	Cpl. Casely	To DAMASCUS	0610	0720	1	10	
"	"	Nal.	To HAIFA	1300	1405	1	5	
B.1149	Lt. Barker	A/M Hankin	Test	1155	1125		10	
B.1284	Capt. Brown	Lt. Finlay	Returned to HAIFA	0530	0540		10	
B.1284	"	"	To RAYAK and return	0630	1710	2	40	
B.1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Beaton	To RAYAK	0550	0700	1	10	
"	"	"	Recon. & return to HAIFA	0900	1150	2	50	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Fysh	Reconnaissance	0550	0610		20	Returned Radiator Trouble
A.7192	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Maclean	To DAMASCUS	0525	0635	1	10	
"	"	"	Return to HAIFA	1400	1525	1	25	
B.1147	Lt. Thompson	Capt. Jarmin	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0915	1015	1	-	
"	"	Solo	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1415	1515	1	-	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	To DAMASCUS	0530	0645	1	15	
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	0850	1115	2	25	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1340	1500	1	20	
A.7190	Lt. Kenny	A/M Bailey	Test	1105	1150		45	
C.4626	Capt. Smith	Lt. Mustard	To RAYAK	0625	0750	1	25	
"	"	"	E.A. Alarm & ret. to HAIFA	1510	1710	2	-	
							27 - 40	

L. W. Anderson
 Major,
 Commanding 1st Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

E 33/187
1st **AUSTRALIAN** Squadron, **XXXX** Royal Flying Corps.

Date **11.10.1918** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1278	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	Reconnaissance	0545	1330	4	45	Landed at RAYAK
B.1285	Lt. Nunan	Lt. Conrick	Escort to Reconnaissance	0545	1330	5	0	" "
B.1149	Lt. Barker	S.M. Robertson	Test	0900	0920		20	
"	"	A/M Hankin	"	1100	1120		20	
"	"	Tpr. Parkinson	"	1535	1610		35	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	F/Sgt. Beard	Test	0900	0945		45	
C.4840	Lt. Cameron	Special Duty (Solo)	To RAMLEH & return	0630	1040	1	50	
B.1223	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Lilly	To RAYAK	0555	0730	1	35	
"	"	"	Return to Ramleh	1545	1710	1	25	
B.1147	Lt. Elwyn	Nil.	Practice	0910	0950		40	
C.4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. Sutherland	To RAYAK	0540	0720	1	40	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1550	1710	1	20	
A.7190	Lt. Thompson	Lt. McCann	To DAMASCUS	1200	1320	1	20	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1615	1730	1	15	
						<u>22</u>	<u>50</u>	

L. W. ...
 MAJOR,
 Commanding 1st Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 12th. Oct. 1918 19 .

1st. Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ **AUSTRALIAN** Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
BF. B1229	Capt. Smith	Lt. Weir	To Rayak	0630	0745	1	15	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance Strat	0930	1230	3	0	Landed at DAMASCUS
" "	"	"	To Haifa	1500	1625	1	25	
" A7190	Lt. Thompson	-	To Rayak	0700	0815	1	15	
" "	"	-	To Haifa	1230	1400	1	30	
" B1147	Lt. Maughan	Lt. McCann	To Damascus	0845	1005	1	20	
" "	"	"	To Haifa	1525	1650	1	25	
" B1237	Lt. Tenkin	Lt. Climie	To Rayak	0630	0745	1	15	Landed at DAMASCUS
" "	"	"	(Escort to reconnaissance)	0930	1230	3	0	
" A7192	Lt. Dewling	-	To Rayak	0650	0815	1	25	
" "	"	-	To Haifa	1225	1345	1	20	
" C4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Smith	To Rayak	0650	0705	1	15	
" "	"	"	To Haifa	1245	1410	1	25	
" C4340	Lt. Cameren	Lt. Upton	To Damascus	1250	1315	1	25	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Fletcher	To Rayak	0650	0805	1	15	
" C4340	Lt. Cameren	Lt. Upton	To Haifa	1440	1650	1	10	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. Fletcher	Bomb Raid & Reconnaissance	0915	1145	2	30	
" "	"	"	Rayak to Damascus	1200	1255		55	
" "	"	"	Damascus to Haifa	1500	1625	1	25	
" A7200	Lt. Barker	-	To Ramleh & return to Haifa	0615	1100	1	45	
" B1149	Capt. Brown	Sgt. Kilburn	Test	0925	1005		40	
" B1234	"	Lt. Lees	To Damascus	0550	0730	1	40	Returned.
" B1273	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	To Damascus & return to Haifa	0530	1645	2	35	
" B1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Gregory	Damascus to Haifa.	1015	1130	1	15	
						37	25	

Stewartson
 MAJOR,
 Commanding 1st. Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **13th Oct. 1918.**

Aust.
1st Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. B1284	Capt. Brown	Lt. Lees	Rece. (Landed RAYAK)	0555	1120	4	10	
" A7200	Lt. Peters	" Barker	To RAMLEH & return (sole)	0610	1130	1	45	
" B1149	" Blake	Cpl. Payne	RAYAK to HAIFA	0950	1130	1	40	
" A7188	" Barker	A/M Prentice	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1100	1150		50	
" "	" Trevan	" Stantke	Practice	1550	1630		40	
" C4623	Lt. McGinness	A/M Stephensen	Test	0955	1040		45	
" A7192	" Harper	" King	Practice	1555	1625		30	
" "	" Wright	Sele	"	1700	1725		25	
" B1223	" Headlam	Lt. Lilly	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0545	0710	1	25	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1505	1705	2	-	
" C4840	" Cameren	Capt. Jarman	Special to DAMASCUS	1325	1430	1	5	
" "	" "	" "	Return to HAIFA	1510	1705	1	55	
" C4626	Lt. Kenny	Lt. McCann	HAIFA to RAYAK	0535	0650	1	15	
" "	" "	" "	Escort to rece. & ret. to HAIFA	0835	1135	3	-	
" A7190	" Elwyn	Sele	Practice	0945	1020		35	
" "	" Hazelwood	"	"	1645	1710		25	
" B1147	" Vincent	"	"	1700	1720		20	
" B1287	" Tenkin	Lt. Climie	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1500	1650	1	50	
" B1229	Capt. Smith	" Weir	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0530	0650	1	20	
" "	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1500	1655	1	55	

						27 - 50		

B.F. B1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Gregory	SUPPLEMENTARY - 8/10/18. HAIFA to DAMASCUS	0530	0650	1	20	
B.F. B1149	Lt. Blake	Cpl. Payne	SUPPLEMENTARY - 12/10/18. HAIFA to RAYAK	1500	1600	1	-	

L. W. ...
Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

33/190
1stAUSTRALIAN
Squadron, XXXX Flying Corps.

Date 14/10/18

19

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
A.7188	Lt. Dunstan	A/M Hurst	Practice	1005	1050		45	
"	Lt. Trevan	" Moss	"	1100	1130		30	
"	Lt. Dunstan	" Lawson	"	1630	1705		35	
B.1295	Capt. Bannister	Lt. Macrostie	Ramleh to Haifa	0930	1040	1	10	
A.7192	Lt. Wright	A/M Taylor	Practice	1010	1115	1	5	
"	Lt. Harper	" Stevens	"	1550	1640		50	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	" Kershaw	To Kuneitra	1015	1100		45	
"	"	"	To Haifa	1400	1455		55	
B.1147	Lt. Maughan	Gen. Borton	To Damascus	1025	1140	1	15	
"	"	Nil-	To Haifa	1525	1640	1	15	
A.7190	Lt. Vincent	"	Practice	0910	0940		30	
"	Lt. Hazelwood	"	"	0940	1000		20	
"	Lt. Elwyn	"	"	1000	1020		20	
"	Lt. Hazelwood	"	"	1655	1710		15	
"	Lt. Elwyn	A/M Scrinshaw	"	1715	1725		10	
						10	40	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY</u>								
<u>12.10.18</u>								
B.1285	Lr. Adair	Nil.	Haifa to Rayak	0600	0705	1	5	
"	"	"	From Rayak (Fcd. Landing)	1730	1830	1	0	
						2	5	
<u>13.10.18</u>	Capt. Bannister	Lt. Macrostie	Kantara to Ramleh	1320	1525	2	5	

- OCT 1918

RMS

MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Sqdn.,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **15.10.1918** 19 .

AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, ~~Rayak~~ Flying Corps.

1st

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1298	Lt. Blake	Nil.	To Rayak and return	0925	1400	2	5 ✓	
A.7188	Capt. Brown	Lt. Dunstan	To Ramleh	1530	1630	1	0 ✓	
"	Lt. Dunstan	Nil.	To Haifa	1630	1720		50 ✓	
C.4840	Lt. Wright	A/M Watts	Practice	1600	1630		30 ✓	
A.7192	" Harper	Lt. Gregory	Special to DAMASCUS	1155	1205	1	10 ✓	
"	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1650	1715	1	25 ✓	
C.4623	" McGinness	" Smith	To RAYAK	0655	0805	1	10 ✓	
"	" "	" "	Reconnaissance	0915	1240	3	25 ✓	
"	" "	" "	RAYAK to HAIFA	1500	1645	1	45 ✓	
B.1147	Lt. Maughan	Sgt. Rogers	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0600	0650		50 ✓	
"	" "	Nil.	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1000	1050		50 ✓	
A.7184	" Murphy	Lt. Hawley	SUEZ to KANTARA	0900	1000	1	- ✓	
"	" "	" "	KANTARA to HAIFA	1100	1330	2	30 ✓	
C.4626	" Kenny	" McCann	To RAYAK	0700	0815	1	15 ✓	
"	" "	" "	Reconnaissance	0910	1210	3	- ✓	
"	" "	" "	RAYAK to HAIFA	1500	1650	1	50 ✓	

						24 - 35		

- OCT 1918

RMS
Captain,
for Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

E33/192
1st **AUSTRALIAN** Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

Date **16.10.18** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1223	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Gregory	To RAYAK	0925	1035	1	10	
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1200	1430	2	30	
"	"	"	Rayak to HAIFA	1600	1740	1	40	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Smith	To RAYAK	0930	1040	1	10	
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1200	1430	2	30	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1600	1730	1	30	
C.4840	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Cameron	To RAMLEH	1110	1210	1	0	
"	"	Cpl. Woodgate	To HAIFA	1610	1710	1	0	
B.1229	Lt. Maughan	Lt. Vyner	To RAYAK	0545	0700	1	15	
"	"	"	Reconnaissance (Strat.)	0750	1055	3	5	
"	"	"	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1210	1320	1	10	
C.4627	Lt. Murphy	A/M Smith	Test n	1100	1120		20	
"	"	" Brier	Test	1605	1650		45	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	To RAYAK	0925	1040	1	15	
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1200	1430	2	30	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1615	1730	1	15	
B.1284	Lt. Barker	Lt. Maclean	To RAYAK	0600	0700	1	0	
"	"	"	Escort to Recon.	0800	1040	2	40	
"	"	"	To HAIFA	1235	1345	1	10	
B.1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Bomb Raid (Landed RAYAK)	0915	1730	5	5	
A.7188	Lt. Blake	Lt. Murray McMurray	DAMASCUS and return (Landed Damascus)	1230	1830	2	25	
						<u>36</u>	<u>25</u>	

- OCT 1918

S. W. ...
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **17th Oct. 1918.** 19 .

Aust.
~~XXXX~~
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

13/193
1st

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. A7188	Lt. Blake	Lt. McMurray	From HAIFA to RAMLEH & return.	0600	1110	1	55 ✓	
" B1149	Lt. Barker	Sgt. Tusker	Test	1500	1520		20 ✓	
" B1295	Lt. Headlam	Cpl. Bond	Test	0650	0730		40 ✓	
" C4623	Lt. Harper	Lt. Sullivan	To RAYAK	0605	0705	1	0 ✓	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance. Strat	0820	1120	3	0 ✓	
" "	"	"	From RAYAK to HAIFA	1320	1445	1	25 ✓	
" C4840	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Gregory	To DAMASCUS	1155	1305	1	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	From DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1550	1710	1	20 ✓	
" C4627	Lt. Murphy	Lt. Lees	To RAYAK	0600	0715	1	15 ✓	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance Strat	0830	1130	3	0 ✓	
" "	"	"	RAYAK to HAIFA	1325	1450	1	25 ✓	
" C4626	Lt. Kenny	Gen. Salmond	DAMASCUS to HOMS	0800	0915	1	15 ✓	
" "	"	"	HOMS to RAYAK	1130	1240	1	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	RAYAK to HAIFA	1310	1435	1	25 ✓	
" A7190	Lt. Maughan	Lt. Traill	To JERUSALEM	0845	0955	1	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	JERUSALEM to HAIFA	1535	1645	1	10 ✓	
						<u>22</u>	<u>40</u>	
			<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 16.10.'18</u>					
B.F. C4626	Lt. Kenny	Gen. Salmond	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	1025	1140	1	15 ✓	

OCT 1918

RMS
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

1st

AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

Date 18.10.1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
B.1149	Lt. Peters	S.M. Robertson	Test	0845	0915		30	
"	Lt. Barker	A/M Morgan	Test	1500	1540		40	
B.1223	Capt. Brown	Lt. Lukis	Ramleh to Haifa	0935	1025		50	
A.7184	Lt. Harper	A/M Reeman	Test	1030	1045		15	
B.1295	Lt. Headlam	A/M Greenup	Test	1030	1050		20	
A.7190	Lt. Boyle	A/M Kempton	Practice	0920	1030	1	10	
B.1229	Lt. Hazelwood	Lt. McMurray	To Rayak	0555	0705	1	10	
"	"	"	Reconnaissance	0815	1120	3	5	Landed at HOMS
"	"	"	Homs to Rayak	1205	1305	1	0	
"	"	"	Rayak to Haifa	1550	1700	1	10	

						10	10	

<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 17.10.18</u>								
B.1223	Lt. Lukis	Gen. Salmond	Haifa to Ramleh	1535	1620	-----		45

R. H. Smith Capt.,
for Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 19th October 19 .

AUSTRALIAN
1st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F.1149	Lt. Barker	A/M Turner	Test	1450	1510		20 ✓	
" 7200	Lt. Adair	" Mayne	Haifa to Ramleh	0600	0650		50 ✓	
" "	"	Gen. Manifold	Ramleh to Haifa	0905	1000		55 ✓	
" 1295	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Lilly	To Homs	0555	0805	2	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance (Strat.)	0910	1200	2	50 ✓	
" "	"	"	Homs to Haifa	1340	1600	2	20 ✓	
" 1147	Lt. Tenkin	Gen. Manifold	Haifa to Damascus	0935	1055	1	20 ✓	
" "	"	Nil.	Damascus to Haifa	1530	1640	1	10 ✓	
" 1229	Capt. Smith	Lt. McCann	Haifa to Homs	0530	0735	2	5 ✓	
" "	"	"	E.A. Alarm & Recon.	0900	1150	2	50 ✓	
" "	"	"	Homs to Rayak	1330	1440	1	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	Rayak to Haifa	1500	1615	1	15 ✓	
						19	15	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 18.10.1918</u>								
B.F.4623	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Conrick	Baixfate Rayak	0555	0700	1	5 ✓	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance (Landed at Homs (Eng. Trouble))	0810	1055	2	45 ✓	
						3	50	

R. H. Smith Capt.,
for Major
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

FAB.

AUSTRALIAN Flying Corps.

Date 20th. Oct. 1918. 19 .

33/196
1st. Squadron,

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F. B1149	Lt. Barker	S.M. Robertson	Test	1415	1500		45 ✓	
"	C4627	Lt. Murphy	HAIFA to HOMS	0610	0810	2	0	} ✓
"	"	"	Reconnaissance Strat.	0945	1230	2	45	
"	"	"	HOMS to HAIFA	1455	1710	1	15	

						6 45		

Rms CAPTAIN,
for MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V(P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
6481—1531 60,000 7/15

**SUPPLEMENTARY
SUMMARY OF WORK.**

Date see Remarks 19 .

AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps

1st Sdn.,

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
C.4626	Lt. Harper	Lt. Lilly	HAIFA to HAMA	0650	0935	2	45	22.10.1918 "C" Flight
"	"	"	Reconnaissance (Strat.)	1030	1335	2	40	" "
			(Landed at A.L.Ground)					
						5	25	" "
C.4626	Lt. Harper	Lt. Lilly	Bomb Raid & Reconnaissance	0435	0700	2	25	23.10.1918
"	"	"	Forced landing at Armored					" "
"	"	"	Cars	0715	0755		40	" "
"	"	"	Fcd.Ldg. to HAMA	1340	1410		30	" "
C.4627	Lt. Murphy	A/M Dagwell	HAIFA to HAMA	0735	0950	2	15	" "
"	"	Lt. Climie	Bomb Raid	1100	1315	2	15	" "
						8	5	" "
B.1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Gregory	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0830	2	30	" "A" Flight
"	"	"	Reco.(Strat.) Ld.A.L.Grd.	0900	1330	3	25	" "
B.1278	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0810	2	10	" "
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1100	1310	2	10	" "
"	"	"	Drop Messages Arm.Cars	1500	1755	2	55	" "
B.1284	Capt. Brown	Lt. Lees	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0810	2	10	" "
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1100	1310	2	10	" "
B.1287	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	HAIFA to HAMA	0655	0900	2	5	" "
"	"	"	Bomb Raid	1100	1315	2	15	" "
A.7188	Lt. Trevan	-	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0810	2	10	" "
"	"	Lt. Conrick	Bomb Raid	1100	1310	2	10	" "
						25	28	" "
B.1147	Lt. Maughan	-	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0815	2	15	" "C" FLIGHT
"	"	-	Petrol to A.L.Ground	0920	1150	1	40	" "
						3	55	" "
A.7188	Lt. Trevan	Lt. Conrick	Reco.(Strat.)ld.A.L.Grd.	0600	1200	4	0	24.10.1918 "A" FLIGHT

- OCT 1918

W. Adair MAJOR,
Commanding Officer
Australian Flying Corps.

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V(P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 21st Oct. 1918 19 .

1st ^{Aust.} Squadron, ~~Royal~~ Flying Corps.

E 33/198

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.Fighter A7188	Col. Williams	Cpl. Payne	To RAMLEH & return.	1255	1730	1	35 ✓	
B1295	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Gregory	HAIFA to HOMS	0555	0755	2	- ✓	
"	" "	" "	Escort to Reconnaissance	1000	1245	2	45 ✓	
"	" "	" "	HOMS to HAIFA	1435	1645	2	10 ✓	
B1147	Lt. Vincent	Lt. MacLean	HAIFA to DAMASCUS	1100	1235	1	35 ✓	
"	" "	" "	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	1535	1700	1	25 ✓	
C4626	" Kenny	" Fletcher	HAIFA to HOMS	0540	0750	2	10 ✓	
"	" "	" "	Reconnaissance	0950	1240	2	50 ✓	
"	" "	" "	HOMS to HAIFA	1435	1655	2	20 ✓	
						18 - 50		

W. Williams
Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V (P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 22.10.18 19 .

JM

E 33/199

AUSTRALIAN
1st Squadron, ~~Koyak~~ Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F.								
B.1149	Lt. Barker	Lt. Gregory	Photography	0845	1130	2	45	
"	"	A/M TAGE	Test	1630	1640		10	
B.1234	Capt. Brown	Sgt. Horscroft	To HAMA and return	0815	1700	5	5	Landed at HAMA
A.7192	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Lees	Jerusalem to Haifa	1100	1230	1	30	
B.1229	Capt. Smith	Lt. Weir	HAIFA to HAMA	0600	0830	2	30	
"	"	"	Reconnaissance	1030	1315	2	45	Landed at NA'AMAN
"	"	"	NA'AMAN to HAMA	1345	1415		30	
"	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1445	1705	2	20	
B.1287	Lt. Tenkin	Lt. Climie	HOMS to HAIFA	0855	1115	2	20	
						19	55	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 21.10.18</u>								
C.4840	Lt. Thompson	Lt. Sullivan	To RAMLEH	0610	0710	1	0	
"	"	"	RAMLEH to HAIFA	0850	0950	1	0	
A.7190	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Lees	To JERUSALEM	1100	1200	1	0	
						3	0	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 20.10.18</u>								
B.1227	Lt. Tenkin	Lt. Climie	HAIFA to HOMS	0610	0810	2	0	

S. Swanson
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V (P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 23rd. Oct. 1918. 19 .

F 33/200
1st. Squadron, **AUSTRALIAN** Flying Corps.
~~XXXXX~~

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
BF. B1149	Lt. Barker	Cpl. Bayne	Test.	0945	1005		20 ✓	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Cpl. Harris	Test	0930	0945		15 ✓	
" "	"	A/M Stewart	"	1110	1125		15 ✓	
" "	"	" Blair	"	1615	1630		15 ✓	
" C4840	Lt. Dowling	-	To HAMA	0610	0825	2	15 ✓	
" "	"	-	To Adv. Landing ground	0900	1030	1	30 ✓	
" "	"	-	To Forced Landing (Lt. Harper)	1230	1340	1	10 ✓	
" "	Lt. Dowling	A/M Clements	Return to Haifa.	1435	1650	2	15 ✓	
" B1295	Mjr. Addison	Lt. Hawley	To HAMA	0610	0825	2	15 ✓	
" "	"	"	To Adv. Landing Ground	0950	1045		4 55 ✓	
" "	"	"	Reconnaissance. Strat.	1100	1355	2	5 55 ✓	
" A7184	"	"	To Haifa	1440	1705	2	25 ✓	
" B1295	"	"	Adv. Landing ground to HAMA.	1357	1437		40 ✓	
" B1229	Capt. Smith	Lt. Weir	Haifa to Hama	0630	0840	2	10 ✓	
" "	"	"	Escort to Reconnaissance	1030	1335	3	5 ✓	
" "	"	"	Hama to Haifa.	1440	1650	2	10 ✓	

						24	20 50.	

W. Addison
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.
- OCT 1918

E 33/201

SUMMARY OF WORK.

1st Squadron, ~~Rxxx~~ ^{Aust.} Flying Corps.

Date **24th October 1918**.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		Remarks
				Departure	Return	
			----- Nil -----			

[Signature]
Major,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V(P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
 6481—1531 60,000 7/15

E-33/202

1st. AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, ~~XXXXX~~ Royal Flying Corps.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **25th. Oct. 1918.** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks	
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.		
B.F.C4840	Capt. Smith	Lt. Wright	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0910	1005		55 ✓		
" "	Lt. Wright	A/M Ashenden	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1130	1230	1	0 ✓		
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	" Blair	Test.	1650	1705		15 ✓		
H.P.C9681	Capt. Smith	A/M Tomrop) RAMLEH to HAIFA	1025	1120		55 ✓		
B.F.B1229	Lt. Tonkin	Sgt. Bennett) HAIFA to HAMA	0700	0920	2	20 ✓	
" "	Lt. Maughan	-) HAMA to HAIFA	1430	1650	2	20 ✓	

						7	45		

L. J. ...
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.
- OCT 1918

E 33/203

1st. Squadron, **AUSTRALIAN** ~~XXXX~~ Flying Corps. **FAB.**

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date **26th. Oct. 1918** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F.B1223	Lt. Lukis	A/M Morgan	Wireless Test	1045	1145	1	0 ✓	
" A7184	Lt. Wright	Lt. Gower	HAIFA to RAMLEH	0600	0700	1	0 ✓	
" "	"	-	RAMLEH to HAIFA	1000	1050		50 ✓	
" B1295	Lt. McGinness	A/M Martyr	HAMA to HAIFA	1150	1405	2	15 ✓	
H.P.C9681	Capt. Smith	Lt. Weir Sgt. Bennett	HAIFA to HAMA (Returned owing to storm)	0600	0815	2	15 ✓	
B.F.C4627	Lt. Murphy	A/M Parr A/M Hall	HAMA to HAIFA	1005	1310	3	5 ✓	
						<u>10</u>	<u>25</u>	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 23.10.'18.</u>								
B.F.A7184	Lt. McGinness	-	HAIFA to HAMA	0610	0825	2	15 ✓	
" "	"	-	HAMA to Adv. Landing Ground	0915	1115	2	0 ✓	
						<u>4</u>	<u>15</u>	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 25.10.'18.</u>								
B.F.B1287	Lt. Adair	Lt. Lees	Reconnaissance Strat. (Landed at Adv. Landing Ground.)	1055	1505	3	0 ✓	

S. W. ...
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

I/Z.

Army Form W. 3077.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

E 33/204
 1st Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ Aust. Flying Corps.

Date 27th Oct. 1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks	
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.		
B.F. C4840	Lt. Dowling	Lt. Sullivan	DAMASCUS to HAIFA	0700	0820	1	20 ✓		
" A7192	" Thompson	A/M Duckett	Test	1345	1405		20 ✓		
B.F. C4626	Lt. Blake	Lt. Lilly	HAMA to HAIFA	1130	1415	2	45 ✓		
I.P. C9681	Capt. Smith	Col. Williams	HAIFA to HAMA	0730	1025	2	55 ✓		
		Lt. Weir							
		Sgt. Bennett	HAIFA to HAMA	1050	1310	2	20 ✓		
B.F. C4627	Lt. Maughan	Lt. Smith							
I.P. C9681	Capt. Smith	Col. Williams	HAMA to HAIFA	1330	1655	3	25 ✓		
		Lt. Weir							
		" Maughan							
		" Smith							
		" Harper							
		Sgt. Bennett							
						13	-	5	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY SUMMARY OF WORK 26/10/18.</u>									
B.F. B1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Gregory	Reco. Landed at Adv. L. Ground & ALLEPPO.	0630	1700	4	25 ✓		
" C4626	" Harper	" Lilly	Contact Patrol, Reco & Bomb Raid. Landed at Adv. L. Ground & ALEPPO.	0900	1630	4	15 ✓		
" C4840	Lt. Dowling	" Sutherland	To DAMASCUS	1600	1700	1	- ✓		
		SULLIVAN							
						9	-	40	

W. Harrison
 Major,
 Commanding 1st Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

FAB.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

Date 28th. Oct. 1918. 19 .

1st-

533/205

AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION.		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Min.	
B.F.A7192	Lt. Dowling	A/M. Schacht	Test	1035	1105		30 ✓	
" B1150	Lt. Headlam	-	KANTARA to HAIFA	1100	1345	2	45 ✓	
" B1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. McCann	Search for missing machine	0855	1140	2	45 ✓	Landed at HAMA
" "	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1410	1655	2	45 ✓	
" B1295	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Smith	Search for missing machine	0855	1140	2	45 ✓	Landed at HAMA
" "	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1410	1655	2	45 ✓	
H.P.C9681	Capt. Smith	Lt. Weir	} HAIFA to HAMA	0730	1000	2	30 ✓	
" "	"	Sgt. Bennett						
B.F.C4730	Lt. Murphy	-	HAMA to HAIFA	1210	1550	3	40 ✓	
			KANTARA to HAIFA	1100	1345	2	45 ✓	
						23	10	

Johnson
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st. Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS.

- OCT 1918

SUMMARY OF WORK.

1st

AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS
Squadron Royal Flying Corps
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Date 29.10.1918 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mins.	
B.F.								
A.7192	Lt. Harper	Lt. Dowling	To RAMLEH	1355	1440		45 ✓	
"	"	Nil.	To HAIFA	1610	1655		45 ✓	
B.1223	Lt. Lukis	Lt. McCann	To DAMASCUS	0630	0730	1	0 ✓	
"	"	"	Search for missing m/c.	0900	1200	3	0 ✓	Landed at HAMA
"	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1415	1655	2	40 ✓	
B.1295	Lt. Headlam	Lt. Lilly	To DAMASCUS	0630	0730	1	0 ✓	
"	"	"	Search for missing m/c.	0900	1200	3	0 ✓	Landed at HAMA
"	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1415	1655	2	40 ✓	
						<u>14</u>	<u>50</u>	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 27.10.18</u>								
B.1147	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	Recon. Landed ALEPPO	0630	1240	2	15 ✓	
"	"	"	ALEPPO to HAMA	1400	1520	1	20 ✓	
B.1284	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Recon. Landed ALEPPO	0640	1145	3	35 ✓	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	Escort to Recon.	0640	1145	3	25 ✓	
						<u>10</u>	<u>35</u>	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY 28.10.18</u>								
B.1147	Lt. Adair	Lt. Vyner	Recon. (Strat.)	0800	1050	2	50 ✓	
"	"	"	ALEPPO to HAMA	1140	1300	1	20 ✓	
C.4627	Lt. Peters	Lt. Traill	Reco. (Strat.) Ld. ALEPPO	0640	1140	3	45 ✓	
						<u>7</u>	<u>55</u>	

W. Anderson
MAJOR,
Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

OCT 1918

JM

Army Form W. 3077.

SUMMARY OF WORK.

1st

E 33/204

AUSTRALIAN
Squadron, ~~XXXXX~~ Flying Corps.

Date 30.10.18 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F.								
A.7237	Lt. Dowling	Nil.	KANTARA to RAMLEH	0930	1145	2	15 ✓	
"	"	"	RAMLEH to HAITA	1220	1310		50 ✓	
B.1223	Lt. Harper	Lt. Weir	Photography	1240	1515	2	35 ✓	
						5	40	

S. Swan
 MAJOR,
 Commanding 1st Squadron,
 AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918

(9 38 52) W 12310—2173 20,000 2/15 H W V(P 417) Forms/W. 3077/1
 6481—1531 60,000 7/15

SUMMARY OF WORK.

AUSTRALIAN
1st Squadron, ~~XXXX~~ Flying Corps.

Date **31.10.18** 19 .

Type	Pilot	Observer	Duty	Hour of—		DURATION		Remarks
				Departure	Return	Hrs.	Mns.	
B.F. C.4627	Lt. Vincent	A/M Hilet	HAMA to HAIFA	1415	1700	2	45	
B.1229	Lt. Hazelwood	Nil.	do.	1430	1700	2	30	
C.4623	Lt. McGinness	A/M Munn	Test	1200	1300	1	0	
"	"	"	HAMA to HAIFA	1430	1700	2	30	
C.4840	Lt. Thompson	Lt. Maclean	HAIFA to HAMA	0840	1000	2	20	
"	"	"	Photography	1440 ^m	1710	2	30	
<u>SUPPLEMENTARY RETURN</u>						<u>13</u>	<u>35</u>	
<u>28.10.18</u>								
B.1284	Lt. Dunstan	Cpl. Bawden	HAMA to HAIFA	0900	1135	2	35	
<u>29.10.18</u>								
C.4730	Lt. Blake	A/M Davies	HAIFA to HAMA	0700	0900	2	0	
C.4627	Lt. Peters	do.	HAMA to ALEPPO	0930	1040	1	10	
"	"	Lt. Trevan & Nunan	ALEPPO to HAMA	1525	1630	1	5	
B.1298	Lt. Adair	Lt. Upton	Escort to Reco. Ld. ALEPPO	0655	1630	4	25	
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	Lt. Climie	Recon.(Strat.) do.	1645	1630	5	5	
B.1284	Lt. Dunstan	A/M Faulkner	Test	1635	1655			
						<u>14</u>	<u>5</u>	
<u>30.10.18</u>								
B.1287	Lt. Tonkin	A/M Parr	To Lt. Hazelwood's m/c.	0900	1730	3	15	
C.4627	Lt. Adair	" Simpson	do.	0900	1730	3	0	
B.1298	Lt. Blake	Lt. Gregory	Recon. Land ALEPPO	0630	1320	4	20	
B.1147	Lt. Trevan	Lt. Lees	Recon. do.	0640	0920	2	35	
B.1150	Lt. McGinness	Lt. Vincent	HAIFA to HAMA	1110	1345	2	35	
B.1284	Lt. Dunstan	Cpl. Bawden	HAIFA to HAMA	1110	1340	2	30	
						<u>18</u>	<u>15</u>	

Lieut.,
for Major
20 Commanding 1st Squadron,
AUSTRALIAN FLYING CORPS

- OCT 1918