

**AWM4**

**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/6/9 Part 3

**Title:** General Staff, General  
Headquarters, Egyptian  
Expeditionary Force

December 1916



AWM4-1/6/9PART3

# OUTLINE MAP OF N.E. EGYPT

ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI  
DECEMBER 2, 1916

## MEDITERRANEAN SEA



- Railways (3 6) ———
- under construction November 1916 ———
- Light Railways ———
- Metalled Roads ———
- International Boundary - - - - -
- Main Roads - - - - -
- Egyptian State Railways - - - - -
- Light Railways ———
- Canals ———
- Wadis - - - - -
- Limits of Cultivation - - - - -

REFERENCE

SITUATION & No. of ENEMY (SIZE INDICATES PROPORTION GERMAN FORCES)

GUNS  
- HEAVY  
- A.A.

AEROPLANES

RAILWAYS

MOTOR ROADS




Reproduced by the Survey of Egypt, 1916. Reprint with

# OUTLINE MAP OF N.E. EGYPT

ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI  
DECEMBER 9 1916

MEDITERRANEAN SEA



- Railways (36)
- Light Railways
- Metalled Roads
- International Boundary
- Main Roads
- Egyptian State Railways
- Light Railways
- Canals
- Wadis
- Limit of Cultivation

**REFERENCE**

SITUATION & No. of ENEMY (BLUE INDICATES PROPORTION GERMAN FORCES)  
 GUNS  
 HEAVY  
 A.A.  
 AEROPLANES  
 RAILWAYS  
 MOTOR ROADS




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# OUTLINE MAP OF N.E. EGYPT

ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI  
DECEMBER 25 1916

MEDITERRANEAN SEA




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# OUTLINE MAP OF N.E. EGYPT

ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES IN SINAI

DECEMBER 29 1916

M E D I T E R R A N E A N S E A



**Legend**

- Railways (3'6")
- " (under construction November 1916)
- Light Railways
- Mettled Roads
- International Boundary
- Main Roads
- Egyptian State Railways
- Light Railways
- Canal
- Wadi
- Limit

**REFERENCE**

- SITUATION & No. of ENEMY (BLUE INDICATES PROPORTION GERMAN FORCES)
- GUNS
  - HEAVY
  - AA
- AEROPLANES
- RAILWAYS
- MOTOR ROADS

SCALE 1:500,000



Reproduced by the Survey of Egypt, 1916.

W.D.

SECRET.

SECRET



From:- Egyptforce, CAIRO.

To :- Troopers, LONDON.

A.M.1542 cipher

8/12/16

Desp. 1150.

Your 21158 and 23226 cipher A.C.1. Weekly return R.F.C :-

(a) <u>EGYPT.</u>	5th Wing	38.	
	20th Reserve Wing	24.	
	X Aircraft Park / Depot	1.	
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>	38.	Includes 8 Balloon Pilots
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>	14.	
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>	16.	

(b) <u>EGYPT.</u>	5th Wing.	4.
	20th Reserve Wing	3.
	X Aircraft Depot	nil
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>	8.
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>	8.
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>	2.

(c) <u>EGYPT.</u>		Service-able.	Unservi- ceable	Not erected.	
<u>5th Wing.</u>					
B.E.S.C.		21.	8.	5 b	(b) On ex- pedition.
Bristol Scout.		5.	4.	nil	
Martinsyde		4.	2.	nil	
De Havilland		nil.	1.	nil	
<u>20th Reserve Wing.</u>					
Bristol Scout		1.	nil	nil	
Maurice Farman		9.	2.	2.	
Avro		4.	8.	nil	
Curtiss		2.	2.	nil	
B.E.S.C.		5.	4a	nil	(a) Includes 1 Instruc- tional mach- ine.
B.E.S.E.		nil.	nil.	3.	
<u>X Aircraft Depot.</u>					
B.E.S.C.		nil.	3.	1.	
Bristol Scout		nil.	1.	3.	
Martinsyde		nil.	1.	3.	
Maurice Farman		nil.	nil.	4.	
Avro.		nil.	3.	nil.	
Caudron		nil.	5.	nil.	
B.E.S.K.		nil.	nil.	4.	
<u>SALONIKA.</u>					
B.E.S.C.		10.	6.	nil.	
B.E.12.		3.	nil.	nil.	
Bristol Scouts		3.	2.	2.	
De Havilland		1.	nil.	nil.	
Armstrong W.		12.	3.	6.	
<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>					
B.E.S.C.		6.	1.	3.	
Henri Farman		3.	nil	3.	
<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>					
B.E.S.C.		10.	4.	6.	
Henri Farman		2.	3.	nil.	
Martinsyde		3.	nil.	3.	

Copies to:-

O

O(a)

O(b)

C.S.S.

I

A

Q

Filed:-

G.S./104/3

G.S.Cables

W.D.



WD

Rec 16  
B 2

1st December, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Force.

With reference to your Oa.7/5, dated 28/11/16, the issue of 2 Lewis guns per battalion for the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade is approved. These guns, however, will only be issued to the Indian brigade while serving on lines of communication, and no alteration in establishment is contemplated.

With reference to the last para. of the above quoted letter, this raises the question of the organisation of the armed Ford cars with the Desert Column. Ford cars on the Western Front are organised in six Light Car Patrols of six cars each, and are numbered from 1 to 6. It is considered that the Ford cars in your command should be similarly organised and numbered 7, 8, ..... . In this connection a copy of establishment for a Light Ford Car Patrol is forwarded for your guidance. The personnel serving with these patrols is not struck off the strength of regiments, but officers and men are merely attached for duty with the Ford cars. Though these units have no authorised establishment, they act as a unit in so far that they have on their charge equipment, etc. It is considered that all such light Ford cars should be included in these patrols, and that the issue of single guns promiscuously to individual cars should not be sanctioned.

Encl:

*(Signature)*  
Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Dec 16  
3

PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR LIGHT CAR PATROL.

DETAIL.	Officers.	Staff Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank & file.	Artificers.	Total.	REMARKS.
Captain, or Subaltern.	1	-	-	-	1	
Subaltern.	1	-	-	-	1	
Sergeant.	-	1	-	-	1	
(1) Corporals.	-	-	2	-	2	(1) Trained Lewis Gunners.
(1) Privates.	-	-	5	-	5	
Batmen.	-	-	2	-	2	
Cook.	-	-	1	-	1	
(2) M.T. Personnel for Repairs.	-	1	-	1	2	(2) Provided with Cars.
(2) Drivers.	-	-	6	-	6	
Total Patrol.	2	2	16	1	21	

(11) Transport.

DETAIL.	VEHICLES.	Drivers.	REMARKS.
(3) Ford Cars.	5	5	(3) Two cars, fitted with box bodies and carry Lewis Machine Guns.
Depot Car.	1	1	
	6	6	



W-D

dec 16  
A

From : General Smuts, DAR-ES-SALAAM.  
To : Egyptforce.

G.O.F. 1415 decode. 3/12/15.

Desp. 1010.  
Recd. 1238.

Distribution of flying Corps.

Headquarters of R.K.A.S. and  
No. 7 Squadron.

KILOSSA.

Advanced Base.

IRINGA.

Aircraft Park.

DAR ES SALAAM.

Military Wing Headquarters.

'A' Flight.

½ 'B' Flight. and  
Advanced Aircraft Park.

MOROGORO.

½ "B" Flight.

TULO.

'C' Flight.

DAR ES SALAAM  
for KILWA.

Aircraft Park.

KILINDINI  
for DARESSALAAM  
and DARESSALAAM (?)

Copiesto :-O.

O(a).

O(b).

C.S.S.

I.

R.F.C.

Filed G.S. Z/34.

" G.S. Cables.

W.D.



SECRET.

SECRET

5

From:- Sirdar, KHARTOUM.

To :- Chief, Egyptforce, CAIRO.

No.61

6/12/15

Desp.1526.

Recd.1626.

Decd.1726.

Following sent to Foreign Office (begins)

Reports telegraphed from YENBO and RABEGH on December 3rd state that Djemal Pasha has arrived MEDINA and Turks from BIR ABBAS neighbourhood have occupied HAMRA and BIR SAID.

Faisal's plans for offensive against railway at MEDAIN SALIH and WEJH postponed on this account and he and main body of his Arabs have retired NAKHL MUBARAK, 25 miles east of YENBO. Situation and Turkish intentions are not clear, but if Turks decide to accept risks to their lines of communication of immediate advance on either YENBO or RABEGH, local Arab forces at these two places are incapable, without assistance of regular troops, to resist them.

Local British Naval and Military officers are evidently anxious regarding situation, but I await further reports from them and Arab leaders before I can say whether Turkish menace is sufficiently grave to necessitate immediate consideration of emergency measures foreshadowed in my telegram of 9 November 7th and my telegram of 31 November 22nd. My opinion regarding desirability of preventing at all costs the capture of RABEGH by Turks is unchanged and if Turks advance in force immediately (and before organisation and training of local Arab forces and trained bands are completed) only with assistance of at least a ~~regularity~~ <sup>regularity</sup> of troops (British or French) could its capture be prevented. There are now considerable quantities of warlike stores and supplies for Sherif at both RABEGH and YENBO. (ends)

Brigade of Regular

Please give Admiral, G-in-C copy of above telegram.

~~(\*) Repeat for this sentence has been asked for.~~

Copies to:-	O	I	)
	O(a)	D.A.G.	) Personal
	O(b)	D.Q.M.G.)	
	G-in-C	Filed:-	G.S. 2/58/1
	C.G.S.		G.S. Cables.
			W.D.





His Excellency,  
The High Commissioner.

7th December 1916.

Your Excellency,

Now that the re-occupation of the Coastal Zone has been successfully maintained for a considerable period, and climatic conditions are favourable, I propose, as soon as possible, to operate from the coast towards SIWA with a view to clearing the Western Desert finally of the remnants of the Senussi forces.

In this connection the construction of a permanent road from DABAA to MERSA MATRUH and SOLLUM would be of great military value.

I would point out that I approached Your Excellency on April 4th, 1916, in my letter No. G.S. 2/28/6, on the subject of the extension of the railway to SIWA. The Egyptian Government, however, did not see its way to support this project, and I had no alternative but to let the matter drop.

Since it has not been possible to construct a railway, I would now recommend most strongly that a road, fit for wheeled traffic, should be made along the coast to SOLLUM

From the military point of view, since reliable communication to posts beyond DABAA at all times of the year cannot, at present, be maintained, except by sea, owing to the tracks becoming impassable to wheeled traffic after even moderately heavy rains, the construction of such a road would provide an additional line of supply for the western garrisons, and would be a valuable asset in the

permanent defence of Western EGYPT. It would be almost essential to ensure the success of operations to SIWA.

As regards the civil aspect, the existence of a permanent road would prove of very considerable advantage to the native population, and would undoubtedly afford material assistance in the full and rapid development of the resources of the coastal zone, as well as facilitating the work of the civil administration.

Unfortunately, the heavy burden of vital requirements on the Eastern Front makes it impossible for me to carry out this project with my limited resources, nor, in the present circumstances, do I consider that such expenditure from Imperial funds would be justified on purely military grounds. In view, however, of the immediate advantages that would accrue from the civil point of view, and of the undoubted military value of such a road, I would urge strongly that its construction should be undertaken by the Civil Administration forthwith.

In that event I would, of course, provide all necessary protection for the labour gangs and convoys employed on the work, but I regret that I would be unable to furnish more than this military protection, and all labour, together with food for labourers and transport of material, would have to be found from the resources at the disposal of the Civil Administration.

I should be very much obliged if the Egyptian Government could give me an early answer to this letter, as on the answer depends whether I shall be able to undertake offensive action to SIWA, or whether I shall be obliged to maintain a completely passive attitude.

I have the honour to be,  
Your Excellency's Obedient Servant,

(Sgd) A. J. MURRAY.

General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

WD

8

SECRET B

From : SirGur, KHARTOUM.

To : Chief, Egyptforce.

7/18/18.

Desp. 1845.  
Recd. 1855.

Following sent to Foreign Office.

No. 85, December 7th, begins :-

See my telegram 61 yesterday. Have just received copy of report by HAKIM FAISAL to Sheriff at MEGGA; he is unable to decide yet if main Turkish concentration is at BIR SAID (directed against YENHO) or WADI SAFAA (directed against RABECH). He says Turkish "Sinai Army is coming HEDJAZ" (I have no corroboration of despatch of large Turkish reinforcements from north); his report concludes "do not weaken RABECH, I would accept help from any quarter".

Colonel Wilson at JERDAN reports to-day that an emergency period appears imminent, but lack of accurate intelligence makes it extremely difficult to estimate degree of emergency. He advises at least a Brigade of troops with necessary artillery be held ready for immediate embarkation at SUZE. I concur with Colonel Wilson's recommendation for reason quoted in my telegram 61 and previous telegrams referred to therein.

An advance by us in SISAI cannot, so far as I can see, take place in time to influence the immediate military situation in HEDJAZ: nor, even should such an advance ultimately succeed in severing Turkish communications with HEDJAZ, could it prevent occupation of MEGGA by a Turkish Expeditionary Force drawn from 18,000 Turkish troops now based on MEDINA, who would become isolated and desperate. These Turkish forces have hitherto remained inactive, either through nervousness of Arab attack on their extended lines of communication or through fear of impending arrival of foreign regular troops to reinforce Arabs. But our present information indicates that these considerations may no longer deter the Turks from undertaking a resolute offensive which, having regard to nature of Arab forces now in field, would almost certainly result in entry of a Turkish force into MEGGA (with all its grave political and military consequences) within space of a few weeks. Ends.

Please give Admiral G-in-C. copy of above.

Copies to :-  
O. Filed G.H. E/88/1.  
O(a). " G.S. Cables.  
O(b). W.D.  
G-in-C.  
G.S.S.  
Col: Holdich.  
Dir: Arbur.



SECRET.

~~SECRET~~<sup>7</sup>

From Eastforce.  
To G.H.Q.

E.G. 14 cipher. 7/12/18. Desp. 2010.  
Recd. 2230.


Your O.A. 210.\*\*

Units selected. 270th and 271st Brigades  
R.F.A., 1/2nd and 2/1st East Anglian Field Companies  
R.E., 161st and 162nd Infantry Brigades. Numbers  
1 and 11 Companies Camel Corps, assuming you can  
release latter. 2/1st and 1/3rd East Anglian Field  
Ambulances. Request instructions re administrative  
services and departments as am wholly unacquainted  
with theatre or its problems, and propose senior  
(Brigade ?) Commander General Mudge for command.  
Re Staff: can hardly make suggestions without data  
as to plans, but following might meet requirements :-  
One G.S.O.2., one G.S.O.3 for Intelligence, one  
D.A.Q.M.G., one Staff Captain, one D.A.D.M.S. Other  
ranks except clerks and police to be found from units  
of force. Presume Staff officers will not be drawn  
from this force. Cannot provide clerks or police  
for H.Q., or Interpreters. Force can be completely  
concentrated at SUEZ ready to begin embarkation 7 days  
from receipt of definite orders. Presume any  
questions of equipment or re-equipment will be  
arranged by G.H.Q. This might otherwise delay  
readiness to embark beyond 7 days. Please instruct  
in good time if any arrangements required re supplies  
or ammunition.

Copies to :-

O.  
O.(a).  
O.(b).  
O.-in-C.  
G.S.S.  
I.  
D.A.G. } P.  
D.Q.M.G. }  
Filed G.S. 2/58/1.  
" G.S. Cables.  
W.D.

\*\* Asks for details of units  
earmarked for service overseas.



SECRET

General Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Force.



With reference to Progress Report, Northern Section, for week ending 2nd December 1916.

I forward for your information a copy of a telegram 3078 sent to Chief Engineer, Eastforce, Northern Section, yesterday.

It appears inadvisable to await the arrival of the S.S. "Mandalay" before completing the pipe line to MAZAR. The S.S. "Mandalay" left AMERICA on the 29th November and must call at SALONIKA before touching at any Egyptian port. Further it is not certain that she will be able to unload at KANTARA. There is therefore likely to be some delay before the pipes on this ship are delivered at ABD and MAZAR.

The insertion of some 5 kilometres of 8" pipe in the section between ABD and MAZAR will not reduce the daily delivery of water to an extent of 10 per cent. On the other hand the insertion of some larger sizes pipes in the section between MAZAR and EL ARISH will correspondingly increase facilities for delivering water when available forward of MAZAR.

It is admitted that it would be a better arrangement to reduce the size of the pipes regularly but the need of pushing the pipe line forward without any delay is the ruling factor at present.

It is recognised that pipes of 8" and larger diameter are not available to take the water supply into EL ARISH, but the D.R.T. suggests that the water in EL ARISH may be unsuitable for use in his locomotives, and it may therefore be necessary to establish a piped supply for watering locomotives at EL ARISH.

Arrangements should therefore be made to extend this piped water supply by 6" pipes right into EL ARISH if it should be necessary to do this.

Will you carefully consider the question of this extension and report if there are any 6" pipe lines in your Command which can be taken up and relaid if no other 6" piping can be made available.

(Sgd) A. LYNDEN BELL.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
8/12/16.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

From:- Engineer-in-Chief, G.H.Q.

To :- Chief Engineer, Eastforce, Northern.

E-in-C.N o.3078. 7/12/16

---

"Berwick Law" has arrived at PORT SAID.  
C-in-C is very anxious that pipe line should be  
pushed on with all possible speed.

---

Vol 3 1 copy 113 Pages,  
December 1916

26th Division Appendix



W.D.

SECRET.

12.

From:- Egeyforce,

To :- Troopers,

A.M.1378 cipher

9/12/16.

Desp. 1100.

Your 21158 and 23226 cipher A.O.1. Weekly return R.F.O

(a)	EGYPT.	5th Wing	39	includes 5 on expedition.
		20th Reserve Wing	31	
		X Aircraft Depot	1	
	SALONIKA.		37	includes 6 Balloon Pilots.
	EAST AFRICA		15	
	MESOPOTAMIA		17	

(b)	EGYPT.	5th Wing	2
		20th Reserve Wing	3
		X Aircraft Depot	nil
	SALONIKA.		10
	EAST AFRICA.		7
	MESOPOTAMIA.		2

(c)	EGYPT.	Service- able.	Unservice- able.	Not Erected.
	<u>5th Wing</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	25 (5 on ex- pedition)	11	nil
	B.E.S.E.	nil	nil	4
	Bristol Scout	5	4	3
	De Havilland	nil	1	nil
	Martinsyde	4	1	3
	<u>20th Reserve Wing.</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	4.	6	nil
	B.E.S.E.	1.	1.	nil
	Bristol Scout	1.	nil	nil
	Maurice Farman	9.	4	3
	Avro	3.	4.	1.
	Curtiss	nil	4.	nil
	<u>X Aircraft Depot</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	nil	3.	nil
	B.E.S.E.	nil	nil	6
	Bristol Scout	nil	1	5
	H. Farman	nil	2	3
	Martinsyde	nil	1	1
	Avro	nil	3	nil
	Caudron	nil	5	nil
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	11	5	nil
	B.E.S.E.	6	nil	nil
	Bristol Scout	4	4	2
	De Havilland	1	nil	nil
	Armstrong W:	15	2	5
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	6	1	6
	H. Farman	3	nil	3
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>			
	B.E.S.C.	18	4	5
	H. Farman	2	3	nil
	Martinsyde	3	nil	3

Copies to:- G A  
 O(a) Q  
 O(b) Filed:-G.S. 104/3  
 C.S.S. G.S.Cables  
 I W.D.

G.S.585.



13. B  
9th December, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Force.

---

1. It has been decided to form a Machine Gun Squadron with each of the three Yeomanry Mounted Brigades serving in the Force under your Command.
2. The Establishment of each squadron will be as laid down in Part VII No. 551/78, except for transport, which will be entirely on the pack scale laid down on page 21 Provisional Establishment of a "Mounted Division and Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry) with Camel Transport".
3. For the present each squadron will consist of Headquarters and three sections only - the remaining three sections it is hoped to form later.
4. The Machine Gun Squadrons of the 5th, 6th and 22nd Mounted Brigades will be numbered 16, 17 and 18 respectively.
5. Personnel will be found from the Regimental Machine Gun Sections and officers attached to and other ranks transferred on probation to the Machine Gun Corps Cavalry Branch. Nominal rolls in duplicate of officers and other ranks so dealt with will be forwarded to General Headquarters as soon as possible.
6. Regimental Armament will be replaced by Hotchkiss Guns, the scale of issue of which will be one per troop as guns become available. Hotchkiss Guns are expected from England shortly.

7. You should make any preliminary arrangements which you may consider advisable in order that this re-organization may be carried out as quickly as possible, when Hotchkiss guns are available for issue, and personnel has been trained to take them over.

*(Sd) Allyn Bell*

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :-  
A.  
Q.  
D.O.S.  
A.M.S.

**SECRET**

PRIORITY.

A 15


From:- Chief, EGYPTFOROE.

To :- Chief, LONDON.

A.M. 1382 cipher 10/12/16 Desp. 2230.

Your 26173 cipher. Please see my A.M. 1284 of 19/11/16. I would send 162nd Infantry Brigade, strength 106 officers and approximately 3900 Other ranks. Also, if required, 'C' Battery 270th Brigade R.F.A., 1/2nd East Anglian Field Coy. R.E., 2/1st East Anglian Field Ambulance and section B.A.C. all from 54th Division. In addition I would send 18th Stationary Hospital unless I am ordered to send latter to SALONIKA, in which case no stationary hospital could be made available. Total embarking strength of this detachment, including requisite train transport, would be men 4850, animals 701, vehicles 173, machine guns 48, guns 18-pdr 4. Force could be concentrated at SUEZ ready for embarkation within 7 days of receipt of orders. As regards SINAI operations, the detachment of this force would not materially affect my immediate objective, the occupation of EL ARISH. Beyond that, however, I shall require every man I have for the protection of the extended L. of C. without further depleting Desert Column which will constitute striking force in further advance. As regards the possible dispatch of troops to RABEGH, I feel bound to point out the serious difficulty which exists in regard to water supply at that place. The condensing plant at present at RABEGH can supply only just enough water for the troops already there. I have already placed all my spare condensing plant at the disposal of the Sirdar, and can do nothing more in this respect unless I give him the condensing plant that has just been erected at MAHEMDIYA after 5 months hard work. This I am prepared to do, but even so, to dismanttle it, transport it and re-erect it at RABEGH would take at least two months. I do not know what further arrangements the Sirdar may be able to make, but I regard this question as vital.

Copies to:- O D.Q.M.G. }  
 O(a) D.A.G. } Personal  
 O(b) Filed:-G.S. 2/58/16  
 C-in-C G.S. Cables  
 C.G.S. W.D.  
 I.



B<sup>16</sup>  
SECRET

From:- CHIEF SHIPBOARD.

To:- CHIEF LONDON.

A.M. 1330. cipher.

10/12/19.

Despd. 1930.

Four 86174. cipher 9th.

I have always thought that an advance by us from EL ARISH into SYRIA might have important results. At the present moment I am endeavouring to make as big a success as I can at EL ARISH, which place and MASAID are strongly entrenched. Our railhead is now within 20 miles of EL ARISH and when it has advanced about 8 miles further, i.e. in about ten days' time, I propose to move the 42nd and 52nd Divisions on MASAID and EL ARISH, and my Mounted Divn. and camelry well South and then East so as to cut off the enemy should they attempt to withdraw. My only fear is that the enemy may evacuate EL ARISH before I am near enough to strike. After the occupation of EL ARISH I propose to push on the 42nd and 52nd Divisions to RAFA constructing the railway from EL ARISH to RAFA as early as possible.

For this railway extension I am in urgent need of railway track demanded from War Office.

Immediately EL ARISH is occupied I intend to send a mounted force towards KOBKADMA with a view to dealing with the enemy detachments at that place and at MADHARA and ABU AWELIA, as well as with any others which may retire eastward from MADHARA and MASAID.

My action subsequent to reaching RAFA must naturally be dictated by the situation at the moment and by the main consideration that the enemy must be defeated in the field. My idea is, however, if circumstances permit, to advance from RAFA on BEKESHARA, where the enemy's main concentration appears to be. The occupation of this place would, moreover, have the advantage of placing me on a railway. I should at BEKESHARA, be only 70 miles from the MESJAZ line, against which my aircraft could operate daily, and further, I cannot but think our appearance at BEKESHARA would result in a rising of the Arab population in Southern SYRIA, who are known to be very disaffected towards the Turks.

As regards additional troops, I fully realise the shipping difficulties, as well as the submarine danger, and the undesirability of taking troops from the main theatre, but if my operations progress, as I hope, I shall have a long line of communications, and I also require more mounted troops if I am to operate with any sort of rapidity. If it is not out of place for me to make the suggestion, would it not be possible to land me, temporarily, two divisions from MESOPOTAMIA and any more mounted troops there may be either there or in INDIA. I should have liked to have suggested sending a Cavalry Division from BRANCO, but realise that, in view of shipping difficulties, this may be out of the question.

/An regards

7.

As regards reducing the troops on my Western Frontier I have already reduced them to the minimum and they consist of two dismounted yeomanry brigades, three companies Bikanir Camel Corps, two Imperial Camel Corps Companies and two B. L. Companies.

There is one point I wish to make quite clear, and that is, that after EL ARISH, my operations cannot be rapid, as, in the absence of local supplies, I am dependent on my railway, though I hope to supplement this by making a sea base at EL ARISH and subsequently at RAMA. You may, however, rely on me to push on as rapidly as I possibly can. I shall not stop acting offensively until I see that I am in danger of risking the defence of EGYPT.

My rearward ~~defence~~ entrenched positions will be carefully maintained.

Given rails and pipes, with which up to now I have been generously supplied, I can make my weight, small or big, felt by the Turks.

I am sending my appreciation by next R.M.

---

Copies to :-

- O.
- O(a).
- O(b).
- G.-in-C.
- S. C. S.
- Col. Holdich. } Personal.
- E. A. S. }
- E. C. S. S. }

Filed G.S. 2/22.  
G.S. Copies.  
W. D.



SECRET

W.D.

From: General Smuts, DAR ES SALAAM.

To: Eypforce, SUKZ.

G.O.S. 1430 Cipher.

10/12/39.

Deept 1345  
Recd: 1447

Distribution of Flying Corps.

Headquarters of Royal Naval Air Service. ALTRINGA.

Aircraft Park. DAR ES SALAAM.

Military Wings:

Headquarters "A" flight,  
and advanced aircraft park. MOROGORO.

"B" flight. TULO.

"C" flight. DAR ES SALAAM,  
for KILWA.

Aircraft Park. KILINDINI, for  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
& DAR ES SALAAM.

Copies to:- O.  
O.(a)  
O.(b)  
G.O.S.  
I.  
Filed:- G.S.Z/64.  
" G.S.Cables.  
W.D.



19.

*A 13 Dec*

From: G.H.Q.

To: EASTFORCE ;repeated CAMELS,ABBASIA.

O.B.449.

13/12/16

Desp:

---

Reference Camel Brigade. Following Provisional Establishment for S.A.A. Column approved:-  
 Officer, Sergeant, corporal, one each;  
 Privates, seven; native personnel, bash reiss, two;  
 reiss, four; drivers, forty-five; riding camels, ten;  
 baggage camels, ninety, which includes ten per cent spare AAA Above allows for 135 rounds S.A.A. per rifle and 6,000 rounds per Lewis gun, which, in addition to S.A.A. at present with companies, gives a total of 600 rounds per rifle, and 10,000 rounds per Lewis gun AAA  
 European personnel should be found from camel units of brigade, and natives and baggage will come from C.T.C. companies allotted to Eastern Force.

---

Copies to:- O. Q.  
 O.(a) Filed:- G.S.212.  
 O.(b) " G.S.Cables.  
 C.G.S. W.D.  
 A.





W.D.

20.

SECRET

G.S. 2/33/1.

From :

The Commander-in-Chief,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

To :

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,

War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

13th December 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith an appreciation of the situation in connection with operations beyond EL ARISH.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant.

(s) A. J. Murray

General,

Commander-in-Chief,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

To the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,  
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

-----

1. In continuation of my appreciation forwarded to you on October 21st, now that the realisation of my first main objective - the occupation of EL ARISH - is at least reasonably in sight, it seems desirable to bring to your consideration in some detail the policy which I propose to pursue beyond that point.

2. With the establishment of a British force at EL ARISH, a definite stage in the operations in this theatre will have been reached, in the accomplishment of the effective redemption of SINAI from Turkish domination, and in the attainment of the actual starting point for a further advance into southern SYRIA, which I consider essential, in order to keep as large an enemy force as possible employed in this theatre, thereby affording both direct and indirect relief to the Sherif in his operations in the HEDJAZ.

3. From EL ARISH two main lines of advance are open to me --

(a) The northern route by the coast to RAFA and thence to BIR SABA, a total distance of approximately 60 miles from EL ARISH.

(b) The southern route by AWEIGILA - AUJA - KHALASA, or by KOSSAIMA - AUJA - KHALASA to BIR SABA, a distance from EL ARISH of about 80 miles and 100 miles respectively.

4. Whichever line of advance is adopted, the operations immediately succeeding the occupation of EL ARISH will partake, necessarily, of the nature of an intermediate, or transition, phase, in the course of which we may expect to pass, through various stages, from the conditions of desert warfare, which have hitherto exclusively obtained in this theatre, to those of open campaigning, which may be looked for east of the line GAZA - SHALLAL - KHALASA, when the well-watered plains of SYRIA are reached. In considering this intermediate phase, therefore, very close study of the country in which we are about to operate is necessary, in order that no opportunity may be lost of turning every peculiarity of terrain to our own advantage and to the corresponding disadvantage of the enemy.

5. The area with which we are concerned - the rectangle contained within EL ARISH, GAZA, BIR ES SABA and KOSSAIMA - may be sub-divided broadly into four main categories - (a) Waterless desert; (b) Desert country partially water-bearing; (c) Non-desert country passable generally to all arms, but practically waterless; (d) Well-watered cultivated country passable to all kinds of military traffic, irrespective of season.

6. Starting from EL ARISH, the nearest (i.e., western) portion of this rectangle consists of a belt of waterless desert averaging some 15 miles in width from west to east, and extending from EL ARISH nearly to KOSSAIMA, along the eastern edge of the WADI EL ARISH.

At the southern (KOSSAIMA) end, this belt gives place to country intersected by deep, irregular wadis, in part water-bearing, through which run the road and railway linking KOSSAIMA, through AUJA, with BIR SABA.

The WADI EL ARISH is itself passable by road to ordinary military traffic, and possibly, in the dry season,

/to

to mechanical transport also, as far as KOSSAIMA. In this connection the Turks are reported to have constructed carriage roads from KOSSAIMA to EL ARISH (at any rate, as far as BIR LAHFAN), from KOSSAIMA to AUJA and BIR ES SABA, and perhaps from AUJA to ABU AWEIGILA, but it remains to be seen whether all, or any, of these are sufficiently metalled to stand continuous heavy traffic.

As regards water in the WADI EL ARISH, the principal permanent sources are to be found at --

MAGHDABA,	estimated capacity	3,000	galls.per day	(sweet)
ABU AWEIGILA,	"	2,500	" " "	( " )
(both the above are probably capable of considerable development).				
MOWEILLAH,	estimated capacity	25,000	galls.per day	(slightly brackish)
KOSSAIMA,	"	50,000	" " "	(Brackish)
GEDAIRAT,	"	100,000	" " "	(sweet)

In addition to the above, considerable rain deposits may be looked for during the winter months, though the latter must necessarily be regarded as an occasional, rather than as a reliable, source of supply.

7. Turning to the southern side of the rectangle, two roads lead to the well-watered and cultivated district east of the WADI CHUZZE. The most northerly of these passes through RAHEIBA (12 miles from AUJA) where there is water, and strikes the WADI CHUZZE, or, more accurately, its continuation the WADI SHANAG, at KHALASA (20 miles from AUJA). This road, good for the most part, is reported to have one difficult stretch of sandy country close to KHALASA.

The southern road (that followed by the BIR ES SABA - AUJA Railway), by the WADI MIGRIH, is slightly shorter, and is reported to be good throughout, but there is no water before THAMITAT EL RASCHID (18 miles from AUJA) is reached.

8. North of the line ABU AWEIGILA - KHALASA, and

/between

between the WADI EL ARISH and the WADI CHUZZE, lies a waterless plain, 30 miles in breadth from west to east, bounded on the north by a line of sand dunes stretching from EL ARISH to GAZA along the seacoast. Waterless, except at a few settlements close to the coastal dunes this area consists mainly of light, sandy soil, well suited to the operations of mounted troops, except in certain portions towards the southern end, between the Turco-Egyptian boundary and RAHEIBA, where sand dunes supervene.

9. Between the coastal dunes and the sea runs the SULTANI road from EL ARISH to RAFA and GAZA. Along the coast as far as RAFA it is reported that water can be found by digging to a moderate depth ; between RAFA and GAZA water is found only at a considerably greater depth, but on this stretch there are wells giving large supplies of good water at KHAN YUNIS, BENI SALEH and DIER EL BELAH.

10. There remains that part of the area east of the WADI CHUZZE, that is to say, east of the line GAZA - SHALLAL - KHALASA - THAMETAT EL RASCHID and north of the line ASLUJ - TEL EL MILLAR. This consists of a well-watered and cultivated district adequately supplied with good roads.

Beyond this line it may be assumed that water will cease to be the governing factor of the operations, and that conditions will henceforward be practically those of normal open warfare.

11. In considering the respective merits and demerits of the two lines by which an advance into southern SYRIA is possible, it is true -

(a)

(a) that, by an advance up the WADI EL ARISH, and especially by the establishment of a British force at KOSSAIMA, the re-occupation of SINAI would be effectively rounded off, with such moral advantages as might accrue therefrom;

(b) that if rapidly carried out, this movement would tend to isolate and intercept the remaining enemy garrisons in central SINAI, notably at NEKHL, MAGHARA and HASSANA, unless these were able to make good their retreat by way of AKABA to MAAN - a difficult operation unless far better provided with camel transport than there is reason to believe;

(c) that such a line of advance might allow of the use of wheeled, and possibly of mechanical, transport, whereas an advance by the northern route would have to be maintained by an extension of the EL ARISH railway, at least as far as RAFA.

12. Against this, however, must be set --

(a) the greater distance to be traversed before our objective - the enemy's main concentration in southern SYRIA - is reached, involving a loss of time which would doubtless be turned to valuable account by the enemy.

(b) the risk of a long and vulnerable section of our lines of communication running parallel with our true front, the adequate protection of which would involve a serious drain upon my fighting troops, and which, if broken even temporarily, would completely isolate any force operating further east by the interception of its sole line of maintenance, and, if necessary, of retirement. Rather than incur such a risk, in order safely to adopt this line of advance, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to undertake the construction of an additional railway from the neighbourhood of ISMAILIA either to KOSSAIMA or to ABU AWEIGILA, with the heavy expenditure, not only of material and money, but of precious time that

/such

such a project would involve. 26-

13. An advance by the northern route through RAFA, on the other hand, would preserve to the full our liberty of action, while involving a minimum of risk to our necessarily extended lines of communication.

(a) By following the coast, our lines of communication would be vulnerable only on one flank. This flank, moreover, would be protected first by a belt of sand dunes, and then by a wide, practically waterless, plain - the latter well adapted to the operations of mounted troops, based primarily on the water-bearing area within the dunes, and ultimately upon the railway which would be pushed forward pari passu with the advance;

(b) Such a line of advance would be suitable to the form of transport with which the desert column is now equipped;

(c) There is reason to believe that water supply can be developed at almost any point as the advance progresses, thus materially adding to our freedom of manoeuvre, without increasing the burden on the lines of communication;

(d) It is the shortest route to the area in which the enemy can be forced, either to accept decisive action, or to abandon, without serious opposition, the whole of southern SYRIA to our occupation;

(e) Finally, an advance upon RAFA by a powerful mobile force, based upon EL ARISH and maintained by railway, would almost inevitably compel the enemy to conform to our plan of operations.

14. The latest information available regarding the enemy tends slightly to increase previous estimates of the strength that he may be able to dispose against us, as stated in my appreciation of October 21st, para. 9, as recent intelligence strongly indicates the transfer of the 43rd Division from the LEBANON to southern SYRIA, though this

/movement

movement as yet lacks definite confirmation. On the other hand, it now appears highly improbable that the enemy will find himself in a position to withdraw troops from the CAUCASUS in the immediate future, and if this view, which is based on information supplied by the Russian General Staff, proves correct, it is difficult to see how, even presuming the transfer to southern SYRIA of a division from the ALEXANDRETTA area, he can place a force of more than 40,000 men on this front, except by the abandonment of his campaign in the HEDJAZ.

15. In these circumstances, the dangerous dispersion of his forces that would be involved in the retention of his isolated garrisons in central and eastern SINAI, in order to maintain a weak threat against the Maritime Canal or against our lines of communication at EL ARISH, or west of it; still more, the risk to the enemy involved in an attempt to advance by the central road against the southern sections of the Canal line, *make such a project,* would, in face of our movement through RAFA against his main communications at BIR SABA, appear out of the question.

16. In my opinion, therefore, there can be little doubt that a direct advance from EL ARISH on RAFA would secure, ipso facto, the total evacuation of SINAI by the enemy. I am also strongly of opinion that the threat against SYRIA and the HEDJAZ Railway involved in an advance even as far as RAFA, would result, not only in preventing the withdrawal of Turkish troops from that area to other theatres, but would also lead to the transfer of Turkish troops from the HEDJAZ to SYRIA, thus materially relieving the pressure on the Sherif of MECQA. The nature of any operations subsequent to the occupation of RAFA must, of necessity, be governed by the military situation then existing, but the main principles underlying such operations should clearly be to reach, if

/possible



possible, some objective from which the HEDJAZ Railway can be effectively controlled.

17. Meanwhile, to ensure the protection of my right flank before moving eastward from EL ARISH, and in order, if possible, to intercept and cut off the enemy's scattered garrisons in central SINAI, I propose, on reaching EL ARISH, immediately to detach a mobile force of approximately three mounted brigades with one or two battalions of camelry to advance along and clear the WADI EL ARISH as far as KOSSAIMA or at least as far as ABU AWEIGILA. This action, rapidly and resolutely carried out, might further tend to deceive the enemy, temporarily at least, as to my true intention, namely, a systematic and methodical advance into southern SYRIA by way of RAFA.

*Genl. A. J. Murray*

G.H.Q., E.E.F.,  
13/12/16.


General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

ND

A

29 G.S.

LIST OF STORES, &c. DESPATCHED TO THE SHERIFF OF WEGGA  
DURING NOVEMBER, 1916.



<b>CLOTHING.</b>		
Masks eye.		40.
Boxes tin.		40.
Puttees S.D. prs.		30.
Vests, woollen		30.
Drawers, prs.		30.
Knives clasp with M.S. and T.C.		33.
Bags, kit		30.
Spurs jack, ordinary,	prs.	30.
Braces, Officers,	prs.	30.
Boots, ankle,	prs.	240.
Boots, ankle (Australian)	prs.	200.
Cotton, khaki drill,	yds.	19,040.
" white staying	yds.	579.
" grey drill	yds.	1,949.
Buttons, zinc small,	gross.	194 & 64.
" " large,	"	583 & 48.
Thread whited Brown skeins.		3,500.
" Machine drab No.50, cops.		250.
Cottons Khaki No. 30.	cops.	344.
Thread sewing dark drab skeins.		3,400.
Machine Khaki No. 40.	reels.	49.
Cotton khaki No. 30.	cops.	5,000.
Sweaters. T.P.		5,000.
Socks, woollen.	prs.	400.
<b>WEEDON SECTION.</b>		
Chests, rifle.		60.
Rifles, M.L.M.MK I.		3,000.
Rifles,		15,000.
Bottles, Oil, Mk. IV.		9,000.
Bottles, Oil,		9,000.
Pullthroughs, Mk. IV.		3,000.
Pullthroughs,		15,000.
Protectors, foresight No. 1.		3,000.
Protectors, foresight.		15,000.
Bags tool armourers filled		5.
Guards hand leather.		7,666.
<b>SECTION 1.</b>		
Bottles, water en. Mk. VI.		5,030.
Carriers " Bottle with shoulder strap,		5,030.
Whistles, Infantry,		60.
Haversacks, O.S.		5,000.
Haversacks, G.S.		500.
Braces with Buckle (W.E.08)		5,000.
Tins mess D.S.		5,000.
Covers tin mess T.P.		5,000.
Valise Equipment. '88,		
Straps greatcoat		5,000.
Bandoliers, 90 rds.		2,250.
" 50 rds.		2,750.
<b>SECTION 2.</b>		
Sacks		1.
Cases, W.P.		1.
Lanterns, tent, folding		10.

Kettles, camp oval 12 qts.	600.
Sheets, ground,	12,020.
Axes, pick heads T.P.	1,400.
" " " 4 1/2 lbs.	93.
" " " 6 lbs.	110.
" " helves heavy	1,400.
" " "	203.
Shovels, T.P. in lieu of G.F.	( 2,000.
Shovels, T.P.	( 200.
Tanks, camel 15 galls. with keys.	999.
Crowbars, 4'6"	3.

SECTION 3.	Wire steel galvanized barbed 2 std. S.W.G.	14 cwts.	22.
	Wire iron 20 S.W.G. lbs.		60.

SECTION 5.	Harness P.D.G.S. double lead, sets.		26.
	" " " wheel, "		13.
	Pack Saddlery Amm. Camel sets.		10.
	" " Machine Gun Camel.		10.
	Straps, breeching.		24.
	Brushes, dandy		90.
	Rubbers horse		90.
	Saddlery, Universal, sets		10.

SECTION 7.	Hammers, carpenters.		3.
	Cutters, wire,		3.

SECTION 8.	Compasses Magn. Pocket		30.
	Tapes measuring lines 1000'		2.
	Twine packing large	lbs.	10.
	" middling,	lbs.	12.
	" small,	lbs.	11.

SECTION 9.	Drum, Oil, 3-gallon.		3.
	" " 6-gallon		75.
	Dubbing, lbs.		100.

SECTION 10.	Tarpaulins.		4.
	Shoes, horse (500 prs.)		1,000.
	Nails Iron 3" 25 lbs.		25.

SECTIONS 11, 12, and 13.	Blankets		8,625.
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SECTION 14.	Bars supporting Draught pole No. 3.		2.
	Bars supporting Draught pole No. 3 Mk. II.		4.
	Blocks, brake, F. & T.		4.
	Bolts tension spring B.L.5" How:		2.
	Bolts nave bosshead sq. bevelled 5/8 x 4-3/8.		2.
	Boxes, Mob. stores, No. 1.		2.
	" " " No. 6.		1.
	" " " No.22.		1.
	Boxes spare spring keep pins washers, or Insulators No. 1.		1.
	Carriages, field, Q.F.15-pdr. (Nos. 8612, 8578, 8660, 8611)		4.

31

Limbers, Q.F. 15-pdr. (Nos. 8608, 8604, 8765, 8780, 8735, 8593, 8596, 8789.)	8.
Wagons, ammunition, Q.F. 15-pdr. - (Nos. 8797, 8749, 8696, 8697.)	4.
Sights rocking bar Q.F. 15-pdr. (on carriages).	4.
Carriages, field, B.L. 5" How: (Nos. 7996, 7967, 8275, 3888, 3266, 3930.)	6.
Limbers, B.L. 5" How: Carriage. (Nos. 4371, 4741, 3933, 4339.)	4.
Handspikes traversing No.1 Mk. III (on carriages).	4.
Cans, Oil, lubricating No. 9.	8.
Capsquare, B.L. 5" How: Left.	1.
	Right.
	1.
Cartouches, B.L. 5" How: Large.	28.
	Small.
	12.
Chains suspending drag shoe B.L. 5" How: plain Inside	2.
	Outside
	2.
Collars compressing springs B.L. 5" How: plain	2.
	with boss.
	2.
Keys adjusting drum No. 3 Dial Sights.	2.
Keys, capsquares, No. 18.	1.
Keys, capsquares, No. 19.	1.
Keys securing lid box ammunition B.L. 5" How:	1.
Nuts spring bolt carriage B.L. 5" How :	2.
Pins lynch 2nd class "C" Mark II.	4.
Pins lynch B.L. 60-pdr. & Q.F. 15-pdr.	8.
Pins draught No. 3.	1.
Pins securing axletree limber B.L. 5" How:	2.
Pipes connecting buffer Carr. B.L. 5" How:	1.
Plates dividing spring power Carr. B.L. 5" How:	2.
Plugs filling hole Hyd. Buffer No.2.	2.
Ropes wire drag shoe Carr. B.L. 5" How:	2.
Screws connecting case screw elevating B.L. 5" How:	1.
Shoes drag No.8.	1.
Sights dial No.3 with holders screw Mark III.	2.
" - do - II.	4.
" " No.1.	4.
Spanners, No.93.	2.
" " 261.	2.
" " 262.	2.
Spanners Hyd:buffer No. 112.	2.
" " " " 113.	2.
" " " " 114.	2.
Springs spiral carriage B.L. 5" How:	2.
Straps securing 1" x 32" B.P.C.B. with stop	2.
Washers axletree 2nd class 1/16"	4.
	1/8"
	4.
Washers drag 2nd class "C"	6.
Washers pipe connecting buffer B.L. 5" How: sets	2.
Soles, drag shoe, No.6.	2.
Apparatus adjusting running out springs Q.F. 15-pdr.	4.
Blocks brake Q.F. 15-pdr. & 60-pdr. Carr. near	1.
	off
	1.
Bolts securing foresight Q.F. 15-pdr.	8.
Bolts securing hindsight " "	8.
Covers apparatus adjusting running springs Q.F. 15-pdr.	3.
Cylinders re-packing Hyd: Buffer. 15-pdr. tin	2.
	wood
	2.
Drifts, bronze 15-pdr.	2.
Extractors hemp packing Q.F. 15-pdr.	2.
" leather " rings "	2.
Slings ammunition carrier Q.F. 15-pdr.	4.
Springs running out	4.
Reflectors No.1. Dial Sight	4.
Cases cans lubricating No.9.	4.

SECTION 15.	Binoculars, non-prismatic, prn.	27.
	Clinos field Mark III.	4.
	Directors No.1 Mark III.	2.
	Cases Stand F.A. Telescope	3.
	Stands Telescope F.A.	3.
	Telescopes F.A. Mark IV.	1.
	Posts aiming circular head.	4.
	" " square head.	4.
SECTION 15 A.	Lead, 0.4" x 0.2", section feet	2.
SECTION 15 B.	Boxes Mark II Field Clinometer	2.
	Cases stand telescope F.A.	2.
	Cases telescope F.A.	1.
	Cases large Clinometer.	6.
	Clinometers field Mark III.	2.
	" " large	6.
	Directors No. 1 Mark III.	2.
	Instruments, angle of sight Mark II.	1.
	Plotters field Mark II (in case).	1.
	Posts aiming circular head.	4.
	" " with flag.	2.
	" " square head.	4.
	Stands, F.A. telescope Mark II.	2.
	Telemeters Artillery Mark IV.	1.
	Tapes Mark IV telemeter.	1.
	Cords " " "	1.
	Stands " " "	2.
	Cases, stands "	2.
	Periscopes No.19.	1.
	" " S.	4.
	C.W.P. E.15/287.	1.
SECTION 16 A.	Boxes, tallow.	4.
	Keys lynch pin B.L. 60-pdr. & Q.F. 15-pdr.	24.
	C.W.P.R. 114/731.	1.
SECTION 16 B.	Guns Maxim .303" Convd. Mk. II, complete with spare parts	30.
SECTION 17.	Ordnance Q.F. 15-pdr. (Nos. 8, 7, 15, 1.)	4.
	Gauges striker protusions No.1.	4.
	Keys breech apparatus Q.F. 15-pdr.	4.
	Keys firing pins Q.F. 15-pdr.	4.
	Q.F. 15-pdr.:-	
	Bolts catch retaining striker.	8.
	Screws breech.	1.
	Catches safety	8.
	Catches breech block.	1.
	Extractors.	4.
	Pins, firing.	12.
	Springs catch breech block.	8.
	" " B.M. lever.	4.
	" " Striker.	8.
	" main.	4.
	" rebound striker.	8.
	Strikers.	8.
	Screwdrivers special.	4.

Q.F. 15-pdr. :-  
 Wedges firing 8.  
 C.W.P.E. 17/18/160. 1.

SECTION 18. O.B.L. 5" How: Sights B.L. crossbar. Fore left. 2.  
 " right 2.  
 " tangent 4.

SECTION 18 A: Boxes obturating pads and discs B.L. 4" & 5" How : 4.  
 Miners Vent T. 8.

SECTION 18 B. Bits vent 14" 4.  
 Clamps tangent sight D. 8.  
 Discs pad obturating adjusting B.L. 5" How : 16.  
 " " " protecting front. 16.  
 " " " rear. 16.  
 O.B.L. 5" How: Bolts stop. 2.  
 Catches vent T axial. 1.  
 Collars actuating T tube. 1.  
 O.B.L. 5" How:-  
 Levers cam 1.  
 Pins actuating collar 1.  
 Pins keep hinge bolt cam lever 8.  
 Rings carrier 1.  
 Screws breech. 1.  
 Springs clip carrier ring 24.  
 " catch foresight 8.  
 " " vent T axial 8.  
 " " cam lever 8.  
 " latch carrier ring 8.  
 Vents T axial. 4.  
 Pads obturating B.L. 5" How: 16.  
 Sights B.L. cross bar fore 5" How: Mk. II, Left 4.  
 Right 4.  
 Sights B.L. cross bar tangent B.L. 5" How: 8.  
 Wrenches B.M. No. 61. 4.  
 C.W.P. E/17/18/159. 1.  
 O.B.L. 5" Hows. (on carriages) 4.  
 Ordnance B.L. 5" Howitzers (on carriages) 2.

SECTION 19. Covers breech Q.F. 15-pdr. ) On guns. 4.  
 Covers, muzzle, No. 1. ) 4.  
 Covers breech 5" How. ) On guns. (of each) 4.  
 Covers, muzzle, No. 4 ) 2.  
 Covers breech B.L. 5" How. ) Loose on guns. 2.  
 Covers muzzle No. 4. ) 2.  
 Boxes lamp siege to hold 2. 2.  
 Brushes breech screw 8.  
 Cleaners plasaba No. 9 4.  
 Lamps siege 4.  
 Ropes drag light pres. 20.  
 Boxes lantern bullseye 8.  
 Lanterns, bullseye G.D. 8.  
 Heads brush plasaba 5" bore (B.L.) 4.  
 Lashings tarred 1 1/2" x 32' 2.  
 1" x 10' 16.  
 1 1/2" x 30' 1.  
 C.W.P.E./19/20/475 1.  
 Ropes drag heavy G.S. pres. 5.

SECTION 20. Handspikes common 6-ft. 12.  
 Jacks lifting G.S. 3.  
 Posts picket 5' 15.  
 Spokes No.35a wheel, front 3.  
 back 3.

SECTION 21. Pedrails 48.  
 N.I.V.

SECTION 28. Cells electric insert "S" 6.

SECTION 29. Inst. Telegraph Sounders Translating 5.  
 Telephone sets portable. Stevens pattern 3.  
 Cells electric insert "S" (in phones). 12.

SECTION 29. A. Pins earth 6.

AMMUNITION. ~~Cartridges S.A. ball .303" Mark VI. 4,000,000~~  
 5" How: H.E. Comp. rounds. 3,000.  
 15-pdr. Q.F. shrapnel, Comp. rounds. 2,000.  
 S.A.A. Mark VI. rounds 15,300,000  
 10 pdr. B.L. shrapnel rds. complete 1,000.  
 Turkish S.A. rounds 457,600.  
 Cartridge Q.F. 2.95" shpl. rds. complete 1,586.  
 Cartridge Q.F. 2.95" double rds. complete 1,470.  
 Gellignite sticks 12,500.  
 Detonators No.8 2,300.  
 Fuze safety fms. 256.  
 Fuze instantaneous yds. 75.  
 Matches Vesuvian Boxes 50.  
 Gunpowder lbs. 15.

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LIST OF SUPPLIES DESPATCHED TO THE SHEKIP OF MECCA  
DURING NOVEMBER 1916.

\*\*\*\*\*

Rice.	958,256 lbs.
Atta.	698,010 lbs.
Coffee.	11,192 lbs.
Sugar.	22,426 lbs.
Lab. Oil "Zeta".	582 galls.
Benzine.	3,000 galls.



LIST OF WORKS STORES DESPATCHED TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA  
DURING NOVEMBER 1916.

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Bags, Sand.	15,000.
Barrels.	50.

LIST OF ANIMALS DESPATCHED TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA  
DURING NOVEMBER 1916.

-----

Heavy Draught Horses.

90.

RAILWAY MATERIAL.

-----

Old Rails

40.

---

SIGNAL STORES AND EQUIPMENT.

---

Poles.

80.

Poles and Bars.

80.

Bobbin Insulators.

160.

SECRET.

W.D.

B 39.

PARAPHRASE of telegram from Sirdar KHANTOUM addressed to Foreign Office, repeated Chief Egyptforce.

14/12/16.

Desp. 1712.  
Recd. 2210.

HEJAZ. Your wires 36 and 37. This morning I discussed military and political situation with Capt. G. Lloyd and Col. Bremond who have both just arrived from JEDDA. Our attempts to organise and train an Arab fighting force capable of facing Turks in the field have been unsuccessful, chiefly owing to the inertness and lack of knowledge of Arab leaders and behaviour of Arab forces in recent skirmishes affords very little ground for believing that they can withstand a sustained advance by the Turks. An advance of this kind has been much facilitated by the arrival of heavy seasonal rains, which would enable it to be carried out by a much larger force than was practicable a few weeks ago, and quite possibly by several routes. Immediately therefore, and looking from a purely military aspect, it appears that there is no serious obstacle to a Turkish column of several thousand infantry together with artillery reaching MECCA. The information we possess, and the present disposition of Turkish troops indicate that Turkish commanders are preparing to take the offensive at once, whilst in view of the fact of the altered water conditions inland, the occupation of RABEEN by an immobile regular force perhaps would not prevent the Turks sending a relatively small flying column via an alternative route to MECCA. In my opinion (which Col. Bremond fully confirms) it is highly unlikely that the Turks will run the risk of detaching a force in this way.

The great moral effect, in time of crisis, of putting on shore regular troops on HEJAZ coast would be very great. It would give the different Arab forces a rallying point, and stimulate them to take action against the enemy's communications and detached posts. Conversely, it would depress the morale of enemy troops and almost inevitably upset present Turkish plans.

I cannot see any alternative or practicable means of helping Arabs and of saving the Sherif's movement from collapse. The Sherif has annulled his original application to us to send European troops, but is very genuinely alarmed at the situation, and, according to ~~General~~ Col. Bremond's opinion, would, with a little pressure, ask for them again. The Sherif is urging the necessity for an immediate advance of British troops in SINAI and the demolition of the railway running to MEDINA. I am not aware of General Sir. A. Murray's plans, but I am unable to see how his advance, however successful it was, could cut the railway in the next few weeks, although such an advance, if pushed through RAPA, would tend very greatly to alleviate Turkish pressure in the HEJAZ. The immediate question for the decision of

/s/

40


His Majesty's Government is whether we shall make a final attempt to save, in spite of themselves, the Sherif and his Arabs. It is my opinion that they and the Sherif himself, with or without pressure, will agree to the landing at RABEH of christian troops, and if the situation develops unfavourably in the meanwhile will cordially welcome these troops.

Having regard to the issues at stake, I consider that we should despatch the necessary troops immediately, as if the enemy advances (which we think he may do at any time) there is not any time to lose. If I have authority from His Majesty's Government to do so, I will take immediate action, and I will ask General Murray and the Vice Admiral Commanding-in-Chief to arrange for the embarkation of the French contingent and the British Brigade as soon as possible from SUEZ.

In the opinion of Colonel Fremont which he has expressed to me, the force mentioned above should be augmented by two battalions of Infantry. I agree that this is most desirable, and submit that an urgent appeal should be addressed to the French Government that the two battalions of Senegalese which are now at GIBUTI may be dispatched to RABEH as soon as transport can be arranged, or some similar force. I have communicated these proposals to Col. Fremont and he informs me that he is in entire agreement with them.

---

198  
41  
G.S.324.



The Secretary,  
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

14th December, 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following proposed amendments to the recent War Establishment, dated 6th October, 1916, of the Divisional Train, 52nd or 53rd Divisions (Native Driver Personnel).

1. The employment of heavy draught horses in place of mules has been found necessary, and in this way a considerable reduction has been made in the number of native personnel employed. It is proposed also to substitute four native officers (i.e., one per each company of the Train) for four of the British officers shown in the Establishment.

2. With regard to the rank of artificers, the Establishment as approved provides for the following :-

<u>WHEELERS.</u>	<u>SADDLERS.</u>	<u>FARRIERS.</u>
Staff Sergeant 1.	Sergeant 1.	Staff Sergeant 1.
Corporals 1.	Drivers 2.	Corporals 1.
Drivers 2.		Drivers 3.

When the draft Establishment was submitted, the detail of the rank required in each case was not mentioned, but it was intended that they should be in accordance with page 23, Part VIII, Territorial Divisions, viz :-

<u>WHEELERS.</u>	<u>SADDLERS.</u>	<u>FARRIERS.</u>
Staff Sergeant 1.	Staff Sergeant 1.	Staff Sergeant 1.
Corporals 2.	Corporals 2.	Corporals 2.
Drivers 1.		Drivers 2.

The additional non-commissioned officers allowed by the latter are considered necessary; their inclusion in the establishment has therefore been provisionally sanctioned

/pending

pending War Office approval.

3. With regard to the class of warrant officer, it is noted that the approved establishment provides for a warrant officer, class 2. In the establishment submitted, no company quartermaster sergeant was asked for, his duties being performed by the warrant officer, who it was assumed would be graded class 1, as he was shown as a warrant officer and not as a Company Sergeant Major in the detail column. In point of fact, all the companies have at present got warrant officers class 1, and it is considered necessary, in the interests of efficiency of the companies, that they should be retained.

4. A copy of the establishment containing the proposed amendments is enclosed, and it is requested that approval may be given as early as possible.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

*By* A. Lynden Bell  
General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

*Bell  
M.L.  
B.S.*



The Secretary,  
WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.

14/12  
15th December 1916.

Sir,

In view of the number of Army Service Corps Officers who are now necessarily employed in EGYPT on duties which are not included in existing establishments, it is requested that their retention should receive War Office covering authority.

The duties for which these Officers are required at present are shown on the enclosed statement, and as it is inevitable that the numbers will fluctuate from time to time, as for instance when depots are closed and new supply depots established, it is considered impracticable to frame any fixed establishment that would meet the situation.

I have the honour, therefore, to request that sanction may be accorded to the employment of the following number of Officers whose appointments are not included in the War Establishment of existing formations or units.

Lieut-Colonels.....	2.
Majors.....	30.
Captains.....	42.
Captains or Subalterns.....	2.
Subalterns.....	60.
Quartermasters.....	21.
Total.	<u>137.</u>



(-2-)

In the event of his suggestion being approved, the figures would be revised from month to month, and any reductions possible would be effected.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. A. Lyndent Bell, *M.L.C.*  
*6/2/18*  
Major General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

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EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.


Duties for which Army Service Corps Officers are required, whose appointments are not included in the War Establishment of existing formations, etc,

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UNIT.	Lt-Col.	Major.	Captain.	Captain or Subaltern.	Subaltern.	Quartermaster.	Total.	REMARKS.
Attached S. & T. Directorate.	-	-	1	1	-	1	3	Includes Regtl. officers attached and officer i/c STATES.
i/c Central Accounts.	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	
Assistant to D.B.O.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Secretary, Local Resources Board.	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	
Base Motor Ambulance Depot, Alexandria.	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	
S.T. Stores Branch.	-	-	1	-	2	-	3	
ALEXANDRIA.								
Local Duties.	1	-	4	-	*2	1	8	*Includes Asst: Compensation Officer.
Supply Depot, ZAHRIEH.	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	
Military Ford'g. Dep: Supply Depot, MUSTAPHA.	-	1	1	-	1	-	3	
Supply Depot, METRAS.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Supply Depot, METRAS.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Main Supply Depot.	1	-	3	-	1	4	9	
Compress. Forage Store, GABBARI.	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	
TIRO, Local Duties.	-	1	1	-	-	5	7	
Main Supply Depot, SHARABIA.	-	1	1	-	4	-	6	
Compressed Forage Factory BARRAGE.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
WESTERN FORCE.								
SHERIKA.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
MENSA MATRUH.	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
EL DABAA.	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
SOLIM.	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	
MINIA.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
FAYOUM.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
SHUSHA.	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	
BAHARIA.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
ASSIUT.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
QUARA.	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	
EASTERN FORCE.								
NORTHERN SECTION. (a)								
Local Duties, PORT SAID.	-	1	7	-	5	1	14	(a) Includes - i/c M.T. Det'l Froz: Meat Dep I.W.T. and O.G., A.S.C. Main Sup+Depo
i/c Caterpillar Sect: Adv: Sup: Depot, Desert Column.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Main Sup: Depot, KANTARA.	-	1	4	-	8	1	14	
Sup: Depot, BALLAH WEST.	-	1	3	-	4	2	10	
" " EL FERDAN.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
" " FERRY POST.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
" " MOASCAR.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Main Sup Depot, ZAGAZIG.	-	1	1	-	3	1	6	
Carried forward	2	8	34	2	47	18	111	

Duties for which Army Service Corps officers are required (Cont.).

UNIT.	Lt-Col.	Major.	Captain.	Captain or Subaltern.	Subaltern.	Quarter-master.	Total.	REMARKS.
Brought forward	2	8	34	2	47	18	111	
EASTERN FORCE (Cont.)								
SOUTHERN SECTION.								
Local Duties, SUEZ. (b)	-	2	4	-	7	3	16	(b) Includes - Main Sup:Dep:SUEZ. Sup:Dep; PORT TEWFIK. I.W.T. and O.G. A.S.C.
Sup:Depot, SERAPEUM.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Sup:Depot, EL KUBRI.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Sup:Depot, EL SHATT.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Special Duties, ASSIUT, Western Force.	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	Employed under A.Q.M.G. (P) as Recruiting Officers of Native Personnel E.C.T.C.
SUDAN.								
KHARTOUM.	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	
EGYPTIAN ARMY.	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	
CYPRUS.	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>137</b>	



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14  
15th December, 1918.

General Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Force.

1. With reference to proposed formation of Camel Corps Brigade. Herewith copies of Provisional War Establishment for -

- (a) Brigade Headquarters.
- (b) Brigade Signal Section.
- (c) S.A.A. Column.
- (d) Supply Details.

2. As regards (a), the Riding Camels required will be supplied from the Remount Depot at ABBASSIA.

3. As regards (b), the R.S. personnel is being provided from the Signal Depot, ALEXANDRIA, while the remainder will be found from the Imperial Camel Corps. If a W/T detachment is desired, it should be furnished from the Pack W/T Section (Camel Transport) of G.H.Q. Signal Company, which is at the disposal of Eastern Force.

4. As regards (c), Imperial Camel Corps will find the European personnel, while the Native Drivers and Baggage Camels should be provided from the Camel Transport Corps Companies at the disposal of Eastern Force.

5. As regards (d), arrangements are being made for provision of personnel.

6. All personnel, other than that found from units of the Brigade, will be ordered to proceed to MAZAR as early as possible.

Sixty Riding Camels are being sent to MAZAR. This will provide all those necessary to complete the above four units, and leave a small margin.

7. With reference to the provision of a water unit. It is regretted that no trained personnel is available at present, and in order to provide this necessary service it is suggested that as a temporary measure one section of a Field Company should be allotted to the Camel Brigade. If this can be arranged, the 57 Riding Camels necessary to mount all the personnel will be provided and sent to MAZAR. Eventually, arrangements would be made to train Imperial Camel Corps personnel and an independent unit formed on lines which may be recommended after further experience has been gained by the Camel Brigade in the field.

8. It is also regretted that the provision of a Field Ambulance with Camel Transport is, for the present, out of the question. The time required to re-organise a Field Ambulance on a camel basis and train the personnel in camel management, etc., would render its participation in early operations quite impossible. In these circumstances it will be necessary either (a) to attach an already organised Ambulance Convoy, or (b) to improvise one as a temporary measure. In the event of (b) being selected, would you please say whether this can be arranged with the resources at your disposal, and, if not, what essentials are lacking, when every endeavour will be made to meet them as early as possible.

Whether course (a) or (b) is adopted, it may be regarded as a temporary measure, and after further experience with the Camel Brigade endeavours will be made to form a Field Ambulance with Camel Transport suitable for this special duty.

*Ego A. Robertson*  
*R. Calcutt*  
 for Major-General,  
 Chief of the General Staff,  
 Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies to :-  
 D.A.S.  
 Q.  
 A.(S).  
 I.C.C.

BRIGADE IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS.

HEADQUARTERS.

PROVISIONAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

Detail.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank & File	Total.	Riding Horses.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Remarks.
Commander, (Brig-General).	1	-	-	-	1	1	3	3	
STAFF.									
Brigade Major.	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	
Staff Captain.	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND DEPARTMENTS.									
A.V.C.	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	} 3	(a) 1 C. of E. 1 R.C. 1 Presbyterian and Non-conformist.
Chaplain.	3	-	-	-	-	-	3		
Clerk to Staff.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	
Cook.	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	
Batmen.	11	-	-	11	11	-	11	-	
Signal Section.	1	-	2	20	23	-	23	5	
Native Drivers.	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	
Total.	19	-	2	33	46	3	43	11	

CAMEL BRIGADE SIGNAL SECTION.

PROVISIONAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

Detail.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts & Sergts.	Rank and File.	Total.	Riding Horses.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	Remarks.
Captain or Subaltern.	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	
Sapper (spare)	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	
Driver for Baggage Camel.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	
Batman.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	
<u>Telephone Detachments.</u>									
Sergeant.	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	
Corporal.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	
Pioneers.	-	-	-	7	7	-	7	-	
Drivers for Baggage Camels.	-	-	-	4	4	-	4	4	* Includes following R.E. Personnel -
<u>Signallers, and Despatch Riders.</u>									
Sergeant.	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	
Corporal.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	
Pioneers.	-	-	-	4	4	-	4	-	
	1	-	2*	20	23*	-	23	5	

\* Includes following R.E. Personnel -  
 1 Sergeant.  
 1 Corporal.  
 4 Pioneers.

NOTE. One camel is provided to carry tent telegraph and small stores in two panniers and two camels are provided for the stores (cable, barrows, telephones, etc.) of each telephone detachment. The load on each of these is 300 lbs., leaving approximately 500 lbs., in all to be distributed amongst the remaining 24 camels ridden by the detachments.

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BRIGADE IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS.

S.A.A. COLUMN.

PROVISIONAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

DET L.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Riding Horses.	Riding Camels.	Baggage Camels.	REMARKS.
Officers	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	
Sergeants.	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	
Corporals.	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	
Privates.	-	-	-	7	7	-	7	90*	*Includes 10% spare.
Total.	1	-	1	8	10	-	10	90	
Native Personnel									
Reis.									
Drivers.				45					

Above allows for 135 rounds S.A.A. per rifle.  
 6,000 " " " Lewis Gun,



BRIGADE IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS.

SUPPLY DETAILS.

PROVISIONAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

DETAIL.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File.	Total.	Riding Camls.	REMARKS.
Captain.	1	-	-	-	1	1	
Subaltern.	1	-	-	-	1	1	
Staff Sergeant.	-	-	1	-	1	1	
Sergeants.	-	-	1	-	1	1	
Corporals.	-	-	-	2	2	2	
Privates.	-	-	-	4	4	4	
Batmen.	-	-	-	2	2	2	
	2-	-	2	8	12	12	

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W/D



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Officer Commanding,  
Imperial Camel Corps.

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Encl:

The attached copy of a letter despatched to the General Officer Commanding Eastern Force, regarding the formation of the Camel Corps Brigade, is forwarded for your information.

(add) A.P. Robertson

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
14/12/16.

Lieutenant-Colonel.G.S.



18th December, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,  
Western Force.

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Encl:

The attached establishment of an Armoured Train is forwarded for your information.

1. Nos. 1 and 3 Armoured Trains (at present serving with the Desert Column) have now been placed upon practically an identical establishment, except as regards the number of infantry escort - this difference being caused by a different nature of escort truck being used.
2. It is intended to bring all three armoured trains in EGYPT on to the same establishment as far as this can be done.
3. Will you, therefore, please say whether an establishment identical to the attached can be drawn up for the armoured train at present in your command?. If this can be arranged, questions affecting the equipment of the train and the posting of the necessary personnel can be carried through with less delay by the Army Ordnance Department and 3rd Echelon respectively.

(Add) A.S.P. Robertson  
Lt Col  
G.S.

Major-General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

ESTABLISHMENT of No. 1 ARMoured TRAIN.

Vehicle.	Number.	Armament in each truck.		Personnel.									TOTAL.	Remarks.
		Pom-poms.	M.G.	Officers		R.A.	M.G.	R.E. Searchlight.	Infantry.	Engine driver.	Brakes man.	R.A.M.C.		
				C.O.	Sub.									
Engine	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	(a) 3 Camp Guards. (b) 2 Tel. & Sig. (c) Infantry 1 R.A. 1
Gun Trucks	2	1	-	-	-	12(b)	-	-	23(a)	-	-	-	35	* <u>DETAIL.</u>
Escort Trucks	2	-	1	-	-	-	10	-	20	-	-	1	31	S.M.(W.O. Cl.II) 1 Sgt. 1 Cpls 2 N.C.O's (M.G.) 2 <u>6</u> Privates <u>37</u>
Searchlight Truck.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	
Command	-	-	-	1	2(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	<u>Ammunition.</u>
														Pom-poms .303 4.000 50.000
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>43*</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>74</b>	

55

SECRET

WD  
A

56



General Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Force.  
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Herewith one copy of 'Notes on Tanks' and a covering letter by Lieut: Colonel Elles, for information.

With reference to our G.S.Z/58/5 of December 3rd and G.S.397 of December 3rd. These units are expected to arrive on December 19th; will you please say what you wish done with them on arrival.

*Sgt A.B. Robertson*  
*for Lt Col as*  
Major General,  
Chief of the General Staff,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., E.E.F.  
15/12/16.

*copy to M.C.R.A*

SECRET.

57

Headquarters, Heavy Branch,  
Advanced G.H.Q.

20th November, 1916.

Dear General,

I send you some notes you asked for about Tanks, which are a summary of various papers on the subject which have been issued.

The notes of course refer to conditions that obtain in France; Egypt must adapt our experience to their conditions which I imagine are quite different both as regards ground and opposition.

May I suggest that Egypt be warned that these Tanks can't do half the things the "Daily Mail" says they can; also that machinery won't do more than a very definite amount - and it cannot make an extra effort as a man can.

In time of course they are going to win the war, but not this year.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Hugh Elles.

1. Tanks are assembled for a battle at the nearest railhead, and march by stages to the battlefield. During this period the concealment of tanks from view is of considerable importance. They are easily distinguished by aircraft and balloons, unless they are carefully concealed by tarpaulin, rafia, etc. There should be no movement by day forward of or at the detrainning station.
2. On the night before the battle, the Tanks approach as near to the enemy as possible. It has been found that 400 yards was the nearest that it is possible to approach with the Tanks without a great risk of being discovered by the enemy, owing chiefly to sound. During the latter part of this approach march the noise of the Tanks must be drowned by the use of Machine Guns or shelling. If the attack is to be at dawn no preparation for concealment is required for the Tanks in their starting position. If, however, the battle is to start later than dawn, large pits have to be dug to conceal the Tanks, unless there is existing cover such as buildings, natural hollows, etc.. The concealment of these pits presents considerable difficulties.
3. In the present stage of their development Tanks must be regarded as entirely accessory to the ordinary methods of attack, i.e. to the advance of infantry in close co-operation with Artillery.
4. In cases where they have reached a hostile trench a little ahead of the infantry, they have undoubtedly done valuable service. Their moral effect upon the enemy's infantry has been considerable. They have also not only drawn a good deal of hostile Machine Gun and Rifle fire on themselves, and, therefore, off the attacking infantry, but they have been able to cause considerable loss to the enemy in the trench, to knock out in many cases his machine guns, and, by the combined moral and material effect, to bring about the enemy's surrender or retirement. In the event of his attempting to retire, they have been able to cause him further loss.
5. Cases have also occurred in which Tanks, coming up after the infantry, have been able to deal with strong points, and machine guns which were holding the infantry up.
6. On the whole, the idea seems to be that the Tanks, or, at any rate, the majority of them, should reach the enemy's trenches just ahead of the infantry - say 50 yards.
7. The ideal as described in the preceding paragraph is, however, undoubtedly difficult to attain. In the first place, the pace of the Tanks varies much with the nature of the ground and with the slopes. Downhill, over easy ground, they can move faster than the Infantry. Uphill, or over difficult ground, they move slower. If they start originally any appreciable time in front of the infantry, they will probably bring down the enemy's barrage before the infantry have got away. If they do not start in sufficient time ahead of the infantry, the latter will soon pass them unless the ground is very favourable to the Tanks. If they are moving any appreciable distance ahead of the infantry, there is an immediate complication as regards the barrage which it is so essential that the infantry should move close up to. In the Fourth Army an attempt was made, and was partially successful, to solve the latter difficulty by leaving lanes in the barrage up which the Tanks moved; so far as this attempt failed, the cause of failure appears to have been due to the breakdown of several Tanks and consequently to there being lanes in the barrage up which no Tanks were moving.

8. On the whole, it may be said that the most favourable conditions for the use of Tanks in the present stage of their development is where both they and the Infantry can move off to the assault from a starting line within not more than 300 or 350 yards from the trench to be assaulted. If the ground is very favourable the Tanks could start from this line simultaneously with the Infantry with good prospects of reaching the enemy's trench a little before them. If the ground is less favourable it will probably be possible to give the Tanks a start of a minute or two without danger of the enemy's barrage catching the Infantry before they could leave their starting trenches. Nothing can be laid down on the subject except that it is advantageous if things can be arranged so that the Tanks do reach the objective hostile trench just in front of the Infantry, but as they are merely accessory to the combined action of the Infantry and Artillery it would not be justifiable to take any risk of interfering with that combination or of bringing about a risk of failure of the Infantry attack through not affording our men the protection of our Artillery barrage or by bringing down on them prematurely the enemy's barrage.
9. Page.  
The speed of Tanks is approximately as follows :-  
By night 15 yards a minute.  
By day over heavily shelled ground, 15 yards a minute.  
By day over lightly shelled ground and ordinary trenches 30 yards a minute.  
By day on open ground, 90 yards a minute.
- Tanks can cross any wire entanglement and they leave a track which is passable to Infantry. The wire is not, however, in any way removed, and loose strands remain on the ground which may act as trip wires. Tanks can push their way through brush-wood but cannot negotiate woods if they contain trees of any size.
10. Tanks have rendered great value by passing down the main streets in Villages, knocking out Machine Guns and keeping down the fire of snipers; but they are liable to be held up if they attempt to pass over the ruins of Villages by falling into cellars or dug-outs.
11. If the ground behind our front has been heavily shelled or is very much intersected with trenches, tracks should be prepared, so as to render the approach march of the Tanks as easy as possible. Tanks experience considerable difficulty in surmounting obstacles by night and the hours of moonlight should be chosen whenever possible.
12. Reconnaissance work and Intelligence work in connection with Tanks is of the greatest importance, and Tanks should not be sent into action until the Tank Commander has had time to reconnoitre the ground very thoroughly, and work out his route on a Map, marking the time when he should pass various points and objectives. He should also have full use of all available aeroplane photographs.
13. A considerable amount of transport is required in connection with Tanks, for the formation of forward dumps of Petrol and water, etc., Aeroplane petrol is required.
14. Officers are very short of Military experience, and require careful instructions.
15. The following signals have been used with success :-  
Tanks to Infantry Red Flag - Broken down  
Green Flag - Am on objective  
/Infantry



Infantry to Tank "Enemy in sight" signal - Tanks required.

Pigeons have also been used with success from Tanks.

18. Very hard ground or roads must be avoided, or the tracks will be damaged. The Tank will become stuck if an attempt is made to cross deep sand or marsh. In order to avoid wear and tear on the machine, and the consequent repairs, en route to the battle, the Tanks should be railed up as close as possible to the scene of operations.

The success of a Tank operation depends :-

- (a) Upon mechanical fitness of the Tank.
- (b) Upon concealment and secrecy.
- (c) Upon each Tank officer knowing exactly what he has to do.

W D

SECRET

61  
App B

From : Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

To ; Vice-Admiral,  
Naval Commander-in-Chief,  
EAST INDIES AND EGYPT.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
15th December, 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information a copy of the correspondence which has taken place between Admiral Spitz and myself regarding an offer made by him to place his squadron at my disposal during the impending operations in the vicinity of EL ARISH.

I am not aware of the nature of the assistance Admiral Spitz is able to provide, but I presume that information is already in your possession.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. Lynden-Bell,  
C.G.S.

for General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET 62

From : Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

To : Rear-Admiral Spitz,  
Commanding French Syrian Naval Division,  
PORT SAID.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
15th December, 1916.



Sir,

I have the honour to convey to you my sincere thanks for your letter No. 341 of December 11th, and to say how greatly I appreciate your kind offer of co-operation which will be of the greatest value to me.

I have arranged with Admiral Wemyss to convey to you, through him, my plans, with suggestions as to the best form which, in my opinion, your kind co-operation might take.

Allow me to repeat my sincere recognition of the valuable support which you have so generously offered to place at my disposal.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) A.J.Murray,

General,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

DIVISION DE SYRIE


63  
Port Said, le 11 Décembre 1916.

ETAT-MAJOR.

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No.341.

Le Contre-Amiral de SPITZ Commandant la  
Division Navale de Syrie à Monsieur le General MURRAY  
Commandant en Chef les Forces Expéditionnaires en  
Egypte.

Mon Général,



En prévision d'opérations militaires que vous  
pouvez projeter, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître  
que je serais heureux de mettre à votre disposition les  
bâtiments de la Division que je commande, dont la coopé-  
ration pourrait vous être utile pour toute opération  
intéressant la partie de la côte, dont le blocus incombe à  
la Marine Française.

Je mettrais également avec plaisir à la disposition  
de l'Amiral WEMYSS les bâtiments qui pourraient lui être  
utiles pour concourir à une opération dans la zone dont  
le contrôle est attribué à la Marine Britannique.

Le Vice-Amiral WEMYSS m'ayant demandé dernièrement  
par communication orale de son Chef d'Etat-Major, la  
coopération du REQUIN pour une opération de ce genre, je  
lui ai répondu dans le sens que je viens de vous indiquer.

Veillez agréer, Mon Général, l'expression de mes  
respectueux sentiments.

(Signed) SPITZ.