

AWM4

**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Infantry

Item number: 23/48/12

Title: 31st Infantry Battalion

July 1916



AWM4-23/48/12

31st Bn 8th Inf Bde

PAGE 22

Date. 1916	Place and Time. FRANCE	- How Diary -	Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
July 1 st	MORBECQUE	Transport arrived 1 officer and 24 other ranks	
" 3 rd	"	whole Bn put through a practical demonstration of poisonous gas.	Vol 2
" 7 th	"	Stand by orders received to be ready to move to front line.	
" 8 th	FRANCE	Move orders received 1.15 am. - Bn	
" 9 th	"	route marched via MEURVILLE to ESTAIRES & billeted at latter place night of 8 th /9 th	
" 11 th	"	March continued & Bn further billeted at RUE DORMOIRE 1 mile WEST of ERQUINGHEM relieving the 18 th Bn.	
" 11 th	"	Bn relieved 15 th Bn taking over part of BOIS-GRENIER LINE - Map Ref. France	
		Sheet 36N. W 5000 from H 29 A 22 to	

D.398/9.14.—C.11056.

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
July 16 th	FRANCE	I I9 C42 in reserve to the 29 th Bn.	
	"	Bn moved to 4 billets in vicinity of FLEUR BAIX - relieved by 4 th N.Z.	
		9 casualties by enemy shelling billets.	
		Bn took over sector N10C06 to N10C66 prior to proposed attack to be delivered on the 17 th .	
		inst. Operations orders issued.	APPENDIX A.
" 17 th	"	Assault postponed. Casualties caused from enemy shelling support trenches 1 officer 13 other ranks.	
" 18 th	"	Holding line. Further casualties 12 ^{wounded} wounded.	
" 19 th	"	Bombardment on both sides during the day.	
		Assault launched at 6 pm. Enemy's position captured & an attempt made to consolidate during the night. (Additional operation order)	APPENDIX B

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.												
July 20 th	FRANCE	Both flanks were broken & a general retirement to our original lines necessary. Casualties very heavy. Bn withdrawn from front line & re-billed in FLEURBAIX. Casualties amongst officers 1 killed 10 wounded 6 missing.													
" 21 st	"	Despatches & detailed summary of operations covering period of attack 19 th & 20 th inst prepared & forwarded to G.O.C 8 th Inf Bde.	Appendix C & D												
		Casualty return													
		<table border="0"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Killed</td> <td>Wounded</td> <td>Missing</td> </tr> <tr> <td>officers</td> <td>1</td> <td>11</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other ranks</td> <td>66</td> <td>410</td> <td>80</td> </tr> </table>		Killed	Wounded	Missing	officers	1	11	5	Other ranks	66	410	80	
	Killed	Wounded	Missing												
officers	1	11	5												
Other ranks	66	410	80												
		Estimated Germans killed in Bn sector 500, captured 120.													
		Bn moved & billeted in BAC ST MAUR													

D. 398/9.14.—C.11056.

Date. 1916	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
July 22	FRANCE	Battalion less 1 platoon moved to	
		Bac St Maur. One platoon to Coy	
		to hold JUNCTION POST, 3 rd line defenses.	
" 23	"	2 officers with reinforcements joined	
		battalion during last 2 days.	
" 25	"	Present strength 11 officers 501 other ranks.	
		Board of Officers appld inquiry in losses	
		Telephones etc during action, also to	
		dispose of deceased officers & others	
		effects. Forwarded recommendations	
" 28	"	Shifted battalion into billets at	
		A25 a on RUE BIACHE. Congested &	
		extremely dirty.	

Date. 1916	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
July 29 th	FRANCE	Capt. W.W. TRACEY of 29 th Bn transferred to battalion as senior Coy. commander.	
"	"	Orders received to receive the 29 th battalion in front line trenches on night of 31 st July 1 st Aug th .	
" 30 th	"	Recommended Lieut. ALAN, WALKER, J.P., McLENNON & DRAYTON for rank temp ^l Captains.	
" 31 st	"	Completed arrangements taking over front line trenches. Map reference sector BRIGADE TRENCH MAP AREA. M. = N10. C 1/2-6 to N10.6 8-9.	

W. W. Tracey
 Capt. 29th Bn.

1916

BATTALION ORDER No. 1

31st

Battalion Head Quarters

Appendix A


16.7.16
8th Div - 13de

1. With the object of preventing the enemy drawing troops from their front, offensive operations are to be carried out by troops of the 11th Corps, and 2nd Anzac under the command of the G.O.C. 11th Corps.
2. The Brigade will move into position as follows :-
31st and 32nd Battalions - each 1 Company less a platoon, in the front line.
One platoon from each of the above Companies in the 70 yards line.
Remainder of the 31st & 32nd Battalions in the 300 yards line.
3. The frontal allotted for above battalions is :-
32nd Battalion - from ~~XXXX~~ 10.a.9.½.1 inclusive to 10.c.5.½. 6½ exclusive.
31st Battalion - from N 10.c.5.½.6.½. inclusive to N 10.c.½. 6 exclusive.
4. The 31st & 32nd Battalions will be the assaulting Battalions.
5. OBJECTIVES. 31st Battalion from N.10.c.5.½ 3.½ inclusive to N.10.c.½. ~~X~~ 2.½ exclusive.
6. The method of attack will be:-
Each Battalion of the Assaulting Battalions will have two Companies in the first and second waves, and two Companies in the 3rd & 4th waves.
Companies distributed in depth, that is, two platoons in front and two platoons of the same Company in rear as per diagram on next page

7.

DIRECTION OF ENEMY

----- 500 to 700 yards -----



Same for 3rd and 4th Waves.

8. A little before bombardment of enemy parapet finally lifts (remember it will lift to support trenches and return to parapet several times) first and second waves will cross the parapet and take up position in "No Mans Land" as near as possible to the enemy wire with an interval between sections. One wave to be through enemy wire before next wave reaches it, unless the wave in front breaks.
9. During each of the "Lifts" to barrage lines between 4.25 and 6.31 (vide Appendix "A") the Infantry in the trenches will shew their bayonets over the parapet, Officers will blow whistles and shout orders, in order to induce the enemy to man his parapets. At the end of each of these "Lifts" the Artillery will shorten range on the enemy's front parapet and continues the intense bombardment of the front and support lines.
10. During the last phase of the intense bombardment the Infantry of the first two waves will be deployed in "No Man's Land" as near as possible to the enemy's trenches, opposite their sections of attack, and will assault at 7.00 immediately the Artillery "Lift" to barrage lines.

(2)

Brigade Commanders will fix the time for their first wave to leave the front trenches ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ according to their distance from the enemy's lines. The deployment must be completed before 7.00.

11. The assaulting Infantry will notify their front positions in the enemy's trenches to aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps by means of flashing mirrors and flares at 8.00 (1 hour after assault) and 9.00 (2 hours after assault) and at intervals of one hour subsequently during daylight. Sound sheets will also be issued according to special instructions issued.
12. Every work in the enemy first line system is to be taken, ~~but~~ but no troops are on any account whatever to go beyond that line. See that communication trenches leading back from first line are not mistaken for parts of the first line.
13. DRESS. Marching Order - no packs.
14. No time will be issued later. All Officers must check watches frequently from now on. Time can be obtained from Brigade Signal Officer.
15. Battalion Commanders will detail special parties to construct covered communications back from captured trenches which must be done as soon as possible.
16. Battalions to-night MUST report absolutely accurately the condition of the enemy's wire, exact locality to be given. Patrols must go to the wire. Must report both what there is and what of it has been cut.
All information must be sent to Brigade Headquarters immediately.

Each man will carry 150 rounds ammunition, 2 Mills Grenades, and 2 Sandbags. Every third man will carry pick and shovel alternatively.
17. Pump for drinking water is situated in the front trench between - N 10. 22. and N 10. 3.10.
18. Battalions will detail parties to clear wire.
19. Special parties will be told off to consolidate trenches taken.
20. Machine & Lewis Guns will be pushed up after the 4th wave to hold the line captured.
21. Mens' packs are useful to carry Magazines for Lewis Guns 6 will fit in a pack.
22. Each Battalion will detail 6 runners for sending back information to Brigade Headquarters.
23. Working parts for Lewis Guns should be covered until required for use.
24. Every man must know his own particular job.
25. Lewis Gunners and Machine Gunners should fire short bursts after the German Trenches have been captured.
26. Reserve Machine Guns and reserve Stokes Guns will be at CELLAR FARM post.

- 27 Leading two battalions will carry filled water bottles, and one day's iron ration.
REMAINDER. Filled water bottles, two days' iron rations.
- 28 Packs. Packs will not be carried. They will be stored in Battalion dumps under Brigade arrangements.
- 29 Advanced Dressing Stations with stretcher parties will be established at :-
G.36.d.7.8.
H.26.d.1.1
H.21.a.1.9
Working cases will be directed to
G18.c.6.9
which will be a main dressing Station. A Main Dressing Station will also be at
H.8.c.0.3
All casualties are to be relieved of ammunition or bombs.
- 30 Staff Officers, Cyclist Orderlies, or Despatch Riders may use all roads and in any direction.
- 31 Prisoners of War will be sent under escort to Divisional Collecting Stations at:-
G29.d.7.8
H.21.a.4.5.
from whence they will be evacuated to point
G.16.b.5.9
under arrangements to be made by the A. P.M.

W. B. Bernard

Lieut
For C.O. 3 1st Battalion A.I.F.

Issued at

Copy No. 1
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APPENDIX "A"

Programme for 17th July 1916 on front of attack

FROM	TO	
11:00 ^{am} 0.00	0.30	Registration by Divisional Artilleries and Trench Mortars.
0.30	2.00	Registration and bombardment by Heavy Artillery (9.2" Howitzers and upwards) <u>Registration only by 6" howitzers will be included in this period.</u>
2.00	4.00	Wire cutting by 18 pdrs.
4.00	7.00	Wire cutting by 18 pdrs. continued Wire cutting by Trench Mortar batteries. Bombardment by 18 pdrs, 4.5 " Howitzers and 6" Howitzers.
5.00	7.00	Heavy Artillery (9.2" How. and upwards) Slow Bombardment.
7.00		ARTILLERY LIFT TO BARRAGE LINES

Lifts.

During the bombardment there will be "Lifts" to Barrage Lines for the following periods:-

From 4.25	till 4.29
From 5.04	till 5.09
From 5.29	till 5.36
From 6.21	till 6.31

*W. Bernard Lieut
Dor Coy 3rd Btn.*

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Appendix B

S E C R E T.

5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL ORDER No. 37.

1. The operations detailed in 5th Australian Divisional Order No. 37, will be carried out as therein detailed on 19th JULY.
2. Zero time will not be earlier than 11 a.m.
3. On the 18th July there will be a bombardment of the GIVENCHY and CUINCHY fronts.
Heavy Artillery will carry out slow registration and bombardment on the front of attack.
4. Orders for any necessary moves will be issued in due course. Preparations for the attack will be pushed ahead by Infantry Brigades and Divisional Artillery, C.R.E. and Signal Company according to the plans already made.

Initial return (Sgd) D.M.King, Major Lt.Cc
Gen. Staff, 5th Aust.Division

Commanding Officer,
29th Battalion
✓ 30th "
✓ 31st "
32nd "
Machine Gun Company
Lt.Trench Mortar Battery.

Forwarded.

18/7/16

[Signature] Major.
Brigade Major, 5th Infantry Brigade.

SECRET

Headquarters,
8th Infantry Brigade.

Commanding Officer,
29th Battalion
30th "
✓ 31st "
32nd "
Brigade Machine Gun Company
Lt. Trench Mortar Battery.

Zero time will be 11.0 a.m.

19/7/16

[Signature]
Major,
Brigade Major, 8th Infantry Brigade

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- WAR DIARY -APPENDIX *Appendix*FRANCE,
"Fleurbaix"
21st July 1916

FROM Lt.Col. F.W.Toll, C.O. 31st Battalion
TO G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade.

Sir,

For your information and necessary action I beg to report on the action of the 19th & 20th instant together with the preliminary operations etc.

On the 15th instant at 12 midnight the Battalion

Move f rom moved from Bois Grenier line of defences, ref. map FRANCE
Bois G renier
line a s Sheet 36 N.W. scale 1/20.000 Bois Grenier Line H 29 B22
shewn

to I 19 C52 reserves being relieved by New Zealand Troops. The Battalion arrived at billets in Fleurbaix early on Sunday morning the 16th instant, and rested for that day. Prior to this our Intelligence Officer, Lieut. G. Still, with Corporal Day and 4 other observers also Lieut. Wilson of "C" Company with 1 N.C.O & 4 men to assist in getting information where in first line of our defences and received losses by enemy shells. Corporal Day and Private Luxmore being wounded. Lieut. Still and his party did excellent work and I wish to bring to your special notice Corporal Day. This N.C.O has on several occasions shewn merit of high order as a scout, and lately as an assistant to my Intelligence Officer. The men of this party also deserve praise for their untiring efforts and constant vigilance throughout the period 6th to 19th July.

Occup ation
of ou r front
line.

On Sunday night 16th instant one Company "D" less one platoon took over the right section of Brigade Area of front line defences, as per marginal note.

Ref.M ap
Bde.T rench
Map area L
1/10000
Secto r

One Platoon of "D" Company and 3 Companies with Battalion Head Quarters in reserve on 300 yard line.

N10 C 06 to
N10 C 67
Suppo rts
N10A 04 to
N10A 76

This line (reserve) was constantly shelled by enemy's guns causing casualties as per appendid list. On the 17th instant two Companies "A" & "C" were taken from reserve line and billeted in Fleurbaix owing to congested state of reserve line. "B" Company remaining in support to "D" Company. On Tuesday 18th I changed the front line Company "D" with "B". "D" going

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 into billets, and ⁽²⁾ "C" Company taking position in support line.

Orders for
 Offensive
 Operation.

On the 15th July received verbal instructions re contemplated operations as outlined in Battalion Order No. 1 "Appendix A", Brigade Order No. 23 dated 16.7.1916, and continuation order No. 23 "Appendix B" See also Brigade Order No. 24.

On the 18th instant the following dispositions were made by this Battalion.

First Wave.	2 Platoons "A" Coy 2 Platoons "C" Coy
Second Wave	2 Platoons "A" Coy 2 Platoons "C" Coy
Third Wave	2 Platoons "B" Coy 2 Platoons "D" Coy
Fourth Wave	2 Platoons "B" Coy 2 Platoons "D" Coy

"B" Company supported "A", and "D" Company supported "C" Company. Grenadiers were allotted to flanks of leading Companies, one team to each Platoon of first and second wave, with two teams in reserve. Also the six Lewis Guns and personnel. The Signallers and Stretcher Bearers were organised, the latter to follow fourth wave, but owing to terrible losses before the assault was delivered the formations above were broken. Of the 8 signallers who were organised as runners in event of broken communications 6 were killed or wounded before we left the support trenches and Company signallers had to be requisitioned.

At 4 p.m. on the 19th the Battalion was reported in position. The Battalion Head Quarters moved from support trenches to front line at 5.30 p.m. At 2 minutes to 6 o'clock, the first wave or what was left of it charged over our parapets, and crossed the zone known as No man's land. The second wave followed at 6 p.m. but I found it necessary to join the third and fourth waves and with this I moved towards the enemy's position. On arrival we found great devastation had taken place by our gun fire and many of the enemy were dead or dying

(3)

in their dug outs and emplacements. It was found that underground works contained many Germans who were at once bombed and killed. Owing to heavy losses up to this juncture, particularly amongst the Officers I with my Staff Adjutant, Lieut. Bernard, and Intelligence Officer Lieut. Still (with 1 signaller Corporal Carew) and 1 runner private Eddy) proceeded with remnants of Battalion, leaving as few as possible to assist Machine & Lewis Gunners to get established. We proceeded to find enemy's second line of defences. There were none in the area shown on map except open ditches containing water which somewhat confused me, and I determined to advance and clear my front for 200 yards. We found straggling enemy hiding in underwoods about trees and ditches, many of whom we killed and many surrendered. I then found we were under a heavy fire from Artillery both in front and flanks, especially my left flank. Leaving Major Eekersley (whom I found on the right flank at this time) in command I gave him instructions to dig in on his right, and hold a position on which an enemy's machine gun was found. This we destroyed and captured another which one man carried back to German's first lines. During the night of the 19th & 20th every effort was made to reorganise the scattered troops. Men from all Units were placed in such positions as were available to make a resistance in small posts, the centre being established as my headquarters. Communications and reports will be detailed on another document by my Intelligence Officer and attached hereto.

Of the General action it is almost impossible to say exactly the effect, but considerable number of enemy were destroyed and large quantities of bombs etc. thrown into ditches as we could not carry away or otherwise destroy

As a first report and time not allowing for enlarging of same I take this opportunity of bringing to your notice for special notice and reward, the following Officers N.C.O's and men, but the superhuman efforts made by all

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ranks makes it extremely hard to differentiate.

I wish to mention Major Eckersley (wounded) for his assistance in holding our advanced line which eventually had to retire to within 100 yards of our Main positions. Major Eckersley did not get back to us, being wounded in the head but was picked up by the 54th as reported. (This is not certain).

For special reward I mention Lieut. Wilson G.H. of "C" Company who alone ^{left} of his Company Officers in the advance shewed great coolness and pluck and materially assisted in holding in check the troops on my left flank.

C.S.M. W. McLean deserves special recognition for his work in the same quarter.

Lieut. Morisset, McLennan, Aland & Sergeant Law who held on to first line and came through unwounded deserve mention.

Capt. Mills and Lieut MacLeod did excellent work in their position 100 yards in front of Main line and by their behaviour and cool judgement were enabled to dig in and hold till daylight. Capt. Mills is reported missing and wounded.

I wish to mention for special consideration Lieut. G. Still who accompanied me throughout and kept communication as best he could both by pigeons and runners. Lieut. Wilson as mentioned above, Lieut. Bernard who is reported wounded in advanced position. As Adjutant he assisted greatly in organising the advance. Corporal Carew, signaller, although wounded in thigh in early stages was with Private Eddy the only remaining men of my staff. The N.C.O's work was splendid particularly in the early morning when men were beginning to break. He with a revolver kept many at their post, who seeing so many retiring on both flanks were almost in a panic.

Private Eddie who carried the pigeon basket through a hail of shell fire and did good work throughout. I recommend he be promoted to a Corporal as a reward.

Private D. O'Connor who crossed and recrossed three times (No man's land) with messages behaved in a splendid manner. He certainly deserves promotion.

I also beg to bring to your notice Sergeant O'Sullivan ? of the 54th Battalion for recognition of his splendid organisation and control of men. His behaviour was worthy of special notice and I pass it on for his C.O.'s information.

An N.C.O. of the 29th also deserves mention. This N.C.O brought over and was in charge of two platoons of the 29th and behaved in most courageously. I will try and ascertain his name later.

I append my recommendations in order of merit as they appeared to me at present, but further recommendations will be made as evidence is forthcoming.

CONFIDENTIAL

Recommendations for distinction in assault of
19th 20th July 1916.

31st Battalion, 8th Infantry Brigade.

OFFICERS

Lieut. George Still

" V.D. Bernard

" L.J. Trounson

" H. McLennan

" R.C. Aland

" V.L. Morisset

" F. Drayton

Capt. C. Mills

W.O.

C.S.M. W. McLean

N.C.O'S

Sergeant V. Law

" F. R. Smith

Corporal R.J. Carew

" A.C. Day

OTHER RANKS

Private D. O'Connor

" R. Eddie

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Brigade Major,
8th Infantry Brigade A.I.F.

Continuation of Confidential recommendations.

The following A.M.C. details & stretcher Bearers
are brought to the favorable notice of G.O.C. for
consideration.

I strongly recommend the first named man for special
distinction. His work and action came under my personal
observation. The work of all the men named was splendid
every one went in No man's Land repeatedly and brought
back wounded men, but the particular good work of
Pte. G.H.Wilson was in tending the wounded under heavy
shell fire behind our own trenches. This man undoubtedly
saved many lives by his first aid assistance to the
wounded of all units.

In order of merit I would mention

- Pte. Wilson G.H. Special
- Pte. Thompson W.G.
- Pte. Forder P.
- Pte. Ingram R
- Pte. Fitzpatrick J. L.

July 22nd 1916

Fred R. Toll Lt. Col
C.O. 31st Battalion
A.I.F.

Recommendations
for awards.

[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

[Faint handwritten signature or initials]

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Brigade Major

8th Infantry Brigade.

Re my second recommendation for recognition of exceptionally good service in action 19-20th July.

A.M.C. Details.

I find on further enquiry that Pte. Thompson W.G. mentioned second in the list, carried out his duty far beyond the German defences. This man brought in some of our wounded from the advanced position behind German main line. This did not come to my knowledge until after my report was sent in, and I strongly recommend he be bracketed with Pte. Wilson H.G. for special ~~xxxxxx~~ reward. Their work was magnificent under extremely heavy artillery and M.G. fire in the open.

July 23rd 1916

F. W. Holl
Lt. Col
C.O. 31st Battalion A.I.F.

Report on Operation "Assault on and attempt to Consolidate Enemy's trenches N10 c 13 to N10 c 14 on the 19th & 20th July 1916".

Observation and Artillery fire will be found in summary of Intelligence attached herewith. Commencing at 2.45 p.m. first message was sent to Brigade Head Quarters ^{CA}₁. "Enemy straffing from midday searching for batteries. Enemy trench mortars on front line from N10 c 06 to N10 c 56 some falling on parapet and majority on 75 yards line. From 2 p.m. enemy heavy straffed support and communication trenches behind sector referred to above. Many casualties. Our trench mortars not yet firing. Many of our shells falling short. Our heavy artillery has apparently destroyed some of the enemy trench mortars. Enemy's parapet and wire between N 10 c ~~56~~³³ and N 10 c 64 being destroyed in many places.

At 3.15 p.m. ^{CA}₂ Very heavy straffing on both front and support trenches N 10 c 06 to N 10 c 67. Flares and ammunition blown up in front dump. Telephone station carried away by shell. Four signallers and two runners injured. Colonel received several pellets in face and legs but not out of action. Observers report heavy damage to wire and parapets but our shells. No man's land also being cut up. Heavy bombardment now continuous on both sides. Enemy firing rifle grenades in section between "mine" and "cellar" farm" avenues, coming enfilade from left flank.

At 3.59 p.m. message received BMI 1. "Report when in position" to which at 4.01 p.m. the reply was given

^{CA}₄ Four waves now in position 4 p.m.

At 4.10 p.m. ^{CA} over 5. Our artillery no effect on sector N10 c 03 to N10 c 33. Our shells landing in rear of enemy's parapets. A further progress report at 4.50 p.m. C.A over 6. At 4.30 p.m. our shells still falling in rear of enemy's parapets between N 10 c 03 and N 10 c 33. Their wires still intact in this sector. At 4.38 wire in sector N 10 c 43 to N 10 c 75 badly damaged, also parapets. Enemy shelling

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lightly on front ~~parapets~~ line but very heavy on support trenches.

Reports were then received that our shells were dropping on our own parapets causing casualties and at 4.56 p.m. the request was made for our artillery to lift Section "A". This was not carried out by artillery but became worse, shells falling behind the whole frontage held by us, very heavy casualties eventuating and at 5.10 p.m. a very urgent wire was sent CA over 7 "Please ask Artillery A5A to lift another 100 yards on sectors "A" "B" & "C". Shells falling behind our parapet 5 p.m. The situation was not improved and at 5.19 p.m. CA over 8 was sent "Our artillery dropping shells behind Sectors "A" "B" & "C" 4.50 to 5.15 p.m. Artillery asked to LIFT over those sections. Enemy wire N10 c 03 to N10 c 33 not much damaged. On left N10 c 33 to N10 c ~~33~~ 64½ wire and parapets badly damaged very little enemy fire on front trenches practically all on supports between "Mine" and "Cellar farm" avenues, and NORTH of same searching for batteries. Casualties occurring through our own shrapnel. At 5.45 p.m. CA over 10. "Being severely enfiladed from left flank. Enemy wire still intact in Sector N10 c 03 to N10 c 33 but parapet damaged. Most of our shells land 20 to 30 yards in rear of their parapet. They are now shelling our front line with scattered casualties! It will be seen that our casualties during the afternoon prior to attack were heavy and unfortunately very many must be accounted to our own artillery dropping short. Just prior to launching the attack the enemy bombardment was hellish, and it seemed as if they knew accurately the time set.

At 5.58 p.m. CA over 9 first and second waves across parapet and deployed in No man's land, ready to launch attack. C.O. leaving with 4th wave.

In face of the terrific shell fire now on the Battalion bravely lead by its Officers sprung over the parapets and charged across No man's land. Unfortunately many Officers were struck down in this early stage together

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(3)

APPENDIX

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with senior N.C.Os. and in many instances were without leaders. Our wire had been well cut and there was no difficulty in getting through. No man's land was fairly easy to cross although badly cut up by large craters and ditches full of water etc. The enemy's wire entanglements were found to be badly broken. No man's land was swept mostly by enemy machine gun fire. The enemy's first line was won and thoroughly cleared, many Germans were killed and prisoners taken. The dugouts were thoroughly searched by bombs. A temporary search was made for the communication trenches but could not be found except in one instance. Only sufficient men were left behind to assist the Lewis Machine Gunners in establishing Posts. The remainder swept on with the intention of capturing the second and third ~~in~~ trenches in the first line system, but we went on and on but no trace could be found of same. It now appeared evident that the information supplied as to enemy defences and aerial photographs were incorrect and misleading. The ground was flat covered with fairly long grass, the trenches shown on aerial photos were nothing but ditches full of water, along which were straight lines of trees. We pushed on expecting to eventually reach the enemy's works. At 6.30 p.m. a wire CA over 12 was sent by pigeon "Four waves well over 200 yards beyond enemy's parapets no enemy works found yet so am digging in!" The men were rallied and opened out and instructed to dig in about 250 yards from enemy's front line. The C.O. and Staff went on through our own box barrage and investigated some 350 to 400 yards about N10 A 78 and found immediately in front about 150 yards N10 A 75 to N10 A 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ what appeared to be a strong and important enemy position. It was protected in front by high heavy barbed wire entanglements some five feet high and would have been a difficult position to storm and was intact from our own gun fire. All this time our men were feeling the effect of the enemy's enfilade artillery and machine gun fire, the latter coming from concealed positions in farms, Belangre, and from houses in "Les Clochers" village.

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Also from our own Artillery as it was impossible to post them as to our position. The men were reorganised and disposed as well as possible and an attempt made to co-ordinate their trenches with 54th Battalion on our right. No contact with the 32nd Battalion on our left then being made. We had to use our entrenching tools to dig temporary cover exposed to shell and machine gun fire from all points of the compass and sand bags were very few in number, with which to build parapets. The men were cheerful and worked willingly and it is impossible to differentiate. There was a woeful scarcity of Officers and N.C.Os but the best was done under the circumstances. The Advance line was under the command of Major Eckersley and in the event of them not being able to hold during the night the C.O. decided to strengthen as much as possible the enemy's first line with what material was available and made his Headquarters there. Communication being kept up with advance party. At 7.14 p.m. CA 13 was sent also by pigeon. No works to hold so fell back to enemy first line. Send ammunition across urgently. Machine Guns and crews required. Am strengthening parapets. Will require entrenching tools picks and shovels, sandbags. Many casualties but cannot estimate until first count after reorganising".

Contact was made with the 54th Battalion on our right flank but none could be made with 32nd on our left, who apparently had pushed the whole of their men beyond the first line and had entrenched nearly in line with our own battalion, but contact was afterwards established. Very few of our men were available for the improvement of defence of the enemy's first line and all men available 54th & 55th Battalions and Engineers were put on to strengthen parapets by transferring bags from rear to front and throwing up dirt, using entrenching tools and few shovels in hand. Picks, shovels and sand bags were in urgent demand but where thousands were required hundred only were available. Naturally to converge and strengthen this position took some considerable time. Promises of assistance were given to advance line but could not be

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D

fulfilled. The enemy's first trench ~~XXXXXXXX~~ had been thoroughly cleared of Germans and part of one underground communication trench was located. It was a heart breaking job attempting to block the various openings in the trenches with the material at hand but the men performed miracles cheerfully. All the time we were under shell and machine gun fire and suffered heavy casualties. At 7.25 p.m. CA over 14 message was sent "Can hold enemy's first line if reinforcements are sent over urgently. Send men with picks and shovels extra ammunition for machine guns and men".

Small parties unknown from Infantry and sappers volunteered to go over to our own lines to bring over ammunition shovels and sand bags, and were successful in doing so, but the amount brought over was inadequate. At 8.50 p.m. CA over 15 was sent. "Have been to front as far as 350 yards in rear of first trenches but there are no trenches or works of any kind to consolidate merely open ditches full of water". Part of the Battalion are attempting to entrench but owing to heavy casualties from shell fire on front left flank and rear (our own) position is untenable 8.30 p.m.

Small isolated parties are digging on our right front apparently straightening out line. Material will be required and communication opened up with our original trenches. We have suffered severe losses and may require assistance to hold position. Urgently require stretcher bearers, medical assistance as all bearers are casualties.

At 8.55 p.m. CA over 16 "Thick curtain of smoke in front and cannot observe (this smoke was afterwards ascertained came from our ammunition dumps which were on fire) strengthenig parados of first captured enemy's line. Battalion broken up reorganisation at present impossible. Send as many stretchers and bearers as possible. Ammunition required also picks shovels sand bags and duck boards.

Message BMI 24 in response to appeals was received. "Reinforcements tools ammunition and machine guns now going forward."

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Our advance line was informed on this and requested to hold on and, keep digging in and obtain touch with the joining units. Next BMI 49 received about 10 p.m.? Report urgent which portions of attack are successful, which doubtful, and which portions of enemy's trenches still held by enemy so that a fresh bombardment can be arranged in order to gain the whole line. Give exact boundaries for artillery guidance. The portions captured will be held on to.

At 10.20 p.m. CA over 17 the following reply was sent "Have captured enemy's first line opposite Brigade Sector but doubtful as to exact location, enemy are sniping with M.Gs. and cannot locate, village on fire and cannot observe forward defences ~~xx~~ badly knocked about. Consider our troops 200 yards in front at least though in no formed earthworks. Must have support early and no large reconnaissance can be made. Machine & Lewis Guns holding on although being severely shelled and are short of ammunition send urgent.

At 10.25 p.m. CA over 18. Uncertain as to exact area captured have not seen 32nd. 54th on my right (Colonel Cass) sending this "Have no communications except telephone to Colonel Cass. Advance line were driven back from their position but entrenched about 100 yards in front of enemy's first line. Some were under Captain Mills. Lieut Merisset, Aland, & MacLeod were also present with men from their respective companies, probably some 200 men. The balance of our Battalion were scattered and mixed up with other units. Messages were sent to and fro to our advanced line and Officers and men urged to hold out and assistance was promised as soon as it was forthcoming. A small party of the 29th Battalion not more than 2 platoons reinforced in charge of Sergeant O'Sullivan who reported and placed himself and party under the C.O. They were a welcome and useful addition to our small garrison and assisted to hold our left flank which was very tenuated, but was held by C.S.M. McLean of "B" Company with a small body of 1 Sergeant and 6 other ranks until Lieut. Wilson and party joined up later. Warrant Officer McLean endeavoured

to obtain touch with troops on our left flank but there was a huge gap of hundred of yards and it was apparent that the division on our left had either not launched an attack or had been unsuccessful. This flank was a source of anxiety the whole of the night and it was evident that if attacked from this direction our position would be extremely difficult to hold. Reports were continually sent in with requests for ammunition shovels picks sand bags and at 11.45 p.m. the following message was sent CA over 19 "Only small party of 29th Battalion arrived under a Sergeant. Must have relief for first line also communication required. Reinforcing troops should bring across telephone wire to link up. Large quantities of sand bags required for front line. Being heavily bombarded by enemy's guns on left flank.

It is worthy of mention that Private D. O'Connor of "B" Company willingly volunteered and took over three separate messages across no man's land, which was continually swept by Artillery and Machine Gun fire.

The Artillery on both sides was extremely severe and our works were torn by both sides, the advance line particularly feeling the effect of our own artillery who of course did not know our positions. Our machine gun fire from our own lines in rear was also very gruelling especially as we had had to shift sand bags from one side to the other to obtain protection from enemy fire, and so expose our selves in the rear. Owing to the lack of sand bags saps and large openings in enemy's lines could not be properly blocked, and these were a constant source of anxiety as through these the enemy ~~xxxx~~ would probably counterattack. All ranks worked exceedingly hard and if our left flank had been secure the captured trenches could have been held.

Sufficient ammunition had been brought across to keep two Lewis Guns and 1 Machine Gun going but the ammunition had to be nursed. The gunners did magnificent work and are specially mentioned. Lieut Trounson with 1 man of the 31st and two from the 54th worked the Lewis Guns, but the

crew of the machine gun is unknown. Lieut Drayton assisted Captain Robertson of the 54th to organise the grenadiers, but the supply of bombs was inadequate and soon exhausted. No grenadiers were available for left flank. At 2.30 a.m. an Officer reported that the advanced right flank had been driven back by bombers to the enemy's first line, but held there until the general retirement. From this onwards all hands stood to, and strengthening work had to be held over as it was evident that the enemy intended to counterattack in force. About 3.30 a.m. the left flank was also driven in and from reports and information sent in they formed part of the 32nd Battalion. These did not hold in the enemy's front line but retired right across no man's land to our own original positions. Our orders were to hold captured positions and we determined to hold on. By means of M.G & Lewis Guns and with rifle fire we held off the enemy but were under a gruelling enfilade fire from Artillery and Machine Guns. At last at 5.30 a.m. the enemy attacked from both flanks simultaneously and in force preceded by strong bombing parties. Our supply of grenades was exhausted so resisted by rifle and machine gun ~~fire~~ fire only. The enemy moved outside and under protection of parades so were secure from our artillery. The retirement of both flanks had left us up in ~~xxxx~~ the air and it was apparent that we would have to retire. At 5.45 a.m. the remnants of our troops broke and retired and it was impossible to restrain them although an attempt was made to keep them at the point of the revolver. The C.O. was the last man to leave the enemy's trench.

The enemy then swarmed in and the retirement across no man's land resembled a shambles, the enemy artillery and machine guns doing deadly damage. Our own lines were reached at last, but the artillery bombardment was intense and even under shelter of our own trenches the casualties were awful. At 7.00 a.m. a message CA over 20 was sent. Held advanced line until daylight when flanks broke. Were then attacked by bombers and heavy artillery which practically blew us out.

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The flanks breaking caused a general retirement at 5.45 a.m. to our original front line. With small remnant of my battalion apparently only three company Officers remaining in front line and will await further orders.

Our lines were in a dreadful condition, wounded men everywhere, most of whom had lain here all night. All stretcher bearers were casualties, and under the intense bombardment heavy casualties were occurring.

At 8.12 a.m. CA over 21 was sent "Unless we have heavy artillery retaliation immediately and silence enemy's guns practically the whole of the Brigade will be wiped out. Hundreds of stretcher bearers are required.

The condition of the wounded were so awful and assistance so urgently required that C.O. proceeded to Brigade Head Quarters where the necessary arrangements were made to collect wounded. The remainder of the Battalion were then marched out of front line and billeted in Fleurbaix.

To sum up under the hellish concentrated enemy fire the battalion did magnificent work in capturing and holding the positions for so long without reinforcements and necessary material to consolidate captured works, and it was only on the breaking of both flanks that it was finally forced to retire to its original attacking position.

21/7/16

Head, A. Toll, 2nd Bn
Co 31 Bn

REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Up to 6 a.m. 20. 7.1916

GENERAL

The intention was by a regular and intense bombardment to launch an attack on enemy position at 6 p.m.

ENEMY'S DEFENCES
Front
Trenches

The enemy's front line defences were found to be well and strongly built, well traversed, good strong dug-outs, high parapets, deep dug-outs, with underground connections to same. Iron plates with sliding loopholes for machine guns and snipers were placed at frequent intervals, emplacements for trench mortars were noted usually immediately in rear of dug-outs, and several machine guns were captured but only one to my knowledge was destroyed when it could not be brought back. No earthworks existed in rear of main trench as was believed to exist from previous assaults, and aerial photographs as far as road about N.10 a.55. There are merely open ditches full of water. Fairly long grass lines of trees, and country badly holed by shells. No communication trenches were noticed by me, but I was afterwards informed that one underground passage had been observed and blocked. Farm Delange appeared to be strongly held and we experienced enfilade machine gun fire from this position, also from M.C. in Les Clochers. The main position appears to be N.10 a.73 to N.10.b.33. High dense strong wire entanglements have been erected in front of positions which appears to be an exceedingly strong place.

Apparently the greater part of enemy's troops during bombardment withdrew by means of covered communication trenches to strong post N.10.A 73 and to flanks of bombarded positions.

When counter-attack was made by the enemy it was mainly from flanks, with a feint of a frontal attack. Bombing parties ran along and outside of parapets throwing bombs, and none with which to resist the position had to be abandoned.

SIGNALLING

The enemy apparently left men behind in concealment as our advanced and second divisions were indicated by means of coloured flares with consequent heavy bombardment.

The Gas Alert and Alarm were given at 4.50 a.m. evidently from gas created from shells, none reached us. At 9 p.m. the Gas Alarm from similar quarters causes but was really dense smoke from our burning ammunition dumps.

From 9 a.m. our artillery shelled methodically, registering shots. Fair damage to enemy's wire and parapet N.10. c.33 to N.10.c.75.

From 10.30 a.m. both light and heavy artillery fired but no damage on N.10.c.03 to N.10.c.33.

12 mid-day enemy replied with shrapnel and H.E. searching for our batteries, and paying particular attention to our 300 yard line and communication trench. The range of which the enemy had to a few yards.

12 mid-day to 2 p.m. heavy strafing on both sides. We did great execution on enemy's wire and parapet. N.10.c. 33 to N.10. c. 75 but no results on wire N.10.c.03 to N.10.c. 33 where shells appeared to be landing well in rear of enemy's trenches.

2 p.m. to 6 p.m. enemy strafed very heavily 300 yard line, and all communication trenches. Large damage being done and many casualties. Battalion ammunition dump on fire, and blew up. Several casualties.

2.

C.O. slightly injured and 7 signallers wounded by one shell. Wires to brigade and front line destroyed.

3 p.m. to 6 p.m. our 18 pounders, T.M. and Howitzers from slow to intense bombardment on enemy's wires, parapets and communication trenches (afterwards shewn to be open water ditches) also on distant heavy batteries.

The enemy artillery vigorously replied and did immense damage to our trenches and heavy casualties were caused before our attack was launched.

When LIFTS occurred observed. :--

ARTILLERY

1st Lift. 3.25 p.m. to 3.29 p.m. Great damage to wires and parapets N 10 c 32.3 to N 10 c 75. Practically no damage to wire on N 10 c. 03 to N 10 c.33. Shells going over and artillery advised to drop

2nd Lift 4.04 p.m. to 4.09 p.m. Great damage on left but little on right. Instead of dropping on right the left was dropped and our shells fell on our own parapet in sector B & C. Urgent wire to artillery to lift.

3rd Lift. 2.29 p.m. to 4.36 p.m. Shells falling on our sector A.B.& C. Further request to lift. Great damage to enemy's wire opposite the whole attacking front now observed.

4th Lift. 5.21 p.m. to 5.31 p.m. Great damage to enemy's wire and parapets. Shells still falling on our sector and many casualties occurred.

Enemy strafed very heavily with further casualties and our second ammunition dump caught on fire. From further observation the enemy's wire & parapet were found to be greatly damaged and with a little care there was no difficulty in entering the enemy's trenches.

The trenches must have been untenable and groups of dead were found lying in one position, many prisoners were found in the state of abject fear in dugouts as the result of the bombardment.

NO MAN'S
LAND

The information previously gleaned was found to be correct, and no difficulty was experienced in crossing although it had been frightfully cut up by shell craters.

BATTERIES
LOCATED

We were heavily enfiladed by heavy artillery fire from left flank but it was impossible to locate enemy's Batteries. In captured trenches trench Mortar positions also Minewerfer emplacements were observed immediately in rear of parados, and usually alongside railway track and behind dugouts.

Whilst our intense bombardment was at its worst the greater part of the enemy retired to a strong post leaving a minimum garrison who as long as they remained in their dugouts appeared to be safe. When counter-attacking, bombing parties worked swiftly along and without the parados doing great execution. A feint attack was made on our front to distract our attention.

AIRCRAFT

No enemy aircraft was used whatever being kept down by the fine work of our own planes. Owing to the uncertainty of our position to be consolidated it must have been an anxious time for them to observe for the artillery, and the shells put into our own new entrenchments were unavoidable, as our supply of flares had been destroyed before launching the attack, so we were unable to indicate to them our positions

Brigade Major,
8th Infantry Brigade.

In continuation of recommendation submitted in my report of 21st July 1916 on action of 19th 20th July, I wish to elaborate on specific actions of those whose names are mentioned at the same time wish to draw attention to the many who are killed and wounded, whose deeds may never come to light.

In order of those mentioned come :-

OFFICERS

LIEUT. G.A.STILL For gallantry in organising struggling troops and advancing over open country in rear of enemy's position, also for keeping up communications with Brigade Headquarters by means of pigeons, and later by runners, and in German main breastworks during night, assisting in consolidating positions won, and generally devotion to duty.

LIEUT. V.D. BERNARD also showed great gallantry in re-organising scattered troops when under heavy shell and M.G. fire. This Officer was wounded when up in advanced position and is reported missing.

LIEUT R.C.ALAND For coolness and gallantry in taking command of the remaining men of his Company after both his Captain and 2nd in Command were wounded. This Officer also, when retiring assisted to carry a wounded man back over a fire swept ground for nearly 200 yards, and landed him the German main position. He acted during the night with determination, and by his cool behaviour encouraged his men who were more or less badly shattered.

LIEUT. H.E.MOLENNAN Advanced with great coolness and nerve over the fire swept zone behind German main position. His gallant behavior struck me as deserving the highest praise especially as all the Senior Company Officers were casualties.

LIEUT. L.J. TROUNSON showed great gallantry in maintaining a continuous service with his Lewis Gun. He established himself on top of enemy's parapet and with only one man assisted materially in holding the position in German trench all night. He and his gun were literally blown out of his position.

LIEUT. F. DRAYTON showed coolness of a high order. On arriving on enemy parapet a German Officer attempted to throw a stick-bomb but Drayton shot him with his revolver through the head. He took the shoulder-strap off the tunic and handed to Brigade Major the following morning. Lieut. Drayton afterwards advanced with remnants of his company across the open country - His company Commander and second in Command being wounded early in the engagement.

2/LIEUT. G.H.WILSON with a few men pluckily held an exposed position under heavy shell fire and M.G. fire. His coolness undoubtedly was responsible for holding on as long as they did. As his Senior Officers were all casualties, he ~~was~~ responded to the position with gallantry.

N.C.O'S AND MEN

C.S.M.MCLEAN W. held with great gallantry the extreme left flank of Battalions front in German main position, and showed extreme devotion to duty during the night under heavy and enfilading fire, assisting in protection of our M.G. position from enemy bombers.

2.

SGT. F. LAW this N.C.O. acted with great gallantry and coolness under a withering hail of artillery on the right flank. He with about 10 men attacked an enemy's M.G. position, and put it out of action and captured it. One of the party carried it back to the main position. This N.C.O. afterwards got most of his little band back to main position and held on all night.

Corporal R.J. CAREW (Signaller) showed great gallantry in earlier stages of action. Although six of his comrades (Signallers) were killed and wounded he alone kept with his C.O. and carried the basket of pigeons to advanced position. He then assisted greatly in getting stragglers together. At this stage he was severely wounded in the thigh with shrapnel. He gallantly continued on, and during the night attempted to get signal communication with Colonel Cass, which only lasted a few moments. At dawn this N.C.O. with a revolver assisted to hold off German Bombers, and remained at his post until some of the very last. At the same time he was suffering great pain from his wound. He is now in Hospital.

No. 316 Pte. J.J. WALKER of "A" Company (not mentioned in my first despatch). This soldier assisted Lieut. Aland to carry a wounded across a fire swept zone and gave first aid when under heavy fire. He got his man right back to main position and was wounded himself in doing so. R

Pte. O'CONNOR was mentioned for his devotion to duty in passing across No Man's Land with messages three times during the night. Under the conditions I recommend he be promoted to Corporal.

Pte. EDDIE This soldier a scout and of the Intelligence Party acted with splendid gallantry during the action. He with Cpl. Carew in the advance assisted with pigeons and later kept up communications with both flanks. Although no special act can be quoted, I strongly recommend his promotion to rank of Corporal as a reward for devotion to duty.

The A.M.C. Details did such splendid work that individuals acts are hard to explain, but the two men specially mentioned show out as deserving of reward.

Pte. THOMPSON attended the wounded out in the open and advanced position. He carried wounded men in under heavy shell fire and worked untiringly all night. Giving succour to wounded of both sides under most awful conditions.

Pte. WILSON. in our own trenches for twenty four hours or more tended our wounded under terrible conditions. His devotion to duty and untiring efforts were certainly responsible for many men's lives being saved by this soldier's first aid. When he came under my notice he was alone during his best amidst a shambles.

The R.M.C. and majority of A.M.C. Details being casualties in early part of day the work of the few left was tremendous.

Lt. Col.
C.O. 31st Battalion. A.I.F.

Brigade Major.

8th Infantry Brigade.

Continuation of Confidential Recommendations.

The following A.M.C. Details and stretcher bearers are brought to the favourable notice of G.O.C. for consideration.

I strongly recommend the first named man for special distinction. His work and actions came under my personal observation. The work of all the men named was splendid. Everyone went in No Man's Land repeatedly and brought back wounded men, but the particular good work of Pte G.H. Wilson was in tending the wounded under heavy shell fire behind our own trenches. This man undoubtedly saved many lives by his first aid assistance to the wounded of all Units.

In order of merit I would mention :-

Pte. G.H. WILSON Special.

Pte. W.G. THOMPSON

Pte. P. FORDER

Pte. R. INGRAM

Pte. J.L. FITZPATRICK.

July 22nd 1916.

Lt. Col.
C.O. 31st Battalion A. I.F.

Memo of 23rd mentioning Pte. THOMPSON W.G. to be bracketted with WILSON for special work bringing wounded from advanced lines during action 19th-20th.

F.W.T.

Headquarters,
8th Infantry Brigade.

Commanding Officer.

29th Battalion.
30th "
31st "
32nd "
Machine Gun Company.
Lt. Trench Mortar Battery.

The G.O.C. desires to express his warmest appreciation of the manner in which all Officers, N.C.O's and men of the 8th Australian Infantry Brigade, carried their orders in the operations of the 19th-20th July, and his heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devotion to duty displayed by all ranks.

21.7.16.

(signed) Davies- Major.
 Brigade Major.
8th Infantry Brigade .

5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONSPECIAL DIVISIONAL ORDER

By

Major-General The Honourable J.W. McCAY C.B. V.D.
Commanding 5th Australian Division.

Headquarters,
21st July 1916

LAUDATORY 614. The G.O.C. Division has great pleasure in publishing for information of all ranks in the Division who have so gallantly maintained the ANZAC tradition the following messages. :- The first from General Sir, Douglas Haig the Commander-in-Chief, and the second from the Corps Commander embodying a message from General Sir Herbert Plumer, Commanding Second Army.

- (1) " Please convey to the troops engaged last night my appreciation of their gallant effort and of the careful and thorough preparations made for it. I wish them to realise that their enterprise has not been by any means in vain and that the gallantry with which they carried out the attack is fully recognised "
(20th July 1916)
- (2) " The Corps Commander has much pleasure in forwarding the following message received from General Sir Herbert Plumer, Commanding 2nd Army
- ' The Army Commander has received with great pleasure a report of the operations carried out by the 5th Australian Division under the 11th Corps. He wishes you to convey to the Commander and all ranks his appreciation of the gallantry displayed during their first serious engagement in France and his congratulations on the success achieved. '

The Corps Commander congratulates the Division not only on their gallantry but also on the fact that they are the first Australian Division to earn such recognition in France . (20th July 1916)

(Signed) J.P. McGlinn

Lieut. Colonel
A.A. & Q.M.G. 5th Australian Division.

5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
SPECIAL DIVISIONAL ORDER

By

Major-General the Honourable J.W. McCAY C.B. V.D.
Commanding 5th Australian Division

Headquarters,
20th July 1916

LAUDATORY 613. (a) The following letter from Lieut. General R.C.B. Haking K.C.B., Commanding 11th Corps, under whose Command the Division was for the operations of 19/20th July is published for information of all ranks.

"XI Corps"
C.R. 38

G.O.C.
5th Australian Division.

I should be glad if you will convey to all ranks of the Division under your Command my deep appreciation of the gallant and successful manner in which they carried out the attack on the enemy's lines yesterday afternoon.

Officers and men displayed a fine spirit throughout the attack and drove back the enemy with true British vigour. The Commanders and Staff Officers also worked with untiring energy and great skill in a difficult attack, and I am very proud to have had such a fine Division as yours under my Command on such an important occasion.

Although the Division was unable to hold the position gained for a long time, the attack must have made a great impression upon the enemy, and fulfilled its main purpose which was to assist our comrades who are fighting in the South and prevent the enemy from moving reserves away from our front in that direction.

I wish you all a still more complete victory in your next attempt, and I hope I shall be somewhere near when it takes place.

20.7.16.

(Sgd) R. Haking Lt. Gen.
Commanding 11th Corps.

(b) The G.O.C. Division desires to add that he and all his Command cannot fail to appreciate these eoniums bestowed on the Division, which behaved with such steadfast courage and passed through a fierce fight in the manner of which Australia will rightly be proud.

(Sgd) J.P. McGlinn.
Lieut. Colonel.
A.A. & Q.M.G. 5th Australian Division

31st Battalion

27.7.16

COY.	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		DIED OF WOUNDS		TOTAL
	OFF.	O.R.	OFF.	O.R.	OFF.	O.R.	OFF.	O.R.	
H.Q.		10	3	30		5		1	49
A		12	1	101	2	29		1	146
B		12	2	94	2	17		1	128
C		14	3	102		17		1	137
D	1	22	2	76	1	13		1	116
TOTAL	1	70 ¹	11	403	5	80		5	576

X Lt. Cox H.	Maj. Eckersley	Capt. Mills (W. & P.)
	" Clements (D. of W.)	" Robertson (K)
	Capt. Sharp	Lieut. Bernard Adj. (W. & P.)
	" Fisher	" Hudson (K)
	" Macpherson	" Spreadborough (K)
	Lieut. O'Rourke	
	" Denning (Shock)	
	" McLeod	<u>Sick</u>
	" Hibbs	Lieut. Morisset
	Capt. Russel M.O.	" Still
Lieut. Goudie		