

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/11/20 PART 1

**Title:** 11th Infantry Brigade

July 1918 Appendix 1



AWM4-23/11/20PART1



9.  
**CONFIDENTIAL.**

ORIGINAL.  
DUPLICATE.  
TRIPLICATE.

153

**Australian Imperial Force.**

**WAR DIARY**

OF

*11th A.I. Bde.*

FOR

*July*

*1918*

Signature of Officer compiling

*D. P. Fraser Lt*

Signature of Officer Commanding

*L. A. Wasey Major  
for G.O.C. 11th A.I. Bde.*



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July 1918

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Map Ref  
Sheet 62<sup>D</sup>

Army Form C. 2118.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Chateau Allonville	1		<p>11 Aust Inf Bde Monday Units getting training, training + resting - Bryson organizing for an attack on village of Hamel and locality which will take place about the 4<sup>th</sup> inst A large number of Tanks are to be employed and liaison with Tank officers of 13 Tank Bn is being maintained. They are a good crowd of fellows and have much confidence in working with Australians. Practice attacks are being arranged to perfect this form of attack + coordinate the effort. Two companies of 131 USA Infantry Regt arrived today to be distributed amongst our Bns + help in attack. - They are a good type of men Weather warm + dry General Cannan &amp; staff very busy making preparations D.C.Y.</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allonville Chateau	2		<p>11 Aus Light Bde</p> <p>Tuesday X Day Church services held by Chaplain</p> <p>At 11 Am a parade was held at short notice to permit of Mr Wm Hughes Premier of Australia who is over here on a visit to see some of our troops - General Birdwood and Mr Cook MHR were also present</p> <p>During the afternoon units less "C" echelon marched out to a staging area on river near Querrou where they bivouacked until 9 45 PM - The men rested and indulged in swimming.</p> <p>At 9 45 the march was resumed moving via Douvres along River bank towards Hamlet + Vavre and relief was completed before daylight in accordance with Brigade order No 127.</p> <p>Brigade HQ + Otr were established in Chateau in Vavre at 25d 24 - General Cannan + R M Vasey arriving per motor car about 9 PM.</p> <p>D. Fraser</p>	+ ?



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vaure Chateau J25d2.4	4		<p>11 Quet Lfby Regt</p> <p>Thursday "Z" day Zero day Battalion assembled on Jump off tape (which had been laid after dark) and were ready to move off. Barrage at Zero hour which had been fixed for 3.10 AM. No casualties had occurred up to this time and enemy shelling was very light. Units formed up in lines of sections in single file and all was complete at 2.30 AM. All indications pointed to a complete surprise. Only enemy frequent use of Very lights + occasional bursts of machine guns indicating his presence in front of our sector. - From Zero minus 8 minutes to Zero harassing artillery fire spread over his front line trunk system + back areas was supplied and the noise of this and many planes + aeroplanes which had been sent up to assist in the attack was sufficient to drown the sound of the Tanks moving up to their assembly tapes - All these details had been carefully thought out and enemy had been educated to during the past four days. to this treatment at any time during the night.</p>	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauve Chateau J25d2-4	4		<p>11 Aug 2 Bde</p> <p>Thursday continued "Zero" day. At 3.10 AM our heavy creeping barrage (with all calibres artillery firing on ground calculated at about 18 yards per gun in action) came down 200 yds in front of our attacking troops, after four minutes of this intense fire during which each gun delivered about 16 shells the barrage lifted and in one hundred yds lifted every three minutes the <del>art</del> infantry following - The Barrage was calculated to be about 800 yds deep covering the whole of the front attacked. Heavy gun fire near supplying neutralising fire on enemy batteries + dealing with enemy known strong points.</p> <p>Our troops moved forward rapidly and were well clear of enemy barrage before his S.O.S. came down. Enemy S.O.S. was then weak and the excellent counter battery work of our heavy artillery was made evident as it was apparent he could use very few of his guns under the heavy accurate shelling they were subjected to.</p> <p>P.T.O. DP4</p>	

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#  
Vauve  
Chateau  
J25d2:4

4

11 Aus Infy Regt

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and references to Appendices

Thursday Zero day continued At 340 am our infantry was well in the enemy defences and were quickly dealing with all resisting troops who were so completely taken by surprise that they had little option but surrender - exception to this was found in PEAR trench a well constructed strong point which was strongly held + defended by brave troops with a number of heavy + light MG - desperate fighting occurred in this locality and many deeds of heroism were performed by our men in dealing with the garrison retarding their advance - Our Lewis gunners showed their mettle and high training by ~~for~~ shooting the enemy gun crews firing their gun while advancing from the hip opposition soon broke at this point and advance continued - At Hamed Village the 44 Bn ~~divided and moved around North & South of the village leaving the mopping up to be done by the 43 Bn which they had~~

D.C.

P.T.O

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Waver Chateau	4		<p>11 Am. Inf. Bde</p> <p>Thursday "Zero" day cont. At 3.41 Am The 43<sup>rd</sup> Bn had reached <del>their</del> their first objective and at 3.51 Am the arranged halt in the Barrage 3.41 to 3.51 Am the 44<sup>th</sup> Bn leapt through the 43<sup>rd</sup> and continued dividing into two parties followed the Barrage one part of the Bn going to the North the other to South of the Village of Hamel &amp; mopping up <del>Hamel</del> wood to North of Hamel in progress where some resistance was met &amp; many enemy were killed. They then continued on to their final objective the front line east of Hamel on the high hill which had given the enemy such excellent observation during the past 3 months. The 43<sup>rd</sup> Bn meanwhile mopped up the Village of Hamel assisted by 3 tanks which caught up with the attackers during the halt in Barrage.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">D.L.Y.</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauve Chateau T25d2.4	4		<p>11 Am Liffy Began</p> <p>Thursday Zero day continued — The Tanks which had been advancing behind the infantry up to the Holt in Barnage now took the lead and well landed quickly dealt with any strong points found by changing target at them &amp; with shelling the defenders out with their light field pieces or dealing with them with mg fire. The 42<sup>nd</sup> Bn meanwhile advancing along their <del>own</del> frontage south of the river and assisted by tanks, maintained a continuous line with their <del>own</del> flank and cleaned up all opposition points took their objective with very few casualties and quickly consolidated their position. During the progress of the offensive aeroplanes were actively harassing the enemy along the roads as they retreated forcing into his transport and demoralising his retreat</p> <p>P.T.O. D.P.4</p>	



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# WAR DIARY

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauve Chateau T25d2.4	4		<p>11 Am 2 Bde</p> <p>Thursday this day continued. Airplane were also used to deliver <del>S.A.</del> ammunition to the front line troops &amp; to replenish dumps by dropping this material attached to parachute over the desired localities. By a system of signals they also warned infantry of massing of troops for counter attack &amp; directed artillery fire on the enemy whenever he collected.</p> <p>Some gallant feats were performed by all arms of the attacking force during the day - One particular instance is reported of an aviator with observer who when throwing his box of ammunition out attached to parachute had the misfortune of a rope fouling in the wing &amp; tearing the fabric off one side - By skilful management he contrived to regain control of his machine which had tipped up on edge and <del>handing</del> passing control to his observer he crawled out on the undamaged wing to counter-balance the weakened wing - A successful</p>	

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D. C. H. Mason

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauv Chokan J25d24	4		<p>11 Am L Bgan</p> <p>Thursday 2nd day continued. Under three different conditions the plane was brought down from over 1200 feet altitude <del>and</del> to within 100 feet of the ground when something again went wrong and the machine crashed - The pilot in the wing was killed &amp; <del>the</del> severely injured.</p> <p>The appendices give a detailed story of the fight and conclusion of our position. At 4:55 am the whole of our objectives were in our hands and during the day the position was consolidated.</p> <p>The enemy losses in killed on our Bgan sector are estimated at 12 officers &amp; 650 OR. Killed on day of attack and subsequent counter attacks and 19 officers 520 OR taken prisoner. - A great deal of war material taken. <del>The</del> French Mortars and other guns captured.</p> <p>Our losses were killed 4 officers 45 OR } Total 19 officers 341 OR Wounded 15 296 } Missing</p> <p>D. D. &amp; L., London, E.C. (A10266) Wt W5300/P713 750,000 2/18 Sch. 52 Forms/22/8/16</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauve Chateau	5		<p>11 Aus Infy Bde</p> <p>Friday Last night a strong counter attack occurred during which the enemy endeavoured to regain possession of the high hill east of Hamel Village. Enemy about 300 strong followed a disused communication trench from deep gully to the east and occupied deep dugouts on the eastern slope of the hill from which they organized an attack by bombing their way into our trenches. They captured a number (about 10 men) in their first surprise and the position was very delicate for some hours until a counter attack led by Lieut. Gage F.O, Mc and CR Cornish well supported by good Newcomen destroyed them by bombing &amp; Stokes mortar fire 1 officer &amp; 50 O.R were taken prisoner and many enemy were killed by MG fire as they retreated. The Hill was heavily shelled all day. All objectives were taken by the 4 Bde on our right in yesterday's fighting.</p> <p>D P Fraser</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Vauv Chateau	5		<p>11 Am I Brigade</p> <p>Friday continued During the day enemy heavily shelled the trenches and Hamel village and this necessitated frequent movement of the men in the trenches away from the localities shelled in an effort to avoid casualties - During the day three tanks which had been damaged in the fight were repaired sufficiently to be towed out or taken out under their own power - The enemy grant anti tank rifles with a bore diam of 450 were captured by 41 Bn. These are effective weapons against tanks as they have armour piercing bullets that will penetrate 1" steel plate and are a new idea to deal with our tanks - Aeroplanes were active during the day General Cannon has received many congratulatory messages on the success of the Brigade</p> <p>Identification of prisoners captured during yesterday opp our front from normal principally being (D) Fraser 201 + 202 I R of 43 Div and 55th Div</p>	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
<p>Vauve Chaban J25d24</p> <p>Our Brigade Major Myn Vasey and Asst BM Henderson both went sick today were evacuated to Hospital with temperature Myn Vasey has had very heavy work lately</p>	6		<p>11 Aug 21st Bygde</p> <p>Saturday Relief of the Brigade commenced last night when the 41<sup>st</sup> + 42 Bns were relieved by the? Bns. The G.O.C. desire to relieve the 44 Bn which had to bear the brunt of the heavy shelling since the attack could not be arranged owing to the amount of movement necessary to provide for such a relief. — The men with the 44 were very tired and nerve-racked after the severe strain of the attack on the 4<sup>th</sup> followed by the strain of repulsing + wiping up the counter-attack and afterwards withstanding the heavy shelling of three days in the trenches. — The relief of the 44 Bn + 43 Bns are arranged for tonight</p> <p>WCH</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allonville y Chateau			<p>11 A.D. Bysae</p> <p>Sunday Relief of Bysae was completed about midnight 6 inst when 44 Bn was relieved by the 50 Bn of 4 Div Bysae Hostile shelling was very active during the relief and hampered the change over a number of casualties to our Bn being sustained - Scattered shelling of Gas + H.E. over the whole area Following the relief TBs marched round outskirts of Cortee and La Neuville to I 25 where hot meals were provided for the men &amp; where they rested until 7 am afterwards proceeding to locality of Daours &amp; being embussed in motor transport proceeded to bivouac grounds in Allonville area - The 41 Bn marching on to their billets at <del>La Neuville</del> Trechencourt General Cannon &amp; <sup>Capt Swenson</sup> arrived about 3 am at Bysae H.Q. which had been re-established at old H.Q. in Chateau</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allonville. P. Chaban			<p>11 A.S. Bde</p> <p>Monday Brigade resting. 42<sup>nd</sup> - 44<sup>th</sup> Bns in Wood under shelter at Allonville 43<sup>rd</sup> Bn at Cardonville 41<sup>st</sup> at Freckencourt all are enjoying the spell after the strenuous &amp; anxious time they have lately had - Good hot food &amp; plenty of amusement is provided for them. A concert party composed of members of the units has been formed by the Brigade (Staff Capt Heilary) and they <del>are</del> have a good deal of talent included in their numbers - A practice alarm of the whole of 4<sup>th</sup> Army came off tonight and men and officers were hurried into fighting order Blankets &amp; packs placed in dumps &amp; loaded on transport and men had to stand to<sup>o</sup> for several hours until stand down was ordered about midnight. <del>Heavy</del> Weather unsettled raining all the evening</p>	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allonville Chateau	9		<p>11 Ave Infantry Bde</p> <p>Tuesday Unit still resting, swimming &amp; physical exercises - At 3 PM. General Sir John Monack CB KCMG our Corps Commander visited the Brigade with General Jellicoe and at a Brigade Parade held outside Allonville he presented buttons of medals won at Passchendaele - he said on March &amp; April - He in a few well chosen words he expressed his pleasure in attending as their Corps Commander for the first time - He congratulated the 11 Brigade for the magnificent work accomplished in stemming the tide of advancing enemy on March 27, 28, 29 between the Ancre &amp; Somme Rivers - that being as he expressed it the very spear point of the enemy attack and the most important point in the line He thanked the men for their magnificent fighting, their high appreciation of their responsibilities &amp; loyal support etc He was not hopeful of any Corps relief too much had to be done &amp; for few troops to do it He also praised their recent success at Hamel</p>	

French Prime Minister's visit to 4th Aust. Div. HQ was attended by GOC this Brigade. M. CLEMENTE speech attached appendix 1.

weather dull & showery  
D.P.H.



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allonville Chateau	10		<p>11 A.D. Bde</p> <p>Weather unsettled. Units physical training sports in afternoon - Plenty of picture shows. Concert parties to amuse them.</p> <p>Expeditionary Force Carletons provided a free picture show to our fellows which was much appreciated. 10 A.D. Bde also showed with a concert party.</p>	
	11		<p>Thursday. Bns going through Cloud &amp; Shell gas tests for practice &amp; to test their masks.</p> <p>A lecture by Mr. Burks on Bys gas. Officer followed on "Every method of gas attacks". Heavy thunder storm during the evening.</p>	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Allmouth Rahau	12 <sup>th</sup>		<p>11 Aug 2 Bde</p> <p>Friday 3<sup>rd</sup> Aus Div have again to take over a section of Corps front and relieving the 4 Division.</p> <p>The 9<sup>th</sup> Bde to hold one Bn frontage N of River Somme + one Bn front south of River. The 18<sup>th</sup> Bde and one Coy of Pioneers to hold the southern Div frontage.</p> <p>11 Bde to move into trenches Systems forward near Poivre on South bank of River in Coy + 136 &amp; 012 + 18 holding themselves as to be Div reserve.</p> <p>Batt<sup>n</sup> moved out in the afternoon and got comfortably established in their new homes before dark.</p> <p>Bde H<sup>q</sup> Div were established at Camp Chateau in Corbie - a magnificent home alongside the canal with every convenience once the home + residence of a millionaire French Banker named <del>Mr</del> M. Bouillet.</p> <p>The house + belongings are knocked about with shells from enemy bombardment but it is easily the most beautiful home we have seen in France. He is evidently a man of immense wealth + one of the renowned water collectors of Butterflies.</p>	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie Chateau O5C68	13		<p>11 Aug 1918 Bde</p> <p>Saturday Units settling down in their new positions 41 Bn Hq Bn 012 central with the Bn occupying dugouts (shallow) along the terrace to the West 43 Hq Bn approx 014 Cent in a very small dugout in the bank surrounded by Companies of Bn. 44 Bn 07c + 13a with Hq Bn between Companies and 42 occupying La Neuville trench with Hq Bn in a saw mill N bank of river General Cannon paid all units a visit accompanied by his BDO all were getting comfortably established</p>	
	14		<p>Sunday Nothing of interest Bns resting - many men going sick with an influenza necessitating removal to Hospital - Two of our Balloons brought down in flames by enemy aviators - The Balloons otherwise got down safely by parachute (on 13 inst)</p>	

W.D.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Cortie Olahan 05668	15		<p>11 A.M. Bday</p> <p>Monday. Suitable arrangements for bathing men provided and units bathing their men &amp; supplying clean clothing.</p> <p>Yahye parties working on protective walls for horse &amp; transport lines against bombing.</p> <p>Another of our Batteries brought down in flames today - occupants got safely down in parachutes.</p> <p>Weather very hot &amp; uncomfortable.</p> <p>Our Brigade H.Q. has proved to be the most comfortable we have yet had in France - electric light is supplied by a water wheel plant near by.</p> <p>The garden has a magnificent collection of roses now in bloom and our table is always decorated with roses of a quality rarely seen even in England - Although enemy lands large shells in the near vicinity when searching for one of the numerous batteries surrounding us we are all satisfied to remain here for the duration - of the war.</p> <p>D. L. H.</p>	



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## WAR DIARY

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Map of 62<sup>D</sup>

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Cortie 05068	16		<p>11 One Left by Bear</p> <p>Tuesday Weather extremely hot heavy occasional showers during last night. Enemy shelling the town. <del>Amplified</del> Another. Balloon fired by an enemy plane yesterday afternoon. Col Woodcock <sup>4:30</sup> visited Bear Hq Otrs during afternoon - He is soon to get English leave probably on 21 or 22 inst. Major Barry our B.M. returned from Hospital tonight after 10 days absence. He has quite recovered.</p> <p>Our artillery quite active and as the village of Cortie is attracting a lot of heavy guns since the advance of our line on the 4 inst. there is much artillery noise throughout the night &amp; day. Working parties being supplied to 9 &amp; 10 Brigades &amp; to Engineers &amp; Tunneling Coys.</p>	

D.P. Fraser



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie 05068	14		<p>11 Ans. D. 14 B. 20</p> <p>Wednesday Weather continues extremely hot - Last night enemy heavily shelled British positions in squares O 15. 16 21. 22 27. 28 with gas about 2000 # shells 77 - 4. 2 15. 9 being reported - we had no casualties as all necessary precautions were taken. Aerial training and working parties supplied.</p>	

DPZ



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie 0506.8	18		11 Ave Infantry Brigade Thursday Intermittent firing by our heavy & light artillery throughout the period - Enemy shelling below normal	
	19		Friday Our aircraft very active the weather good & visibility excellent - About noon an enemy Balloon shot down in flames by one of our aviators and other balloons forced down - Enemy shelling of this area very constant during the period - A court-martial was assembled at this Chateau today. Major Debeney of 42 <sup>nd</sup> Bn proceeding - Lieut Lloyd our 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bde Machine Gun Officer captured by our 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bde HQ school situated at #2802.8 today on all defences by 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bde.	

D. P. Traver



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July 1918

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Map Ref Sheet  
62<sup>D</sup>

Army Form C. 2118.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie 05068	20		<p>11 Ans Lfth Bde</p> <p>Saturday Our Div Commander Gen Pellebrand visited this Bde Hdqrs today &amp; discussed the probable relief of 9<sup>th</sup> Bde who occupy sector astride the Somme by this Bde about end of this month - A conference of Regiments of this Bde took place here today at which Lt Col Jackson GSO1 was present - Major Vasey has left to take up duties temporarily at 3<sup>rd</sup> Div Hdqrs - Capt Ford will take on duties of Bde Major and Capt Hillary continue as Staff Capt - Capt Swanson promoted to rank of temporary Major is Asst Bde Major and Capt Moran Asst S.C. - <del>The</del> Heavy &amp; sporadic shelling of Corbie during the period - A hostile Balloon destroyed by our artiller at 9.30 am this morning</p> <p>D L Fraser</p>	

(A10266) Wt W5390/P713 750,000 2/18 Sch. 52 Forms/C2118/16.

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July 1918

WAR DIARY

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Army Form C. 2118.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie 05068	21		<p>11 Aus Light Brigade</p> <p>Sunday Bright day but very windy - General Cannan &amp; Capt Ford with B.D. visited all Bns during the day and had lunch with Col Woolecks of 42nd - Units instructed to reconnoitre North Bryde sector astride Somme River - Good news of the Marne fighting arriving. French &amp; Americans have strongly counterattacked relieving the position very much. Hostile shelling of our areas below normal and usual activity of our aircraft</p> <p>ended</p>	

DP4



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05068	22		<p>11 Austly Bde Monday - 44 Bn had a very successful aquatics sports day on the Somme River - Weather very fine Enemy aeroplane brought down one of our Ballons in flames at 2.30 PM in retaliation for one of theirs fired by our aeroplanes 45 minutes earlier Our Balloon crew <sup>(2)</sup> descended safely in parachutes Lt Col Heron of 41 Bn visited our funeral today Having returned from Senior Officers Tactical School at Montreux for 4 days - Quiet day</p>	
	23		<p>Tuesday Excellent news from the Marne French &amp; American troops having continuous successes - An attack by French in neighbourhood of Moreuil about 10 Kilos S of Bretonne was successful on 8.00 AM lost to dept of 3000 &amp; capturing 1500 prisoners - The artillery plainly heard here - Usual hotter shelling &amp; air activity</p>	

(A16266) W.W. 5300/1713 750,000 2/18 Sch. 52 Forms C. 2118/10.

D.P.Y

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05068	24 <sup>th</sup>		<p>11 Am. Inf. Bn. Bryan</p> <p>Wednesday Capt. Hawken returned from Hospital trench working parties being supplied for cable burial making Communication Trenches &amp; dug out A great deal of war material is being salvaged by all our units - Baths (hot) with a clean change of underclothing available weekly at. Port &amp; Dore - Enemy artillery quiet - a few aeroplane observed - Weather cloudy no rain</p>	

D. P. Tracer

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July 1918

WAR DIARY  
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.  
(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05068	25		<p>11 Queerly Bga</p> <p>Thursday Units training and engaged on salvage work &amp; improvement to defences. The weather affords excellent opportunities for sport cricket swimming in the Somme river etc and this is being taken every advantage of by the men who are again very fit. Enemy heavily shelled at a Battery position situated 300 yds in rear of our Bga. He also and a lot of his shells came over "putting the wind up" most of our fellows as the fragments of bursting 5.9 HE fell about our quarters.</p> <p>JP Train</p>	



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Army Form C. 2118.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05c68	26		<p>11 Am. 1st Bde</p> <p>Ynaday - Capt Sand (DM) &amp; Intelligence Officer visited of Bde H<sup>o</sup> Otr this morning getting particulars of the "Handover" &amp; front we expect to occupy after the 1<sup>st</sup> of Aug. General Cannan &amp; Capt Sand attended a M.G. demonstration which was witnessed by about 50 officers of the Bde. The affair took place on South Bank of Somme in O2 &amp; was conducted by Capt Whitehead of 3 MG Bn. who gave a very lucid description of the means by which night shooting was conducted. This was afterwards demonstrated on a target firing through a screen -</p> <p>Rain fell at intervals during the day and a heavy downpour lasting nearly two hours during the evening</p> <p>D. P. Fraser</p>	



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July 1918

# WAR DIARY

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

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Army Form C. 2118.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
0506.8.29			<p>11 A 2 Bde</p> <p>Saturday General Cannan has been requested by 3 Div to take over G.O.C. temporarily of 9 A 2 Bde as General Goddard has gone away ill. - He accordingly took over this afternoon after having a conference of his Commanding Officers of 11 Bde. Lt Col Alex Heron of 41 Bn has well administer the command of this Bde during his absence.</p> <p>The usual night shelling of Battery positions near the H<sup>o</sup> Otr took place - Regular morning swimming in the Somme is joined in by all officers of the Bde.</p> <p>The weather is warm &amp; comfortable.</p> <p>Enemy remains quiet on the front generally but last night on the night of 25/26 he attempted three raids on our Corps front in all of which he failed &amp; left prisoners with us.</p> <p>D. Fraser</p>	



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# WAR DIARY

or

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Army Form C. 2118.

July 1918

Map Ref

Sheet 62 D

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
			11 Aus Infy Bde	
05068	28		<p>Sunday Church services held by Bns - The American Major CO of Batt<sup>n</sup> who of the 88 troops who are to attached to this Bde when in the line arrived with his adjutant - a number of his officers are at present allotted to our Bns for experience.</p> <p>"Later" Information came through from our Div H<sup>q</sup> that other arrangements were being made for the relief of 9 Bde Sector N of Somme River and all our present relief arrangements were cancelled.</p> <p>It is rumoured that 5 Aus Div who hold the Northern Div Sector are to be relieved by the 18 British Div who will include all frontage between the Rivers Somme &amp; Ancre.</p> <p>A minor enterprise will take place on this 5 Div frontage tonight at 12.30 AM &amp; whereby we hope to take the enemy's front &amp; support line.</p>	
			D. Fraser	



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# WAR DIARY

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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July 1918

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Sheet 620

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05068	29		<p>11 Aug 29th Bde</p> <p>Monday Normally quiet day. but aircraft activity but enemy planes less than usual - Artillery (hostile) not so active. - Best instructions regarding relief cancelled. New instructions provided for our taking over about 2000 yards south of River Somme one B<sup>n</sup> frontage and one Pioneer Coy frontage from 9 Aug Bde and one Coy from 10 Aug Bde - Our frontage therefore covers from Somme Canal on the North to Benamtra Lane at P 166-7.5 - The 18 British Div 54 Bde have taken over frontage defended by 5 Aug Div plus one B<sup>n</sup> frontage of 9 Aug Bde which takes in all trenches North of River Somme - This relief takes place on night of 30/31 inst - Our relief takes place on night of 31/1 Aug. Bde Intelligence Officer and 3 Officers &amp; 14 OR of this Bde units together with other 3 Div officers from 9 &amp; 10 Bde attended a Tank demonstration at Vaux-et-Armenois - The show was very successful and demonstrated the complete control &amp; rapidity of turning movement of the new pattern tank - A captured German Tank captured by 26 B<sup>n</sup> (Aug) at Monument Wood on 24 inst. was on view and made for comparison with ours.</p> <p>D P Tracer</p>	



# WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
05c68	30		<p>11 Que I Bga</p> <p>Tuesday Capt Gard with Lieut Fraser B.D.O. Capt Bga H.O. Dtr at 4 PM to inspect forward areas Bns H.O. Dtr and front line trenches &amp; Coy dugouts preparatory to taking over <del>the</del> defence of portion of the Div line - Visited 40 Bn H.O. Dtr and got particulars of Communication Trenches etc and met a number of Gards old friends who were glad to see him as he belonged to 40 Bn and was once its adjutant.</p> <p>We left about 9 AM &amp; proceeded up Boort Lane C.T. to front line trench - At this point our front line is exposed to Accroche wood which is occupied by enemy - The knowledge that enemy snipers operated on this exposed section of trench made us hurry over danger points but after passing 150 yds to south from point of C.T. junction with F line a rifle shot rang out &amp; Capt Gard fell shot through the stomach - the bullet afterwards</p>	

(A7092). Wt. W12839/M1293/757600. 1/17. D. D. & L., Ltd. Forms/C.2118/14.

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# WAR DIARY

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July 1918

11 Aus Light Bde

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and references to Appendices

Corbie  
05068

30

(Tuesday continued) Passed through the sleeve of Lt Francis coat between arm & body without wounding him. A first aid dressing was at once applied after dragging the wounded officer into some shelter and arrangements made with the Coy. C.O. whose dugout was about 150 yds further south to supply stretchers, bandages & ring up for a doctor to meet the party. This was done the 40 Bn Doctor meeting the party and making a preliminary examination. The Capt Sand was afterwards carried to dressing station & sent on per Motor Ambulance to Casualty Clearing Station. The doctors were not hopeful of his recovery.

General Cannan ~~was~~ who is temporarily S.O.C. of Bde was advised & he made necessary arrangements for Major Vasey to return from 3rd Bn to fill the late Col's old duties of B.M. - Enemy shelling fairly active. Major Vasey arrived about 8 PM.

(A 7833) W.L. 7803/M1672 350,000 1/17 Sch. 52a Forms C/2118/14

D.P.F.

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# WAR DIARY

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Map Ref  
Sheet 62<sup>D</sup>

July 1918

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie	31		<p>11 Aug 1st Bn</p> <p>Wednesday - Enemy normally quiet with Artillery and aircraft weather warm &amp; unsettled looks like rain</p> <p>This Brigade relieved the right Bn of 9<sup>th</sup> Bde and one Coy of 40 Bn. 10 Bde tonight and relief complete was reported at 1.30 PM - Dispositions 42 Bn on the left one Coy of 3rd Div Pioneer Centre and 44 Bn on right adjoining 40 Bn - Our sector extends from River Somme on the north to Benambra Lane (P16 6 66) on the south a frontage of 2250 yds approx - for particulars see Relief order No ?</p> <p>General Cannan returned to this Bde this afternoon having landed over by 9<sup>th</sup> Bde's northern defensive line N of Somme to 54 British Bde - Major Payne of 9<sup>th</sup> Bde B.M. and Lt Halford B20 returned here with our General &amp; slept at their H<sup>q</sup> Dtr - The sad news of death of our late acting B Major Capt Sand came through this afternoon. He died about noon. and is to be buried tomorrow at Crouy on the Somme River</p> <p>D.L.H.</p>	



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# WAR DIARY

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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Map Ref  
Sheet 62 D

July 1918

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
			11 Aus Infy Bde	
	31		Wednesday The death of Capt-JH Ford cast quite a gloom over the usually happy group of officers & men who compose this 11 Bde Staff - He was an officer of very exceptional ability particularly as a Staff Captain which duties he occupied since he joined this Bde last December - His happy genial nature endeared him to all but he could be very stern with those who neglected their duties. He was a very hard working officer and will be a great loss to the Australian Forces - He only recently returned to 11 Bde after 4 weeks absence two weeks on duty with Aust. Corps and two weeks on leave in England. On return here he took on temporarily the duties of Brigade Major during the absence of Major Vasey who had been called to go down on duty.	
			D L Tracer	



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## WAR DIARY

OF

11th A I Bde

FOR

July 1918

## LIST OF APPENDICES.

No.

Subject.

1. HAMEL OFFENSIVE
2. BRIGADE ORDERS
3. DEFENCE
4. INTELLIGENCE
5. 'Q' REPORT.
6. MAPS etc.
7. BDE BOMBING OFFICER'S REPORT  
& GAS OFFICER'S REPORT.



11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brigade Headquarters.

1st. July, 1918.

HAMEL OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTION No. 1.

NOTE:- Zero day is assumed to be "Z" day, the day before Zero "Y" day and two days before Zero, "X" day. "A" day is the day following Zero day.

1. INTENTION.- On "Z" day at an hour to be notified later the 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade acting under the orders of the G.O.C. 4th. Australian Division will attack and capture the Village of HAMEL and consolidate a line to be known as the BLUE Line.
2. FLANK TROOPS.- The 4th. Australian Infantry Brigade will attack on our right, the 15th. Battalion being next to our most Southern Battalion. The 18th. Aust. Infantry Brigade is in defence of area North of River SONNE but is not attacking.
3. ALLOCATION OF INFANTRY.-
  - (a) The 43rd. Battalion will within the boundaries shown on the attached Map "A" capture and mop up HAMEL. After clearing the Town all troops will be withdrawn from it.
  - (b) The 44th. Battalion will avoiding the Town of HAMEL "leap-frog" through 43rd. Battalion and capture and consolidate the BLUE Line in the South Battalion area.
  - (c) The 42nd. Battalion will capture and consolidate the BLUE Line within the Northern Battalion area.
  - (d) The 41st. Battalion will be Brigade Reserve and located in J.31., J.32., P.1.a. and c., P.2.a. and c.

4. ARTILLERY ACTION.-

The advance to the BLUE Line will be covered by a creeping barrage of field and heavy artillery.

The "Start line" of the most Westerly 18.pdr. barrage is shown on Map "A".

From Zero minus 8 minutes until Zero normal artillery harassing fire, using a large proportion of Smoke shell will be maintained. This harassing fire must not be mistaken for the commencement of the creeping barrage which will be easily recognisable by the intensity of fire.

The creeping barrage will open on the "Start line" at Zero, the first round of each gun being a Smoke shell.

This barrage will remain on the "Start line" until Zero plus 4 minutes after which it will lift 100 yards every 3 minutes for ten lifts, i.e., the tenth lift will be made at Zero plus 31 minutes.

For next ten minutes the barrage (i.e., from Zero plus 31 minutes to Zero plus 41 minutes) will remain stationary. In order to indicate that a halt is taking place the first two rounds per gun fired on this halt line will be Smoke, and in order to indicate that the barrage is about to advance again, another Smoke screen will be built up during the last two minutes of the halt.

At Zero plus 41 minutes the barrage will lift 100 yards and thereafter will continue to advance at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes finally coming to rest and forming a protective barrage 400 yards East of the BLUE Line. This protective barrage will last until Zero plus 123 minutes.

P.T.O.



## 4. (Continued).

Rate of fire of 13-pdrs.— Zero to Zero plus 31 minutes 3 rds. p.g.p.m.

Zero plus 31 to Zero plus 39.— 1 round p.g.p.m. except for the 500 yards front of the barrage where it passes through HAMEL where the rate of fire will remain at 3 rounds p.g.p.m.

Zero plus 39 minutes until commencement of protective barrage 3 rds. p.g.p.m.

During the protective barrage it will drop down to 1 round p.g.

Cease fire Zero plus 123 minutes.

An Artillery Barrage Map has been issued (to Brigade Units only).

It will be noted that artillery barrage does not allow of all Units reaching the BLUE Line simultaneously. Heavy Artillery will carry on a counter battery programme from Zero hour to Zero plus 2 hours on Australian Corps front, and also on front of Flank Corps.

In the event of the enemy opening an intense bombardment of our front prior to Zero hour counter battery will commence forthwith.

## 5. TANKS.—

1 Section (3 tanks) of "G" Coy. 15th. Tank Battalion are allotted to 42nd. Battalion for capture of BLUE Line.

2 Sections (6 tanks) of "C" Coy. 8th. Tank Battalion are allotted to 43rd. Battalion for capture of HAMEL.

2 Sections (6 tanks) of "C" Coy. 8th. Tank Battalion are allotted to 44th. Battalion for capture of BLUE LINE; one Section moving North and one South of the Village of HAMEL.

2 Sections (6 tanks) of "A" Coy. 8th. Tank Battalion acting as liaison with 4th. Brigade and 11th. Brigade for the capture of the BLUE Line. These will move in two lines (1 Section to each line).

There are 2 Sections (6 tanks) of "B" Coy. 15th. Tank Battalion acting in immediate reserve of "C" Coy. 8th. Tank Battalion.

2 Carrying Tanks are also allotted to this Brigade.

Above Tanks will be duly marked by Battalions concerned with their Regimental A.I.F. colours - Reserve Tanks by Brigade colours.

On "Y/2" night the Tanks will assemble about 1000 yards West of the Infantry taped line of assembly and will commence to move forward to the attack at Zero minus 8 minutes.

## 6. AEROPLANES.

Two Contact 'planes will fly from Zero to Zero plus two hours and one from Zero plus 2 hours until dark. They will call for flares by means of firing White lights and sounding a series of A's on the Klaxon Horn. Flares will not be called for until about Zero plus 90 minutes and will only be lit by the most forward troops. These contact 'planes will be marked by having two small black flaps attached to the triangular 'plane near the tail of the machine.

A counter-attack plane will fly from Zero to dark. This 'plane will be marked by having a streamer attached to the right strut and on seeing an enemy concentration for a counter-attack will fire a S.O.S. Signal consisting of a parachute White flare giving off large quantities of Smoke in the direction from which enemy is assembling or counter attacking.

Special Aeroplanes have been detailed to drop S.A.A. for Infantry and Vickers Guns. Dumps for Infantry will be formed at P.4.d.3.2 and P.10.d.00.82. These positions will be marked by a "N" made of strips of white cloth 6 feet by 1 ft. These "N's" will be placed the former by 42nd. and the latter by 44th. Battalion. Vickers Guns requiring S.A.A. will place out a "V" made of White strips 6ft. by 1 ft. These 'planes are marked by the lower 'planes being painted black from the wing tips for 3½ ft. towards the body. Every endeavour will be made to save the parachutes in dropping this S.A.A.



7. MACHINE GUNS.

(a) 11th. M.G. Coy.

(i) Three guns will follow the 44th. Battalion to consolidate in the BLUE Line.

The roles of these guns will be one gun in P.10.d. to fire into the valley at P.17.a.

Two guns for the protection of the spur running through P.11.a.

(ii) One gun to follow the 42nd. Battalion for the protection of the valley of the SOMME.

(iii) Eight guns to consolidate about 1000 yards West of the BLUE Line with the following roles:-

Two guns for the protection of the Western slope of the Spur in P.10.b.

Two guns for the protection of the spur in P.9.b.

One gun for the protection of the Southern exits <sup>from</sup> HAMEL.

One gun for the protection of the Northern exits from HAMEL.

Two guns for the protection of the Western slopes of the spur in P.4.b. and d.

As a secondary role these eight guns will be prepared to put down a S.O.S. barrage not less than 500 yards East of the BLUE Line in the valley in P.11.c. and P.17.a.

This will extend Southwards the S.O.S. in para. (ii) (b) below.

(iv) Four guns plus four extra guns of the 3rd. M.G. Battalion in J.33. to give covering and neutralising fire on selected targets during the Infantry advance.

(b) OTHER MACHINE GUNS.

(i) Four guns of the 24th. M.G. Coy. will give covering fire on selected spots in HAMEL during the early stages of the advance.

(ii) Fourteen guns emplaced in J.28. and J.34. will give covering and neutralising fire on selected spots during the advance; after the BLUE Line has been gained these guns will be prepared to put down a S.O.S. barrage not less than 500 yards East of the BLUE Line in P.5.c. and P.11.

(c) No machine gun fire will be opened until Zero plus 3 minutes.

(d) C.O. 44th. Battalion must ensure that his advancing infantry have normal safety clearance of Machine Guns firing from P.1.

8. ASSEMBLY.

The forward taped line of assembly will be along the line: -

P.8. Central.

P.9.a. 0.4.

P.3.b. 2.5.

This line on "Y/Z" night will be marked with pegs painted White on our side. These pegs will be joined up by tape and tapes will be led back through the gaps in the wire from certain of these pegs to the front line to guide the troops on to the assembly line. Wire will be cut for the gaps on "X/Y" night though it will not be removed until "Y/Z" night.

The 43rd. Battalion will assemble on this line with their rearmost troops closed up so that the Battalion has not a greater depth than 100 yards, thus allowing the 44th. Battalion to assemble well forward and clear our front line before the enemy's barrage comes down.

The 42nd. and 44th. Battalions will assemble as far forward as possible except that if so desired their reserve Coys. need not leave our present front line before Zero plus 30 minutes by which time they must be West of it.

During the first 4 minutes of the barrage the leading troop will get as close up to it as possible, the troops in rear closing.

Two Platoons of 42nd. Battalion will assemble in J.34.c. in order to ensure that no gap occurs on our left flank.



## 8. (Continued).

One Platoon of each of the 43rd. and 44th. Battalions will assemble in the 15th. Battalion area in order that touch may continually be maintained with the latter. For the same reason one Platoon of 15th. Battalion will assemble in the 43rd. Battalion area.

Similarly one Section of the 43rd. and 44th. Battalions will assemble in the 42nd. Battalion area and one section of the latter in the 43rd. Battalion area.

Each Battalion will detail two Officers who are not taking part in the action to supervise the assembly of the Battalion; this supervision being in addition to that of Coy. and Platoon Commanders.

The assembly of all Units is to be complete by Zero minus 15 minutes and immediately reported to Brigade Headquarters.

## 9. MOPPING UP.

Areas for mopping up are to be allotted to Companies, Platoons and Sections.

Battalion mopping up areas are shown in Map "A".

## 11. HEADQUARTERS.

The location of Headquarters will be :-

Brigade Headquarters	J. 25.d. 27.40.	("X/Y" night, "Y" day and "Y/Z" night)
41st. Battalion	- J. 13.d.	("X/Y" night and "Y" day)
42nd. Battalion	- J. 25.d. 27.40.	("Y/Z" night)
43rd. Battalion	- J. 23.a. 6.7.	("X/Y" night, "Y" day and "Y/Z" night)
43rd. and 44th. Battalions.	- P. 1.a. 4.4.	( ) do ( )
Rear Brigade H.Q.	- BUSBY - Billets Nos. 35 and 36.	

## ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sgd). G.A. VASEY, Major.  
 Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

## Distribution.

Copy No.	1. G.O.C.
	2. B.M.
	3. S. C.
	4. 41st. Battalion
	5. 42nd. Battalion
	6. 43rd. Battalion
	7. 44th. Battalion
	8. 11th. T.M. Battery
	9. 11th. M.G. Coy.
	10. 4th. M.G. Battalion
	11. 4th. A.I. Brigade
	12. 12th. A.I. Brigade
	13. 13th. A.I. Brigade
	14. C. R.A., 4th. Aust. Divn.
	15. C. R. E., do do
16/19.	4th. Aust. Division
20/21.	3rd. Aust. Division
	22. 13th. Aust. Field Amb.
	23. 13th. Field Coy. Eng.
	24. 8th. Tank Battalion
	25. "C" Coy., 8th. Tank Bn.
	26. 11th. Brigade Sig. Section
	27. 4th. Div. Sig. Coy.
	28. 4th. Div. Pioneers
29/31.	War Diary
	32. File.



Administrative Instruction No.1.  
Issued with HAMEL Offensive Instruction No.1.

SUPPLIES. 1. Supply will be by normal method. A special reserve of Iron Rations and Water has been placed in dumps as per Schedule "A" attached.

TRANSPORT. 2. (a). Battalions will use their pack transport augmented by American transport for carrying material forward from Brigade dumps.  
 (b). Transport personnel will reconnoitre routes to be used on "Z" day and "Z/A" night and following night. Carrying parties will be detailed to carry material forward from locations where Pack transport will unload to Forward, Support and Reserve Coys.  
 (c). Transport lines will be established at the following places and immediately made proof against hostile bombing:-

41st. Battalion	H.28.b.5.0.
42nd. Battalion	H.28.d.7.7.
43rd. Battalion	H.35.a.5.0.
44th. Battalion	H.35.d.2.0.

AMMUNITION. 3. Dumps are established as per Schedule "A".  
 Battalion dumps will be drawn on first. Units arranging to keep their dumps filled by drawing from the Brigade dumps. Ammunition on Zero day will also be dropped per means of parachutes from aeroplanes, at dumps as per Schedule "A".

HOT FOOD CONTAINERS. 4. Each Battalion has been issued with Hot Food Containers.

WATER BOTTLES. 5. Additional water bottles to the number of 700 per Battalion will be issued to Units at their Transport Lines at 6 p.m. on "Y/Z" day.

HYDROCHLORIDE OF LIME. SUPPLY TANKS. 6. In dumps as per Schedule "A".  
 7. Two Supply Tanks are available for the Brigade. They will establish forward dumps at approximately P.4. Central and P.10.d.00.82. fifteen minutes after the capture of the final objective. Material in dumps as per Schedule "A". Tanks will be marked on sides "11th. Brigade Supply Tanks".

TANKS. 8. Units will arrange to have Battalion signs attached to their fighting tanks. Reserve tanks for this Brigade will have the 11th. Brigade oval coloured blue attached - size 15" x 6".

PRISONERS OF WAR. 9. (1). 10 M.M.P. will report to Forward Brigade H.Q. of the 4th., 6th., and 11th. Brigades at 10 p.m. on the Evening of the "Y/Z" night.

They will take over all Prisoners of War after interrogation from the Brigades concerned and escort them to a forward P.O.W. Collecting Station at CORBIE. Map Location Sheet 62D., O.5.c.8.8.

(2). Units will do their utmost to send all Prisoners to the Brigade Headquarters as expeditiously as possible and will not use the Prisoners for stretcher bearing unless the position absolutely warrants it.

(3). The P.O.W. will be taken from the forward collection Station at CORBIE under M.M.P. escort to the rear Division P.O.W. at N.11.c.8.8. and from there will be taken to the Corps P.O.W. Cage at POULAINVILLE.

(4). 11th. Bde. H.Q. is at J.25.d.27.40.

4th. Bde. H.Q. is at P.7.a.0.3.

Attention is directed to S.S. 135, Sec.27, and page 87, Appendix "A".



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STRAGGLER POSTS.

10. Divisional Straggler Posts will be maintained at the following points:-

No. 1. I.33.b.2.2. No. 2. O.2.b.5.3.  
No. 3. O.9.a.8.3. No. 4. O.1.c.2.5.  
No. 5. N.6.a.5.5.

Brigade Straggler Posts will be established by 41st. Battalion at J.32.a.80.60., J.31. Central, P.1. Central.

Battalions will arrange Straggler Posts of their own in addition to the Divisional and Brigade Posts.

STRAGGLER COLLECTING STATION. The Divisional Straggler Collecting Station will be at N.6.c.9.5.

All Stragglers collected and who are found to be Medically Fit will be fed and sent back to their respective Brigade at the earliest possible moment.

SALVAGE.

11. Each Battalion will have one Platoon of its reserve Coy. specially earmarked to deal with Salvage from Zero plus 3 hours onwards.

Units will select prior to Zero day the location where they will form their Salvage dump and notify their transport personnel. Salvage will then be collected by all returning limbers and pack animals and conveyed to the 4th. Divisional Salvage Dump at BUSSY.

Salvage Area as per Map attached.

BURIALS.

12. (a). One Platoon of each reserve Coy. will be detailed for Burial purposes.

(b). They must not operate on this work, however, until the attack is finished when they are not likely to be required for tactical purposes.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

13. (1). M.D.S. for WALKING CASES will be at N.4.c.9.2.

A.D.S. for STRETCHER CASES will be at N.4.c.9.2.

H.D.S. for STRETCHER CASES will be at G.29.c.5.3.

LES ALENCONS.

GAS CENTRE will be at G.29.c.5.3.

All Gassed Cases will be sent to this location.

(2). O.C. 15th. Aust. Field Ambulance will be responsible for evacuation from 4th. Aust. Divisional Sector as follows:-

WALKING CASES direct to C.C.S.

STRETCHER CASES to M.D.S. LES ALENCONS.

(3). R.M.Os. forward battalions will move with battalion and will select new R.A.P. in consultation with O.C. Battalion at suitable site notifying site as soon as possible to O.C. 13th. Aust. Field Ambulance and to A.D.M.S. Communication will be maintained by means of Field Ambulance Stretcher-bearers. Bearer Relay and Motor Loading Posts will be moved forward by C.O. 13th. Aust. Field Ambulance as situation warrants.

(4). Adequate stocks of Surgical and Medical requirements, stretchers and blankets have been placed at all Medical Posts and R.A.Ps.

(5). Full use is to be made for the evacuation of WALKING CASES of returning empty mechanical transport.

(6). R.A.Ps. and evacuations as per Schedule "B" attached.

WATER.

14. (a). Water points (drinking water) are situated as follows:-

N.15.b.5.9. H.35.c.5.6.

Water for Horses - N.6.c.5.2.

(b). Before water in HAMEL or BOUZENCOURT is used, samples must be tested by R.M.O.

Tablets for purifying water will be issued to all Units.



"B" and "C" 15. Administrative details, Q.M. Store, Orderly  
ECHELONS. Room will be established at transport lines loca-  
 tion as per para. 2. (c).

"C" Echelon and remaining personnel of "B"  
 Echelon will remain in ALLONVILLE Area.

"C" Echelon will be commanded by Major LOTT,  
 43rd. Battalion.

CASUALTIES. 16. Casualties will be reported promptly.  
 43rd. Battalion will detail one Officer to re-  
 port to the M.D.S. at N.4.c.9.2., and 44th. Battal-  
 ion will detail one Officer to report to the M.D.S.  
 at G.29.c.5.3. on the afternoon of "Y" day, for the  
 purpose of noting all casualties to assist in checking  
 the Brigade Casualty Lists. Number, rank, name,  
 date of casualty, nature of casualty, and Unit are  
 required in each case.

DEAD ANIMALS. 17. Units will bury all dead animals in their res-  
 pective areas. Parties will be definitely do-  
 tailed beforehand for this purpose.

REAR BRIG- 18. Rear Brigade Headquarters will be established  
ADE H.Q. in BUSSY.

(R.B.)

*H. B. Hillary*  
 Captain.  
 A/Staff Captain, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Distribution:

To all recipients of HAMEL Offensive Instruction No.1.



SCHEDULE "A".BATTALION DUMPS.

Dump.	Location.	Article.	Quantity in each Dump.
No.1. "A" Bn. (44th).	P.8.b.0.4.	Ammunition, S.A.A. (25,000 clip packed bando- lier, 25,000 packet packed (or loose).	50,000.
No.2. "C" Bn. (43rd).	P.2.d.1.5.	" Grenades No.36. " " Mills No.23.mk.II. " Stokes 3" Assorted Rings.	300. 200. 250.
No.3. "B" Bn. (42nd).	J.33.d.1.5.	Rations, Iron. Water in Petrol Tins. Lime, Chloride, Barrels. Quantity of BarbWire, long and short pickets.	200. 200. 1. 1.

BRIGADE DUMPS.

No.1.	J.25.d.4.3.	Ammunition, S.A.A. " Grenados No.23.Mk.II. " Stokes 3" Assorted Rings.	20,000. 250. 500.
No.2.	O.6.d.1.3.	Rations, Iron. Water, gallons. Quantity of Barb wire, long and short pick- ets, sandbags and galvanised iron.	250. 400. 1.

FORWARD DUMPS IN NEW AREA ESTABLISHED BY TANKS.

No.1. "B" Bn.	P.4.Central.	Wire, Barb, Coils. Pickets, long.	100. 150.
No.2. "A" Bn.	P.10.d.00.82.	Pickets, short. Iron, Sheets. Bombs, T.M.(not detonated). Water, Tins. Ammunition, S.A.A.	300. 28. 150. 34. 10,000.

DUMPS ESTABLISHED BY AEROPLANES.

No.1.	P.4.d.2.2.	Ammunition, S.A.A.	20,000.
No.2.	P.10.d.00.82.	" "	20,000.

PRESENT ENGINEER DUMPS CONTAINING R.E. MATERIAL.

Locations.	J.34.a.80.45.
	J.32.c.10.80.
	P.2.d.50.50.
	P.8.a.20.80.
	P.1.d.90.30.



SECRET.

## SCHEDULE "B".

## MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.


Map Reference:- Sheets 62D. and  
62E. 1/40,000.

	R. A. Ps.	Motor and Wagon Posts.	Motor Relay Posts.	Advanced Dressing Station.	Main Dressing Station.	Divisional Collecting Station.	Evacuation.
Right Bde.	0.24.a.5.7. 0.12.c.2.9. P.7.c.1.9. 0.6.d.6.6.	0.6.d.1.6. Hamelet. 0.17.c.3.7.	0.15.a.5.7.				<p>Right Sector. By hand carriage and wheeled stretcher to M.L.P. 0.6.d.8.6., thence through motor relay post 0.15.a.5.7. to A.D.S. Left Sector. By hand carriage and wheeled stretcher to M.L.P. J.26.Central and M.L.P. I.30.b.3.5.; thence through motor relay post I.32.a.2.5. to A.D.S. A.D.S. to M.D.S. By Divisional Amb. Transport. M.D.S. to C.C.S. By 3rd.M.A.C.</p>
Left Bde.	J.25.d.6.1. J.28.c.8.9. J.22.d.3.3. J.33.Central.	I.30.b.3.5. Smiths Farm. J.26.cent.	I.32.a.2.5.	N.4.c.9.2.	LES ALENGONS G.29.c.5.3.	H.19.b.0.6.	

APPENDIX

15-3





11TH. AUST. INF BDE. SALVAGE AREA. Ref. Sheet LA NEUVILLE 1:20,000



Headquarters,  
2nd July 1918.

APPENDIX 1

155

HAMEL OFFENSIVE CIRCULAR NO. 2.  
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Brigade Headquarters will be in communication with all Battalions by Ground Cable and Visual.
  2. Brigade forward Station will be established at P.9.b.40.95.
  3. Cable Head will be in the vicinity of P.2.b.50.20.
  - 4.(a) Two metallic circuits will be laid from Brigade Headquarters to Cable Head.
  - (b) Two metallic circuits will be laid to the Brigade forward Station, one Infantry and one Artillery.
  - 5.(a) Central Brigade Visual Station will be established at J.19.c.90.35.
  - (b) Visual Stations will also be established at Brigade forward Station and Headquarters of each of 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Battalions.
  6. Visual Stations will be connected to the nearest Headquarters or Cable Head.
  7. Visual communication will be established to Right Brigade and Right Brigade forward Station.
  8. Line communication will be established to both flank Brigades.
  9. Signalling to Aeroplanes will be by Ground Flares, Popham Panels, and O.L., lamp if necessary.
  10. Wireless communication will be established between Brigade forward Station and Brigade Headquarters, and between Brigade Headquarters and 4th Australian Divisional Headquarters.
  11. All visual messages will be sent D.D.
  12. Pigeons will be supplied to Assaulting Battalions and will be drawn from Brigade Headquarters on "Y" day.
  13. Message Rockets from forward positions will be fired to Brigade forward Station, thence to Brigade Headquarters through Test Point situated at 43rd and 44th Battalion Headquarters.
  14. Station calls for Aeroplanes will be :-
 

11th Brigade Headquarters.....	E.
41st Battalion.....	F.
42nd Battalion.....	D.
43rd Battalion.....	T.
44th Battalion.....	N.
  15. All possible means of communication will be used.-
 

Telephone	Visual
Wireless	Aeroplanes
Pigeons	Runners
Message Rockets.	
  16. The code laid down in S.S., 135 Appendix "B" will be used for Popham Panel messages.
  17. Diagram of Communications attached.
  18. Wireless calls will be as follows :-
 

Trench Sets.	2/3	3/4	4/5	5/6.
4th Aust. Division.	LHO	DAJ	YAA	YAX
11th Bde.H.Qrs.	LHT	DAP	YAM	LHK
(Left Bde) 12th Bde H.Q.	YDR	YAL	DAK	YDG
(Right " ) 4th Bde.H.Q.	YAS	LHN	YDI	YAF
Loop Sets.				
11th Bde. H.Qrs.....	DKM			
11th Bde.Fwd.Station.....	YLN			
4th Bde.H.Qrs.....	DOO			
4th Bde.Fwd.Station.....	LMN			
- Accumulators will be charged at 12th Brigade Headquarters J.19.c.7.7.

CORRECTION to HAMEL Offensive Instruction No. 1.

Para 8 Lines 2 and 3 for P.9.a.9.4. and P.3.b.2.5., read P.8.b.2.5 and J.33.d.15.10.

Para 8 fourth sub-para, last line for "WEST" read "EAST".


*L. A. Vasey.*

Major.

Brigade Major, 11th Inf.Bde.A.I.F.

DISTRIBUTION. To all recipients HAMEL Offensive Circular No. 1.





PRELIMINARY COMMUNICATION  
SCHEME  
11th AUST. INF BDE.

- LEGEND.
- Cable
  - - - Wireless
  - ... Visual
  - H.Q.
  - Runner Posts — R



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## HAMEL OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTION NO 3.

APPENDIX

1. S.O.S. The S.O.S., Signal from 12 Noon 2nd July is a Rifle Grenade bursting into three green lights, one over another. From Zero minus 1 hour until Zero the S.O.S., line will be the start line of the 18 pdr., barrage.
2. BRIGADE O.P. The Brigade O.P., will be established at J.19, c.90.35. An Officer of the 41st Battalion will be at this O.P.
3. MAPS AND DOCUMENTS. No Maps showing our trenches, Headquarters or any other secret information will be taken forward of Battalion Headquarters.  
No papers which give identification of Units or information useful to the enemy will be carried by any Officer, N.C.O., or man.
4. SYNCHRONISATION OF WATCHES. Each Unit will send an Officer to Brigade Headquarters at 3 p.m., and 9 p.m., on "Y" day in order to obtain Synchronised time.  
No Synchronisation will be done over the telephone.
5. ENEMY DOCUMENTS.  
(a) Officers and N.C.O's only will be searched by a responsible Officer and all documents and maps taken from them. These will be sent without delay to Brigade Headquarters. Privates will not be searched.  
(b) At least two N.C.O's per Battalion will be detailed as dug-out searchers. All documents and maps found will be at once sent to Brigade Headquarters.
6. PRISONERS. Officer and N.C.O., Prisoners will be kept separate from Privates, and as far as possible the locality in which a prisoner was captured will be sent with him.
7. INFORMATION FROM OUR OWN WOUNDED. 42nd and 43rd Battalions will detail an Officer with two runners to be at the Motor and Wagon Posts at J.26, Central and I.50, b.3.5., respectively. These Officers will, with the N.C.O's approval, question our wounded. All information so gained will be sent to Brigade Headquarters.
8. FORMATIONS. Each Assaulting Battalion will attack in two lines followed by a line of Moppers Up, and a Reserve Company. Each Company will provide its own Moppers Up.
9. PROTECTION OF ASSEMBLY. 42nd and 43rd Battalions will cover the assembly of the Brigade with strong fighting Patrols from Zero minus 2 hours until Zero minus 8 minutes.
10. COMMENCEMENT OF ASSEMBLY. Assaulting Battalions will commence to assemble on the taped line at Zero minus 2 hours.
11. FIXING OF BAYONETS. Bayonets will be fixed at Zero minus 8 minutes.
12. LIAISON. Captain G. LONGMORE, 44th Battalion and Captain D.A. YOUNG, 43rd Battalion will be Liaison Officers at 4th and 12th Australian Infantry Brigade Headquarters respectively. They will report to these Headquarters on Y/Z night.  
Close liaison both from front to rear and to the flanks will be maintained between all Units.
13. ADVANCE OF RESERVE COMPANIES. The rate of advance of the Reserve Companies of 42nd and 44th Battalions will be so regulated that they do not advance EAST of the position of the Support Line to the Blue Line (where they will consolidate) unless they are required to complete the capture of the Blue Line.
14. REPORTS. From Zero to Zero plus 6 hours reports will be sent in every half hour and from Zero plus 6 hours until A/B night every hour or more frequently, as the situation demands.
15. HAMEL VILLAGE.  
(a) The 44th Battalion may be required to assist the 43rd Battalion by attacking HAMEL from the EAST.  
(b) After the Village has been Mopped Up all Troops will be withdrawn from it.
16. ENEMY SNIPERS. After reaching the Blue Line, Enemy Snipers must be dealt with by our Snipers, Vickers and Lewis Guns and Stokes Mortars.  
Tanks will assist in this by Mopping Up, up to about 100 yards of the Blue Line protective barrage.
17. TACTICAL COMMANDER. The Infantry Commander on the spot is responsible for the decision as to the joint action of tanks and infantry. He will give such orders to the Tank Section Commanders as the situation demands. His orders should not interfere with the general plan of the operation as laid down in the orders of higher authority.

18 Patrols /



18. PATROLS. Active Patrolling with a view to securing identification will be carried out on Z/A night and A/B nights
19. SECRECY.  
(a) All Troops will remain under cover from enemy observation, both aerial and ground, during "Y" day.  
(b) All messages prior to Zero hour in connection with the operation will only be sent by fullerphone or D.R.
20. PASSWORDS. The following Passwords will be used on the Brigade Front :-

Y/Z night	BILLY.
Z/A night.	DIGGER.
A/B night.	BLACKBOY.

Headquarters,  
2nd July 1918.  
EJR.

*L.A. Casey*  
Major.  
Brigade Major, 11th Inf. Bde. A.I.F.

DISTRIBUTION.

To all recipients of HAMEL Offensive Instructions Nos. 1 and 2.



SECRET.11th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Copy No.....

HAMEL OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 5.Light Trench Mortars.

1. Two Mortars of 11th Australian Light Trench Mortar Battery will accompany each Battalion.
2. The two Mortars allotted 43rd Battalion will follow the 44th Battalion as the latter leap-frogs through the former.  
Thus six Mortars will be available to assist the advance to the Blue Line and will consolidate WEST of it, and be prepared to put down a S.O.S., barrage for its protection.

*G.B. Hillary*Captain.  
for Major.Brigade H.Qrs.  
3rd July 1918.

Brigade Major, 11th Inf. Bde. A.I.F.


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APPENDIX



153  
153



MAP 3  
1:25000

MOFFING OF  
AREA


LEGEND  
42° 30' N  
43° 30' N  
44° 30' N

APPENDIX 1  
53



4TH AUST. DIV  
DIAGRAM A  
ISSUED WITH DIVISIONAL ORDER N° 128.

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16'3

war diary

APPENDIX

55-

S. CRET.  
15Notes on HAMEL Operations - 4th. and 5th. July, 1918\*I. Depth of Attack and Objectives.

1. The final objective was the old British trench system well sited for defence, and was consequently well known to the enemy and shown on all his maps with the result that it was heavily shelled after capture. Such heavy shelling was foreseen and in order to avoid portion of it outposts were put out in front of it, but trenches so constructed were not so well sited for defence as the old line itself.
2. It is considered that in any future operations which involve the capture of well defined and well sited trench systems the final objective should be well away from such systems which should be avoided by as many troops as possible. The dugouts in the system captured gave protection to portion of the garrison but were not sufficient for everybody.
3. The necessity and advisability of allotting definite Units to certain tactical features was exemplified by the capture and mopping up of HAMEL which was allotted to one Battalion.
4. No intermediate objectives as such were allotted, the 10 minute halt in the barrage not defining the area which the HAMEL Battalion was responsible for mopping up. The advance to the final objective was commenced before the whole of the Village of HAMEL was cleared up.
5. It is considered that strongly held tactical features should not be allowed to hang up an advance but that special parties be detailed to engage them if necessary attacking them in reverse after the leading wave has passed and joined beyond them.

II. Artillery.

1. The silence prior to the commencement of harassing fire at Zero minus 8 was most marked and it is thought that light harassing fire by one or two batteries should be carried out prior to the commencement of anything in connection with the operation - even though the enemy has been schooled up to being accustomed to sudden bursts of harassing fire.
  2. The use of Smoke was useful in that as he had been previously schooled to expect gas with the smoke the enemy in many cases was caught wearing his gas mask.
  3. The use of smoke to indicate halts in the barrage was of little value owing to the large amount of smoke and dust drifting about the battle-field. It is suggested that if it is desired to indicate a halt in the barrage that something in the nature of the old 18-pdr\* Star shell or a shell to give off coloured smoke be used.
  4. Very little registration had been carried out prior to Zero and the barrage which at the beginning was good became ragged towards the end. A certain amount of short shooting of single guns and batteries late in lifting occurred. This combined with the fact that no matter how careful the training and leadership men will advance too close to our barrage was the cause of a considerable number of casualties.
  5. During the halt in the barrage the rate of fire - except in HAMEL Village - was reduced to one round per gun per minute and as has been experienced before men again advanced into and through the barrage with the result that further casualties were again caused.
- If it is desirable to have a halt in the barrage it is considered that either the rate of fire should not be decreased or the guns should cease fire altogether. In the latter case the halt should be fairly lengthy, in order that the foremost troops may have an opportunity of dealing with any enemy who are in their immediate vicinity.
6. The advisability of fixing prior to Zero the S.O.S. protective barrage of the final objective of a limited objective attack was well illustrated. In this case the S.O.S. was not fixed until about Zero plus 10 hours and was then done over the wire, thus increasing the possibility of error and the strain on the Signal Service. If the S.O.S. protective barrage is fixed beforehand and it is desired to alter it owing to our troops pushing out to a more favourable position the alteration can be arranged over the wire.



## II. Artillery (Continued).

7. After the final S.O.S. had been fixed the S.O.S. Signal was sent up owing to a hostile counter attack and it was found that in places short shooting was occurring which could not be remedied until after the hostile counter attack had been dealt with. It is therefore suggested that at say Zero plus 12 hours whilst it is still daylight and communications comparatively easy the S.O.S. Signal be fired or the Artillery informed and Batteries open on their S.O.S. lines for say two minutes. This would allow of any necessary corrections being made prior to darkness when a hostile counter attack may be expected.

8. It is considered that the pace of the barrage was too slow, particularly at first. If a close assembly in or forward of our front line is being carried out it is essential that the barrage advance rapidly so as to enable all assaulting troops to clear our front line and shake out into attack formation before the enemy's barrage comes down.

9. If tanks are operating it does not matter much if the Infantry do miss the barrage as the tanks are able to give the necessary covering fire to allow of the advance to be continued and the barrage caught up to again. Even if tanks are not operating Stokes Mortars and Lewis Guns are able to give the necessary covering fire. A halt of 5 or 10 minutes at say every 30 minutes will ensure the infantry being up with the barrage.

10. Liaison between Artillery and Infantry by means of Officers at Brigade and Battalion Headquarters proved satisfactory.

11. F.O.O's did not appear to do much. They appeared to lack communication to their batteries. Cannot each Artillery Brigade or Group concentrate on providing one F.O.O. with more or less reliable communications by means of visual and line. Many useful targets were missed by reason of this lack of communication.

12. As far as infantry are concerned they prefer an H.E. barrage to a shrapnel one. It is stated that shrapnel shells bursting overhead cause much apprehension amongst the troops. Whilst the "whirr" of the shrapnel frightens the enemy and keeps his head down it is considered that this effect is obtained by the use of overhead H.E. fire. An H.E. barrage is only effective when the ground is hard.

When Tanks are operating they prefer a shrapnel barrage as with it there is less risk of casualties being caused to themselves.

13. In a surprise attack such as this where there was no artillery preparation it is certain that enemy wire will be met and the infantry must be supplied with Bangalore Torpedoes and wire cutters. When it is necessary for the infantry to stop to cut wire covering fire by riflemen and rifle grenadiers must be supplied.

14. Counter battery work from Zero to about Zero plus 3 hours was most effective but after that it was only partially successful in stopping heavy enemy shelling of our new positions.

As far as infantry are concerned, that they want in the way of C.B. work is intense from say Zero to Zero plus 15 minutes so as to allow them to clear his barrage and again intense from about Zero plus 3 hours onwards when by means of low-flying planes and other methods the enemy artillery has discovered where our troops are.

It is recognised however that in order that our Field Artillery may continue to fire on the advancing Barrage C.B. work must go on after Zero plus 15 minutes so that the enemy artillery may not interfere with them.

15. No Anti-Tank Guns were sent forward immediately after the capture of the final objective. In view of the increasing use of Tanks by the enemy it is considered most essential that guns for this purpose be so sent forward in order that they may, if necessary, be used to repel Tanks employed by the enemy in counter attack.

## III. Frontage.

The frontage allotted this Brigade was approximately 2000 yards which was about 1 man per yard taking into account the four Battalions of the Brigade plus the 2 Coys. U.S. infantry attached, but one Battalion was in Reserve and not employed - hence in the actual attack there was less than 1 man per yard.



III. Frontage (Continued).

This strength per yard of front was considerably below that generally considered necessary but proved to <sup>be</sup> quite sufficient.

IV. Distribution of Troops.

The only point to remark on under this heading is that one Battalion was allotted to capture and mop up HAMEL Village after which it withdrew and consolidated West of the Village, in order to avoid the enemy shelling which it was appreciated would be directed into the Village. At Zero plus 3 hours and onwards HAMEL Village was heavily shelled.

V. Formations.

1. The formation adopted by each assaulting Battalion was 3 Companies in line followed by a reserve Coy. in Artillery formation.
2. Each front line Coy. provided its own moppers up and had two platoons in front followed by a platoon in a line of sections in single file to mop up and a reserve platoon in a line of sections in single file.
3. Each front line platoon of front line Coys. had its two rifle sections as a line of skirmishers followed by its two Lewis Gun Sections each in a diamond formation. The leading man carried the gun so that if he became a casualty one of the other men of the same Section following him was sure to pick up the gun.
4. This formation proved quite satisfactory and easy of manoeuvre as on one occasion a Coy. having lost its direction was inclined to its left and again to its right under the verbal command of its Commander. Also the Battalion which leap-frogged through the HAMEL Battalion moved half on the North and half on the South of the Village and joined up East of the Village.

VI. The Assembly.

1. The infantry assembly on a taped line in front of the front line was complete without casualties by Zero minus 15 minutes.
2. The risk of such an assembly as this was again emphasised and it is very questionable whether it is worth the risk. On this occasion the enemy's first barrage which was very light and scattered came down at Zero plus 7 minutes and practically ceased at about Zero plus one hour so that had the assembly been carried out some 3000 yards (dependant on 1st. lift of the Artillery) in rear of our front line the whole of the assaulting troops could have passed through the enemy's barrage with very few casualties - probably fewer than were caused by our own barrage.
3. The Tank assembly was carried out on a taped line about 1000 yards West of the front line and the tanks commenced to move up at Zero minus 8 minutes. They caught up to our infantry at about Zero plus 8 minutes.
4. Had the infantry assembly been carried out well behind our front line the tanks would have been able to assemble in front of them and thus would have been in their proper position, i.e., in front of the infantry throughout the whole attack instead of having to catch up to them in which there was a risk that they might never have done so.

VII. The Attack.

The chief thing noticed during the actual assault was that men were attracted to the scene of a local fight with the result that gaps in our line occurred. It is considered that such gaps should be filled by the Reserve Tanks following the infantry until such time as the infantry Commander redistributes his men. This is merely a matter of arrangement and co-operation with the Tanks detailed for the operation.

VIII. Organisation of the Captured Position.

1. A Conference was held to decide how, allowing for normal casualties, the captured territory was to be organised for defence.
2. Reserve Coys. of assaulting Battalions, which in defence will become the Support Coys. of the Line Battalions, should not, unless actually required to assist in the capture of the final objective, go beyond the



### VIII. Organisation of the Captured Position. (Continued).

position on which they are going to dig in and consolidate. If they do it means they have to be withdrawn later with a resultant loss of time and possibility of confusion.

5. Platoon Commanders should be issued with a plan showing their positions of consolidation relative to the other platoons of the Battalion.

### IX. Exploiting Success.

1. Nothing of this nature was allowed by higher authority although suggestions for the mopping up of certain batteries were put up prior to Zero. When the final objective had been captured there were no enemy within 1000 yards of it during the hours of daylight following and the quietness of the enemy's artillery was apparently due to his withdrawing his batteries. Had any exploiting of success been allowed it is almost certain that at little cost to ourselves many more casualties would have been inflicted on the enemy and many enemy guns captured.

2. It is considered that the minimum final objective of any attack against defences such as those opposite this front should be the enemy's gun line.

3. If the final objective is not as far as the gun line arrangements should be made with the artillery to allow of at least a local exploiting of success.

4. With definite creeping and protective barrages this is extremely difficult and some system of light signals is suggested, but with tanks and the weapons at the immediate call of the infantry, i.e., Stokes Mortars, Lewis Guns, Bombs and the Rifle it is very questionable whether during the later stages of an advance when the enemy has to an extent become disorganised a creeping barrage is necessary.

5. In order to allow of the local exploiting of a success and at the same time mislead the enemy as to the most forward line being consolidated the following is a suggestion. As part of the pre-arranged Artillery programme after the protective barrage for the final objective has been down for say 20 minutes it will again commence to advance for about 700 yards (this distance being dependant on the maximum range of the guns) by 100 yard lifts. The infantry if they so desire can either not move at all, or closely follow the barrage or go out after the barrage. If they establish themselves in front of the final objective as defined in orders they will at once notify higher authority so that a new S.O.S. barrage line can be arranged. Until this new line is arranged the S.O.S. line should remain as the old protective barrage of the final objective. This should be safe as a further advance would not be attempted if there was any sign of enemy counter-attack, also if a counter attack against this new line develops within say two hours of its being gained the S.O.S. should not be fired until, if it has become necessary, the most advanced troops have fallen back to the final objective as ordered.

Such a local exploiting of success would allow of our new front line to be sited as best suited for local tactical features.

6. The exploiting of a success would, provided arrangements for motor lorries, etc. for the approach march had been made, not over fatigue the troops. During any exploiting of success the amount of actual fighting decreases and hence the strain on the troops is not so great.

7. Failing being able to use horses or ordinary mechanical transport supplies for this further advance could be well brought up by Supply tanks and by means of Aeroplanes dropping them to the forward troops.

### X. Employment of Engineers and Pioneers.

1. This operation again emphasised the inadvisability of employing Engineers or Pioneers in the newly captured area before the enemy artillery has quietened and the infantry have settled down.

2. The only exception to this is that it proved useful to have a few Sappers attached to the Headquarters of the Battalion whose Headquarters moved. They assisted in the construction of a dugout for the new Battalion Headquarters.



## XI. Signal Communications.

1. Visual proved of great value, also signal message rockets on several occasions most useful. With practice and previous study of the Map and probable positions of Headquarters very little difficulty was experienced in aligning the stands for these rockets.
2. A Brigade forward Station provided with Wireless, Visual, Telephones, Runners and Pigeons was established in the enemy's front line and was in communication with Brigade Headquarters by Wireless by Zero plus 30 minutes. During the days following the assault this station proved of great value in relieving the congestion on the Battalion lines.
3. In this a surprise attack with very little enemy artillery fire ground lines held well and little difficulty was experienced with them.

## XII. Movement of Headquarters.

One Battalion Headquarters moved during the operation. It moved after the capture of the final objective to a pre-determined position which was in close proximity to the Brigade Forward Station so that communication to it was immediately ensured.

## XIII. The Action of Tanks.

1. The support and covering fire given by the Tanks was of great value but their capabilities were limited and they were exposed to a greater chance of being hit owing to the advancing barrage and the slow rate at which it moved.
2. Owing to the rapidity and suddenness with which the new Mark of Tank can turn a certain number of casualties were caused to our troops by their Machine Guns. These would probably be avoided were our troops not at all times so close to the Main Body of Tanks as they were during this operation. This closeness was doubtless due to a large extent to the Artillery barrage which our troops as the result of all their previous training naturally tried to keep close up to.
3. Owing to the diversity of the characteristics of Tanks and Artillery firing on a creeping barrage it is not considered the Tanks can be fully employed, in large numbers anyway, when there is a slowly advancing creeping barrage covering the infantry advance. It is considered that when large numbers of Tanks are operating the Artillery barrage should make lifts of 500 yards at least. This would give the Tanks full scope for their mobility, and their fire power together with that of the infantry would be sufficient to enable the infantry to continue their advance.
4. The following were the only Signals with Tanks used. They were quite successful.
  - (a) Tanks to Infantry. Red, White and Blue Flag. "Coming out of action".
  - (b) Infantry to Tanks. Red and Yellow Flags. "Broken Down".
  - (c) Infantry to Tanks. Helmet placed on bayonet. "Tank wanted here".

In the latter case after the Tank came over the Infantry Officer attracted the attention of the Tank Commander by means of the bell at the rear of the Tank and indicated what he required of the Tank.
5. Each fighting Tank carried a certain amount of S.A.A. and Lewis Gun Magazines. Unloading parties for these must be detailed beforehand.
6. The employment of Reserve Tanks appeared to be indefinite. A suggestion for their use is put up in Para. VII above.
7. Liaison with the Tank Coy. Commander was maintained by the latter reporting to Brigade Headquarters during the operation. It is considered that he should live at Brigade Headquarters throughout the time Tanks are operating.
8. Supply Tanks proved of great value and saved many large carrying parties. Greater use should be made of this most valuable form of transport for work in the forward area.
9. The rumble and vibration of Tanks moving 1000 yards away from a dugout were heard inside the dugout.



XIV. Use of Smoke.

As a means of indicating halts in the barrage smoke proved of little value but was useful in deceiving the enemy as to whether or not gas was being used, he having been previously schooled to expect gas and smoke.

XV. Machine Guns.

1. Overhead and flanking Machine Gun fire proved of great value.
2. No difficulty was experienced in moving forward the guns detailed to follow the advance to the approximate positions selected beforehand.
3. Section leaders must during the advance use their own initiative and be ready to form a defensive flank in the event of permanent or temporary flank failures, even though their orders may have been to advance further. They must however report their action to Infantry Battalion and Coy. they are co-operating with.

Lewis Guns.

- XVI. Firing from the hips with the Lewis Gun was employed when dealing with the enemy in the crops and at firing at enemy snipers and machine gunners in houses in HAMEL. It proved most effective.

XVII. Action of Light Mortars.

1. These proved of great value. Though not actually employed during the infantry advance they materially assisted the Brigade on our right whilst temporarily checked just short of the final objective.
2. To assist in the forming of defensive flanks and to assist neighbouring Units Light Mortars are of the greatest value.
3. 32 shells per Mortar were carried by the teams. A further supply of shells were brought up in the Supply Tanks.
4. Light Mortars dealt successfully with Snipers and Machine Guns East of the final objective.

XVIII. Action of Bombers and Rifle Bombers.

1. The use and necessity of bombers in any trench system was again exemplified. During the night following our attack the enemy counter attacked and using the many old trenches in the vicinity of our front line was only ejected and driven off by the use of Bombs.
2. For dealing with Snipers and Machine Guns in NO MAN'S LAND after the completion of the advance the No. 33 Grenade proved useful. The discharger cups and No. 33 bombs were not carried on the man but were brought up in the Supply Tanks.
3. The Egg Bomb proved but of little value and is not favoured by the troops.
4. It is recommended that in all attacks all troops, except Nos. 1 and 2 of Lewis Gun teams, Signallers and Runners carry four Mills Bombs.

XIX. Carrying Parties.

Going to the use of Supply Tanks the only Carrying Parties required were 40 men attached to the L.T.M. Battery and about 50 men required on night 4/5 July to carry up a further supply of Bombs to the front line.

XX. Rations and Water.

These were supplied in dumps well forward before Zero and were also carried up by the Supply Tanks. No difficulty at all was experienced as regards either of these articles. The distribution to Coys. of these articles in one Battalion was faulty and requires careful attention when bagging and making up supplies from Q.M. Dept.

XXI. Wounded.

1. Many wounded were evacuated on the fighting tanks coming out of action. No fractures or abdominal wounds should be allowed to be evacuated by this means.



Page 7.XXI. Wounded. (Continued).

2. No case occurred of tanks running over our own wounded though it was feared such might occur.
3. The rifles of wounded were stuck in the ground and pieces of white tape tied to the tops of the crops to indicate the positions of seriously wounded cases to the Tanks.

XXII. Medical and Administrative.

No difficulties were experienced in either of these matters. Everything demanded by Brigade was supplied. Wheeled stretchers, two of which were lent to each Battalion, proved invaluable for evacuating forward areas by Battalion Stretcher Bearers.

XXIII. Maps - Air Photos.

1. The supply of maps and air photos was good though some of the latter arrived too late to be of use.
2. In all future operations it is recommended that small maps showing the enemy territory of 1/50,000 scale be issued down to Section Commanders.
3. The supply of barrage maps down to Coy. Commanders was useful.
4. Replicas of country to be attacked should be on view in each Battalion area 3 or 4 days prior to Zero.

XXIV. Orders and Instructions.

1. With the experience now gained by all Commanders it is considered that many of the Orders and Instructions issued for operations should be cut out, all points for discussion being settled at a Conference of those concerned. In this operation Instructions were received too late for issue to Units.
2. If Instructions in writing are received by Brigade from higher authority the former for its own protection must pass them on in writing to Units, thereby limiting the initiative of Unit Commanders and throwing a great amount of Office work onto the Staff and Clerks when the former would be better employed reconnoitring the area of operations.

XXV. Patrols and Scouts.

Patrolling on the night following an attack must be most vigorous and owing to fatigue and loss of sleep of front line troops should be carried out by Reserve Coys. if not by troops of the Brigade Reserve.

XXVI. Relief.

1. If a keen and vigorous lookout is to be kept and strong patrols sent out it is essential that assaulting Battalions be relieved on the night following an attack - if not by another Brigade by the Reserve Battalions of the Brigade in the line. Similarly Brigades should be relieved within 48 hours of Zero.
2. The above applies to limited objective attacks only, due to the approach march, the assembly, the attack, consolidation and then the heavy enemy shelling of the newly captured position following one upon another and allowing of no rest.
3. In more open warfare this is not the case, as the enemy shelling is not so heavy and one body of troops passes through another and thus allows of rest.

XXVII. Miscellaneous.

1. It was found that troops tend to go at right angles to the contours of a slope and thus lose direction. In deciding on assembly lines, lines of advance and objectives this factor must be considered. If necessary special bodies of troops should be detailed by lower formation to fill any gaps caused by the line of advance being arranged to be perpendicular to the contours. On this occasion this was done by 2 Platoons of Left Battalion.



XVII. Miscellaneous. (Continued).*Distinctive*

2. In newly captured country bare of ~~destructive~~ landmarks it is difficult to accurately locate oneself on the map and it is suggested that on prominent features behind our original line large beacons be lit to assist the troops. In order to avoid any confusion as to which beacon one is looking at perhaps it could be arranged for them to be of different colours.

3. The question of gaps in our wire needs careful consideration. It was found on this occasion that these were not sufficient and not wide enough. It was found on the hard ground that Tanks passing over our loose wire did not make a track through it, but the wire sprung up again. In passing over thick wire Tanks made gaps but with a considerable amount of infantry traffic through these gaps the wire sprung up and again formed an obstacle.

4. Difficulty was experienced in guiding Regimental transport to localities in the newly captured positions. It is therefore suggested that the Transport Sergeant and a few drivers live at Battalion Headquarters during the operation and during the hours of daylight go out and reconnoitre the new area so that they may be able to bring up the transport at night without requiring any guides.



THE TIMES, MONDAY

## THE TRICOLOR OVER HAMEL.

### STORIES OF AMERICANS' EXPLOITS.

#### THE NEW ADVANCE.

(From Our Special Correspondent.)

WAR CORRESPONDENTS'  
HEADQUARTERS, JULY 7.

So far from the Germans having made any serious attempt to recover the ground taken by Australians and Americans on July 4, last night the Australians pushed out again, and, without resistance of any importance, advanced their line south of Hamel and east of Vaire Wood a distance of another 400 yards on over a mile front.

Vaire Wood crowns the eastern edge of the high plateau, and this advance takes us across the summit to where the ground dips eastward north of Warfusée. On the edge of the eastern descent is another wood, long and narrow, being three-quarters of a mile from north to south, and only 200 or 300 yards wide east to west, known as the Bois d'Accroche. On the edge of this farther wood there was a machine-gun position which, after the Australian advance, was giving some trouble, so it was liberally treated with rifle grenades. Then one man, single-handed, crept out to inspect it, and came back with one officer and 12 men prisoners, being the whole garrison of the post.

In connexion with the fighting of the Fourth in Hamel village, one hears similar stories of large captures of prisoners by individuals, for the village was full of dug-outs to which the Germans retreated on the approach of our Tanks and infantry. One American went alone into a dug-out, and knew in the darkness that men were around him. He called on them to surrender, but in reply some one hit him, just missing his head, presumably with a rifle butt. Then the American started shooting in the dark, while scuffling like rats went on all around. Presently cries of "Kamerad!" went up, and when a light was brought it was found that the random shots had killed five men, and that nine unwounded were ready to surrender.

A party of four Americans got 16 prisoners in one dug-out. Another party of three followed a cable to see where it went, and it led them to a dug-out, where they found four officers and 19 men, who surrendered like lambs.

I have said before that the prisoners taken here have mostly been of good physical type, largely Prussians, but some of the officers are most offensive. One deliberately struck an officer who was speaking to him with the utmost courtesy. He might have been shot, but, instead, the officer who was hit, and who was a much smaller man, turned to and hammered the Prussian with his fists till he literally squealed. One of the extraordinary sights of the battle was to see Australian soldiers bringing German wounded in tenderly on stretchers, and the prisoners say frankly that the food they are getting is better than their recent rations.

One of the most impressive incidents of the capture of Hamel was the act of an Australian officer, who climbed the most prominent ruin in the village and planted a large French Tricolor on the top. He was a man of middle age, with grizzled hair, and was fired on by machine-guns as he did it. A shell hit one corner of the building and blew it away, but he went on with his job, and the red, white, and blue floats over the recaptured village now.

#### ANOTHER ADVANCE



AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From 6 p.m. 3rd July, 1918 to 6 p.m. 4th July, 1918

NOT TO BE TAKEN FURTHER FORWARD THAN  
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

For Official Use Only

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Infantry. At 3.10 a.m. this morning we attacked and captured HAMEL village and VAIRE and HAMEL WOODS and consolidated our new line east of these localities. The advance was made on a frontage of over 4,500 yds. immediately south of the SOMME to an average depth of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles. At the same time we attacked east of VILLE-sur-ANCRE and captured the enemy's defences on a frontage of 1,200 yards to a depth of 400 yards. A successful raid was simultaneously carried out against enemy trench in K.13, which resulted in the capture of prisoners and machine guns.

The day's operations have resulted so far in the capture of 36 officers and 1191 O.R. unwounded and 2 officers and 78 O.R. wounded. In material 103 machine guns, 12 trench mortars, and 1 77mm. gun have so far been counted. Our casualties were light. Tanks successfully co-operated in the main operation. Heavy casualties are reported to have been inflicted on the enemy by both the infantry and the artillery.

(b) Artillery. During the night both heavy and field artillery co-operated in the attack with barrage fire. Successful counter-battery work and effective gas shoots were carried out. MORCOURT and the valleys leading to it were shelled, and a large party in Q.13 and Q.19.a. dispersed. Traffic on the AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN road was also successfully engaged. During the remainder of the day harassing fire was maintained on general targets and hostile batteries.

(c) Prisoners and Material. During the period 36 officers and 1191 O.R. unwounded and 2 officers and 78 O.R. wounded, 103 machine guns, 12 trench mortars, and 1 77mm. gun have been captured.

2. DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY'S FORCES

Corps Front. The following identifications have been secured during the period:

108th Divn.

3rd Bn., 137th I.R. 25 prisoners July 4th.

13th Divn.

1st and 3rd Bns., 13th I.R.	} VAIRE WOOD sector prisoners July 4th.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns. 55th I.R.	
1st and 2nd Bns., 15th I.R.	
1st Coy., 7th Pioneer Bn.	

The 13th Divn. is stated to have relieved the 77th Res. Divn. on the night 1st/2nd July. The order of battle is given from north to south as 55th I.R. - 13th I.R. - 15th I.R.

43rd Divn.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns. 202nd R.I.R.	HAMEL	prisoners	July 4th
243rd Minenwerfer Coy.	"	prisoner	"
525th Bearer Coy.	"	prisoners	"

From evidence received to-day it is considered that this division has two regiments north of the river and one regiment south of it, the order of battle from north to south being 203rd R.I.R. - 201st R.I.R. - 202nd R.I.R. The southern divisional boundary runs through the southern outskirts of HAMEL.



4-7-13

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No. 181

107th Divn.  
232nd R.I.R. K.13 prisoners July 4th  
52nd R.I.R. east of VILLE-sur-ANCRE prisoners July 4th

The order of battle of this division is confirmed.

77th Res. Divn. MERICOURT-sur-SOMME P.S.  
July 4th.

Miscellaneous Units

16th F.A.R.	VAIRE WOOD sector	prisoners	July 4th
59th F.A.R.	"	"	"
43rd F.A.R.	"	"	"
2nd Army Arendt-Gruppe	"	"	"
49th Divl. Wireless Detachment	"	"	"

From the above identifications it will be seen that in our main operation 11 enemy battalions were engaged south of the SOMME this morning.

3. AIRCRAFT

Our aircraft carried out successful contact patrols. A successful reconnaissance and bombing programme supported the attack this morning.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

During the night enemy artillery was very quiet. Enemy reply to our barrage for the attack this morning was weak. From 3.30 to 4.20 a.m. a light barrage was placed between VAIRE and HAMEL. From 4.30 a.m. to noon heavy harassing fire was brought to bear upon HAMEL and HAMEL WOOD, trenches east of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, and trenches west of MORLANCOURT. During the afternoon hostile artillery was quieter. Some harassing fire west of MORLANCOURT is reported. The only reports of back area shelling are those of AUBIGNY, FOUILLOY, T.5.a. and M.29, all by H.V. guns. No counter-battery work was carried out.

5. MOVEMENT

At 6.15 p.m. about 500 troops marching by platoons were observed from MERICOURT to MORCOURT and at the same time some 400 infantry were observed marching into MERICOURT from CHUIGNOLLES and movement estimated at one battalion was moving from MORCOURT into PROYART. 200 men were also observed marching from MERICOURT on road through Q.18.b. and d.

At 6.30 p.m. about 200 men were observed marching into GUILLAU-COURT along the road from W.21.b. through W.15.c. (Air Reconnaissance)

During the afternoon ground observers reported considerable movement north of MORLANCOURT which was engaged by our artillery.



4-7-18.

- 1a -

No. 181.

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 13th DIVISION.

Order of Battle. The 202nd R.I.R., 43rd Res. Div. is N. of the 55th I.R. South of this is the 13th I.R. and then the 15th I.R., then 137th I.R., 108th Divn. (P.S.)

Reliefs. The 55th I.R. relieved the 332nd I.R. on July 1/2nd. The 13th I.R. relieved the 419th I.R. on July 2/3rd. The 15th I.R. relieved the 257th R.I.R. on night July 1/2nd. It is rumoured that the 13th Divn. will be relieved in about 8 days time. (P.S.)

Recent History. After leaving the MOREUIL sector the 13th Div. moved to CAMBRAI where it remained 14 days, the 55th I.R. was at ELINCOURT, the 15th I.R. at CLARY and the 13th I.R. at HONNECHY. From here the whole division moved to VALVILLERS by rail and remained there 8 days. It then moved into line and relieved the 77th Res. Divn.

Names of Commanders. Divnl. Cdr. - Gen. von BORRIS., 13th I.R., Major BIELER. (P.S.)

Roumanian Army. All men in the Roumanian Army under 35 were withdrawn in April and reinforced the divisions in France. One man formerly in the 89th Divn. gave the following route from ROUMANIA of his draft which left at the end of May, TARGOVISTE, GRAEOVA, ZSEGED, BUDAPEST, ODERBERG, BRESLAU, SACHEN, ESSEN, AACHEN, BEVERLOO. They remained in BEVERLOO for 14 days and went thence to the Field Recruit Depot of the 13th Divn. at BRAY where there are 1000 men. Then they went to MARCHÉLÉPOT and joined the 15th I.R. (P.S.).

Drafts. On June 18th the division received a draft of 600 from BEVERLOO, mostly returned wounded. No 1919 class. This draft went from BEVERLOO, via NAMUR, and BREUX. (P.S.).

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 13th I.R., 13th DIVISION.

Dispositions. The 1st Bn. was holding the line with the 3 and 4 coys. in front and the 1st and 2nd in close support. Another bn. is in support and another in rest near PROYART. (P.S.).

Tour of Duty. This regiment works on a 6 day cycle. (P.S.).

Routes. A prisoner of this regiment left RUSSIA at the beginning of November and travelled via the following towns: BERKHOFF, KOVNO, VILNA, KONIGSBERG, BERLIN, HALLE, COLN, TRIER, DIDENHOFEN, SEDAN and FREUEN. (P.S.).

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 55th I.R., 13th DIVISION.

General. This regiment came into the line on July 1/2nd, having previously been resting at VILLERS CARBONIERES. (P.S.).

Dispositions. The 3rd Bn. was in the line this morning, the 10th Coy. being in support at P.15.a.5.0. (P.S.).

Strength and Casualties. 9th Coy. 36 men and 4 l.m.gs., 10th Coy. 49 men and 4 l.m.gs. Owing to influenza both these coys. were 1 platoon under strength. (P.S.).

Drafts. The 9th Coy. received a draft of 25 6 weeks ago, of whom 20 belonged to the 1919 class. (P.S.).

Minenwerfer. The Minenwerfer Detachment took over the 4 minenwerfer of the 332nd I.R. in open trenches N. of HAMEL WOOD on the night July 2/3rd. The Minenwerfer Detachment consisted of a Feldwebel, 2 unteroffizier, two gefreiter and 20 men. Dugouts were being constructed beside the positions. Ammunition was brought up by the detachment in reserve. At CLARY practices had been carried out with Minenwerfer in attacking strong points.



4-7-18.

- 2a -

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 15th I.R., 13th DIVISION.

Dispositions. The 2nd Bn. held the line with 1cbg. in support and another in reserve. The 6th and 7th Coys. were in the line with the other two 150 m. in rear in support. The 1st Bn. was in support 1 km. in rear, the 3rd Bn. either at VAUVILLERS or in a wood near MERICOURT-sur-SOLME. (P.S.).

Strength. Of 2nd M.G. Coy. 1 officer and 110 - 120 O.R. with 12 '08 machine guns. Losses are said to have been very heavy. (P.S.)

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 6th COY., 232nd R.I.R., 107th DIVN.

Dispositions. This regiment had apparently only one coy. in the line whose northern boundary was the BRAY - CORBIE Road, the 203rd R.I.R., 43rd Res. Divn. being on the south. The front line was very thinly held. (P.S.).

Miscellaneous. There was much sickness in the regiment, particularly in the 1st and 3rd bns., which had to be withdrawn from the line on this account. (P.S.).

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 52nd R.I.R., 107th DIVISION.

Dispositions. The 2nd and 3rd Bns. held the line, each with 3 coys. forward, the other coys. being on the railway lines in E.26.d., E.26.c. and K.2.b. The reserve Bn. is some 4 km. in rear. The order of coys. from N. to S. was: 6, 7, 5, 10, 11 and 9th with 8th and 12th coys. in support. The sunken road in K.3.a. and c. is a centre of activity but the road in K.2.a. and the quarry are unoccupied. (P.S.).

Strength and Losses. Coy. strength vary from 25 to 70. Losses in the lines near the river have been fairly considerable, particularly as the result of T.M. fire. Losses this morning are said to have been heavy. (P.S.).

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 137th I.R., 108th DIVISION.

Order of Battle. N. to S. - 137th I.R., 265th R.I.R., 97th I.R.

Dispositions. The 3rd Bn. was holding the line with the 10th, 12th and 9th Coys. in that order from N. to S. Platoons of the 11th Coy. were allotted to both the 10th and 12th Coys., the remaining platoon being in a trench 300 yards in rear, N. of the ST. QUENTIN - AMIENS road. Two of the front line coys. were N. of this road and 1 south. The 1st Bn. was in support about 1 km. in rear in trenches and rifle pits. The 2nd Bn. was in reserve in the Ravine near the old ammunition dump behind LA MOTTE. The divisional artillery are in the valley N. and S. of WARFUSEE. The divisional pioneers are in the valley N. of WARFUSEE with 1 coy. in the chalk pit at P.36.c.8.8. (P.S.).

Reliefs. An inter-battalion relief (th. 2nd by the 3rd Bn.) occurred on the night 3/4th July. The tour in the line lasts 5 days. A divisional relief is imminent and the relieving division is said to be in the neighbourhood. (P.S.).

Various. The 108th Divn. has had severe losses since it came into the line in this sector.

There are 5 l.m.gs. per coy. (P.S.).

Commanders. 108th Divn. - Gen. Major CAMPE., 137th I.R., Oberst FROEGT. (P.S.).



4-7-18.

- 3a -

No. 181.

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 202nd R.I.R., 43rd RES. DIVN.Order of Battle. N. to S. - 203rd R.I.R., 201st R.I.R., 202nd R.I.R.Dispositions. The 3rd Bn. held the line with the 11th and 10th Coys. forward and the 9th and 12th in close support behind HAMEL. The 2nd Bn. is also in the line. The 1st Bn. is in reserve around Q.8.b.O.7.Reliefs. The 2nd Bn. came into the line on 18th June, the 3rd Bn. on 28th June. An inter-battalion relief is expected on July 5/6th. P.S.Strength and Casualties. 10th Coy. 85., 8th Coy. 70.

The heavy batteries east of HAMEL sustained heavy casualties and damage to their guns recently from our counter-battery work. (P.S.).

Drafts. On 1st May 200 men of 1919 class came to the 43rd Res. Divn., about 35 coming to the 10th Coy. (P.S.).Miscellaneous. There appears to be a certain amount of typhoid fever in the 43rd Res. Divn. and also Spanish influenza, the 8th Coy. having lost 20 men during the last 5 days out of 70. (P.S.).INFORMATION REGARDING THE 58th F.A.R. and 59th Res. F.A.R.Relief. The 58th F.A.R. is to relieve the 59th Res. F.A.R. in the line tonight.77th Reserve Division. The division has gone back to MERICOURT-sur-SOMME for the present. Its further movements are unknown.

*S. A. M. M. M.*  
for Brigadier-General,  
General Staff, Australian Corps.



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HEADQUARTERS  
25 JUL 1916  
THE AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE  
1 69

## Visit of French Prime Minister to the Australian Troops.

It will interest members of the AUSTRALIAN Corps to know how it was that the Prime Minister of France came up to visit us the other day and what he said.

When the Supreme Council of the Allies was sitting at Versailles the other day, and the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and England were present around the table, and all the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, it so happened that there came in, while they were deliberating there, the news of the battle of Hamel, and of the success that the Australian Troops had gained. All those present asked the Secretary to telegraph at once their congratulations to the Australians. But when it came to M. Clemenceau, the venerable Prime Minister of France, after starting to instruct the Secretary to telegraph his congratulations also, he said: "No, I will go and tell them myself."

M. Clemenceau is 78 years of age. Every Sunday he drives to some division of the French Army, goes to see them close up to the line, travelling hundreds of miles through the country in spite of his age. This Sunday he determined to come to an Australian Division. As the 4th Australian Division had been directing the operations at Hamel, he came to that. After chatting and laughing with the Officers and men who could be got together at short notice at Headquarters—as much at home amongst them as if he were a boy again—he said he would like to say a word or two to them on behalf of the French people. A number of the men were gathered into a rough semicircle, and the little Premier, "The Tiger," as he is known by the French, standing in front of them simply, without any attempt to flatter or over-do his praise of them, made them in English the following speech:—

"Gentlemen," he said, "I hope you will be kind enough to excuse my faulty English. I know only a little, but I find it very useful at this moment, this English, because it enables me to tell you what all the French people think of you. When the Australians came to France we expected a great deal of you. First, because we had heard of what you had done in war in Gallipoli; secondly, because we had heard a great deal of what you had accomplished in peace in your own country. The French people expected that when you came to France to fight in this great struggle, which, after all, is the same for the French, the English, the Australians and all those who have fought this great war out in the cause of freedom, which is the same for all, they expected a good deal of you; and I should not like to say that they have been surprised that you have fulfilled that expectation. They admired most the fact that you were capable of doing what they expected of you. The more they expected of you, the more they held it in admiration.

"Hamel—after all, that is not such a very great battle; but I am ready to hold that in a comparatively small battle the man, the fighting man, who goes in to give all he has—his home, his hopes, his life itself—in a small battle his qualities show in all the brighter light, the action of each individual man having more influence in the final result. In a very big action it is not possible to notice so well the qualities of particular men. Well, in this battle the Germans saw that they had before them men who came from far away to attest that wherever free people lived, in England, in France, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and all free countries, these were not ready to give way to the Boche who has acted with such barbarity—who wounded and killed not only men in battle, but women and old men and little children—who ruined and destroyed our country, our houses, our fruit trees, even our gardens.

"We have all been fighting beside each other here. It is such a wonderful thing that this should happen in history on these old fields of battle which you had read of in books, hearing of wars which you had not seen and the consequences of which you had never expected to see. It is a wonderful thing that you should be fighting beside us on these old battlefields of history. Still, it has come true. The work of our fathers, which we wanted to leave unharmed to our children, they tried to rob us of. They tried to take from us all that was dearest in modern society. But the free nations of the world said that the Boche should not do this so long as they were there to come and prevent it. Men were the same in England, in France, in Italy, and all the countries which are proud of being the home of a free people. And that is what you did. And that is what made us greet you when you came. We knew that you would fight a real fight. But we did not know that from the very beginning you would astonish the whole continent.

"I have come here just for the very purpose of seeing the Australians. I am going back to-morrow to see my countrymen and tell them: 'I have seen the Australians. I have looked in their eyes. I know that these men who have fought great battles beside us in the cause of freedom will fight alongside us again until the cause of freedom for which we are battling is safe for us and for our children.'"

The Australians who had been listening to this fine speech from the Grand Old Man of France, gave three tremendous cheers for France, which affected him greatly. He then called for three cheers for Australia, and left to go back to Paris.



Report on Operations carried out by 11th. Australian  
Infantry Brigade, 4th. July, 1918.

Map Reference: 82B.

This Brigade took over the defensive line from the River SOMME at J.54. Central South to P.8. Central, in conformity with Brigade Order No. 127.

Preparations as directed in "HAMEL Offensive" were carried out. Tapes were laid, supply dumps established, and all details were completed on or before Zero night 4th. July, 1918.

Personnel.- Infantry.

4 Battalions less Echelons, comprising approximately 8,000 men plus 3 Companies (800 men) of 131st. Regiment, U.S.A. Troops, who were attached to the Brigade for the operation.

Tanks.

53 Fighting Tanks of the 8th. and 13th. Tank Battalions plus two Supply Tanks used in transport of stores and munitions.

Objective.

The capture of the Village of HAMEL and re-establishment of the old French AMIENS line in P.4.b. and d., P.10.b. and d., as first line of resistance for our defences.

Dispositions and Tasks.

The 42nd. Battalion on the North, 43rd. on South of Brigade Sector which extended from the River SOMME to P.8. Central, to jump off together at Zero plus 4 minutes and follow barrage until first halt of 10 minutes at Zero plus 31 to 43 minutes. At this point 44th. Battalion to leap-frog through 43rd. Battalion and continue the advance, leaving HAMEL Village to be mopped up by 45rd. Battalion with the assistance of Tanks.

41st. Battalion, used as Brigade reserve, were located in J.31.a. and c., and P.1.a. and c.

Zero Hour.

Fixed at 5.10 a.m., 4th. July.

Weather.

Dry and warm, cloudy, somewhat delaying daybreak.

Assembly.

This was carried out in perfect order without casualties, and all men were lying up at their various positions in good time for the "jump off."

Taping. - This was done on Zero night, stakes having been driven into ground at intervals of 500 yards on the previous night. No difficulty was experienced in getting on to the correct line.

Flanking Units.

The 46th. Battalion, of 12th. Australian Infantry Brigade, held the line on our Northern flank and did not take part in the attack. The 15th. Battalion, of 4th. Australian Infantry Brigade, on our Southern flank attacked with us and advanced their line, taking all the high ground West of AGROCHE Wood in P.16.

Preliminary Bombardment.

Barraging Fire was opened by Artillery (H.E. and Smoke Shells) at 5.2 a.m. and under cover of this the Tanks moved up to their assembly positions from HAMELET Village.



The Attack.

At 3.10 a.m. our heavy barrage came down, and after 4 minutes' intense fire crept Eastward at the rate of 100 yards every 3 minutes closely followed by our Infantry, 43rd. Battalion on the right and 42nd. Battalion on the left, the 44th. Battalion closely following to clear enemy barrage area before his guns got going. This was successfully accomplished, but enemy barrage which began to fall about 3.20 a.m. was thin and scattered and did little damage.

At 3.41 a.m. barrage halted for 10 minutes to enable 44th. Battalion (who were closely following first wave) to leap-frog through 43rd. 42nd. Battalion at the first objective. The movement was well executed and the line was ready to move forward with barrage at 3.51 a.m. Artillery lifts now only 100 yards every 4 minutes.

The 43rd. Battalion closely followed, preceded by 3 Tanks detailed to assist in cleaning up Village of HAMEL. At this point 44th. Battalion divided, one portion going to the North the other to the South of Village. NOYHAMEL Wood on North of Village was cleaned up and trenches and Strong Points in HAMEL outskirts were captured during this enveloping movement with little opposition.

Two guns are reported as shooting short right throughout the operation, shells falling along the line P.8.b.4.8. through P.9. Central, and this caused heavy casualties to those detailed to follow in that locality.

Opposition was first encountered in locality of PEAR Trench about P.8.d., where a Machine Gun opened fire, but was quickly silenced by a Lewis Gunner named SHAW who fired two magazines from the hip, putting 3 of the crew out of action. An American Corporal rushed in and bayoneted the 3 remaining men. Opposition again met in P.9.c.3.8. and P.9.c.7.8. when SHAW again knocked an Enemy Machine Gun and crew out, killing an Officer.

At P.9.b.1.7. a Strong Point with about 50 enemy put up a short fight, but was bombed out of it and the post rushed - 15 enemy killed and 30 captured.

Strong Points and Dugouts in P.8.d. were quickly disposed of and occupants and defenders killed or captured.

Smoke shells were mixed with H.E. throughout in the barrage fire and provided cover for Tanks' movement, and also frightening the enemy into wearing his gas masks. Large numbers of enemy dead were found with their gas masks still on when mopping up HAMEL Village.

As the final objective was reached between 4.45 and 4.55 a.m., considerable enemy Machine Gun fire was experienced, but this was quickly overcome with the assistance of the Tanks which had joined up with the first wave during the 10 minutes' halt, and the final objective was reached a few minutes afterwards.

Tanks proceeded to clear up locality of our new front line, and consolidation of this new system of trenches was commenced with all speed. Meanwhile, the mopping up of HAMEL Village was proceeding. Dugouts in vicinity of P.8.d.6.0. found to be occupied were bombed and many enemy killed or taken prisoner.

Corporal SCHULTZ, of 43rd. Battalion, captured a Battalion Headquarters, consisting of 4 Officers and 23 Other Ranks, unaided, which tends to show how low the morale of the enemy had fallen.

It is estimated that 100 enemy were killed in HAMEL during the mopping up.

Tanks. - All reports are unanimous concerning the very fine services rendered by the Tanks, and great confidence is established in the rank and file of Infantry Units.

No difficulty was experienced in communicating with Tanks equipped with pull bells, but without bells effort to attract attention was unsuccessful.



Tanks (Continued).

At 5 a.m. to 5.15 a.m. the protective barrage gradually reduced in volume and finally died down, and the Tanks having completed their tasks withdrew, leaving three of their number stranded in the vicinity of HAMEL with minor defects - the result of enemy fire. These were afterwards repaired and safely withdrawn on the 5th instant.

The two Supply Tanks proved of exceptional value in transporting munitions to the forward dumps, enabling a large supply of Stokes shells to be delivered at front line directly the final objective was reached. A quantity of wire, S.A.A. and water was also transported to the dumps, and the men usually employed on the dangerous and exhausting duty of "carrying parties" were made available for other necessary work.

Aeroplanes.

During the attack our airmen maintained air superiority, completely dominating the air up to about 8 a.m. when most of our large squadron of 'planes disappeared.

During the morning S.A. Ammunition in boxes was delivered to Machine gunners in forward systems by aeroplanes, service parachutes being used, and some food supplies were also dropped by same means. Enemy 'planes were also observed delivering food supplies by this method, some of which was dropped over our trenches by mistake.

Between 9 and 11 a.m. thirty-one enemy 'planes were counted in the vicinity of our front line, and they caused much annoyance to our infantry by flying low over our lines and Machine gunning into the trenches. Two of our 'planes were driven down within our lines before our air dominance was again established by the return of a number of our fighting airmen.

Machine Guns.

The very excellent service rendered by Units of the Third Divisional Machine Gun Battalion, who were operating with the Brigade, was fully appreciated by the enemy. A strong protective barrage was supplied on S.O.S. lines during the enemy counter-attack on night of 4th/5th instant.

Communications.

The Signal Service withstood the very severe strain of heavy continuous traffic throughout and proved as efficient as could possibly be desired. No interruptions to the service were caused throughout, the means of transmission being "Line", "Visual", "Wireless", "Pigeons", "Runners" and "Message Rockets". The loop wireless set proved most efficient for forward working.

Half an hour after Zero hour speaking communication was provided and maintained to Forward Brigade Station near HAMEL at P.9.b.20.95., thus providing a means of relief for any congestion.

Medical Services.

The evacuation of the wounded was good, enemy prisoners being detailed as stretcher bearers on the way out to the cages.

Medical arrangements were all very thorough and a sufficient number of dressing stations provided for much larger casualties.

General.

During the day light desultory shelling of our front and support lines and HAMEL Village did not prevent our men from consolidating the newly won positions, and much necessary work was accomplished during hours of daylight.

Several times during the day our artillery shelled centres where enemy movement was reported.

At 11 a.m. enemy reported massing in P.16.b. and again at P.19.b. 95.50. at 11.32 a.m., and at P.16.d\*95.50 about 300 enemy with fixed bayonets seen about 11.55 a.m. All these parties were dispersed with artillery fire promptly and accurately placed.

The two Companies of 131st.I.R., U.S.A., troops allotted to the Brigade for the attack convinced all who saw them during the operation of their exceptional quality as fighting men. The same excellent fighting traits of strength, determination and bravery were everywhere manifested.



Night Counter-Attack.

At 10.30 p.m. on night of 4th. instant about 250 enemy were found to have moved up through a C.T. to a Strong Point in vicinity of P.11.a.3.6., from which point they strongly attacked "A" Coy. of 44th. Battalion, and, after a vigorous hand-to-hand contest with bombs and bayonets a lodging was effected into some of the numerous maze of trenches of that locality.

As soon as the serious nature of the attack was realised the S.O.S. Rocket was fired and our artillery barrage came down, thus preventing any reinforcing of the attacking party while it lasted.

Fighting continued in our trench system until 2.30 a.m., when the whole enemy party were driven out, killed, or taken prisoner.

1 Officer and 50 Other Ranks were taken prisoners and over 100 are estimated to have been killed. 10 Machine Guns were also taken from this party along with other war material. Lieutenants. P.O. GAZE, M.C., and J.R. CORNISH were in charge of the splendid parties detailed to eject the enemy, and they showed fine leadership and resource in their conduct of this difficult task.

Hostile Shelling.

During day following the attack only light enemy shelling took place, but throughout daylight hours of 5th. and 6th. instant persistent shelling of P.10.a. and b., HAMEL, and trenches in our old front line P.2. and 8. took place. Our counter-battery shooting frequently modified the intensity of this shelling, but many casualties were caused during this time.

Relief.

On the night of 5th/6th. July, 42nd. and 43rd. Battalions were relieved by the 45th. and 48th. Battalions, 12th. Australian Infantry Brigade, the 11th. Brigade Battalions returning to their old bivouacs at ALLOUVILLE and GARDONETTE.

On the night of 6th/7th. July, 44th. and 41st. Battalions were relieved by Battalions of 13th. Brigade, the 50th. Battalion relieving the 44th. Battalion in the front line system.

Busses were provided to convey these two Battalions to their billets in FRECHENECOURT and ALLOUVILLE, meeting them at VESQUEMONT at 9 a.m. on morning of the 7th. instant.

All U.S.A. troops attached to this Brigade were withdrawn on night 6th/7th. instant and returned to their Units.

For prisoners and material captured, and our casualties, see attached sheet.

Commanding Officers.

41st. Battalion. - Lieut.-Col. A.R. HERRON, D.S.O.  
 42nd. Battalion. - Major E.J. DIBDIN.  
 43rd. Battalion. - Lieut.-Col. J. FARWELL.  
 44th. Battalion. - Lieut.-Col. J.P. CLARK, D.S.O.

9th. July, 1918.  
 (R.B.)

*D.P. Gaze*  
 Intelligence Officer, 11th. Aust. Infantry Bde. Lieut.



# OUR LOSSES.

Unit.	Killed.		Wounded.		Injured.		Missing.		Gassed.		Total.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
41st. Battalion.		1		6							3	7.
42nd. Battalion.	2		1	47	1						7	48.
43rd. Battalion.	2	17	5	68	2		2		1		5	90.
44th. Battalion.		23	5	113			13				1	149.
11th. T.M. Battery.			1	2							3	2
U. S. A.		4	3	33			6					45.
Total	4	45	15	269	3		23		1		19	341 = 360.

## ENEMY LOSSES.

Personnel.	Officers.		O. R.	Material.	
Prisoners.	11		230.	Machine Guns, about	70.
Estimated prisoners captured by 43rd. and 44th. Battalions, but who passed through 4th. Bde. Collecting Station.	5		200.	Trench Mortars	13.
Estimated wounded prisoners passed through our Dressing Stations.	3		90.	Anti-Tank F. Piece (75 mm.)	1.
Killed during attack within Objective.	8		350.	Anti-Tank Rifles.	2.
Killed East of our Line by Artillery and during the counter-attack.	4		300.	Minenwerfer Ammunition.	600.
Total	31		1,170.	S. A. A.	155,000.
				German Rifles, uncounted.	
				Engineering material.	
				A large quantity of Signalling Apparatus and Stores.	

NOTE:- A German disposition map captured during the attack on HAMEL indicated that the above figures would be well within the probable Enemy losses.

APPENDIX



ACTION OF 11th. A.M.G. COY. IN HAMEL OFFENSIVE, JULY 4th., 1918.July, 2nd. 1918.APPROACH MARCH.

The 11th. A.M.G. Coy. plus one composite section made up from the other Companies of the 3rd. A.M.G. Battalion marched out from camp at ALLONVILLE at 3.30 p.m. on 2/7/18, via QUERRIEU to BUSSY-les-DAOURS, which was reached at 5.30 p.m. Here the men rested and had a hot meal, after which at 10 p.m. the Coy., less 2 Sections under Lieuts. WHITE and HUXTABLE, continued its march to the line via AUBIGNY, FOUILLOY and HAMELET, positions in the support line being taken up by 2 a.m. 3/7/18.

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.July 3rd. 1918.

Company Headquarters established at U.31.b.90.60.

While the men rested in the trenches the officers made their final reconnaissance and arrangements for the assembly, and on this night 48 hours' rations, over and above their iron rations, were issued to the men.

DISPOSITIONS.

Twelve guns were detailed to go forward with the advancing Infantry, four of which, under Lieuts. BUNN and FORBES were to go forward to the final objective; one section under Lieuts. BATES and CARLSON, and another under Lieuts. HARDING and BALL being detailed for the first objective. The remaining section of the 11th. Coy. and the composite section under Lieuts. WHITE and HUXTABLE respectively were detailed to proceed to prepared positions at U.34.a.70.20 (K) and U.34.a.92.00 (L).

ASSEMBLY.

The twelve advancing guns assembled with the reserve Companies of the 42nd. and 44th. Battalions.

TEAMS AND STORES.

Each advancing gun team consisted of one N.C.O. and 7 men, and carried the following stores in addition to the gun:-

1 Tripod and spare parts.

16 Filled Belts.

2 Picks.

2 Shovels.

32 Sandbags.

32 Grenades.

2 Tins of water.

FIRST DISPOSITION.

Final Objective; The advance was made without much difficulty and the four guns for the final objective got to their positions and were mounted along the line of consolidation, covering the front with bands of fire in conjunction with the Lewis Guns. 4000 rounds of bulk S.A.A. were obtained for each gun. Three captured Maxim Guns were also mounted in this line.

FIRST OBJECTIVE.

Four guns were sited in P.3.d. North of the village of HAMEL covering the spurs to the North of the village and the exits. Four guns were sited South of the village performing the same duty on that side of the village. In addition to these direct fire tasks, these guns put down an S.O.S. barrage in P.11.d. Each of these eight guns had 8000 rounds S.A.A. in bulk.

REPORTS.

Immediately the guns were in position their dispositions and fields of fire were forwarded to C.H.Q. on a message map, these reports being in within an hour of Zero. Later, when the line of consolidation was definitely fixed, a further message map was sent in showing any alteration made.

LIAISON.

Close touch was maintained throughout the operation with the Infantry Commanders.



ACTION ON 11th. A.M.G. COY. IN HAMEL OFFENSIVE, JULY 4th, 1918.

TARGETS.

After the objectives were reached no machine gun targets presented themselves.

BARRAGE BATTERY.

The two barrage sections (K and L Batteries) moved into their positions on the night of 3/4th. July, 1918, and were able to lay out their Zero lines in daylight. They maintained neutralising fire in front of the 18 pdr. barrage on strong points in and about HAMEL, expending about 43,000 rounds.

CASUALTIES.

The total casualties for the 3rd. A.M.G. Battalion for the operation were:-

Killed 3 Other Ranks.

Wounded 10 Other Ranks.

GENERAL.

On night 4/5th. July, 1918, S.O.S. went up at 10.17 p.m. and our forward guns fired 12,000 rounds (5,000 German), K. and L. batteries 24,500 and the eight support guns 12,000. The arrangements for the attack were excellent and well carried out, especially the work of the tanks in bringing up S.A.A. and other stores. The dropping of S.A.A. by Aeroplanes for forward guns was not such a success, as the parachutes drifted to the west of HAMEL.

The German Machine Gunners were very quick getting up from their deep dugouts, and getting their guns into action after the barrage had passed.

On one occasion the Brigade on our right was held up for a time creating a distinct gap, which Lieut. HARDING covered by putting No. 12 Gun in position immediately.

This shows the necessity for the Commanders of the support guns being fully alive to their responsibility of their job, not merely to push forward to their objective as speedily as possible, but to be ready to put a gun or more if necessary into position immediate and cover the exposed flank in front with enfilade fire.

The Company claim having taken ten prisoners in the first objective on right of HAMEL and brought out of the line four captured Light Machine Guns. When relieved the Brigade on our left had not completely linked up. The Company was relieved at 11 p.m. night 7/8th. July, 1918.

(Signed) A.C. BLACKLOW, Lt.-Col. Commanding, 3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion.

FIRST OBJECTIVE.

Four guns were sited in P.S.D. North of the village of HAMEL covering the square to the north of the village and the exits. Four guns were sited south of the village performing the same duty on that side of the village. In addition to these direct fire tasks, these guns put down S.O.S. barrage in P.S.D. Each of these eight guns had 3000 rounds S.A.A. in bulk.

REPORTS.

Immediately the guns were in position their dispositions and fields of fire were forwarded to G.H.Q. on a message map, these reports being in within an hour of zero. Later, when the line of consolidation was definitely fixed, a further message map was sent in showing any alteration made.

LIAISON.

Close touch was maintained throughout the operation with the


Infantry Commanders.



VAIRE WOOD.

3<sup>RD</sup> M. G. B N. GROUP.

Parts of 62° N.E. & 62° S.E.



Approximate British Front Line \_\_\_\_\_ 22-6-18

**TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION  
RECEIVED UP TO 24-6-18.**



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APPENDIX

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NOTES ON THE ENEMY  
OPPOSITE THE CORPS FRONT.

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- (1) ENEMY'S DEFENCES.
- (2) ORDER OF BATTLE.
- (3) ATTITUDE.
- (4) SHORT HISTORY OF DIVISIONS OPPOSITE  
THE CORPS FRONT.

APPENDIX

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS.



(1) ENEMY'S DEFENCES.

Up till recently the enemy has displayed little energy in the construction of forward defences opposite the Corps Front, and as yet there are no signs of new work in the immediate back areas at all.

During the past few weeks, however, there are increasing indications that he intends to develop a complete two line system with the usual saps, dugouts, and communication trenches. In certain areas the work is nearing completion and a considerable defence scheme is evidently contemplated, the tendency being to link up the already existing chains of rifle pits and incorporate them in the trench lines.

From the report of patrols, there is no doubt that wire obstacles do exist, but they appear to be hastily improvised and should not afford any great obstacle.

The only work on rear defences has been on the old French line, which has been cleaned out in places and wired. This should prove quite an effective line of resistance when the work is completed. Mined dugouts have been constructed in numerous places in the forward and battery areas, particularly in the sides of embankments for protection against our artillery fire.

(2) ORDER OF BATTLE.50th Reserve Division.

230th R.I.R.  
229th R.I.R.  
231st R.I.R.

The 50th Reserve Division came into the MEAULTE Sector at the end of May, relieving the 54th Reserve Division. Its southern boundary is the River ANCRE.

107th Division.

52nd R.I.R.  
227th R.I.R.  
232nd R.I.R.

This division relieved the 54th Division on 20/21st June in the MORLANCOURT sector.

43rd Reserve Division.

203rd R.I.R.  
201st R.I.R. (?)  
202nd R.I.R.

This division relieved the 24th Reserve Division in the SOMME sector on June 22/23rd, but it is probable that, unlike the latter division, it has 2 regiments north of the SOMME, not one, owing to the sidslipping further south.

77th Reserve Division.

332nd I.R.  
419th E.R.R.  
257th R.I.R.

This division relieved the 108th Division in the HAMEL Sector on 16/17th May. Its relief has been imminent since the beginning of the month.



108th Division.

137th I.R.  
265th R.I.R.(?)  
97th I.R.

This division relieved the Jager Division in the VILLERS BRETONNEUX Sector on 19/20th June and is due for relief. Previous to this it had been in the HAMEL Sector, where it relieved the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division on April 30th, the relief of the Jager Division being effected by sideslipping. For the first half of May the 2nd Bn., 265th R.I.R. was attached to the 107th R.I.R., 24th Reserve Division, north of the SOMME.

(3) ATTITUDE.

The enemy's general attitude is obscure in this area. North of the SOMME, there seems little doubt that he is apprehensive of further operations on our part similar to those at VILLE-sur-ANCRE and north of SAILLY LAURETTE, and this nervousness has led to the hasty construction of a defence system during the past few weeks, with which he was content to dispense for so long. This and the appearance of trench mortars of heavier calibres point to a passive attitude, at any rate for the time being, though the absence of any rear organisations for defence seems to indicate that his present attitude is temporary.

South of the SOMME, the enemy's intentions are still more obscure and have been complicated by the recent sideslipping northwards, and the temporary withdrawal of the 265th R.I.R. from the 108th Division. This regiment was apparently the least shattered in the division and its withdrawal must have imposed a heavy strain on the two other and weaker regiments which had to hold their own sectors in addition, though there was an unconfirmed rumour that they had been reinforced by a battalion from another division.

To sum up, the attitude of the enemy is, at any rate for the present, purely defensive and he is apprehensive of our intentions. This attitude is abundantly disclosed by the frequent bombing of his own wire, amongst other signs of nervousness, and in general by the policy implied by his defensive works.



- 8 -

(4) 107th Division.

Engagements. After being on the Galician Front till 1917, the 107th Division proceeded to the Western Front. It has just arrived in the CAMBRAI area where our attack on the CAMBRAI front took place.

On the 20th November, 1917, the 107th Division was drawn into the battle and lost heavily in prisoners. It took part in the German advance south of the CAMBRAI area on the 30th November and remained in the GONNELIEU sector till March of this year. It participated in the advance on the SOMME, on the 21st March and was relieved south of MERCATEL on the 20th April.

After resting and training near CAMBRAI it came into line in the MORLANCOURT Sector on 16th May and remained in the line until the 23rd. It suffered heavily from our raids and artillery fire, particularly in our attack on VILLE-sur-ANCRE on the 18th May, when 150 prisoners were captured from one regiment alone. It went into rest near CAMBRAI until the 21st June when it again returned to the MORLANCOURT Sector.

Quality. The moral of the 107th Division is fair but it is not a good fighting division.

108th Division.

Engagements. The 108th Division was on the Eastern Front - GALICIA - till the end of 1917. At the beginning of April of this year it came into the line at WINTERBERG in the VOSGES and was relieved on the 13th April and went into rest at JUVENCOURT.

It came into line on the SOMME front near MARCELOUVE at the beginning of May and relieved the Jager Division by sideslipping northwards about May 18th. The 265th R.I.R. suffered heavily during its tour in the line, particularly in our operation on the 10th June.

It was last identified on the 22nd. inst. and is probably now relieved.

Quality. The moral of the 108th Division is good. As a fighting division it is not of the best as it has spent most of its time on the RUSSIAN Front.

43rd Reserve Division.

Engagements. The 43rd Reserve Division was first engaged in October, 1914, in the First Battle of YPRES. Part of the division remained in BELGIUM, proceeding to SERBIA about July, 1915. The remainder of the division was seriously engaged in the fighting about SOUCHEZ during the French offensive. One regiment lost 26 officers and 1320 men during the fighting. About the beginning of July elements of the division took part in the Mackensen offensive in POLAND, and one regiment, during 4 months, lost 63 officers and 3511 men.

After a short spell in SERBIA, the division returned to the Western Front, and was heavily engaged in the VERDUN fighting in February and March, 1916. It took part in the German counter-offensive in RUSSIA in June. In 1917 the 43rd Reserve Division took part in the fighting on the CHEMIN DES DAMES (July and August, 1917) and suffered severe losses. After another tour in RUSSIA it returned to the Western Front and took part in the LYS advance remaining in the line near FESTUBERT till the end of April. It went into rest near CAMBRAI and trained for 3 weeks and came into the line in the MORLANCOURT Sector about the 21st inst.

Quality. The 43rd Reserve Division has always been considered a good fighting unit. It is drawn from the depots of guard regiments and consequently contains "human material" of good quality.

In the end of 1917 it was used as a special counter-attack division. Owing however, to its many engagements and heavy losses, it has frequently been reconstituted.



77th Reserve Division.

Engagements. The 77th Reserve Division was first engaged on the Eastern Front taking part in the fighting at the It proceeded later in the year to GALICIA where it remained till the beginning of 1917, when it went into line on the RIGA front. In January, 1918, the division was transferred to the Western Front being in reserve in LORRAINE and later went into line in the WOEVRE. It moved up to the SOMME front in April, 1918, and went into the line on the 23rd of that month in the VILLERS BRETONNEUX sector where it suffered heavily in our counter-attack on the 24th April, both in casualties and prisoners. It was withdrawn at the end of May and rested till the 17th June when it was again in the line in the HAMEL Sector. It has suffered severely from our gas and artillery shoots.


Quality. The 77th Reserve Division is of poor quality and the moral is not good. One regimental commander was removed during April for giving vent to utterances prejudicial to moral.



1:20,000 N°17 HOSTILE BATTERY POSITIONS BRAY 15.6.18

EDITION I.

Parts of 62° NE  
62° SE





1



12-0-18

Edition 1

APPENDIX 53




BAYONVILLERS

Parts of 62°N.W., 62°N.E., 62°S.W. & 62°S.E.

EDITION I.

1:20,000

HEAVY ARTILLERY  
BARRAGE MAP  
HAMEL OFFENSIVE  
SECRET  
JULY 1918



Approximate British Front Line ——— 22-6-18

Scale 1:20,000

TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION  
RECEIVED UP TO 24-6-18.



153.  
153.  
MERICOURT.

Scale: 1:40,000

FIELD SURVEY C. R. E. (3810) 18-6-18.

# PROBABLE DISPOSITIONS — OF ENEMY TROOPS —

Between DERNANCOURT & VILLERS BRETONNEUX.

1-7-18

1 Com. 1 Batt

## RESERVES

54<sup>TH</sup> R.D.

54<sup>TH</sup> DIV

1<sup>ST</sup> DIV

24<sup>TH</sup> R.D.

233<sup>RD</sup> DIV

In Reserve

Montauban

50<sup>TH</sup> R.D.

231<sup>ST</sup> R.I.R.

52<sup>ND</sup> R.I.R.

In Reserve

227<sup>TH</sup> R.I.R. (Dispositions unknown)

In Reserve

? 232<sup>ND</sup> R.I.R.

? 203<sup>RD</sup> R.I.R. In Support

In Reserve

201<sup>ST</sup> R.I.R. (Dispositions unknown)

202<sup>ND</sup> R.I.R.

232<sup>ND</sup> R.I.R.

In Support

419<sup>TH</sup> I.R.

257<sup>TH</sup> I.R.

137<sup>TH</sup> I.R.

? 265<sup>TH</sup> R.I.R. (Dispositions unknown)

27<sup>TH</sup> I.R.

? In Support

109<sup>TH</sup> Div?

CORPS T.O. SECTION.

107<sup>TH</sup> DIV.

43<sup>RD</sup> R.D. DIV.

77<sup>TH</sup> RES. DIV.

108<sup>TH</sup> DIV.

Reserve Caffy Area

Reserve Q.6.a.

? In Reserve

In Reserve  
N. of Proyard



