

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/11/21 PART 1

**Title:** 11th Infantry Brigade

August 1918 Appendices



AWM4-23/11/21PART1



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**Australian Imperial Force.**

**WAR DIARY**

OF

11th A I Bde

FOR

August 1918



Signature of Officer compiling

D. P. Fraser

Signature of Officer Commanding

L. A. Casey Major  
Bde Major W. A. Anderson Bde



August 1918.

WAR DIARY

11th A.I. Bde

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Reference sheet 62

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie	1st		Brigade holding line immediately east of Hamel, River Somme	
Chateau			Brigade Northern Boundary. Heavy shelling by both sides during the day, reported. Active patrolling by our men at night, no enemy encountered. Today General Cannan attended conference at Bussy to discuss outline of offensive to be made on this front on or before 8th inst. The Bde sector which owing to rearrangement of Divisional Bde, was taken over partially from the 9th Brigade from 10th Bde as garrisoned by troops of the 42nd & 44th Bns.	App 3
"	2nd		Normal artillery activity. 7 patrols operated but no enemy encountered. Conference of COs of Bns held this afternoon at Bde HQ. Weather fine to discuss probable offensive on about 8 inst. A great advance is anticipated on about 50 miles of frontage by French troops in the front Australian & English troops on north.	
"	3rd		Artillery less active than on previous days. Front actively patrolled but no enemy seen. Weather showery. Information re the offensive made known to officers & NCO of Bns.	
"	4th		Normal artillery activity during day. Tonight in view of the forthcoming offensive the 10th Bde. sidesteps northwards and garrisons the whole of the 3rd Divisional sector, which action relieves the units of this Brigade concerned.	(See Bde order No 131 App. No 1)



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WAR DIARY of 11th A.I. Bde.

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Ref. Sheet 62 D.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Corbie area.	5 <sup>th</sup>		This morning Bde HQ moved from Chateau Corbie, which was taken over by 4 <sup>th</sup> Aust. Div. Hdqrs, and established at Red Chateau at 1.30. c. 6.5. Units are now comfortably housed in and around Corbie, according to areas allotted them as per Brigade Order No 131.	App. 1.
"	5 <sup>th</sup>		Training for offensive in progress, and conference of COs by GOC held at Bde HQ. Tonight the enemy heavily attacked the English troops holding Sailly-Laurette sector, penetrating to supply lines & capturing 100 men.	
"	6 <sup>th</sup>		Battalions are now being coached in their various tasks for the impending operation. Brigade staff are very busy reconnoitering the ground and establishing forward dumps etc.	
"	7 <sup>th</sup>		Tonight the troops on our left counter-attacked, <del>captured</del> retaking ground lost on previous night. Final arrangements are made, General Cannan and staff tonight moved forward <del>to</del> and established Brigade HQ at P. 4. a. 5.5. All units taking emergency tracks laid out by 11th Fd Coy Engrs. have occupied their assembly positions. Some uneasiness was caused this evening by news that the enemy had again attacked & captured the front line system on the 18th Divisional front, but an immediate counter-attack by that division re-established the situation, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the British troops during enemy assault.	

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Ref. Sheet. 62<sup>D</sup>

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Hamel.	8 <sup>th</sup>		<p>About 1 hour before the Zero hour, the troops were assembled on the jumping off tape, this was carried out without confusion, and the men arrived fresh and fit.</p> <p>4.20 am. Zero hour. A heavy fog made observation impossible, and when infantry and tanks commenced their advance, it was difficult to maintain direction and keep touch on the flanks. However to this mist we owe a great amount of protection and the exceedingly light casualties inflicted by the enemy.</p> <p>The 42<sup>nd</sup> Bn attacked along the south bank of the River Somme on a frontage of 750 yards, and the 44<sup>th</sup> on the south flank on a front of 1250 yards; the 41<sup>st</sup> Bn + 1 coy of 43<sup>rd</sup> was in support and the 43<sup>rd</sup> in Reserve. When the 42<sup>nd</sup> &amp; 44<sup>th</sup> Bns reached a line about 200 yards east of the GAILLY-INARFUSEE Road, the 41<sup>st</sup> Bn leaptfrogged through the 44<sup>th</sup> and with the 42<sup>nd</sup> continued the advance. The attack was pressed home according to plan and the enemy surrendered in large numbers.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JLH</p>	<p>app. 4.</p>



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Ref. Sheet. 62<sup>D</sup>

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme.	8 <sup>th</sup> cont <sup>d</sup>	7.30 am	<p>Information came through that the green line had been reached and consolidation commenced; the 9<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde on our Right also reached their objective according to plan; the 174<sup>th</sup> English Bde on the North of the Somme met heavy resistance at Malard Wood which stopped their advance, and later hampered to a large extent the operations of the 4<sup>th</sup> Bde.</p> <p>On capture of GREEN LINE Bde HQ moved forward to P. 17.6.9.2 and remained there till zero + 7 hours.</p> <p>At zero + 4 hours the 4<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde approached through our Brigade and the 12<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde through the 9<sup>th</sup> Bde, and continued the advance. The 4<sup>th</sup> Bde reached their objective in good time capturing many prisoners and much material. Casualties were inflicted on our men by Enemy enfilade fire from the left flank, which was left open owing to the partial success of the 174<sup>th</sup> Bde.</p> <p>At zero + 7 hrs. Brigade Hdqrs. moved to dugout in our front line system east of Hamel at P. 10.6.95.17, which place had been used by this Bde as a cable head for the operation; the Battalion Hqs. moved from their positions in P. 4 &amp; P. 10 and established themselves in localities allotted to them in enemy territory.</p>	See Narrative



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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Ref. Sheet 622

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme.	9 <sup>th</sup>		Brigade resting in positions as occupied during advance of yesterday.	
Bde HQ			This afternoon the 131 <sup>st</sup> Regt. of Americans, passed through the 174 <sup>th</sup> English Brigade and continued the advance from MALARD WOOD at which point the English were held up yesterday; this operation entailed the capture of the village of Chippilly, a place strongly defended by enemy machine guns. - Heavy shelling of the roads & approaches by Chippilly & Malard wood by enemy large calibre guns made the attack difficult but the fine spirit of the men prevailed and enemy were driven out of their MG positions & captured & destroyed. - A fine view of the operation & battle was obtained by this Bde situated only a mile away on Southern heights of River Somme.	
"	10 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup> Noon	A verbal message was received from Div. HQ that this Bde was to relieve the 4 <sup>th</sup> Bde on the BLUE LINE. Reconnaissances were immediately carried out by Bde & Bn staffs. On returning to HATTEL General Cannan met the Divisional Commander who explained the operations to be carried out by 3rd Aust Div. H. tonight. During	

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Ref Sheet 620

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme Morecourt Village	10 <sup>th</sup> cont'd		<p>a hurriedly assembled conference, the <del>the</del> detailed action of this Brigade was set out. Relief was carried out without incident during the night. The following are the dispositions: 41<sup>st</sup> Right line battalion, 43<sup>rd</sup> Left line battalion, 42<sup>nd</sup> support and 44<sup>th</sup> reserve, supported by the 11<sup>th</sup> M.G. Coy with 16 Guns, and 2 mortars with each battalion. Brigade Command Post was established at Q 24. a 3.3. at 11 pm; but at 1 am word was received that the operation to be undertaken by the 10<sup>th</sup> Bde, and with which <del>we</del> were to cooperate, had failed, so it was at once decided that no action would be taken by this Bde, and General Cannon &amp; staff moved back to their Headquarters situated in dugout at MORECOURT.</p> <p>During the night our men were harassed by enemy bombing <del>and</del> machine gun fire from enemy planes, and shell fire, of which the village of Morecourt received a liberal portion.</p>	

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Ref. Sheet 62D.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme Marcourt	11 <sup>th</sup>	8.30 pm	<p>Today arrangements are made for 41<sup>st</sup> Bn to attack and capture that portion of the AMIENS line south of River not occupied by us.</p> <p>Zero hour which had been fixed for 8.15 pm was postponed 15 minutes to allow for artillery to arrange the barrage. After a hard fight in which many enemy were killed, the objective was gained and about 2 officers &amp; 200 O.R. prisoners remained in our hands.</p> <p>This operation is fully described in narrative appended.</p> <p>The peninsula directly to north of Mercourt Village and Mercourt village were captured in this operation.</p> <p>The 42<sup>nd</sup> Bn moved forward and occupied the trenches vacated by the 41<sup>st</sup> Bn thus forming a defensive switch should any accident prevent the successful performance of 41 operations.</p>	
	12 <sup>th</sup>		<p>(11/12<sup>th</sup>)</p> <p>During the night the Brigade front was extended southwards the southern portion being occupied by 42<sup>nd</sup> Bn, thus at 3 am the dispositions were 41<sup>st</sup> on left with 43<sup>rd</sup> in support; 42<sup>nd</sup> on right with 44<sup>th</sup> in support.</p> <p>At daylight the 43<sup>rd</sup> Bn mopped up area, in rear of 41<sup>st</sup> and bounded on west and north by the Somme River.</p>	



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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Amme	12th		During the <del>forenoon</del> <sup>after-</sup> noons patrols from 41st & 42nd Bns established themselves on a general line R.15. cent R.9. cent east of PROYART.	
Morcourt	12th			
		11.15 am.	Word was received from Division that the Brigade would be relieved <del>at</del> tonight. During the day 42nd Bn came in contact with the enemy holding St Germain Wood, this wood they captured together with about 60 prisoners.	
		7.30 pm.	One Coy of the 42nd Bn had established itself on the outpost line through R.15 cent & R.9. cent, and the 44th had moved up into the position vacated by the 42nd.	
			During <del>the</del> today's fighting 110 prisoners were brought in making a total for two days of 2 officers and 350 O.R. (British)	
			Tonight the 51st Brigade 17th Division relieved this Brigade and our Bns moved out to areas in valleys east of Hamet	

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Ref Sheet 62D

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme.	13 <sup>th</sup>	4.15 am	Relief complete. Brigade is now assembled in the HAMEL Area. Bde HQ in dugouts previously occupied by us at P.19.6.95.17. Lt Col Wooler who has been <del>in command</del> as Liaison Officer with Corps during the past week has again taken command of his Bn 42 <sup>nd</sup> - Units resting & bathing their men. Weather fine and warm.	
Hamel.	14 <sup>th</sup>		Brigade resting <del>and</del> A reconnaissance of route to the southern sector of Corps frontage Hartman. Leans area being made by Bga & Bn officers as this is expected to be sector of our future activities.	
Veret.	15 <sup>th</sup>		Brigade resting. - General Cannan held a conference of Bn CO's adjutants & company Commanders to discuss points of last offensive and probabilities for the future. Every plane making regular bombing raids in our locality.	



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WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Map Ref  
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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Hamel Locality Hamp in Aug out P1069517	16		<p>11 Aug 2 Bde</p> <p>Brigade meeting and doing light training with plenty of talking in river Somme - Hot bath with charge 7, underwear is also provided to all the men. Enemy bombing planes visit this locality nightly and drop loads of bombs - Special care is therefore taken to keep all lights screened. Very large stores of enemy Very lights have been captured by our operations and much amusement is obtained by the men by firing off these off. Every night - beautiful displays are given and our aviators returning over our sector to their aerodrome were apparently <sup>at first</sup> much puzzled by these displays. Weather warm &amp; sunny - Brigade &amp; Bn officers reconnoitering the Southern frontage of our Air Corps area in view of possibility of <del>from</del> taking over that sector from 2 Bde. -</p> <p>J. L. Fraser</p>	
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# WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Map Ref.

Sheet 62 D

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
HQ in Aug Out P. 4.6.95.17 + John at J286 P.3	18		11 Am Liffy Bgan Bright Sunny warm weather. Brigade received instructions to move over to North side of river and establish HQ at Paddy's L. L. C. and the various units in selected places in area surrounding. All were duly transferred and comfortably located before dark. Brigade Order 133. Bgan HQ established in Aug Out on North side of village at J286 P.3. 131 Regt of U.S. troops <del>had</del> <del>HQ in our late August</del> who were relieved from the Liffey force to which they had been attached on N side of river. established their HQ in our late Aug Out at P. 10.6.95.17 The 11 Bde. now Divisional reserve to 9th Bde. having gone into the line near Bray with 3 Bn. Div. Pioneer on right flank holding the E. H. N. E. peninsula frontage. - 10 Bde. in Support	app. 1.
Paddy L. C. J286 P.3	19			

J. L. Fraser



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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Ref. Sheet 62 D. 3  
" 62 C

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SAILLY-le-SEC J28683	20th		Brigade resting in bivouacs in Sailly-le-sec - Sailly Lavette area. Orders received to be ready for active operations within 24 hours. Conference of COs with G.O.C. held, to discuss probable employment.	
"	21st		Further conferences of COs Battalions with G.O.C. Brigade, held. Definite instructions were given this evening to move Brigade up to Assembly Lines 3000 to 4000 yards west of Bray, early tomorrow morning. Units holding Divisional Front at present are 9th A.I. Bde on Left. 3rd Pioneer Bn on Right.	
	22nd		This morning B. units of this Bde moved into their respective assembly places, difficulties experienced and some casualties sustained owing to heavy enemy shelling of localities. Dispositions of Battalions are:- 44th & 43rd Bns are Right and Left Forward Bns respectively, 42nd Support Battalion, 41st Reserve Bn. At 8 am General bannak and Staff moved forward from Sailly-le-sec and established Bde Hdqrs in dugout at K.24.d.1.6. Battalion Hdqrs as follows:- 41st Bn. K.24.central, 42nd Bn. 43rd Bn. K.22.d.1.6, 44th Bn. At 6.30 pm. during Conference of COs with G.O.C. at Bde H.Q. news of English retirement of 1000 yards on our Left flank, came through	See Narrative Attached



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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Ref. Sheets 625.  
+62C

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme.	22 <sup>nd</sup>	cont'd	Battalions were at once disposed to form a defensive flank to cope with this new situation. The Enemy unable to maintain his attack, the situation became normal again at 10pm. The enemy in possession of Happy Valley, and units ordered to take up original positions.	
	23 <sup>rd</sup>		2am. Battalions again in Assembly positions; and rested as much as possible during remainder of day.	
	24 <sup>th</sup>	1am	10th Brigade attacked & captured the village of Bray establishing a defensive line 500 yards East of that village, the English troops succeeded in reestablishing their line East of Happy Valley, capturing over 100 prisoners in the operation.	
		4.30pm	Conference of COs with GOC held at Bde H.Q. to give final details of attack tomorrow morning, (the capture of the high ground in L. 5, L. 7, L. 18. & L. 24.	
		9pm	Units commenced to move forward to assembly positions, 43 <sup>rd</sup> & 44 <sup>th</sup> Left & Right attacking Bns respectively, 41 <sup>st</sup> Bn Brigade Reserve and 42 <sup>nd</sup> exploiting Battalion.	
		Mid night	General Cannan and Staff moved forward and established Bde. Adgrs at L. 14. to 23. <del>consisting of a</del> consisting of a German Bunker in an old Quarry.	

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme	24 <sup>th</sup> Contd.		41 <sup>st</sup> & 42 <sup>nd</sup> Bns' Headquarters were established at L 8 c 25, 43 <sup>rd</sup> at L 14 b 4.7 & 44 <sup>th</sup> Bn HQ at L 19 a 16.	
"	25 <sup>th</sup>	230 am	Zero hour. Our barrage good, enemy retaliation weak, not impeding progress of our troops.	
		3 am	Thick fog settled over whole area.	
		355 am	Success signal received. Battalions reached all objectives, very little opposition met with, 44 <sup>th</sup> Bn only took 3 prisoners. 42 <sup>nd</sup> Bn passed through 44 <sup>th</sup> on final objective and exploited to a depth of 1000 yards.	
		10 am	Fog lifted.	
		12 noon	Brigade having been ordered to make a further advance, assaulting Bns (43 <sup>rd</sup> & 44 <sup>th</sup> ) moved forward to high ground in L 5 & L 11, on reaching crest were met with heavy enemy MG & field gun barrage.	
			Battalion files were again established as follows:- 41 <sup>st</sup> L 5 c 15-05, 42 <sup>nd</sup> L 11 b 3.7, 43 <sup>rd</sup> L 4 d 2.7 and 44 <sup>th</sup> at L 10 d 1.7.	
		10 pm	43 <sup>rd</sup> & 44 <sup>th</sup> attacked. Touch with 7 <sup>th</sup> LONDONs on left of 43 <sup>rd</sup> was difficult to maintain necessitated a defensive flank, but ultimately a line was established as follows:- A 25 d 65.30, A 26 c 20.00, G 2 a 30.30, G 2 c 15.80, G 2 c 20.00 to G 9 a 20.80.	



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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Ref Sheet 625  
+62c

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Somme.	26 <sup>th</sup>	noon	10 <sup>th</sup> & 11 <sup>th</sup> Bdes attacked to establish the 'C' line, 4 <sup>th</sup> 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn on left and 4 <sup>th</sup> 4 <sup>th</sup> Bn on Right. 4 <sup>th</sup> 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn were temporarily held up by heavy MG fire from Hutment in A. 27. d, Manicourt Valley and Copse "C", however 4 <sup>th</sup> 1 <sup>st</sup> continued the advance passing through 4 <sup>th</sup> 3 <sup>rd</sup> at 11 pm, all objectives being gained.	
"	27 <sup>th</sup>	4.55 am	4 <sup>th</sup> 1 <sup>st</sup> Bn attacked in conjunction with 174 <sup>th</sup> Bde on left, and met with heavy resistance, but by the excellent use of their Machine Guns and Trench Mortars pressed on and established their objective at 8.5 am. During the day a great deal of sniping took place, in which our men maintained the superiority. Relief of this Brigade by 9 <sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde commenced tonight.	
	28 <sup>th</sup>	2.30 am	Relief complete. Brigade resting. 4 <sup>th</sup> 2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn became Reserve Bn to 9 <sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde, having H.Q. in Quarry in B. 25. c.	
	29 <sup>th</sup>	3 pm	During morning Brigade rested. Bde Hdqrs and units moved to bivouacs <del>in</del> North of Suzanne. Bde H.Q. established at A. 26. b 70.00. also H.Q. 4 <sup>th</sup> 1 <sup>st</sup> Bn in Tangny Wood in A. 29. a. 4 <sup>th</sup> 4 <sup>th</sup> Bn H.Q. near "L" Copse in C. 3. a with Troops in V.P.U. Wood. 11 <sup>th</sup> L. Bn Bde near Bde H.Q. <del>Today the 4<sup>th</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Bn returned from leave.</del>	

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Somme.	30th		Brigade resting. 42nd Bn in reserve to 9th A.I. Bde. Col. Aaron and Major Vasey to day left on English leave. Capt. St Jackson, G.S.O. III Division has taken over <del>the</del> B Coy's duties, this Bde, during Major Vasey's absence.	
"	31st		With further offensive operations in view, the Brigade moved forward this afternoon to relieve 9th A.I. Bde. in the line. Bde. HQ are now at Earthworks Copn H 3.677 north of them. Operations commence tomorrow morning.	
<p><u>Note</u> Particulars and further details of operations are contained in the appended narratives.</p>				
<p>D. L. Frazer.</p>				



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## WAR DIARY

OF

11<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde

FOR

August 1918

## LIST OF APPENDICES.

No.	Subject.
1.	Bde Orders
2.	Offensive
3.	Intelligence
4.	Narratives
5.	Laudatory.
6.	Maps



SECRET.

Copy No.... 1

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER No. 131.

3rd. August, 1918.

1. (a). The 42nd. and 44th. Battalions will be relieved by the 39th. and 40th. Battalions respectively in the front line on the night 4/5 August, 1918.
- (b). On relief the 42nd. and 44th. Battalions will move to the Support Area and be distributed as shown on the attached tracing.
- (c). Command of the Left Brigade Sector "B" Division will pass to G.O.C. 10th. Australian Infantry Brigade on completion of the relief.
2. On night 4/5 August the 41st. and 43rd. Battalions and 11th. L.T.H. Battery will withdraw from their present positions and will be distributed in the Support Area as shown on the attached tracing.
3. The 3rd. Battalion 130th. Regiment U.S. Infantry will remain disposed as at present and will come under the tactical Command of G.O.C. 10th. Australian Infantry Brigade on completion of the relief.
4. Brigade Headquarters will close at 0.5.c.45.60. and reopen at 1.30.c.5.6. at 10 a.m. 5th. August.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*P. A. Casey.*

Major.


Brigade Major, 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade.



Distribution:

- Copy No. 1. 41st. Battalion.  
2. 42nd. Battalion.  
3. 43rd. Battalion.  
4. 44th. Battalion.  
5. 11th. L.T.M. Battery.  
6. Brigade Signal Section.  
7. Left Group Artillery. (No Map.)  
8. 9th. Field Company. (No Map.)  
9. 11th. Field Company.  
10. 3rd. M.G. Battalion.  
11. 3rd. Bn., 130th. U.S. Inf. Regiment. (No Map.)  
12. 3rd. Pioneer Battalion. (No Map.)  
13/14. 3rd. Australian Division.  
15. 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
16. 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
17. 54th. Brigade. (No Map.)  
18. "C" Coy., 13th. Tank Battalion.  
19. 11th. Field Ambulance. (No Map.)  
20. 25th. Coy., A.A.S.C. (No Map.)  
21/23. War Diary.  
24. File.





# PLAN

To Accompany BRIGADE ORDER.

Nº 131

Ref. Sheet 62D. Scale: 1:20,000.



SECRET.

Copy No. 155

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER No. 133.

1. The Third Australian Division is relieving the Liaison Force North of the SOMME, relief to be complete by dawn of 20th. August.  
2. The 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade will be Support Brigade located as follows:-

Brigade Headquarters.	...	J.29.c.5.8.
"A" Battalion - 43rd. Battalion.	...	K.22, K.23 & K.24.
"B" Battalion - 44th. Battalion.	...	K.34.
"C" Battalion - 42nd. Battalion.	...	K.26. and K.31.
"D" Battalion - 41st. Battalion.	...	J.24. and J.30.
11th. Trench Mortar Battery.	...	SAILLY LAURETTE.

3. Moves to the new Area will be as follows:-

43rd. Bn. Via CERISY Bridge to pass RECORD Wood	2.00 p.m.	19th. inst.
44th. Bn. do do	3.00 p.m.	do
42nd. Bn. Via BOUZENCOURT Bridge to cross at	3.00 p.m.	do
41st. Bn. do do	5.30 p.m.	do
11th. L.T.M. Bty. do do	6.15 p.m.	do.

4. Brigade Headquarters will close at P.10.b.97.17. and re-open at J.29.c.5.8. at 4.30 p.m. 19th. August.

ACKNOWLEDGE,

*L.A. Vasey*

Major.

19/8/18.

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Distribution.

Copy No. 1.	41st. Battalion.	11.	11th. Field Company.
2.	42nd. Battalion.	12.	25th. Coy, A.A.S.C.
3.	43rd. Battalion.	13.	10th. Field Ambulance.
4.	44th. Battalion.	14.	11th. Machine Gun Coy.
5.	11th. T.M. Battery.	15/17.	War Diary.
6.	Bde. Sig. Section.	18.	File.
7/8.	3rd. Aust. Division.		
9.	9th. A.I. Brigade.		
10.	10th. A.I. Brigade.		



11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

SECRET.

Brigade Headquarters.

5th. August, 1918.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION No. 1.  
Issued with Battle Instruction No.1.

1. SUPPLIES.

Railhead - POULAINVILLE.  
Refilling Pt. - H.7.d.3.4.

2. TRANSPORT.

Transport Lines, Q.M. Stores, and Administrative personnel of Battalions will be established at :-

41st. Battalion.	I.35.d.40.15.
42nd. Battalion.	I.32.d.90.50.
43rd. Battalion.	I.52.d.80.80.
44th. Battalion.	I.32.b.10.10.

On "B" day Transport Lines will move to the vicinity of J.31.a. and J.31.b.

3. DUMPS.

(a). Dumps containing S.A.A., Grenades, Stokes Mortar Shells, Rations, Water and R.E. Material will be established as under:-

P.10.d.8.3.	by 41st. Battalion.
P.10.b.5.5.	by 42nd. Battalion.
P.10.b.4.6.	by 43rd. Battalion.
P.10.d.6.8.	by 44th. Battalion.
P. 4.d.6.5.	by Brigade.

(b). 2 Dumps will be established by a Supply Tank in new area as follows:-

1st Load at Q.14.a.15.90.

2nd Load at Q.8.a.30.70.

Both Dumps contain Ammunition, Stokes bombs and Water, and Dump at Q.8.a.30.70. will in addition contain R.E. material.

4. WATER.

No water in new area is to be used until tested. Tunneling Coy. will open up Wells in new area and will mark them "NOT TESTED". Units will have wells tested, removing the above sign and substituting a sign :-

UNFIT FOR USE

or

FIT FOR USE

With .... Scoops

as the case may be

Water situated in peat beds adjacent to Canal is 55% purer than water in the Canal itself, but requires chlorination. Water Points are situated at J.28.b.8.4., J.25.d.2.5., O.15.d.6.8., and O.8.d.0.5. Each Battalion Dump as per para. 3 must have 150 tins of water, Brigade Dump 130 tins, each Tank Dump 66 tins. At Zero plus 6 hours one water cart will go to each P.18.a. Central and Q.7.a.3.5.

5. PRISONERS OF WAR.

All prisoners of War will be returned to P.O.W. collecting station at P.4.a. Central. Units must not detain prisoners.

6. STRAGGLER POSTS.

Divisional Straggler Posts are situated at O.18.b.5.4., O.12.b.7.7., O.32.c.8.4., J.26.c.1.1.

43rd. Battalion will provide Brigade Straggler Posts at J.33.b.1.1., P.3.a.0.0., P.2.c.7.3., P.8.a.5.7.

Straggler Posts will also be established by each of 42nd and 44th. Battalions in vicinity of "jumping off" line.

All men collected will be returned to Units in parties of four to eight.



7. SALVAGE. Each Battalion will employ at least one platoon on Salvage in area as per plan attached from Zero plus 4 hours onwards.  
Transport personnel will reconnoitre predetermined Battalion Salvage dumps.  
Divisional Salvage Dump is situated in HAMELET.
8. BURIALS. Each Battalion will employ at least one platoon on Burials in area as per plan attached from Zero plus 4 hours onwards.  
Burial Returns will be forwarded to Brigade Headquarters daily.
9. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS. (a) 16 A.A.M.C. Bearers with 8 stretchers and one wheeled stretcher will report to the R.M.O. of each Battalion on "Y" day at 6 p.m. They will move forward to R.A.P.'s under his control.  
When a new R.A.P. is established notification will be advised to 9th. Field Ambulance and Brigade Headquarters at once.  
(b) A.D.S. Stretcher cases, will be at O.15.a.5.7.  
W.W.D.S. will be at O.10.a.9.7.  
Bearer Relay Post is at P.4.a.4.5.  
Motor Loading Posts are at P.3.c.2.8. and P.8.b.2.3.
10. VETERINARY POST. Veterinary Aid Post is situated at FOUILLOY.
11. NUCLEUS. Nucleus will remain at present location under command of Captain R.F. O'BRYEN (42nd. Battalion).
12. SANITATION. Box Latrines are to be used. Good sanitation in new area is imperative.
13. AREA STORES. On moving from present Area all Trench Shelters and Area Stores will be returned to Brigade Q.M. Store.
14. DEAD ANIMALS. Units will bury all dead animals in their respective areas as per Map attached, and in addition bury all dead animals in vicinity of Transport lines. Parties will be detailed before hand for this purpose.

*C.B. Hillary*  
Captain

(R.B.)

A/Staff Captain, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.



SECRET.

153

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Administrative Instruction issued under Brigade Order No.133.

1. SUPPLIES.

Railhead -... CORBIE, 20th. August.  
25th. Coy., A.S.C., H.Q. I.34.d.30.70.  
S.A.A. Section, 3rd. Aust.D.A.C. - J.28.c.5.7.

2. WATER.

Sterilising Plant on lorry for supplying water  
carts - J.26.c.5.5.  
Wells - As per attached Appendix "A".

3. RESERVE RATIONS.

4370 Iron Rations ... J.28.c.5.7.

4. BATHS.

Baths will remain as at present.

5. TENTS and SHELTERS.

Those drawn from Area Commandant, GAILLY, will be  
returned to him on leaving the area.

6. PRISONERS of WAR CAGE. - J.28.a.Central.

7. MEDICAL. - Medical arrangements as per Appendix "B".

8. CEMETERIES. - SAILLY LAURETTE J.36.c.8.8. VAUX J.27.c.1.5.

9. DIVISIONAL CLOTHING STORE. - I.35.d.5.4.

10. SALVAGE. - 41st. Battalion. Squares J.24 and 30. K.19. and 25.  
42nd. Battalion. Squares K.20, 26, 31 and 32.  
43rd. Battalion. Squares K.21, 22, 23 and 24.  
44th. Battalion. Squares K.27, 28, 33 and 34.

Units will arrange Battalion Dumps and Salvage will be  
returned to Camp Store by Ration Limbers, thence to Railhead  
by Supply Wagons.

11. DIVISIONAL CANTEEN. Central Store ... HAMELET.

12. AUSTRALIAN COMFORTS FUND. - Sheet 62D., O.5.Central.

20/8/18.

Appendix "B".

A/Staff Captain, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Captain.

R.A.P's.	Bearer Relay Post.	Motor Loading Post.	Advanced Dressing Station.	M.D.S. and W.W.	Evacuation.
J.23.d.8.4. .31.Central. .22.d.10.60. K.34.d.3.7.	K.16.c. 9.4.	K.15.d. 8.1.  K.24.c. 4.3.	J.36.d. 8.3.	J.28.c.7.7. (H.Q.15th. Aust. Fld. Amb. and 2 Tent subdiv- ions, No. 34 Dental Unit).	By hand carry to K.15.d.8.1. through relay by day. Ford car stationed at K.28.a.5.1. at night with relay at K.15.d.8.1.  Hand carry to K.34.c. 7.0. Ford car to K.32.b.8.0. Sunbeam car to A.D.S.  Stretcher cases from A.D.S. to M.D.S. by motor Amb. cars.  Walking wounded from W.D.S. to C.C.S. by bus.

NOTES:- (a) New Motor Loading post is being established at K.24.c.4.3.  
(b) Gas centre is at O.10.a.9.7.



No.	Location.	Description.	Roads to and From.	Facilities for raising water.	Use Recommended.	REMARKS.
1.	CHIPILLY. Q.4.a.3.5.	Ordinary French Domestic Well.	Suitable for Water Cart.	Hand Pump.	Fit for drinking after chlorination 2.	In good working order.
2.	Q.4.c.50.95.	do	Not accessible for vehicles.	do	1 do	In use at present.
3.	Q.4.a.80.05.	do	Suitable for water cart.	do	1 do	-
4.	Q.4.d.10.75.	do	do	do	1 do	In use.
5.	Q.4.a.6.5.	do	Not suitable.	do	1 do	In good working order.
7.	ETINEHEM, No. 13 Billet No. 87. Well L.25.b.15.30. in OSF. St. KAUPT St. 12' Deep.		20 yds. from St. No Roadway.	Windlass and bucket dilapidated.	3 do	Notice on well "Nur abge kocht trink bar". previously used by us with 1 scoop b. powder.
8.	L.25.b.20.35. No. 5 billet. No. 84 Well.	Ordinary French Domestic Well.	10 yds. from St. No roadway.	Hand pump in fair order.	2 do	-
9.	L.25.b.35.55. No. 15 Well bear Corner of OSF. St. and Kaupt St.	do do In bad repair	Alongside road.	Hand Pump out of order.	1 do	Previously used by us. Could be repaired.
10.	L.25.b.15.75. 23 Well opp. Church.	do do In working order.	Accessible for water cart.	Hand pump in good order.	1 do	Notice in German as above.
11.	L.19.c.8.0. No. 44 Well.	do do	Not accessible. Could be made so.	Hand Pump in fair order.	2 do	do do
12.	L.25.a.95.70. No. 24 Well.	do do	Accessible for carts.	Windlass dilapidated.	2 do	do do
13.	L.25.a.90.75. No. 28 Well, No. 39 billet.	do do	Not accessible.	Hand pump in fair order.	1 do	do do
14.	K.24.c.1.1. Well in chalk in Chalk Quarry. Apparently new.	Well in chalk	Alongside road.	Hand pump in good order.	No sample.	Suitable site for water point in use at present.

Distribution.- Copies to 41st. Battalion. 42nd. Battalion. 43rd. Battalion. 44th. Battalion. 11th T.M. Battalion.  
3rd. Divisional Salvage Coy. Brigade Transport Officer. War Diary. File.



11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER No. 134.

Brigade Headquarters.  
21st. August, 1918.

Reference Map:- LENS 1/100,000.  
62D., N.E., 1/20,000.  
Map attached.

1. INFORMATION.

- (a). The Third Army this morning successfully attacked from BEHUCOURT-sur-ANCRE to MOYENVILLE advancing in an E.S.E. direction about one and a half miles.
- (b). At 4.45 a.m. on 22nd. August, 1918, the III Corps will advance in an E.N.E. direction, the Third Australian Division protecting the Right flank of the III Corps during the advance.
- (c). The 47th. Division is the Right Division of III Corps and is employing the 141st. Brigade for the first objective, the 142nd. Brigade for the second objective and the 140th. Brigade to exploit the initial success.
- (d). The 9th. Australian Infantry Brigade plus one Squadron 13th. Light Horse will operate on the front of the Third Australian Division and will advance at the same hour as the III Corps to the first and second objectives and may continue the advance to the limits of the exploitation. For this purpose the 9th. Brigade are using the 35th. Battalion on the Right and the 33rd. Battalion on the left for the advance to the first and second objectives and the 34th. Battalion plus 1 Squadron 13th. Aust. Light Horse for the exploitation.
- (e). The 3rd. Pioneer Battalion are holding the present front line on the ETINHEM Spur and will advance their line in conformity to the 9th. Brigade to the general Line River SOMME - L.20.b.6.1. to L.15.c. 4.6.
- (f). The British line, held by the 5th. Australian Division, South of the SOMME runs as follows- R.3.a.7.3., R.3.Central, R.3.d.8.4., R.3.d.9.0., R.9.b.3.7., R.9.d.4.0., R.15.d.6.0.

2. INTENTION.

The 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade will, if the exploitation by the 9th. Brigade has been successful relieve that Brigade in the Southern portion of the Divisional front.

3. DISTRIBUTION.

- (a). The 44th. and 43rd. Battalions will be front line Battalions on the Right and Left respectively and will take over from the 9th. Brigade the main defensive line which will be protected by a line of posts not more than 300 or less than 150 yards in front of it. These Battalions will be disposed to a depth of between 750 and 1100 yards.
- (b). The 42nd. Battalion (Support Battalion) will be disposed with 1 Coy. for the local protection of the remainder of the Battalion and the Reserve Battalion - this Coy. will also act as a nucleus garrison to guard the Western exits from BRAY and will not be employed in any counter-attack - the remainder of the Battalion will consolidate along a line within the Brigade boundaries in L.14. and L.20.a. and b.
- (c). The 41st. Battalion (Reserve Battalion) will be disposed in defensive positions in K.18.b. and d., L.13.a. and c., K.24.b. and L.19.a.
- (d). The 42nd. Battalion less 1 Coy. and the 41st. Battalion will be available for counter-attack under orders from the G.O.C. Brigade.

4. BOUNDARIES.

Boundaries will be as shown on the attached map.

5. ARTILLERY.

The 7th. Australian F.A. Brigade are covering the exploitation by the 9th. Australian Infantry Brigade and will support the consolidation of this Brigade.  
Present Headquarters 7th. Aust. F.A. Brigade is K.28.d.7.5.



### 6. MACHINE GUNS.

One Section 11th. Machine Gun Coy. will accompany each of 43rd. and 44th. Battalions and will cover the consolidation being sited for the close defence of the main line of resistance.

These Sections are at present located at K.18.c. Central and K.31.b.6.8. respectively.

### 7. LIGHT TRENCH MORTARS.

Two Mortars of the 11th. Light Trench Mortar Battery will be attached to each Battalion.

These mortars are at present disposed in the forward system and will be picked up by Battalions under arrangements to be made between Battalions and the Light Trench Mortar Battery.

### 8. ASSEMBLY.

(a). Battalions will assemble as follows. 44th. and 43rd. Battalions with their leading troops 200 yards West of the N.W., S.E. road through L.13. Central, the 44th. Battalion being on the right. 41st. and 42nd. Battalions about 1500 yards West of this road, the 41st. Battalion being on the right.

(b). Battalions will be assembled in these positions and ready to move at 7.30 a.m. 22nd. August.

(c). C.Os. Battalions will be at J.22.d.1.6. (present Headquarters 43rd. Battalion) at 7 a.m. 22nd. August so as to receive the executive order to move from the assembly position. As soon as that order is received C.Os. Battalions will move to their respective Headquarters.

### 9. ENGINEERS.

One Section 11th. Field Coy. will assemble and move with the 42nd. Battalion who will receive instructions as to their employment for the construction of forward Battalion Headquarters.

### 10. REPORTS.

Reports will be sent to J.29.c.5.7. If the Brigade is employed Brigade Headquarters will close at J.29.c.5.7. and re-open at J.22.d.1.6. at an hour to be notified later when reports will be sent to the latter location.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

(R.B.)

Major.  
Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

### Distribution.

Copy No.	1.	41st. Battalion.*
	2.	42nd. Battalion.*
	3.	43rd. Battalion.*
	4.	44th. Battalion.*
	5.	11th. T.M. Battery.
	6.	11th. M.G. Company.
	7.	Bde. Sig. Section.
	8/10.	3rd. Aust. Division.
	11.	9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
	12.	10th. do do
	13.	15th. do do
	14.	C. R. A.
	15.	C. R. E.
	16.	7th. Aust. F.A. Brigade.
	17.	11th. Field Company.
	18.	A. D. M. S.
	19.	19th. Field Ambulance.
	20.	3rd. M.G. Battalion.
	21.	3rd. Pioneer Battalion.
	22.	File.
	23/25.	War Diary.

\* Maps to these recipients only.



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## 11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER No. 135.

24th. August, 1918.

1. At 2.30 a.m. 25th. August, 1918 the 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade operating on the Left Flank of the Third Australian Division and in conjunction with an attack by III Corps will attack capture and consolidate the general line L.11.d.7.5. - L.5.d.4.0. L.5.b.6.3.

2. The 10th. Australian Infantry Brigade are operating on our Right their Left Battalion being 39th. Battalion.

The 175th. Brigade 58th. Division are operating on our Left flank their *Centre* Battalion being 2/10th. LONDONS, *Right* Battalion 12th. LONDONS and *Left* Battalion 9th. LONDONS.

3. The 44th. and 43rd. Battalions will assault on the right and left respectively, the 42nd. Battalion will be in Support and the 41st. Battalion Reserve Battalion.

4. Boundaries will be as per the attached Map.

5. The forming up line for the Assaulting Battalions will be the North South grid line between L.3. and L.4., and between L.9. and L.10.

The 42nd. Battalion will assemble in rear of the 43rd. Bn.

Assembly of 43rd. and 44th. Battalions to be complete by 1.45 a.m.

6. The 41st. Battalion will move from its present position to the Reserve Battalion Area in L.8.b., L.9.a., b. and c., commencing at 9 p.m. on 24th. instant.

7. One Platoon of the 42nd. Battalion will relieve the 38th. Battalion in the CHALK PIT Post in L.3.d. by 10 p.m. 24th. August.

8. The advance to the final objective (GREEN Line) will be covered by an artillery barrage advancing throughout at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes.

The Artillery Start Line is parallel to and 300 yards East of the forming up line. The barrage will open on and remain on this line for four minutes before making the first lift.

A protective barrage to cover consolidation of the GREEN Line will remain for 30 minutes after the GREEN Line has been

reached, though during the last 15 minutes of this 30 minutes 50% of the guns will search up to 1000 yards East of the protective barrage line.

9. The 23rd. Machine Gun Coy. plus 12 guns of the 9th. M.G. Coy. will cover the advance to the GREEN Line.

After the capture of the GREEN Line the 11th. M.G. Coy. will move forward and emplace its guns as follows for the protection of the GREEN Line:-

2 Guns in L.3.b.  
2 Guns L.11.d.  
4 Guns L.5. Central.

4 Guns. L.11.a.) To fire on S.O.S,  
4 Guns L.11.c.) in L.6.a.

10. Two Light French Mortars will accompany each Battalion.



24/8/18.

11. 30 minutes after the capture of the GREEN Line two Coys. 42nd. Battalion will move through 43rd. and 44th. Battalions and reconnoitre the area within 1000 yards East of the GREEN Line. These two Coys. will not consolidate East of the GREEN Line and must be back West of it not later than 1 hour 30 minutes after the GREEN Line has been reached.

12. Contact Aeroplanes will fly at daylight 25th. August.

13. Prisoners will be sent to L.14.a.3.4. where they will be taken over by Brigade Intelligence Officer.

14. Headquarters during the operation will be :-

Brigade Headquarters.	...	K.22.d.1.6.
Brigade Command Post.	...	L.14.a.3.4.
41st. and 42nd. Battalions.	...	L.8.c.2.8.
43rd. and 44th. Battalions.	...	L.14.b.3.7.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*L. A. Vasey*

Major.

Brigade Major, 11th, Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Distribution.

- Copy No. 1. 41st. Battalion.\*  
 2. 42nd. Battalion.\*  
 3. 43rd. Battalion.\*  
 4. 44th. Battalion.\*  
 5. 11th. T.M. Battery.  
 6/7. 3rd. Aust. Division.  
 8. 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
 9. 3rd. M.G. Battalion.  
 10. 175th. Infantry Brigade.  
 11. C. R. A.  
 12. Left Group Artillery.  
 13. 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
 14. Staff Captain.  
 15/17. War Diary.  
 18. File.

\* Map forwarded to these Units only.



11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

181/4/13-

27th. August, 1918.

1. The 58th. Division under cover of an artillery barrage will attack and capture HARRICOURT and the old British front line East of that village and exploit to further 800 yards East.
2. The 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade will co-operate in this attack by capturing and mopping up the area QUARRY A.28.a. thence South of PARGNY Wood to A.29. Central PARGNY Mill inclusive thence River SOMME exclusive forming a defensive flank facing E.N.E. along the line QUARRY A.28.a. to PARGNY ~~area~~ (inclusive). *Mill*
3. The 41st. Battalion will carry out the attack using 7th. London Battalion plus one Coy. 5th. London Battalion.
4. The 174th. Brigade are operating on the North of this Brigade.
5. The Artillery Start Line is A.28.a.3.4. to A.28.c.55.25.  
The 18 pdr. barrage will open on this line at 4.55 a.m. and remain on it until 5.15 a.m. when it will commence to advance parallel to the start line at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes for 500 yards after which the rate of advance will be 100 yards in 6 minutes until reaching the protective barrage line which is 300 yards East of the final objective.
- The protective barrage for the final objective will remain for 30 minutes, during which period a proportion of the guns will search Eastward.
6. Two Coys. 3rd. M.G. Battalion are giving covering fire during the advance.  
C.O. 44th. Battalion will be responsible for keeping the 11th. Machine Gun Coy. M.G. informed as to the progress of the operation detailed in this Office 181/4/14 of the 26th. August.
7. The four Mortars at present with 41st. Battalion will accompany the Battalion thus leaving four mortars available for the defence of the line occupied by 41st. and 44th. Battalions night 26/27 August.
8. At 5 a.m. 27th. instant one Coy. 43rd. Battalion will move from vicinity GREEN Line and take up the position vacated by the 41st. Battalion. This Coy. will come under the orders of the C.O. 44th. Battalion after passing East of the GREEN Line.
- C.O. 44th. Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the line through G.4., A.27.c. and d. from 4.30 a.m. 27th. instant.
9. Owing to the line of advance of the 174th. Brigade converging on to that of this Brigade, troops of the 174th. Brigade will probably assemble in the 41st. Battalion area.

(R.B.).  
Distribution.

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Major.

41st. Battalion.  
42nd. Battalion.  
43rd. Battalion.  
44th. Battalion.  
11th. M.G. Company.  
10th. A.I. Brigade.  
174th. Brigade.  
3rd. Aust. Division.  
War Diary.



SECRET.

Copy No. 28

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brigade Headquarters.  
6th. August, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTION No. 1.

Reference Maps ( 62D., S.E., 1/20,000.  
( BARRAGE Map 1/20,000.

1. INTENTION.

The 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade as part of the Third Australian Division will attack and capture portion of the enemy defences opposite the Divisional front and consolidate a line, known as the GREEN line.

2. INFORMATION.

(a) The 9th. Australian Infantry Brigade are attacking on our right, their left Battalion being the 35th. Battalion, and the 174th. Brigade plus 1 Battalion 58th. Division are attacking on our Left, their Right Battalion being the 10th. London Regiment mopping up SAILLY LAURETTE, with 6th. London Regiment leap frogging through to GREEN Line.

After the capture of the GREEN Line the 4th. Australian Infantry Brigade will pass through the 11th. Brigade and capture the RED LINE. This success will be exploited by the capture of the BLUE Line.

(b) The 202nd. R.I.R. 43rd. Reserve Division and the 55th. I.R. 13th. Division are holding an outpost position opposite the front to be attacked by this Brigade - an enemy disposition Map has been issued.

3. BOUNDARIES.

The Brigade Southern boundary is the line P.16.a.77.51. - Q.11.c.57.62.

The Brigade Northern Boundary is the SOIRE Canal, inclusive.

The inter-Battalion boundary is the road running through P.11.b., P.12.a. and b., Q.7.a. and b. inclusive to the Left Battalion.

4. INFANTRY DISTRIBUTION.

(a) The 44th. Battalion will advance from the taped line of assembly and mop up within the Right Battalion Area, as defined by the above boundaries, up to the safety limits of the field artillery barrage during the halt from Zero plus 63 to Zero plus 67.

The Battalion will then reorganise and prepare to continue the advance. At Zero plus 87 the Battalion will move forward in support of the 41st. Battalion and will consolidate the Support Line as shown on the attached Plan "B". If necessary the 44th. Battalion will assist the 41st. Battalion in the capture of the GREEN Line.

(b) The 41st. Battalion plus 1 Coy. 43rd. Battalion will, during the halt in the barrage from Zero plus 63 to Zero plus 67 pass through the 44th. Battalion and within the Right Battalion Area mop up, up to the safety limits of the protective barrage for the GREEN Line and consolidate the GREEN Line and the SWITCH Line shown on the attached Plan "B".

(c) The 42nd. Battalion will within the Left Battalion Area mop up the area between the taped line of assembly and the protective barrage for the GREEN Line, and will consolidate the lines and areas shown on the attached Plan "B".

(d) The 43rd. Battalion, less one Coy., will be Brigade Reserve and following closely behind the Assaulting Battalions will move to a position in P.17.b. and P.12.c. where it will remain until Zero plus 100 minutes when it will continue to advance and then consolidate the Reserve Line as shown on the attached Plan "B".

This Battalion may be required to form a Right or Left flank defence or to complete capture of GREEN Line.

P.T.O.



4. INFANTRY DISTRIBUTION (Continued).

- (e) Two Platoons 39th. Battalion will move along the Northern bank of the SOMME Canal and will act as a Liaison Unit between the 42nd. Battalion and the 10th. London Regiment. These two Platoons will remain North of the Canal throughout the whole operation during which time they will be under the tactical command of C.O. 42nd. Battalion.
- (f) Mopping up areas are shown on the attached Plan "A".

5. ARTILLERY ACTION.

- (a) The infantry advance to the GREEN Line will be covered by an advancing field artillery barrage.
- (b) This barrage will open 200 yards East of the taped line of assembly. The time-table of lifts and the taped line are shown on the Barrage Map.
- (c) The Protective barrage of the GREEN Line will be maintained until Zero plus 240 minutes when all barrage fire will cease.
- (d) As each gun arrives at the Protective Barrage Line 3 rounds of Smoke will be fired in quick succession - this smoke will therefore commence from our Left.
- (e) Fifteen minutes after the Protective barrage line is reached 50% of guns will search to a distance not exceeding 1000 yards East of that line in bursts of fire.
- (f) Rates of fire of 18 pdrs. will be :-

Zero to Zero plus 51.	3 rds. p.g.p.m.
Zero plus 51 to Zero plus 87.	4 rds. p.g.p.m.
Zero plus 87 until arrival at the Protective Barrage Line.	3 rds. p.g.p.m.
Whilst on Protective Barrage Line.	1 rd. p.g.p.m.
Guns searching East from the Protective Barrage Line in bursts of fire.	3 rds. p.g.p.m.

- (g) Heavy Artillery is being used on Counter Battery work chiefly.

6. ACTION OF TANKS.

- (a) "C" Coy. 13th. Tank Battalion is operating with the Brigade during the attack.
- (b) The allotment of this Coy. to objectives is as follows:-
- (i) 3 Sections (9 Tanks) to operate, firstly with the 44th. Battalion and then with 41st. Battalion for the capture of the GREEN Line.
  - (ii) 1 Section (5 Tanks) to operate with the 42nd. Battalion for the capture of the GREEN Line.
- (c) All these Tanks will remain East of the GREEN Line for a period of not less than 15 minutes after which they will withdraw to Q.13. as soon as the area between the GREEN Line and the safety limits of the Protective barrage has been cleared of the enemy.
- These Tanks will later move forward with the 4th. Australian Division for the capture of the RED and BLUE Lines.
- (d) An infantry man will be inside each Tank: these men will be supplied by 42nd. and 41st. Battalions.

7. ACTION OF MACHINE GUNS.

- (a) Eight Guns of the 11th. Machine Gun Company will move with the assaulting infantry. These guns are allotted as follows:-

4 to go with 41st. Battalion.  
4 to go with 42nd. Battalion.

During the advance to the GREEN Line these guns will fire on opportunity targets and be prepared to assist in the formation of a defensive flank if necessary.

P.T.O.



7. ACTION OF MACHINE GUNS. (Continued).

These guns on reaching the GREEN Line will be sited for the close defence of this line having particular regard to the tactical features - the Spur in Q.14.c. and a. and the Spur in Q.8.a. and b.

(b) A Machine Gun barrage commencing at Zero plus 3 minutes on the Left flank and at Zero plus 7 minutes on the Right flank will cover the first part of the advance to the GREEN Line.

This barrage will at all times be 500 yards East of the Artillery barrage and will advance at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes until Zero plus 34 after which it will advance at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes ceasing fire at Zero plus 38 minutes on the Right flank and Zero plus 46 minutes on Left flank.

(c) After ceasing fire on the barrage 8 guns of 11th. Machine Gun Coy. and 8 of the 23rd. Machine Gun Coy. will move forward for the defence of the GREEN Line.

These guns will be sited for the close defence of the following tactical features:-

- (i) KATE WOOD and the Spur in Q.13.d. and Q.14.c.
- (ii) The Spur in Q.8.c. and a.
- (iii) The Spur in Q.1.d. and Q.2.c.
- (iv) The Spur in Q.7.

They will also be prepared to put down an S.O.S. as follows:-

- (i) 12 guns firing in the valley in Q.14.d. from the Brigade Southern Boundary Northwards for 700 yards.
- (ii) 4 guns on the Western exits from CERISY-GAILLY at Q.3.c.2.0. and Q.3.c.50.45.

Between Zero plus 2 hours and Zero plus 4 hours these guns will carry out such harassing fire on possible enemy assembly positions as the Ammunition supply will permit.

Possible Assembly positions are:-

- The Valley East of HAMILTON WOOD in Q.14.d.
- The Sunken roads in Q.9.
- The low ground on the Western outskirts of CERISY GAILLY in Q.3.c.

8. ACTION OF LIGHT TRENCH MORTARS.

(a) Mortars are allotted to Battalions as follows:-

- 4 to 42nd. Battalion.
- 2 to 44th. Battalion.
- 2 to 41st. Battalion.

(b) The two Mortars which move with the 44th. Battalion will follow the 41st. Battalion when the latter passes through the former, thus leaving available to 41st. Battalion four Mortars for the advance to the GREEN Line.

(c) All Mortars will co-operate with the Infantry during the advance to the GREEN Line and when it is reached will set up on S.O.S. lines as well as engaging opportunity targets.

One Mortar is to be placed to cover the CERISY Cemetery for S.O.S. purposes.



9. ENGINEERS.

(a) One Section of 11th. Field Coy. Engineers plus half a platoon of 1st. Australian Tunnelling Coy. will follow the assaulting troops crossing the assembly line at about Zero plus half an hour and will immediately proceed with the work of inspecting existing dugouts and providing accommodation for Brigade and Battalion Headquarters.

10. MOVEMENT OF HEADQUARTERS.

The location of Headquarters prior to Zero will be :-

11th. Brigade H.Q.	P.4.a.5.5.
41st. Battalion.	P.10.b.97.15.
42nd. Battalion.	P.4.d.98.25.
43rd. Battalion.	P.10.b.98.25.
44th. Battalion.	P.10.b.97.15.

After Zero Headquarters will be approximately as follows:-

11th. Brigade H.Q.	P.17.Central.
41st. and 44th. Battalions.	P.18.a.7.1.
42nd. Battalion.	Q.1.c.30.55.
43rd. Battalion.	P.11.b.9.2.

It is expected that at Zero plus 90 minutes portion of Brigade Headquarters will leave P.4.a.5.5. for Cable Head (P.10.b.97.15) arriving there at Zero plus 105 leaving there again at Zero plus 130 and arriving at P.17.Central at Zero plus 145.

11. SUCCESS SIGNALS.

The Success Signal will be fired when the GREEN Line has been reached.

12. REPORTS.

The place (Map location) as well as the time of writing must be put on all reports.

13. SYNCHRONISATION OF WATCHES.

An Officer from each Battalion will report to Brigade Headquarters (L.30.c.5.6.) at 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. the day prior to Zero day to synchronise watches.

14. ACTION OF 4th. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

(a) For the capture of the RED and BLUE Lines the 4th. Australian Division is using the 12th. Brigade on the Right and the 4th. Brigade on the Left.

The 4th. Brigade is using the 13th. Battalion on the Right and 14th. Battalion on the Left for the capture of the RED Line, the 16th. Battalion for the capture of the BLUE Line and the 15th. Battalion to mop up CERISY GAILLY.

The 12th. Brigade is employing the 45th. Battalion on the Left for the capture of the RED Line and the 47th. Battalion for the BLUE Line.

(b) Attacking troops of 4th. Australian Division will form up on a line approx. P.3.c. to P.14.c., to be in position by Zero minus 30 minutes.

(c) After the advance of the 3rd. Australian Division the 4th. Division will move forward into the valley running N. from ACCROCHE WOOD and will move from there so as to pass the GREEN Line at Zero plus 4 hours.

(d) No troops of this Brigade will move forward with the 4th. Division troops but should the latter experience opposition in the early stages of their advance covering fire by Machine Guns will be given.



15. COMMUNICATIONS. - 11th. Australian Brigade.

(a) For Brigade Communication Scheme see attached Plan "C".

(b) Means of Transmission.Lines - All metallic.Visual - Main Central Brigade Visual Station :Call  
"D O P", J.28.b.3.2.Cable Head Visual Station P.10.b.9.1.,  
Call "G O.R."11th. Brigade Visual Station P.4.a.5.2.,  
Call "P U G O."All Battalion Headquarters will work Visual to Brigade  
Central Visual Station. "D O P."Pigeons.Runners. - Relay Posts at Advanced Brigade Headquarters,  
P.17.d.

Cable Head P.10.b.9.1.

Brigade Headquarters P.4.a.5.5.

Message Rocket.Popham Panel. - At Headquarters for co-operation with  
Aircraft. Calls to be notified later.Ground Flares.

Brigade Observation Station is at J.28.b.3.2.

(c) All Pigeons and 50% of the Message Rockets in the possession of Battalions at Zero plus 4 hours will be handed over to the troops of 4th. Australian Division as they pass through on the GREEN Line.

(d) In order to economise their use the Pigeons issued to Battalions will be distributed between Battalion Headquarters and one Coy. Message Rockets will be distributed similarly. These means of communication must only be used in cases of urgent necessity.

(e) One Section of Light Horse and one Section of Cyclists will be attached to the Brigade and used as Orderlies.

16. AIRCRAFT.

Low flying aeroplanes engaging Ground targets will precede the Infantry.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*H.A. Casey*


Major.

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Distribution.

- Copy No. 1. 41st. Battalion.
- 2. 42nd. Battalion.
- 3. 43rd. Battalion.
- 4. 44th. Battalion.
- 5. 11th. T.M. Battery.
- 6. Brigade Sig. Section.
- 7/8. 3rd. Aust. Division.
- 9. 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 10. 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 11. 174th. Inf. Brigade.
- 12/13. 4th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 14. 12th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 15. C. R. A.
- 16. C. R. E.
- 17. 3rd. M.G. Battalion.
- 18. 11th. M.G. Company.
- 19. 3rd. Pioneer Battalion.
- 20. 11th. Field Company.
- 21. "C" Coy., 13th. Tank Battalion.
- 22. "C" Sub Group Artillery.
- 23. "B" Sub Group Artillery.
- 24. A.D.M.S.
- 25. 9th. Field Ambulance.
- 26. Major T.A. FERGUSON.
- 27. Major A.W. LOTT.
- 28/30. War Diary.
- 31. File.





LEGEND for "Mopping Up" AREAS.

- 41st Battalion : [Yellow box]
- 42nd " : [Green hatched box]
- 44th " : [Red hatched box]

Reference Sheet 62D S.W.

Scale : 1/20,000



100



34

Scale 1/20,000.







# MANUFACTURE DE BONNETER

• TEINTURE & FILATURE •

*Jules Lardière*

USINE HYDRAULIQUE DU PONT DE RÔME

M

L

Payable dans Amiens

Le règlement de mes factures par traites ne change en rien la compétence attribuée au lieu de paiement

PESEZ MES COLIS A RÉCEPTION  
JE TIENDRAI PAS COMPTE

CORBIE, le

191

IMPRIMERIE MODERNE

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• TEINTURE & FILATURE •

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CORBIE, le

191

IMPRIMERIE MODERNE

2

35



153  
SECRET

## 11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Copy No. 36.

Brigade Headquarters.  
7th August, 1918.

## BATTLE INSTRUCTION No. 2.

## APPROACH MARCH AND ASSEMBLY.

1. The attached Map (issued to Battalions only) shows "C" and "D" routes for the Approach March.

2. These routes will be used as follows:-

"C" Track - 44th. Bn., 41st. Bn. plus 1 Coy.

"D" Track - 42nd. Bn., 43rd. Bn. plus 1 Coy.

Trench Mortar Battery personnel will move with the Battalions to which they are affiliated for the operation.

3. The two Platoons 39th. Battalion attached 42nd. Battalion will move to their assembly position by the tow path on the NORTH bank of the SOMME Canal.

4. The following Tables "A" and "B" show the moves of Battalions to the assembly line in Dry and Wet weather respectively.

Table "A" will be adhered to unless notification is received prior to 6 p.m. on the day before Zero that Table "B" is to be acted upon.

5. (a). Each Battalion will detail an Officer to be at the Starting Point to regulate traffic. This Officer will report to Brigade Headquarters by the most expeditious means that the whole of his Battalion has passed the Starting Point by means of the Code word "MOTH".

(b). Officers from Brigade Headquarters will be posted on "C" Track at P.9.a.90.95. and "D" Track at P.4.a.55.31. to check the times of passing of Units.

6. The assembly line will be as shown on the barrage Map.

7. Battalions are responsible for taping their own assembly line.

Direction tapes will be laid from the assembly up line in an Easterly direction parallel to the line of advance.

8. Completion of assembly will be wired to Brigade Headquarters by the Code word "CANDLE".

TABLE "A".

Unit.	Track.	DRY WEATHER.			Halts From.
		Starting Point.	Passes S. P.		
44th. Bn.	"C".	0.6.d.6.7.	Zero minus 4 hrs. 20 min.	}	Zero minus 3 hrs. 30 min. to
41st. Bn. plus 1 Coy.	"C".	1.36.d.0.0.	Zero minus 4 hours.		Zero minus 3 hrs. 15 minutes
42nd. Bn.	"D".	0.6.a.75.57.	Zero minus 4 hrs. 25 min.	}	Zero minus 3 hrs. 35 to Zero minus
43rd. Bn.	"D".	do	Zero minus 3 hrs. 55 min.		3 hrs. 20 minutes

44th. and 42nd. Battalions not to halt again until assembled.  
41st. and 43rd. Battalions may have another 15 minutes' halt.



T A B L E "B".

WET WEATHER.

<u>Unit.</u>	<u>Track.</u>	<u>Starting Point.</u>	<u>Passes S.P.</u>	<u>Halts From*</u>
44th. Bn. "C".		0.6.d.6.7.	Zero minus 6 hours.	} Zero minus 5 hrs. 20 to Zero minus 5 hrs. 5 minutes*
41st. Bn. "C". plus 1 Coy.		I.36.d.0.0.	Zero minus 5 hrs. 35 min.	
42nd. Bn. "D".		0.6.a.75.57.	Zero minus 6 hrs. 20 min.	} Zero minus 4 hrs. 20 minutes to Zero minus 4 hrs. 5 minutes.
43rd. Bn. "D". less 1 Coy.		do	Zero minus 5 hrs. 35 min.	

44th. and 42nd. Battalions not to halt again until assembled.

41st. and 43rd. Battalions may have another halt of 15 minutes.

*L. A. Vasey.*

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade. Major.

Distribution:-

To all recipients of 11th. Australian Infantry Brigade  
Battle Instruction No. 1.

(R.B.)



C.O.,  
 41st. Battalion.  
 42nd. Battalion.  
 43rd. Battalion.  
 44th. Battalion.  
 11th. T.M. Battery.



Information has come to the notice of the Brigade Commander that there is to be an offensive between the SOMME and the ANCRE.

This will be primarily carried out by the III Corps, but the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions will co-operate on the Right flank.

It is expected that this Brigade will take part, but it is not known whether it will be next the SOMME or next the III Corps.

Reconnaissance of the whole of the Divisional front and its immediate flanks will be commenced forthwith.

Battalions will be employed as follows:-

44th. Battalion	-	Right.
43rd. Battalion	-	Left.
41st. Battalion	-	Right Support.
42nd. Battalion	-	Left Support.

Two mortars of the Trench Mortar Battery will go with each Battalion.

Select Battalion Headquarters and R.A.P.'s.  
 Approach Routes and Assembly for Infantry.

19/8/18.  
 (R.B.)

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Major.



150



C.O.,  
41st. Battalion.  
42nd. Battalion.  
43rd. Battalion.  
44th. Battalion.  
11th. T.M. Battery.

290

Information has come to the notice of the Brigade Commander that there is to be an offensive between the SCHE and the

This will be primarily carried out by the III Corps, but the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions will co-operate on the right flank.

It is expected that this Brigade will take part, but it is not known whether it will be next the SCHE or next the III Corps.

Reconnaissance of the whole of the Divisional front and its immediate flanks will be commenced forthwith.

Battalions will be employed as follows:-

- 44th. Battalion - Right.
- 43rd. Battalion - Left.
- 41st. Battalion - Right Support.
- 42nd. Battalion - Left Support.

(H.B.)  
19/8/18. Two mortars of the 11th. T.M. Battery will be employed.  
Battalion.

2

38.



C.O.,  
 41st. Battalion.  
 42nd. Battalion.  
 43rd. Battalion.  
 44th. Battalion.  
 10th. A.I. Brigade (For information).  
 174th. Brigade. do



1. The Divisional Commander directs that the line G.4.d.3.9.- G.4.Central - G.4.a.3.4. along trench to A.27.d.65.25. along trench Sunkon Road at A.27.d.1.1. to a point about 100 yards North of Copse "K" where a joint Post in connection with 8th. Battalion LONDON Regiment will be formed, is to be established as a main line of resistance - patrols operating to the North-East of this line.
2. The situation at present is we hold as main line of resistance "B" Line protected by troops of 44th. Battalion from G.3. Central to A.27.c.4.4.  
 The 8th. LONDON Regiment has one Coy. along line A.27.a.1.7. to A.21.c.7.3.  
 The line Copse "G" - OXFORD Copse is reported to be held by British troops.  
 The 10th. Brigade hold general line G.2.Central - G.3. Central.
3. In order to carry out the above the 44th. Battalion will to-night establish this line from G.4.Central to Trench junction at A.27.d.65.25. acting in co-operation with 41st. Battalion. The 10th. Brigade will co-operate in the above by mopping up the VAUX-SUZANNE Spur including VAUX Wood. It is understood that the 57th. Battalion will be employed on the Left of the 10th. Brigade front.
4. The 41st. Battalion will establish the above line from the Left flank of the 44th. Battalion to 100 yards North of Copse "K". CREST AVENUE is inclusive to 41st. Battalion.
5. The 41st. Battalion will move through the 43rd. Battalion who after the former are established East of them will withdraw to the position West of GREEN Line vacated by 41st. Battalion.
6. The above operation will be carried out as early this evening as possible endeavour being made to complete it before midnight.
7. The 43rd. Battalion will remain in its present position.
8. The 41st. Battalion will take forward the two Trench Mortars at present attached to 43rd. Battalion. The two Mortars at present with the 43rd. Battalion will remain and co-operate with 41st. Bn.
9. Harassing Artillery fire will be directed on huts in A.27.b. and d. and trench system A.28.

*Handwritten:* Hardman

26/8/18.  
 (C.O.).

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Issued at .....

*Handwritten:* 10 min to 10.30  
 10.30 to 11 pm  
 9.15 to 10  
 351

39.







For 24 hours ending 6 a.m., 2nd, August, 1918.

OPERATIONS.

- (a) ARTILLERY. Active on rear areas during the day. At 10.15 - 11.40 p.m. and 1 a.m. harassing two-minute bursts were put down on enemy forward zones. 13 and 18-pdrs. engaged targets in vicinity of RECORD WOOD and Cross Roads in Q.7.a. Heavies fired in HALARD WOOD, CERISY, and O.1' and 3' SAILLY LAURETTE also shelled.
- (b) PATROLS. 7 Patrols operated on our front, of which Right Battalion sent out 3, each of 1 Officer and 6 Other Ranks. No. 1 Patrol report leaving P.16.b.4.8. at 10 p.m., returning to P.11.a.40.10. at midnight. Saw or heard no enemy movement. Covered ground 250 yards East of our trenches. No. 2. Left P.11.c.10.70. at midnight returning to P.16.b.35.75. at 2 a.m. Worked down into Valley. Lay up at 3 points. Horse transport heard on WARFUSEE GAILLY Road about P.23.b. No. 3. Left P.16.b.4.8. at 2 a.m., returned P.11.c.2.8. at 4 a.m. Saw one enemy about P.16.b.9.7. who disappeared into crops. Apparently a Post here, as a well-marked track leads from the point Eastwards. Talking was heard at approx. P.11.c.3.1. Pioneer Coy. Had two Patrols. No. 1 left P.10.d.9.8. at 11 p.m. and returned to P.11.a.4.0. at 12.30. Report M.G. firing from P.17.a.8.3. Very Lights from P.11.d.4.4. No. 2. Left P.11.a.4.3. at 1 a.m. and returned to P.11.a.4.0. at 2.30 a.m. Report M.G. firing from approx. P.17.a.8.5. Left Battalion sent out two Patrols. No. 1 comprising 1 N.C.O. and 7 Other Ranks left P.5.d.2.6. at 10.30 p.m. and returned to P.11.a.9.9. at 1 a.m. At about P.5.d.9.1. encountered unknown number of enemy who threw bombs and fired Machine Gun at our party, firing along road running through P.11.b. and P.5.c. Bombs again thrown from P.11.b. 90.63. and M.G. from P.12.a.65.85. No casualties resulted. No. 2 Patrol left P.11.a.5.5. at 1.30 a.m. returning to P.11.a. 95.95. at 4.00 a.m. No enemy seen or heard.
- (c) MACHINE GUNS. 26,200 rounds fired by our M.G. Companies on road, trench tracks and centres of enemy movement over our Divisional Front.
- (d) LIGHT TRENCH MORTARS. Guns established and preparations made for dealing with targets. No firing done.
- (e) SNIPERS. Active but no hits claimed.
- (f) AIRCRAFT. Our planes very active during the period heavily engaged by enemy A.A. fire when over enemy lines. At 7.30 a.m. they fired M.G. into trenches in P.17.a. 12.30 p.m. 4 bombs dropped in P.17.a. 2.45 p.m. 5 dropped in P.17.a.
- IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.
- ENEMY DEFENCES.
- |                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| (a) New work.       | None observed.   |
| (b) Wire.           | None observed.   |
| (c) Posts.          | Suspected at P.16.b.9.7., and P.11.c.3.1.                            |
| (d) M.Gs.           | Fired from P.12.a.65.85., P.6.b. 8.9., Q.1.a.2.9., and P.12.a.65.85. |
| (e) Trench Mortars. | None reported.   |
- ENEMY AIRCRAFT. Inactive over front lines. At 4.50 p.m. 4 enemy planes flew over towards our balloons, 2 succeeding in bringing four balloons down in flames. Although heavily engaged by A.A. fire they succeeded in retreating. One appeared to be hit and flew East very low and groggy.
- DESCRIPTION:- Overlapping top wings, fuselage grey brown, wings painted with colored squares.
- BALLOONS. Two observed at 40° and 58° T.B. from O.12.c.90.05.
- ENEMY ATTITUDE. Quiet except for several snipers. Artillery more active than previous night.
- MOVEMENT. Continuous traffic from bank K.25.b.75.20. along to Wood K.25.d. and disappearing at K.31.b.5.6. Dog seen on hill P.11.c. this appeared near P.11.c.6.1. Looks like a dugout.

P.T.O.



(2)

MOVEMENT (Continued)

Parties of men seen moving from quarry to Bank on Road K.31.c.  
8.5. between 10 a.m. and Noon. Fired on by our 18 pdrs.  
Dugout in sunken road K.31.c. Considerable movement seen in  
K.32.b. on fring of HALARD WOOD. Wagons loaded with hay going  
East to about Q.26.d.5.4. Trench movement Q.26.c.70.35.  
Movemont about Q.24.b.75.80.

At 8 p.m. four horse waggon on road in Q.26. going towards  
WARFUSEE. A 6 horse waggon disappeared behind HOPE? WOOD at  
8.15 p.m. going East. Between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. 51 men seen  
going to ACCROCHE WOOD from P.17.c., some with equipmont and packs.  
9 to 10 a.m. four men seen at P.23.a. going to TAILLOUX WOOD.  
Three men seen digging at Q.13.d.5.5., afterwards entered dugout  
at Q.13.central. Between 6 a.m. and 7.30 a.m. about 100  
onemy in small parties seen in P.23.a. entering Wood from P.24.a.  
(Crossroads). Artillery advised.

MISCELLANEOUS. Visibility good. During night when enemy was shel  
shelling SAILLY-le-Sec, some sneezing gas used and an occasional  
mustard shell. At 10.5 p.m. during enemy strafe North of River  
several double greens and single red lights fired.

*H. L. Fraser*  
for MAJOR.

Brigade Major 11th. Infantry Brigade A.I.F.



Time.	Number.	Calibre.	Area Shelled.	From Direction of.	Remarks, Damage, etc.
6.35 a.m.	15	10.5 cm.	Left of HAMEL.	CERISY.	Counter Battery.
7.00 a.m.	10	10.5 cm.	J.27.	do.	In and around village and road.
7.00-8.25 a.m.	13	105 cm.	O.11.a. & O.10.b.	WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT.	
8.10 a.m.	4	77 mm.	Left of Hamel.	CERISY.	
8.40-9.00 a.m.	7	105 mm.	O.12.c.&d.	WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT.	H.E.
9.00-9.30 a.m.	5	105 mm.	O.18.d.	do.	H.E. Counter Battery.
9.50 a.m.	1	105 mm.	P.7.	do.	Shrapnel.
10.38-1. pm.	10	15 cm.	O.12.b.&c., P.13.d. O.18.b.	do.	H.E., H.V. One dud.
11.30-12.30 pm.	21	15 cm.	J.35.d., J.27.a, J.35.	WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT	H.E., Shrapnel & H.V. 3 duds.
2 pm.	20	15 cm.	J.27.	CERISY.	Counter Battery.
2.15-2.25 pm.	19	105 cm.	Wood in Q.14. P.4.d. P.10.c., P.10.b.20.	Wood in Q.14.	Front Line H.E.
7 am.	10	10.5 cm.		WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT.	H.E.
2.20 pm.	1	15 cm.	CORBIE.	NORCOURT.	White Shrapnel.
2.30 pm.	3	77 mm.	O.5.a.&d.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
2.45 pm.	14	105 mm.	O.17.o.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
3.50-4.10 pm.	12	77 mm.	P.4.d., P.5.b.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
5.25 pm.	10	10.5 cm.	P.4.d., P.18.o.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
5.30 pm.	12	10.5 cm.	O.18.a.	do.	H.E. in salvoes.
5.45-6.15 pm.	18	10.5 cm.	O.17.a.&b.	BAYONVILLERS	H.E. and Shrapnel.
6.55-7.5. pm.	17	15 cm.	P.4.d.	do.	H.E. and Shrapnel.
U.10-8.20 pm.	55	10.5 cm.	P.9.b. & 4.c.	T.B. 109° from	Intermittent.
7.45 pm.	40	77 mm.	P.10.d.	P.9.d.40.40.	
8.00-10 pm.	80	All calibres.	P.5.d.	CERISY.	Slight damage to trench.
8 pm. to 12 pm.	150	77 mm. & 15 cm.	SAILLY-le-SEC	MALARD WOOD	Buildings demolished.
8.20 pm.	25	77 mm.	P.16.a.	T.B. 109° from	H.E.
8.30 pm.	22	77 mm.	P.10.d.	do.	H.E.
8.45 pm.	16	10.5 cm.	P.9.d.	do.	H.E.
9.10 pm.	23	10.5 cm.	HAMEL & J.27.a.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
9.15 pm.	68	10.5 cm.	P.9.b.	do.	H.E.
10 p.m.	100	10.5 & 15 cm.	J.32.33.34.	CERISY.	Harrassing.
10 p.m.	150	7.7 & 10.5 cm.	P.5.c.	do.	Harrassing.
10.45-11.15 p.m.	15	10.5 cm.	VAIRE.	do.	H.E.
11 pm. to 3 am.	30	15 cm.	F.L.	MALARD WOOD.	Harrassing.
11.45 p.m.	20	10.5 cm.	HAMEL.	MORCOURT.	H.E.



153  
HOSTILE SHELLING REPORT (Continued).

Time.	Number.	Calibre.	Area Shelled.	From Direction of.	Remarks, Damage, etc.
1 am.	10	77. mm.	P.2.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
1.30 am.	20	10.5 cm.	P.4.d.	do.	Lacy. Gas.
1.00-3. am.	50	all calibres.	SALIIY-leSEC.	MALARD WOOD.	59% Lacy.Gas. 50% H.E.
2.00 am.	10	77. mm.	P.2.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
2.25. am.	90	10.5 & 15 cm.	HAMEL & P.4.	WARFUSEE.	H.E. & Shrapnel.
2.30 a.m.	50	all calibres.	P.5.d.	CERISY.	Slight damage to trench.
3.00- 6.00 am.	50	7.7. & 15. cm.	Sailly-le-Sec.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E. & Shrapnel.



Intelligence Summary No. 3.  
For 24 hours ending 6 a.m., 3rd, August, 1918.

Reference Map:- Sheet 62D.

# OPERATIONS.

(a) ARTILLERY. Normally active throughout period. Spasmodic shooting on enemy forward positions by 13 and 18 pdrs. Heavies shooting on back areas. A shoot was put down on Sunken road and Quarry in K.31.c. at 12.30 p.m.

(b) PATROLS. 7 Patrols operated on Brigade front; Right Battalion supplying 5.

No. 1 Patrol, of one Officer and 6 O.T. left P.10.d.9.7. at 10 p.m., returning to P.16.b.4.8. at Midnight. Movement seen about P.11.d.0.0.

No. 2, of 1 Officer and 6 O.R., left P.16.b.4.8. at Midnight, returned to P.10.d.8.4. at 2 a.m. Report M.G. active from Ridge P.11. and P.17., but none from Valley or ACCROCHE WOOD. Only occasional Very Lights from ACCROCHE WOOD. Enemy post of about 8 to 10 men located at P.16.b.90.95.; patrol fired on with rifles and bombed from this Post.

No. 3, of 1 Officer and 6 O.R., left P.10.d.65.75. at 2 a.m. returned to P.16.b.4.8. about 4 a.m. Nothing reported.

No. 4, of 1 Officer and 8 O.R., left P.11.a.5.4. at midnight, returning to P.10.d.8.7. at 2 a.m. trenches and rifle pits in P.11.a. and c. were examined and no signs of enemy seen. Sounds of talking and digging heard in P.11.d.4.4. whilst patrol was lying up listening in old C.T., a whistle was blown near above working party and immediately after about 40 rounds of 77 mm fired into vicinity of patrol.

No. 5, 1 Officer 6 O.R., left P.10.d.8.7. at 2 a.m., returned to P.11.a.5.4. at 4 a.m. Reported enemy quiet. No enemy seen or heard.

## Left Battalion Patrols.

No. 1, of 1 Officer and 7 O.R., report leaving P.5.d.1.1. at 10.30 p.m., returning to P.5.d.3.6. at 1.30 a.m. Wet weather made progress difficult. M.G.'s firing from P.12.a.2.5. and P.12.a.3.7. No enemy seen.

No. 2, of 1 Officer and 14 O.R., left P.11.a.5.5. at 1.30 a.m.; returned to P.5.d.0.0. at 3.35 a.m. Ground searched well, no trace of enemy. M.G. from N.E. of RECORD WOOD very active during this patrol.

(c) MACHINE GUNS. - Our M.G. Coys. expended 18,250 rounds on our Divisional frontage during the period. Principally on tracks in Q.1.a., Bridges Q.1.c.3.7. and P.6.d.4.7. Road Junction Q.1.c.3.3. Roads P.12.a.60.05., P.12.c.35.30. Road Junction P.17. Central. Area between P.12.c.5.0. and P.18.a.00.40. HUNS Walk P.9.c.80.80. Trenches P.22.d., P.23.a. and Road through P.22.d. towards WARFUSEE.

(d) TRENCH MORTARS. - No firing.

(e) SNIPERS. - Right Battalion claim two certain hits vicinity of ACCROCHE WOOD.

(f) AIRCRAFT. - Inactive. At 6 a.m. one 'plane flew over ACCROCHE WOOD. A blast of whistle heard and Enemy A.A. M.G. opened fire.

IDENTIFICATIONS. - Nil.

## ENEMY DEFENCES.

(a) New Work. - None seen.

(b) New Wire. - None seen.

(c) Posts. - At P.16.b.90.95. (Patrol report).

(d) M.G. located at Trench P.17.a.7.4.

A.A. M.G. at P.16.b.8.8., also M.G. in P.12.a., J.36.d.8.1. and P.17. Central.

(e) T.M. - Nil.



4. ENEMY AIRCRAFT. - Inactive.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE. - Normal ; quiet; slight Machine Gun activity during night.

6. MOVEMENT. - Frequent movement seen in and out of ACCROCHE WOOD from daylight to 10 a.m., all wearing full packs; engaged by Lewis Gun and rifle fire. At 8.40 a.m. 18 pdrs. dispersed three men and tracks further South used; they were harassed with L.G. fire. Between 5 and 10 a.m. movement of small parties from Cross Roads, P.24.a.0.6. to Trench P.17.o.3.1.. This movement occurred over same area yesterday morning about same time.

At 2.15 p.m. Four men seen in Trench K.25.d.85.20.

At 2.30 p.m. Three men seen in Trench K.25.d.60.20.

At 9.00 p.m. Small parties of twos and threes between P.17.a.5.5. and ACCROCHE WOOD.

At 4.30 a.m. Similar parties returning from Wood.

Throughout the day constant movement was seen in Quarry and Sunken Road K.31.c. Artillery put down heavy shoot on this place at 12.30 p.m. at the request of Infantry.

3 Transport seen at Q.26.d.5.4. going East.

At 3.50 p.m. Train with 18 trucks came from X.1.a. to R.25.d. Shunted at R.31.a. until 4.30 p.m. Artillery advised but no action resulted.

At 4.44 p.m. five men seen at Q.25.d.7.4. moving East.

At 8.35 p.m. 21 Men moving from LAMOTTE in twos along road in P.29.b. , 10 to 15 yards apart, wearing caps - small bags on back. Disappeared into ACCROCHE WOOD.

*1. The...*

5/2/18.  
(R.B.)

Major  
Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Bde.



Time.	No.	Calibre.	Area Shelled.	From Direction.	Remarks.
5.30 a.m.	40	15 cm	J.27.b.	Q.14.c.9.8.	H.E.
7.00 a.m.	12	10.5 cm	P.11.a. & 5.a.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
7.20 a.m.	50	10.5 cm	P.5.c.	Q.7.c.6.6.	H.E.
8.-8.10 a.m.	30	All calibre.	P.5.c. and d.	MALARD WOOD.	Slight damage to trench.
9.00 a.m.	6	15 cm	P.10.b.	CERISY.	H.E.
9.20 a.m.	20	15 cm	P.16.a.	HAMILTON WOOD.	H.E.
11.05 a.m.	13	77 mm	O.11.a.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
11.25 a.m.	14	10.5 cm	P.9.d.	BAMONVILLERS.	H.E.
11.30 a.m.	12	10.5 cm	P.10.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
Midday.	20	15 cm	J.27.b.	Q.14.c.9.8.	H.E. & Shrap.
12.15 p.m.	10	10.5 cm	P.10.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
12.25 p.m.	50	10.5 cm	P.9.c.	CERISY.	H.E.
12.30 p.m.	120	15 cm	P.14.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
1.30 p.m.	50	15 cm	J.28.a.	Q.14.c.9.8.	H.E. & Shrap.
1.00 p.m.	30	10.5 cm	J.34.d.	MALARD WOOD.	Searching.
2.00 p.m.	16	10.5 cm	P.15.d.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
2.20 p.m.	15	10.5 cm	P.10.c. and d.	HAZEL WOOD.	H.E.
do	6	15 cm	O.17.b.	WARFUSEE.	Black Shrap.
3.15 p.m.	20	10.5 cm	P.10.b.	Q.13.d.4.6.	H.E.
3.30 p.m.	50	10.5 cm	P.10.d. and 11.a.	Q.7.c.	H.E.
3.30 p.m.	21	10.5 cm)	J.21.d., 28.c.	MORCOURT.	H.E. & Shrap.
		15 cm)	and P.4.b.		
4.00 p.m.	20	15 cm	J.34.b. P.10.a.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
4.00 p.m.	16	15 cm	P.15.d.	MORCOURT.	H.E. & Shrap.
4.25 p.m.	16	77 mm)	P.10.d. and	MORCOURT.	do do
		15 cm)	J.27.a.		
4.40 p.m.	50	15 cm	J.36.a.	MORCOURT.	H.E.
4.50 p.m.	6	10.5 cm	O.11.b. and d.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
4.55 p.m.	to) 84	10.5 cm	P.4.a., 10.d., 15.a.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E. & Shrap.
9.00 p.m.	)		and b., J.34.a.		
6.40 p.m.	50	10.5 cm	P.10.c.	CERISY.	H.E.
7.20 p.m.	30	10.5 cm	P.5.c.	CERISY.	H.E.
8.00 p.m.	50	10.5 cm	J.23.c.	Q.13.Central.	H.E.
10.10 p.m.	35	10.5 cm	SAILLY-le-SEC.	WARFUSEE.	H.E. & Shrap.
8.00 p.m.	50	15 cm	J.35.a.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
8.15 p.m.	10	10.5 cm	P.4.b.	CERISY.	H.E.
9.00 p.m.	30	10.5 cm	J.29.b.	Q.14.c.9.8.	H.E.
9.00 p.m.	to) 50	10.5 cm	P.9.b.	KATE WOOD.	H.E.
11.30 p.m.	)				
10.00 p.m.	30	10.5 cm	P.4.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
10.00 p.m.	12	77 mm	P.3.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
11.00 p.m.	40	15 cm	J.28.a.	Q.14.c.9.8.	H.E.
11.20 p.m.	50	10.5 cm	P.4.b. and d.	CERISY.	H.E.
11.25 p.m.	50	15 cm	J.28.a.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
11.30 p.m.	to) 60	10.5 cm	P.11.a. and c.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
5.00 a.m.	)				
11.30 p.m.	50	10.5 cm)	J.35.a., b. and c.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
		15 cm)			
12.25 a.m.	200	10.5 cm	SAILLY-le-SEC.	WARFUSEE.	H.E. & Shrap.
1.00 a.m.	20	10.5 cm	P.5.c.	Q.7.c.6.6.	H.E.
1.45 a.m.	50	77 mm)	P.4.b. and d.	CERISY.	H.E.
		10.5 cm)			
2.20 a.m.	20	do	P.4.d.	CERISY.	H.E.
2.30 a.m.	30	10.5 cm)	J.35.a., b. and c.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
		15 cm)			
2.40 a.m.	100	77 mm	J.29.b. and d.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
2.40 a.m.	6	15 cm	HAMEL.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
4.00 a.m.	30	10.5 cm	J.22.	Unknown.	Gas.
4.20 a.m.	20	15 cm	J.29.d.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
4.35 a.m.	26	10.5 cm	P.10.a.	Unknown.	H.E.
4.40 a.m.	30	15 cm	J.29.d.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
5.00 a.m.	6	77 mm	NOTHAMEL WOOD.	CERISY.	H.E.
5.45 a.m.	20	77 mm)	P.10.d.	HAZEL WOOD.	Slight damage to trench.
		10.5 cm)			



## 11TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4.

For 24 hours ending 6 a.m. 4th. August, 1918.

## 1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Artillery. Active at intervals throughout the night. At 7.30 a.m. 3rd. inst. 18 pdrs at Infantry's request fired on much movement in rear of ACCROCHE WOOD dispersing them. About 2 a.m. Gas was reported by Patrols in Valley P.11.b. which was believed to drift back from GAILLY where our heavies were shooting about that time.

(b) PATROLS. 7 Patrols operated on our front, 5 of which were provided by Right Battalion.

Right Battalion. No. 1 Patrol left P.11.a.40.60. at 10 p.m. returning to P.10.d.99.80. at 1.5 a.m. Patrol which comprised 1 Off. and 6 O.R. examined rifle pits and C.T. to P.11.c.6.0. No sign of enemy. Transport heard in direction of P.23.b.99.50. M.G. fired from approx. P.11.b.80.25. Enemy very quiet. Few Very Lights.

No. 2 Patrol of 1 N.C.O. 6 men left P.11.a.4.6. at 2 a.m. returning to P.11.c.00.80. at 4.15 a.m. Patrolled valley and searched pot holes etc. No sign of enemy activity.

No. 3 Patrol of 1 Off. 10 O.R. left P.10.d.6.2. at 10 p.m. returning to P.11.c.00.80. at midnight. Valley thoroughly searched to a distance of 500 yards from our line. No sign of enemy posts or machine guns in hollow. Machine guns fired from crest line opposite.

No. 4 Patrol of 1 off. 14 O.R. left P.16.b.4.8. at midnight returning to P.10.d.0.8. at 2 a.m. Suspected post at P.16.b.90.95. where previous movement had been seen and from where Patrol was fired on was rushed but no enemy found. There are numerous shell holes at the end of a well worn track but no definite post.

No. 5 Patrol of 1 N.C.O. 6 O.R. left P.10.d.0.7. at 2 a.m. returning to P.16.b.4.8. at 4 a.m. Everything very quiet - Few flares and practically no M.G. activity. No enemy were seen or heard.

Left Battalion.

No. 1 Patrol of 1 N.C.O. 8 O.R. left P.11.a.9.9. at 10.20 p.m. returning to P.5.c.9.0. at 1.30 a.m. No enemy movement detected. At midnight enemy put 12 88 mm. down at P.5.d.1.1. Very Lights fired from P.12.a.46.55. No M.G.'s encountered.

No. 2 Patrol of 1 Off. 10 O.R. left P.11.a.5.5. at 1.30 a.m. returning to P.5.d.0.0. at 3.45 a.m. Area thoroughly searched no movement or any work detected. A few Very Lights fired although not as many as on previous nights. Very little M.G. fire. Gas drifting across our front as the result of a shoot of heavies - caused much inconvenience.

(c) MACHINE GUNS. Our Machine Gun Company fired 19,900 rounds over our Divisional frontage during period on the following targets:-

Trenches P.23.a., P.22.b., P.11.d.70.13.

Huns Walk. P.17.b. and 18.a.

Roads. P.22, P.6.d.30.05, Q.1.a.25.25.

Road Junctions. P.23.a. Central. P.17. Central.

RECORD WOOD. P.12.a. BRIDGE. P.6.d.3.7. and Q.1.c.35.75.

(d) TRENCH MORTARS. At 5.10 p.m. our 6" Newtons fired 10 rounds on Dugout on ACCROCHE WOOD (Location not reported).

At 5.25. p.m. 10 rounds fired on M.G. Position at P.17.a.7.4. Four hits observed.

(e) SNIPERS. Snipers active but no hits claimed.

P.T.O.



Intelligence Summary No. 4.

1) AIRCRAFT. Our Airman very active throughout the day. Bombs were dropped and Machine Guns fired on ACCROCHE WOOD and vicinity at 1.40 p.m., 2 p.m., 6.50 p.m., 7. p.m. and 7.10 p.m. They were heavily engaged with A.A. fire.

IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

- (a) New Work. None reported.
- (b) New wire. None reported.
- (c) Posts. Suspected at P.11.a.80.00. where men were seen at 0.50 p.m.
- (d) M.Gs. Approx at P.17.b.5.1., P.11.b.80.28., P.6.c.2.9., also firing from SAILLY LAURETTE & GAILLY, but machine guns generally quiet throughout the night.
- (e) Trench Mortars. Nil.

ENEMY AIRCRAFT. General inactive.

At 9.10 a.m. Two planes patrolled his lines for about thirty minutes.

At 12.10 p.m. One enemy plane driven off by our A.A. fire when over our lines.

At 6 p.m. Four planes flying very high crossed our lines going west.

ENEMY ATTITUDE. Artillery, Machine Guns and Very Lights less active than usual for the period.

P.10.b.&.d. were not fired on between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m. which is unusual.

MOVEMENT. A great deal of movement of small parties of men in twos and threes seen about enemy forward areas particularly around WARFUSEE and ACCROCHE WOOD from daylight to 9 p.m. daily.

6.30 a.m. Three men from West of ACCROCHE WOOD went into Wood.

7.5. a.m. Five : " " " " " " " " " " (fully equipped.)

7.12 a.m. Men moving into WOOD in twos and threes, at 100 yards intervals ( probably 50 in all)

8.30 a.m. Man seen at P.17.d.6.1.

8.10 a.m. Three men moved into WOOD leading a dog.

12.50 p.m. 4 men entered WOOD apparently linesmen.

3.40 p.m. Two men entered WOOD and two left by same track.

3.50 p.m. Four men entered Wood.

9 p.m. Three men entered WOOD leading dog.

Continuous movement on Road K.31.b.25.90, apparently working on Dugout in hillside, also in Quarry, K.31.b.4.3. (fired on by Artillery.

8.20 p.m. Six men entered and two left TAILLOUX WOOD carrying equipment.

4. p.m. Transport seen moving East past Q.26.d.5.4. Four mounted men at same point going towards WARFUSEE.

7.10 a.m. Nine men apparently working on Cable Bury N.E. corner of WOOD.

NOTE. WOOD means ACCROCHE WOOD.

Between 2 and 3 p.m. Train twice seen in Q.34.

8.10 p.m. Motor Ambulance going East in Q.23.a.5.8.

6.20 p.m. Two motor cycles in Q.23.5.5.8.

6.30 p.m. Limber to VALARIE WOOD from Q.28.d.3.4. Returned VIA Q.27.d.95.60.

Between U and O p.m. Movement of Transport in Q.23.a.5.8.

*A. L. Fraser R.*



Time.	No.	Calibre.	Area Shelled.	From Direction.	Remarks.
6.30 a.m.	19	105 mm	P.5.d. & P.9.b.	MORCOURT.	H.E. & Shrap.
6.45 a.m.	14	77 mm	F.L. P.10.b.	do	H.E.
7.00 a.m.	10	77 mm	J.34.d.	CERISY GAILLY.	Scattered.
8.10 a.m.	10	-	HAMEL WOOD.	do	H.E.
8.50 a.m.	10	77 mm	O.11.d. O.17.a.	MORCOURT.	H.E. and H.V.
9.00 a.m.	30	10.5 cm	P.9.d.	do	Shrapnel.
9.00 a.m.	9	15 cm	P.10.d. and	BAYONVILLERS	H.E.
	5	77 mm	P.9.d.	and HAZEL WOOD.	
9.18 a.m.	56	77 mm	P.16.b. P.15.a.	do do	H.E.
9.24 a.m.	29	105 mm	P.9.d., P.15.b.,	LAMOTTE.	H.E. and
			P.4.b., P.10.a.	MORCOURT.	Shrapnel.
9.30 a.m.	15	10.5 cm	P.3.d.	CERISY.	-
10.00 a.m.	10	10.5 cm	do	do	-
10.15 a.m.	20	4.2	P.4.b.	do	3 Hits on Trench.
10.30 a.m.	20	77 mm	P.3.d.	WARFUSEE.	-
10.30 a.m.	10	77 mm	P.2.c., B.9.	CERISY.	-
do	10	15 cm	do	do	-
10.55 a.m.	16	10.5 cm	P.10.b.	-	Shrapnel.
11.00 a.m.	15	4.2	P.4.d.	MALARD WOOD.	Searching.
11.00 a.m.	20	77 mm	J.35.b. and d.	do	Harassing.
11.05 a.m.	10	10.5 cm	P.15.c. 1.9.	BAYONVILLERS.	Shrapnel.
11.10 a.m.	11	77 mm	P.11.a.	do	1 Rd. per minute.
11.20 a.m.	20	77 mm	P.16.c., B. & d.	HAZEL WOOD.	H.E.
11.30 a.m.	10	4.2	J.34.d.	MALARD WOOD.	No damage.
11.35 a.m.	20	10.5 cm	P.11.a.	do	-
11.40 a.m.	70	10.5 cm	P.14.d. Cent.	BAYONVILLERS.	-
Noon.	5	15 cm	P.10.a.	-	Shrapnel.
12.40 p.m.	31	10.5 cm	P.15.b., P.16.a.	LAMOTTE. MORCOURT.	H.E.
12.40 p.m.	60	77 mm	P.16.c. and d.	BAYONVILLERS.	H.E.
12.45 p.m.	12	10.5 cm	P.10.d.	do	-
12.50 p.m.	15	15 cm	P.10.b.	-	-
2.35 p.m.	34	105 mm	P.10.b., P.15.b.	BAYONVILLERS.	H.E.
3.00 p.m.	10	4.2	J.34.d.	MALARD WOOD.	No damage.
do	50	All calibres.	P.4.b., P.5.a.	do	Few Hits on trench.
3.20 p.m.	30.	77 mm	HAMEL.	do	-
4.00 p.m.	10	77 mm	O.17.b. & 18.d.	WARFUSEE.	H.E.
4.30 p.m.	15	77 mm	P.2.c.	CERISY.	-
5.15 p.m.	56	105 mm	P.10.d. J.34.d.	MALARD WOOD.	H.E.
6 to 8 p.m.	30	77 mm	P.2.c.	CERISY.	-
7.45 p.m.	15	105 mm	P.7.a.	WARFUSEE.	7 Duds.
8.10 p.m.	20	15 cm	O.17.b.	do	H.E. 2 Guns.
9.30 p.m.	20	77mm & 4.2	P.5.c.	CERISY.	No damage.
9.30 p.m.	10	10.5 cm	P.10.b.	do	-
9.30 p.m.	20	10.5 cm	P.3.d.	do	-
11.30 p.m.	60	Various.	SAILLY-le-SEC.	MALARD WOOD.	Not known.
11.30 p.m.	60	do	P.4.b. and d.	CERISY.	No damage.
Midnight.	50	77mm & 4.2	P.10.b.	TAILLOUX WOOD.	2 hits on C.T.
do	6	10.5 cm	P.3.c.	CERISY.	-
12.15 a.m.	12	10.5 cm	P.2.c.	do	-
1.30 a.m.	40	77mm & 105mm.	SAILLY-le-SEC.	MALARD WOOD.	10 minutes' strafe.
1.45 a.m.	10	10.5 cm	P.3.c. and b.	CERISY.	-
2.30 a.m.	30	4.2 and 77 mm	P.4.b. and d.	FORBES WOOD.	-
3.05 a.m.	80	Various.	SAILLY-le-SEC.	MALARD WOOD.	10 minutes' strafe.
3.30 a.m.	50	-	P.9., Support Line	-	Large proportion
			and Village.		Blue Cross Gas.
3.50 a.m.	250	Various.	SAILLY-le-SEC	MALARD WOOD	Strafe along Sector
			Sector.	and MORCOURT.	to MORLANCOURT from
			Front Line & C.T.		Canal at SAILLY-le-
					SEC.
5.30 a.m.	20	4.2	J.35.b. and d.	MALARD WOOD.	No damage.



11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.  
OBSERVATION REPORT.

For 24 hours ending 6 a.m., 6th. August, 1918.

Weather - Showery. Visibility poor.

Air Activity - Our 'Planes' - Only patrol 'planes' out.  
Enemy 'Planes' Nil.

Shelling - Very light until about 4.20 a.m. this morning when area  
shoot with 77's and 105 mm., Gas and H.E. about 70% Gas shells (Green  
Cross). This continued until about 6.30 a.m., shells falling at the  
rate of 18 per minute; principally on Battery positions and near VAUX,  
VAIRE, I.25., 26., 20., 32. and 33.

Movement 11.30 a.m. Five men seen on road Q.17.  
11.40 a.m. About thirty men seen moving to and from Gullies  
Q.20 and 21.  
9.45 a.m. Two waggons on road going to WARFUSEE at  
Q.23.c.4.4.  
10.00 a.m. Seven men carrying shovels to SUSAN WOOD Q.21.b.9.7.  
1.10 p.m. Three men without rifles go to HAZEL WOOD Q.9.a.  
from O.23.a.5.9.  
3.10 p.m. Five men wiring at P.23.a.5.2. Artillery dis-  
posed them.

6/8/18.  
(R.B.)

Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.  
NOTE - Not sufficient time to type Hostile Shelling Report.

Major.  
Brigade.



# HOSTILE SHELLING REPORT.

Time.	No.	Calibre.	Area Shelled.	Direction.	Remarks.
6.10 am.	10	Railway Gun	fired 10 rounds from 133 T.B.	from J.28.b.2.2.	
7 am.	97	77 mm.	P.27.a.b., P.16.b. Bayonvillers P.15.b. P.10.a. J.28.a.	Morcourt. Chipilly.	H.E. & Shrap.
7.15 am.	20	4.2.	P.11.a.1.1.	Cerisy.	H.E.
7.15 am.	77	105 mm.	P.15.a.P.11.c.	Bayonvillers.	H.E.
7.50 am.	80	105 mm.	J.27.a.b., P.4.c.	Morcourt.	H.E. & Shrap.
<del>8.20 am.</del>	<del>50</del>	<del>4.2.</del>	J.33.d. P.10.a.b.		
8.20 am.	50	4.2.	J.27.a.	Morcourt.	H.E.
9.10 am.	20	4.2.	Sailly le Sec.	Morcourt.	H.E.
9.40 am.	10	4.2.	" " "	Cerisy.	H.E.
10.10 am.	50	5.9	J.22.a.	Morcourt.	H.E.
1.45 pm.	30	4.2.	J.27.b.	Malard Wood.	H.E.
2.50 pm.	16	15 cm.	J.27.a.&d.	Bayonvillers.	H.E.
2.30 pm.	<del>30</del> 5	4.2.	J.27.d.8.8.	Malard Wood	H.E.
2.50 pm.	20.	4.2.	P.11.a.10.10.	Q.8.b.9.6.	-
3.20 pm.	30	77 mm.	J.34.d. 27.d.	Malard Wood.	H.E.
3.25 pm.	12	105 mm.	J.26.& Sailly le Sec.	Bayonvillers.	H.E. & Gas.
8.30 pm.	6	15 cm.	J.26.d.	Bayonvillers.	H.E.
10 pm.	20	4.2.	Sailly-le-Sec.	Cerisy.	H.E.
2 am.	30	4.2.	Welcome Wood.	Malard Wood.	H.E.
2.30 am.	30	4.2.	J.35.a.	" "	H.E.
3 am.	30	4.2.	Sailly-le-Sec.	Cerisy.	H.E.
3.30 am.	20	77 mm.	J.29.d.	Cerisy.	H.E.
4.30 am.	100	77 mm.	J.29.a&c.	Malard Wood.	H.E.
4.20 to 2000/		H.E. Shrap	J.25.J.26.J.27	Unknown.	H.E. & Gas.
6.30 am.2500		& Gas.	J.32 & J.33.		Batteries and positions in and around of VAUX VAIRE.

60



C.O.,  
41st., 42nd., 43rd., 44th. Bns.  
11th. Trench Mortar Battery.



The following extract from Australian Corps Intelligence Summary of the 30th/31st. August is forwarded for information:-

" MISCELLANEOUS. - The following prisoners have been captured by this Corps from the 1st. January, 1918, to the 31st. August, 1918:-

" 1st. January to 31st. July.	85 Officers	2,973	O.R.
" 1st. August to 31st. August	324 Officers	13,380	O.R.
TOTAL	409 Officers.	16,355	O.R.

" The following material has been captured:-

" 1st. January to 31st. July, 1918.

" 77 mm Gun.	1	Light Trench Mortars.	8
" Tank	1	Heavy Trench Mortars	3
" Machine Guns	389	Granatanwerfer	8
" M.G. Stands.	3	Flamenwerfer	1
" M.G. Barrels	2	Horses	2
" Lewis Guns (re-captured)	4	Anti-Tank Rifle	1
" Minenwerfer	24	Anti-Tank Gun	1

" 1st. August to 31st. August, 1918.

" Guns and Howitzers	171	G.S. Waggon	9
" Anti-Tank Guns	3	Motor Lorries	5
" Trench Mortars	153	Motor Ambulance	1
" Machine Guns	1089	Tractor	1
		Aeroplane	1

" A large amount of captured material has yet to be counted."

1/9/18.  
(R.B.)

A/Brigade Major, 11th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Captain



153  
Information re Enemy Works, Machine Guns, Suspected H/Qs., and Movement in Squares P.6, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 24, Q.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22, also K.31 and 32.

AEROPLANE PHOTOS. Corps Interpretation.

- A 3 AE A 804. Bridges at P.6.c.35.75 and P.6.c.20.80 are intact. En posts along road at P.6.c.95.00 are occupied. Tracks show distinct about these. Tracks show in swampy ground at P.6.c.45.10.
- A 3 AE B 156. New short length of Tranch from P.23.a.20.90 to P.23.a.00.80. Works appears to be in progress at edge of wood at P.17.c.40.00.
- A 3 AE A 803. New rifle pits from P.21.d.70.90. to P.21.d.65.60. Po at P.27.b.80.90. is occupied.
- A 3 AE A 802. Cellars of houses at K.31.c. 25.35., J.36.d.50.35., J.36.d.60.15. appear to be occupied, tracks show about these points. D.O. apparantly exists at K.31.c.00.60, tracks lead to this point road at J.36.d.85.30.
- A 3 AE B 146. Increased activity about pits at P.24.c.30.00 and P.23.d.98.40.
- A 3 AE B 144. Increased activity round about pit at P.24.c.30.00 and P.12.d.25.20. New tracks lead from roads at P.12.c.10.20 to pit at P.12.c.68.45.
- A.3.AE B 143. Bridges intact at K.32.d.65.80, 65.70, K.33.c.25.65, Q.2.b.80.90., K.33.c.30.10., Q.3.a.95.70., across marshy ground from K.33.c.90.00. to K.33.d.00.30. Houses at Q.2.b.85.80. appear to be occupied.
- A 3 AE B 138. Possible H.Q. at Dugouts at K.32.a.40.35., tracks come to this point. Increased activity in copse at K.31.b.90.60. and bot road fork at K.32.a.10.55.
- A 3 AE B 137. This photo clearly shows the activity about woods and ombankments at K.33.b., 33.a.&.c.

AEROPLANE OBSERVATION.

Dugouts reported at P.17.c.2.6. confirmed by Observer.  
Observer reports some new timber could be seen at R.E. dump at Q.19.b.3.7.  
Shed at Q.7.b.90.95 still appears to be intact.  
Dugouts at P.11.b.9.3. Appears to be covered with timber and men seen standing at entrance.

MACHINE GUNS AND POSTS.

P.18.c.5.8.      P.22.a.9.9.      P.18.a.50.45.      P.6.a.95.75.  
P.17.a.70.60.      P.11.d.50.80.      P.17.c.30.80.      P.12.a.55.80.  
P.12.a. Central.      P.12.a.90.70.      P.12.d.55.80.  
Many M.Gs. reported firing from vicinity ACQUARIE WOOD and from Squa P.16 and P.17. ACCROCHE WOOD and approaches. Also from SAILLY LAURETTE across river from Square P.6.

Enemy Posts at P.12.c.00.20. P.16.b.90.95. P.12.c.00.20 again reported and P.11.c.30.10.

MINENWERFERS. Reported several times as active from P.6.b.40.55. and also firing from SAILLY LAURETTE and vicinity.

SUSPECTED H.Qs. and DUGOUTS.

Headquarters at CHALK PIT. K.31.d.8.3. and P.17.c.25.90. and Suspe H/Qs. at P.29.a. DUGOUT at P.11.b.90.40.  
Men seen leaving suspected Dugout at K.31.d.50.90.  
Suspected Dugout at P.17.a.85.00. Pigeons and dog seen to disappear at this point.

MOVEMENT.

Wiring reported in progress at P.28.b.6.3.  
Much movement and work including wiring at P.17.a. and ACQUARIE WOOD  
Continual movement in Valley P.17. to ACQUARIE WOOD. Possibly defensive works about here.  
Signal Station located in thick bush Q.9.c.80.20.  
Digging several times reported and much movement in vicinity of Q.9 30.70., Q.22.a.20.40. and Q.8.a.50.20.

P.T.O.



(2)

Tow path along canal P.6.c.90.80. obstructed by fallen trees and wire entanglements - practically impassable to troops.  
Considerable movement at Quarry K.31.c. and d. (Many times reported)  
Enemy appears to be constructing large Dugouts at K.31.d. Much work seen here.  
Strong Post at P.22.a.10.40.  
Movement reported several times from Q.7.d.&.8.a.  
Movement reported from Chalk Pit P.22.c.80.60.  
Suspected Headquarters at P.11.b.9.2. to P.11.b.9.5. Much work seen in progress. Several times reported.  
Dugouts at ACQUARRIE ST. P.31.d.  
Enemy Post at P.12.c.00.20. and Works at P.17.d.5.8. reported by H.G.Coy.  
Much movement reported by H.G.Coy vicinity of ACCROCHE WOOD and approaches, also considerable movement during day at K.31.c.8.3. and vicinity.

=====



Information concerning enemy territory opposite 3rd. Divl. Front.Extract from Aust. Corps Summary No. 60. - BRIDGES.

Type.	Reference.	Remarks.
Road.	L.22.a.5.7. and 5.4. )	Both in good condition.
"	L.20.d.80.55, 15.35. )	
Foot.	L.21.a.75.25. and 45.47.	Both in good condition.
Railway.	L.21.d.48.50. and 18.35.	Both in good condition.
Road.	L.30.a.48.82., 51.78., 98.52.	All in good condition.
Road.	G.25.c.35.37.	In good condition.
Road.	L.21.b.5.7.	Destroyed.
Railway.	L.21.b.6.7.	Partially destroyed.
Lock.	L.30.b.41.52.	In good condition.

Interpretation of Aeroplane Photographs.

Photo.	Reference.	Remarks.
A3AEA.924.	L.15.d.40.63.	Large hospital.
" 895.	L.22.d. and 23.c.	Apparently much use made of Railway Siding here.
" "	L.22.c. and 28.a.	Work - possibly dugouts in embankment here.
" 891.	L.15.c.68.55.	Possible dugout.
" 890.	L.32.a.70.30.	Line of short trenches from this point Northwards.
" 889.	L.26.b.4.4.	Line of rifle pits running N. and S. through this point.
" 888.	L.14.b.12.35.	Much movement apparent in small Wood here.
" "	L.14.b.36.68.	Re-entrant, a centre of movement and numerous dugouts in terraces.

P.T.O.



Photo.	Reference.	Remarks.
A3AEA.886.	L.22.b.80.65.	Three short trenches visible.
" "	L.22.b.62.65.	Possible dugout.
" 885.	L.33.b.	Apparently camouflage along North Bank of Canal.
" 884.	L.15.a.	Work and rifle pits in terraces.
" 882.	L.27.d.9.7.	Numerous rifle pit defences visible.
" "	L.21.d.42.40.	Short piece of trench.
" 879.	L.20.b.	All terraces in this locality have numerous rifle pit defences.
A3AEB.301.	L.16.c.52.43.)	New trench defences at these points.
" "	L.16.c.90.35.)	
" 298.	L.17.c.	Rifle pits in terraces.
" 285.	L.35.b.30.14.	Possible dugout, and defences in SQUARE Wood.
" 283.	L.23.b.37.40.	New short trench.
" "	L.24.c.25.25.	Possible dugouts.
" 282.	L.30.c.55.45.	Defences visible here.
" 275.	L.10.a.17.85.	Trench defences.
" 267.	L.11.c.45.42.	Dugout here and new work on old trenches apparent.
" "	L.16.b.63.80.	Rifle pits in embankment.
" 263.	L.24.a.15.80.	Large mound, a locality of much activity and new work on old trenches in vic.
" "	L.18.a.56.26.	Possible dugout in wood.

APPENDIX 3

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## RECEIPT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR.

Army Form W. 3443.

Received from † 11<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde. of 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust.  
 The undermentioned numbers of prisoners of war :—

Army\*  
 Corps  
 Division  
 Brigade

Officers	Other Ranks	Total
—	20	20

Signature D. L. SawyerTime 3.30 p. Date 25-8-1918.Rank Sgt.

\* Strike out those not required.  
 † Appointment of Officer handing over.

Appointment M. M. P.  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Bde.

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 The undermentioned numbers of prisoners of war :—

Army\*  
 Corps  
 Division  
 Brigade

Officers	Other Ranks	Total
—	7	7

Signature D. L. SawyerTime 6.45 p. Date 25-8-1918.Rank Sgt.

\* Strike out those not required.  
 † Appointment of Officer handing over.

Appointment M. M. P.  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Bde.

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Army\*  
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Officers	Other Ranks	Total
—	20	20

Signature D. L. SawyerTime 1.30 p. Date 25/8/1918.Rank Sgt.

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 The undermentioned numbers of prisoners of war :—

Army\*  
 Corps  
 Division  
 Brigade

Officers	Other Ranks	Total
—	16	16

Signature D. L. SawyerTime 12.20 p. Date 27/8/1918.Rank Sgt.

\* Strike out those not required.  
 † Appointment of Officer handing over.

Appointment M. M. P.  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Bde.



INTELLIGENCE gained from P.O.W. SUMMARY to 19.00  
on 25th. August, 1918.

- (1). Number of Prisoners passed through ... 48 Men.
- (2). Regiments Represented. ... 202nd. R.I.R.) 43rd. Division.  
203rd. R.I.R.)
- (3). Average Time Prisoners were in Trenches ... 7 days.
- (4). Re Artillery.  
(a) All guns except a battery or two removed at night of  
23rd. August, 1918.  
(b) Artillery said to have moved towards PERONNE. (FREITZ, J.)
- (5). Morale of Enemy. ... Confusion behind lines (AREN.).  
Not supposed to be in retreat.
- (6). Reinforcements. ... No reserves to hand at time of capture,  
but a Division is said to be coming up.
- (7). Positions of Enemy.  
(a). No well defined line and only a few small shallow  
holes behind SUZANNE.  
(b). A Divisional Headquarters said to be at A.29.b.4.2.  
(c). Army Headquarters said to be at PERONNE.  
(d). A position in VAUX Wood near River.  
(e). Artillery said to be left of and in SUZANNE.

Communications (Enemy).

- (a). Seem to be poor. 203rd. Regiment did not know what  
troops were on their flanks nor did they have any communica-  
tion with them.  
(b). Troops brought up at night or early morning  
through VAUX Wood.

Details of P.O.W. Receipts.

Batch I.	Despatched at 13.30.	...	20 Men.
Batch II.	" " 15.30.	...	20 Men.
Batch III.	" " 18.45.	...	7 Men.
	Evacuated to Hospital	...	1 Man.
Total			48 Men.

Captured East of BRAY on 25th. August, 1918.

*D. P. Fraser* Lieut.  
Intelligence Officer, 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

25/8/18.  
(R.B.)



Captured East of BRAY on 28th. August, 1918.  
 16-11-17

Batch I.	Despatched at 13.30.	...	20 Men.
Batch II.	" " 13.30.	...	20 Men.
Batch III.	" " 13.45.	...	7 Men.
Evacuated to Hospital	...	...	1 Man.
Total			48 Men.

22/8/18.  
 (R.S.)  
 Intelligence Officer, 11th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 60



W. W. W. W.

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.OBSERVATION REPORT. 27/8/18.

From O.P. - A.27.d.65.20.

- 10.00 a.m. - Hostile artillery very active from 10.a.m., especially in A.23, A.22., A.27. and A.21, chiefly firing from direction of MAUREPAS and ANGLE Wood, also from South of SOMME in vicinity of FEUILLERS and FRISE. Majority of Shells 77 H.E. and Shrapnel.
- 10.30 a.m. - Three hostile 'planes over MARICOURT driven off by our A.A. Flying very high.  
Our aeroplanes active.
- 10.00 a.m. - Visibility good, though dull, with intervals of sunshine.
12. Noon. - Considerable amount of transport seen going North-East along road B.4.c. Men also seen going back in sixes and small lots.
- 12.55 p.m. - Balloon seen on ground on road in H.1.d. - T.B. 100½ deg.
- 1.00 p.m. - Limbers seen going North along road in H.1.d. and c. One seen going South along same road.
- 1.05 p.m. - Traffic seen going East along road H.16.a.
- 1.00 p.m. - Limbers seen moving along road through H.1.c. and d., majority going North. Six seen. Balloon also seen H.1.d. - T.B. 100½ deg.
- 1.00 p.m. - Limbers and lorries going East along road H.16.a. Four in all.

From O.P. - A.27.d.65.25.

- 1.00 p.m. - Hostile artillery quietened down considerably, though still active in A.23.a. and b.
- 1.00 p.m. - Our artillery active, especially firing on enemy back areas.
- 1.00 p.m. - Our 'planes very active.

Movement.

Hostile large gauge railway engine seen going North along line through H.3.Central.

Visibility dull though good

Hostile 'Planes. - From 10.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. none seen.

Balloons. - Balloons up at 129½ deg. T.B. and 60 deg. T.B.

27th. August, 1918.  
(R.B.)

Lieut.  
Intelligence Officer, 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

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APPENDIX



*W. J. O'Leary*

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

OBSERVATION REPORT. 27/8/18.

From O.P. - A.27.d.65.20.

- 10.00 a.m. - Hostile artillery very active from 10.a.m., especially in A.23, A.22., A.27. and A.21, chiefly firing from direction of MAUREPAS and ANGLE Wood, also from South of SOMME in vicinity of PEUILLERS and FRISE. Majority of Shells 77 H.E. and Shrapnel.
- 10.30 a.m. - Three hostile 'planes over MARICOURT driven off by our A.A. Flying very high. Our aeroplanes active.

10.40 a.m. - Visibility good, though dull, with intervals of sunshine.

12. Noon. - Considerable amount of transport seen going North-East along road B.4.c. Men also seen going back in sixes and small groups.

12.35 (H.E.) Balloon seen on ground on road in H.1.d. - T.B. 100 deg.

1.00 p.m. - Limbers seen going North along road in H.1.d. and c. One seen going South along same road.

1.05 p.m. - Limbers seen going East along road H.16.a.

1.00 p.m. - Balloon seen on ground on road through H.1.c. and d., majority going North. Six seen. Balloon also seen H.1.d. - T.B. 100 deg.

1.00 p.m. - Limbers and lorries going East along road H.16.a. None in all. Hostile shells seen falling in all. Noisy.

From O.P. - A.27.d.65.25.

1.00 p.m. - Hostile shells seen falling in all. Noisy.

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APPENDIX



12/3/62

11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.Story of the 8th. August Offensive - HAMEL Village to CHIFFILLY.Scheme.

On August 1st. General GANNAN attended a Conference of the Third Divisional Brigade Commanders at BUSSEY to discuss broadly the outline of an offensive to be undertaken on this front on or before the 8th. instant.

The Australian Corps was to operate on the South of the River SOMME on a frontage extending from the SOMME Canal to VILLERS BRETONNEUX. GUILLAUCOURT - ROSIERES-en-SANTERRE Railway Line.

The Third Australian Division was to be on the North flank with boundaries SOMME Canal on the North, to approximately 1,500 yards North of BRETONNEUX-WARDUSEE Road on the South, the 11th. Infantry Brigade to attack on a frontage of 2,000 yards from the SOMME Canal Southwards, with the GREEN Line running through CHIFFILLY Q.2.Central, South through Q.2.Central to approximately Q.14.d.00.00. as an objective, the jump-off to be from the HAMEL defensive trenches in P.8.d. and P.11.a. and c.

The 4th. Brigade of the 4th. Australian Division was to continue the advance without Artillery barrage, under open warfare conditions to a final objective, the BRAY-HARDONNIERES defences, leap-frogging through the 11th. Brigade at the GREEN Line, after a halt of two hours in the advance, and fully exploiting the day's successes.

The 9th. Brigade were to operate on our South flank, and the 10th. London Regiment of the 174th. Brigade British on the North of the River SOMME on our North flank.

General Intention.

The general intention was for the Australian Corps to penetrate the enemy defences to a depth of 3,500 yards and establish a defensive line on the old BRAY-HARDONNIERES system of defences, providing a strong Northern flank for a deeper penetration by the Canadian Corps, which is to operate immediately South of the Railway Line (BRETONNEUX-ROSIERES-en-SANTERRE) afterwards advancing our line to conform with this deeper penetration on our Southern flank.

The task assigned to the Third Division was to capture the area bounded on the East by a Green Line marked on the Map running through Q.2.Central to Q.8.d.00.00., and to establish itself strongly in that locality.

Preparation.

Owing to the very limited time before the offensive was to take place preparations were hurried.

General GANNAN held daily conferences with his Battalion Commanders until all details were arranged.



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Page 2.Training.

Battalion Commanding Officers worked hard in order to give their Officers and men all the preparation possible. All the lessons learned at the recent HAMMEL Offensive of July 4th. were impressed on all ranks and apparently little was omitted to ensure success.

The 41st. Battalion had a replica of the locality to be attacked made to scale and the men obtained a lot of information from study of it.

The whole Battalion was also practised in following a barrage diagonal to the objective.

The 48th. Battalion had excellent natural features along the SOMME Canal and HAMMEL-CHERISY Road to assist them in maintaining direction.

General.

The assault was to be assisted by 18 Tanks of the "C" Coy., 13th\* Tank Battalion, covered by a heavy artillery barrage up to and protecting our Green Line objective, which was approximately the limit of range of the 18-pdr\* guns.

The artillery roughly provides one gun for every 25 yards of frontage, with additional heavy artillery searching and supplying neutralising fire on known enemy battery positions, and dealing with located Machine Gun nests and other enemy strong points.

Approach March.

On the night of the 7th/8th. August all preparations were complete, assembly and direction tapes were laid by Battalions, and every detail was carried out and provided for.

Tracks "C" and "D" were marked by Engineers by posts through fields on new routes, carefully selected as being least liable to enemy shelling, from shelled area charts compiled by this Brigade from past records.

It is considered that the marking of tracks by posts only is not sufficient as they frequently get knocked down by Pack animals. All tracks should be taped and care taken to thoroughly mark when crossing roads.

March Tables for wet and dry weather conditions were compiled, and Officers detailed to check the time of passing of Units, so that men would not have to be on the Jumping-off tape longer than was absolutely necessary and the assembly on the Jumping-off tape was carried out to time-table arrangements without confusion or loss of time, the men arriving fresh and fit, with sufficient time to rest (about one hour) before the Zero hour arrived, which had been fixed at 4.30 a.m.

All watches had been synchronised at 9 p.m. on night of 7th/8th. of August.

During the time of the approach march, a heavy artillery barrage, followed by an attack was made on the British Division on the North flank, and considerable uneasiness was caused by the news that the enemy had



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succeeded in capturing the front line trench of the 18th. British Division North of the BRAY-CORBIER Road.

The enemy apparently feared an attack by this Division, and tried to disorganise by attacking first, and this was no doubt responsible for the limited success of the British Division on the North of the River on the following morning.

Headquarters.

Brigade Headquarters were moved up to a dugout in P.4.a.3.5. at about 8 p.m. on the night of 7th. August, and Battalion Headquarters were provided in P.10.b. and d., when the 41st., 43rd. and 44th. Battalions took up this position in the front line system, and the 42nd. Battalion Headquarters in P.4.d.95.95.

Provisional Headquarters were selected for Brigade and Battalion in enemy territory to be occupied if found suitable after the advance, and these were found to meet requirements, when the various Headquarters moved. Brigade Headquarters moved to Brigade Command Post at P.17.b.50.20. at 9 a.m. and these were occupied until Zero plus 7 hours. The 4th. Australian Brigade having meanwhile leap-frogged through our troops at the Green Line and were well established in their objective on the BRAY-HARBONNIERES defences - the Headquarters were then moved to P.10.b.95.17., a position where better communication could be maintained.

The Attack.

At Zero hour minus 15 minutes, light harassing artillery fire together with much aeroplane activity was provided to cover the advance of the tanks <sup>from</sup> their tape line ~~from the village of~~ *to the assault.*

A heavy fog made observation impossible, and at Zero plus four minutes when the troops commenced their advance, one of the greatest difficulties was to maintain direction over the valleys and hills, and also to keep touch on the flanks.

This want of visibility, however, provided protection for our men, and is probably largely responsible for the exceedingly low casualties inflicted by the enemy.

Excellent leadership, added to the initiative of our rank and file, enabled them to keep direction.

Disposition.

The 42nd. Battalion attacked along the South Bank of the River SOMME on a frontage of 750 yards, and the 44th. Battalion on the South flank, extending 1,200 yards further South to the Brigade Southern Boundary.



Disposition(Continued).

The 41st. Battalion plus 1 Coy. of <sup>43rd</sup> 44th. Battalion was in support, and the 43rd., less one Company, in reserve.

When the 42nd. and 44th. Battalions reached a pre-determined line about 300 yards East of the GAILLY-WARFUSSE Road in Q.1.b., P.7.a. and c. and P.18.b. (which point was well marked by the steep re-entrant Longully and by the cross roads in P.7.a. and the Village of GAILLY) the 41st. Battalion leap-frogged through the 44th., and with the 42nd. continued the advance and consolidated on the Green Line objective. For this particular advance the 41st. Battalion had attached to it one Company of the 43rd. Battalion.

The 11th. Light Trench Mortar Battery and personnel was distributed as follows:- 4 Mortars with personnel with 42nd. Battalion for dealing with possible opposition, 2 teams and Mortars with 44th. Battalion, and 2 teams and mortars with 41st. Battalion.

The 44th. Battalion quota following on with 41st. after that Battalion leap-frogged through the former - thus the 8 guns and teams were available for the defence of the Green Line. These arrangements worked well, 30 rounds ammunition per gun being carried by the teams.

The 11th. Machine Gun Coy. supplied four guns and teams to 42nd. Battalion, 4 to 41st., and 8 guns and teams supplied barrage fire until Zero plus 45 minutes when they moved up to new selected positions to cover the Green Line.

Attached to the 42nd. Battalion were 2 Platoons from the 39th. Battalion of the 10th. Brigade who provided liaison with the British troops on the North of the River and followed along the North bank of the SOMME Canal, to ensure that any enemy Machine Gun nests were dealt with, and to protect the North flank of the 42nd. Battalion.

The attack was pressed home according to plan, and the enemy surrendered in large numbers, being completely surprised and bewildered by the suddenness and determination of the attackers and by their inability to see our men through the dense fog, which was thickened and intensified by the smoke and dust of our heavy barrage.

Some hard fighting took place in the enemy strong points protected by Machine Gun nests; but our men were not to be denied, and these were quickly disposed of, and the garrisons were either killed or made prisoner.

Owing to the density of the fog, the advance was slower than expected, and some platoons of the 41st. Battalion were about 30 minutes late in getting to their objectives, but with the assistance of the tanks they quickly mopped up the woods and defenses in the area. At 7:30 a.m. information came through that at the Green Line had been reached and consolidation commenced.

Success Signals arranged by firing rockets were not useful on this occasion owing to the density of the fog. At about 7:30 the fog commenced to clear, and at 8:30 (Zero plus 4 hours) when our protective barrage ceased, the 4th. Brigade leap-frogged through our Brigade; the Sun was shining brightly and visibility was good.

The 4th. Brigade continued the advance reaching their objective in good time and capturing many prisoners and much material.



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The 9th. Australian Brigade on our South flank made its Green Line according to time-table and consolidated - the 18th. Brigade leap-frogging through to continue the advance at Zero plus 4 hours.

The 174th. British Brigade on our North flank met heavy resistance at MALARD Wood which stopped their advance: this considerably hampered 4th. Australian Brigade operations as enemy were able to shoot into their backs from high ground North of River.

Prisoners.

Seven Officers and 512 Other Ranks passed through the Brigade Collecting Station, and in addition 400 captured by 41st. and 44th. Battalions are estimated to have followed the HAMMEL Road and passed through to the Divisional P.O.W. Cage without reporting at Brigade Headquarters, making a total of 7 Officers 912 Other Ranks.

The first identification of prisoners was sent to Divisional Headquarters at 5.35 a.m.

Artillery.

Over 100 Guns supplied a thick and carefully arranged effective barrage, and in addition heavy guns operated on neutralising Battery fire and known Strong Points and Machine Gun nests.

Directly information came through that the first objective was taken, part of the artillery moved forward to new pre-determined positions ready to assist in the continuation of the attack.

The enemy barrage was completely smothered by ours.

Tanks.

The 12 Tanks operating with the Brigade did excellent service assisting in the taking of Strong Points.

Unfortunately the Supply Tank attached to this Brigade for transport purposes broke down on 1st day and was not available.

The fog made it difficult to maintain direction.

Aeroplanes.

Our planes working in large numbers completely controlled and dominated the air during the operation, but the fog limited their assistance until 9 a.m.



Page 5a.

Frontages and Strengths.

The total frontage of the Brigade was 2,000 yards and the total fighting strength of the four Battalions was just under 2,000 or hardly one man per yard all told.

Three battalions plus one Coy. or approximately 1,650 men assaulted and if one subtracts from this 150 for the 3 Battalion Headquarters it leaves 1,500 as the total of assaulting troops or 3 men per 4 yards of front.

This necessitated the usual front line of skirmishers being dispensed with and all the assaulting troops moved in lines of columns of sections in file which enabled small groups to deal with any centres of resistance encountered.

For a surprise attack and provided other means, such as artillery, Tanks and Machine Guns are available to give the necessary covering fire to movement and the enemy is not holding a fully organised defensive system it is considered that a total strength of one man per yard of front is a safe basis for calculations of frontages, though at the same time it is the minimum considered necessary.

Consolidation.

The advantage of laying down beforehand the lines of consolidation of Battalions, Companies and Platoons was again exemplified.

In this operation Battalions consolidated almost exactly along the lines shown on a plan issued prior to the action.

Exploiting of Success.

The fact that the initial success of the assault was so fully exploited by other Divisions did much to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the troops who were thus relieved of the necessity of remaining in the newly captured positions under heavy enemy shell fire.

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Page 6.Engineers.

The 11th. Field Coy. had a Liaison Officer with the Brigade during the operation who kept in touch and advised the G.O.C. on all engineering works, provided reports on dugouts, bridges, etc.

Communications.

At Zero minus 10 minutes the Tanks advancing to their jumping-off positions fouled and broke all the telephone wires leading to our Headquarters. At this time Visual was impossible owing to the heavy fog and Message Rockets could not be used for the same reason. Wireless was also temporarily out of repair. However, the telephone wires were all repaired again by Zero plus 30 minutes and no further serious difficulties occurred, excellent communication being maintained throughout the remainder of operation.

Medical.

Arrangements were good and wounded were quickly attended to dressed and evacuated from the R.A.P. established alongside Brigade Headquarters in P.4.a.6.6., the M.O. working at high pressure for over 8 hours on our own and enemy wounded.

Ammunition.

The supply was complete and sufficient.

War Material Captured.

10 Field Pieces.	1 Range Finder.
2 Heavy Minenwerfer.	1 O.L. Lamp.
2 Medium do	In addition, large quantity of
3 Light do	S.A.A., Bombs and Light Sig-
1 Anti-Tank Giant Rifle.	nals. Also much recaptured
12 Heavy Machine Guns.	British War Material, S.A.A.
67 Light Machine Guns.	and Bombs.

A great mass of enemy documents, Staff Circulars, were also sent in.



Casualties.

The special feature of this operation was the extraordinarily small number of our casualties, which only totalled 9 Officers 180 Other Ranks, of whom 1 Officer and 82 O.R. were killed.

The remarkable results achieved for such a loss indicates the thoroughness of the preparation and the excellent manner in which the attack was carried out.

G.O.C. 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.... Brigadier-General J.H. GANNAN, C.B., C.M.G.

Brigade Major  
Staff Captain

"  
"

... Major G.A. VASEY, D.S.O.  
... Captain C.H.G. HILLARY.

Commanding Officers - Battalions.

41st. Battalion commanded by  
42nd. Battalion " "  
43rd. Battalion " "  
44th. Battalion " "

... Lieut-Colonel A.R. HERON, D.S.O.  
... Major E. J. DIBBIN.  
... Lieut-Colonel J. FARRELL.  
... Major W.H. ROCKLIFF, M.C.



The O.C. Signals,  
Third Australian Division.

War Diary

15th. Aug. 1918.

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Diary Report on recent operations.

PERSONNEL. L/Cpl. WHITEFORD, D.J. on English Leave.  
Sapper McDONALD, admitted to hospital 15/8/18.

TRAFFIC. See attached sheets. (29th July to 14th. Aug.)

COMMUNICATIONS. Brigade Headquarters situated at CORBIE CHATEAU  
All lines O.K. In preparation for offensive operations in which  
11th. Brigade was to take part, whole Brigade moved into area on either  
side of SOMME CANAL, between HAMELET and J.19.c. 11th. Brigade H/Qs.  
was situated in small maison, J.36.c. and lines run to all Battalions  
in their new positions.

Signal Officers (Lieut. Groves and Lieut. McPherson) attended  
conferences at Brigade Headquarters, and Third Divisional Signal  
Company H/Qs to prepare for coming offensive. All stores were looked  
to and deficiencies in cable and equipment (the latter for light) of  
Brigade Signal Section and Battalions, made up. A conference of  
Signal Officers within the Brigade was held and a general plan of  
communications, visual, runner, racket - relay and lines, drawn up.  
The Headquarters of the 11th Brigade having been decided as a large  
dugout in P.4.a.5.2. Two days previous to the attack, six metallic pairs  
pairs were laid (3 arm quads) from Divisional Bury Cable-head at  
P.9. a 3.3 to Brigade Headquarters.

(ii) Two metallic circuits (arm.quad.) laid from Bury Cable-head  
skirting North edge of HAMEL to Advance Brigade Headquarters situated  
in P.10.b.95.20.

(iii) Two pairs (D.III) cable and quad) laid through trenches  
to Advance Brigade Headquarters.

(iv) One (D.III) metallic line laid to proposed 42nd. Battalion  
Headquarters for the attack. P 4 d 90.90

(v) One pair laid to Left Flank Brigade (174th. Bde.) at  
Shrapnel Gully. J 28 a 5.6

(vi) One pair laid to Third Divisional C.P. (visual station)  
situated J.22.c.3.2

This gave the basis of a system of communication for the  
Brigade when it moved up to take position on night 7th. and 8th.  
August. Communication to Right Flank Brigade was through the  
Divisional buried system H.A. to C.P., then ground line to 9th. Brigade  
Headquarters. P 14 b 4.4

Wireless arrangements were made by Divisional Wireless  
Officer and allotments made to this Brigade, as follows:-

(i) One forward P.B. and A with operating personnel attached  
with 11th. Brigade Forward party, and to move with them, working back  
to a rear set stationed at Advanced Brigade Headquarters. P.10.b.95.20.

(ii) One loop set wireless, with personnel attached Brigade  
Forward Party, working forward to a forward set, moving with and  
operating for 42nd. Battalion, who were operating well on the Left  
Flank along the Canal and some distance away from Brigade Forward  
Station.

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Alternative means were as follows:-

- (i) Pigeons. 12 for Brigade, issued to attacking Battalions only.
- (ii) Message Rockets.
- (iii) Visual. Laid out according to scheme (see diagram).
- (iv) Runner.

On the evening of the 7/8/18 the Brigade Signal Section closed down Office at J.36. c at 9 p.m. and opened Office at P.10.b.95.20. same hour. Communications established O.K. with flanking P.4.a.5.2 Brigades, all Battalions, Advanced M.G. Battalion and Divisional Headquarters.

Forward Party was assembled at 11 p.m. and moved off with complete allotment of stores to Advance Brigade H/Qs., and established office there and visual station.

Attack opened at 4.20 a.m. 8/8/18. Weather was not wet but there was a thick, heavy mist on, which, lasting till 8 a.m. completely made visual communication impossible for first three hours.

Soon after (15 mins) the barrage opened, overland lines forward were cut by the progression of tanks over them, but all line communication was restored in 20 minutes.

At 4.50 a.m. Brigade Forward Party moved forward to position chosen as suitable place for Brigade Forward Station at P.17.4.3.2 linesmen laying two metallic circuits as they proceeded. Advance of Forward Party was approx. 1,400 yards and communication was through by 5.30 a.m. per wireless back to Advance Brigade, and by line soon afterwards.

All Battalion Headquarters except 43rd. Bn., which remained in dugout with Advance Brigade Station, moved forward as follows:-

- (i) 42nd. Bn. from P. to Chateau at GAILLY.
- (ii) 41st & 44th. Bns. from P.10.b.95.30. to P.18.a. Central, from where the 41st. Battalion established Forward Command Post at KATE WOOD.

Lines were laid from Brigade Forward Station to:-

- (i) 41st. and 44th. Battalions.
- (ii) 9th. Brigade Forward Station (Right) Situated approx.

- (iii) 43rd. Bn. Headquarters which moved into position at 7 a.m.

These lines were maintained by Forward Brigade linesmen.

Visual communication was established early with Advanced Brigade P.10.b.95.20., Divisional Visual Station (D.O.P.) 41st and 44th. Headquarters, P.18.a.5.5. Visual was also established between D.O.P. and 11th. Brigade Headquarters P.4.a.5.2., and Advance Brigade, P.10.a.95.20., and was quite workable after 8.20 a.m.

42nd. Battalion in their new Forward Headquarters had visual wireless and runner communication until a line was able to be laid direct from Advance Brigade to them by 9 a.m.

9.30 a.m. Brigadier General CANNAN and Staff moved from Brigade Headquarters to Brigade Forward Station. A Sub-Office was left at P.4.a. while arrangements were being made to have Divisional Line bridged over at H.A. test dugout on to direct forward pair to Advance Brigade. This Office also kept on the exchange several subscribers in vicinity.

On account of lack of accommodation at Brigade Forward Station Brigade Staff moved back to Advance Brigade in P.10.4.95.20 where communication was established with all forward and rear units.



The lines held well considering, although they suffered at times from heavy enemy bursts of fire. On 11th. Brigade reaching and consolidating upon their objective, the Green Line, and the leap-frogging of the 4th. Brigade commencing through us, all wireless communication was cut out by 3rd. Division. Four hours after Zero, 4.20 a.m., lines were maintained to all Battalions and the system consolidated and offices arranged suitably for delivery and reception of all signal traffic.

11th. Brigade remained in position on the Green Line throughout 8th, 9th and 10th. August, moving forward to relieve 4th. A.I.Bde. on night 10th/11th. August. Brigade Advance Party left P.10.b.95.20. for MORCOURT, to take over Office from 4th. Brigade. At 8 p.m. 10/8/18 office opened same hour at MORCOURT.

On arrival there it was found that a stunt was to come off 3.30 a.m. next morning, so hurried arrangements for forming of a Bde. H/qQs Advance and a Brigade Forward Station, situated respectively at Q.24.a.5.5. and Q.13.a.70.10. Stores for both these stations were allotted and arrangements made for personnel and stores necessary to remain at MORCOURT to keep up Office. Two metallic circuits ran from MORCOURT to Q.24.a. Central. Parties arrived here at midnight and linesmen were sent out in parties to lay several stunt lines as follows:-

- (i) One pair to 41st. Battalion H/Qs. Q.24.a.5.6.
- (ii) One pair to Right Flank Brigade (9th. A.I.Bde) Q.30.c.5.4.
- (iii) One pair to Advance Brigade Visual Station.
- (iv) Two metallic circuits forward to Brigade Forward Station Q.13.a.70.10.

These lines were all laid in readiness, offices being established by 2.20 a.m. 11/8/18, when orders came through cancelling the operations owing to failure of plan of advancing Right Brigade (10th Bde) Parties forward were recalled and remained with Brigade Staff at Q.24.a. Central throughout early morning. The enemy heavily barraged the whole area from 2.35 a.m. to 6.30 a.m. Lines back to Brigade H/Qs. MORCOURT went continuously and linesmen were out constantly.

At 7 a.m. Brigade Staff and Signal Section all moved back to MORCOURT and communication was established as before. Visual touch was maintained with all Battalions from high feature in Q.15.b.6.6. Line communication being established from there to Brigade Headquarters.

On evening 11/8/18 at 8.30 p.m., 41st. Battalion were to attack and encircle the village of MERICOURT. For this an alternative line was laid to their Forward Communication post, Q.13.a.70.10. and a visual station despatched to their old H/Qs. Q.24.a.5.6. to ensure chain of visual stations to Brigade Headquarters. The attack was quite successful and communication maintained throughout.

The following morning at 4 a.m. the 43rd. Battalion were to move out and mop up the village of MERICOURT, consolidating finally with 41st Battalion.

On completion of this 43rd. Battalion moved to H/Qs. N.E. of MERICOURT and their line was extended from old position. This was too often out of repair, so use was made of a shallow uncovered bury used previously by the enemy for his own communications and two metallic circuits (arm quad English Cable) completed, and joined through to 43rd Battalion H/Qs. The bury channel was only 1 foot deep, but it was very efficacious in keeping the cables in it from being cut by ground shrapnel, and also out of the way of overland traffic. This Brigade is going to adopt similar means in any forthcoming operations if time and



small labour can be obtained beforehand.

Communications were maintained throughout the Brigades length of time in MORCOURT Sector, though with some difficulty owing to occasional heavy shelling by enemy.

Line to Left Flank Brigade, 13th. A.I.Bde, was laid across Canal, 12th. August.

On night of 12th/13th. August preparations were made for the relief of 11th. Brigade by 51st. Brigade, and advance party left for Brigade Headquarters, first notified as P.4.a., then later on, when that dugout was found to be occupied by 12th. Field Engineers, moved to P.10.b.95.20. establishing wireless communication with Divisional Headquarters at 2 a.m. Line communication being discontinued for the time.

Rear Party at MORCOURT moved from there at 4.55 a.m. 13/8/18 on completion of relief by 51st. Brigade.

Battalions of 11th. Brigade were located as follows:-

- 41st. Battalion.
- 42nd. Battalion.
- 43rd. Battalion.
- 44th. Battalion.

Lines were run out to these Headquarters and communication established on 13/8/18. Line to Division was arranged through buried system, though it was very weak.

After complete days rest which the men of the section badly needed, parties of two and three were sent out salvaging cable lying spare round the area, and in this way five miles twisted was brought in. Mobile stores of Battalions were again brought up to establishment by addition of cable and technical stores. Lines as at present are all O.K. Men are being given the maximum of rest owing to likelihood of more operations in the near future.

MATERIAL, SIGNAL, Taken by Brigade in operations.

- 1 Cable Wagon complete. (43rd. Battalion)
- 2 Wireless Sets.
- 1 Box Valves.
- 5 miles Single Cable (D.3 Type)
- 12 Buzzer Field 'Phones.
- 6 Ringing 'Phones.
- 1 20 Line ringing mag-ex change and small stores.

Diagrams. "A" 8th to 10th. August.  
"B" 11th to 13th. August.

Lieut.  
O.C. Signals.  
11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.



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11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.Brigade Headquarters.  
16th. August, 1918.OPERATIONS NIGHT 10th/11th. AUGUST to 12th/13th. AUGUST, 1918.I. NARRATIVE.

1. At about 12 Noon, 10th. instant, a verbal message was received from Divisional Headquarters that this Brigade was to relieve the 4th. Brigade on the BLUE Line on night 10th/11th. August.  
Reconnaissances by Brigade and Battalion Staffs were immediately carried out. When returning to HAMMEL the Brigade Commander met the Divisional Commander who explained to the former the plan of the operations to be carried out by the Division that night. This was rapidly passed to Battalions at a hurriedly assembled Conference, at which the detailed action of this Brigade was set out.
2. The relief was carried out without incident and was completed by about 5 a.m., when the dispositions of the Brigade were 41st. Battalion Line Right, 43rd. Battalion Line Left, 42nd. Battalion Support, 44th. Battalion Reserve, 11th. Machine Gun Coy. with all 16 Guns disposed for the defence of the BLUE Line, 11th. Trench Mortar Battery with 2 Mortars with each Battalion.
3. At 11 p.m. a Brigade Command Post was established at Q.24.a.3.3. at 41st. Battalion Headquarters. At about 1 a.m. word was received through the Liaison Officer at 10th. Australian Infantry Brigade Headquarters that the latter's operation had been unsuccessful. It was at once decided that neither 41st. or 43rd. Battalions would try to carry out their part of the operation and these Battalions were informed accordingly. This was later confirmed from Divisional Headquarters. At 6 a.m. the Brigade Command Post was quitted and the S.O.C. returned to his Headquarters at MORGOURT.
4. During the 11th. instant arrangements were made <sup>for</sup> the 41st. Battalion to attack and capture that portion of the AMIENS Line South of the SOMME not held by us. Artillery and Machine Gun support by 18 guns of 11th. Machine Gun Coy. and 8 guns 23rd. Machine Gun Coy. specially brought up from the Divisional Reserve for the purpose, were arranged. Zero hour was fixed for 8.15 p.m. but owing to the short notice given the Artillery it was postponed till 8.30 p.m.
5. The attack went well but owing to the limited amount of Artillery fire enemy Machine Guns remained active throughout, and it was only after a very hard fight in which many enemy were killed that the whole line was captured.  
After its capture an enemy party of about 2 Officers and 80 Other Ranks surrendered from GATEAUX WOOD. In all about 2 Officers and 200 Other Ranks were captured as the result of this action.



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6. As the 41st. Battalion moved to the attack the 42nd. Battalion moved up and took the place of the Companies withdrawn from the defensive line. Later the same night the 42nd. Battalion took over the Southern portion of the Brigade front which that night was extended Southwards under orders from Divisional Headquarters. Thus at 5 a.m. 12th. instant the dispositions of Battalions were 42nd. Battalion Line Right, 41st. Battalion Line Left, 44th. Battalion Support Right, 43rd. Battalion Support Left. Two guns of the 11th. Machine Gun Coy. followed the 41st. Battalion into the newly captured trench and were available for its defence.
7. Commencing at daylight 12th. instant the 43rd. Battalion mopped up the Area bounded by the SOMME on the West and North, the Line occupied by the 41st. Battalion on the East and our old front line on South. Owing to most of the enemy having surrendered during the night there was not much fight in cleaning up this area - about 40 prisoners were captured.
8. About 7 a.m. the 10th. Brigade advised that their patrols were East of PROIANT and shortly afterwards Division ordered that patrols be sent to establish themselves on the general line R.15. Central, R.9. Central.
9. This instruction together with the general idea of the future operations of the Corps and Brigade was issued to all Units by D.R. leaving Brigade Headquarters at about 9 a.m. The 41st. and 42nd. Battalions were instructed to send out these patrols as it was intended to keep the 43rd. and 44th. Battalions fit and rested for the next assault which it was thought would take place on the morning of 13th. instant.
10. At about 11.15 a.m. the Divisional Commander rang up and gave warning that the Brigade would be relieved that night.
11. It was then decided that 1 Coy. 43rd. Battalion should provide the patrols or advance guard for the 41st. Battalion who were naturally tired after the previous night's fight. This decision was communicated personally to C.O. 41st. Battalion and was given verbally to a member of 43rd. Battalion Staff.
12. The 42nd. Battalion immediately upon the receipt of the orders sent out patrols and became engaged with the enemy who was holding ST. GERMAIN WOOD strongly. By a flank attack, however, this Wood was captured together with about 60 prisoners.
- The advance to the line R.15. Central R.9. Central was continued but much opposition was met and progress was slow. This was accentuated by the fact that through a misunderstanding of a verbal message the Coy. of 43rd. Battalion who should have been operating on the Left flank of 42nd. did not materialise until about 6 p.m., up till which time the 42nd. Battalion's Left flank was exposed. Many enemy were seen in LOEC and LUG Woods and for a time an enemy counter-attack in force was feared. However, both heavy and field artillery fired on all reported enemy concentrations and no counter-attack developed.







Page 3.

13. During the whole of this fighting the enemy artillery fire on the newly captured territory was very heavy and included Gas shelling.
14. At about 7.30 p.m. the Coy. 43rd. Battalion, now under the orders of C.O. 41st. Battalion, was in position and touch throughout the whole of the most advanced line was established. Supporting troops were moved forward and the 44th. Battalion moved up to that portion of the AMIENS Line vacated by 42nd. Battalion.
- Three Platoons 44th. Battalion were used as a carrying party for taking up water and ammunition to 42nd. Battalion during the afternoon.
15. During the day's fighting about 110 prisoners were brought in, making the total for the two days about 2 Officers and 550 Other Ranks, excluding those evacuated wounded.
16. During the night the 51st. Brigade 17th. Division relieved the Brigade. Relief was complete at about 4.15 p.m. when the Brigade moved back to the vicinity of HAMEL.

## II. ORDERS.

During these operations very few written orders or instructions were issued - they were either issued verbally or took the form of Priority wires.

The practice of giving verbal orders, particularly over the telephone, without at least confirming them by wire later, which is so easily got into during periods of stationary warfare must be avoided. The misinterpretation of a verbal message during these operations was the cause of much delay.

## III. OBJECTIVES.

### A. Night 11th/12th. August.

The objective for this attack was the old AMIENS System and it was to be taken from the Southern flank thus cutting off altogether enemy in the bend of the SOMME North of MERICOURT.

That the attack was so completely successful was primarily due to two causes:-

- (i) The irresistible dash and fighting spirit of our troops.
- (ii) The demoralised state of the enemy.

Against any but a badly shaken enemy an attack which aims at penetrating the enemy defences and leaving both its own flanks exposed is fraught with many dangers, and it is considered that a Battalion is the maximum force which should be launched to such an attack, unless information of a most reliable nature is available to indicate that the enemy is not in any strength in the area of the attack. In this case Aero-plane Observers reported the trenches in R.Y. to be heavily manned. The risk of having the whole of the assaulting Battalion mopped up was great. Had this happened a further disaster was provided against by one of the Support Battalions moving up into the old front line as soon as it was clear of the assaulting troops.



Page 4.

B. 18th. August.

1. The objective in this attack was the Ridge running through R.15. and R.9. and included the Knoll at R.9. Central.
2. To the retreating enemy this was a natural rearguard position and was held accordingly.
3. To attack such a position in daylight under the conditions of modern warfare when the enemy is disposed in endless depth and is covered by supporting artillery, which had been stationary for four days, demanded a very high standard of both leadership and dash.
4. Such a position must be approached very slowly and with great caution. As soon as one minor tactical feature is gained by the most advanced troops, supports must be brought up to hold this feature and then the patrols go on again, making the advance a series of bounds from one feature to another.
5. To deal with the depth in which the enemy is disposed he must be attacked in depth in order that rear parties may be brought up to neutralise the more distant enemy fire whilst the foremost troops assault the nearest enemy.
6. A frontal attack on any Strong Point is usually successful but is expensive. Enveloping tactics from either or both flanks were always successful and saved many casualties.
7. No. 27 bombs proved of value on occasions to blind enemy strong points whilst they were being outflanked.
8. ST. GERMAIN WOOD was captured by being outflanked and attacked in reverse.
9. Over 50% of our casualties during this day's operations were due to enemy artillery fire, which shows that any daylight attack against an enemy who has had even only a limited time in which to organise his artillery support will always be costly.



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IV. ARTILLERY.

1. After the many months of trench warfare when the supply of both guns and ammunition is more or less unlimited the principles of the employment of artillery as laid down in F.S.R. and F.A.T. appear to be forgotten and too much is expected of the gunners.
2. The advantage of having the Artillery Group Commander in the same Headquarters as the Infantry Brigadier was again exemplified. During conditions approximating closely to those of open warfare communications are naturally difficult to establish and maintain, so that by having the Artillery and Infantry Brigade Headquarters together the Signal resources of both Arms work together thus allowing of the rapid transmission of information from the front line to the Artillery, whereby many targets which would otherwise be missed are engaged. The artillery are also the more easily kept in touch with the tactical situation.
3. The question of how to ensure that R.G.A. batteries are in touch with the tactical situation and know just where our most advanced troops are located is most difficult to solve. It was almost overcome by the attachment to this Brigade Headquarters of a Liaison Officer with a Wireless set from the 9th. Brigade, R.G.A. who as information came to hand sent it direct to this "brigade". Unfortunately during the later stages when he was most wanted he was withdrawn to do liaison duty at D.A.H.Q. Had he remained no difficulty would have been experienced either in keeping the "Heavies" in touch with the situation or in obtaining heavy artillery support when ~~required~~ desired.
4. Two batteries of 6" Hows. located near Brigade Headquarters ran a telephone line onto our exchange and were thus at our immediate call.
5. In order to get the best results from the Heavies some better means of co-operation and communication between them and the Infantry must be devised, otherwise the latter never feel satisfied that the former know of the latest advancement of the line or other tactical situation.
6. Field Artillery Liaison Officers at Battalion Headquarters were useful in directing fire onto movement seen and reported by the Infantry.
7. The sending forward of Medium Trench Mortar Battery personnel to man captured enemy guns proved of value and should be arranged for in all similar operations.

V. EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.

1. For the purpose of constructing Battalion Headquarters and R.A.P.'s it is considered that one Section of Engineers should be attached to each Brigade prior to any operation. This Section would be subdivided amongst the Battalions operating.
2. It is recommended that 3 tunnellers be attached to the Intelligence personnel of each Battalion. They would go with the latter and after a dugout had been searched would make it safe or unsafe according as to whether the enemy had left behind a booby trap or otherwise.







## VI. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Generally speaking the Signal service stood the strain of semi-open warfare well. Breaks in the more rapid means of communication, i.e., telegraph, telephone, wireless and visual did occur, but only rarely and for short lengths of time.

2. The amount of work thrown onto the signal personnel by the many rapid and lengthy moves of Headquarters was large and could not be maintained for too long owing to physical fatigue.

Owing to all forms of electrical wireless communications being manned by Signal Service personnel, Regimental Signallers thus being at times prone to forget that these auxiliary means of communication are available and also to the fact that, in order to man these Wireless instruments, Regimental Signallers are attached to the Signal Service it is suggested that either:-

- (i) Wireless instruments become an authorised issue to Battalions and are manned by Battalion Signallers, or
- (ii) Personnel of the Signal Service be attached to Battalion Headquarters to replace the Regimental Signallers in the same way as is now the case with Field Artillery Brigades.

4. During the preparations for the 8th. August attack communications to Divisional Headquarters were laid and prepared by the Brigade Signal Section and when completed were taken over by the Divisional Signal Coy. This is the normal work of the Divisional Signal Coy. and threw extra work onto the Brigade Section. In future operations it is requested that adequate arrangements be made by the Divisional Signal Coy. to do this work.

5. In order to facilitate the laying out and reeling up of wire it is suggested that the Brigade Signal Section be issued with a cable wagon in the same way as is an Artillery Brigade. By this means much more cable could be salvaged than is at present.

6. The use of coloured lights as Success Signals was most useful and it is considered that their use could be further extended by a code being arranged between front line ~~Battalion~~ Coys. and Battalion Headquarters and the Machine Gunners (who are part of the Infantry) to indicate certain happenings. On seeing these Signals the Machine Gunners would act upon them and Battalion Headquarters would report to the Artillery and higher formations the event which the Signal indicated. This would minimise the possibility of mistakes being made, as, to the Artillery the Signals themselves would mean nothing.

## VII. MOVEMENT OF HEADQUARTERS.

1. Generally speaking little difficulty was experienced in maintaining communications without interruption owing to a change of Headquarters.



VII. (Continued).

2. All signallers must be again reminded that before closing down a Signal Office they must inform all Signal Officers with which they are in communication that they are doing so, in order that the latter may not think that the line to the former is "dis." and send out linesmen on a useless and unnecessary job.

VIII. MACHINE GUNS.

1. Machine Guns proved of immense value in augmenting the reduced volume of artillery fire. The Ammunition expenditure is large but it is more or less easily replaced. As an example, during the operation of 41st. Battalion on night 11/12 August 24 Vickers Guns fired 54,000 rounds in about half an hour; but the effect of their fire in reducing that of the enemy was well worth the expenditure.

IX. LIGHT TRENCH MORTARS.

1. As another method of giving the necessary mechanical <sup>/covering</sup> fire which the decrease in artillery reduced 3" Stokes Mortars were of great value, and if the ammunition supply were more certain would be of much greater value.
2. Without attaching personnel from Battalions to the Trench Mortar Battery 20 rounds per gun can be carried into action. This amount has to last during the advance and during the early stages of consolidation until further supplies can be brought up, and is not sufficient.
3. In order to provide the necessary carriers without drawing on Battalions it is considered that the establishment of a Light Trench Mortar Battery should be increased 100%.
4. The absolute lack of transport in a Light Trench Mortar Battery considerably affects its mobility and throws an additional strain on the already fully employed 1st. Line Transport of Battalions. It is considered that a Trench Mortar Battery should be issued with four-horsed limbers such as are issued to Machine Gun Coys. so that either Limbers or packs could be used as necessary. Perhaps some form of sledge or the Mortar mounted on wheels as is the enemy "Minnenwerfer" would prove satisfactory.
5. Until Light Trench Mortar Batteries are issued with transport and some quick method of carrying forward Ammunition is discovered their full possibilities will not be developed.



#### X. ACTION OF BOMBERS AND RIFLE GRENADIERS.

1. Mills bombs were largely used in clearing the many dugouts in the area - No. 27's were not used for this purpose at all.
2. The No. 36 Grenade was used largely in dealing with hostile Machine Guns and centres of resistance encountered during the attack on 12th. August and assisted considerably in giving covering fire to any movement.
3. The No. 27 Grenade was used to blind enemy Strong Points and it was found that in addition to blinding them it considerably reduced enemy fighting power owing to the flying pieces of phosphorous.

#### XI. CARRYING PARTIES.

- Generally speaking first line transport worked well up behind the front line troops and carrying parties did not have long carries. An exception to this was on the afternoon of 12th. August when a further supply of water and ammunition was required on the line in R.15. and R.9. and a carrying party of 3 Platoons was employed.

#### XII. RATIONS AND WATER.

- No difficulty was experienced regarding either of these articles - two water bottles per man were of immense value and should always be carried in similar operations.

#### XIII. MEDICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE.

1. Evacuation of wounded went well, but at least four wheeled stretchers should be issued to each Battalion for operations of a similar nature to those under review. The good roads and cross country tracks are most suitable for their employment and owing to the depth of the advances the carry enforced on Regimental Stretcher Bearers is too long.
2. Administrative arrangements worked well, supplies of rations, water and ammunition coming forward well. R.E. material, i.e., sheet iron, timber, etc., was very short during these operations though there were large dumps of wire and picquets well forward.

#### XIV. PATROLS AND SCOUTS.

Owing to the long distances covered on foot effecting reliefs and the extent of the advances carried out it was found very difficult to carry out the principle "that touch with an enemy when once obtained should not be lost without orders from superior authority" owing to the physical fatigue of the troops. It was found that the provision of local protective patrols was all that could be managed.



Page 9.XV. EQUIPMENT.

1. The normal equipment of the Infantry soldier as laid down in this Brigade, viz.,-

Rifle and Bayonet.  
 Fighting Order, no blankets or greatcoats.  
 200 Rounds S.A.A. (Except Nos 1 and 2 of Lewis Guns, Runners and Signallers who carried 100 Rounds).  
 4 Mills Bombs (Except the above who carried 1 or 2).  
 1 large entrenching tool, in proportion one pick to 1 shovel. (Except above who carried the small entrenching tool).  
 Iron Ration plus unexpended portion of the day's ration.  
 2 Water Bottles.  
 5 Sandbags.  
 Ground Flares.

Bombing Sections with a supply of No. 27 and 36 Grenades in addition proved satisfactory though it is now considered that the number of sandbags can be reduced to 2 or 3. The small entrenching tool was not carried except as stated above.

2. In view of the large amount of marching which has now to be undertaken by troops a plentiful supply of clean sox must be arranged for.
3. For the saving of ammunition much use was made of captured enemy rifles and Machine Guns our own rifles being taken forward in any advance.

XVI. INFORMATION AND LIAISON.

1. The passing of information to front, rear and flanks was not always good, particularly to flanks.
2. As an incident of this on the 12th. instant the Right Flank Brigade advised us that patrols were being sent out to try and occupy the high ground East of PROYART. This was communicated to our Right Battalion. The next thing the latter knew was when we again informed them that the Battalion on their right was established East of PROYART, no notification at Battalion Headquarters having been received from the Battalion operating. Similarly when our Battalion advanced the one on the right hung back showing that there was not the co-operation between the two Battalions there should have been.
3. It is the primary duty of all Staffs to pass necessary information to front, rear and flanks and it is considered that the practice of attaching Liaison Officers from one Unit to another has tended to make Staffs forget this duty and it is very questionable whether Liaison Officers serve any useful purpose. They crowd already limited accommodation and unless diplomatic are usually in the road and interrupt Staffs when they are busy on other matters.



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## XVI. (continued).

4. A liaison Officer is supposed to know the plans and ideas of the Commander whom he represents, but nowadays this is not usually the case and some Subaltern who is perhaps in need of a rest is withdrawn from a Coy. and comes to a Brigade Headquarters knowing practically nothing of the general plan and less about his own Commander's plans.
5. Except for Officers from technical branches of the Service such as Artillery or Tanks, who act as technical advisers, it is not considered that Liaison Officers as such serve any useful purpose or are necessary, but runners from flank Units would be useful to meet a breakdown in the Signal Service.
6. If Liaison Officers between Units are supplied they must be provided with their own means of communication.

XVII. BATTALION & D COY. STAFFS.

1. The strain thrown on Battalion and Coy. Staffs during operations such as those under review is tremendous and the length of time during which these operations can be continued is limited by the physical endurance of these Staffs.
2. It is considered that Battalions could not have gone on longer than the 60 hours they did during this period.
3. The ruling that Seconds in Command and C.Os. Battalions shall not go into a fight together should be cancelled during these active operations.

XVIII. FOUR LETTER CODES.

1. The present system of Four Letter Codes for Units is most cumbersome and confusing and has proved to be quite unsatisfactory during periods when several Divisions are operating.
2. Code names of Units operating on the flanks and of relieving Units were on occasions not known and naturally confusion and misunderstanding was the result not only amongst Staffs but also amongst the Signal Service.
3. In this operation as in the HAMEL operation in July, the whole of the Code names were changed during the operation making their use more difficult than ever.
4. It is recommended that one permanent list of Code names be issued and taken into general use.

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XIX. GENERAL.

1. All the principles laid down in the manuals were found to be correct and sound if all concerned will only adhere to them more closely than they do, instead of trying to follow some of the cumbersome practices of trench warfare, successful co-operation and results will be assured.
2. It is considered that the greatest lesson learnt is the absolute necessity for some form of fire, either artillery, trench mortars, Machine Guns, smoke bombs or rifle fire, to cover any movement.

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