

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/29/31

**Title:** 12th Infantry Battalion

September 1917



AWM4-23/29/31



12<sup>th</sup> Battalion  
3<sup>rd</sup> Inf. Bgde  
A.I.F.

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Vol. II  
Page 19

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date 1917	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
STEENT-JE	1 <sup>st</sup> Sept.		Strength 55 officers 1087 OR. Div. Commander around inspecting training	<u>cum</u>
	3		M. R. G. Waldock returned from supernumerary list.	<u>cum</u>
	5		Inspection of office system & routine by Brigade Major.	<u>cum</u>
	6		Competition in Battalion drill. Scores:- 10 <sup>th</sup> Batta 83 11 <sup>th</sup> Batta 68 9 <sup>th</sup> Batta 58 12 <sup>th</sup> Batta 51.	<u>cum</u>
	7		Strength 56 officers 1056 OR.	<u>cum</u>
	9		The Co went up the forward area for reconnaissance. All officers proceeded to DEVONSHIRE LINES and viewed large size model of our new Corps front.	<u>cum</u>
	11		Batta. participated in a Brigade attack practice near VIEUX BERQUIN which was viewed by the Army Commander. The exercise was afterwards criticised by Brigade, Divisional & Army commanders. The latter then lectured on present day method of attack.	<u>cum</u>
THIEUSHOUK	13		Left STEENT-JE at 0930 & proceeded via STRAZEELE & CAESTRE to THIEUSHOUK. The officers & OR remaining out of the line stayed at ROUGE CROIX en route.	<u>cum</u>
WIPPENHOEK	14		Proceeded to Patricia Camp in the WIPPENHOEK area. Strength 56 officers 1044 other ranks.	<u>cum</u>
	15		Daily reconnaissance parties proceeded up to front line. 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lt. V. L. BOVELL killed in action	<u>cum</u>
OUDERDOOM.	16		Proceeded to mic-mac camp in OUDERDOOM area. Roads very dusty & congested with traffic.	<u>cum</u>
	17		Great deal of work & preparations for pending operations.	<u>cum</u>
CHATEAU BELGE	18		At 2000, we moved via DICKEBUSCH to a bivouac near CHATEAU BELGE.	<u>cum</u>
HALFWAY HOUSE.	19		Moved to Halfway House. Move complete by 1155. Men all resting in afternoon & evening.	<u>cum</u>
FRONT LINE	20/21		For operations, see report attached.	<u>cum</u>
	22		On being relieved in the line at 0225 by 1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup> Battns. we moved back to Halfway House & remained there until <del>20</del> 2100 when we proceeded to bivouac ground near DICKEBUSCH HUTS.	<u>cum</u>



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Place	Date 1917.	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
STEENVOORDE	Sep. 1. 23.		Proceeded by motor buses to STEENVOORDE area at 1600.	<u>cmw</u>
	25		Reports on operations & recommendations for awards submitted to Brigade HQ. The details from ROUCECROIX rejoined us yesterday, including Capt. LEBURT, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lts. C. BRIDGER & E.R. FACEY. LT. T.A. LAY rejoined from wounded today, also LT. F.E. PRIDDEY.	<u>cmw</u> <u>cmw</u> <u>cmw</u>
	26.		2 <sup>nd</sup> Lt. S.V. GIBSON, reinforcement officer arrived.	
	28		Corps commander presented medals. Strength 52 officers 894 OA.	
	30.		Moved from STEENVOORDE by motor buses at 1100 & bivouaced in Chateau Segard area. Enemy aeroplanes dropped 18 bombs in the near vicinity of camp about 2030 killing 3 men & wounding 11 men	<u>cmw</u>


H. Elliott  
Lt. Col.  
Commanding 12<sup>th</sup> Bn.



Distribution Map 12th Battalion

1:5000

Jq part of 'a' + 'c'



yards



J. J. KEEN



12th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION ORDER NO. 12.

4

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.  
12th. September 1917.

Reference Sheet HOOGE 1/10,000.

1. The 3rd. Australian Infantry Brigade, in conjunction with the 2nd. Australian Infantry Brigade on the right and the 7th. Australian Infantry Brigade on the left will capture the enemy defended area NONNE BOSSCHEN - POLYGONEVELD on a day to be notified. The 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade, in divisional reserve will be holding the present front line.
2. The Brigade Boundaries are:-  
Right;- A line from Sq. J. 18 Central to Road Junction Sq. J. 14. A. 50. 55 thence through N. in CHLENGORSE WOOD to J. 10. C. 0. 5.  
Left;- A line from Sq. J. 18. B. 0. 7. through H in CHATEAU STABLES to Edge of wood at Sq. J. 17A. 50. 95 thence through P. in POLYGONEVELD.
3. Objectives are allotted as below ( vide also attached plan ).  
1st. Objective - 11th. Battalion - Line marked RED.  
2nd. Objective - 12th. Battalion - Line marked BLUE.  
3rd. Objective - Line marked GREEN - This line will be captured by two Battalions - 10th. Battalion on the right, 8th. Battalion on the left. The interbattalion boundary is the point Sq. J. 9. D. 3. 9.
4. The attack will be delivered in three stages in the leap-frog principle, each battalion deploying two Companies in the front line and two in support.  
A. Company will be on the right and D. Company on the left.  
The intercompany boundary will be a line from J. 9. C. 7. 2. - J. 9. D. 3. 5. - J. 9. C. 75. 70. the road throught the objective at the last named point being inclusive to A. Company.  
B. Company will mop-up as per para 5, and C. Company will be employed as carrying party.  
1 section Light Trench Mortars will be allotted to each Battalion.  
The stages of the attack are as follows;-  
i. STAGE 1. The advance to the RED LINE.  

The barrage will be put down 150 yds in front of the Infantry line of departure. The whole Brigade will immediately commence to move forward, the 11th. Battalion pressing close to the barrage.

At plus four the barrage will advance for 150 yards at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes; thereafter and up to the RED line it will slacken pace to 100 yards per 3 minutes. The barrage will halt in front of the RED LINE for 45 minutes.

The 11th. Battalion will, under this barrage capture all enemy strong points in this area and the objective line will be consolidated.

The remaining troops of the Brigade will at the same time get as far forward as possible, and the 12th. Battalion into position immediately in rear of the RED LINE, preparatory to resuming the advance.
- ii. STAGE 2. The advance to the BLUE LINE.  

Between the RED and BLUE LINES the barrage will travel at 100 yards in 3 minutes.



11 STAGE 2. Cont'd.

The 12th. Battalion will press up under the barrage mop-up the area and capture and consolidate the BLUE LINE.

In front of the BLUE LINE that barrage will halt  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours.

111. STAGE 3. The advance to the GREEN LINE.

The 9th. and 10th. Battalions will push through the 12th. Battalion and capture and consolidate the GREEN LINE.

5. B. Company (Capt. I. N. HOLYMAN) will mop-up the whole of the area between the RED and BLUE lines. The Company will be extended in lines of sections in file at 35 yards interval, Platoons from the right being No. 5 (Lt. WARDLAW) No. 6 (Sgt. TAYLOR-VERNON) No. 7 (Lt. CAMPBELL) No. 8 (Lt. THOMPSON).

Strong points at J.9.C.3.5. and 6.6. will be consolidated and garrisoned.

6. 2 Sections 3rd. M.G. Company will follow B. Company and will emplace their guns in the 2nd. Objective.
7. After each objective has been captured the Unit in Garrison will be reorganised to repel counter attacks. To this end forward and flank routes will be reconnoitred.

8. 11th. Battalion will maintain liaison with 12th. Battalion. A. Company will maintain liaison with 10th. Battalion and D. Company with 9th. Battalion. Lieut. J. J. KEEN with 5th. Battalion on our right and Lieut. W. H. E. HALE with 7th. Brigade on our left. Each liaison officer will be accompanied by two runners. A. Company will also detail a patrol of 1 N.C.O. and 4 men who will be stationed at J.9.C.8.2. to maintain touch with a patrol from 5th. Battalion and D. Company a similar patrol ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ at J.9.A.55.30. for the 7th. Brigade patrol.

9. (a) Location Points and Finger Posts etc. As aids in locating positions triangular marks coloured RED, BLUE and GREEN respectively will be set up at points 100 yards in rear of the centre of the RED, BLUE, and GREEN objectives.

They will be placed in position as follows:-

RED MARK - <sup>12</sup>~~11~~th. Battalion - Location J.8.D.9.5. (Lt. J. J. Keen)

BLUE MARK - <sup>9</sup>~~11~~th. Battalion - Location - J.9.C.6.6. (Lt. J. J. Keen)

GREEN MARK - 10th. Battalion - Location - J.9.D. 4.9.

(b) Fingure posts as guiding points along route to and from Battalions and Brigade report centre will be set up ny Intelligence platoon, at distances of 150 yards.

(c) B. Company will run a white tape along the centre of the line of advance of the Battalion.

(d) A. and D. Companies will detail an officer to check the line of advance with a Prismatic Compass.

*C. M. Newton*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 12th. Battalion A.I.F.

Lieut. & Adjt.







Battalion Headquarters,  
17th. September.

Sheet HOODE 1/10,000.

Reference ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

1. The following orders are issued supplementary to Order No. 19.
2. The left Platoon of D. Company will capture and consolidate a strong post at J.9.A.5.3. and will only be used for any other purpose in case of extreme urgency. The right platoon of A. Company will act similarly at J.9.C.85.29. Engineer personnel has been detailed to assist at these two posts.
3. When the mopping up of the area between the 1st. and 2nd. objectives is completed the two centre platoons of B. Company will take over 100 yards of the centre of the 2nd. objective from A. and D. Companies. The two outer platoons will establish small strong points between the two objectives.
4. In the event of 9th. and 10th. making good the 3rd. objective, and their flanks being unprotected through units on the flanks not coming up, B. Company will be responsible for holding the flanks from the 2nd. forward to the 3rd. objective, establishing strong points from the two outer platoons detailed in para 3.
5. C. Company will be employed at first solely as carrying party. When dumps Nos. 3 and 4 in 2nd. objective are once filled 2 platoons will suffice for this work. The other two platoons will take cover between the first and 2nd. objectives, and will be held ready to make attacks to the flanks in case assistance is asked for by 7th. or 2nd. Brigades, or to reinforce B. Company in protecting the forward flanks as in para 4.
6. In the event of the 9th. and 10th. Battalions being driven in by a counter attack, D. and A. Companies will in turn at once counter attack without waiting for orders from higher authority, taking all men of 9th. and 10th. with them.  
All available men of B. and C. Companies between the 1st. and 2nd. objectives will be sent into the 2nd. objective and hold same.

*R. M. Newton*  
Lt. & Adjt.  
1st. Battalion A.I.F.


Issued at 1730.

Distribution as per battalion order No. 19.



SECRET.

12<sup>th</sup> Battalion A.I.F. Disposition at place of Assembly.



Sections to be on slightly irregular intervals. Numbers are platoons.

18/9/7.

R. M. Newton Maj. 12<sup>th</sup> Batten.



12th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION ROUTINE ORDER NO. 19.SUPPLEMENT NO. 3.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

18th. September 1917.

Reference Sheet HOOGE 1/10,000.

1. Bayonets will not be fixed until the artillery barrage commences.
2. Prisoners of war will be sent under escort of slightly wounded men to Brigade Headquarters. They should be used as relief stretcher bearers if possible.
3. Intelligence platoon will search for maps etc. as per special instructions to Intelligence officer. All commanders will give all possible assistance.
4. No use will be made of the telephone before zero hour. Companies will report to Battalion Headquarters by runner. The message "rations arrived" will signify that units are in position.
5. Barrage maps have been issued. Company and Platoon Commanders will note that barrage is not parallel to line of advance. Care must be taken that men do not diverge to the right.
6. R.A.P. will be at J.14.A.45.60.
7. Lieut. R.W. FLETCHER will act as liaison officer with 5th. Battalion and Lieut. H.M. SANDY will place the RED MARK in position at J.9.D.5.9. Paras 8 and 9 will be amended accordingly.

*R.M. Newton*  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Lieut. & Adjt.  
 12th. Battalion A.I.F.

Issued at 1730.

Disposal as per Order No. 19.



Report of Operations near POLYGON WOOD 20/21st. September 1917

The objective assigned to this ~~Kakkakka~~ Unit for the attack on 20/9/17 was the "BLUE LINE", approximately the W. edge of POLYGON WOOD.

The Battalion moved into HALF WAY HOUSE on morning of 19th. It was due to pass the starting point at 0130 on 20th, but owing to being blocked by 28th. Battalion did not pass till 0205.

No trouble was experienced in finding the way to the forming up place, but it took along while for the men to get up owing to the marshy state of the ground. At 0410 all men were in position on the tapes.

On looking at the forming up place later from the enemy's point of view it was seen that it was the sky-line of a rise, and that the men were evidently observed, as at about 0430 he placed a barrage on and in rear of our front line. This continued till 0515 when it ceased for a few minutes and then re-commenced and continued with less intensity till our barrage started at 0540.

A considerable amount of confusion was caused by the casualties and by the men from the rear crowding forward to miss the worst of the barrage.

At zero hour all four battalions went over together and assisted in the mopping up of GLENCORSE WOOD and NONNE BOSSCHEN.

While the 11th. Battalion was consolidating the RED LINE the 12th. Battalion was re-organised and moved forward to the BLUE LINE.

On arrival at the edge of POLYGON WOOD it was found that tree stumps made digging very difficult so a line was started just in the wood on the right running back to 50 yards. in rear on the left. This was much broken and by connecting shell holes quite a good trench was dug by 1030. This was improved during the whole time the Battalion was in the line, and by the evening of the 21st. was a well constructed line. The 10th. Battalion rendered a lot of help, and as they had too many men for their front line, eventually took over about 80 yards of the 2nd. Objective, which became too crowded after our mopping up party came into the line.

Strong Points were constructed at the corners of the Wood at J.9.C.8.2. and J.9.A.5.3. Each had a concrete pill box as Headquarters.

Enemy movement was observed near the mound J.10.A.7.8. and in JETTY WOOD J.10.A.&B., but artillery fire was directed onto these and no further sign of the enemy was seen.

The relief by the 1st. and 2nd. Battalions passed off without casualties. It was late owing to the lateness of orders being received. Provided the way is well known so that there is no chance of guides being lost, I am of the opinion that the middle of the night is a good time for relief, there being little shelling as a rule between 11p.m. and 3 a.m.

The barrage standing in front of an objective was not needed in this case by the Battalion consolidating, but it gave the Battalion attacking the next objective an opportunity for reorganization. Two hours in front of the 2nd. Objective was found to be too long.

Liasion between the various Battalions was good. We continually received messages from our officers with flanking units, and their officer sent back progress reports from our H.Q. Touch was well kept and there was no need for assistance being given in any case.

Telephonic communication with Brigade forward report centre was well maintained on the whole.

The enemy's morale was low. In <sup>only one</sup> ~~no~~ case was fire from M.G. or rifles brought to bear on our men. <sup>from Black Watch corner.</sup> About 20 men and 3 M.Gs. were captured in one Strong Post. In one Pill- Box the Officers had not ventured outside to use latrines, but used a tin in the passage outside.

The enemy appeared to have fixed barrage lines and by observation of these casualties were avoided.

The task of carrying from HALF WAY HOUSE and HOOGE proved almost too much for the Company detailed for this duty, in view of the marshy state of the ground to be traversed. Rations and water were got through to the front line without difficulty. 18 tins of water were handed over in the front line on relief.

The Battalion Headquarters for the 1st. and 2nd. Objectives at least should be near their Company's. Many more messages are sent between Battalion Headquarters and Company's than between Battalion Headquarters and Brigade Headquarters.



And a great saving of time is effected, as well as saving the runners.

Two Lewis Guns were lost owing to casualties in the gun teams, and three were damaged by shell fire.

13 enemy machine guns were captured. 8 are now in our possession, three were left mounted in the front line, one was handed to 2nd. M.G. Coy. and one lost near HOOGE, owing to the men carrying it out both being wounded.

No record was kept of prisoners captured - probably about 40.

Total Casualties : 1 Officer killed, 1 missing, and four wounded.

Other Ranks.	A. Coy.	B. Coy.	C. Coy.	D. Coy.	Total.
Killed	3	5	5	3	16
Missing	6	4	4	2	16
Wounded	34	29	38	37	138
					<u>170.</u>

*C. H. Elliott Lt. Col.*

*Commandg. 12th Bn.*

### REPORT BY O/C. A. COMPANY.

#### ASSEMBLY.

The Company moved into position without incident and the guiding tape was of great assistance, but had it been necessary to wear gas-helmets it would have been extremely difficult to move from CHATEAU WOOD forward, owing to the absence of tracks.

There was a lot of low whistling, evidently for communication as 11th. Battalion moved into position. It would have been audible to enemy's scouts. Men did not take cover even when on a sky-line when flares went up, and they were evidently seen by the enemy.

#### ADVANCE TO THE RED LINE.

On the right of the Brigade sector all units were mixed up and there was little control, consequent on the enemy shelling and the rough nature of the ground. A strong concrete post which resisted in NONNE BOSCHEN WOOD was quickly surrounded and rushed, but the three waves of the attack were so close to one another - really in one mass that the post inflicted undue casualties, on us with M.G. Fire.

#### ADVANCE TO BLUE LINE.

A. Company was quickly reorganised while waiting to advance from the RED LINE and followed close to the Barrage meeting no opposition except a little M.G. fire from BLACKWATCH CORNER. Our information concerning the position proved very correct, and there was little trouble in keeping direction. The BLUE Objective was rushed as soon as the Barrage passed it, and the only Strong Post there either did not have sufficient time, or the men were too much demoralized by our shell fire, to resist. They surrendered with two machine guns complete.

#### ADVANCE TO GREEN LINE.

The protective barrage in front of the BLUE LINE seemed of unnecessarily long duration. 9th. and 10th. Battalions ~~evidently~~ <sup>eventually</sup> advanced to their objective without incident.

#### CONSOLIDATION.

The necessity for first gaining good cover from artillery fire was demonstrated. A. Company firstly dug deep in selected positions in groups of four / six men and later connected these posts by a more shallow trench. No casualties were inflicted by the enemy's barrage on the evening of 20th. If men are kept immune from shell fire they can defeat an Infantry attack from shell holes.

#### COUNTER ATTACKS.

It was evident from observation that the enemy had great difficulty and suffered heavily, in bringing his men into their assembly positions. They came forward in very small parties, rushing from shell hole to shell hole, and it must have been impossible to regain good organisation. The men appeared to be in marching order.

#### RELIEF.

5th. Battalion began to relieve in daylight and the enemy evidently surmised that that was the beginning of the general relief. If tapes could have been laid by each unit ( Company to Battalion or to some



central point, and thence to the rear) it would have greatly assisted incoming and outgoing troops.

#### LESSONS LEARNED.

Our Heavy Barrage starting the same time as the Infantry is an effective counter to the enemy's principle of defence in depth. The necessity for keeping close to the Barrage, each man knowing as much as possible about his objective, line of advance and method of advance were both emphasised. The value of rapid converging attack on strong points was obvious.

#### ENEMY'S NEW DISPOSITIONS.

Nothing was noticed which had not been previously notified in Div. Circulars and Maps.

#### ENEMY'S MORALE.

The enemy's morale was undoubtably bad. He was evidently demoralised by the weight of our artillery fire and our Infantry were upon him before he could recover sufficient courage to resist, and surrendered abjectly in most cases. His equipment was good, and good seemed to be sufficient. His bread was of much worse type than that sampled on the SOMME.

*Govanagh*  
*Lieut.*  
*of 08 A Coy*

#### REPORT BY O/C.B. COMPANY.

At 0130 on 20/9/17 I moved off with B. Company from HALF WAY HOUSE being rear Company of the Battalion.

At the entrance to CHATEAU WOOD C. Company stopped at Dump to load material which then brought the Battalion into the following order of Companies; A.D.B. we reached the assembly position with little trouble and no casualties. A. and D. Companies formed up along the tape. A. on the right and D. on the left. I moved my Company up 40 yards in rear of them across the Brigade front in the following order of platoons from the right 5,6,7,8,. The platoons were formed up as arranged q.e. Lines of Sections at 40 yards intervals in shell holes. About 0430 the enemy discovered that troops were moving in front of our line and opened a heavy Barrage, this caused some disorganization, and the troops started to move off towards the left flank to avoid shelling.

This disorganisation was only momentary. I went along towards the left flank and ordered the men to take cover in shell holes which they did immediately.

Our casualties from this barrage were very slight. At about 0530 A. Company of the 9th. Battalion moved up and took cover in shell holes in rear of my position.

The tapes at the assembly points were of great assistance in getting into position.

At zero hour our barrage started and on its lifting the first 100 yards the whole line moved forward irrespective of distances, to enable us to get out of the enemy's barrage, which was still on the assembly point.

On moving forward towards the first objective I could only find a few of the 11th. Battalion. I took charge of that part of the line moving the whole lot forward irrespective of company or battalion and with these men reached the first objective which we started to consolidate.

There was no opposition reaching this point and enemy shelling was well in rear of us.

I reported having reached first objective to Battalion Headquarters at 0630.

We reorganised the 12th. Battalion as far as possible at this point about 0640.

Captain MASON 11th. Battalion with his Company came into first objective having got too far out to the flank. They immediately started to consolidate the position. At 0708 I pushed forward under Barrage with 12th. Battalion towards the 2nd. objective. The following officers were with me in going forward. Lieuts. SHEPHERD, CAMPBELL, TYNAN, SANDY, BLACKLOW and WARDLAW.

We reached 2nd. Objective with no opposition capturing 7 Machine Guns and about 30 prisoners. We immediately started to consolidate, approximately a long line J.9.A.8.4. to J.9.C.8.2.

As Company's being in the front line, most of the material brought forward by C. Company had been lost in the marshes on the way to 2nd. Objective, in many cases the men having to be pulled out of the mud by



their comrades. The consolidation was helped along considerably by our finding a quantity of Hun shovels on the objective.

About 1015 9th. and 10th. Battalions passed over our lines towards the 3rd. objective. Slight enemy shelling at this period. At 1100 Lt. WARDLAW with two platoons started constructed Strong Points about J.9.C.8.5. to fill in the gap between A. and D. Company. At this period Lt. THOMPSON was missing and has not traced up to the present.

A party from C. Company under Lieut. TYNAN were at this period sent back to bring forward material, and establish dumps as previously arranged.

During the afternoon and evening our own heavies were consistently shelling our own lines.

About 1930 the S.O.S. signal went up from the GREEN LINE our artillery immediately replied with a heavy barrage but no counter attack developed.

Shelling around our line at this period was very slight and although enemy planes were flying low he evidently did not discover our lines.

About 2100 everything was again very quiet and remained so until about daybreak and our consolidation was carried on with, and a good line was established by dawn. At dawn our artillery Barraged. Enemy replied with some slight shelling causing no casualties.

My Company casualties up to this period were approximately 5 killed 13 wounded 7 missing.

About 1800 I received word from Battalion Headquarters that we were to be relieved that night.

About 1930 enemy opened heavy barrage about our lines most of his shells falling just in rear. S.O.S. signals went up from right and left flanks and also in front. Our artillery replied with heavy barrage. At 2030 9th. and 10 th. Battalions reported back that all was O.K. on their front and that no attack had developed. Throughout this heavy barrage we suffered no casualties

Things quietened down about 2200 and allowed our relief to take place. A. and B. Companies of 1st. Battalion took over our line, about 0100, we moved back to half way house suffering no casualties

LESSONS LEARNT

Carrying party - In my opinion ~~the~~ carrying party for material is practically of no use while moving forward to the attack, as their loads are lost through heavy shelling which causes disorganization, and their loads are thrown away. I think it would best if loading parties left after the objectives had been taken.

ASSEMBLY. - Assembly position could be better marked if different coloured luminous discs were used in conjunction with the tape line.

RELIEFS - Advanced parties from the relieving unit of a few N.C.O's should be sent forward by daylight before a relief takes place to give incoming units fuller information as regards our disposition and those of the enemy.

ENEMY MORALE. Although we captured enemy strong points in some cases with three machine guns he made no attempt to put up any serious opposition. In no case did we find any machine guns or enemy in shell holes.

ENEMY DISPOSITION.

The main enemy defences seemed to be concrete Pill-Boxes distributed checkerwise in depth.

*Robyuan Capt  
of 13 Coy*

REPORT BY O/C. C. COMPANY!

I was in charge of C. Company 12th. Battalion which was detailed as carrying Company. On the morning of 19th. instant we advanced from HALF WAY HOUSE loaded up and with orders to take all our material to dumps 5 and 6 in the BLUE LINE. Before arriving at the assembling point we experienced considerable difficulty owing to the swampy nature of the taped track which greatly fatigued the men at this early stage. On arrival at assembly point the enemy opened a fairly heavy barrage on us by which a considerable portion of our material was destroyed. I think it would an improvement on what took place if dumps had been previously established in our front line and sunken tracks dug so that carrying party could assemble there and load up without being seen.



Those parties would start from the front line quite fresh and would stand a good chance of getting most of their material to their objective.

Tracks should be made or tapes laid between dumps as great difficulty has been experienced in keeping correct direction in shell torn country, in the dark. The system of carrying from line to line as adopted was a success and sections in single file did not suffer heavy casualties while carrying in the daytime, and the front line was kept well supplied with war material.

#### ADVANCE.

The advance was carried out very steadily but the opportunities of reorganization at RED and BLUE LINES were not availed of to the best advantage.

#### CONSOLIDATION.

The consolidation was carried out rapidly and well in some places. There was however a tendency to make pronounced trench lines: where the necessary means of concealment adopted, by joining up shell holes and making no marked earthworks enemy planes and other means of observation were unable to observe such and no artillery barrage were put on them.

#### COUNTER ATTACKS.

All counter attacks by enemy broke down under our artillery barrage.

#### RELIEFS.

Parties coming up to relieve our troops moved swiftly and carelessly over the open country between the RED, BLUE, and GREEN LINES, and did not take the precaution to sit still while enemy lights were over our lines. Those troops were invariably shelled and casualties inflicted on them and on troops being relieved. If troops got down when a light is being sent up by the enemy they would be able to observe the ground better and would not be observed by the enemy.

#### ENEMY'S DISPOSITIONS.

The country over which we travelled seemed to be held lightly the main defence being strong points with machine guns. The defenders appeared to be demoralised by our artillery and rarely put up a fight.

*Andrew Cap...*

### REPORT BY B/C. D. COMPANY.

#### ASSEMBLY

Too much undue exposure and unnecessary noise (regarding command etc.)

#### ADVANCE TO RED LINE.

No formation. 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Battalions were all mixed up, men too eager overran barrage. When 11th Battalion were consolidated at the RED LINE we reorganised.

#### ADVANCE TO BLUE LINE.

In lines of sections in single file. Control good.

#### ADVANCE TO GREEN LINE.

9th Battalion advanced before barrage had lifted and had to retire. 10th Battalion followed barrage according to barrage time.

From the assembly point to BLUE LINE no serious opposition met with.

#### CONSOLIDATION.

Good. (Shortage of trench tools). Line too thickly held.

#### COUNTER ATTACKS.

When information reached BLUE LINE that enemy were massing every man stood to and was thoroughly alert. Supply of S.A.A., Bombs, rifle grenades good.

#### RELIEF.

In D. Company's line was carried out satisfactorily.

#### LESSONS LEARNED.

After objective taken and consolidated and men should remain in the trench or strong points and not promenade in the open, and when enemy aircraft overhead men if digging should remain still.

*J. Shepherd*