

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Machine Guns

Item number: 24/24/10

Title: 24th Australian Machine Gun
Company

June 1918



AWM4-24/24/10

CONFIDENTIAL.


ORIGINAL.
DUPLICATE.
TRIPLICATE.



Australian Imperial Force.

WAR DIARY

OF



FOR

JUN 1918

191

Signature of Officer compiling

H. S. Henderson

Signature of Officer Commanding

J. B. Hunter
Major

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Army Form C. 2118

24TH
AUST.

M.G. COY.

NO.

215

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
ALLONVILLE	1:6:18		Reveille 6 a.m. ; Breakfast 7 a.m. The Coy., was formed up at 9 a.m. in readiness to move to BUSSY. The first Section left at 9 a.m. accompanied by its Limbers and each Section in turn left at 10 minuted intervals, the Section arriving at BUSSY at about noon. The Coy. then bivouaced and had dinner, after which the Camp was taken over from 15th M.G.Coy. (5th Div.) and the Nucleus were accommodated in dug-outs along the River Bank. Preparatory to going into the Line, the men sorted and cleaned all Guns and Gun-gear. At 6 p.m. Tea was served. At 8 p.m. 4 Sections marched off and proceeded to the Line, where they took up their positions. The relief was completed by midnight. No.426D Sgt.SUGG C."MM", wounded, and 1 horse casualty sustained. Strength 10 Offs. 177 O/Ranks.	
BUSSY AREA	2:6:18		The day was devoted to making dug-out bomb and water-proof by the Nucleus. Strength 10 Offs. 175 O/Ranks.	
	3:6:18		All available men from each Coy., were detailed to dig soil for bomb-shelters for Transport.	
	4:6:18		Working Parties erected Bomb-shelters at Transport Lines. A Bombing class was commenced under Cpl. FREEMAN, 13th Battn.	
	5:6:18		Nucleus was paid, £3500 francs being disposed of.	
	6:6:18		No.633 Pte. BREEN J.F. evacuated to Hospital from Line sick.	
	7:6:18		Working Parties continued erecting Bomb-proof shelters at Transport Lines.	
	8:6:18		A Relief of 32 men and N.C.Os. proceeded to Line at 8 p.m. The relief marched out of Camp headed by the 4th Aust.M.G.Btn. Pipe Band.	
	9:6:18		Enemy attacked on 20 mile front, but gained no marked success. A heavy bombardment was experienced on CORBIE Sector on night of 8th-9th insts. Two of the Coy's Guns and 1 Tripod were damaged by enemy shell-fire and replaced. No casualties were reported in this Coy. Strength 10 Off.174.	
	10:6:18		At 10.30 a.m. combined Church Service was held by Chap.FINIGAN, also a Church of England Service by Chap.Collins. Capt.CROUCH "MC" relieved Major HINTON "MC" at forward Coy. H.Qs. A Concert was held at Battn.H.Qs. at BUSSY at 7 p.m. items being contributed from members of 4th A.M.G.Btn. and 56th Battn, and 5th Pioneers. 5 Offs. 90 O/Ranks and 16 Guns in the Line.	
			At 9.45 p.m. 2nd Division assisted by 13th Brigade attacked on the CORBIE Sector, which was successful and all objectives gained. A number of prisoners were captured, and our casualties were few.	

Handwritten signature: H. Shindan

WAR DIARY


—or—

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.



215

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BUSSY	11:6:18		Lieuts. SINCLAIR & PEUT relieved by Lieuts. RITCHARD & SHERIDAN. No. 464 Pte. JEFFERY C.F. evacuated wounded. 27 Reinforcements taken on strength. Strength 10 Offs. 200 O/Ranks.	
	12:6:18		Slight enemy shelling in the vicinity of DAOURS and BUSSY, but no damage or Casualties sustained in BUSSY.	
	13:6:18		No. 749 Cpl. Eames J.A. "MM" evacuated sick from Forward Coy. H'Qrs. Training consisted of Bombing Instruction in the morning, Swimming & Cricket in afternoon. 27 O/Ranks proceeded to Line as relief.	
	14:6:18		All men of Nucleus proceeded to Battn. Q.M. Store for the purpose of having new eyepieces fitted to their Gasmasks. Strength 10 Offs. 199 O/Rs.	
	15:6:18		Slight enemy shelling in and round BUSSY. Church Parades under Chaps. Chaps. COLLINS and FINIGAN.	
	16:6:18		Enemy shelled BUSSY with Mustard Gas shells and H.E. There were a few casualties.	
	17:6:18		20 O/Ranks proceeded to R.M.O. for Inoculation. No. 424 Sgt. POPKIN C.B. and 594 Pte. LIVINGSTONE wounded. 30 O/Ranks marched out as Relief.	
	18:6:18		About midday an enemy Plane attacked one of our Observation Balloons and succeeded in setting fire to it. The enemy Plane on the return towards his own lines was brought down by our Anti-Aircraft fire.	
	19:6:18		Training proceeded with at Nucleus. Strength 10 Offs. 197. O/Ranks.	
	20:6:18		Capt. H.W. CROUCH M.C. proceeded to Battn. H.Qs. to assume duties as Adjutant.	
	21:6:18		11 Reinforcements taken on strength. Lieut. H.A. SHERIDAN assumed position as 2nd in Command of Coy. Strength 10 Offs. 207 O/Ranks.	
	22:6:18		Training & Lectures by Lieut. J.H. KENNARE.	
	23:6:18		Combined Church Parade held by Chap. COLLINS at Nucleus.	
	24:6:18		Lieut. T.R. JACK M.C. wounded. Lieut. W.A. SHELLEY "MM" took command of "B" Section on Lieut. JACK being evacuated wounded.	
	25:6:18		Further slight enemy shelling of BUSSY.	
	26:6:18		35 O/Ranks marched out to complete Inter-company relief.	
	27:6:18		Working Party of 50 O/Ranks proceeded to VAIRE to dig Gun Positions, Trenches, etc.	
	28:6:18		Slight enemy shelling in vicinity of Nucleus, but no casualties. Our Artillery very active during night.	
	29:6:18		Combined Church Service held by Chap. COLLINS.	
	30:6:18			

H. S. Henderson
120

WAR DIARY

OF

24th AUST. M. G. COMPANY


FOR

J U N E

1918.

LIST OF APPENDICES.

No.	Subject.
"A"	24th A.M.G.Coy. Order No.8
"B"	Disposition of Coy.
"C"	War Diary Notes on Recent Fighting Nos.13 & 15.
"D"	Type of Car used by 17th Armoured Car Bn.
"E"	German Tank.
"F"	Report on Minor Operations 14th Bn.
"G"	Statement by Escaped Prisoners of War.
"H"	24th A.M.G.Coy. Order No.101.
"I"	4th Aust.M.G.Battn.Order No.8
"J"	Extract from Second Army Summaries.
"K"	Rations Report for month.

*H. Sheridan*

SECRET.

APPENDIX

4.

COPY No. 10

24th AUST. MACHINE GUN COY.

ORDER No. 8.

7:6:1918.

1. An inter Company Relief will take place in the 24th M. G. Coy. on the night of 8th inst.
2. The following Gun teams will be relieved, relieving teams being arranged by Capt CROUCH "MC", who will, as far as possible, send N.C.Os. and men to their respective Sections:-

"A" Section.....	2 teams.....	2 N.C.Os.	6 men.
"B" "	2 "	2 "	6 "
"C" "	4 "	4 "	12 "
3. All relieving N.C.Os. and men will wear their full equipment, but O.S.'s Sections in the line, will arrange for the incoming gun teams to take over the blankets and waterproof sheets of men to be relieved. Capt. CROUCH "MC" will make the necessary arrangements at rear Company H'Qrs.
4. Relieving Gun teams will reach Coy. H'Qrs. by Gun teams before 9.30 p.m., and will be met by Section guides as follows:-

"A" Section at Lieut. SHELLEY'S "MM" H.Qs.	9.50 p.m.
"B" " " Cemetery	9.45 p.m.
"C" " at Lieut. SHELLEY'S "MM" H.Qs.	10. p.m.
5. On relief, relieved teams will move back to Rear Coy. H'Qrs., by Gun teams, reporting to C.S.M.
6. Ration arrangements to be unaltered except in so far as the Section Officers order, (i.e.) with the Section Cooks.)

H. S. Shendon Major.
O. C. 24th Aust. M. G. Coy.

Distribution:

- Copy No. 1 "A" Section.
 2 "B" Section.
 3 "C" Section.
 4 "D" Section.
 5 Capt. CROUCH "MC".
 6 Coy. H'Qrs.
 7 Battr. H'Qrs.
 8 C.S.M.
 9)
 10) War Diary. ✓
 11)



DISPOSITION.

9:6:1918.

"A" Section.In the Line.Lieut. Pent.

Sgt. Decker, Cpl. Foster.
 L/Cpl. Grant "MM", Ptes. Harris, Jeffery, Gower.
 Cpl. Passmore, L/Cpl. Garrick, Ptes. Weir, Whalan.
 Cpl. Watson, Ptes. Livingstone, Russell, Oakes.
 L/Cpl. Brindle, Ptes. Ledwich, Hunter.
 Ptes. Crabtree (Sec. Runner) Clarke (Sig.)
 Pte. Gray. (1 Off. 20 45 O/Ranks.)

"B" Section.In the Line.Lieut. Shelley "MM".

Cpl. Heywood "MM", L/Cpl. Graham, Ptes. Young, Jenner.
 Cpl. Ganet, L/Cpl. Woodman, Ptes. Harper, Bryer.
 L/Cpl. Hunt W.J., Ptes. Oatmur, Robinson, Foster A.M.
 Ptes. Linney, King, Tablam, Watson.
 Ptes. Frost, Harper J.W. (Sec. runner) Stewart (Sig.)
 (1 Off. 20 12 O/Ranks.)

"C" Section.In the Line.Lieut. Sinclair.

Sgt. Wilson.
 L/Cpl. Cockfield, Ptes. Heath W., Murgatroyd.
 Cpl. Buchanan "MM", L/Cpl. Keneally, Ptes. Raymond,
 Smith.
 Cpl. Paterson, Ptes. Johnstone, Richmond, Purves.
 Ptes. Loudon, Fitzpatrick, Holmes, Waldon.
 Pte. Green, Hill (Sec. runner).
and Section with "C" Section.
 Cpl. Tugger, Ptes. Parish, Greenwood, Walker C.C.
 (1 Off. 22 O/Ranks.)

and Section.In the Line.

Lieut. Lantzke.
 H.Q. at Coy. H.Q.

Sgt. Liddicoat "MM".
 Cpl. Cpl. Rose, L/Cpl. Junior, Ptes. Pateman, Stark.
 Bayly.
 L/Cpl. Twist, Ptes. Trehear, Walker J.E. Knight.
 Ptes. Bright, Blandford
 (1 Off. 12 O/Ranks.)

FORWARD COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.

Capt. H.W. CROUCH "MC".
 Lieut. LANTZKE, "nd"
 Section.

Cpl. James "MM", Ptes. Hanner, Hatherley, Baillie,
 Lauder & Felix (2 att'd. Linemen) (Sigs.)
 Ptes. Mufford, Hukins, Weston, Tyson (H.Q. runners)
 Pte. Soutter.
 (1 Off. 11 O/Ranks.)

REAR COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.

Major R.B. HINTON, "MC".
"A" Section.

Sgt. Popkin.
 L/Cpl. Pill
 Pte. Dickenson.
 " Cleary
 " Baker
 " Pearce.
 " Brown C.C.
 " Wingfield.
 " Irvine

"B" Section.

Sgt. Courtney.
 Cpl. Irwin.
 L/Cpl. England.
 Pte. Gibson.
 " Hunt V.M.A.
 " Birmingham
 " Leveraha.
 " Mayall.
 "

"C" Section.

Sgt. Redford.
 Cpl. Hutton.
 L/Cpl. Caperh.
 " Johnson.
 " Stuart.
 Pte. Irving.
 " Tickner.
 " Elliott.
 " Ellis.
 " Ryan.
 " Preece.
 " Parslow.
 " Howlett.
 " Howard.
 " Hooper.
 " Heath S.E.

"D" Section.

Sgt. Murphy.
 Cpl. Trevenen.
 Pte. Simmons.
 " Keat.
 " Birrell.
 " Gillespie.
 " Rockliff.

Total. 9 O/Ranks.

Total. 8 O/Ranks.

Total. 18 O/Rs.

Total. 9 O/Rs.

H'Qrs. Section. C.S.M. O'Brien, C.S.M. B. Parker, L/Sgt. Reale, Houslar, Tuson,
 Monument, Champion, Arkle, Wyatt, Hannan, Strettles, Jones, Brown, Ingles
 Parry. (15 O/Rs.)



WITH BATTN. TRANSPORT.

Cpl. Corbey, L/Cpl. Dvrs. Patching, Lynn, Dunbar, Nichol,
 Dvrs. Gordon, Munro, Allen, Bennett, Brydon, Sims, Marshall, Woods,
 Ryan, Cox, Watson, Pardon, Alsop, McLennan, Cooke, Ryan,
 Daley, Pte. Warrett.
 Dunbar (Carrier), Ptes. Hutton (Artif.), McDowell (Saddler),
 Kitley (Cook), Cotterill (Feedman), Glanville & Weir (Brakesmen).
 (30 O/Ranks.)

		Offs.	O/Rs.
BTH. REST POST.	Ptes. Harris G., McPherson.		
BTH. PACK GUARD.	Pte. Freeman.		1
HOSPITAL.	Lieut. Bartella, Ptes. Green, L/Cpl. Davies, Walker.	1	2
27th A.A.S.C.	Pte. Vernon.		1
A. W. L.	Pte. Barry.		1
	<u>Total.</u>	1	7

RECAPITULATION.

	Offs.	O/Rs.
"A" Section in the Line.	1	30
"B" Section in the Line.	1	19
"C" Section in the Line.	1	32
"D" Section in the Line.	1	12
"E" Section in the Line.	1	7
"F" Section in the Line.	1	11
"G" Section in the Line.	1	15
with Batten. Transport.		30
Bth. Rest Post.		2
" Pack Guard.		1
Hospital.	1	2
27th A.A.S.C.		1
A. W. L.		1

Total. 11 176.

Less 2 Lineamen att'd. Coy., Forward H'Qrs. 2
Strength of Coy. 11 174.



T/9.

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING—No. 13.


GERMAN TACTICS IN THE ATTACK.

(Issued by the General Staff.)

1. The method of concentration of the attacking troops and their movement to the position of assembly in the recent operations on the Western Front were very similar to those employed by the Germans in the attack on Riga in September, 1917. Several of the attacking and second line divisions were brought forward by night marches and by easy stages. In certain cases these marches were so regulated as to bring the divisions into their assembly positions at the end of their last march. This method of attacking after long marches was a feature of the training and manœuvres carried out by the German divisions in the back areas during the early part of this year. In some cases, the starting point of the attacking divisions was at a considerable distance behind the enemy's line. Prisoners who have been captured from divisions which adopted this practice state that their losses during the advance were comparatively light.

2. The enemy has employed two or three different methods for the deployment of his assaulting troops. There is evidence to shew that in some cases an assault division was brought up through a division already in the line. The 3rd Naval Division, for instance, is stated to have marched through another division to attack Contalmaison, and in the attack north of the Scarpe on the 28th of March the three attacking divisions passed through the regiments of the two divisions which were holding the line. As a general rule, however, the enemy appears to have distributed his divisions in depth in groups of two or three, and the assaulting division attacked with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in reserve. Thus, the German IX. Corps (St. Quentin Group) for the attack on the 21st of March was organized with three divisions in the front line and three divisions in reserve. The Corps frontage was about three miles, so that each division attacked on a frontage of about 1,760 yards, with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in divisional reserve. The heads of the central reserve division were ordered to arrive at positions about 4,500 yards behind the German front line at the moment of the assault. The leading regiments of the assaulting division had two battalions in front and one battalion in reserve. The leading battalions had two companies in front and two in close support.

3. The general dispositions adopted by a company in the attack are shewn in the diagram below. This diagram is based upon a prisoner's statement, and shews the formation adopted during training. It is probably typical of the formation generally employed by a company in the attack, but the strength of the various waves naturally depends upon the fighting strength of the company. It will be seen that a fourth platoon is temporarily formed, consisting of runners, signallers and carriers. The task of this platoon, in addition to maintaining communication, is to supply the forward infantry with ammunition and engineer material.



4. The special assault detachments which form the first wave of an attack advance in extended order, but there is no definite information to shew the exact formation adopted by the succeeding waves of the leading battalions. It is probable that the usual method of advance is in line of groups in file until the battalions reach our trenches, when the men deploy into line. The reasons

for this kind of formation are obvious. Casualties from artillery and machine gun fire are reduced to a minimum and the strength of the attack is liable to be underrated. The reserves follow the assaulting battalions in artillery formation, taking advantage of every form of natural cover.

5. The enemy's maxim that the light machine gun is not an auxiliary weapon, but just as much the chief weapon of the infantry as the rifle, has been acted upon throughout the recent offensive. Light machine guns have always been well forward with the assaulting troops. On one portion of the front it was noticed that the system adopted was for one big man to carry the gun until the attacking troops came within our rifle fire. The No. 1 then took the gun from the carrier and crept forward as far as possible before opening a machine gun barrage, under the protection of which the infantry attacked.

6. The enemy's light trench mortars have usually followed close behind the assaulting infantry. They have been used to support the attack if it appears to have been definitely checked and to reinforce machine guns in the defence of captured localities against our counter-attacks.

7. In some cases, as in the attack carried out by the enemy on the 24th of April between the Somme and Hangard, attacks have been delivered by mixed groups of infantry and artillery, a minimum of one field gun battery accompanying an infantry regiment. Although this form of attack may not have been universally adopted by the enemy, it has been employed on all known occasions by various divisions during the recent operations on the Somme and Lys battle fronts. It should be noted that the constitution of mixed groups was laid down by the Germans for the engagement of intervening divisions during the fighting in Flanders in 1917.

8. In the majority of cases, the objectives of the attack appear to have been unlimited and the orders to the troops have been to push on until an organized resistance was encountered. In this connection, it is of interest to note that many of the prisoners who have been captured have been in possession of maps, complete in every detail, of the country into which they might penetrate.

9. In the development of his offensive operations the enemy has aimed at establishing continuous action. He has, therefore, allowed his unit commanders of all grades the fullest initiative, and has endeavoured immediately to exploit any success which he obtains. His tactical methods during the recent fighting constitute a complete return to the principles laid down in the training regulations of German infantry before the war.

4th of June, 1918.

Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING—No. 15.

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE BRITISH FRONT ON THE AISNE ON THE 27th OF MAY.

1.—Indications of the Attack.

The enemy was very successful in concealing his preparations for the attack. Hostile artillery was exceptionally quiet during the fortnight preceding the attack, and there was an almost entire absence of gas shelling. There was little aerial registration and very little aerial and wireless activity of any kind; aeroplane photographs, the latest of which were taken on the 23rd of May, disclosed few new ammunition dumps and no new gun positions. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that the whole front was covered with old gun positions and that about three weeks previous to the attack some of these were reoccupied by the enemy. Except for the reoccupation of these positions, there were no indications of the attack until the 24th and 25th of May, when abnormal lorry and train movement was noticed in the back areas behind the enemy's lines. In the late afternoon of the 26th of May, whole battalions were seen on the march in the forward areas. The enemy made no attempt to conceal the movements of these troops and did not reply when they were shelled.

2.—Hostile Artillery Preparation.

During the night of the 26th-27th of May, as it was evident that the enemy intended to attack, harassing fire was carried out by the heavy and field artillery on the enemy's roads and approaches. The tracks, however, were numerous and the country very open, so that it is unlikely that the enemy experienced much interference in his approach. There was no artillery retaliation, and the enemy's bombardment opened with a crash at 1 a.m. on the 27th of May without any previous preparation. The bombardment is described as the heaviest there has been during the recent offensive. Our front line system of trenches was bombarded mainly, if not entirely, by trench mortars. Instantaneous fuzes were used and the wire, which is described as particularly strong, was destroyed. The shelling of our batteries was very accurate. The bombarded zone included practically the whole of our battery positions. Gas was not used in the front system, but was freely employed for counter-battery work and in every suitable locality in rear. The gas employed was chiefly, if not solely, "blue cross." Its effects were felt as far back as the Valley of the Vesle.

3.—The Attack.

The infantry attack is believed to have begun at about 4.30 a.m. It was preceded by a very heavy barrage, extending to a depth of about 400 yards, which appears not to have been a regular creeping barrage, but to have been moved from zone to zone at some distance in front of the assaulting troops. The enemy throughout the fighting adopted his usual tactics of working round flanks. On the British front, at any rate, the enemy appears to have made little use of tanks. It is reported that a few tanks worked along the valley of the Miette and thence up to La-Ville-au-Bois, but their co-operation was no real factor in the success of the attack in this sector. From the beginning of the battle the enemy had a great superiority in the air, and he was exceedingly quick in getting forward his balloons. A balloon was working from Juvincourt before 11 a.m. Another feature of the advance was the rapidity with which the enemy succeeded in bringing up his light trench mortars. They were drawn by horses and got into action more quickly, and were of greater use, than the field artillery which also accompanied the infantry in the advance.

4.—Lessons.

There was nothing new in the enemy's tactics, but the success which he again obtained emphasizes more strongly than ever the following points:—

(a) The outpost system must be lightly held. It is useless to expose to the preliminary bombardment a single man more than is absolutely necessary.

(b) It is none the less essential to organize some form of forward or outpost system, otherwise the enemy will simply destroy the main defensive battle line by his preliminary bombardment, and will then overwhelm such elements as remain by the strength of his infantry attack.

(c) Reserves should not be sent up piecemeal as reinforcements to the troops holding the line, but must be used as distinct units with definite tasks.

(d) It is essential that a mobile reserve of guns should be retained.


(e) Little registration was reported during the period immediately preceding the attack. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that registration can always be done unobtrusively when the light is unfavourable for ground or aerial observation, or when the wind makes sound ranging difficult. There is also a general tendency not to report a few apparently aimless rounds which do not cause any inconvenience. The importance of reporting all shelling, especially on quiet days, cannot, therefore, be too much emphasized.

6th of June, 1918.



PRINTED IN FRANCE BY ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES.

PRESS A—6/18.



See
Please short
all your men &
men at Coy &
return to
215

Type of Car in use by
17th Armoured Car Bn.
Tank Corps
May. 1918

Armament - 2 Hotchkiss Machine Guns



FIELD SURVEY CO. R.E. (3722) 26-5-18


APPENDIX

10.

APPENDIX

UNIT NUMBER 60 4000000 200

Handwritten notes:
The vehicle was damaged by a shell on 11/11/18.
The engine was blown out and the vehicle was
burnt out. The vehicle was found on 11/11/18.
The vehicle was found on 11/11/18.



IX III
193
A B

W. H. T. 1118
1118 1118
1118 1118
1118 1118

215

Plate 1.

GERMAN TANK.

FRONT VIEW.

June 1918



1. The points most vulnerable to Rifle and Machine Gun bullets are :—
 Flaps in the conning tower.
 Gun shield.
 Machine Gun apertures.
 Under-carriage, when exposed during the crossing of an obstacle.
2. A direct hit by artillery will put the tank out of action.
3. A trench 8 feet wide or a large shell hole will arrest the tank's progress.


PRINTED IN FRANCE BY ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES.



PRESS A-5/18-6547X-2,500.

Plate 2.

GERMAN TANK.
FRONT AND SIDE VIEWS.

June 1918

1. The points most vulnerable to Rifle and Machine Gun bullets are :—
 Flaps in the conning tower.
 Gun shield.
 Machine Gun apertures.
 Under-carriage, when exposed during the crossing of an obstacle.
2. A direct hit by artillery will put the tank out of action.
3. A trench 8 feet wide or a large shell hole will arrest the tank's progress.

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PRESS A-5/18-6547X-2,500.

215

"E"

24TH
AUST.
M.G. COY.

Plate 3.

GERMAN TANK.

REAR VIEW.

June 1918



1. The points most vulnerable to Rifle and Machine Gun bullets are :—
Flaps in the conning tower.
Gun shield.
Machine Gun apertures.
Under-carriage, when exposed during the crossing of an obstacle.
2. A direct hit by artillery will put the tank out of action.
3. A trench 8 feet wide or a large shell hole will arrest the tank's progress.

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24TH
AUST.
M.G. COY.
No. _____

PRESS A-5/18-6547X-2,500.

C O P Y.

14th Battalion A.I.F.

Report on Minor operation 15th/16th June, 1918.

Reference VAUX 1/20,000.

The night proved almost cloudless and the addition of a fairly clear moon rendered forming up somewhat difficult. All parties were however on J.O.T. well before Zero without casualty.

Barrage opened punctually but all parties agree that it was very light, and while only a few short H.E. are reported, a considerable amount of shrapnel burst too early. Pace, jump, and position of barrage were satisfactory. Wire was found strong and not sufficiently cut, but surmounted with slight difficulty save on the Left Sector where however, the resistance in front of the wire and the scanty time allotted to this party rendered any chance of cutting through, out of the question.

The Front Trench was strongly manned by the enemy who, in the Centre, hurriedly evacuated, but on the flanks stayed and suffered accordingly. The Right party following right up to and inside their barrage met little opposition, taking 9 prisoners and killing about 12 for 6 of whom they produced actual identification. They were troubled by an enemy M.G. from their Southern flank during their return which was apparently pushed up through the barrage.

Centre party found their objective vacated showing signs of recent occupation. This party found the only dugout, a small one, with apparently only one entrance, possible a Company H.Q. Unfortunately the premonitory bomb set it on fire so the usual steps were taken to dispose of the inhabitants. On pushing on into the clearing they found recently evacuated "pot-holes".

Left Party encountered lively rifle and bomb fire from advanced positions in front of enemy wire which were promptly rushed, two prisoners taken, 1 Light Machine Gun captured, and the rest killed. This party was allowed a bare 12 minutes for their operation and the return signal found them backing their way through thick wire covering what was evidently a strongly held trench.

As a result of the operations 6 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners were brought in, 1 Machine Gun captured, 1 dug-out destroyed, and a number of the enemy killed, which latter case can be better estimated when the raiding parties have been interviewed. There is concrete evidence of a satisfactory use of the bayonet.

The whole operation went without a hitch and reflects the greatest credit on all ranks especially the three Officers to whose painstaking explanation of detail, previous reconnaissance and vigorous patrolling, the success of the operation is almost wholly due. All ranks seem to have known exactly what their various tasks were and keenness was certainly not lacking.

Our casualties were -

2 Other Ranks killed.

11 " " Wounded.

Identification was Normal.

In the field,
16/6/1918.

(Sgd) Henry A. CROWTHER, Lt-Col.,
Commanding 14th Battalion A.I.F.



P.T.O.

16th Battalion A.I.F.Report on Minor operation 15th/16th June, 1918.

A raid was carried out against enemy's trenches in P.8.d., entry being forced at P.8.d.9.8. By means of two Bangalore Torpedoes two gaps were blown in enemy's wire, and raiders rushed the gaps and gained entry to the trench. No. 1 Party bombed up Southern side of Pear Shaped Trench, and No. 2 along North, unfortunately however the O.C. No. 2 Party and his two Senior Sergeants were wounded when entering the trench.

At Zero plus 5 minutes our shells began to fall short and caused several casualties.

At Zero plus 9 minutes the O.C. Raid gave the order to retire. Wounded were evacuated and an orderly retirement took place, No. 1 Party covering No. 2 Party, and the Blocking Party covering No. 1.

There were a considerable number of prisoners in the Line but they could not be persuaded to leave the trenches so were shot. A few Hun prisoners, five in all, and 3 Light Machine Guns were brought back.

Our casualties were 15 wounded.

The Hun casualties must have been particularly heavy, especially on the Sunken Road running S.E. The O.C. Raid gives as a reasonable estimate 50 killed, half this number were not inclined to return, and suffered accordingly.

Zero time for the infantry was advanced about 30 seconds owing to the fact that the Bangalore Torpedo Party were detected and bombed after having placed their Torpedoes in position, so fuzes were immediately ignited.

C O N F I D E N T I A LSTATEMENT BY ESCAPED PRISONERS OF WAR.

Administrative Headquarters,
Australian Imperial Force,
"B" Records Section,

April 30, 1918.

<u>Reg.No.</u>	<u>Rank.</u>	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Unit.</u>
372	Cpl.	Lane C.W.	("D" Section; 24th
648	Pte	Ruschpler R.C.	(M.G. Coy; 4th M.G. Battalion.

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AUST.

M.G. COY.

No.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

- (a) Date April 5, 1918.
(b) Place Dernancourt, near Albert (Somme)
(c) What happened immediately before Capture.

We were occupying a machine gun position in a chalk pit on the Amiens side of the village of Dernancourt, near Albert. From our position Dernancourt would be distant some 500 yards.

On the morning of April 5, we were surrounded by large bodies of Germans while we were in the chalk pit. At this time the enemy was in possession of Dernancourt. The enemy had not attacked on our sector of the front, and we did not see the Germans arrive. In places the chalk pit we occupied was 30 feet deep. It afforded good protection, but our range of vision was limited. We had our own front to watch.

Suddenly Germans appeared on our left. They were in goodly numbers--some hundreds. At about the time we noticed the approach of the Germans on our left, we found that they also had us covered from the rear. The enemy fired a few shots, but none of our men was injured. The shots were probably fired by the Germans to intimate to us that they were handy and that they had us surrounded.

We had four Vickers guns with us in the pit. There was another machine gun section--"A" Section-- on our left. That section would be about 100 yards away. That section must have been captured before we were captured. Otherwise the Germans would not have been able to get round behind us.

Lieut C.A. Myers was the Officer in Charge of our Section.

There were 17 of us all told, including the officer, Serjeant Reeves, Corporal Lane, and a runner.

The Germans had surrounded the chalk pit and had full command of the only entrance to it. We surrendered. There was no alternative. The Germans motioned us to move out of the pit, and on towards Dernancourt.

What happened immediately after Capture.

We marched in this direction for about 100 yards. Then we stopped to attend to some wounded. Australian soldiers- Infantry and Pioneers- who were sitting or lying k on the roadside. The rest of the party went on toward Dernancourt, and that was the last we saw of them, with the exception of two who had been wounded by our own shrapnel, and whom we carried to a German dressing station. The men so wounded were--

No 650a Pte Tonks E.V.

No 3237 " Pearce W.A.

Throughout the whole of that day we were carrying the wounded- German and Australian- to the German dressing stations. During

the afternoon we were separated for a while, but in the evening we met again. Up till then we had not been interfered with and we arranged to wait until it was dark, and then make an attempt at escape.

From Dernancourt to Peronne

But before dark the Germans found something for us to do. In one of the German dressing stations a German doctor had been killed. We were detailed to carry the dead doctor's body, to his old billet at Meaulte. We were accompanied by some German stretcher bearers who were carrying some German stretcher cases. We only went part of the way, when we were detached under a guard of two armed Germans. We were to take the doctor's body to his billet, but we had not gone far, when one of our shells lobbed unpleasantly handy to us.

It put the wind up "our Fritz" guards. They made us dump the doctor. We did so gladly. We then went on to Meaulte and slept there that night - in the doctor's billet. At 2.30. in the morning we started to march to Maricourt, and from there - in company with German "walking cases" - to Peronne. We reached Peronne at about 1.p.m.

Here we were questioned by a German officer. He asked us no questions of any military significance. But we were made to fill in a card, stating that we were Prisoners of War, giving the necessary Regimental details - Number, Rank etc. We were given dinner at Peronne - a thick macaroni soup. Then we were taken to a brewery in the main street, the brewery having been converted into a compound for prisoners of war. There were about 200 English prisoners there, about 20 Frenchmen, and two other Australians besides ourselves. Those were

Arthur Seeley.

George Wilson.

We cannot say to what unit either of these men belonged. We remained at Peronne for five days. During that time we were engaged on various general fatigues - burying dead, mending roads, tidying and cleaning up.

From Peronne to Bray.

On the night of the fifth day of our captivity - April 10 - 100 of us were marched from Peronne towards Bray. Halfway to Bray we camped. The roads were in a fearful state - all worked up to a dough or putty. We camped for a while in an old farmhouse, but at 5.30. p.m. we pushed on for Bray, and we arrived there at about 10.p.m. We were placed in one of the old British prisoners of war cages about a kilometre north of the town. We found about 100 "Tommys" there. There had been two or three Australians there but they had been taken away. Next day we were all set to work levelling ground for a new aerodrome. The site was to the South of Cappy - between Cappy and Chugnies. Next night we effected our escape.

Method of Escape

One of our shells had blown a hole in the outside wall of wire, surrounding the cage. The hole had not been properly mended and there was no sentry at the spot. We used a duck-board to clamber over and through the wire that night at about half-past 9 o'clock. We made straight for our own lines - towards Dernancourt.

An English soldier named Munday started out with us. After we had gone about three kilometres we ran into some Germans and had to "cut and run" for it, across country. It was fairly dark.

We waited a while for Munday, lying in a ploughed furrow in the fields, but we never saw him again. So we pushed on ourselves. We had frequently to hide to allow small bodies of German troops to pass on. Whenever we ran up against Germans in the dark they challenged us. At least we took what they said for a challenge and never waited to answer it. Eventually we passed the enemy reserves and supports and got into his front line. Our own line lay between 200 and 300 yards ahead, and we made a blackguard bolt across the interval. German sentries fired at us and one opened up a small x with a machine gun, but we got across safely.

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and ran into a company of the 21st Battalion. We were in our own lines again at 3.50 on the morning of April 13.

Battalion, Brigade and Division on

From the Company Officer we were passed successively on to General Birdwood. In the end we were sent across from France to report to the British War Office, and the Headquarters of the Australian Imperial Forces in London.

Those who became prisoners of war with us, at Dernancourt, on the morning of April 5, were --

24th M.G. Coy
of
4th M.G. Batt:

Lieut Myers	F.C.A.	4822	Dawson "MM" G.
Lieut Dight	C.C.	3237	Pearce W.A. (Wnd)
647 Pithers	T.C.	682	Hackett W.
650a Tonks	E.V. (Wnd)	642	Liddell E.R.
292 Sgt Reeves	J.R.	430b	Sutherland D.
476 Share	M.A.	422a	Sgt Mc Phee C.C.
368 Hinds	H.J.	631	Adam M.K.
431a Sellars	A.H.	420c	Mc Farland M.H.
399 Townsing	J. T.	645	Murphy E.
650 Watkins	P.J.	472a	Stanwix E.J.
652 Wegner	G.O.	472a	Stewart J.
433b Gleeson	J.M.	556	Whitnear W.R.
427b A/Cpl Biggs	J.W.	432	Druce V.F.

We also saw the fol owing --

7332	Yde	E.A.	4th M.G. Btn.	3079	Forsyth	S.J.	4th M.G. Btn.
4828	Kelly	S.	" " "	3409	Egan	L.C.	" " "
2827	Harris	H.B.	" " "	511	Leonard	W.J.	" " "
				4620	L/Cpl Wilson	George.	35th Btn.
				2167	Farrshar	W.J.	47th Btn.



Signatures

172 Cpl G.W. Lane
648 P.C. Russell

SECRET.

APPENDIX


COPY No.....

24th. Aust. M.G. Coy. Order No. 101.

Ref. Sheet 62D 1:40,000.

15th. June 1918.

- (1) The following raids will be undertaken on the Brigade front on night 15th.-16th.
- (A) Three parties each 50 strong from 14th. Battalion will raid VAIRE WOOD between P 20 a 9.7 and P 14 d 5.8.
- (B) Two parties each 30 strong, from 16th. Battalion will raid enemy strong point in P 8 d.
- (C) 15th. Battalion will send out fighting patrols to within 100 yards (about) of Artillery barrage line which will fall on and creep back from a line from P 9 a 00.00 to P 3 c 80.00 to P 3 d 70.60.
- (2) Artillery will co-operate.
- (3) Zero hour later.
- (4) 24th. M.G. Coy. will assist by giving covering fire as follows :-
- (A) Guns in J 33 c (F3, F4, & F5) will fire on copse in P 9 c from 3030 to 8560.
- (B) Guns in P 1 a (R14, R15, & R16) and guns in J 31 d (S8 & S9) will fire on trench in P 9 a and c from 4085 to 9515.
- (5) Rate of fire as follows:- Fire will open at Zero. Rapid for 1 belt : thereafter till 0+30 at rate of one belt in three minutes, thereafter till 0+60 intermittent.
- (6) On conclusion of operation, guns will carry out the usual harassing fire, and lay on S.O.S. lines after harassing fire.
- (7) Report on operations to be included in usual morning report.



H. W. Crouch
For O.C. 24th. M.G. Company. Capt.

Extra copy to:-

15th. Battalion.
4th. A.I. Brigade.
4th. M.G. Coy.

SECRET.

APPENDIX I

Copy No.....

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

Operation Order No. 3.8.

Headquarters,
29th May, 1918.

Reference Map 62D. 1/40,000

1. The 4th Aust. M.G. Battalion will relieve the 5th Aust. M.G. Battalion in the line on the 31st May and 1st and 2nd June, 1918.
2. Machine Gun Companies will relieve as under:-

Date.	Relieving Coy.	To Relieve.	Remarks.
31/1	13th A.M.G. Coy.	Left Coy.	Hqrs at J.22.c.90.30.
1/2	24th A.M.G. Coy.	Centre Coy.	" " 0.6.b.60.50.
1/2	4th A.M.G. Coy.	Right Coy.	" " 0.18.a.30.20.
31/1	12th A.M.G. Coy.	Reserve Coy.	" " 0.1.c.10.70.

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No.

3. M.G. Battalion H.Q. will be at H.25.c.35.50. (BUSSY) at 11 p.m., 1st. June.

4. Details of relief to be arranged mutually between Coy. Commanders concerned.

5. Transport will be brigaded at H.34.d.9.3. under arrangements of Bn. Transport Officer who will meet Transport Sergeants at that place at 9.30 a.m., 30th May.

6. Nucleus personnel will be accommodated at BUSSY under M.G. Battalion arrangements.

7. Administrative Orders issued separately.

8. Relief to be notified by code wire.

9. Acknowledge.

C. Douchatel

Capt.

Adj. 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion.

Issued through signals at 10 p.m.
Extra copies to.

5th Aust. M.G. Battalion.
3rd Aust. M.G. Battalion.
2nd Aust. M.G. Battalion.

SECRET.

APPENDIX

Copy No. 41

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION

Administrative Instructions
Issued in connection with Operation Order No. 8.

Nucleus Personnel

consisting of not less than 25% of Officers, Sergeants, Corporals, and gunners (S.S. 135 Section XXX, para 4) will be billeted at BUSSY under command of Capt. H. W. CROUCH, M.C. (24th Coy). Composition of nucleus by ranks to reach this Office by 8 p.m., 30th inst.

Pack Dump.

will be at Billet No. 6, ALLONVILLE, under a guard of 1 Cpl. and 3 O.R. from 4 p.m., 30th May.

Billeting.

certificates will be rendered by Companies concerned before leaving area. An Officer will be left behind (where necessary) to hand over billets to ^{incoming} unit and obtain certificate re sanitation and cleanliness.

Bootmakers. Tailors.

will be at Q.M. Store, BUSSY. They will deal with a percentage of Men of Reserve Coy. daily.

Salvage.

will be carried out as under previous arrangements.

Water.

Petrol tins on limbers will be filled with chlorinated drinking water, re-filled every three days.

S.A.A.

Mobile Echelon will be maintained on limbers. Demands to replace S.A.A. expended will be sent to Battalion H.Q.



C. W. Crouch

Capt.

Adj. 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion.

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Wardham

Copy.

APPENDIX J

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EXTRACTS FROM SECOND ARMY SUMMARIES.22nd April, 1918.1. GERMAN ATTACK NORTH OF THE SCARPE. (22/3/18).Method of attack.

The three attacking Divisions passed through Regiments of the 2 divisions in the line, which then supported the attack.

The attacking divisions each had all three regiments in line; in one case, these regiments attacked with two battalions (in two waves) in front line and the 3rd battalion in reserve.

The troops assembled for attack in shell holes behind the front line. After the objectives of the attack (roughly the line VINY - BAILLEUL - ST. LAURENT BLANCY) had been gained, VINY Ridge was to be attacked by three assault divisions on the following day.

Results of the attack.

The attack only succeeded in pressing us back from our outpost line. The enemy's casualties were heavy, as a result both of our artillery fire prior to the attack, and of his attempt to press forward under our machine gun and rifle fire; one battalion lost 14 officers and one regiment 24 officers.

Cause of failure.

A captured officer states that the main causes of failure were :-

- (i) The intensity of our machine gun barrage.
- (ii) The fact that some of the attacking troops did not leave their front line until 10 minutes after the assault had been launched.

13/4/18.ENEMY LOSSES.

(a) Very heavy casualties were inflicted by our machine guns upon the enemy when attempted to advance in a north-westerly direction near DAMSTRASSE on the 11th instant.

(b) Prisoners state heavy losses were suffered by the 6th and 7th Companies of the 150th I.R. (11th Reserve Division) yesterday. The latter Company which came into action about 60 strong was practically annihilated by machine gun fire.


17/4/18.Alpine Corps.2nd Bavarian Jager Regiment.

In a small attack near MONT DE LILLE, East of BAILLEUL, the 2nd Bn. of the 1st Jager Regiment passed through elements of the 2nd Bavarian Jager Regiment which, according to the prisoner, had suffered heavy casualties from our machine gun fire.

18/4/18.13th Division.

From conversation with an officer of the division from whom the Operation Order referred to in para 5 (b) was captured, it would appear that the attack referred to for the 17th instant by the VI German Army broke down everywhere with heavy losses.

On the front of the 13th Division the attack never got forward owing to our artillery and machine gun fire.



The Regimental Commander of the 23rd I.R. (the Regiment in support) was wounded, and one of the companies had suffered considerable losses.

The losses of the leading regiments were probably heavy.

Prisoners state that the 23rd I.R. lost 80 officers killed and wounded round the ARRAS - CAMBRAI road at the end of March.

22nd Reserve Division.

103rd I.R.

Prisoners state that all three battalions of the regiment were involved in the unsuccessful attack on the 10th, which had for its objective the high ground at MUILTHOEK.

All the prisoners agree that they suffered very heavy losses, from 20% to 30% from our machine gun fire on the 10th instant.

(Annexe to Second Army Summary of 20th April, 1918).

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT

Captured - 14/4/18.

Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

I.R./11 No. 22374 op. 30/3/18.

1. During the course of our offensive up to the present date, the principal resistance has been offered by machine gun posts echeloned in depth. Their complete destruction was not achieved by the artillery bombardment preparatory to the assault even when the fire was of long duration, and must not be expected. We must content ourselves with the neutralisation of the greatest possible proportion of these posts by heavy fire and by Blue Cross.

The engagement of M.G. posts which remain in action is then carried out by single guns (or L.T.M.s) which are under the orders of the infantry in the front line, and follow as closely after them as possible and shoot over open sights at close range (1000 metres). It is advisable to always attach the same batteries to individual battalions. Under the covering fire of these guns (or T.M.s) the infantry advances in quite small groups, or bounds, for which purpose the L.T.M.s must also be detailed with them. The H.M.G.s must in general be used for holding down the objectives of the infantry attack, and follow accordingly in larger bounds. They form, further, the support in case of hostile counter attacks.

The procedure outlined was apparently only adopted in part; but where it was adopted, it was accompanied by success and small losses. I request that attention may be given to making this procedure universal. The idea of forcing success by the employment of masses must be absolutely abolished. It only leads to unnecessary losses. The effective use of weapons, and not numbers gives the decision.

(Signed) HUBENDORF.

(Annexe to Second Army Summary of 20th April, 1918).

3.

Summary of a

CAPTURED OPERATION ORDER OF THE 12TH INFANTRY DIVN.

A captured order dated 15th April, shows that the 12th Division was to make an extensive attack on the 17th instant, in conjunction with attacks all along the front of the Sixth German Army.

NOTE:- The leading waves of this attack were never able to leave their positions owing to our artillery and machine gun fire.

21/4/18.

117th Division.

11th R.I.B. - Prisoners state that casualties in the 3rd Bn. have been very heavy and that the battalion strength is now said to be below 130.

Losses have been due largely to our artillery fire when in support and reserve, but chiefly to our machine gun fire. Both the Regimental and battalion commanders have been wounded.

29th April, 1918.

19th Reserve Divn.

73rd R.I.B. A prisoner of this regiment captured on the 26th inst. near KEMMEL states that out of a company strength of 80, 40 became casualties by the morning of the 26th inst, chiefly through our machine gun fire.

ENEMY LOSSES.58th Division.

88th I.R. A prisoner captured on the night of the 25th/26th inst. near KEMMEL, states that very severe losses have been sustained. In his company there are only 35 men left out of a previous strength of 130, losses being chiefly due to machine gun fire.

13th Reserve Division.

39th R.I.B. According to a prisoner captured South East of VIERSTRAAT on the 26th inst, the losses of the 3rd Bn. from machine gun fire were so severe on the first day, especially at the opening of the attack, that during the night 25th/26th, the Battalion was re-organised into a strong company, of about 190 men. The 12th company had 18 men and a Lieutenant left out of a previous strength of 88.

Extract from Wireless Press dated 2nd May, 1918.

British Official. 1/5/18.

10.4 a.m. A local attack made by the enemy yesterday upon one of our posts in the neighbourhood of ST JULIEN was repulsed by machine gun fire. Posts held by the enemy in the ~~WESTERN~~ ~~METTEREN~~ Sector were rushed by our troops during the night and a few prisoners captured by us. By a successful minor enterprise carried out last night, French troops improved the position held by them in the neighbourhood of LOCRE.



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APPENDIX

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4.


From 21st Division Summary No. 17 of 27th April.

CASUALTIES.

All the prisoners agree that their heaviest casualties have been from M.G. fire. Several prisoners taken yesterday state that M.G. fire seemed to come from all directions, both on the morning of the 25th and 26th and the resistance by our M.G.'s has had a strong moral effect on the German Infantry.

Provisional Examination of a man of the 450th Regt.
333rd Division, captured on 1/5/18.

Asked as to the reason of the failure of their attack on the 29th April, prisoner stated that the regiment in his division could not leave their position owing to the heavy artillery fire which was poured on them; the few men that did get forward were wiped out by machine gun fire.



RATION REPORT FOR JUNE 1918.

Rations for the month were satisfactory. Fresh meat averaging 50%, Preserved meat 50%, bread 75%, Biscuits 25%, Bacon and Meat and Vegetable Ration good. Milk, Tea, Sugar, etc., full issue as under:-

Fresh Meat	1 Lb.
Preserved Meat	9ozs.
Bread or	1 lb.
Biscuits	10 lbs.
Rice	1 oz.
Bacon	4 ozs.
Cheese	2 ozs.
Fresh Vegetables	8 ozs.
Jam	3 ozs.
Tea	$\frac{1}{2}$ oz.
Sugar	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ozs.
Milk	1 oz.
Pickles (thrice weekly)	1 oz.
Tobacco & Cigarettes	2 ozs.
Matches three times per fortnight	1 box.

The Cooker was kept with Nucleus. Guns Teams in the Line did their own Cooking at Sections H.Q. Fresh meat and Vegetables were sent up each day.

Comforts were sent up on:-

June 1st.	Cocoa and Milk.
2nd	Cigarettes & Tobacco.
4th	Rolled Oats, Milk, Cocoa & Milk.
5th	Tobacco.
6th	Playing Cards, Cocoa & Milk.
10th	Writing material, pencils, reading matter.
12th	Puddings, Coffee, Sweets, etc.
14th	Coffee & Milk.
15th	" "
23rd	Cocoa & Milk, Playing Cards.
24th	Cigarettes & Tobacco, Chocolates.
25th	Cocoa & Milk.
26th	" "
27th	" " Oatmeal.
28th	" "

Curry Powder was supplied from Battalion Funds.

Green Vegetables and Potatoes were salvaged from evacuated areas helping the rations to a great extent.

The Cooking for the Company was done by:-

Pte. H. Champion.
" R. Monument.
" C. Wyatt.

J. Parker
G.M.S.

