

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/55/1 PART 2

Title: 38th Infantry Battalion

May 1917 - April 1919



AWM4-23/55/1PART2

[23/55/1,
Part 2]

38th Aust Infantry Battalion

War Diary Appendices and other documents

Copies kept by Lieut H.R. Robbins MC, Adjutant
38th Aust Inf Bn, covering period May 1917 to
April 1919.

These are mostly documents which would normally have been filed within the war diary. There is some duplication, but not a lot, of items that are filed in the official war diary. In some cases of apparent duplication, minor differences exist.

Contents : Orders for raid, Ploegsteert, 22 May 1917.
Orders for attack, Messines, 8 Jun 1917.
HQ 3 Div report to HQ 2 ANZAC Corps on
Messines attack, 8 Jun 1917.
Orders for attack, Passchendaele, 4 Oct 1917.
Orders for attack, Passchendaele, 12 Oct 1917.
Orders for raid and feint attack,
Warneton, 10 Feb 1918.
10 Aust Inf Bde report on battle of
Proyart, 8-12 Aug 1918.
10 Aust Inf Bde report on battles for Bray,
Curlu, Cléry, Roisel, 21-31 Aug 1918.

(continued)

[23/55/1,

Part 2]

(continued)

(Note that 2 versions of this report exist, and both are filed here).

Original copies of messages by Lt HR Robbins, acting CO 38th Aust Inf Bn, during battle for Cléry, 31 Aug 1918. Lt Robbins was subsequently awarded the MC for his efforts as acting CO in this battle.

10 Aust Inf Bde report on operations near Péronne, 5-10 Sep 1918.

List of war diary appendices, Oct 1918.

38th Aust Inf Bn report on attack at Bony 29 Sep - 20 Oct 1918.

Instruction for movement to Hallencourt, 5 Oct 1918.

Admin Instructions for Hallencourt, 12 Oct 1918.

Instruction for movement to Sorel and Wanel, 19 Oct 1918.

Documents concerning return of 38th Inf Bn band instruments to Australia.

RMO's report, Mar 1919.

Last RO issued in 38th Aust Inf Bn, 4 Apr 1919.

Nominal roll of decorations awarded to 38th Aust Inf Bn personnel.

Nominal rolls of 38th Bn embarkation quotas Nos 29 and 45.

Cartoon of 38th Inf Bn personalities.

Org diagram and notes on military intelligence.

Maps for military history study of Napoleonic wars.

Bullen
16 May 1988

Orders for Raid - 22/5/17.

Reference Maps. PLOEGSTEERT Scale 1/10,000. 28 S.W.

1. On Z day at zero a team from 3rd Br. composed of 700 214 OR. will carry out a raid on the enemy trenches opposite ANTONS. FARM. Z day + zero hour will be notified later.
2. The enemy trenches will be raided as follows.
on the front line from U15. a. 69.72. to U9. c. 24.13.
on the second line from U15. a. 72.89 to U9. c. 45.15.
In rear of the 2nd line the trenches leading to ULSTER AN from 2nd line up to U9. c. 96.12.
3. The enemy wire is being cut at the following places
U15. a. 69.72 - U15. a. 29.87. - U9. c. 24.13.
4. The objects of the raid are as follows
 - a. To kill & capture more of the enemy than we lose ourselves in the undertaking.
 - b. To damage his defences.
 - c. To obtain prisoners.
 - d. To capture & destroy machine & trench guns & other technical weapons.
5. The artillery program subject to approval will be:-
From zero hour to zero + 3 minutes the enemy wire & first lines will be bombarded including ULTRICA SAND
Howes will bombard the FISH POND & ULSTER AN
At zero + 3 minutes to zero + 6 minutes guns will be left from front line from the two points of entry of assaulting column to second line.
At zero + 6 min. to zero + 7 min. barrage lifts from 1st to 2nd line to box. some heavies remaining on M.G. positions west of FISH POND.
At zero + 7 min to zero + 8 min lift from M.G. Position to FISH POND
At zero + 8 all guns lift from FISH POND to box
At zero + 38 min. Infantry begin to leave enemy line
At zero + 53 - all artillery fire ceases unless asked before this to continue.
6. Machine guns will form a barrage on enemy front trenches on both sides of the artillery box barrage & also on selected positions in rear of box.
7. On Z day assaulting columns of the team will assemble at the time & point to be notified later fully equipped (except for heavy equipment) & armed. Times for marching off from assembly point to be notified later.
8. Routes from assembly point to jumping off ~~point~~ trenches will be notified later.

9. A. No. 1 Assaulting column will form up in our front line trench at or near SAP 3 at the head of TORONTO AV. & will enter NO MANS LAND by a gap in our wire near the head of SAP. 3.

B. No. 2 Assaulting column will form up in our front line trench at or near the point of the BANTON FARM salient & will enter NO MANS LAND by a gap in our wire near the point of that salient.

It is desired to immediately arrange for construction of exits thro' the wire at the points named & also at a point in our wire opposite to U15. a. 29. 89. in enemy's front line.

10. At Zero hour minus 30 mins. Assaulting Columns will leave our trenches by exits as directed & form up in NO MANS LAND as near as possible to enemy's wire in lines of double parties in fours with 10 yds interval & 15 yds distance between parties all lying down & facing the respective objectives of assaulting Columns.

11. At Zero hour assaulting ^{Columns} ~~troops~~ will advance on their objectives.

12. Assaulting Columns will enter enemy's trenches as follows.

No 1. Assaulting Column by gap in enemy's wire at U15a. 49. 72
 No 2 do do do do U9. C. 24. 13.

13. Absolute silence must be maintained by all ranks from the time of marching off from Assembly point at Zero Hour & no lights or smoking will be permitted during that period.

14. The following will be the composition of the team & assaulting column thereof & action of the parties composing such column:

O.C. Raict Captain J.F. Fairweather

No 1 Assaulting Column. O.C. Lt. C.H. PETERS.

Party	Composition	Action	Off.	OK.
No 1 party. Wire & bridging	1 off. INCO & 8 men including 4 Scouts.	To effect entrance to enemy's trenches at A & then act as parapet men.	1.	9.
No 2 party right blocking party.	INCO 8 men	To block front line S.E. of point of entry at A.		9
No 3 party Switch blocking party	INCO 6 men	To block communication trench B.C. at B.		7.
No 4 party Storming & mopping up party	INCO 10 men	To storm & mop up front line from A to ULRICH SAP		11
No 5 party Storming party.	INCO. 8 men	To storm communication trench D on right flank from A to BISHOPND & attack FISH POND from South with the assistance of No 5 & 6 parties No 2 Assaulting Column mop same up & return by trench stormed.		9.

No 6 party Lewis Gun team	1 NCO 8 men	To cover right flank of attack at or near B.	off	OR	6
No 7 Party Storming party	10 off 1 NCO 8 men	To storm support trench from D to E & then communication trench E.F. to front line			9.
No 8 party Blocking party	1 NCO 8 men	To block right of support line to D.			9.
No 9 party mopping up party.	1 NCO 8 men	To mop up support trenches from D to E & then communication trench E.F. to front line.			9.
No 10 party Lewis Gun team	1 NCO 8 men	To cover front of right assaulting column at or near D.			6.
No 11 party Covering party Lewis Gun Signallers Runners	1 NCO 8 men	To cover right flank in NO MANS LAND			6. 2. 2.
					3. 94

No 2 Assaulting Column

O.C. assault. Lt. T.H. DUNN.				1	
No 1 party wire & bridging party	10 off 1 NCO 8 men (including 4 Scouts)	To effect entrance to enemy wire at G & then act as parapet men.		1.	9.
No 2 party Blocking party	1 NCO. 8 men.	To block left of front line trench at G.			9.
No 3 party Storming & mopping up party.	1 NCO 8 men	To storm & mop up front line from G to F.			9.
No 4 party Sap party.	1 NCO. 4 men.	To clean out ULRICH SDP & then assist NO 2 party in mopping up.			5.
No 5 party Storming & blocking party.	2 NCOs & 8 men	To storm the 2 left communication trenches G.H. & J.H. to 2nd line & form block at H.			10.
No 6 party Lewis Gun team	1 NCO 8 men	To cover left flank of attack north of trench G.H.			6.
No 7 party Storming & mopping up party.	10 off 2 NCOs & 10 men	To storm communication trench I. H.L. from H to the FISH POND & then to assist NO 6 party & NO 5 party of NO 1 assaulting column to storm & mop up the FISH POND & return by trench stormed.		1.	12.
No 8 party Storming & mopping up party.	1 NCO 8 men	To storm communication trench K.L. from K to the FISH POND & then assist NO 5 party & NO 5 party of NO 1 assaulting column to storm & mop up the FISH POND & return by trench stormed.			9.
No 9 party mopping up party Lewis Gun team	2 NCOs 8 men	To mop up trench H.L. & K.L. & cover front of left in NO MANS LAND assaulting column at point N of Trench H.L.			10.
No 11 party Covering party Lewis Gun	1 NCO 8 men	To cover left flank in NO MANS LAND			6

No 10 party
Lewis Gun team
Signaller
Runners

1 NCO 5 men

20 cover front of left
assaulting column at
point N of trench H L.

6.
2.
2.

3. 95.

Total raiding team 7 off. 214 OR.

15. The leading party (wire & bridging) of each assaulting Column must devote its entire energy to the making of an entry into the enemy trenches & securing that entry by overcoming any initial opposition from the enemy from his parapet. While making such entry they should be covered by the leading storming or blocking party & ensuring Lewis Gun team of their columns.
16. During the cutting of the enemy wire, should any delay occur therein, all parties not engaged in such cutting or in covering such operations should be down talking cover till the advance is continued.
17. All parties (except blocking & covering parties) will withdraw from the enemy trenches as soon as the work which has been allotted to them has been carried out. Covering & blocking parties will remain in the trenches until all troops which they are covering have withdrawn.
18. Under the direction of the 10th A.I.B sig officer telephone lines will be run out from position of O'raid in our trenches to the positions in NO MANS LAND occupied by O.S.C.
Assaulting Columns.
19. All troops must have left the enemy trenches by Zero + 50 mins.
20. All officers & NCOs must thoroughly reconnoitre our front line trenches & NO MANS LAND opposite to objective, also routes leading from point of assembly to jumping off trenches.
21. O'raid will arrange for scouts to thoroughly patrol NO MANS LAND & enemy wire opposite to objective. He will further arrange for the laying of tape by scouts of each assaulting column across NO MANS LAND from the 3 points where enemy's wire is being cut (as in para 3 hereof) to the gaps in our wire (directed to be constructed by para 9 hereof).
22. All wounded will be evacuated by 2 overland routes reconnoitred & prepared by Engineers. All officers NCOs & stretcher bearers scouts & runners should thoroughly reconnoitre these routes.
23. All troops will as far as possible evacuate by overland routes to avoid any of the shelling of communication trenches that the enemy may carry out.
24. R.A.P. will be at ONTARIO. AV.
25. After leaving enemy trenches all troops will report at U 25. a. 15. 20 when motor lorries will be waiting to carry them to billets.
26. Watches will be synchronised on 2 day at 10 p.m.
27. O'raid will occupy dugout at U 14. b. 43. 90.
28. Evacuation from RAP to ADS at Charing Cross. will be under arrangements made by O'C 9th J.A.

Signed

A. FRASER

Capt. Adj
3803rd AIF.

25/5/17.

Raiding party of 7 off. 214 OR chosen from all
Coys. went over at 2 AM. The party was divided
into two columns of which one effected an entry
into the enemy's trench & brought back one
prisoner. Our casualties of which many
were caused by our own barrage consisted
of 2 off 26 OR killed or missing. 2 off 63 OR
wounded.

RAID
25/5/17
Barrage

22/5/18

Receiving party of 7th Div of 2nd
Corp. went out at 2 AM. The party was divided
into two columns of which one effected an entry
into the enemy's trench & brought back one
prisoner. Our casualties of which many
were caused by our own barrage consisted
of 2 of 7th killed & 1 missing. 2 of 18th
wounded.

RAID

22/5/18

Phlegsteert.

ORDER FOR ATTACK 30/3/17. Messines 7 June '17

REFERENCE : PHOTOEGSTEERT. 1/10,000 Sheet 28 SW. 4 Edit. 4b.

1. The 10th A.I.B., will attack enemy trenches on Z day at dawn, Zero hour + Z day will be notified later. The Brigade will attack simultaneously with the 9th A.I.B. on its right + the N.Z. div. on its left.

The Brigade boundaries will be

- (a) On right a line running from enemy's front line at ^{the} N in BARRICADE AVENUE, direct to the point where the MESSINES SUGAR REFINERY ROAD crosses LA DOUVE RIVER at U 10 a 5.5.7.
- (b) On left a line running direct from enemy's front line thro' the A in LA PETITE DOUVE FARM + the junction of OWL TRENCH with UNCANNY trench to OWL SUPPORT.

The dispositions of the 9th + 10th A.I.B. in the attack will be as follows (letters from right to left)

A Batt.	33 rd	Lt Col. MORSHEAD
B "	35 th	Lt Col. GODDARD
C "	39 th	" HENDERSON
D "	40 th (less two companies)	" WARD
E "	36 th	" MILNE
F "	34 th	" MARTIN
G "	38 th	" DAVIS.
H "	37 th (+ 1 1/2 Comp of 40 th)	" SMITH.

1. In the attack the 38th Batt. will be preceded by the 40th Bn. which will attack enemy's front line ULNA support + ULNA SWITCH, north of LA DOUVE RIVER.

2. After bombardment of front line + support trenches, the barrage will halt on or about the position GHJ from ZERO + 14 to ZERO + 30; the barrage will then creep forward + will next halt on a line about midway between ULNER RESERVE + UNGODLY TRENCH but bordering E of SCHNITZEL FARM from ZERO + 45 to ZERO + 113, it will then creep forward to a line about 200' to 300' EAST of BETHHEEM FARM halting there at ZERO + 125 + remaining there until ZERO 600 or thereabouts.

This line will be sufficiently far EAST of BETHHEEM FARM to permit troops to man the hedges N + E of that position.

3. The 38th Bn will attack enemy trenches on ZERO HOUR on Z day.

4. The objectives of the Bn. are: The country between the lines HT + LM, ULNA AVENUE, the ULNER reserve trenches, the UNGODLY trench + BETHHEEM FARM.

The boundaries of the Bn objectives are

- (a) on right LA DOUVE RIVER, on
(b) on left the Brigade's left boundary.

5. The attack will be made in 3 waves each consisting of two lines.

First wave

(O.C. MAJOR A.J.A. MAUDSLEY) will be formed by "D" Coy + 5+6 platoons of B Coy.

Second wave (CAPT. R.E. TREBILCOCK) will be formed by "A" Coy + 7+8 platoons of B Coy.

Third wave (O.C. CAPT. F.E. FAIRWEATHER) will be formed by "C" Coy.

The first wave will follow 50' in rear of 40th Bn; there will be a distance of 15' between the 1st + 2nd lines of each wave + a distance of about 100' between each wave.

The first wave will be followed at a distance of 30' by two clearing up parties each of 2 N.C.O.s + 25 men to be detailed by O.C. 2nd wave. These parties to clean up LA DOUVE RIVER + ULNA AVENUE as far as ULCER RESERVE.

These two parties will advance with their waves on barrage creeping forward at ZERO + 113. The wave will be followed at a distance of 30' by a clearing up party of 1 N.C.O. + 10 men to be detailed by O.C. 3rd wave. This party will clean up UNGODLY AVENUE from UNGODLY TR. to point where UNGODLY AV. crosses hedge 125' E of MESSINES SUGAR REFINERY RD, returning to their wave on completion of this work.

The 3rd wave will be preceded by moppers up of a strength equal to 40% of 3rd wave. They will follow the 2nd wave at a distance of 30 paces + will mop up the UNGODLY system of trenches + communication trenches between that + ULCER RESERVE system.

6. Each platoon of the 1st wave will be preceded by a party of 1 N.C.O. + 5 men who will form a passage over LA DOUVE RIVER for the platoons to which they are attached; these parties will each carry a bridge. The 40th Bn. will have bridged LA DOUVE RIVER at several points. These parties will not only secure these bridges but see that new bridges are laid if necessary; they will lead their leading platoons to the bridges prepared for them + stand by until their wave has passed over. When they will rejoin their platoons. All members of bridging parties should thoroughly reconnoitre the ground over which their platoons will go, + the positions on the river where the bridges will be laid.

7. The objectives of the 3 waves will be as follows:-

1st wave The ULCER RESERVE + SCHNITZEL FARM system of trenches

2nd wave The BETHHEM FARM + UNGODLY AV. + defences in rear of halted barrage.

3rd wave The UNGODLY TR. system from Brigade left boundary to LA DOUVE RIVER.

8. As soon as the Bn. has crossed LA DOUVE RIVER waves will form up in rear of the Artillery barrage at the line G.H.I. ready to move behind the creeping barrage at ZERO + 30. Four platoons of the 1st wave will move on to their objective on S side of ULNA AV. with the right flank of their wave resting in LA DOUVE RIVER, the other two platoons of the wave being on N. side of ULNA AV.

The first wave will be assisted on its capture of the ULCER RESERVE system of trenches by a platoon of the 39th Bn. operating from the South.

The tasks of storming LA DOUVE RIVER + ULNA AV. will be allotted by the OC. 1st. wave to definite platoons in his wave.

The 2nd wave will move on similar formation as 1st wave as far as the ULCER RESERVE system of trenches; on passing this system the two platoons on right of 2nd wave will be directed to storm LA DOUVE RIVER, UNGODLY AV. + trenches S. + S.E. of the triangular field E of MESSINES SUGAR REFINERY RD at U 3 a. as far as our hilled barrage; the remaining 4 platoons of the wave will move on to BETHHEEM. FARM. + adjoining trenches making the said triangular field the right flank + the HUTS the left flank of their objective.

The task of cleaning up LA DOUVE RIVER + ULNA AV. as far as ULCER reserve will be undertaken by the 2nd wave (para. 5).

The 3rd wave will move on to its objective as far as the ULCER RESERVE system of trenches having 3 platoons on the right + one platoon on left of ULNA AV. From ULCER RESERVE the 3rd wave will move directly on to its objective; to this wave is allotted the task of cleaning up LA DOUVE RIVER from the ULCER RESERVE SYSTEM to UNGODLY TR. as well as cleaning up UNGODLY AV. (para 5).

During the whole advance constant touch must be kept with the 39th Pm. on the right + N.Z. Brigade on left

9. All officers + NCOs ~~to~~ must see that the proper direction in the attack is maintained + that constant touch is kept throughout. Officers should take compass bearings on to the objectives of their waves + platoons + immediately check any deviation from the proper line of advance.

10. During the halt in barrage from ZERO + 45 to ZERO + 113, 2nd + 3rd waves will take up position in such cover as may be available in rear of ULCER RESERVE, avoiding as far as possible enemy communication trench + ~~wire~~ mines. During this halt direction of advance must be checked + reconnoitred.

The 2nd + 3rd lines must move up to rear of our barrage in time to move closely behind when it moves forward at ZERO + 113.

11. The OC. 1st. wave may, ~~if necessary~~, call on the 2nd + 3rd waves for reinforcements if necessary for the capture of the objective of his wave.

12. The Pm. will move from point of assembly to the jumping off trenches by the brown route (as per plan); the movement will be by platoons in file, with 30' distance between platoons. Platoons will march in the order in which they file into the jumping off trenches.

13. The jumping off trenches of the Pm. will be the front line + 1st + 2nd support trenches from SEAFORTH FARM to BASH TR. The centre of each wave resting on MESSINES ROAD. Waves will feed into these trenches in the following order:
1st wave into front line trench in order of platoons as follows, NO. 13, 14, 15, 16, 5, 6.

2nd wave into first support trench in order of platoons as follows:-
No. 12, 3, 4, 7, 8.

3rd wave into 2nd support trench in order of platoons as follows:-
M.G. section, 2nd L.T.M.B., platoons 9, 10, 11, 12.

Waves will leave our trenches by platoons thro' 3 gaps cut in our wire, left platoons moving to a flank & following thro' such gaps as soon as right platoons have cleared same.

14. A proportion of Engineers & Pioneers will accompany each wave during the attack.

15. Two L.T.Ms. will accompany the Pns in the attack. One of these guns will be allotted to the 2nd wave & one to the 3rd wave.
O.C. 2nd wave will use the L.T.M. in the capture & consolidation of

BETHHEEM FARM.

O.C. 3rd wave will use the L.T.M. in the capture & consolidation of

UNGODLY TR.

L.T.M.s will follow 30' in rear of 3rd wave.

16. 1 M.G. section will accompany the Pns in the attack. 1 gun & team will be allotted to 1st wave, 1 gun & team to 2nd wave. These guns will be used in consolidating the captured objectives & filling gaps that may occur during the advance. They will follow the advance at a distance of 100' in rear of 3rd wave.

17. On the capture by the 2nd wave of the 3rd objective the O.C. second wave will detail 1 platoon with 6 H.Gs. teams to form a post at or near the triangular field S.E. of BETHHEEM FARM (para viii). This post will provide groups to man the ditches & shell holes in front of the line L-M, & to cover the consolidation of such line. The outpost line will as far as possible consolidate its position; it must offer a determined resistance to any counter attack by the enemy, but the main line of consolidation will be the line of resistance.

18. O.C. 3rd wave will detail two blocking parties of 1 N.C.O., 8 men & a H.G. each, to form blocks in

(a) UNGODLY AV. at ~~the~~ near the point where it crosses the hedge 120' E of MESSINES SUGAR REFINERY RD

(b) at or near the point where LA DOUVE RIVER is crossed by the MESSINES SUGAR REFINERY RD.

Such blocks to be formed on the mounding forward of the barrage at 2 ERD + 125.

These blocking parties will be under the control of the O.C.

19. On the 3rd objective being captured all available men will at once be engaged in consolidating the position down on or about the line L-M; complete touch being kept with the Bratts. on the flanks.

For the purpose of this consolidation the O.C. 1st wave will detail 4 platoons & the O.C. 3rd wave 2 platoons, to move forward to the line decided to be consolidated to assist in such consolidation.

20 The O.C. 1st wave will immediately on the capture of his objective construct a strong point N. of near SCHNITZEL FARM, linking such strong point up with ULCER RESERVE + UNGODLY TR.

The O.C. 3rd wave will immediately on the capture of his objective construct a strong point E. of UNGODLY TR. in the angle formed by that trench with UNGODLY AV. linking up with UNGODLY TR. UNGODLY AV. + ULCER RES.

The O.C. 2nd wave will immediately on the capture of his objective construct a strong point N. of near BETHHEEM FARM linking up with that farm, the front line consolidation + UNGODLY TR. He will also arrange for the construction of a communication trench from front line consolidation at or near the triangular field to the strong point to be constructed by O.C. 3rd wave.

21 Commanders of waves + units must carefully watch the progress of their own + other units in the attack + must at all times give cooperation + carry out the system of mutual support.

22 The O.C. 2nd wave will as soon as barrage permits send out scouts to the front of sentry groups to reconnoitre the ground there + keep him constantly informed as to the enemy's movements.

23 All ranks must be impressed with the necessity of sending back constant + correct information as to the situation, whether such information be negative or otherwise. To this end situation reports will be sent by O.C. waves to Bn H.Q.

At ZERO + 10 mins + every 10 mins from then onwards, until the capture of the 3rd objective, when reports will be sent at 15 min. intervals giving the general situation of other waves as far as within their knowledge in addition to their own position.

24 Methods of sending messages will if sent be usual signalled be confirmed in writing; runners will carry messages in right hand top pocket.

25 O.C.s ^{waves} ~~companies~~ will nominate officers of his command eligible to carry on should the O.C. become a casualty, + will acquaint such nominee with all orders ~~with~~ regarding the operation.

26 No account must any troops fire on hostile planes as such action would disclose to enemy their presence + position.

27 During the advance H.Q. teams should be directed to engage enemy machine gun + rifle fire brought to bear on our troops.

28 Brigade dumps will be at U 14 B 40.54, + U 8 d 15.10.
Bn dump will be SCHNITZEL FARM + ULCER SWITCH.

29. OC 1st & 2nd waves will each detail 1 NCO & 20 men to act as carrying parties from Bw Dumps to Bw forward dumps. These parties will be supplied with 7UCOM packs & must be trained in their use. 2nd party detailed from the 1st wave will carry to the dump at SCHITZEL. FM & 2nd detailed from the 2nd wave to the ULCER SWITCH dump. They will start carrying as soon as the UNGODLY TR. System has been captured. OC 3rd wave will detail 50 men each to carry 4 Stokes mortar bombs forward with their attacking waves. These bombs will be carried in two sandbags tied together & slung over the shoulder. They will be divided into two parties 25 men carrying for each LTM. They will carry these bombs forward to the wave object where they will dump the Stokes mortar ammunition carried by them in some convenient & sheltered position near the L.T.M. On the capture of the 2nd wave of its objective the OC 2nd wave will immediately arrange for the LTM ammunition to be dumped for the LTM attached to him to be carried forward to the position that such guns may be directed to occupy all carrying parties must be properly organized & trained so as to ensure that the necessary stores are speedily delivered at the front line. OC 2nd wave will detail two parties each of 1 NCO & 10 men to carry forward stores ammunition etc with their wave to its objective.

30. Signalling

31. On objectives being captured a Bw advanced Report Centre will be established near SCHITZEL. FM. all reports to be forwarded to this centre as soon as location has been notified

32. All ranks taking part in the attack are forbidden to carry letters, maps, orders, sketches or other documents which would be likely to give information to the enemy.

33. Provided however that all officers shall carry the following maps: $\frac{1}{8000}$ showing enemy line
 $\frac{1}{10000}$
 $\frac{1}{20000}$
 Sumpoint $\frac{1}{10000}$ or $\frac{1}{20000}$ showing approach routes
 Officers & NCO's will also carry in their message books sketches drawn roughly to scale of the enemy's trenches for use in sending back reports during operation.

34. If weather conditions permit ~~from defensive~~ gas & smoke will be released from defensive front to the Sth of our assaulting troops.

35. The following distinguishing badges will be worn.
 Scouts — Green band
 Runners — Red
 Sketch bearers — White band with S.B. in red.
 Carrying parties — Yellow band.
 Mopping up parties — White band.
 Salvage parties — Khaki band with SALVAGE in red.

Men equipped with wire cutters will wear a piece of white haps tied to the right shoulder strap.

Destination patches to be worn by all ranks as follows
 1st wave — Pink patch
 2nd — } yellow patch
 3rd — }

35. It is strictly forbidden that any water be drunk from the water bottle carried by assaulting ~~troops~~ during the approach march or prior to jumping off. Water in the bottles carried should be made to last for 48 hours.
36. All prisoners taken will be sent back under guard at once & handed over to escort which will be provided. Returnees carrying parties & slightly wounded men are to be detailed as such escorts. Prisoners should be given no opportunity of destroying documents in their possession. In case of officer prisoners all papers & correspondence will be taken & sent back with prisoner. Prisoners will be allowed to retain personal effects. Documents taken from dugouts will be labelled giving approx. location & sent back. Identity discs will never be taken from the living. Officer prisoners will be kept apart from the rank & file. Escorts should take receipts for number of prisoners & documents handed over.
37. It is forbidden for anyone to remove sights or any parts of captured guns. These guns are required for use against the enemy.
38. As it will be necessary to use enemy dugouts which have been captured these dugouts must be cleared in such a way as not to destroy them or render them unfit for occupation. Only Mills grenades & Stokes shells will be used for clearing purposes.
39. Dress equipment arms ammunition tools water & rations to be worn & carried by personnel are laid down in appendix A. Hereto.
40. Bns Q.M & Q.M.S, the Transport Office & Lt & 2 other ranks of the Transport Service will personally reconnoitre the route to Brigade dumps by which supplies will be sent forward to such dumps.
41. O.C. Coy will at once have reconnoitred overland routes across NO MAN'S LAND & will as soon as possible after the capture of their objectives have reconnoitred overland routes from the most forward objective to our present lines & to Bn. HQ & Dumps for use of carrying parties, runners, casualties, reserves etc. These routes will as soon as possible be marked with white tape.
42. All officers & NCOs will personally reconnoitre the assembly trenches of their units & gaps in our wire thro which their units will pass.
43. Absolute silence must be maintained by all ranks from the time of marching off from point of assembly till ZERO HOUR. No smoking or lights are permitted during that period.
44. Artillery flags (Black & yellow) are to be carried one in each platoon of assaulting waves. These flags will be waved so as to indicate to artillery the line of advance of units.
45. The use of flares & rockets for the purpose of signalling the positions reached by our most advanced troops & communicating with aeroplanes, artillery etc must be explained to all ranks.

46. The hour or hours on which watches will be synchronized on Z day will be notified later.

47. The time & place of assembly & the time of marching off from place of assembly on Z day will be notified later.

48. R.A.P.s will be situated as follows:-
1. Rifle House U 30. d. 9. 8.
 2. Head Horse Corner. U 21. a. 2. 8.
 3. Prowse Point U. 14. d. 85. 70.
 4. Amerscraft. W. U. 14. d. 20. 95.
 5. The Only Way. U. 14. a. 65. 85.

The R.M.O. will make all necessary arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded to R.A.P.s.

49. O.C. waves will detail 4 men from each wave to act as salvage men. Arms, ammunition, equipment etc of casualties will be collected & carried to Pon dumps. O.C. Coy will study carefully the plans for the assembly of their waves for attack & will collaborate in their formation of such plans. The will keep in constant liaison with units on their flanks front & rear. The will ensure that all under their command are made thoroughly conversant with the plan of attack.

51. Reports to be sent to V. S. C. by 55. near our front line west of MESSINES ROAD. until Pon HA has moved forward after assault when position of advance to will be notified to all concerned.

52. Attention is directed to French Standing Order 3rd Aust. Div. ~~55135~~ - which will be read in conjunction with the order.

Signed A. FRASER Capt & Adj
38 Pon A.I.F.

[Faint signature]

MESSINES

MESSINES.

June
1917

38th Div
Major D. E. BATES

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten text, likely a diary or report, covering the remainder of the page.]

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Hd Qrs. 26th June, 1917.

Herewith copy of narrative forwarded to 2nd Anzac Corps with regard to recent offensive operations.

"I beg to forward hereunder report on the recent offensive operations in connection with the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge in which the Division was engaged.-

OBJECTIVE.- The objective allocated to this Division was the capture in two stages of a triangular piece of country in enemy possession, bounded by a line commencing opposite Westminster Avenue and running generally Northwards, passing east of the Gray Farm system to the Douve, and, thence North-easterly to the intersection of Hun's Walk and Owl support trench system. The respective stages of the advance were marked by what was known as the Black and the Green Lines. These lines merged into one line south of the Douve but north of this river the Green Line bore away to the East. The total depth of the advance necessary to capture these objectives was, on the right of the Divisional Sector 250 yards and on the left of the Divisional Sector 2,300 yards. The frontage of the attack of the Division was roundly 2,000 yards.

PREPARATORY MEASURES.- Although the Divisional Artillery, considerably reinforced by Army Brigades, was placed under the general command of the G.O.C., R.A., yet the detailed direction of the Divisional Artillery as to targets to be engaged, and as to nature of the barrage within the Divisional Zone of operations, remained in the hands of the Division, as also the nomination of targets for the destructive bombardment by Heavy Artillery. - Wire cutting by Medium and Heavy Trench Mortars and by Divisional Howitzers with instantaneous fuses was also carried out under close divisional supervision.

Ten days prior to Zero day the two assaulting Brigades were put into the line on the Offensive Front of the Division in order to prepare their own Assembly Trenches and to clear and improve the avenues and lines of approach, and the tracks both overland and underground, leading back to the billets to be occupied prior to the approach march. Dumps for ammunition, water, rations, bombs, flares, &c. were formed by Brigades and Battalion Commanders. Two large divisional dumps of Engineering material were also formed. Advanced dressing stations and forward regimental aid posts were constructed.

PLAN OF BATTLE.- The plan adopted was to attack with two Brigades of Infantry in line and one Brigade in reserve; the attack following immediately upon the firing of four mines, with which the opening of the Divisional Artillery and Heavy Artillery barrages synchronized. The advance to the Black Line was designed as a continuous operation

with two short pauses to permit of rear waves leap frogging through forward waves and creeping close to our advancing barrage. There was a pause of about 10 hours on the Black Line, whereupon, the advance to the Green Line, north of the Douve, was to be carried out by an additional Battalion which had not taken part in the original advance and had not moved from its assembly trenches until some 7 hours after Zero.

DISPOSITIONS.- The disposition of the combatant troops of the Division was as follows; viz:-

9th Australian Infantry Bde on the right with a frontage of 1000 yards attacking with three Battalions (33rd; 34th; & 35th) with the Battalion (36th) in Bde Reserve, and to join carrying parties. 10th Australian Infantry Bde on the left with a frontage of 1,000 yards, attacking with three Battalions (38th; 39th & 40th) with the 37th Battalion held back for 6 hours in order to carry out the second stage of the attack.

The 11th Australian Infantry Bde was in Divisional Reserve but one of its Battalions (the 44th) had been trained and prepared to duplicate the task of the 37th Battalion, in case the latter should meet with unexpected difficulties. The Reserve Brigade was disposed with one Battalion in the Catacombs (44th) two Battalions in the subsidiary line (42nd & 43rd) and one Battalion (41st) which had held the defensive front during the later stages of the preliminary bombardment, and which was withdrawn one hour before Zero, at Touquet Berthe.

The internal Brigade dispositions involved that in each Brigade the right half of the Brigade front of attack was dealt with by a single Battalion in depth, but the left half of the Brigade front of attack was dealt with by two Battalions in depth. In the case of the 9th Bde the 34th Battalion leapfrogging through the 40th Battn. In order to deal with the serious metical obstable formed by the river Douve where it crosses "No Man's Land" five platoons of the 40th Battalion were launched to the attack from the offensive Front of the New Zealand Division, i.e. North of the Douve, the remainder of the Battalion attacking from the south straight across the river,

TECHNICAL TROOPS. were disposed as follows:-

With each assaulting Brigade one Field Coy and one Company of the Pioneer Battalion. -

In reserve one Field Coy and two Companies of the Pioneer Battalion. An additional Company of the Pioneer Battalion had been organized out of surplus personnel to carry out road construction and repair.

All technical troops remained under the command of the C.R.E. and with the exception of a few sappers allocated at the rate of two per Infantry Coy, none of them took part in the first advance.

NARRATIVE:- The approach march of the assaulting Brigades commenced from back billets from 10 p.m. onwards on "Y" night, four separate routes being used. Very serious difficulties were encountered during

the approach march by the fact that the enemy put up a concentrated gas shell barrage between Hyde Park corner and Maison 1875, through which the whole of the assaulting Infantry had to pass. There were many casualties owing to the element of surprise, and the assaulting troops reached the assembly trenches generally from 15 to 30 minutes after the time allotted, with a certain amount of disorganization, and, it is estimated with about 1,000 men short. In spite of these disturbing factors, the assaulting waves were rapidly reorganized in the assembly trenches without attracting attention.

Precisely at Zero the four deep mines were fired by the No.3 Canadian Tunnelling Company and simultaneously the Divisional Advancing and Standing Barrages and the Heavy Artillery Barrage and counter-battery fire came down. All the assaulting Infantry were clear of our old front line trenches so rapidly that no trouble was experienced from the enemy barrage which came down in places on our old lines within from 3 to 5 minutes after Zero. The whole advance of the Infantry up to the Black Line proceeded exactly to time-table, although opposition was met with in the enemy front and support lines at Grey Farm, at Schnitzel Farm and at Beltheem Farm. The opposition came chiefly from the enemy machine guns, but every objective was taken with a rush and without loss of time. The leading wave of the 33rd Battalion was actually digging in on the Black Line within 15 minutes after Zero. The 38th Battalion had established strong points defended by Lewis and Vickers Machine Guns, at both Schnitzel and Beltheem Farms within four hours after Zero. The "mopping up" was particularly well done and there was no trouble of any kind resulting from trenches or dugouts having been left unsearched. A considerable amount of killing was done in both enemy front and support lines, both with the bayonet and by bombs in the dugouts.

About 6 hours after Zero the 37th Battalion moved forward from its place of assembly to the Black Line and lay deployed waiting for "New Zero". At "New Zero" this Battalion advanced towards the Green Line, and it was for some hours believed that it had fully made good its objective. Contact Aeroplane reports shewed that the Battalion was digging in some 150 yards short of its proper objective, and this was found to be subsequently due to the obliteration of the old trenches having made the identification on the ground of the Green Line very difficult. About 2 hours after "New Zero" it was reported that the 37th Battalion had yielded ground in sympathy, it was alleged, with the retrograde movement of troops on their left, but there is no evidence that this was due to any pressure from the enemy, and it appears to have been due to shelling which the forward troops imagined came from our own artillery. In order to clear up the situation and make certain beyond doubt that the capture of the whole territory up to the original Green Line should be effected the 44th Battalion was placed under orders of the 10th Australian Infantry Brigade and moved up during the darkness to the Black Line. The Battalion advanced at daybreak on June 8th, and carried all ground up to the Green Line and commenced consolidation thereon.

On the afternoon of the 8th instant the 9th Australian Infantry Brigade pushed out daylight patrols and established posts on the line Thatched Cottage to the bridge over river Douve where Green Line crosses the latter. On the evening of the 9th inst. the 9th Australian Infantry Brigade (33rd and 36th Battalions) with the assistance of an advancing Artillery Barrage captured the whole of the La Potterie System of trenches south of the River Douve and established posts on the eastern side of same extending as far south as Fuze Cottage. The 10th Aust. Infantry Bde. having been considerably weakened owing to losses during the advance and from subsequent shell fire, was withdrawn in the early morning of the 9th instant, and the 11th Australian Infantry Brigade took over the captured territory north of the Douve. On the evening of the 9th inst, the 11th Aust. Infantry Brigade co-operated with the 9th Aust. Infantry Bde. in the attack on La Potterie by the capture of the whole of undulating Trench and the establishment of a line of posts on the eastern side of same. The Division was withdrawn from the line on night June 12/13th, by which date both the Black and the Green Line consolidation had been considerably advanced and the whole of these lines was defensible.

On Zero day our line from St. Yves to the River Lys had been held by two battalions of the 57th Division. These were relieved on night June 10/11th by the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade. On June 12th this latter Brigade pushed out daylight patrols towards the enemy's front and support lines and found same practically unoccupied. During the nights of the same day the 4th New Zealand Infantry Bde established posts in the enemy's lines and substantially effected the complete capture of this portion of the enemy's defensive system. This Brigade remained in the line when the 3rd Australian Division was relieved by the New Zealand Division.

BOOTY. - The total enumerated captures of the Division during the operation were as follows:-

Prisoners - 4 Officers, 316 other Ranks.
Field Guns - 11, of which 8 were brought in before the Division was relieved and the remainder were left in the Field.

Machine Guns - 27
Trench Mortars - 10
Small Guns 2 - Nature unknown.

It is certain, however, that a considerable number of Machine Guns, Trench Mortars and weapons of this nature were destroyed during the bombardment, or remain buried in the debris.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.-

(5)

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.- No hitch whatever occurred in regard to supply either of munitions or of water and rations. The majority of the men in the forward lines received hot food on the night of Zero day. The success of these supplies rested entirely upon the previous organization of Pack Transport on an extensive scale. The evacuation of the wounded was carried out most expeditiously, and there was no congestion either at the aid posts or at the ambulances. Recommendations for distinctions:- I have already submitted my recommendations for immediate rewards in connection with the above operations.

(Sgd.) J. Monash. Major General,
Commanding Third Australian Division.

Map reference. Belgium & France Sheet 28 1/40 000
 Ravenstaple Edition 1. 1/10000
 Smaprint issued with P.I.B.V. 1104. 1/5000

1. Position explained & map studied & all information given as per 10th A.I.B. instructions.
2. The Bn will attack with two companies "D" & "C" assaulting. One Coy. mopping up & one Bn reserve & will attack & capture all country between points B.C. & S on maps & will dig in & hold the positions shown by the line C.S beyond which the barrage will rest for 60 mins. (see barrage map issued) All territory so attacked & captured will be mopped up by this Bn.
3. a. The Bn (with one subsection 10th A.I.T.M.B.) will attack the line C.S in two waves of two lines each.
 The first wave will be composed of two platoons from both "C" & "D" Coys.
 "D" Coy (Capt. W.H. ORCHARD) less two sections will attack from the right boundary on a frontage of about 500^x & will capture all country up to line C.S on that frontage & dig in.
 "C" Coy (Capt. H.F. SELLECK) less two sections will attack simultaneously on a frontage from the left flank of "D" Coy. to the left flank boundary B & will capture all country up to the line C.S on that frontage & dig in on line C.S. Digging in on line C.S on that frontage will be covered by line of outposts about 100^x in front.
- b. "B" Coy (Capt. F.F. MOORE) less 4 L.G. sections will mop up the whole front & will follow first wave at a distance of 30^x in lines of sections in file. All captured territory will be thoroughly searched & cleaned up & all maps & documents etc. sent to B.H.Q. as soon as possible.
- c. The second wave (to reinforce the 1st) will comprise the remaining two platoons each of "C" & "D" Coys. & will follow the mappers up at 70^x distance & will be in two lines at a distance of 30^x between lines - sections in artillery formation.
- d. Behind the 2nd wave will be one sub section of the 10th A.I.T.M.B. - 1 gun in rear of "C" Coy & one in rear of "D" Coy



These will report to O³C Coy at 8pm this evening. This sub section will be reinforced by another sub section which will join it when passing thro the 39th Bn. These guns will be at the disposal of O³C of these Coys. When the 39th Bn passes the 38th Bn all guns will move forward with the 39th Bn

e The L^g sections from B Coy will be allotted 1 each to C + D Coys & 2 to A Coy & will report 9 hours before ^(ZERO) f. A Coy. (Capt H. DENCH) plus two L^g. sections as above and less 4 sections (carriers) will act as Bn reserve & support attacking wave & will move 100' in rear of 2nd wave in lines of platoons in artillery formation.

h. a The following will act as carrying parties & will report to Lt H. McCOLL 9 hours before Zero.

- 1 Sgt 14 OR from D Coy
- 1 - 14 - C -
- 2 - 32 - A - = 4 - 60.

b Coy will also detail 10 stretcher bearers each who will report to RMO 9 hours before Zero.

5. The 38th Bn will reach the track where it crosses POTIGZE - ZILLEBEKE road at 1.4. c. 70.50. at 7 hours before Zero (which will be communicated later) & will march in the order in which it will be required at the place of assembly (leaving bivouac 7.40 hours before Zero) Gas masks at alert. Platoons or parties in single file with distances of 10^x

6. At Zero hour the Bn & T.M. sections will leave the assembly positions & pass as quickly as possible over NO MANS LAND in formation as above but not at the stated distance until in enemy territory.

7. Bn dump will be established at a point in 38th Bn territory to be selected & notified later.

8. B Coy will detail parties to collect salvage & take same to the dump.

9. The R.A.P. will be established at point D. 70. c. 6.6.

10. All prisoners will be sent to the rear under escort & dealt with according to Brijude instructions.



11. The Bn Sig Officer will establish communications between BnHQ & the attacking Coy. Close touch must be kept throughout the Bn & with Bn on the flanks.
12. Fighting order arms & equipment as per Appendix A
13. BnHQ will be at Mitchell farm D26. a. 25. 95. 300^x west of BREMEN redoubt. Forward position will be notified later probably JUDAH HOUSE.
14. Morning & evening situation reports to BnHQ by 3am & 3pm daily

Signed

G. HURRY

major
of C.O. 38 Bn A.I.F.

14th October 1917

Passchendaele



This is the first order issued was cancelled & considered not published. It should not be published if offensive objectives have already been outlined to all officers and are shown on maps issued to them. They are as follows:-

R.W.I.

Battalion Order 46.

9/10/17.

Reference 1/10,000 Paschendale Edition 1A.

1/20,000. Belgium Edition 87 Sheet 28KE.

1. a. The 10th A.I.B. will attack on A day
b. Objectives have already been outlined to all officers and are shown on maps issued to them.

They are as follows:-

Line A.C.E.G. boundary between 10th A.I.B. and N.Z. Div.

Line B.D.F.H. boundary between 10th A.I.B. & 9th A.I.B.

Line A.B. Brigade jumping off line.

Line C.D. Red Line (limit of first objective)

Line E.F. Blue line — second —

Line G.H. Green line — final —

The 40th Bn will mop up & capture all enemy territory from AB to CD.

The 38th Bn will (plus one Coy. of the 39th Bn) pass thro the 40th Bn and capture & mop up all enemy territory between from CD to EF.

The 37th Bn will pass thro the 38th Bn & capture & mop up all enemy territory from EF to GH.

C. The barrage will advance throughout by lifts of 100x every 8 min. except as follows.

It will probably rest 4 min on front of jumping off line & 4 min. at first 100x leap.

It will halt 200x beyond the red line (CD) till Zero plus 2 hours 20 min. and 200x beyond the Blue line till Zero plus 5 hours 20 min. & will come to rest on the 505 line 200x beyond the line GH. These times are not definitely fixed & a barrage map will be issued later.

2. The 38th Bn plus D Coy 39th Bn will attack capture & mop up the area from the Red Line (CD) to the Blue line (EF) on A day at Zero hour both of which will be notified later.

The 35th Bn (9th A.I.B.) will attack on the right and the 2nd NZ Bde. on the left of the Bn. A Coy of the 9th Bde will move in rear of the left flank of the Bn.



To assist in the capture of Paschendale & a Coy. of a NZ. Bn will be detailed also to assist this Bn on left flank.

3. "A" Coy. (Capt R.E. TREBILCOCK) will attack on the right on a frontage of about 350 yds. extending from the point B. Nth West along the line AB & will be responsible for the capture of the southern half of the Bn objective.

"B" Coy (Capt. E.W. LATCHFORD) will attack on our left on a frontage of about 350' extending from the left flank of A Coy to the point A on the line AB and will be responsible for the capture of the northern half of the Bn objective.

"C" Coy (Lt P.C. HERRING) will be responsible for the mopping up of the area captured by A Coy.

"D" Coy. (Lt W. MAXWELL) will be responsible for the mopping up of the area captured by B Coy.

4. A+B Coys will attack in two waves of two platoons each at about 100' distance from each other. Platoons in the first wave to be in extended order in two lines & platoons in the second wave to be extended in two lines of sections in artillery formation with 30' distance between the lines of waves.

C + D Coys will follow their assaulting coys - two platoons each of C + D coys following about 30' in rear of first waves of A + B coys respectively; in two lines of sections of moppers up in artillery formation & the remaining two platoons of each Coy following about 30' in rear of the second waves of A + B Coys respectively in similar formation.

Distances between sections of moppers up to be about 200'

D Coy 39th Bn (Capt H. SOUTHBY) will act as a Bn reserve & will follow in rear of the 38th Bn at a distance of 100'.

The distances laid down in this order will be assumed as soon as the enemy's front line has been passed.

5. On reaching the BLUE LINE Coys will immediately dig in & consolidate that position during the halt of the barrage in front of that line. On the barrage lifting & on the 39th Bn passing then to attack the final objective the 38th Bn will move forward another 200' & dig in & consolidate a line which will be held

Care must be taken that this line is linked up with the units on both flanks.

6. As soon as D Coy 39th Br reaches a line about 300⁺ in front of the RED LINE it will halt taking all available cover & will send forward files to keep in touch with the attacking troops on both flanks & centre so that should it assist once be required it can at once proceed to give same. When the position is captured & the barrage moves forward ~~to the front~~ to the final objective D Coy 39th Br will move forward to the BLUE LINE (EF) & complete the consolidation of that line.
7. Three LTM mortars of the 10th LTM B will accompany the 2nd wave of A Coy & three will accompany the 2nd wave of B Coy. These mortars will be at the disposal of the OC Coys to assist in the capture of the Br objectives. After the capture of such objectives these mortars will be at the disposal of the OC 37th Br.
8. Two Vickers guns & teams of the 10th MG Coy will accompany the second wave of A Coy & two the second wave of B Coy. These guns will be at the disposal of the OC Coys for the capture of the & consolidation of the Br objective.
9. A Br dump will be formed at or near CREST FM. A further Br dump will be formed near D6 Cent. A Coys will obtain supplies from the CREST FM. dump & D Coys will obtain supplies from the dump at D6 Cent.
10. A Coys will be responsible for consolidation of the southern half of the advanced line 200⁺ in front of the BLUE LINE. B & D Coys will be responsible for the consolidation of the northern half of such line.
11. OBC B & B Coys will immediately on the capture of their objective take back routes to the RED LINE. These routes should if possible be made around the flanks of PASSCHENDRAE & not pass thro the village. All traffic thro the village should be avoided as it is likely to be subjected to heavy shelling.
12. Immediately on the capture of the objective outposts should be thrown out to the front as near the barrage as possible. Particular attention to be paid to the flanks.



13. Immediately on the capture of the Bn objectives OC Coy will detail carrying parties to bring forward supplies
14. It is pointed out that the capture of the ~~Bn objective~~ ^{operation} ~~objective~~ will consist mainly of the capture of the village of PASSCHENDALE. Should the village be strongly held by the enemy the operation may take the form of village fighting. This will necessitate able & decisive leadership. It must be borne in mind that by keeping close to our barrage & rapidly advancing as soon as it lifts the enemy will not have time to occupy prepared positions in ^{the} houses
15. OC Coy will detail two parties of 1 NCO & 2 men each to meet & form liaison with two parties from the NZ Bn on our left at - Cross roads D.b. a. 82.35. ^{to}
Dune road junction at D.b. 6. Cent.
16. The Sig officer will arrange for sig communication to be carried out between Coys & Bn HQ.
17. OC Coy will see that complete touch is kept with the Units on their flanks front & rear.
18. The approach march orders will be issued later.
19. Forward troops will be ready at all times to communicate by flares with aeroplanes or same calling by series of A's on the Maxton horn or firing a white light. Flares will be lit only when the troops are the most advanced in the line & command ers on the spot will decide what proportion of flares will be lit on each occasion.
20. 10th Bde HQ will be in the vicinity of HAMBURG at 01.6.63
21. Bn HQ & advanced Bn HQ will be notified later ^(concerned)
22. Fighting Order. Arms & equipment as per Appendix 'A'
23. Morning & evening situation reports to Bn HQ at 3 am & 3 pm ^{daily}
24. Acknowledge

Signed.

A. FRASER

Capt + Adj. - 38 Bn A.I.F.

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Researcher's
12th Oct
1957



Raid Order No. 1. 28 Jan 18. 1918

Reference maps. Sheet 28. $\frac{1}{40,000}$
Bas Warneton Sheet 28 $\frac{1}{10,000}$
Warneton - $\frac{1}{10,000}$ Ed 2 B.
French plan 10th A.I.B. $\frac{1}{5,000}$.

1. On 2 day at Zero hour the 10th A.I.B. special party will raid enemy trenches between the following points
U. 18. a. 28.55. - U. 18. a. 70.85
U. 17. c. 50.25. - U. 17. c. 10.15.
2. The objects of the raid are ~~to~~:-
 1. To kill & capture as many of the enemy as possible.
 2. To damage & destroy his defensive system.
 3. To capture & destroy material.
 4. To obtain identification of enemy troops.
 5. To capture documents.
 6. To lower the enemy's morale.
 7. To raise our own morale.
3. Artillery program & scheme of wire cutting to be notified ^(later)
Machine guns will assist with a barrage along a line from U. 17. d. 45.15. to U. 17. c. 95.75.
LT Mortars will cooperate by firing on SPINNING MILL U. 18. c. 95.85. & WICART. FM. U. 18. c. 23.10. using some smoke to make screen along active part of enemy front line between above positions.
4. A diversion in the form of a Chinese attack has been arranged to take place opposite the enemy trenches Nth of the road in U. 11. d. Details are in the hands of Lt. E.M. BARKER
5. On 2. day at a time to be notified later the 10th A.I.B. special party will assemble at ROMNEY CAMP fully equipped in every particular in accordance with Special party order less bridges & mats which will be sent by the light railway to DU CHASSEUR CABARET & picked up there.
The party will fall in in order of parties as laid down in para 10 hereof and will preserve that order throughout the approach to our front line.
6. Embarkment will take place at COANAUGHT SIDING & the party will proceed by light Railway to ^{PRACINE} ~~PRACINE~~ DUM? & detrain there.



Groups will then move by VANCOUVER TRACK 10
 AU CHASSEUR CABARET thence overland to FACTORY by
 taped overland route.

At Zero minus 40 min. Assaulting teams will
 commence to move out into NO MANS LAND & form up on
 jumping off tapes laid previously by scouts.

6. Teams will form up on the tapes in two lines of
 single ranks with a distance of 30' between lines in
 the order in which they will enter the enemy trenches
 commencing from right of rear line according to number
 of their parties.
7. After leaving RACINE DUMP absolute silence must be
 preserved. No smoking & lights of any description
 will be allowed. Altho the assembly in NO MANS LAND
 will be covered by patrols supplied by scouts of caissons
 every precaution must be used to prevent the enemy
 gaining any knowledge of our intentions. Surprise will
 be the keynote of success.
8. At Zero hour plus 1 minute Assembly teams will move
 to their objectives. This will allow time for the Chinese
 Attack diversion to operate and for that reason no
 movement of the teams must take place between Zero hour
 & Zero plus 1 minute.
9. Assaulting parties will enter enemy trenches by gaps
 cut in his wire at ———

Right party U.18. a. 23. 60. (point A on special map)
 Left party U.12. c. 05. 05. (— K —)

10. The composition & duties of the parties will be —
 HQ raid party.

Capt F.E. FAIRWEATHER

INCO	4	summers	2	Sigs	4	Lincimen
Right Assaulting team			3	off	150	OR.
Left do do			3	"	77	"
To operate Chinese attack			1	"	11	"
Scout & Intelligence officer			1			
Total			9	off	179	OR.



18. Raiders returning will be checked at a point on VANCOUVER beamline about 100^x Nth of AU CASSEUR CABARET when each man will hand to checking officer (Lt G. DUTTON) the linen duplicate of his special identity disc. A second check will be made on return to billets.
19. A hot meal will be available on arrival at ROMNEY CAMP.
20. All watches will be synchronised at Bde HQ at 3pm on 2 day.
21. CO 39th Bn AIF will have all approached routes cleared of traffic from Zero hour minus 1 1/2 hours to Zero plus 1 1/2 hours.
22. Weather reports will be rendered to OC Raid by each party Commander by 9am on 2 day plus 1 day

Signed

F. E. FAIRWEATHER *capt*

OC 10th AIB Special party.

Orders for Chinese Attack

1. As laid down in para 4 of 10th AIB special order No 1 a Chinese attack will be arranged to take place in conjunction with the main operation on 2 night.
2. The attack will take place Nth of the main attack on a front of 75^x from U.N. d. 68.75. to U.N. d. 65.90.
3. The objects of the diversion are:—
 1. To deceive the enemy as to our intention.
 2. To draw fire.
 3. To induce the enemy to put down his SOS in wrong *(locality)*
 4. To avoid casualties.
 5. To lower the enemy's morale.
4. Enemy wire will be cut & our barrage will extend along his front line systems opposite this locality. Exact artillery program will be notified later.



5. Lt E.M. BARKER is detailed to supervise the attack & he will have a party of INCO & 10 men to assist. This party will include two stretcher bearers
6. Special camouflage figures will be used & a supply of these has now been secured from special RE Works park
7. The training of the Chinese attack party in the use of the figures & a careful reconnaissance of NO MANS LAND in vicinity of locality laid down in para 2 will be commenced ^{(forthwith).}
8. On Zero minus 1 night Lt Barker & party will proceed from ROMNEY CAMP, to CANPAC DUMP thence by WARNETON TRACK to junction of WARNETON TRACK & EGMONT AV. He will take 30 special figures & appliances. to be left at junction of EGMONT AV & camouflaged. The party will then proceed by overland route to our front line in vicinity of U.I. d. 30.90. thence into NO MANS LAND & prepare such positions as may be necessary for the proper working of the figures on 2 night.
9. On 2 night Chinese party (at a time to be notified later) will assemble at Romney CAMP & proceed by route (as para 8 & picking up figures at EGMONT AV proceed to front line & locality laid down in para 2. hereof. The figures will be irregularly spaced & echeloned over the front.
10. Absolute silence & no smoking or lights are permitted after leaving CANPAC DUMP. It is highly important that the enemy's suspicions are not aroused.
11. C.O 40th P.M. will supply covering patrols on 2 minus 1 & ^{(2 nights).}
12. At Zero minus 20 min figures will be in position & covering patrol will withdraw.
13. At Zero minus 3 min two figures will be raised for 10 seconds. This should attract the enemy's attention
14. At Zero hour all figures will be raised & will then be lowered & raised at irregular intervals. At least 50% of the figures must always be upright.
15. At Zero plus 70 minutes all figures will be lowered & operators will return to a safe position in our own lines.



- 16. At Zero plus 1 hour Lt BARKER will arrange for salvage of figures from NO MANS LAND. The party will be checked at EGMONT DUMP & will withdraw by the BARNETON TRACK.
- 17. Evacuation of wounded will be overland route to EGMONT AY - thence by EGMONT AV, USEFUL LANE & DOUVE RIVER duckboards to RAP. at U 10. G. 20. 60 thence - via DUCKBOARD TRACK, MESSINES RD to HYDE PARK ~~CORNER~~ advanced dressing stations.
- 18. At Zero plus 20 min. Lt BARKER will report to OC Raid by telephone from nearest Sig office.
- 19. Arms & equipment will be as laid down in 10th A.I.B. Special party order 402.
- 20. Attention is directed to 10th A.I.B. special party order 401 paras 19. 20. 22.
- 21. Acknowledge.

Signed

F. E. FAIRWEATHER Capt

OC 38 10th A.I.B. Special party.

Raid Order
10th Feb 1918



The task of moving all Dumps forward in close proximity to the jumping off line was carried out by this Brigade under great difficulties. The congestion of the roads at night owing to the movement of the other arms of the Service made it almost impossible to get the transport through so that the greater part of these Dumps had to be carried forward by man power. The work of transferring the Dumps was rendered more difficult by the darkness of the night and by the necessity of moving across broken country and over old trench systems often under heavy harassing shell and Machine Gun fire. There was little or no time for rest as, after working all night, the task of refitting the men and the issuing of extra Iron Rations, Water bottles, Water, Grenades, Flores and Message Rockets had all to be carried out during the day.

Watches were synchronized during afternoon of the 7th and again at 10 p.m.

On the night of 7th/8th August, the Battalions holding the line were withdrawn to the Support Trenches on the arrival of the troops of the 9th and 11th Brigades to prevent congestion at the position of assembly.

Battalions were then reorganized in their new areas and held in readiness to move on receipt of orders. The enormous activity of the last few days and the fact that the enemy had captured several hundred British prisoners on MORLANCOURT RIDGE inclined us to believe that our plans must be known to the enemy. The night was consequently an anxious one and as each hour passed and no enemy action arrived our wonder increased. It was not until the last few minutes before ZERO that we allowed ourselves to believe that our Attack was unexpected.

At ZERO hour - 4.20 a.m. on the 8th August 1918, our Artillery, Trench Mortars, and Machine Guns opened fire in one well-timed and terrific burst. At the same time our planes dropped their loads of bombs on enemy rear positions.

At ZERO hour, the 37th Battalion was assembled and ready to move, in the event of ACCROCHE WOOD holding up the advance, they were to be used to clear the WOOD to enable the 33rd Battalion to proceed to its Objective. The assistance of the 37th Battalion however, was not required as ACCROCHE WOOD was taken by the 33rd Battalion without much difficulty.

Two platoons of the 39th Battalion moved forward with the Attack along the North Bank of the SOLLE CANAL to keep touch with the 58th Division and the 11th Australian Infantry Brigade. Although their role was not fighting but liaison, they drove the enemy before them and succeeded in capturing 40 prisoners and 5 Machine Guns without suffering any casualties themselves.

The 10th A.L.T.M. Battery at ZERO hour co-operated with the Artillery and the Medium Trench Mortars by engaging enemy positions in ACCROCHE WOOD from ZERO to ZERO plus 10 minutes, covering the advance of the Infantry.

A remarkable feature of the Operation was the small amount of Artillery retaliation.

The Tanks all got away well on ZERO Hour and advanced with the Infantry and at 7 am the GREEN LINE had been captured and consolidation commenced.

As soon as the 4th Division passed through, the Battalions of the 10th Brigade were reorganized and ready to move to any part of the Corps Zone.

Shortly after ZERO Hour, salvage parties collected all stores in the area into Dumps.

At 8.20 am, orders were received from Division for the Brigade while in Reserve to take over the old enemy trench system running from P.22.d. to the Junction with our old front line in P.16.b. as a reserve system and HUNS WALK was to be improved as a C. T.. The boundaries were allotted as under :- 40th Batt. from P.22.d.8.0. to P.17.c.3.1. and 39th Battalion from P.17.c.3.1. to Junction with our old front line. Before this move was completed, however, this order was cancelled by Division and instructions given for the troops to be reorganized and rested and to remain tactically disposed with local precautions against surprise and to be ready to move at an hour's notice from 3 am on the 9th. This was later altered to read 5 a.m. on 9th.

At 2.45 pm, orders were received from Division for the Brigade to move forward during the afternoon to Q.20 and to come under the orders of the G.O.C. 4th Australian Division as reserve. The Brigade was not to be used except in case of emergency to form a defensive flank.

The G.O.C. Brigade reported to the G.O.C. 4th Division at CORBIE for instructions.

MOVE TO Q.20.

37th Batt. moved at 4.30 pm, 38th Batt at 4.35 pm, 40th Batt at 4.40 pm and 10th Machine Gun Coy at 4.45 pm round the South of ACCROCHE WOOD and the 39th Battalion moved at 4.40 pm and the 10th A.L.T.M. Battery at 4.45 pm around the North edge of the WOOD. The 10th Brigade Headquarters, Tunnelling Section, Cyclist Platoon, and passed the South edge of the WOOD at 4.50 pm.

A Brigade Report Centre was established at ALWAYS CROSS, Q.19.4.

The move was carried out by Units moving over open country in Artillery formation and the column moving South of the WOOD came under harassing artillery fire and suffered slight casualties, otherwise the move was completed without mishap.

Our planes were flying in large flights and had complete mastery of the air and thus effected cover and protection from hostile aircraft.

Brigade Headquarters were established in the Gun-pits of a 10.5 cm Battery at Q.14.c.3.8..

Fighting Transport, Limbers with S.A.A. and bombs and Water Carts moved forward with their Battalions to the vicinity of the GREEN LINE.

On the morning of the 9th August 1918, Officers of the 39th and 40th Battalions reconnoitred the forward area of the 12th Brigade and Officers of the 37th and 38th Battalions reconnoitred the area of the 4th Brigade and Officers of Brigade Headquarters were engaged on the same work.

Troops spent the 9th in making bivouacs and as far as possible were bathed. During the night, enemy bombing planes flew over the bivouac Areas and dropped bombs without causing damage and in addition the whole Area was subjected to scattered shelling but no casualties, except to a few transport animals, occurred.

On the morning of the 10th August, the G.O.C. was called to a Conference at 4th Divisional Headquarters at CORBIE where he was instructed to carry out an Operation to capture the Spur on the West of CHUIGNOLLES between the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN Road and the SOMME. Battalion Commanders and O.C. 10th M. G. Coy were hurriedly called to a Conference at Brigade Headquarters at 2 p.m., there being present as well the C.O. 8th Tank Battalion and his Section Commanders and C. O. 17th Armoured Cars.

The scheme was explained by the G.O.C. and orders issued verbally to all Commanders as time was very limited. The 37th Battalion with one Section 10th M. G. Company and with 3 tanks, one on the road and one on either side of the road as flank guards was to lead the way followed by 38th Battalion with half Section 10th M. G. Coy, ; next came 40th

Battalion with 3 tanks disposed on the flanks, half section 10th M.G. Company, 10th T. M. Battery and 39th Battalion in rear.

Special Signal arrangements were made both for lamp signalling and for special light signals to enable troops of 50th Battalion on N. of the SOMME to recognize our troops. All troops were to move as unobtrusively as possible from bivouac areas across country and to delay joining the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN Road as long as possible. Tanks were to be met by Guides at the Hospital Q.30.c. and the column was to pass the front line at LA FLAQUE at 9.30 p.m.

All Units had strict orders as to flank protection and tanks were to assist in this work. Brigade Headquarters were selected at Q.30.c.5.5, and the G.O.C. moved forward at 5.30 p.m..

On his arrival, owing to the presence of several enemy balloons which commanded the approach route he decided to delay the approach march for half an hour so that there might be less chance of the enemy learning our intentions and ZERO Hour was accordingly altered to 10 pm.

The advance from bivouacs had already commenced when this message was received but the troops who were moving in Artillery formation across country were halted in sheltered spots out of observation from the enemy. (A message was received later from 3rd Divisional Headquarters ordering ZERO to be kept at 9.30 pm, but it was received too late to be carried out).

The retarding of ZERO resulted in the troops having to take to the Main road in the vicinity of Brigade Headquarters owing to trenches and wire ahead of that position making progress slow in the dark. The first trouble met with was when the 40th Battalion was passing the Checking Point at Q.30.c.5.5.. Enemy planes flew along the road bombing and inflicted casualties both on personnel and on animals. Damaged limbers and wounded and struggling animals almost blocked the road and disorganized temporarily the march, but they were quickly cleared away and the march was resumed.

From this point forward, the road was almost continuously shelled especially in the vicinity of the Railway Dump just east of the old AMIENS LINE. In spite of everything, the head of the column passed Cross Roads, LA FLAQUE punctually at 10 p.m. The leading tanks which should have been disposed one on the road - one on either flank, found it impossible on account of the darkness to move anywhere but on the centre of the road where they followed the guides Lieut. G. MCNICOL MC, 37th Battalion and Captain JEFFREY of the Tanks.

The enemy had heard the approach of the tanks and a hail of Machine Gun fire with a considerable amount of "whizz-bangs" shells was poured into the column as it passed the LA FLAQUE Cross-roads. The troops still pushed forward but, owing to the necessity of taking advantage of every possible cover, at a slower rate. The flank guards were slightly better off for cover, but the main body could only move either by means of the drains along the roadside or else practically in a prone position. The two Officers who were acting as guides to the tanks both became casualties and the tanks stopped. Word was sent forward by Lieut-Colonel E.K. KNIGHT through the Section Commander of the tanks that they must keep pushing forward at all costs but in the meantime two tanks had turned round and the advance of the Infantry was blocked, particularly as the tanks themselves were firing at enemy gun positions on both sides of the road. Just after ordering the tanks forward Lieut-Colonel KNIGHT was killed and the Senior left with the column was Major L.H. PAYNE, 40th Battalion who supervised the reorganizing and digging in which subsequently took place.

It was soon obvious that the scheme as originally planned could not be carried out and the G.O.C. Brigade ordered the 38th and 40th Battalions to dig in to the N.E. of LA FLAQUE Cross roads from approx. R.27.d.0.4. to R.26.a.1.5.. The 39th and 37th Battalions were at the same time ordered to withdraw to the old AMIENS LINE trenches near Q.30.d.. Seven Machine Guns and 2 - 3" Stokes Mortars covered this new defensive line. While the advance part of the troops had been suffering from Machine Gun fire, those in rear had been severely gassed and casualties totalling nearly 200 were received by the Brigade between 10 p.m. and daybreak on 11th August.

When it was decided to dig in near LA FLAQUE, the tanks were ordered to withdraw at 3.30 am. Immediately the noise of their engines was heard, the enemy fire increased in intensity, dying down again somewhat as daylight came.

At 4 am, however, in connection with an Operation of the 2nd Australian Division on our right, our artillery put down a heavy barrage on enemy positions to which he replied by an equally heavy shoot on our new positions. The digging in had, by this time, proceeded sufficiently far to give cover to our troops and our casualties were few.

Later in the morning, as the 5th Brigade left flank had advanced beyond our furthest post, it became necessary for us to move our right flank to maintain touch with the 5th Brigade posts and artillery covering fire was called for to keep down Machine Gun fire during the Operation. With this assistance, the 38th Battalion patrols rushed several enemy Posts and captured 3 Officers and 28 Other Ranks with 4 Machine Guns which were manned and used against the enemy.

During the 11th August, the positions of 38th and 40th Battalions were improved, the enemy keeping up intermittent Machine Gun and Artillery fire on our troops particularly those in the vicinity of LA FLAQUE.

After dark on 11th, this Brigade took over the line held by the 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade up to the road East and West through R.19.b. with Battalions disposed as follows :- 38th Bn on right, 40th Bn in Centre and 37th Bn on the left, and 39th Bn in reserve; Battalion Headquarters of 38th and 40th Battalions being moved back from LA FLAQUE to more suitable positions in R.26.

Prisoners captured during the 11th knew of no orders for withdrawal from their positions East of LA FLAQUE but the diminution of Machine Gun fire as reported by 38th Battalion during the night 11/12th seemed to indicate that such a withdrawal might have taken place during the night 11/12th.

The G.O.C., at daybreak, decided to capture PROYART and to push forward our line as far as practicable to the high ground on the East of the Valley running East of PROYART and through R.21.central - the line of Objectives being approximate. line from AVENUE CROSS to R.28.a.3.2. to R.21.d.central to Road and Railway Junction in R.21.a., thence Northwards along the line of the railway to R.15.central. This latter point was fixed in conjunction with 11th Brigade, in order that the whole of PROYART might be inclusive to this Brigade. Divisional Headquarters were asked by phone to keep artillery fire to EAST of the road running from AVENUE CROSS to ROBERT WOOD and thence to CHUIGNOLLES. Machine Guns also were ordered to keep East of this line. Orders were then telephoned to the three line Battalion Commanders instructing them to push out patrols and to occupy wherever possible positions ahead of our existing line up to the high ground as detailed above.

The troops entered with eagerness into the Operation which was carried out without any artillery support - covering rifle and Lewis gun fire only being relied on. It was soon found that the enemy was still holding many machine gun positions well placed to cover the low-lying country East of PROYART and LA FLAQUE and that he intended to offer resistance to any advance on our part.

On the right, the 38th Battalion found the enemy was still holding posts at AVENUE CROSS and opposite the centre of their line. By sending out two patrols who crept along under cover of the road on either side to outflank the AVENUE CROSS post and then to rush it, the right Company succeeded in capturing this Post with 1 Officer 28 Other Ranks and 3 Machine Guns. The Post was composed of 3 deep dugouts with a breastwork formed from the spoil.

In the centre, under covering fire from the reserve company, patrols pushed forward by short rushes and cleared out the enemy from his posts as far East as a line running R.28.c.5.4. to R.28.a.2.2. to R.21.d.central.

During the course of August 11/12th, the 38th Battalion captured a total of 4 Officers, 53 Other Ranks and in addition snipers accounted for a considerable total.

On the left of 38th Battalion, the 40th Battalion moved forward on a comparatively narrow front which included the Southern portion of PROYART Village. No enemy was seen actually in the Southern end of the Village but portions of half-consumed meals showed that he had made a very hurried exit.

Along the road running East and West through the Village, patrols met the enemy, captured 5 prisoners, 2 Machine Guns and inflicted casualties. Pushing on, they met the enemy in trenches in R.21.b. and found his snipers and Machine Guns active, so that advance had to be carried out very cautiously. However by skilful use of covering fire, patrols dribbled forward and occupied the trenches in R.21.b. Machine Guns further up the hill on our left were still active but the patrols of this Battalion pushed on and cleaned up three more enemy posts inflicting for the day 50 or 60 casualties by means of the Lewis Guns but suffering very slightly ourselves. The enemy bombarded PROYART and vicinity intermittently all day with occasional very heavy bursts of fire from guns of large calibre. While the two Battalions on the right were moving forward gradually on the South, the 37th Battalion on the left was working through the North of PROYART Village and were meeting exceedingly heavy machine gun fire from the front and left flank. The right flank also was enfiladed till the 40th Batt cleaned up their front.

Sergeant STATTON of 40th Battalion, seeing the 37th Battalion was held up on his left, on his own initiative organized a small party and in broad daylight, under very intense Machine Gun fire dealt with 5 nests of Machine Guns which were causing the trouble. He rushed 3 guns one after another and did wonderful execution with his pistol and finally when this was empty had a hand to hand fight with a German who had charged him with a bayonet. His dash completely surprised the enemy and the crews of the last 2 guns made off leaving the coast clear for the 37th Battalion to advance.

In the centre, while advancing alongside the road running East through the Village, an enemy post was encountered and rushed after a very smart piece of work by Corporal McCROHON, the Garrison of six with a Machine Gun being captured. This centre company moved forward by gradual stages to the bank in R.21.a.6.8., but had difficulty in maintaining this position for some hours owing to the enfilade fire from its left. The Company on the left worked forward as far as CROSS on SHRINE in R.15.a., but could proceed no further for a long while owing to the heavy Machine Gun fire from R.9.c.. It was not till the 41st and 42nd Battalions on the left had worked round through ST GERMAIN WOOD and silenced these guns that any further advance was possible. Having secured these positions East of the Village of PROYART, our snipers and Lewis Gunners continued their activities and gradually with the assistance of flank units obtained the superiority of fire so that just before dusk on 12th, it was possible to rush the enemy positions along the line of the railway from R.21.a.8.5. to R.15.central.

This final stage was carried out by a succession of rushes ~~and~~ under fire of portions of the troops. Eight Machine Guns were captured by the 37th Battalion but few prisoners were taken owing to the slowness of the general advance, which also accounted for the comparatively slight casualties suffered.

By the time the Brigade was relieved by 50th Brigade on the night 12/13th, the line as decided on for the Objective of the day was entirely occupied and consolidation was well advanced. We were in touch with both 6th Brigade on the right and 11th Brigade on the left - the former having advanced their left to conform to our right flank post.

Twice during the day, concentrations of the enemy were reported in the vicinity of ST MARTIN WOOD and were dealt with by artillery and no counter attack was made on our positions.

W. Ramsay Macnicoll

Brigadier - General.
Commanding 10th Australian Infantry Brigade.

17/8/18.
RL/ACC.

cc Coy
After arrival
pass on to cc Day
Day return file
to Br. H.Q.
Albans Capt.

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS FROM AUGUST 21st 1918

In the late afternoon of 21st August troops of this Brigade moved from areas South of CERISY to positions in vicinity of SAILLY LAURETTE North of the SOMME in anticipation of relief of 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. Hqrs were established at K.22.b.6.2. near MALARD WOOD. Battalions located as under:-

SHEET 32 D.

37th Bn. K.19. 38th Bn. K.25. 39th Bn. J.35. 40th Bn. J.36.
10th A.L.T.M.Btty J.36.

On the 22nd inst. the day was very ~~h~~ hot and dusty and nearly all troops battled and had changes of clothing. The bivouac areas were subjected to scattered H.V. shelling but no damage was suffered.

On 23rd inst. 39th Battalion was moved forward early in the morning to position in K.31. ready for support to 9th Aust. Inf. Bde on account of the troops on their left flank being pressed back by enemy opposition. This situation on the left remained somewhat obscure throughout the day.

On the night 23/24th August the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. relieved 9th Aust. Inf. Bde in the line which ran along the Western outskirts of BRAY to L.15.a. Cent to Cross roads at L.9.d.2.0. thence along road Northward to Chalk Pit L.3.d.5.8.

Battalions were disposed as under:-

3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (attached) opposite to LA NEUVILLE and along the West side of river to L.15.c.4.4.
37th Bn. thence to Cross Roads at L.9.d.2.0.
38th Bn. thence to Chalk Pit
39th Bn. forming a defensive flank from Chalk Pit to L.2. Central on account of uncertainty of the position of the Division on our left.

40th Battalion and 37th Battalion (with 1 Coy) formed up during progress of the relief on a jumping-off line N. of BRAY through CRUCIFIX at L.15.c.2.7. ready to capture BRAY, ZERO HOUR for attack being 1 a.m. on the 24th August.

Brigade Hqrs moved at 3 p.m. to K.28.d.9.3.

During the relief the enemy shelled forward areas heavily but did little damage.

On their approach march the 40th Battalion met with some delay owing to the road near K.22.b.3.0. being blocked which resulted in Lewis Guns having to be unloaded from limbers and carried forward. The Battalion was on its jumping off line by 12.30 a.m. having suffered no casualties.

Communication by wire was almost impossible owing to the frequency with which the wires were cut. Power Buzzers owing to the atmospheric disturbances were unreliable and messages were sent by runners a distance of 3000 yards and then telephoned through.

37th Battalion prior to their moving off relieved portion of 35th Battalion but were ready to assist on North of BRAY at ZERO, their role being protection of left flank of 40th Bn. by establishing 4 posts between road junction at L.16.a.2.9. and L.9.d.4.7.

Our artillery opened with a good barrage at 1 a.m. moving by 100 yards lifts every 3 minutes throughout. The enemy replied at once by heavy machine gun fire and very shortly afterwards by much artillery, 4.2", 5.9" and 8" being used especially in the gullies in L.20.b. and in L.14.d.

The attacking troops - 2 Coys of 40th Bn attacking with 1 Coy of 37th Bn. on left; 1 Coy of 40th Bn mopping up and 1 Coy carrying - got away well on the left of the barrage at 1.3 a.m.

Those on the Northern outskirts of the village came under heavy machine gun fire and sustained fairly heavy casualties - the Left Coy Commander, Major L.F. GIBLIN D.S.O., D.C. being among the wounded. The progress of this company was slow on account of machine gun fire but the assistance of a platoon of the 37th Bn. was obtained after a long delay owing to the messenger sent to ask for this assistance becoming a casualty. On account of this delay the artillery was kept firing for 15 minutes longer than programme time to allow consolidation to be completed.

The Right Coy met with slight opposition in the Southern end of the town.

By 2.30 a.m. both Right and Left Companies were through the town with the mopping up Coy almost through.

During consolidation of the objective - L.13.d.0.0. to L.13. Central to L.13.a.2.9. - considerable machine gun fire was encountered from the spur in L.13.d. but some very good work was done by the 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery's Stokes Mortars, one battery of 4 enemy machine guns being knocked out and others silenced. By 3.30 a.m. all objectives had been reached and consolidation was progressing and by 4 a.m. the village had been cleared by the of the enemy by the mopping up party. The opposition in the village had been determined at first, as the enemy had expected the attack; but as soon as he discovered that the North and South parties had worked round the flanks of the village the enemy surrendered freely and a total of 2 Officers 184 other ranks was captured - 1 Officer and 103 Other Ranks unwounded and 1 Officer 78 Other Ranks wounded. Material captured was considerable, 40th Battalion securing 22 machine guns and 2 Minenwerfer and the 37th Battalion 9 machine guns and some a signalling apparatus. In addition the Railway yard contained many trucks of R.E. material and there were enormous quantities of munitions and war stores in the huge dump East of the town.

The casualties sustained by the attacking troops for the operation were 2 Other Ranks killed and 1 Officer 40 other ranks wounded.

The 3rd Aust. Pioneer Battalion assisted the attack by covering the right flank on the South side of the river - establishing 3 posts around LE NEUVILLE.

During the day of 24inst up till about 7 p.m. enemy shelled very heavily all forward positions with guns of heavy calibre but very few casualties were sustained.

On 24th inst. instructions were given for the advance to continue during the night 24/25th. This advance was carried out by the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde on the Left, the objective being the high ground East and Northeast of BRAY with a final line of consolidation along the line of the road from Cross roads at L.24.c.2.1. through squares 24 a and c 10 a and c to Brigade boundary at L.11.c.7.6. thence Northerly along the same road. On consolidation of this objective patrols were to be pushed forward to the river bank and a switch line from L.17.b. through L.18.c. was to be constructed.

24/25th Aug 1918. The attack of 10th A.I. Bde was carried out by 37th Battalion under Lt-Col. C.B. Story on the right with 2 Coys (A and D) in line B Company mopping up and C Company in support; 39th Battalion on left under Lt-Col R.O. Henderson D.S.O. with C Company on the right, A Coy in the centre B Company on left flank, and D Coy as reserve.

40th Battalion mopped up the area South of the 37th Battalion as far as south as the river and established a strong bridgehead post at L.24.c.1.1.

38th Battalion were in reserve West of BRAY

25th AUGUST 1918 The attack was carried out with the support of an artillery barrage at 2.30 a.m. on the 25th August. Attacking troops formed up by 2 a.m. on the start line - a North and South line through cross roads at L.10.c.0.1. This necessitated the withdrawal of the 40th Bn from the posts established on the capture of BRAY. 37th and 39th Battalions were relieved at dusk by 38th Battalion in line left - this line afterwards being handed over to 11th Aust Inf Bde.

The assembly was carried out without mishap, the enemy artillery fire which had been severe during the day having slackened after nightfall.

Our barrage went down promptly at ZERO and the enemy quickly replied with artillery fire which was never very intense. No infantry opposition was met with until near final objective. This was quickly overcome and 20 prisoners of 30th Regiment, 45th Division were captured.

During consolidation of the GREEN LINE, which was covered by guns of 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery and a protective artillery barrage, enemy artillery increased and continued heavy scattered shelling over the whole of the high ground on the peninsula East of BRAY throughout the 25th inst.

The position of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde on the South of the river ran L.1. Cent., to C.1. d. C. O. to West outcirts of CAPPY, so that the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde still required to watch river crossing N.W. of CAPPY.

Ten (10) Machine Guns and approximately 100 prisoners were captured in this operation.

Consolidation being completed, patrols were pushed out to the river through South and of CHEYLON WOOD and came under enemy machine gun fire. About noon a command post was established near the Railway Station at BRAY just before dark on 25th. At the same time the 40th Battalion moved one Company to dotted GREEN LINE on map attached.

At 9 a.m. on 25th inst orders were received for the advance to be continued by bounds - the rate of advance to be regulated by the movement of troops of the Division on the left. 11th Aust Inf Bde was on our left and had on its left 58th division troops.

The stages of advance laid down (as shown in attached map) were:-

1st stage C.8.c.8.8., C.8.a. Cent, G.1.d.8.8. to THIGGER WOOD.

2nd stage S.E. Corner SUZANNE, cross roads at G.8.b.0.7., G.8. Cent, Copse "N", A.20. Cent

3rd stage G.15.b. Cent, G.9.d. Cent, G.7. Cent, Copse "J", A.26. Cent.

The inter-Brigade boundary ran from L.12. Cent to Cross roads in VAUX WOOD, G.4. Cent.

A troop of 15th Light Horse was allotted this Brigade for reconnaissance patrol work, but on account of machine gun fire were compelled to work dismounted most of the earlier part of the 25th.

The troops on left of the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde were held up near BILLON Copse and later, owing to the inter-Brigade reliefs, their advance was delayed with the result that no move could be made by this Brigade.

A captured enemy map gave the enemy successive lines of resistance on the country east of SUZANNE. This proved useful to our troops when they attacked on 26th inst.

25/26th August 1918 At about midnight a wire from 3rd Aus. Div. was received stating that the 58th Division troops had been ordered to push forward during the night, and that 11th and 10th Aust Inf Brigades were to conform, and were ordered to take the first two objectives - Lines "A" and "B" and the 37th Bn. the 3rd - "C" Line - 1 troop of 15th Light Horse carried out patrol work.

The 39th Battalion attacked "A" line without artillery barrage and had the 44th Battalion on their left. "C" and "E" Companies attacked with "A" Company support and with "D" Coy carrying.

A machine gun in CHATEAU WOOD, was silenced by Lewis guns of the right Coy and captured.

26th Augst. 1918 By 5 a.m. on 26th August a series of posts had been dug and occupied along "A" line, shown in attached map, and patrols were being pushed out into the village. The 37th Bn. moved to a position of readiness for attack on "C" line and were located along approximately Grid line between L.11., L.12 on western edge of CHEYLON WOOD.

At 8.30 a.m. on 26th the 39th Bn. commenced to move through SUZANNE to "B" line with D.C. and A Coys attacking and B Coy in support in rear of cemetery G.8.a.

D Coy moved via the south of the village mopping up the long street near the river and coming under heavy machine gun fire from the high ground to the north when nearly through the village street but moved under cover of banks on the north of the street to the old German trenches in G.9.c. Cent. The Centre and left Coys met with little opposition till they emerged from the east side of the village, when they encountered much machine gun and Minenwerfer fire. However they gradually moved across under covering Lewis Gun fire and in small parties reached their objectives on the spur in G.8.b and G.9.c consolidating a position and using as far as possible the German trenches.

Soon after the 39th Battalion got to the Eastern edge of the village enemy artillery, which had been very quiet during the night, opened and throughout the rest of the day continued with guns of all calibres to pound SUZANNE and the high ground to the West, first at SUZANNE Church and later at G.3.c.7.a.

The 37th Battalion (Lt-Col. C.B. Story) were meanwhile moving through close on the heels of the 39th Battalion - "B" and "C" Coys in front line and "A" and "D" Coys supporting.

"B" Coy moved via the South of the village and occupied without difficulty trenches just in advance of 39th Battalion in G.9.c. "C" Coy on the left met with very considerable ... fire from MURRAY WOOD and from the German trenches in G.9.a. and b. MURRAY WOOD was attacked from the flanks by "C" Coy, 37th Battalion and by a party of 5 from the 39th Battalion under Lt. L. Le FEVRE. This latter party with a Lewis gun crawled from 39th Bn. trenches into MURRAY wood where they opened fire and drove back a party of 30 of the enemy, then, attacking a machine gun crew with revolvers, they and 37th Battalion flanking parties cleared the way for the advance of the 37th Bn. "C" Coy. This Coy had further considerable hand to hand fighting in the trenches in G.9.a. and b. up to the "C" line. From these trenches the enemy fled in numbers towards VAUX wood: many casualties were inflicted on him as he fled and in addition 1 prisoner and 1 machine gun were captured. During this stage of the advance the enemy used two 77 mm guns at close range until they were silenced by rifle and Lewis Gun fire. The enemy pulled these two guns by man power into a depression close by and later brought out two horse teams to remove them but Lewis Gun fire caused casualties to these teams and the enemy fled abandoning the guns, which however were removed at nightfall before our troops could get on the spot.

By 1.15 p.m. "C" line was completely occupied and was being consolidated. During this advance touch was lost with 34th Bn. on the left, but "D" Coy, 37th Bn. sent out liaison patrols and established touch when the objective was reached by 37th Bn.

On reaching "C" line further advance was held up till flank troops came up, so it was after dark on 26th August before the final mopping up of the peninsula as far as VAUX was possible, by which time the enemy had withdrawn all his troops and also his guns from the valley in G.10. Examination after the advance showed that many of these guns 21 cm and 10.5 cm had quite recently been emplaced and had not fired a shot.

Casualties for the day up to 6 p.m. were 3 other ranks killed, 1 Officer 40 other ranks wounded.

After dark "B" Coy on the right pushed forward and consolidated a line from G.10.c.3.0. to G.9.a.9.0. with "B" Coy, 38th Bn. (which with "D" Coy 38th Bn. had been attached to 37th Bn. at 10 a.m.) on their right

CLEARING OF VAUX WOOD South Spur

Shortly after 7 p.m. on 26th orders were received for this brigade to occupy SUZANNE-VAUX Spur south of the grid through 3 central, 4 central. This was to be carried out in conjunction with 11th A.I. Bde's operation on the left. The 38th Bn. (under command of C.O. 37th Bn.) were allotted South end of the peninsula to DRAGON wood inclusive, and 37th Bn. the north of this line with one platoon detailed for liaison with 11th A.I. Bde on the left.

27th AUGUST 1918

It was not till 7 a.m. on 27th August that the mopping up commenced but it was completed without any opposition, the enemy having withdrawn completely after blowing up bridges at ECLUSIER and VAUX. At the conclusion of this operation early on 27th August the 38th Bn. once again came under the orders of Major A.J.A. HAUSLEY a/C.O. of 38th Bn. and established "A" Coy to watch ECLUSIER Crossings, "B" Coy to guard VAUX crossings, with "C" and "D" Coys in vicinity of VAUX wood.

At 9.30 a.m. on 27th verbal instructions were given for the relief of the Brigade by 9th A.I. Bde, but after orders had been issued to Units further instructions were received from 3rd Aust. Div. at 4 p.m. that the advance was to continue and that the 9th A.I. Bde would take over the line running North and North West of VAUX wood and would advance during the night, but that troops of the 10th A.I. Bde would remain in the vicinity of SUZANNE ready to move and come on the right of the 9th A.I. Bde when they had reached the vicinity of GURLU.

August 27/28th 1918

(5)

During the night 27/28th the 9th A.I. Bde attacked enemy positions in vicinity of FANGHY Wood and advanced to positions east of CURLU - the village itself was not mopped up.

As soon as this move had been carried out it was necessary for the 10th A.I. Bde to move round to the right flank of 9th A.I. Bde - The 38th Bn. (Major A.J.A. AUDSLEY) being detailed for this operation - one coy was sent at 7.30 a.m. on 28th by way of the causeways leading East from VAUX to reconnoitre and hold the peninsula between VAUX and CURLU as far south as BRISE. The Bridges across the various channels of the Somme which had been blown up by the retreating enemy were rapidly made trafficable for infantry - 3rd Aust Pioneers and 10th Field Coy Engineers being allotted for this work. A small amount of I.G. fire was encountered from the CURLU side of the peninsula but by noon the spur was held and the crossing at H.12 d was denied the enemy.

August 28th 1918

At 7.30 p.m. on 28th August two Companies of 38th Bn (C and D Coys) were sent round along the North bank of the river to work through CURLU and take up a position on the right of the 9th A.I. Bde. Although the latter had posts East of CURLU the enemy had not been cleared from the ~~village~~ village. "D" Coy moving through the village had some stiff fighting before the I.Gs and snipers were cleared out of the village, and sustained heavy casualties. 4 I.Gs were captured in the village and by daybreak of 29th a line of posts had been established about 150 yds S. and E. of CURLU.

38th Bn. Hqrs were established at I.29.b.3.3. early on night of 28th August but the area was so severely shelled that communication except by runner was impossible.

During the late afternoon of 28th inst. 40th Bn. moved in close support in valley near HILLIETRE Wood in G.9.b., G.10.a. and 37th and 39th Bns moved to positions in vicinity of SUZANNE.

August 28/29th August 1918.

The 38th Bn. having consolidated from G.3.d. to B.35.c.4.0. South-East of CURLU during the night 28/29th August at daylight on 29th pushed out reconnoitring patrols towards HEL. This was accomplished without any opposition and a line was established through H.9.Cent, H.5.d.0.0. H.1.b. central and at midday orders were issued for 30th Bn. to attack with 40th Bn. as Left Flank Guard. The first objective was to be trenches M. and N. in H.4. b. and d. The second was the high ground in B.29. TERLINE Trench "A" Squadron 17th Light Horse was sent forward to try and make hill 110 in B.29.c. and d. One section of 12 pdrs was allotted 38th Bn. and followed close after the attacking troops engaging fleeting targets with success. As soon as the Light Horse patrols moved forward enemy artillery and I.G. fire opened heavily, but the move forward continued by small parties working their way forward taking advantage of available cover and generally beating down enemy I.G. opposition until HANNETONS and TOURNOL Trench were reached about 1.30 p.m. Here the 38th Bn. was held up by I.G. fire. With the assistance of 2 Coys of 40th Bn (after a half hours artillery preparation on CLERY and COUPE ALLEY) this was overcome and the advance continued. By 10. p.m. the 38th Bn. were on a line H.3.c., H.5.b.7.1., H.5.b.3.5., Copse 5., H.5.b.9.0., where touch was made with 34th Bn. The village of CLERY however had not been mopped up. The 40th Bn. had 2 Coys - flank guard - in GLAYOS ALLEY and 2 Coys in support on West and North Western edges of CLERY.

Battalion Hqrs were established - 38th at H.5.d.1.3. and 40th adjacent.

While this advance was taking place, 37th and 39th Battalions were moved forward from SUZANNE-VAUX area to bivouacs in H.1 and H.3. The inter-Brigade boundary was cross roads at S. E. corner HEL wood, E Corner HONITZER Wood, 4.b.Cent, Copse 5., Trench junction B.30.d.0.5.3.

The 2nd Aust. Div south of the SOMME had advanced to H.17 where two companies had been thrown across the canal but could advance no further on account of heavy I.G. fire from North of the river. The position of the Division on the North was very uncertain and the Brigade on our left was sent backwards in a westerly direction to maintain touch with them.

The casualties for the advance from VAUX wood were 8 Other ranks killed 2 Officers 37 other ranks wounded and the captures included

August 27/28th 1918

(5)

During the night 27/28th the 9th A.I.Bde attacked enemy positions in vicinity of FARGNY Wood and advanced to positions east of CURLU - the village itself was not mopped up.

As soon as this move had been carried out it was necessary for the 10th A.I.Bde to move round to the right flank of 9th A.I.Bde - The 38th Bn. (Major A.J.A. AUDSLEY) being detailed for this operation - one coy was sent at 7.30 a.m. on 28th by way of the causeways leading East from VAUX to reconnoitre and hold the peninsula between VAUX and CURLU as far south as PRISE. The Bridges across the various channels of the Somme which had been ~~blowin~~ blown up by the retreating enemy were rapidly made trafficable for infantry - 3rd Aust Pioneers and 10th Field Coy Engineers being allotted for this work. A small amount of I.G. fire was encountered from the CURLU side of the peninsula but by noon the spur was held and the crossing at H.12 d was denied the enemy.

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At 5.30 p.m. on 28th August two Companies of 38th Bn (C and D Coys) were sent round along the North bank of the river to work through CURLU and take up a position on the right of the 9th A.I.Bde. Although the latter had posts East of CURLU the enemy had not been cleared from the ~~village~~ village. "D" Coy moving through the village had some stiff fighting before the I.Gs and snipers were cleared out of the village, and sustained heavy casualties. 4 I.Gs were captured in the village and by daybreak of 29th a line of posts had been established about 150 yds S. and E. of CURLU.

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During the late afternoon of 28th inst. 40th Bn. moved in close support in valley near MILLIETRE Wood in G.9.b., G.10.a. and 37th and 39th Bns moved to positions in vicinity of SUZANNE.

August 28/29th August 1918.

The 38th Bn. having consolidated from G.3.d. to B.25.c.4.0. South-East of CURLU during the night 28/29th August at daylight on 29th pushed out reconnoitring patrols towards HEI. This was accomplished without any opposition and a line was established through H.9.Cent, H.5.d.0.0. H.3.b. central and at midday orders were issued for 39th Bn. to attack with 40th Bn. as Left Flank Guard. The first objective was to be trenches N. and S. in H.4. b. and d. The second was the high ground in B.29. TERLINE Trench "A" Squadron 13th Light Horse was sent forward to try and make hill 110 in B.29.c. and d. One section of 12 pdrs was allotted 38th Bn. and followed close after the attacking troops engaging fleeting targets with success. As soon as the Light Horse patrols moved forward enemy artillery and I.G. fire opened heavily, but the move forward continued by small parties working their way forward taking advantage of available cover and generally beating down enemy I.G. opposition until HANNETONS and TOURNOL Trench were reached about 1.30 p.m. Here the 38th Bn. was held up by I.G. fire with the assistance of 2 Coys of 40th Bn (after a half hours artillery preparation on CLERY and COUL ALLEY) this was overcome and the advance continued. By 10. p.m. the 38th Bn. were on a line H.3.c., H.5.b.7.1., H.5.b.2.5., Copse 5., H.5.b.9.0., where touch was made with 34th Bn. The village of CLERY however had not been mopped up. The 40th Bn. had 2 Coys - flank guard - in GLANOS ALLEY and 2 Coys in support on West and North Western edges of CLERY.

Battalion Hqrs were established - 38th at H.5.d.1.3. and 40th adjacent.

While this advance was taking place, 37th and 39th Battalions were moved forward from SUZANNE-VAUX area to bivouacs in H.1 and H.2. The inter-Brigade boundary was cross roads at E. corner HEI wood, E Corner HONITZER Wood, 4.b.Cent, Copse 5., Trench junction B.30.d.0.5.3.

The 2nd Aust. Div south of the SOMME had advanced to H.17 where its two companies had been thrown across the canal but could advance no further on account of heavy I.G. fire from North of the river. The position of the Division on the North was very uncertain and the Brigade on our left was sent backwards in a westerly direction to maintain touch with them.

The casualties for the advance from VAUX wood were 8 Other ranks killed 2 Officers 87 other ranks wounded and the captures included

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS FROM AUGUST 21st 1918

In the late afternoon of 21st August troops of this Brigade moved from areas South of CERISY to positions in vicinity of SAILLY LAURETTE North of the SOMME in anticipation of relief of 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. Hqrs were established at K.22.b.6.2. near HALARD WOOD. Battalions located as under:-

SHEET 32 D.

37th Bn. K.19. 38th Bn. K.25. 39th Bn. G.35. 40th Bn. J.36.
10th A.L.T.M.Btty J.33.

On the 22nd inst. the day was very ~~h~~ hot and dusty and nearly all troops bathed and had changes of clothing. The bivouac areas were subjected to scattered H.V. shelling but no damage was suffered.

On 23rd inst. 39th Battalion was moved forward early in the morning to position in K.31. ready for support to 9th Aust. Inf. Bde on account of the troops on their left flank being pressed back by enemy opposition. This situation on the left remained somewhat obscure throughout the day.

On the night 23/24th August the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. relieved 9th Aust. Inf. Bde in the line which ran along the Western outskirts of BRAY to L.15.a.Cent to Cross roads at L.9.d.2.0. thence along road Northward to Chalk Pit L.3.d.5.8.

Battalions were disposed as under:-

3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (attached) opposite to LA NEUVILLE and along the West side of river to L.15.c.4.4.
37th Bn. thence to Cross Roads at L.9.d.2.0.
38th Bn. thence to Chalk Pit
39th Bn. forming a defensive flank from Chalk Pit to L.2. Central on account of uncertainty of the position of the Division on our left.

40th Battalion and 37th Battalion (with 1 Coy) formed up during progress of the relief on a jumping-off line N. of C. through CRUCIFIX at L.15.c.2.7. ready to capture BRAY, ZERO HOUR for attack being 1 a.m. on the 24th August.

3
Brigade Hqrs moved at 5 p.m. to K.28.d.9.3.

During the relief the enemy shelled forward areas heavily but did little damage.

On their approach march the 40th Battalion met with some delay owing to the road near K.22.b.3.0. being blocked which resulted in Lewis Guns having to be unloaded from limbers and carried forward. The Battalion was on its jumping off line by 12.30 a.m. having suffered no casualties.

Communication by wire was almost impossible owing to the frequency with which the wires were cut. Power Buzzers owing to the atmospheric disturbances were unreliable and messages were sent by runners a distance of 3000 yards and then telephoned through.

37th Battalion prior to their moving off relieved portion of 35th Battalion but were ready to assist on North of BRAY at ZERO, their role being protection of left flank of 40th Bn. by establishing 4 posts between road junction at L.16.a.2.9. and L.9.d.4.7.

Our artillery opened with a good barrage at 1 a.m. moving by 100 yards lifts every 3 minutes throughout. The enemy replied at once by heavy machine gun fire and very shortly afterwards by much artillery, 4.2", 5.9" and 8" being used especially in the gullies in L.20.b. and in L.14.d.

The attacking troops - 2 Coys of 40th Bn attacking with 1 Coy of 37th Bn. on left; 1 Coy of 40th Bn mopping up and 1 Coy carrying - got away well on the left of the barrage at 1.3 a.m.

Those on the Northern outskirts of the village came under heavy machine gun fire and sustained fairly heavy casualties - the Left Coy Commander, Major L.F. GIBLIN D.S.O., I.C. being among the wounded. The progress of this company was slow on account of machine gun fire but the assistance of a platoon of the 37th Bn. was obtained after a long delay owing to the messenger sent to ask for this assistance becoming a casualty. On account of this delay the artillery was kept firing for 15 minutes longer than programme time to allow consolidation to be completed.

The Right Coy met with slight opposition in the Southern end of the town.

By 2.30 a.m. both Right and Left Companies were through the town with the mopping up Coy almost through.

During consolidation of the objective - L.13.d.0.0. to L.13. Central to L.13.a.2.9. - considerable machine gun fire was encountered from the spur in L.13.d. but some very good work was done by the 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery's Stokes Mortars, one battery of 4 enemy machine guns being knocked out and others silenced. By 3.30 a.m. all objectives had been reached and consolidation was progressing and by 4 a.m. the village had been cleared by the of the enemy by the mopping up party. The opposition in the village had been determined at first, as the enemy had expected the attack; but as soon as he discovered that the North and South parties had worked round the flanks of the village the enemy surrendered freely and a total of 2 Officers 184 other ranks was captured - 1 Officer and 100 Other Ranks unwounded and 1 Officer 78 Other Ranks wounded. Material captured was considerable, 40th Battalion securing 22 machine guns and 2 Minenwerfer and the 37th Battalion 9 machine guns and some a signalling apparatus. In addition the Railway yard contained many trucks of R.E. material and there were enormous quantities of munitions and war stores in the huge dump East of the town.

The casualties sustained by the attacking troops for the operation were 2 Other Ranks killed and 1 Officer 40 other ranks wounded.

The 3rd Aust. Pioneer Battalion assisted the attack by covering the right flank on the South side of the river - establishing 3 posts around LA NEUVILLE.

During the day of 24th inst up till about 7 p.m. enemy shelled very heavily all forward positions with guns of heavy calibre but very few casualties were sustained.

On 24th inst. instructions were given for the advance to continue during the night 24/25th. This advance was carried out by the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde on the Left, the objective being the high ground East and Northeast of BRAY with a final line of consolidation along the line of the road from Cross roads at L.24.c.2.1. through squares 24 a and c 18 a and c to Brigade boundary at L.11.d.7.6. thence Northerly along the same road. On consolidation of this objective patrols were to be pushed forward to the river bank and a switch line from L.17.b. through L.18.c. was to be constructed.

24/25th Aug 1918. The attack of 10th A.I. Bde was carried out by 37th Battalion under Lt-Col. C.B. Story on the right with 2 Coys (A and B) in line B Company mopping up and C Company in support; 39th Battalion on left under Lt-Col. R.O. Henderson D.S.O. with C Company on the right, A Coy in the centre B Company on left flank, and D Coy as reserve.

40th Battalion mopped up the area South of the 37th Battalion as far as south as the river and established a strong bridgehead post at L.24.c.1.1.

38th Battalion were in reserve West of BRAY.

25th AUGUST 1918 The attack was carried out with the support of an artillery barrage at 2.30 a.m. on the 25th August. Attacking troops formed up by 2 a.m. on the start line - a North and South line through cross roads at L.10.c.0. This necessitated the withdrawal of the 40th Bn from the posts established on the capture of BRAY. 37th and 39th Battalions were relieved at dusk by 38th Battalion in line left - this line afterwards being handed over to 11th Aust Inf Bde.

The assembly was carried out without mishap, the enemy artillery fire which had been severe during the day having slackened after nightfall.

Our barrage went down promptly at ZERO and the enemy quickly replied with artillery fire which was never very intense. No infantry opposition was met with until near final objective. This was quickly overcome and 20 prisoners of 20th Regiment, 4th Division were captured.

During consolidation of the GREEN LINE, which was covered by guns of 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery and a protective artillery barrage, enemy artillery increased and continued heavy scattered shelling over the whole of the high ground on the peninsula East of BRAY throughout the 25th inst.

The position of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde on the South of the river ran L.1.Cent., to G.31.d.O.O. to West outskirts of GAPPY, so that the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde still required to watch river crossing N.W. of GAPPY.

Ten (10) Machine Guns and approximately 100 prisoners were captured in this operation.

Consolidation being completed, patrols were pushed out to the river through South and of CEYLON WOOD and came under enemy machine gun fire. About noon a command post was established near the Railway Station at BRAY just before dark on 25th. At the same time the 40th Battalion moved one Company to dotted GREEN LINE on map attached.

At 2 a.m. on 25th inst orders were received for the advance to be continued by bounds - the rate of advance to be regulated by the movement of troops of the Division on the left. 11th Aust Inf Bde was on our left and had on its left 58th division troops.

The stages of advance laid down (as shown in attached map) were:-

- 1st stage G.9.c.S.S., G.8.a.Cent, G.1.d.S.S. to TRIGGER WOOD.
- 2nd stage S.S. Corner SUZANNE, cross roads at G.8.b.C.7., G.8.Cent, Copse "N", A.26.Cent
- 3rd stage G.15.b.Cent, G.9.d.Cent, G.3.Cent, Copse "J", A.26. Cent.

The inter-Brigade boundary ran from L.12. Cent to Cross roads in VAUX WOOD, G.4.Cent.

A troop of 15th Light Horse was allotted this Brigade for reconnaissance patrol work, but on account of machine gun fire were compelled to work dismounted most of the earlier part of the 25th.

The troops on left of the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde were held up near BILLON Copse and later, owing to the inter-Brigade reliefs, their advance was delayed with the result that no move could be made by this Brigade.

A captured enemy map gave the enemy successive lines of resistance on the country east of SUZANNE. This proved useful to our troops when they attacked on 26th inst.

25/26th August 1918 At about midnight a wire from 3rd Aus. Div. was received stating that the 58th Division troops had been ordered to push forward during the night, and that 11th and 10th Aust Inf Brigades were to conform, and were ordered to take the first two objectives - Lines "A" and "B" and the 37th Bn. the 3rd - "C" Line - 1 troop of 15th Light Horse carried out patrol work.

The 39th Battalion attacked "A" line without artillery barrage and had the 4th Battalion on their left. "C" and "B" Companies attacked with "A" Company support and with "D" Coy carrying.

A machine gun in CHATEAU WOOD, was silenced by Lewis guns of the right Coy and captured.

26th August, 1918 By 5 a.m. on 26th August a series of posts had been dug and occupied along "A" line, shown in attached map, and patrols were being pushed out into the village. The 37th Bn. moved to a position of readiness for attack on "C" line and were located along approximately Grid line between L.11., L.12 on western edge of CEYLON WOOD.

At 8.30 a.m. on 26th the 9th Bn. commenced to move through SUZANNE to "B" line with D.C. and A Coys attacking and B Coy in support in rear of cemetery G.8.a.

D Coy moved via the south of the village copping up the long street near the river and coming under heavy machine gun fire from the high ground to the north when nearly through the village street but moved under cover of banks on the north of the street to the old German trenches in G.9.c.Cent. The Centre and left Coys met with little opposition till they emerged from the east side of the village, when they encountered much machine gun and Minonwerfer fire. However they gradually moved across under covering Lewis Gun fire and in small parties reached their objectives on the spur in G.8.b and G.9.c consolidating a position and using as far as possible the German trenches.

Soon after the 39th Battalion got to the Eastern edge of the village enemy artillery, which had been very quiet during the night, opened and throughout the rest of the day continued with guns of all calibres to pound SUZANNE and the high ground to the West, first at SUZANNE Church and later at G.3.c.7.a

The 37th Battalion (Lt-Col. C.B. Story) were meanwhile moving through close on the heels of the 39th Battalion- "B" and "C" Coys in front line and "A" and "D" Coys supporting.

"B" Coy moved via the South of the village and occupied without difficulty trenches just in advance of 39th Battalion in G.9.c. "C" Coy on the left met with very considerable ... fire from MURRAY WOOD and from the German trenches in G.9.a. and b. MURRAY WOOD was attacked from the flanks by "C" Coy, 37th Battalion and by a party of 3 from the 39th Battalion under Lt. S. Le FEVRE. This latter party with a Lewis gun crawled from 39th Bn. trenches into MURRAY wood where they opened fire and drove back a party of 50 of the enemy, then, attacking a machine gun crew with revolvers, they and 37th Battalion flanking parties cleared the way for the advance of the 37th Bn. "C" Coy. This Coy had further considerable hand to hand fighting in the trenches in G.9.a. and b. up to the "C" line. From these ~~the~~ trenches the enemy fled in numbers towards VAUX wood: Many casualties were inflicted on him as he fled and in addition 1 prisoner and 1 machine gun were captured. During this stage of the advance the enemy used two 77 mm guns at close range until they were silenced by rifle and Lewis Gun fire. The enemy pulled these two guns by man power into a depression close by and later brought out two horse teams to remove them but Lewis Gun fire caused casualties to these teams and the enemy fled abandoning the guns, which however were removed at nightfall before our troops could get on the spot.

By 1.15 p.m. "C" line was completely occupied and was being consolidated. During this advance touch was lost with 44th Bn. on the left, but "D" Coy, 37th Bn. sent out liaison patrols and established touch when the objective was reached by 37th Bn.

On reaching "C" line further advance was held up till flank troops came up, so it was after dark on 26th August before the final mopping up of the peninsula as far as VAUX was possible, by which time the enemy had withdrawn all his troops and also his guns from the valley in G.10. Examination after the advance showed that many of these guns 21 cm and 10.5 cm had quite recently been emplaced and had not fired a shot.

Casualties for the day up to 6 p.m. were 3 other ranks killed, 1 Officer 40 other ranks wounded.

After dark "B" Coy on the right pushed forward and consolidated a line from G.10.c.3.0. to G.9.a.9.9. with "E" Coy, 38th Bn. (which with "D" Coy 38th Bn. had been attached to 37th Bn. at 10 a.m.) on their right

CLEARING OF VAUX WOOD South Spur

Shortly after 7 p.m. on 26th orders were received for this brigade to occupy SUZANNE-VAUX Spur south of the grid through 3 central, 4 central. This was to be carried out in conjunction with 11th A.I.Bde's operation on the left. The 38th Bn. (under command of C.O. 37th Bn.) were allotted South end of the peninsula to DRAGON wood inclusive, and 37th Bn. the north of this line with one platoon detailed for liaison with 11th A.I.Bde on the left.

27th AUGUST 1918

It was not till 7 a.m. on 27th August that the mopping up commenced but it was completed without any opposition, the enemy having withdrawn completely after blowing up bridges at ECLUSIER and VAUX. At the conclusion of this operation early on 27th August the 38th Bn. once again came under the orders of Major A.J.A. LAUDSLEY a/C.O. of 38th Bn. and established "A" Coy to watch ECLUSIER Crossings, "B" Coy to guard VAUX crossings, with "C" and "D" Coys in vicinity of VAUX wood.

At 9.30 a.m. on 27th verbal instructions were given for the relief of the Brigade by 9th A.I.Bde, but after orders had been issued to Units further instructions were received from 3rd Aust. Div. at 4 p.m. that the advance was to continue and that the 9th A.I.Bde would take over the line running North and North West of VAUX wood and would advance during the night, but that troops of the 10th A.I.Bde would remain in the vicinity of SUZANNE ready to move and come on the right of the 9th A.I.Bde when they had reached the vicinity of CURLU.

August 27/28th 1918

(5)

During the night 27/28th the 9th A.I. Bde attacked enemy positions in vicinity of FANGNY Wood and advanced to positions east of CURLU - the village itself was not mopped up.

As soon as this move had been carried out it was necessary for the 10th A.I. Bde to move round to the right flank of 9th A.I. Bde - The 38th Bn. (Major A.J.A. BUDSLEY) being detailed for this operation - one coy was sent at 7.30 a.m. on 28th by way of the causeways leading East from VAUX to reconnoitre and hold the peninsula between VAUX and CURLU as far south as PRISE. The Bridges across the various channels of the Somme which had been blown up by the retreating enemy were rapidly made trafficable for infantry - 3rd Aust Pioneers and 10th Field Coy Engineers being allotted for this work. A small account of H.G. fire was encountered from the CURLU side of the peninsula but by noon the spur was held and the crossing at H.12 d was denied the enemy.

August 28th 1918

At 5.30 p.m. on 28th August two Companies of 38th Bn (C and D Coys) were sent round along the North bank of the river to work through CURLU and take up a position on the right of the 9th A.I. Bde. Although the latter had posts East of CURLU the enemy had not been cleared from the village, "D" Coy moving through the village had some stiff fighting before the H.Gs and snipers were cleared out of the village, and sustained heavy casualties. 4 H.Gs were captured in the village and by daybreak of 29th a line of posts had been established about 150 yds S. and E. of CURLU. 38th Bn. Hqrs were established at I.29.b.3.2. early on night of 28th August but the area was so severely shelled that communication except by runner was impossible.

During the late afternoon of 28th inst. 40th Bn. moved in close support in valley near HILLIETRE Wood in G.9.b., G.10.a. and 37th and 39th Bns moved to positions in vicinity of SUZANNE.

August 28/29th August 1918.

The 38th Bn. having consolidated from G.3.d. to E.25.c.4.0. South-East of CURLU during the night 28/29th August at daylight on 29th pushed out reconnoitring patrols towards HEL. This was accomplished without any opposition and a line was established through H.9.Cent, H.5.d.0.0. H.3.b. central and at midday orders were issued for 38th Bn. to attack with 40th Bn. as Left Flank Guard. The first objective was to be trenches M. and N. in H.4. b. and d. The second was the high ground in B.29. TERLINE Trench "A" Squadron 15th Light Horse was sent forward to try and make hill 110 in B.27.c. and d. One section of 12 pdrs was allotted 38th Bn. and followed close after the attacking troops engaging fleeting targets with success. As soon as the Light Horse patrols moved forward enemy artillery and H.G. fire opened heavily, but the move forward continued by small parties working their way forward taking advantage of available cover and generally beating down enemy H.G. opposition until HANNETONS and TOURNOL Trench were reached about 1.30 p.m. Here the 38th Bn. was held up by H.G. fire. With the assistance of 2 Coys of 40th Bn (after a half hours artillery preparation on CLERY and COUL ALLEY) this was overcome and the advance continued. By 10. p.m. the 38th Bn. were on a line H.3.e., H.5.b.7.1., H.5.b.2.5., Copse 5., H.5.b.9.0., where touch was made with 34th Bn. The village of CLERY however had not been mopped up. The 40th Bn. had 2 Coys - flank guard - in GLAYOS ALLEY and 2 Coys in support on West and North Western edges of CLERY.

Battalion Hqrs were established - 38th at H.5.d.1.3, and 40th adjacent.

While this advance was taking place, 37th and 39th Battalions were moved forward from SUZANNE-VAUX area to bivouacs in H.1 and H.2. The inter-Brigade boundary was cross roads at E. corner HEL wood, E Corner HOJITZER Wood, 4.b.Cent, Copse 5., Trench junction B.30.d.0.5. 2.

The 2nd Aust. Div south of the SOMME had advanced to H.17 where two companies had been thrown across the canal but could advance no further on account of heavy H.G. fire from North of the river. The position of the Division on the North was very uncertain and the Brigade on our left was sent backwards in a westerly direction to maintain touch with them.

The casualties for the advance from VAUX wood were 8 Other ranks killed 2 Officers 37 other ranks wounded and the captures included

The opposition had become more pronounced as the line moved towards CLERY, the enemy realising that this was the key position to the taking of PERONNE, as the bridges on direct routes from the West over the SOLE had been destroyed and the enemy was in a position to prevent their repair. Troops for the attack on Mt. St. QUENTIN and further South had therefore to move via FEUILLERES and work through the area of the 10th A.I. Bde and were dependent for their success on the work of this Brigade.

August 29th - 30th 1918

On the night 29/30th August following on orders from 3rd Aust. Div., orders were issued for the 37th Bn. to advance on 30th inst. with 18th and 20th Bns, 2nd Aust. Div., cooperating on their right and 34th Bn. on their left. The first bound was to be to the GREEN LINE on map attached on which also are shown Divl. and Brigade boundaries. From that line further advance, if any, would be made by 37th Bn. on right and 40th Bn. on left - The 34th Bn being withdrawn. A squadron of 13th Light Horse was detailed for patrolling after capture of GREEN Line.

37th Bn. (under Lt-Col C.B. Story) had one battery of 18 pdrs of 3rd Army Bde A.F.A. attached to it and in addition one battery of 4.5 hows was pushed forward to work in close touch with attacking battalion commander.

As a preliminary move, 37th Bn. advanced during the night 29/30th through 38th Bn. to take up a line from just East of CLERY to H. 39. a. Cont.

37th Bn. moved off at 9 p.m., "A" Coy on right, "C" Coy in centre "D" Coy on left and "E" Coy in support. The night was intensely dark and direction had to be kept entirely by compass so progress was slow and it was difficult to maintain touch. However the line held by the 38th Bn. was ~~reached~~ reached without mishap, but it was impossible to locate definitely the jumping off line laid down and companies jumped off from the line of 38th battalion.

Soon after passing clear of the village of CLERY, Capt P.G. Towl "A" Coy, found that the enemy was still holding posts on his right and sent out two patrols to locate them. One post was located on the road some little distance East of CLERY. By this time "A" Coy was out of touch with the Coy on its left, so direction was changed slightly to the N.E. and touch was reestablished and almost at once enemy was found about 4.30 a.m. BERLINGOTS Trench I.L.a. and c. This opposition was soon overcome but "A" Coy again lost touch. However it pushed on meeting many Boche in dug outs. These offered little opposition in the main and 18 prisoners were taken. Another party of about 150 surrendered to a patrol of 4, but seeing how weak their captors were they decided to turn the tables. The patrol fired on them and they scattered and remanned the trenches, giving trouble later in the day.

This right coy reached VAN TRENCH but were out of touch on both flanks and the enemy quickly discovered this and commenced to fire on the Company. (by this time only about 20 strong) from front, flanks, and rear. He also counter attacked but was driven off by rifle and Lewis gun fire. The position, however, was such that no good purpose could be reached by staying in VAN TRENCH out of all touch with the remainder of the Battalion, so a withdrawal was made to BERLINGOTS Trench which was found to be ~~occupied~~ occupied by the enemy, who had worked in by means of communication trenches on the flanks. The enemy offered strong opposition and as the Coy now had only one officer, Capt Towl, and under 20 men, a further withdrawal to a bank about 100 yards to the west of BERLINGOTS Trench was decided on. This was carried out under cover of fire from Lewis gun and two captured enemy machine guns. In this position the Company was compelled to stay till the afternoon of 30th August, when the advance of the 2nd Aust. Div troops on the right brought relief. It was only by constant watchfulness and prompt action several times during the day that the enemy was prevented from surrounding and mopping up the little party whose position was all the more precarious owing to their having in their midst 15 prisoners who could not be got to the rear. Lts Cox and Willis with the centre ("C") Coy had attacked Van Trench further north round CLERY COPSE but were unable to make any headway and suffered very heavy casualties - only two men of the right party of 10 returning and both officers becoming casualties. The left coy had rather less opposition but were unable to reach the GREEN LINE and dug in on a bank about 400 yards behind the objective. CLERY Copse and surrounding trenches were very strongly held and several counter attacks were launched, but broke down under our artillery and rifle, Lewis and H.G. fire.

M. 95.

Headquarters

38th Battalion A.I.F.

7th October 1918.

O.B. "1" Coy

Forwarded herewith "Narrative of Events since Aug. 21st 1918" for perusal of all officers of your Coy, and return in order as below please.

Copies will later be made and issued to all officers.


A. Coy to B. Coy

B. Coy to HQ.

J.R. Robbins Lieut.

Adjutant. 38th Batta. A.I.F.

A Coy Lieut.

B. Coy. 

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS FROM AUGUST 21st 1918.

In the late afternoon of 21st August troops of this Brigade moved from areas south of GEMISY to positions in vicinity of SAINT LAURENTE North of the SOMME in anticipation of relief of 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. Hdqrs were established at K.22.b.6.2, near MALANO Wood. Battalions located as under:-

37th Bn. K.19. 38th Bn. K.25. 39th Bn. J.36. 40th Bn. J.36.
10th A.I. P.M. Btry J.36.

On the 22nd inst. the day was very hot and dusty and nearly all troops bathed and had changes of clothing. The bivouac areas were subjected to scattered H.V. shelling but no damage was suffered.

On 23rd inst. 39th Battalion was moved forward early in the morning to position in K.51. ready for support to 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. on account of the troops on their left flank being pressed back by enemy opposition. This situation on the left remained somewhat obscure throughout the day.

On the Night 23rd/24th August the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. relieved 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. in the line which ran along the Western outskirts of BRAY to L.15.a.0ent. to Cross Roads at L.9.d.2.0 thence along road Northward to Chalk pit L.3.d.5.8.

Battalions were disposed as under:-

3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (attached) opposite LA NEUVILLE and along the West side of the river to L.15.0.4.4.
37th Bn. thence to Cross Roads at L.9.d.2.0
38th Bn. thence to Chalk Pit.
39th Bn. forming a defensive flank from Chalk pit to L.2.0ent. on account of uncertainty of the position of the Division on our left.

40th Battalion and 37th Battalion (with 1 Coy.) formed up during progress of the relief on a jumping-off line N. & S. through DRUILLE at L.15.0.2.7. ready to capture BRAY, ZERO HOUR for attack being 1 a. m. on the 24th August.

Brigade Hdqrs moved at 6 p.m. to K.28.d.9.6.

During the relief the enemy shelled forward areas heavily but did little damage.

On their approach march the 40th Battalion met with some delay owing to the road near K.22.b.3.0. being blocked, which resulted in Lewis Guns having to be unloaded from limbers and carried forward. The battalion was on its jumping-off line by 12.30 a. m. having suffered no casualties.

Communication by wire was almost impossible owing to the frequency with which the wires were cut. Power Buzzers owing to the atmospheric disturbances were unreliable and messages were sent by runners a distance of 3,000 yards and then telephoned through.

37th Battalion prior to their moving off relieved portion of 35th Battalion but were ready to assist on North of BRAY at Zero, their role being the protection of left flank of 40th Batta by establishing 4 posts between road junction at L.16.a.2.9. and L.9.d.4.7.

Our artillery opened with a good barrage at 1 a. m. moving by 100 yards lifts every 3 minutes throughout. The enemy replied at once by heavy machine gun fire and very shortly afterwards by much artillery, 4.2", 5.9" and 9" being used especially in the gullies in L.20.b. and in L.14.d.

The attacking troops - 2 Coys of the 40th Battn attacking with 1 Coy. of 37th Battn on left; 1 Coy of the 40th Battn mopping up and 1 Coy. carrying - got away well on the left of the barrage at 1.3 a. m.

Those on the Northern outskirts of the village came under heavy machine gun fire and sustained fairly heavy casualties - the Left Coy. Commander, Major L.F. GIBLIN D.S.O., M.C., being among the wounded. The progress of this Company was slow on account of machine gun fire but the assistance of a platoon of the 37th Battn was obtained after a long delay owing to the messenger sent to ask for this becoming a casualty. On account of this delay the artillery was kept firing for 15 Minutes longer than programme time to allow consolidation to be completed.

The Right Company met with slight opposition in the Southern end of the town.

By 2.30 a. m. both Right and Left Companies were through the town with the mopping-up Company almost through.

During consolidation of the objective - L.16.c.1. to L.16.c.2.9. - considerable machine gun fire was encountered from the spur in L.16.d. but some very good work was done by the 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery's Stokes mortars, one battery of 4 enemy machine guns being knocked out and others silenced. By 3.30 a. m. all objectives had been reached and consolidation was progressing and by 4 a. m. the village had been cleared of the enemy by the mopping-up party. The opposition in the village had been determined at first, as the enemy had expected the attack. but as soon as he discovered that the North and South parties had worked round the flanks of the village the enemy surrendered freely and a total of 2 Officers 184 Other Ranks was captured - 1 Officer 106 Other Ranks unwounded and 1 Officer 78 Other Ranks wounded. Material captured was considerable, 40th Battalion securing 22 Machine Guns and 2 Minenwerfer and the 37th Battalion 9 Machine Guns and some signalling apparatus. In addition the railway yard contained many trucks of R.E. material and there were enormous quantities of munitions and war stores in the huge dump East of the town.

The casualties sustained by the attacking troops for the operation were 2 Other Ranks Killed, and 1 Officer 40th Other Ranks wounded.

The 3rd Aust. Pioneer Battalion assisted the attack by covering the right flank on the South side of the river - establishing three posts around LA NEUVILLE.

During the day of the 24th inst. up till about 7.0 p.m. enemy shelled very heavily all forward positions with guns of heavy calibre but very few casualties were sustained.

On the 24th inst. instructions were given for the advance to continue during the night 24th/25th. This advance was carried out by the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the Right with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the Left, the objective being the high ground East and Northeast of BRAY with a final line of consolidation along the line of the road from Cross roads at L.24.c.2.1. through Squares 24 a and c 18 a. and c. to Brigade boundary at L.11.d.7.6. thence Northerly along same road. On consolidation of this objective patrols were to be pushed forward to the river bank and a switch line from L.17 through L.18.a. was to be constructed.

24th/25th AUG. '18. The attack of 10th A.I. Brigade was carried out by 37th Battn under Lieut-Col. C. B. STORR on the right with 2 Companies ("A" and "D") in line, "B" Coy. mopping-up and "C" Coy. in support; 39th Battn on the left, under Lieut-Col. R.O. HENDERSON D.S.O., with "C" Coy. on the right, "A" Coy. in centre, "B" Coy. on the left flank, and "D" Coy. as reserve.

40th Battn mopped up the area South of the 37th Battn as far South as the river and established a strong bridgehead post at L.24.c.1.1. 39th Battalion were in reserve West of BRAY.

25th AUGUST '18 The attack was carried out with the support of an artillery barrage at 2.30 a. m. on the 25th August. Attacking troops formed up by 2 a. m. on the start line - a North and South line through cross roads at L.10.c.0.3. This necessitated the withdrawal of the 40th Battalion from the posts established on the capture of BRAY; 37th and 39th Battalions were relieved at dusk by the 38th Battalion in line left - this line afterwards being handed over to the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde.

The assembly was carried out without mishap, the enemy artillery fire, which had been severe during the day, having slackened after nightfall.

Our barrage went down promptly at ZERO and the enemy quickly replied with artillery fire which was never very intense. No infantry opposition was met with until near final objective. This was quickly overcome and 20 prisoners of 203rd Regiment, 43rd Division were captured.

During consolidation of the GREEN Line, which was covered by guns of 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery and a protective Artillery barrage, enemy artillery increased and continued heavy scattered shelling over the whole of the high ground on the peninsula East of BRAY throughout the 25th inst.

The position of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Brigade on the South of the river ran M.1.Cent., to G.31.d.0.0. to West outskirts of CAPPY, so that the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade still required to watch river crossing N.W. of CAPPY.

Ten (10) Machine guns and approximately 100 prisoners were captured in this operation.

Consolidation being completed, patrols were pushed out to the river through South end of CEYLON Wood and came under enemy machine gun fire. About Noon a command post was established near the Railway station at BRAY and the 38th Battalion moved to a position on the East of BRAY just before dark on the 25th. At the same time the 40th Battalion moved 1 Company to dotted GREEN Line on map attached.

At 9 a. m. on the 25th inst. orders were received for the advance to be continued by bounds - the rate of advance to be regulated by the movement of troops of the Division on the left. 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade was on our left and had on its left 58th Div. troops.

The stages of advance laid down (as shown in attached map) were:-

- 1st stage G.8.c.0.8., G.8.a.Cent., G.1.d.0.8. to TRIGGER Wood.
- 2nd. " S.E. Corner SUZANNE, cross roads at G.8.b.6.7., G.2.Cent., Copse "N", A.26.Cent.
- 3rd " G.15.b.Cent., G.9.d.Cent., G.3.Cent., Copse "J", A.26.Cent.

The inter-brigade boundary ran from L.12.Cent. to cross roads in VAUX Wood, G.4.Cent.

A troop of 13th Light Horse was allotted this Brigade for reconnaissance patrol work, but on account of machine gun fire were compelled to work dismounted most of the earlier part of the 25th.

The troops on left of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade were held up near BILLON Copse and later, owing to inter-brigade reliefs, their advance was delayed with the result that no more could be made by this Brigade.

A captured enemy map gave the enemy successive lines of resistance on the country East of SUZANNE. This proved useful to our troops when they attacked on 26th inst.

25/26th AUG. '18. At about midnight a wire from 3rd Aust. Div. was received stating that the 50th Division troops had been ordered to push forward during the night, and that 11th and 10th Aust. Inf. Brigades were to conform.

25/26th AUGUST '18.

were ordered to take the first two objectives - lines "A" and "B" - and the 37th Battn the third - "C" Line - One troop of 13th Light Horse carried out patrol work.

The 39th Battn attacked "A" Line without artillery barrage and had the 44th Battalion on their left. "C" and "B" Companies attacked, with "A" Company support and with "D" Company carrying.

A machine gun in CHATEAU Wood, which was silenced by Lewis guns of the Right Company and captured.

26th AUGUST '18. By 5 a. m. on the 26th August a series of posts had been dug and occupied along "A" Line shown in attached map, and patrols were being pushed out into the village. The 37th Battalion moved to a position of readiness for attack on "C" Line and were located along approximately grid line between L.11., L.12., on Western edge of CHATEAU Wood.

At 8.30 a. m. on the 26th the 39th Battalion commenced to move through SUZANNE to "B" Line with "D", "C" and "A" Companies attacking and "B" Company in support in rear of Cemetery G.8.a.

"D" Coy. moved via the south of the village mopping up the long street near the river and coming under heavy machine gun fire from the high ground to the North when nearly through the village street but moved under cover of banks on the North of the street to the old German trenches in G.9.c. Cent. The Centre and Left Companies met with little opposition till they emerged from the East side of the village, when they encountered much machine gun fire and mine-thrower fire. However they gradually moved across under covering Lewis gun fire and in small parties reached their objective on the spur in G.8.b. and G.9.c., consolidating a position and using as far as possible the German trenches.

Soon after the 39th Battn got to the Eastern edge of the village enemy artillery, which had been very quiet during the night, opened and throughout the rest of the day continued with guns of all calibres to pound SUZANNE and the high ground to the West, first at SUZANNE Church and later at G.8.c.7.a.

The 37th Battalion (Lieut-Col. C.B. STORY) were meanwhile moving through close on the heels of the 39th Battalion - "B" and "C" Companies in front line and "A" and "D" Companies supporting.

"B" Company moved via the south of the village and occupied without difficulty trenches just in advance of 39th Battalion in G.9.c. "C" Company on the left met with very considerable machine gun fire from MURRAY Wood and from the German trenches in G.9.a. and b. MURRAY Wood was attacked from the flanks by "C" Company 37th Battn and by a party of 3 from the 39th Battalion under Lieut. S. Le FEVRE. This latter party with a Lewis gun crawled from 39th Battn trenches into MURRAY Wood where they opened fire and drove back a party of 30 of the enemy, then, attacking a machine gun crew with revolvers, they and 37th Battn flanking parties cleared the way for the advance of the 37th Battn "C" Company. This Company had further considerable hand to hand fighting in the trenches in G.9.a. and b. up to the "C" line. From these trenches the enemy fled in numbers towards VAUX Wood; many casualties were inflicted on him as he fled and in addition 1 prisoner and 1 machine guns were captured. During this part of the advance the enemy used two 77 mm guns at close range until they were silenced by rifle and Lewis gun fire. The enemy pulled these two guns by man power into a depression close by and later brought out 2 horse teams to remove them, but Lewis gun fire caused casualties to these teams and the enemy fled abandoning the guns, which however were removed at nightfall before our troops could get on the spot.

By 1.15 p.m. "C" Line was completely occupied and was being consolidated. During this advance touch was lost with 44th Bde on the left, but "D" Coy. 37th Battalion sent out liaison patrols and established touch when the objective was reached by 37th Battalion.

On reaching "C" Line further advance was held up till flank troops came up, so it was after dark on 26th Aug. before the final mopping up of the peninsula as far as VAUX was possible, by which time the enemy had withdrawn all his troops and also his guns from the valley in G.10. Examination after the advance showed that many of these guns 21 cm and 10.5 cm had quite recently been emplaced and had not fired a shot.

Casualties for the day up to 6 p.m. were
3 ~~Other~~ Other Ranks killed, 1 Officer, 40 Other Ranks wounded.

After dark "B" Company on the right pushed forward and consolidated a line from G.10.c.3.0. to G.9.a.9.9. with "B" Company 38th Battalion (which with "A" Coy., 38th Bn. had been attached to the 37th Battalion at 10 a. m.) on their right.

CLEARING OF VAUX Wood Spur.

Shortly after 7 p.m. on 26th orders were received for this Brigade to occupy SUZANNE-VAUX Spur south of grid through 3 Cent., 4 Cent. This was to be carried out in conjunction with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde's operation on the left. The 38th Battalion (under command of the C.O. 37th Battalion) were allotted South end of the peninsula to DRAGON Wood inclusive, and 37th Battalion the North of this line with 1 platoon detailed for liaison with 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the left. **XX**

27th AUGUST '18.

It was not till 3 a. m. on the 27th August that the mopping-up commenced but it was completed without any opposition the enemy having withdrawn completely after blowing up bridges at ECLUSIER and VAUX. At the conclusion of this operation early on the 27th August the 38th Battalion again came under the orders of Major A.J.A. MAUDSLEY a/c.o. of 38th Battalion and established "A" Company to watch ECLUSIER Crossings, "B" Company to guard VAUX Crossings, with "C" and "D" Companies in vicinity of VAUX Wood.

At 9.30 a. m. on the 27th verbal instructions were given for the relief of the Brigade by 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade, but after orders had been issued to units further instructions were received from 3rd Aust. Division at 4 p.m. that the advance was to continue and that the 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade would take over the line running North and North-west of VAUX Wood and would advance during the night, but that troops of the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade would remain in the vicinity of SUZANNE ready to move and come on the right of the 9th Aust. Inf. Bde when they had reached the vicinity of CURU.

August 27/28th 1918.

During the night 27/28th the 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade attacked enemy positions in vicinity of FARGNY Wood and advanced to positions East of CURLU - the village itself was not mopped up.

As soon as this move had been carried out it was necessary for the 10th A.I. Brigade to move round to the right flank of 9th A.I. Brigade - the 38th Battn (Major A.J.A. MAUDSLEY) being detailed for this operation - one Company was sent at 7.30 a. m. on 28th by way of the causeways leading East from VAUX to reconnoitre and hold the peninsula between VAUX and CURLU as far South as FARGNY. The bridges across the various channels of the SOMME which had been blown by the retreating enemy were rapidly made trafficable for infantry - 3rd Aust. Pioneers and 10th Field Coy. Engineers being allotted for this work. A small amount of machine gun fire was encountered from the CURLU side of the peninsula but by Noon the spur was held and the crossing at H.12.d. was denied the enemy.

August 28th 1918.

At 3.30 p.m. on 28th August ~~the enemy~~ two Companies of 38th Battalion ("C" and "D" Companies) were sent round along the North bank of the river to work through CURLU and take up a position on the right of the 9th A.I. Brigade. Although the latter had posts East of CURLU the enemy had not been cleared from the village. "D" Company moving through the village had some stiff fighting before the machine guns and snipers were cleared out of the village, and sustained heavy casualties. 4 Machine guns were captured in the village and by daybreak on the 29th a line of posts had been established about 150 yards S. and E. of CURLU.

38th Battn Headquarters were established at H.29.b.2.2. early on night of 28th August but the area was so severely shelled that communication except by runner was impossible.

During the late afternoon of 28th inst. 40th Battalion moved to close support in valley near MILLIMETRE Wood in G.9.b., G.10.e., and 37th and 39th Battn moved to positions in vicinity of SUZANNE.

August 28/29th 1918 The 38th Battn having consolidated from G.6.d. to B.25.c.4.0 South-East of CURLU during the night 28/29th August at daylight on 29th pushed out reconnoitring patrols towards HEM. This was accomplished without any opposition and a line was established through H.9.Central, H.3.d.0.0. H.2.b.Central and at midday orders were ~~issued~~ issued for 38th Battalion to attack with 40th Battalion as Left Flank Guard. The first objective was to be trenches N. and S. in H.4.b. and d. The second was the high ground in B.29. TERLINE Trench. "A" Squadron 13th Ligh. Horse was sent forward to try and make Hill 110 in B.23.c. and d. One Section of 18 pdrs was allotted 38th Battalion and followed close after the attacking troops engaging fleeting targets with success. As soon as the Light Horse patrols moved forward enemy artillery and machine gun fire opened heavily, but the forward move continued by small parties working their way forward taking advantage of available cover and generally beating down enemy machine gun opposition until HANNETONS and TOURNOL Trench were reached about 1.30 p.m. Here the 38th Battalion were held up by machine gun fire. With the assistance of 2 Companies of 40th Battn (after a half hours artillery preparation on CLERY and CODE Alley) this was overcome and the advance continued. By 10 p.m. 38th Battn were on a line H.6.c., H.5.b.7.1., H.5.b.2.5., Copse 5., H.5.b.9.0., where touch was made with 34th Battn. The village of CLERY however had not been mopped up. The 40th Battn had 2 Companies - flank guard - in GLANDS Alley and 2 Coys in Support on West and North Western edges of CLERY.

Battn Hdqrs were established:- 38th at H.3.d.1.6., and 40th adjacent.

While this advance was taking place,, 37th and 39th Battns were moved forward from SUZANNE-VAUX Area to bivouacs in H.1 and H.2. The Inter-brigade boundary was cross roads at S.W. Corner HEM Wood E.corner HOWITZER Wood, 4. b. Cent., Copse 5, Trench junction B.30.d.9.5. E

The 2nd Aust. Div. south of the SOMME had advanced to H.17. where two Companies had been thrown across the canal but could advance no further on account of very heavy machine gun fire from North of the river. The position of the Division on the North was very uncertain and the brigade on our left was bent backwards in a Westerly direction to maintain touch with them.

The casualties for the advance from VAUX Wood were 8 Other Ranks killed, 2 Officers 87 Other Ranks wounded and the captures included

The opposition had become more pronounced as the line moved towards CLERY, the enemy realizing that this was the key position to the taking of BERONNE, as the bridges on direct routes from the West over the SOMME had been destroyed and the enemy was in a position to prevent their repair. Troops for the attack on MT. ST.QUENTIN and further South had therefore to move via FEUILLERES and work through the area of the 10th A.I. Brigade and were dependent for their success on the work of this Brigade.

August 29/30th 1918.

On the night 29/30th August following on orders from 3rd Aust. Division, orders were issued for the 37th Battalion to advance on 30th instant with 18th and 20th Battns, 2nd Aust. Div., co-operating on their right and 34th Battn on their left. The first bound was to be to the GREEN Line on map attached on which also are shown Divisional and brigade boundaries. From that line further advance, if any, would be made by 37th Battalion on the right and 40th Battalion on the left - the 34th Battalion being withdrawn. A squadron of 13th Light Horse was detailed for patrolling after capture of the GREEN Line.

37th Battalion (under Lieut-Col. C. B. STORY) had 1 battery of 18 pdrs of 3rd Army Bde, A.F.A. attached to it and in addition 1 battery of 4.5" Hows was pushed forward to work in close touch with attacking Battalion Commander.

As a preliminary move, 37th Battalion advanced during the night 29/30th through 38th Battalion to take up a line from just East of CLERY to H.29.a.Central.

37th Battalion moved off at 9 p.m., "A" Coy. on right, "C" Coy., in centre, "D" Coy. on left and "B" Coy. in support. The night was intensely dark and direction had to be kept entirely by compass so progress was slow and it was difficult to maintain touch. However the line held by the 38th Battalion was reached, without mishap, but it was impossible to locate definitely the jumping-off line laid down and companies jumped off from the line of 38th Battalion.

Soon after passing clear of the village of CLERY, Capt. P. G. TOWLE, "A" Coy. found that the enemy was still holding posts on his right and sent out 2 patrols to locate them. One post was located on the road some little distance East of CLERY. By this time "A" Coy. was out of touch with the Company on its left, so direction was changed slightly to the N.W. and touch was re-established and almost at once enemy was found about 4.30 a. m. BERLINGOTS Trench I.l.s. and c. This opposition was soon overcome but "A" Coy. again lost touch. However it pushed on meeting many Boche in dugouts. These offered little opposition in the main and 18 prisoners were taken. Another party of about 150 surrendered to a patrol of 4, but seeing how weak their captors were they decided to turn the tables. The patrol fired on them and they scattered and remanned the trenches, giving trouble later in the day.

This right Company reached VAN Trench but were out of touch on both flanks and the enemy quickly discovered this and commenced to fire on the Coy. (by this time only about 20 strong) from front, flanks and rear. He also counter-attacked but was driven off by rifle and Lewis gun fire. The position, however, was such that no good purpose

could be reached by staying in VAN Trench out of all touch with the remainder of the Battalion, so a withdrawal was made to BERLINGOT'S Trench which was found to be reoccupied by the enemy who had worked in by means of communication trenches on the flanks. The enemy offered strong opposition and as the Coy. now had only one Officer (Captain TOWL) and under 20 men, a further withdrawal to a bank about 100 yards to the West of BERLINGOT'S Trench was decided on. This was carried out under cover from fire of Lewis gun and two captured enemy machine guns. In this position the Company was compelled to stay till the afternoon of 30th August, when the advance of 2nd Aust. Div. troops on the right brought relief. It was only by constant watchfulness and prompt action several times during the day that the enemy was prevented from surrounding and mopping up the little party whose position was all the more precarious owing to their having in their midst 15 prisoners who could not be got to the rear. Lieuts. COX and WILLIS with the Centre ("C") Coy. had attacked VAN Trench further North round CLERY Copse but were unable to make any headway and suffered very heavy casualties - only 2 men of the right party of 10 returning and both Officers becoming casualties. The left Company had rather less opposition but were unable to reach the GREEN Line and dug in on a bank about 400 yards behind the objective.

CLERY Copse and surrounding trenches were very strongly held and several counter-attacks were launched, but broke down under our artillery and rifle, Lewis and machine gun fire.

Aug. 30th '18 The Support Company, 37th Battn, was brought forward early in the morning of the 30th August to reinforce the depleted line Companies but the opposition was too severe for any advance to be made.

At about 10.45 a. m. the 40th Battn was ordered forward to H.5.b. - one Company ("B" Capt. MCINTYRE) being placed under orders of 37th Battn to clear up CLERY Village. Another Coy. ("D") was attached to Centre Coy. 37th Battn to operate against CLERY Copse. At 2 p.m. after artillery and Stokes preparation the copse was attacked. Again the enemy machine gun fire was too concentrated to allow any appreciable advance - heavy casualties were again inflicted on us including 2 out of 3 attacking Officers and it was found impossible to make any headway and the further attack was postponed till the 38th and 39th Battns could advance together after nightfall.

The clearing up of CLERY Village by "B" Coy. 40th Battn was carried out in fine style in the face of much severe opposition, but by skilful handling of his troops Captain MCINTYRE succeeded in locating the enemy machine guns. A ~~strong~~ heavy artillery shoot was put down on these and the attacking troops followed close behind and rushed the positions, capturing two machine guns and 59 prisoners. The Boche made off down communication trenches and suffered heavy casualties from our Lewis gun fire in his retreat.

Lewis gun fire in counter
At 2.30 p.m. a small counter-attack was beaten off and "B" Coy. reinforced by "A" Coy. took up their positions on the Eastern edge of the village.

By this time the 18th and 20th A.I. Battns had commenced to move forward past the village (having crossed the SOMME at FEUILLERES) and in the face of our growing opposition the enemy gradually withdrew. About 9 a. m. the Brigade Command post was established just West of CLERY in H.5.b. and it was largely owing to the close touch which the G.O.C. was able to keep with his Battalions that troops were able to be pushed in to meet the many counter-attacks launched during the day, especially around CLERY Copse. Enemy artillery was intense throughout the day over the whole area H.5. and H.6.a. and b. The 30th was probably the most severe and ticklish day's work the Brigade had yet had, and it was only by the determined way in which the enemy counter-attacks were met that prevented the enemy from mopping up front line troops.

Prisoners obtained in this area were 2nd Guards Div. and were comparatively fresh troops but were not at all averse from being taken prisoner unless they found themselves in a big majority.

During the afternoon of 30th August order C.H.J.11 from 3rd Aust. Division was received for further advance on 31st.

At 7 p.m. on the 30th August a conference of Battalion Commanders was called at Brigade Command Post, at which orders were given for the further advance.

The next stage in the attack was to be carried out by the 38th Battalion (Lt. Col. J. A. MAUDSLEY) on the right; 39th Battalion (Lieut-Col. R. O. HENDERSON D.S.O.) on the left; the latter having moved during the morning of the 30th to H.5.a. and c.

The attacking battalions had - 38th Battn 3 Companies in line with 1 Coy. in close support - 39th Battn 2 Coys in line, 1 in support and 1 in reserve. The 20th Battn was on right of 38th Battn and 33rd Battn was on the left of 39th Battn; boundaries being as shown in attached map. The 40th Battn were in support of the 38th and the 37th Battn in support of the 39th Battn.

The action was to be dependent on the 9th A.I. Brigade making the line C.25.Cent., DEVILLARS Alley, COTHMERCY Trench, Cross Roads C.20.d.3.1.; QUARRY Farm to G.14.c.8.2.

The general plan was to swing gradually the right flank so that the line would ultimately run almost East and West and the Division on the North would work S.E. and meet it, but this Brigade was relieved before that stage could be reached.

Aug. 31st '18 The attack was carried out with artillery barrage which came down punctually at ZERO (6 a. m.) on right but was somewhat ragged on the left.

The enemy offered considerable opposition especially in vicinity of CLERY Copse where he brought up supports but without avail. The enemy also used 77 mm guns at very close range. However the objective was gained by 8 a. m. and was consolidated. Casualties were heavy but the enemy also lost heavily both in killed and prisoners, about 300 of the latter being taken.

Captures included 7 field guns, 1 heavy trench mortar and many machine guns.

Owing to the death from shell fire at daybreak of Major MAUDSLEY (Acting C.O. of 38th Battn) this Battn came under orders of C.O. 39th Battn at 10 a. m. Enemy machine guns continued to be very active after the objective was reached and 4 Stokes mortars were sent forward to deal with them. It was difficult to get them into position but this was done at last and at least two machine guns were put out of action by their shells.

At 10.30 a. m. a strong enemy counter-attack from I.2. Cent. C.26.d. developed. The 39th Battn brought up its reserve Coy. and artillery opened on the valley in I.2. Cent. and C.26. Cent; between the two the attack failed.

The 2nd Aust. Div. troops on the right who had attacked at 5 a. m. had been successful in taking Mr. ST. QUENTIN and FEUILLAU-COURT but the position of the Brigade on the left was not clear and touch was lost on this flank but was obtained about Noon.

A gap existing between 38th and 39th Battalions "C" Coy. 40th Battn were pushed to fill up this gap and very soon had 1 machine gun and 45 prisoners and also two 7.5 Minnenwerfer in action. The crews were captured and the 40th had the satisfaction of turning the guns on to a Hun post.

"A" Coy. 40th Battn were also sent forward on the left of 38th Battn and Battn Hdqrs moved to a point about 300 yards N.E. of CLERY Copse. Two F.O.O's - Major H. GLOVER, 26th Battery A.F.A. and Captain B. L. MAVIES, 25th Battery A.F.A. were stationed here also and did some excellent work both on enemy's positions and also on enemy massing for counter-attacks.

The objective for the day was the main road BOUCHAVESNES-MT. ST. QUENTIN. Much good work was done by the 40th Battalion on the right - snipers and Lewis gunners accounting for many Boche and on several occasions breaking up parties massing for counter-attack.

The excellence of the signal communications of this Batta and their close liaison with Artillery enabled guns to deal quickly with bodies of the enemy and at least twice during the 31st led to counter-attacks being taken up before they could develop.

The 39th Battalion on the left flank in touch with 9th A.I. Brigade had their left flank on the cross roads in C.20.d.3.1. and their right flank in HERSTFIELD trench; 37th and 38th Battns being along brown line in attached map.

During the afternoon in order to facilitate the relief by 11th A.I. Brigade troops were ordered forward on the line of BOUCHAVESNES - MT. ST. QUENTIN Road. Everyone was utterly tired out as a result of the previous weeks strenuous fighting but the prospect of relief put new heart into them and first the 40th on the right then the 39th Batta on the left and 37th Batta in centre pushed forward.

The relief by the 11th A.I. Brigade was a slow process, the night being exceptionally dark and as they were to advance under barrage in the morning at 5 a. m. 1st September, their arrival was anxiously looked for so that outgoing troops might be clear before the enemy's barrage in reply to our could come down. However by a narrow margin the troops of this Brigade were able to get just clear of the danger zone in time and withdrew to bivouacs around CUMU where the respective Quartermasters had hot meals in readiness.

The casualties suffered since the attack on BRAY had numbered 6 Officers, 44 Other Ranks Killed. 29 Officers 377 Other Ranks wounded and 1 Officer 5 Other Ranks missing. Prisoners taken more than equalled the total casualties and the enemy casualties from our fire were, especially on the last two days of the month, very heavy.

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS FROM AUGUST 21st 1918.

In the late afternoon of 21st August troops of this Brigade moved from areas south of CERISY to positions in vicinity of SAILLY LAURETTE North of the SOMME in anticipation of relief of 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. Hdqrs were established at K.22.b.6.2. near MALAND Wood. Battalions located as under:-

SHEET 62 D.

37th Bn. K.19. 38th Bn. K.25. 39th Bn. J.35. 40th Bn. J.36.
10th A.L.T.M.Btty J.36.

On the 22nd inst. the day was very hot and dusty and nearly all troops bathed and had changes of clothing. The bivouac areas were subjected to scattered H.V. shelling but no damage was suffered.

On 23rd inst. 39th Battalion was moved forward early in the morning to position in K.31. ready for support to 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. on account of the troops on their left flank being pressed back by enemy opposition. This situation on the left remained somewhat obscure throughout the day.

On the Night 23rd/24th August the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. relieved 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. in the line which ran along the Western outskirts of BRAY to L.15.a.Cent. to Cross Roads at L.9.d.2.0. thence along road Northward to Chalk Pit B.3.d.5.8.

Battalions were disposed as under:-

3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (attached) opposite LA NEUVILLE and along the West side of the river to L.15.c.4.4.
37th Bn. thence to Cross roads at L.9.d.2.0.
38th Bn. thence to Chalk pit.
39th Bn. forming a defensive flank from Chalk pit to L.2.Central on account of uncertainty of the position on the Division on our left.

40th Battalion and 37th Battalion (with 1 Coy.) formed up during progress of the relief on a jumping-off line N. & S. through CHUCLIFX at L.15.c.2.7. ready to capture BRAY, ZERO HOUR for attack being 1 a. m. on the 24th August.

Brigade Hdqrs moved at 6 p.m. to K.28.d.9.6.

During the relief the enemy shelled forward areas heavily but did little damage.

On their approach march the 40th Battalion met with some delay owing to the road near K.22.b.3.0. being blocked, which resulted in Lewis Guns having to be unloaded from limbers and carried forward. The battalion was on its jumping-off line by 12.30 a. m. having suffered no casualties.

Communication by wire was almost impossible owing to the frequency with which the wires were cut. Power Buzzers owing to the atmospheric disturbances were unreliable and messages were sent by runners a distance of 3,000 yards and then telephoned through.

37th Battalion prior to their moving off relieved portion of 35th Battalion but were ready to assist on North of BRAY at Zero, their role being the protection of left flank of 40th Batta by establishing 4 posts between road junction at L.16.a.2.9. and L.9.d.4.7.

Our artillery opened with a good barrage at 1 a. m. moving by 100 yards lifts every 3 minutes throughout. The enemy replied at once by heavy machine gun fire and very shortly afterwards by much artillery, 4.2", 5.9" and 8" being used especially in the gullies in L.20.b. and in L.14.d.

The attacking troops - 2 Coys of the 40th Battn attacking with 1 Coy. of 37th Battn on left; 1 Coy of the 40th Battn mopping up and 1 Coy. carrying - got away well on the left of the barrage at 1.3 a. m.

Those on the Northern outskirts of the village came under heavy machine gun fire and sustained fairly heavy casualties - the Left Coy. Commander, Major L.F. GIBLIN D.S.O., M.C., being among the wounded. The progress of this Company was slow on account of machine gun fire but the assistance of a platoon of the 37th Battn was obtained after a long delay owing to the messenger sent to ask for this becoming a casualty. On account of this delay the artillery was kept firing for 15 Minutes longer than programme time to allow consolidation to be completed.

The Right Company met with slight opposition in the Southern end of the town.

By 2.30 a. m. both Right and Left Companies were through the town with the mopping-up Company almost through.

During consolidation of the objective - L.16.d.O.O. to L.16.Central to L.16.a.2.9. - considerable machine gun fire was encountered from the spur in L.16.d. but some very good work was done by the 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery's Stokes mortars, one battery of 4 enemy machine guns being knocked out and others silenced. By 3.30 a. m. all objectives had been reached and consolidation was progressing and by 4 a. m. the village had been cleared of the enemy by the mopping-up party. The opposition in the village had been determined at first, as the enemy had expected the attack. but as soon as he discovered that the North and South parties had worked round the flanks of the village the enemy surrendered freely and a total of 2 Officers 184 Other Ranks was captured - 1 Officer 106 Other Ranks unwounded and 1 Officer 78 Other Ranks wounded. Material captured was considerable, 40th Battalion securing 22 Machine Guns and 2 Minenwerfer and the 37th Battalion 9 Machine Guns and some signalling apparatus. In addition the railway yard contained many trucks of R.E. material and there were enormous quantities of munitions and war stores in the huge dump East of the town.

The casualties sustained by the attacking troops for the operation were 2 Other Ranks Killed, and 1 Officer 40th Other Ranks wounded.

The 3rd Aust. Pioneer Battalion assisted the attack by covering the right flank on the South side of the river - establishing three posts around LA NEUVILLE.

During the day of the 24th inst. up till about 7.0 p.m. enemy shelled very heavily all forward positions with guns of heavy calibre but very few casualties were sustained.

On the 24th inst. instructions were given for the advance to continue during the night 24th/25th. This advance was carried out by the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the Right with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the Left, the objective being the high ground East and Northeast of BRAY with a final line of consolidation along the line of the road from Cross roads at L.24.c.2.1. through Squares 24 a and c 18 a. and c. to Brigade boundary at L.11.d.7.6. thence Northerly along same road. On consolidation of this objective patrols were to be pushed forward to the river bank and a switch line from L.17.b. through L.18.a. was to be constructed.

24th/25th AUG. '18. The attack of 10th A.I. Brigade was carried out by 37th Battn under Lieut-Col. C. B. STORY on the right with 2 Companies ("A" and "D") in line, "E" Coy. mopping-up and "C" Coy. in support; 39th Battn on the left under Lieut-Col. R.O. HENDERSON D.S.O., with "C" Coy. on the right, "A" Coy. in centre, "B" Coy. on the left flank, and "D" Coy. as reserve.

40th Battn mopped up the area South of the 37th Battn as far South as the river and established a strong bridgehead post at L.24.c.1.1. 39th Battalion were in reserve West of BRAY.

25th AUGUST '18 The attack was carried out with the support of an artillery barrage at 2.30 a. m. on the 25th August. Attacking troops formed up by 2 a. m. on the start line - a North and South line through cross roads at L.10.c.0.3. This necessitated the withdrawal of the 40th Battalion from the posts established on the capture of BRAY; 37th and 39th Battalions were relieved at dusk by the 38th Battalion in line left - this line afterwards being handed over to the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde.

The assembly was carried out without mishap, the enemy artillery fire, which had been severe during the day, having slackened after nightfall.

Our barrage went down promptly at ZERO and the enemy quickly replied with artillery fire which was never very intense. No infantry opposition was met with until near final objective. This was quickly overcome and 20 prisoners of 203rd Regiment, 43rd Division were captured.

During consolidation of the GREEN Line, which was covered by guns of 10th Aust. Light Trench Mortar Battery and a protective Artillery barrage, enemy artillery increased and continued heavy scattered shelling over the whole of the high ground on the peninsula East of BRAY throughout the 25th inst.

The position of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Brigade on the South of the river ran M.1.Cent., to G.31.d.0.0. to West outskirts of CAPPY, so that the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade still required to watch river crossing N.W. of CAPPY.

Ten (10) Machine guns and approximately 100 prisoners were captured in this operation.

Consolidation being completed, patrols were pushed out to the river through South end of CAYLON Wood and came under enemy machine gun fire. About Noon a command post was established near the Railway station at BRAY and the 38th Battalion moved to a position on the East of BRAY just before dark on the 25th. At the same time the 40th Battalion moved 1 Company to dotted GREEN Line on map attached.

At 9 a. m. on the 25th inst. orders were received for the advance to be continued by bounds - the rate of advance to be regulated by the movement of troops of the Division on the left. 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade was on our left and had on its left 58th Div. troops.

The stages of advance laid down (as shown in attached map) were:-

- 1st stage G.8.c.0.8., G.8.a.Cent., G.1.d.0.8. to TRIGGER Wood.
- 2nd. " G.11. Corner SUZANNE, cross roads at G.8.b.6.7., G.2.Cent., Copse "N", A.26.Cent.
- 3rd " G.15.b.Cent., G.9.d.Cent., G.3.Cent., Copse "J", A.26.Cent.

The inter-brigade boundary ran from L.12.Cent. to cross roads in VAUX Wood, G.4.Cent.

A troop of 15th Light Horse was allotted this Brigade for reconnaissance patrol work, but on account of machine gun fire were compelled to work dismounted most of the earlier part of the 25th.

The troops on left of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade were held up near BILLON Copse and later, owing to inter-brigade reliefs, their advance was delayed with the result that no more could be made by this Brigade.

A captured enemy map gave the enemy successive lines of resistance on the country East of SUZANNE. This proved useful to our troops when they attacked on 26th inst.

25/26th AUG. '18. At about midnight a wire from 3rd Aust. Div. was received stating that the 58th Division troops had been ordered to push forward during the night, and that 11th and 10th Aust. Inf. Brigades were to conform.

25/26th AUGUST '18.

were ordered to take the first two objectives - lines "A" and "B" - and the 37th Battn the third - "C" Line - One troop of 13th Light Horse carried out patrol work.

The 39th Battn attached "A" Line without artillery barrage and had the 44th Battalion on their left. "C" and "B" Companies attacked, with "A" Company support and with "D" Company carrying.

A machine gun in CHATEAU Wood, which was silenced by Lewis guns of the Right Company and captured.

26th AUGUST '18. By 5 a. m. on the 26th August a series of posts had been dug and occupied along "A" Line shown in attached map, and patrols were being pushed out into the village. The 37th Battalion moved to a position of readiness for attack on "C" Line and were located along approximately grid line between L.11., L.12., on Western edge of CHELON Wood.

At 8.30 a. m. on the 26th the 39th Battalion commenced to move through SUZANNE to "B" Line with "D", "C" and "A" Companies attacking and "B" Company in support in rear of Cemetery G.8.a.

"D" Coy. moved via the South of the village mopping up the long street near the river and coming under heavy machine gun fire from the high ground to the North when nearly through the village street but moved under cover of banks on the North of the street to the old German trenches in G.9.c. Cent. The Centre and Left Companies met with little opposition till they emerged from the East side of the village, when they encountered much machine gun fire and mine-thrower fire. However they gradually moved across under covering Lewis gun fire and in small parties reached their objective on the spur in G.8.b. and G.9.c., consolidating a position and using as far as possible the German trenches.

Soon after the 39th Battn got to the Eastern edge of the village enemy artillery, which had been very quiet during the night, opened and throughout the rest of the day continued with guns of all calibres to pound SUZANNE and the high ground to the West, first at SUZANNE Church and later at G.8.c.7.a.

The 37th Battalion (Lieut-Col. C.B. STORY) were meanwhile moving through close on the heels of the 39th Battalion - "B" and "C" Companies in front line and "A" and "D" Companies supporting.

"B" Company moved via the South of the village and occupied without difficulty trenches just in advance of 39th Battalion in G.9.c. "C" Company on the left met with very considerable machine gun fire from MURRAY Wood and from the German trenches in G.9.a. and b. MURRAY Wood was attacked from the flanks by "C" Company 37th Battn and by a party of 3 from the 39th Battalion under Lieut. S. Le FEVRE. This latter party with a Lewis gun crawled from 39th Battn trenches into MURRAY Wood where they opened fire and drove back a party of 30 of the enemy, then, attacking a machine gun crew with revolvers, they and 37th Battn flanking parties cleared the way for the advance of the 37th Battn "C" Company. This Company had further considerable hand to hand fighting in the trenches in G.9.a. and b. up to the "C" line. From these trenches the enemy fled in numbers towards VAUX Wood; many casualties were inflicted on him as he fled and in addition 1 prisoner and 1 machine gun were captured. During this stage of the advance the enemy used two 77 mm guns at close range until they were silenced by rifle and Lewis gun fire. The enemy pulled these two guns by man power into a depression close by and later brought out 2 horse teams to remove them, but Lewis gun fire caused casualties to these teams and the enemy fled abandoning the guns, which however were removed at nightfall before our troops could get on the spot.

By 1.15 p.m. "C" Line was completely occupied and was being consolidated. During this advance touch was lost with 44th Bn on the left, but "D" Coy. 37th Battalion sent out liaison patrols and established touch when the objective was reached by 37th Battalion.

On reaching "C" Line further advance was held up till flank troops came up, so it was after dark on 26th Aug. before the final mopping up of the peninsula as far as VAUX was possible, by which time the enemy had withdrawn all his troops and also his guns from the Valley in G.10. Examination after the advance showed that many of these guns 21 cm and 10.5 cm had quite recently been emplaced and had not fired a shot.

Casualties for the day up to 6 p.m. were 3 ~~Killed~~ Other Ranks killed, 1 Officer, 40 Other Ranks wounded.

After dark "B" Company on the right pushed forward and consolidated a line from G.10.c.2.0. to G.9.a.9.9. with "B" Company 38th Battalion (which with "C" Coy., 38th Bn. had been attached to the 37th Battalion at 10 a. m.) on their right.

CLEARING OF VAUX Wood Spur.

Shortly after 7 p.m. on 26th orders were received for this Brigade to occupy SUZANNE-VAUX Spur south of grid through 3 Cent., 4 Cent. This was to be carried out in conjunction with 11th Aust. Inf. Bde's operation on the left. The 38th Battalion (under command of the C.O. 37th Battalion) were allotted South end of the peninsula to DRAGON Wood inclusive, and 37th Battalion the North of this line with 1 platoon detailed for liaison with 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the left. XX

27th AUGUST '18.

It was not till 3 a. m. on the 27th August that the mopping-up commenced but it was completed without any opposition the enemy having withdrawn completely after blowing up bridges at ECLUSIER and VAUX. At the conclusion of this operation early on the 27th August the 38th Battalion again came under the orders of Major A.J.A. MAUDSLEY a/c.o. of 38th Battalion and established "A" Company to watch ECLUSIER Crossings, "B" Company to guard VAUX Crossings, with "C" and "D" Companies in vicinity of VAUX Wood.

At 9.30 a. m. on the 27th verbal instructions were given for the relief of the Brigade by 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade, but after orders had been issued to units further instructions were received from 3rd Aust. Division at 4 p.m. that the advance was to continue and that the 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade would take over the line running North and North-west of VAUX Wood and would advance during the night, but that troops of the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade would remain in the vicinity of SUZANNE ready to move and come on the right of the 9th Aust. Inf. Bde when they had reached the vicinity of CUREU.

August 27/28th 1918.

During the night 27/28th the 9th Aust. Inf. Brigade attacked enemy positions in vicinity of FARGNY Wood and advanced to positions East of CURLU - the village itself was not mopped up.

As soon as this move had been carried out it was necessary for the 10th A.I. Brigade to move round to the right flank of 9th A.I. Brigade - the 38th Battn (Major A.J.A. MAUDSLEY) being detailed for this operation - one Company was sent at 7.30 a. m. on 28th by way of the causeways leading East from VAUX to reconnoitre and hold the peninsula between VAUX and CURLU as far South as FRISE. The bridges across the various channels of the SOMME which had been blown by the retreating enemy were rapidly made trafficable for infantry - 3rd Aust. Pioneers and 10th Field Coy. Engineers being allotted for this work. A small amount of machine gun fire was encountered from the CURLU side of the peninsula but by Noon the spur was held and the crossing at H.12.d. was denied the enemy.

August 28th 1918.

At 3.30 p.m. on 28th August ~~the enemy~~ two Companies of 38th Battalion ("C" and "D" Companies) were sent round along the North bank of the river to work through CURLU and take up a position on the right of the 9th A.I. Brigade. Although the latter had posts East of CURLU the enemy had not been cleared from the village. "D" Company moving through the village had some stiff fighting before the machine guns and snipers were cleared out of the village, and sustained heavy casualties. 4 Machine guns were captured in the village and by daybreak on the 29th a line of posts had been established about 150 yards S. and E. of CURLU.

38th Battn Headquarters were established at H.29.b.2.2. early on night of 28th August but the area was so severely shelled that communication except by runner was impossible.

During the late afternoon of 28th inst. 40th Battalion moved to close support in valley near MILLIMETRE Wood in G.9.b., G.10.a., and 37th and 39th Battn moved to positions in vicinity of SUZANNE.

August 28/29th 1918 The 38th Battn having consolidated from G.6.d. to B.25.c.4.0 South-East of CURLU during the night 28/29th August at daylight on 29th pushed out reconnoitring patrols towards HEM. This was accomplished without any opposition and a line was established through H.9.Central, H.3.d.0.0. H.2.b.Central and at midday orders were ~~issued~~ issued for 38th Battalion to attack with 40th Battalion as Left Flank Guard. The first objective was to be trenches N. and S. in H.4.b. and d. The second was the high ground in B.29. TERLINE Trench. "A" Squadron 13th Light Horse was sent forward to try and make Hill 110 in B.23.c. and d. One Section of 18 pdrs was allotted 38th Battalion and followed close after the attacking troops engaging fleeting targets with success. As soon as the Light Horse patrols moved forward enemy artillery and machine gun fire opened heavily, but the forward move continued by small parties working their way forward taking advantage of available cover and generally beating down enemy machine gun opposition until HANNETONS and TOURNOL Trench were reached about 1.30 p.m. Here the 38th Battalion were held up by machine gun fire. With the assistance of 2 Companies of 40th Battn (after a half hours artillery preparation on CLERY and CODE Alley) this was overcome and the advance continued. By 10 p.m. 38th Battn were on a line H.6.c., H.5.b.7.1., H.5.b.2.5., Copse 5., H.5.b.9.0., where touch was made with 34th Battn. The village of CLERY however had not been mopped up. The 40th Battn had 2 Companies - flank guard - in GLANDS Alley and 2 Coys in support on West and North Western edges of CLERY.

Battn Hdqrs were established:- 38th at H.3.d.1.6., and 40th adjacent.

While this advance was taking place,, 37th and 39th Battns were moved forward from SUZANNE-VAUX Area to bivouacs in H.1 and H.2. The Inter-brigade boundary was cross roads at S.W. Corner HEM Wood E. corner HOWITZER Wood, 4. b. Cent., Copse 5, Trench junction B.30.d.9.5.

The 3rd Aust. Div. south of the SOMME had advanced to H.17. where two Companies had been thrown across the canal but could advance no further on account of very heavy machine gun fire from North of the river. The position of the Division on the North was very uncertain and the brigade on our left was bent backwards in a Westerly direction to maintain touch with them.

The casualties for the advance from VAUX Wood were 8 Other Ranks killed, 2 Officers 87 Other Ranks wounded and the captures included

The opposition had become more pronounced as the line moved towards CLERY, the enemy realizing that this was the key position to the taking of PERONNE, as the bridges on direct routes from the west over the SOMME had been destroyed and the enemy was in a position to prevent their repair. Troops for the attack on MT. ST. QUENTIN and further South had therefore to move via FEUILLERES and work through the area of the 10th A.I. Brigade and were dependent for their success on the work of this Brigade.

August 29/30th 1918.

On the night 29/30th August following on orders from 3rd Aust. Division, orders were issued for the 37th Battalion to advance on 30th instant with 18th and 20th Battns, 2nd Aust. Div., co-operating on their right and 34th Battn on their left. The first bound was to be to the GREEN Line on map attached on which also are shown Divisional and Brigade boundaries. From that line further advance, if any, would be made by 37th Battalion on the right and 40th Battalion on the left - the 34th Battalion being withdrawn. A squadron of 13th Light Horse was detailed for patrolling after capture of the GREEN Line.

37th Battalion (under Lieut-Col. C. B. STORY) had 1 battery of 18 pairs of 3rd Army Bde, A.F.A. attached to it and in addition 1 battery of 4.5" Hows was pushed forward to work in close touch with attacking Battalion Commander.

As a preliminary move, 37th Battalion advanced during the night 29/30th through 38th Battalion to take up a line from just East of CLERY to H.29.a. Central.

37th Battalion moved off at 9 p.m., "A" Coy. on right, "C" Coy., in centre, "D" Coy. on left and "B" Coy. in support. The night was intensely dark and direction had to be kept entirely by compass so progress was slow and it was difficult to maintain touch. However the line held by the 38th Battalion was reached, without mishap, but it was impossible to locate definitely the jumping-off line laid down and companies jumped off from the line of 38th Battalion.

Soon after passing clear of the village of CLERY, Capt. P. G. TOWN, "A" Coy. found that the enemy was still holding posts on his right and sent out 2 patrols to locate them. One post was located on the road some little distance East of CLERY. By this time "A" Coy. was out of touch with the Company on its left, so direction was changed slightly to the N.W. and touch was re-established and almost at once enemy was found about 4.30 a. m. BERLINGOTS Trench I.l.a. and c. This opposition was soon overcome but "A" Coy. again lost touch. However it pushed on meeting many Boche in dugouts. These offered little opposition in the main and 18 prisoners were taken. Another party of about 150 surrendered to a patrol of 4, but seeing how weak their captors were they decided to turn the tables. The patrol fired on them and they scattered and remained the trenches, giving trouble later in the day.

This right Company reached VAN Trench but were out of touch on both flanks and the enemy quickly discovered this and commenced to fire on the Coy. (by this time only about 20 strong) from front, flanks and rear. He also counter-attacked but was driven off by rifle and Lewis gun fire. The position, however, was such that no good purpose

could be reached by staying in VAN Trench out of all touch with the remainder of the Battalion, so a withdrawal was made to BERLINGOT'S Trench which was found to be reoccupied by the enemy who had worked in by means of communication trenches on the flanks. The enemy offered strong opposition and as the Coy. now had only one Officer (Captain TOWL) and under 20 men, a further withdrawal to a bank about 100 yards to the West of BERLINGOT'S Trench was decided on. This was carried out under cover from fire of Lewis gun and two captured enemy machine guns. In this position the Company was compelled to stay until the afternoon of 30th August, when the advance of 2nd Aust. Div. troops on the right brought relief. It was only by constant watchfulness and prompt action several times during the day that the enemy was prevented from surrounding and mopping up the little party whose position was all the more precarious owing to their having in their midst 15 prisoners who could not be got to the rear. Lieuts. COX and WILLIS with the Centre ("C") Coy. had attacked VAN Trench further North round CLERY Copse but were unable to make any headway and suffered very heavy casualties - only 2 men of the right party of 10 returning and both Officers becoming casualties. The left Company had rather less opposition but were unable to reach the GREEN Line and dug in on a bank about 400 yards behind the objective.

CLERY Copse and surrounding trenches were very strongly held and several counter-attacks were launched, but broke down under our artillery and rifle, Lewis and machine gun fire.

Aug. 30th '18 The Support Company, 37th Battn, was brought forward early in the morning of the 30th August to reinforce the depleted line Companies but the opposition was too severe for any advance to be made.

At about 10.45 a. m. the 40th Battn was ordered forward to H.6.b. - one Company ("B" Capt. McINTYRE) being placed under orders of 37th Battn to clear up CLERY Village. Another Coy. ("D") was attached to Centre Coy. 37th Battn to operate against CLERY Copse. At 2 p.m. after artillery and Stokes preparation the copse was attacked. Again the enemy machine gun fire was too concentrated to allow any appreciable advance - heavy casualties were again inflicted on us including 2 out of 3 attacking Officers and it was found impossible to make any headway and the further attack was postponed till the 38th and 39th Battns could advance together after nightfall.

The clearing up of CLERY Village by "B" Coy. 40th Battn was carried out in fine style in the face of much severe opposition, but by skilful handling of his troops Captain McINTYRE succeeded in locating the enemy machine guns. A ~~strong~~ heavy artillery shoot was put down on these and the attacking troops followed close behind and rushed the positions, capturing two machine guns and 59 prisoners. The Boche made off down communication trenches and suffered heavy casualties from our Lewis gun fire in his retreat.

Lewis gun fire in counter

At 2.30 p.m. a small counter-attack was beaten off and "B" Coy. reinforced by "A" Coy. took up their positions on the Eastern edge of the village.

By this time the 18th and 20th A.I. Battns had commenced to move forward past the village (having crossed the SOMME at FEUILLERES) and in the face of our growing opposition the enemy gradually withdrew. About 9 a. m. the Brigade Command post was established just West of CLERY in H.5.b. and it was largely owing to the close touch which the G.O.C. was able to keep with his Battalions that troops were able to be pushed in to meet the many counter-attacks launched during the day, especially around CLERY Copse. Enemy artillery was intense throughout the day over the whole area H.5. and H.6.a. and b. The 30th was probably the most severe and ticklish day's work the Brigade had yet had, and it was only by the determined way in which the enemy counter-attacks were met that prevented the enemy from mopping up front line troops.

Prisoners obtained in this area were 2nd Guards Div.

and were comparatively fresh troops but were not at all averse from being taken prisoner unless they found themselves in a big majority.

During the afternoon of 30th August order C.H.J.11 from 3rd Aust. Division was received for further advance on 31st.

At 7 p.m. on the 30th August a conference of Battalion Commanders was called at Brigade Command Post, at which orders were given for the further advance.

The next stage in the attack was to be carried out by the 38th Battalion (Lieut-Col. ^{MAUDSLEY} J. A. MAUDSLEY) on the right; 39th Battalion (Lieut-Col. R. O. HENDERSON D.S.O.) on the left; the latter having moved during the morning of the 30th to H.5.a. and c.

The attacking battalions had - 38th Battn 3 Companies in line with 1 Coy. in close support - 39th Battn 2 Coys in line, 1 in support and 1 in reserve. The 20th Battn was on right of 38th Battn and 33rd Battn was on the left of 39th Battn; boundaries being as shown in attached map. The 40th Battn were in support of the 38th and the 37th Battn in support of the 39th Battn.

The action was to be dependent on the 9th A.I. Brigade making the line C.25.Cent., DEVILLARS Alley, COTHEMERDY Trench, Cross Roads C.20.d.3.1.; QUARRY Farm to G.14.c.8.2.

The general plan was to swing gradually the right flank so that the line would ultimately run almost East and West and the Division on the North would work S.E. and meet it, but this Brigade was relieved before that stage could be reached.

Aug. 31st '18 The attack was carried out with artillery barrage which came down punctually at ZERO (6 a. m.) on right but was somewhat ragged on the left.

The enemy offered considerable opposition especially in vicinity of CLERY Copse where he brought up supports but without avail. The enemy also used 77 mm guns at very close range. However the objective was gained by 8 a. m. and was consolidated. Casualties were heavy but the enemy also lost heavily both in killed and prisoners, about 300 of the latter being taken.

Captures included 7 field guns, 1 heavy trench mortar and many machine guns.

Owing to the death from shell fire at daybreak of Major MAUDSLEY (Acting C.O. of 38th Battn) this Battn came under orders of C.O. 39th Battn at 10 a. m. Enemy machine guns continued to be very active after the objective was reached and 4 Stokes mortars were sent forward to deal with them. It was difficult to get them into position but this was done at last and at least two machine guns were put out of action by their shells.

At 10.30 a. m. a strong enemy counter-attack from I.2. Cent. C.26.d. developed. The 39th Battn brought up its reserve Coy. and artillery opened on the valley in I.2. Cent. and C.26. Cent. between the two the attack failed.

The 2nd Aust. Div. troops on the right who had attacked at 5 a. m. had been successful in taking Mr. ST. QUENTIN and FEUILLAU-COURT but the position of the Brigade on the left was not clear and touch was lost on this flank but was obtained about Noon.

A gap existing between 38th and 39th Battalions "C" Coy. 40th Battn were pushed to fill up this gap and very soon had 1 machine gun and 45 prisoners and also two 7.5 Minnenwerfer in action. The crews were captured and the 40th had the satisfaction of turning the guns on to a Hun post.

"A" Coy. 40th Battn were also sent forward on the left of 38th Battn and Battn Hdqrs moved to a point about 300 yards N.E. of CLERY Copse. Two F.O.O's - Major H. GLOVER, 26th Battery A.F.A. and Captain B. L. DAVIES, 25th Battery A.F.A. were stationed here also and did some excellent work both on enemy's positions and also on enemy massing for counter-attacks.

The objective for the day was the main road BOUCHAVESNES-MT. ST. QUENTIN. Much good work was done by the 40th Battalion on the right - snipers and Lewis gunners accounting for many Boche and on several occasions breaking up parties massing for counter-attack.

The excellence of the signal communications of this Battn and their close liaison with Artillery enabled guns to deal quickly with bodies of the enemy and at least twice during the 31st led to counter-attacks being 'oken up before they could develop.

The 39th Battalion on the left flank in touch with 9th A.I. Brigade had their left flank on the cross roads in C.20.d.3.1. and their right flank in HERSFIELD Trench; 37th and 38th Battns being along brown line in attached map.

During the afternoon in order to facilitate the relief by 11th A.I. Brigade troops were ordered forward on the line of BOUCHAVESNES - MT. ST. QUENTIN Road. Everyone was utterly tired out as a result of the previous weeks strenuous fighting but the prospect of relief put new heart into them and first the 40th on the right then the 39th Batta on the left and 37th Batta in centre pushed forward

The relief by the 11th A.I. Brigade was a slow process, the night being exceptionally dark and as they were to advance under barrage in the morning at 5 a. m. 1st September, their arrival was anxiously looked for so that outgoing troops might be clear before the enemy's barrage in reply to our could come down. However by a narrow margin the troops of this Brigade were able to get just clear of the danger zone in time and withdrew to bivouacs around CUMU where the respective Quartermasters had hot meals in readiness.

The casualties suffered since the attack on BRAY had numbered 6 Officers, 44 Other Ranks Killed. 29 Officers 377 Other ranks wounded and 1 Officer 5 Other Ranks missing. Prisoners taken more than squalled the total casualties and the enemy casualties from our fire were, especially on the last two days of the month, very heavy.

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

From 5th to 10th September 1918.

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The pressure that had been brought to bear on the enemy in the CLERY - MT. ST. QUENTIN Area somewhat hastened his retirement, and numerous fire and other indications pointed to a further retirement on his part to the Hindenburg Line.

In the event of his retiring on the Australian Corps Front instructions were received to press his retreat with strong advance guards. The advance being made by a series of bounds, Artillery being preceded by a protective body of infantry.

The advance on the Corps front was made by the 32nd Division on Right, 5th Aust. Division in the Centre and 3rd Aust. Division on the left.

The advance of the 3rd Aust. Division commenced on the 5th September and was covered by an Advance Guard composed of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade Group under Brigadier-General J. H. CANNAN, C.B., C.M.G. The 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade Group under Lieut-Col. J. E. C. LORD D.S.O., moved from CURLU to the area between CLERY and FEUILLACOURT and established Brigade Headquarters North of CLERY in H.6.a. Central with the Battalions in I.1 and 2.

The head of the column passed the starting point - the cross roads North of HEM - at 5 p.m., the order of march being 39th Battn, 38th Battn, 37th Battn, 40th Battn, 10th A.L.T.M. Battery, 10th A.M.G. Coy., 10th Field Coy. 10th Field Ambulance, units passing the starting point at half hour intervals.

The route taken was adjacent to the main CURLU-CLERY-FEUILLACOURT Road. The Brigade had been on the move about an hour when the weather suddenly changed and a heavy thunderstorm lasting an hour burst and the troops were soon wet through.

Shortly after dark all units settled down in their new area. During the night the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade took over the line from the 8th Aust. Inf. Brigade and continued the advance during the day of the 6th. The 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade remained in the CLERY Area but received orders to take over the advance guard with 2 Battalions under Lieut-Col. J. E. C. LORD D.S.O., on the night of the 7th/8th September 1918. At 6 p.m. Colonel LORD went forward to make the necessary arrangements with Brigadier-General CANNAN for the relief of the vanguard.

Orders were issued for the 37th and 38th Battalions with 2 sections of 10th A.M.G. Coy., and 2 sections 10th A.L.T.M. Btty to be ready to move forward at 9 a. m. on the 7th to positions of readiness. Lieut-Col. G. HURRY D.S.O. was to take over the command of the Vanguard.

7th SEPTEMBER L(L).

At 9 a. m. on the 7th September the 37th and 38th Battalions, 2 Sections of 10th A.M.G. Coy., 2 Sections of 10th A.L.T.M. Battery moved forward to their selected positions of readiness in J.20. and J.26. and the troops rested while Officers and N.C.Os went forward and got in touch with the units they were to relieve after dark.

At 1 p.m. a Brigade Command Post was established at the Eastern outskirts of BUIRE Wood North of TINCOURT.

The remainder of the Brigade remained in the CLERY Area.

Soon after dark the Units going into the line moved forward and took over the line from the units of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade in the vicinity of the BLUE Line () with the 37th Battalion on the right, and the 38th Battalion on the left, having 2,500 and 3,000 yards of front respectively.

Owing to some of the guides losing their way the relief was not completed until 5 a. m. Hostile bombing planes were very active during the relief but fortunately we suffered no casualties from this source.

At dawn it was found the BLUE Line had not been occupied by the "relieved Battalions" of the Vanguard. On the left Battalion front the line is placed being 600 yards West of the BLUE Line.

Orders were at once issued for the BLUE Line, running approximately K.12.Central to Q.6.Central to be occupied under the protection of Light Horse patrols. Light Horse patrols reported machine gun fire from enemy positions on Eastern edge of HERVILLY Wood, however moving out in patrol formation the BLUE Line was occupied by 9 a. ., without any opposition and touch maintained with the British troops on the left flank. A prisoner was captured in L.25. belonging to the 80th Fusilier Regt, 21st Division.

Throughout the day the weather was showery and the troops were soon wet through. During the morning enemy shelled forward areas with heavy calibres and Brigade Headquarters and vicinity of BUIRE Wood with high velocity shells

Patrols operating on the Brigade front located enemy machine guns in old trenches in L.7. and 13 and HERVILLY Wood and railway in R.1.

By 7 a. m. the remainder of the Brigade had cleared the CLERY Area and the 39th and 40th Battalions stayed in the vicinity of BUIRE Wood and during the night moved forward and with the 37th on the right, 39th in the centre and the 40th on the left moved through the BLUE Line and, covered by patrols, at 7 a. m. had occupied the old trenches on the line running L.7.Central, L.13.Central, L.19.Central, L.25.Central., L.31.Central, R.1.Central without opposition. One prisoner belonging to the 21st Bavarian Regiment, 5th Bavarian Division was captured in this operation.

The enemy had been in occupation of the trenches opposite the left Battalions but withdrew at dusk.

On the way up to the line while in the vicinity of ROISSEL the 39th Battalion lost 3 men killed and had a limber destroyed from hostile shelling.

8/9th SEPTEMBER 1918

During the night 8/9th september hostile bombing planes were again active.

9th SEPTEMBER 1918

The day of the 9th september passed quietly with the exception of hostile shelling of ROISSEL and HERVILLY and the vicinity of the BLUE Line and during the afternoon high velocity guns were active on TINCOURT and BUIRE Wood. Our patrolling was active and touch was kept with the enemy along the whole front.

9/10th SEPTEMBER 1918

On the night of the 9/10th september the advance parties of the 1st A.I. Brigade moved into the line.

Two patrol encounters took place during the night of the 9/10th and in each case the enemy made off in the direction of his own lines. He was evidently out for information and endeavouring to find out how we were holding the line.

Again during the night we had heavy rain and the trenches were soon very muddy and the men beginning to show signs of their exposure to the weather.

Instructions were received for the line to remain stationary during the day as our advance was to be governed by the advance of the divisions on the flanks. Daylight patrols moved forward and established touch with the enemy and located the positions he was holding and the information was handed over to the incoming Brigade.

Making an early start at dusk the Battalions of the 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade moved forward and relieved the units of the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade. The relief was completed and the command passed to the G.O.C. 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade at 11.40 p.m. on the 10th sept.

On the way out while in the vicinity of HAMBLETT Y.M.C.A. an enemy plane dropped 14 bombs in quick succession, killing 11 and wounding 15 of the 39th Battalion as well as 3 of the Y.M.C.A. personnel. Apart from this unfortunate occurrence the relief passed off well.

On being relieved the G.O.C. and half the Brigade Staff moved to the Chateau between DOINGT and BERONNE and the remainder to wood in J.30.b.

11th SEPTEMBER 1918. On the afternoon of the 11th september the whole of the Brigade Headquarters moved to CARDINAL Wood in J.24, the areas of the various Battalions being 37th Battn, BUSSU, 38th Battn MT. ST. QUENTIN, 39th Battn HANDIE Copse, 40th Battn RED Wood.

13
21
Coffey

50

TENTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

NARRATIVE OF FIGHTING NEAR B O N Y SEPTEMBER 29th TO OCTOBER 2nd.

While resting in BUSSU Area, the first news of an impending operation for the Brigade was received at a Divisional Conference held at DOINGT on September 20th when Divisional Commander announced to Brigadiers that the 3rd Division would in co-operation with 5th Aust. Division take part in an offensive at an early date in the vicinity of BEAUVEVOIR Defences.

Great secrecy was to be maintained, more especially from any French. This was found out at later Conference to be due to the French having a prior attack slightly to the South and it was to prevent any leakage of our plans should French prisoners be captured further South. During succeeding ^{training} days including cooperation with Tanks and with aeroplanes with a view to our forthcoming operations was carried out by Battalions.

As usual, in spite of secrecy of the Divisional Conference, the news of the Operation was widely known even on the same day as the Conference.

September 26th.

A further stage was reached at a Divisional Conference on September 26th when the role of the division and adjoining Units was made known.

The attack was to be carried out near LE CATELLET and BELLICOURT with 5th Aust. Division on right and 3rd Aust. Division on the left, passing through 30th and 27th American Divisions respectively - tanks cooperating.

In this Divisional Sector, 11th A.I. Brigade was to attack on right and 10th A.I. Brigade on left with 9th A.I. Brigade as Divisional Reserve. The date of Attack was fixed for September 29th, but more than usual injunctions as to secrecy were ordered.

The detailed orders for Attack were contained in Divisional Order No. 111 which was received at 05.08 on morning of 27th September.

After a Staff Conference at 9.30 am on 27th, a Conference of Battalion Commanders, Artillery, Tank and other Commanding Officers of Brigade Group was held at 10 a.m.

General instructions were issued to all concerned; final details except in case of orders to move to forward assembly area, being left till 28th September.

Every effort was to be made to prevent the enemy's obtaining warning of the proposed attack and all movement was to take place after dark.

Brigade concentrated on West of RONSSOY and near ST. EMILIE (with Brigade Headquarters at F.19.c.3.7., Sh.62.c.N.E.) on night 27th/28th September. The enormous amount of heavy artillery in the Area was very striking. The shortness of the notice made it impossible for proper reconnaissance of overland tracks and much of the move had in consequence to be made along roads. These were very much congested and progress was very slow but all Units had reported arrival in their bivouacs by midnight 27th/28th without any casualties although bombing planes had attempted to bomb roads two or three times during the march. After arrival in new Areas, a few casualties were suffered due to long range shelling. The weather changed during the night and slight rain fell the following day breaking very cold and raw.

At 10 a.m. on 28th, a Conference of Unit Commanders was held at which detailed instructions (afterwards embodied in B.O. 137) were given to all concerned.

Outline of Scheme.

The 30th and 27th American Divisions would attack at 5.50 am on 29th from the line shown as Brown line in the attached map, under cover of an intense artillery barrage. Their objective was the green line on attached map which was to be consolidated. The Australian troops were to follow the American troops so as to arrive at the American objective by 11 a.m. and from that line were to exploit in a N.W. and Westerly direction without Artillery barrage - ultimately forming a defensive line on the RED line attached.

In this Brigade, 38th Battalion on right with 3 tanks, 39th in centre with 2 tanks, 40th Battalion on left with 3 tanks with 37th Battalion in reserve were ordered to attack. Machine Guns were retained under the command of Brigade Headquarters but 1 sec. 18 pounders was allotted to each of 38th and 40th Battalions. As far as time allowed, Officers and N.C.O.'s reconnoitred the area East of RONSSOY and routes thereto.

During the afternoon of 28th instant, the G.O.C. Division called and discussed the plans issued to Units. Weather improved during the day and the night was very clear so that bombing planes - both enemy and ours - were very active. One exciting fight was noticed in which one of our Camels attacked and followed up an enemy Gotha, but our A.A. fire continued throughout - hampering the Camel and his attack was without success.

29th. Punctually at 05.50, our barrage opened very strongly. Units of this Brigade all reported on the move between 06.30 and 07.30 ready to be on the BROWN line by 09.00. An advance party consisting of Captain CUMMING, Lieut PHILIP, Lieut FORDAM, Signallers and runners left Brigade Headquarters at 08.30 to establish Brigade Headquarters at BONY, keeping in touch with the Signal wagon which was laying a line of cable forward. Brigade Headquarters was to move on receipt of a message that the cable had reached BONY but as no message had been received by 09.30, the G.O.C., B.M. and B.B.O. moved forward to pick up advance party. No shelling West of RONSSOY was noticed but shelling to East of this and the crackle of Machine Gun fire was very plain. Soon after passing RONSSOY, odd machine gun bullets were heard and the road in several places was being heavily shelled. About 1000 yards East of RONSSOY, the rear of our Battalions was encountered and machine gun fire was an incessant din with bullets flying thickly. It took some minutes to realize that our party which was mounted, was under direct observation but the sudden increase in fire when we topped the skyline just west of FLEET ST. showed that the enemy had direct observation and that the advance of the Americans had not gone according to programme. A temporary Headquarters was established in the sunken road of FLEET ST AND Lieut. TAYLOR was sent forward to find the advance party and to arrange for communication to be established with Div. Headquarters. Enemy Machine Gun and 77 fire was heavy all about Headquarters and movement in the vicinity was very difficult on this account. About 10.15, an enemy plane which was flying very low and machine gunning the troops advancing across FLEET ST was brought down by Lewis Gun fire.

At 11.00, Captain CUMMING with Lieut TAYLOR arrived to say that a Signal Office was opened in a dugout near DUNCAN POST at F.17.d.7.1. and a move was made from FLEET ST to this location, shell fire - 77 mm at very close range at tanks in the vicinity making the trip across decidedly "warm".

On arrival at the dugout, it was found that the Signal officer, Lieut SIMS in charge of the cable wagon had kept in touch with Division throughout and informed Div. Headquarters of the situation. Many American troops leaderless and disorganized were encountered having early lost their Officers and become disorganized by the enemy smoke screen which they encountered just East of the GILLEMONT FARM trenches and under cover of which enemy Machine Guns and Snipers had emerged from their dugouts and opened fire from all directions.

The troops of this Brigade in advancing to the Brown Line came under heavy direct fire from Machine Guns and whizzbangs and were unable to reach even their jumping off line.

The whole of the 8 tanks which were to have accompanied our troops were put out of action - some by mines and the rest by shell fire from anti-tank guns. In addition to this the 18 pounders detailed for 38th and 40th Battalions were unable to come into action as there were many American troops who had passed beyond the GILLEMONT Trench line and were still out in enemy territory.

This inability to use our artillery and the lack of tank support made it impossible for any straightout attack to be delivered by us on the enemy emplaced as he was in a carefully prepared trench system with Machine Guns in numbers well sited and in strong concrete shelters. The only plan which promised any hope of success was to occupy the trenches West of the GILLEMONT FARM system and to work continuously forward bombing and Lewis Gunning the enemy while the Division on our right who had been able to advance threatened the enemy in the flank. By 11.00 our troops who had received fairly heavy casualties were disposed as under with Brigade Headquarters in a dugout in DUNCAN TRENCH F.17.d.7.1. Sheet 62.c.N.E. about 500 yards from the front line.-

38th Bn. Right. 2 Coys in DOG TRENCH, 2 Coys near DOG POST.

39th Bn. Centre. DOG TRENCH had loop just West of GILLEMONT FARM.

40th Bn. Left. N. & N.W. of GILLEMONT FARM - along a line approx. N. and S. through A.7. central.

37th Bn. In Reserve West of DUNCAN POST.

The machine gun fire and shelling had continued without intermission and with very little slackening throughout the morning and movement except in trenches was impossible except for single men and even for these it was a matter of extreme difficulty to move owing to enemy having direct observation. The 40th Battalion on the left

managed to move forward 2 companies - Lieut. LAKIN & Lt. BODEN to WILLOW TRENCH. Lieut-Col. R.O. HENDERSON, D.S.O., 39th Battalion

was killed about noon by an enemy sniper and Captain GILES assumed command. Patrols pushed out in front of the 3 line battalions could make no progress on account of the heavy enemy M.G. fire, but soon after noon reports were received through Div. Headquarters that aeroplanes reported that the Americans were along practically the whole length of their objective and that the 5th Aust. Div on the right of 3rd Division were beyond the green line and were nearing their objective. This Brigade was therefore ordered to attack again at 3 p.m.

The situation was reported to Div. Headquarters by Brigade and it was pointed out that the operation would be a very costly one as no artillery could be used owing to the Americans being scattered in shell holes and trenches in the country to be attacked, but Corps insisted on the attack being made.

A vigorous attempt was made to manoeuvre troops forward but advance was impossible and there was practically no change in the position of our troops by nightfall. The enemy during the afternoon had more artillery available than in the morning and forward positions were heavily shelled during the afternoon and early part of the night. The fire slackened after dark and by 22.00 machine gun fire had almost ceased. The 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. on our right met similar opposition to that encountered by this Brigade and were unable to make any appreciable headway immediately on our flank till about 5 p.m. on 29th when under cover of a smoke barrage, they advanced slightly moving up QUERREMONT TRENCH. The 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. in reserve

were disposed in the vicinity of FLEET ST. 54th Brigade were holding trenches on our left.

At dusk on 29th, many American soldiers who had been cut off when enemy emerged from his dugouts on morning of 29th, came into our lines from shell holes etc where they had been lying up all day. Stretcher bearers also managed to bring back many wounded Americans who were just in front of our positions but inaccessible during daylight. By 9 p.m., there were some 500 Americans who had been collected by our Companies and reorganized and for whom food had to be obtained. Rations were sent down by arrangements made with 27th Divisional Headquarters and the troops were looked after by Battalion officers as their own Officers were nearly all casualties.

On night of 29th, orders were given that American troops were not to be engaged in the operations of the 30th, but were to remain in position when our troops moved forward.

On the morning of 30th, patrols pushed out found that the enemy had withdrawn slightly so 40th Battalion occupied GILLEMONT SWITCH with 39th Battalion on their right. 38th Battalion also succeeded in making a slight move forward in touch with 41st Battalion but were compelled to occupy CLAYMORE TRENCH with a post in BONY AV.

During the night 29/30th, orders were received from 3rd Division that 11th A.I. Bde with the assistance of 2 Battalions of 9th Brigade would attack from Squares A.26 & A.27. in a Northerly direction with 14th A.I. Bde on their right working up trenches running approx N. & S. as they moved Northwards; battalions of this Brigade would mop up the enemy in front of our positions, but the operation could not be carried out and except for very slight local advances positions of our line troops was not altered during the day.. 37th Battalion, however, were moved to cover the left flank and occupied positions near WILLOW TRENCH and POMFONIEUS TRENCH and later KNOLL TRENCH with Headquarters at DOLEFUL POST. The weather was very cold and intermittent showers during the day rendered the ground very muddy and conditions altogether were very disagreeable. At about 10 p.m. a report was that Brigade on the right was in BONY was received. Patrols were immediately sent out by 39th Battalion but found the village still strongly held by the enemy with M. G. posts.

During the late afternoon, the NORTHAMPTONSHIRE Regt on the left entered outskirts of VENDEUILLE, the enemy having crossed to E. of the Canal. Daylight patrols found that during the night the enemy had withdrawn from his positions in HINDENBURG line and from BONY and early on morning of 1st October, orders were given for troops to push forward to the Canal line. Enemy artillery was heavy but machine gun fire had diminished greatly. 37th Battalion occupied the vicinity of N. end of the Canal Tunnel to A.9.d.6.6. and were subjected to considerable M.G. fire from the N.E. 40th Battalion along Canal Tunnel in A.9.b. & d. with forward posts near BONY Point. 39th Battalion just East of Canal astride light Railway in A.9.d. 38th Battalion in vicinity A.15.b.

Orders from Division during the afternoon of 1st laid down that the Canal Tunnel line was to be approximately main line of resistance and that outposts should be established on -

- | | | |
|---|----------------------------|---|
| | BONY PT. | THE KNOB. |
| The final dispositions for the day were as follows :- | | |
| 39th Battalion | - A.10.c.5.5. | - outpost at BONY PT. |
| 37th - do - | - A.9.b.6.7., A.10.a.3.7.) | outpost at |
| | A.10.c.4.9. |) THE KNOB. |
| 38th - do - | - | In Hindenburg system as support to 39th Bn. |
| 40th - do - | - | " " " " " 37th " |

Dispositions were unaltered during the 2nd October which was comparatively quiet - enemy artillery firing from long range and M.G.'s having almost entirely withdrawn. Our Lewis Guns and snipers continued to harass the enemy during the day wherever he showed himself but except in LE CATELET and on the hill at A.4e not much enemy movement was noticed. Troops however were not in a fit state to carry out further attack and at dusk on 2nd the Brigade was relieved by 151st Brigade (Brig-Gen SUGDEN) and withdrew to bivouac area near ST. MMILIE.

During the Operations, artillery fire except to a very limited extent was impossible owing to the uncertainty of the position of Americans who had succeeded in getting to or beyond the HINDENBURG LINE in the first rush.

Machine Gun support was afforded in the first instance by 10th M.G. Coy from vicinity of FLEMET ST and later from POT TRENCH and DOLEFUL POST and on 1st instant from WILLOW and KNOLL TRENCH and GILLEMONT FARM.

The left flank of this Brigade was its tender spot and to cover this, 11th M.G. Coy and 2 secs 23rd M.G. Coy were allotted. Liaison was supplied by Captain A.W. WARDELL, MC who had Headqrs alongside Brigade Headquarters and was able to communicate rapidly with any of the Companies required.

RATIONS. Rations were good and plentiful and apart from the difficulty of supplying the numerous unattached Americans for the first night, there was little trouble. Hot meals were sent up in cookers quite close to the front line although on several occasions roads had to be left for cross-country tracks on account of enemy shelling - the Quartermaster of 37th Battalion being killed and Transport Officer wounded while taking forward the cookers.

EVACUATIONS.

The strain on the stretcher bearers was exceedingly heavy on account of the number of American cases that had to be evacuated in addition to our own but this was rendered less arduous than usual by the fact that Ambulances could be brought well forward and thus the distance to carry was diminished.

GENERAL.

The non-success of the American operation and the consequent alteration of the situation at Zero for this Brigade rendered the operation of 29th as originally intended quite impossible to execute. The naturally strong position occupied by the enemy on the HINDENBURG LINE and the failure of the tanks through their suffering 100% casualties before reaching the jumping off line rendered the task of this Brigade exceedingly difficult. To add to this, the impossibility of using artillery fire till the position of the American troops was clear rendered a general advance in the face of the unusually heavy M.G. fire impossible except at the cost of very heavy casualties. However the enemy was kept under constant fire from our Machine Guns, Lewis Guns and rifles and suffered many casualties and as his opposition decreased, advantage was taken of every opportunity to push forward and occupy positions so that when the Brigade was relieved a good jumping off place for further advance by the incoming troops was handed over.

Part of [23/55/1, Part 2]

Original copies of messages by Lieut H R Robbins, acting CO 38th Aust Inf Bn, during battle for Cléry, 31 Aug 1918.

Lieut Robbins was subsequently awarded the MC for his efforts as acting CO in this battle.

Parties of the enemy observed him and attempted to cut off the patrol by outflanking it, thus forcing his retirement. For this cool and courageous work Lieut. Baxter was awarded a bar to his Military Cross, won at Proyart.

The Battalion was now holding a line from the Canal-du-Nord on the south to a trench junction.

Many heroic deeds had been performed to win through to the objective, and many casualties, both killed and wounded, had been sustained. Major A. J. A. Maudsley, Acting C.O., had been killed by a bursting shell, at 6.30 a.m., the control of the attacking Battalion then falling on the shoulders of the Acting Adjutant. Lieut. H. R. Robbins, who shouldered his manifold duties with promptitude and ability. At 10 a.m. word had been received that Colonel R. O. Henderson, D.S.O., commanding the 39th Battalion, would take the dual command of the two Battalions (38th and 39th), but the Colonel, just recovering from a bout of influenza, had virtually to allow Lieut. Robbins to carry the direction of the 38th Battalion on his shoulders. It was for this and other fine work that Lieut. Robbins was afterwards awarded the Military Cross.

Bullen
16 May 1988

10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

From 5th to 10th September 1918.

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The pressure that had been brought to bear on the enemy in the CLERY - MT. ST. QUENTIN Area somewhat hastened his retirement, and numerous fire and other indications pointed to a further retirement on his part to the Hindenburg Line.

In the event of his retiring on the Australian Corps front instructions were received to press his retreat with strong advance guards. The advance being made by a series of bounds, Artillery being preceded by a protective body of infantry.

The advance on the Corps front was made by the 32nd Division on right, 5th Aust. Division in the Centre and 3rd Aust. Division on the left.

The advance of the 3rd Aust. Division commenced on the 5th September and was covered by an Advance Guard composed of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade Group under Brigadier-General J. H. CANNAN, C.B., C.M.G. The 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade Group under Lieut-Col. J. E. C. LORD D.S.O., moved from OUFU to the area between CLERY and FEUILLACOURT and established Brigade Headquarters North of CLERY in H.6.a. Central with the Battalions in I.1 and 2.

The head of the column passed the starting point - the cross roads North of HEM - at 5 p.m., the order of march being 39th Batta 38th Batta, 37th Batta, 40th Batta, 10th A.L.T.M. Battery, 10th A.M.G. Coy., 10th Field Coy. 10th Field Ambulance, units passing the starting point at half hour intervals.

The route taken was adjacent to the main OUFU-CLERY-FEUILLACOURT Road. The Brigade had been on the move about an hour when the weather suddenly changed and a heavy thunderstorm lasting an hour burst and the troops were soon wet through.

Shortly after dark all units settled down in their area. During the night the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigade took over the line from the 8th Aust. Inf. Brigade and continued the advance during the day of the 6th. The 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade remained in the CLERY Area but received orders to take over the advance guard with 2 Battns under Lieut-Col. J. E. C. LORD D.S.O., on the night of the 7th/8th September 1918. At 6 p.m. Colonel LORD went forward to make the necessary arrangements with Brigadier-General CANNAN for the relief of the vanguard.

Orders were issued for the 37th and 38th Battalions with 2 sections of 10th A.M.G. Coy., and 2 sections 10th A.L.T.M. Btty to be ready to move forward at 9 a.m. on the 7th to positions of readiness. Lieut-Col. G. HURRY D.S.O. was to take over the command of the Vanguard.

7th SEPTEMBER (L).

At 9 a.m. on the 7th September the 37th and 38th Battalions, 2 Sections of 10th A.M.G. Coy., 2 Sections of 10th A.L.T.M. Battery moved forward to their selected positions of readiness in J.20. and J.26. and the troops rested while officers and N.C.Os went forward and got in touch with the units they were to relieve after dark.

At 1 p.m. a Brigade Command Post was established at the Eastern outskirts of BUIRE Wood North of TINCOURT.

The remainder of the Brigade remained in the CLERY Area.

Soon after dark the units going into the line moved forward and took over the line from the units of the 11th Aust. Inf. Brigad in the vicinity of the BLUE Line () with the 37th Battalion on the right, and the 38th Battalion on the left, having 2,500 and 3,000 yards of front respectively.

Owing to some of the guides losing their way the relief was not completed until 5 a.m. Hostile bombing planes were very active during the relief but fortunately we suffered no casualties from this source.

At dawn it was found the BLUE Line had not been occupied by the "relieved Battalions" of the Vanguard. On the left Battalion front the line is places being 500 yards west of the BLUE Line.

Orders were at once issued for the BLUE Line, running approximately K.12.Central to Q.6.Central to be occupied under the protection of Light Horse patrols. Light Horse patrols reported machine gun fire from enemy positions on Eastern edge of HERWILLY Wood, However moving out in patrol formation the BLUE Line was occupied by 9 a. ., without any opposition and touch maintained with the British troops on the left flank. A prisoner was captured in L.25. belonging to the 80th Fusilier Regt, 21st Division.

Throughout the day the weather was showery and the troops were soon wet through. During the morning enemy shelled forward areas with heavy calibres and Brigade Headquarters and vicinity of BUIRE Wood with high velocity shells

Patrols operating on the Brigade front located enemy machine guns in old trenches in L.7. and L3 and HERWILLY Wood and railway in R.1.

By 7 a. m. the remainder of the Brigade had cleared the CLERK Area and the 39th and 40th Battalions stayed in the vicinity of BUIRE Wood and during the night moved forward and with the 37th on the right, 39th in the centre and the 40th on the left moved through the BLUE Line and, covered by patrols, at 7 a. m. had occupied the old trenches on the line running L.7.Central, L.13.Central, L.19.Central, L.25.Central., L.31.Central, R.1.Central without opposition. One prisoner belonging to the 21st Bavarian Regiment, 5th Bavarian Division was captured in this operation.

The enemy had been in occupation of the trenches opposite the left Battalions but withdrew at dusk.

On the way up to the line while in the vicinity of FOISEL the 39th Battalion lost 3 men killed and had a limber destroyed from hostile shelling.

8/9th SEPTEMBER 1918

During the night 8/9th september hostile bombing planes were again active.

9th SEPTEMBER 1918

The day of the 9th september passed quietly with the exception of hostile shelling of FOISEL and HERWILLY and the vicinity of the BLUE Line and during the afternoon high velocity guns were active on TINCOURT and BUIRE Wood. Our patrolling was active and touch was kept with the enemy along the whole front.

9/10th SEPTEMBER 1918

On the night of the 9/10th september the advance parties of the 1st A.I. Brigade moved into the line.

Two patrol encounters took place during the night of the 9/10th and in each case the enemy made off in the direction of his own lines. He was evidently out for information and endeavouring to find out how we were holding the line.

Again during the night we had heavy rain and the trenches were soon very muddy and the men beginning to show signs of their exposure to the weather.

Instructions were received for the line to remain stationary during the day as our advance was to be governed by the advance of the divisions on the flanks. Daylight patrols moved forward and established touch with the enemy and located the positions he was holding and the information was handed over to the incoming Brigade.

Making an early start at dusk the Battalions of the 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade moved forward and relieved the units of the 10th Aust. Inf. Brigade. The relief was completed and the command passed to the G.O.C. 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade at 11.40 p.m. on the 10th Sept.

On the way out while in the vicinity of HAMLETT Y.M.C.A. an enemy plane dropped 14 bombs in quick succession, killing 11 and wounding 15 of the 39th Battalion as well as 3 of the Y.M.C.A. personnel. Apart from this unfortunate occurrence the relief passed off well.

On being relieved the G.O.C. and half the Brigade Staff moved to the Chateau between DOINGT and BERONNE and the remainder to wood in J.30.b.

11th SEPTEMBER 1918. On the afternoon of the 11th september the whole of the Brigade Headquarters moved to CARDINAL Wood in J.24, the areas of the various Battalions being 37th Battn, BUSSU, 38th Battn MT. ST. QUENTIN, 39th Battn HANDELL Copse, 40th Battn RED Wood.

38. TH. BATTALION A.I.F.

L I S T O F A P P E N D I C E S.

O C T O B E R 1918.

1. Signal Officer's Statement.
2. Medical Officer's Statement.
3. Battalion Order No. 96.
4. Administrative Instructions.
5. Battalion Order No. 97.

38TH. BATTALION A.I.F.

Battalion Headquarters
12th March 1919

Lieut H. ROBBINS 'MC'
38th Battalion A.I.F.

Being interested in the Operations of this Battalion against the HINDENBURG LINE at BONY between the 29th September and the 2nd October 1918. It was thought that you might care to have the attached Narrative of these Operations, which is a copy of the original Report by Colonel G. HURRY 'D.S.O' to Headquarters, 10th A.I. Brigade.

H. Robbins

Lieut
A/Adjutant 38th Battalion A.I.F.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY 38TH. BATTALION

FROM
19.00 27/9/18 to 17.30 2/10/18

Reference Maps 32.C. N.E. 1/20,000 & WIANCOURT 1/20,000 EDITION 1A.

The Battalion left the bivouac area HAUT-ALLAINES (J.10.b.Sheet 320.N.W.) at 19.00 27.9.18 proceeding by route march via BUSSU, TEMPLEUX-LA-FOSSE, LONG-AVESNES, VILLERS-FAUCON, St.EMILIE to area west of RONSSOY WOOD (F.20 & 21) where bivouacs were made in the wood and trenches in close vicinity. Battalion Headquarters were established at F.21.a.3.6. The following officers marched out with the Battalion.-

<u>H.QRS</u>		<u>A.Coy.</u>	<u>C. Coy</u>	
Lt.Col.	HURRY D.S.O.	Capt. FAIRWEATHER F.E. 'MC'	Capt. PETERS C.H. 'MC'	
Capt	FRASER 'MC'	Lieut WHITEHEAD J.L.	Lieut BOWMAN G.G.	
Lieut	ROBBINS H.	" CALLAN O.J.	" HALLOCH P.	
"	DUNN T.H.	<u>B.Coy</u>		
"	BULT R.B.	Lieut O'DONNELL J.B.	<u>D. Coy</u>	
"	TILFER (Q.M.)	" WILSON W.G.	Capt COLLINS W.J.	
Padre	FREER D.L.		Lieut POTTER E.	
			Lieut EASON J.F.	

On arrival at the new area in F.20 & 21 at about 02.00 on 28/9/18 hot tea was provided by Q.M. Comfortable bivouacs were soon made by the boys and the remainder of the morning and all the following day they were allowed to rest as much as possible. Whilst in this area enemy artillery was active, particularly with gas. During the night of 28/29th respirators had to be worn on numerous occasions.

Reveille was arranged for at 0530 on 29/9/18 and preparations for move forward in accordance with operations orders were at once commenced. At 05.50 the barrage for the stunt opened and the enemy immediately replied with gas shells of which the battalion got a fair share.

At 07.15 the battalion moved off in artillery formation in the following order:- A.Coy - Bn.H.Qrs. - C.Coy. - B.Coy. - D. Coy. - The route towards the brown line to be taken was as follows:- South of the village of RONSSOY to cross roads in A.21.d. thence through ORCHARD POST, thence to R. in road of BELLICOURT ROAD, thence North Easterly to GUILLEMONT FARM where it had been arranged that the tanks to co-operate with this Battalion would be met.

The advance was carried on as above until POT TRENCH was reached when the battalion was held up by H.G.fire coming from direction of BONY. A Company took up a position in DOG TRENCH, the remaining Companies and Battalion H.Qrs disposing themselves in shell holes west of this trench. From information gained it was apparent that the mopping up parties of the Yanks had not done their work properly. A Coy were then ordered to push forward and attempt to clear up the situation. A Company advanced in half sectional rushes from shell hole to shell hole. The H.G.fire became exceptionally heavy and heavy casualties were suffered.

At 0950 C Coy moved forward and occupied DOG TRENCH. B Coy occupied position in front of CAT POST (F.24.a.3.8) with D.Coy on their left.

All this time the enemy had been constantly shelling the area. C Coy suffering heavy casualties. Very little information could be obtained as to the progress of A.Coy. A patrol was sent forward from C Coy but became casualties almost immediately. Capt. PETERS 'MC' later went out with a small patrol and located A Coy H.Qrs. in a shell hole about a 100x East of DOG TRENCH, the remainder of the Coy were consolidating positions in shell holes within about 50ft. of the wire in front of SOUTH GUILLEMONT TRENCH. At 11.00 it was reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER had been badly wounded in the neck, and Lieut CALLAN had been killed. It was later reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER died about 10 minutes after he was hit. Lieut WHITEHEAD was now in charge of A Coy.

At 12.30 information was received that the Americans were everywhere on the GREEN LINE and that the H.Gs. holding us up were a few that they had failed to mop up. The battalion together with 39th & 40th. Bns. was therefore to push forward and get in touch with the Americans in front of us. At 15.00 the advance was continued, C. Coy moving out of DOG TRENCH and pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole under exceptionally heavy H.G.fire. Lieut HALLOCH was wounded. The Company moved forward to shell hole positions in the vicinity of the wire west of South Guillemont trench, where advance was definitely held up at 1600.

At 1755 smoke barrage was put down and the wind drifted the smoke down CLAYMORE VALLEY, the brigade on our right were thus enabled to push forward and A & C Coys were also enabled to push forward to South Guillemont trench where posts were established. Right post C Coy was established at A.19.b.50.75 where they gained touch with 41st. Battrn. Left post A Coy at A.15.d.58 (approx) this Coy failed to gain touch with 39th Bn. During the night patrols were sent out but could not get in touch with 39th Battrn. Whilst holding this trench a party of 30 Americans under Lieut DONNACKER, 10th I.R.U.S.A. were incorporated in the posts held by our troops.

(2)

All this time heavy T.H. fire from direction of BONY AVENUE and shell fire were directed on DOG TRENCH in which battn. H.Qrs. had been established at F.18.c.4.5. Battalion H.Qrs later moved to F.24.a.2.8.

At 04.30, 30/9/18 orders were received that the 11th Bde with 2 Battalions of 9th Bde would attack at 06.00 approx squares A.26 & 27 on a battn frontage in a northerly direction and take up a line through A.8.cent. to the KNOB inclusive. 10th Bde was to clear up the grounds in A.14 and A.8.c.&d. As the attack progressed northwards. Barrage opened at 06.00 and B Coy pushed forward passing through A and C Coys and took up position in CLAYMORE TRENCH, Coy headquarters being at A.14.c.0.3. During this operation B Coy captured 5 heavy Machine guns, 4 light H.Gs. and recaptured 4 Hotchkiss guns taken by the enemy from a disabled tank.

At 08.30 A Coy moved forward up BREAD LANE and established itself in CLAYMORE TRENCH on the left of B Coy, their frontage extending approximately from BREAD LANE to VICK LANE. Here liaison was established with 39th Battn on the left. C.Coy likewise pushed forward to CLAYMORE TRENCH. The position is now as follows:- B.C.&A.Coys in CLAYMORE TRENCH, R.flank at A.14.c.10.15. and left flank at VICK LANE. P.Coy in support in DOG TRENCH. At 09.50 C Coy pushed forward one platoon up BONY AVENUE, and established post at A.14.c.5.3. from which BONY was under observation. A patrol was pushed along this trench to about A.14.d.4.4. where it came under H.G.fire from Village and had to withdraw. At 14.30 orders were received per phone from Bde that Coys were to push forward small patrols as far as possible. Posts have been established in CLAYMORE TRENCH and BONY AVENUE as above. D Coy have moved forward from DOG TRENCH to South Guillemont trench. D.Coy H.Qrs. established at A.19.c.70.30. At 18.00 it was reported from Bde H.Qrs. per phone that tomorrow morning this brigade in conjunction with 9th Bde on right would push forward possibly as far as the KNOB. Definite orders would follow later. Post in BONY AVENUE was to be withdrawn to CLAYMORE TRENCH. At 20.30 orders were received per phone, that proposed stunt for tomorrow mentioned above had been cancelled.

During the night 30th/1st. patrols were pushed forward but no definite information was obtained.

At dawn on 1st. Oct advanced post in BONY AVENUE was re-established at A.14.c.80.25.

At 08.35 C Coy commenced to push forward up BONY AVENUE towards the village of BONY, no resistance was met with and the Coy entered the village at 09.45. At 10.00 B Coy mapped up the village while C Coy continued to push on towards LA CATALET TUNNEL. Posts established and touch gained with 39th at A.15.b.80.10.

At about 14.30 orders received that the 37th Battn would push forward and occupy the KNOB with left flank on CANAL TUNNEL end in A.10.c.2.a. 40th Bn would push out and occupy BONY POINT in touch with 37th Bn on left, and right flank on brigade right boundary - 39th & 38 Bns would be disposed in main HINDENBURG system as support to 37th and 40th Bns. respectively. *38th Bn in A.15.6.*

At 14.00 positions as above were established with the exception that the 39th carried out the task of 40th Bn and vice versa. Disposition of Battn at this time was as follows:- B.&C.Coys in that portion of HINDENBURG LINE in A.15.b. D.Coy in support in that portion of HINDENBURG LINE in A.15.c. A.Coy in reserve in BONY AVENUE. Battn H.Qrs. moved to CLAYMORE TRENCH at A.13.c.95.35.

Whilst taking up new position as above Capt COLLINS, O.C.D.Coy was wounded.

During the remainder of the day with the exception of intermittent shelling nothing else of importance took place.

The above positions were maintained throughout the following day. Enemy artillery was moderately active, particularly in the vicinity of BONY.

At 12.15 warning orders were received that the Brigade would be relieved on night of 2nd/3rd instant by 151st. Brigade.

By accordance with orders from Brigade the battalion commenced to withdraw from position at 16.30 to bivouac area in rear of RONSSOY WOOD. Withdrawal was completed by 17.45 and battalions in position in bivouacs mentioned above by 19.55.

(Sgd) H. HURRY, Lt-Col.
C.O. 38th Bn. A.I.F.

APPENDICES

Signal Service - The co-operation of the Battalion Signal Service with the companies was perfect. Telephonic communication was throughout maintained with all Coys and Brigade. This line was also used by many other units in the vicinity and proved extremely valuable for intelligence purposes. The system employed was by reinforcing the directing Company with H.Qrs Sigs and supplying them with wire to reel out as they moved forward. Other Coys T'd in along the line.

Rations & Supplies - These were received with unfailing regularity. Meals were received warm in excellent quality and sufficient quantity. Sufficient supplies of bombs & S.A.A. were delivered to the most forward Coys and reserve dumps established.

Casualties - The casualties for the Operations were:-
Killed 2 Off. 11.0.R. - Died of wounds, 3.0.Rs - Wounded 2.0.Rs. 87. 0.Rs.

25

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY 38TH BATTALION

FROM

19.00 27/9/18 to 17.30 2/10/18.

Reference Maps. 62^c N.E. 1/20,000. + WIANCOURT 1/20,000 Edition 1st

The Battalion left the bivouac area HAUT-ALLAINES (J.10.6. Sheet. 62^c N.W) at 19.00 27.9.18 proceeding by route march via BUSSU, TEMPLEUX-LA-FOSSE, LONGAYESNES, VILLERS-FRANCON, ST. EMILIE to area west of RONSSOY WOOD (F.20+21) where bivouacs were made in the wood and bivouacs in clear vicinity. Battalion Headquarters were established at F.21.a.3.6. The following officers marched out with the battalion :-

H.Qs	{	1st Lt. COL. HURRY, D.S.O.	A Coy	{	Capt. FAIRWEATHER, F.E., M.C.	C Coy	{	Capt. PETERS, C.H.
		Capt. FRASER, M.C.			Sgt. WHITEHEAD, J.L.			Sgt. BOWMAN, G.G.
		Sgt. ROBBINS, H.			" CALLAN, C.J.			" MALLOCH, P.
		" DUNN, T.H.						
		" BULT, R.B.						
		" TELFER, (QM)	B Coy	{	Sgt. O'DONNELL, J.B.	D Coy	{	Capt. COLLINS, W.J.
Padre FREER, D.L.	" WILSON, W.G.	Sgt. POTTER, E.						
								Sgt. EASON, J.F.

On arrival at the new area in F.20+21 at about 02.00 on 28/9/18 hot tea was provided by Q.M. Comfortable bivouacs were soon made by the boys and the remainder of the morning and all the following day they were allowed to rest as much as possible. Whilst in this area enemy artillery was active, particularly with gas. During the night of 28/29th respirators had to be worn on numerous occasions.

Reveille was arranged for at 0530 on 29/9/18 and preparations for move forward in accordance with operations orders were at once commenced. At 06.50 the barrage for the stunt opened and the enemy immediately replied with gas shells of which the battalion got a fair share.

At 07.15 the battalion moved off in artillery formation in the following order :- A Coy, BN H.Qs, C Coy, B Coy and D Coy. The route towards the brown lines to be taken was as follows :- South of the village of RONSSOY to cross roads in F.21.d. thence through ORCHARD POST, thence to road in road of BELLICOURT ROAD thence North easterly to GUILLEMONT FARM where it had been arranged that the tanks to co-operate with this battalion would be met.

The advance was carried on as above until POT TRENCH was reached when the battalion was held up by M.G. fire coming from direction of BONY. A Company took up a position in dog trench DOG TRENCH, the remaining companies and battalions H.Qs disposing themselves in shell holes west of this trench. From information gained it was apparent that the mopping up parties of the tanks had not done their work properly. A Coy were then ordered to push forward and attempt to clear up the situation. A Company advanced in half sectional rushes from shell hole to shell hole. The M.G. fire became exceptionally heavy and heavy casualties were suffered.

At 0950 B Coy moved forward and occupied DOG TRENCH. B Coy occupied position in front of CAT POST (F.24.a.3.8.) with D Coy on their left.

All this time the enemy had been constantly shelling the area. C Coy suffering heavy casualties. Very little information could be obtained as to the progress of A Coy. A patrol was sent forward from C Coy but became casualties almost immediately. Capt. PETERS, M.C. later went out with a small patrol and located A Coy in a shell hole about a 100' east of DOG TRENCH, the remainder of the boys were consolidating positions in shell holes within about 50' of the wire in front of South Guillemont trench. At 11.00 it was reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER had been badly wounded in the neck, and Sgt CALLAN had been killed. It was later reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER died about 10 minutes after he was hit. Sgt. WHITEHEAD was now in charge of A Coy.

At 12.30 information was received that the Americans were everywhere on the GREEN LINE and that the M.G.s holding us up were a few that they had failed to mop up. The battalion together with 27th & 140th Bns was therefore to push forward and get in touch with the Americans in front of us. At 13.00 the advance was continued. C Coy moving out of DOG TRENCH and pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole under exceptionally heavy M.G. fire. Sgt Malloch was wounded. The Company moved forward to shell hole positions in the vicinity of the wire west of South Guillemont trench where advance was definitely held up at 1600.

At 1705 smoke barrage was put down and the wind drifted the smoke down CLAYMORE VALLEY. The brigade on our right were thus enabled to push forward and A + C Coys were also enabled to push forward to South Guillemont trench where posts were established.

Whilst taking up new positions as above Capt. COLLINS O.C. D Coy was wounded.

During the remainder of the day, with the exception of intermittent shelling, nothing else of importance took place.

The above positions were maintained throughout the following day. Enemy artillery was moderately active, particularly in the vicinity of BONY.

At 12.15 warning orders were received that the Brigade would be relieved on night of 2nd 3rd August instant by 151st Brigade.

In accordance with orders from Brigade the Battalion commenced to withdraw from position at 16.30 in bivouac area in rear of BONSOY WOOD. Withdrawal was complete by 17.45 and battalions in position in bivouacs mentioned above by 19.55.

Shannon D Coy

CO 38 a 97

APPENDICES.

Signal Service.

The co-operations of the Battalion's signal service with the companies was perfect. Telephonic communication was throughout maintained with all Corps and brigade. This line was also used by many other units in the vicinity and proved extremely valuable for intelligence purposes. The system employed was by reinforcing the directing company with P.O.s Sigs and supplying them with wire to reel out as they moved forward. Other boys T'd in along this line.

Rations & Supplies.

These were received with unflinching regularity. Meals were received warm in excellent quality and sufficient quantity. Sufficient supplies of bombs & S.H.A. were delivered to the most forward companies, and reserve dumps established.

Casualties

KILLED.
2 of 11 ORs.

The casualties for the operations were :-

DIED OF WOUNDS.
- 2 ORs.

WOUNDED.
2 of 84 ORs.

Alvory L L G

CO 38087.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY 38TH. BATTALION

FROM
19.00 27/9/18 to 17.30 2/10/18

Reference Maps 62.0. N.E. 1/20,000 & WIANCOURT 1/20,000 EDITION 1A.

The Battalion left the bivouac area HAUT-ALLAINES (J.10.b.Sheet 620.N.W.) at 19.00 27.9.18 proceeding by route march via BUSSU, TEMPLEUX-LA-FOSSE, LONG-AVESNES, VILLERS-FAUCON, St.EMILLIE to area west of RONSSOY WOOD (F.20 & 21) where bivouacs were made in the wood and trenches in close vicinity. Battalion Headquarters were established at F.21.a.3.6. The following officers marched out with the Battalion,-

H.QRS		A. Coy.	C. Coy
Lt.Col.	HURRY D.S.O. ✓	Capt. FAIRWEATHER F.E. ✓ 'MC'	Capt. PETERS C.H. ✓ 'MC'
Capt	FRASER 'MC'	Lieut WHITEHEAD J.L. ✓	Lieut BOWMAN G.G. ✓
Lieut	ROBBINS H.	" CALLAN C.J. ✓	" HALLOCH P. ✓
"	DUNN T.H. ✓	B. Coy	D. Coy
"	BULT R.B. ✓	Lieut O'DONNELL J.B. ✓	Capt COLLINS W.J. ✓
"	TELFER (Q.M.) ✓	" NELSON W.G. ✓	Lieut POTTER E. ✓
Padre	FREER D.L. x		Lieut EASON J.F. ✓

On arrival at the new area in F.20 & 21 at about 02.00 on 28/9/18 hot tea was provided by Q.M. Comfortable bivouacs were soon made by the boys and the remainder of the morning and all the following day they were allowed to rest as much as possible. Whilst in this area enemy artillery was active, particularly with gas. During the night of 28/29th respirators had to be worn on numerous occasions.

Reveille was arranged for at 05.30 on 29/9/18 and preparations for move forward in accordance with operations orders were at once commenced. At 05.50 the barrage for the stunt opened and the enemy immediately replied with gas shells of which the battalion got a fair share.

At 07.15 the battalion moved off in artillery formation in the following order:- A. Coy - Bn. H. Qrs. - C Coy. - B. Coy. - D. Coy. - The route towards the brown line to be taken was as follows:- South of the village of RONSSOY to cross roads in A.21.d, thence through ORCHARD POST, thence to R in road of BELLICOURT ROAD, thence North Easterly to GUILLEFONT FARM where it had been arranged that the tanks to co-operate with this Battalion would be met.

The advance was carried on as above until POT TRENCH was reached when the battalion was held up by H.G. fire coming from direction of BONY. A Company took up a position in DOG TRENCH, the remaining Companies and Battalion H. Qrs disposing themselves in shell holes west of this trench. From information gained it was apparent that the mopping up parties of the Yanks had not done their work properly. A Coy were then ordered to push forward and attempt to clear up the situation. A Company advanced in half sectional rushes from shell hole to shell hole. The H.G. fire became exceptionally heavy and heavy casualties were suffered.

At 09.50 C Coy moved forward and occupied DOG TRENCH, B Coy occupied position in front of CAT POST (F.24.a.3.8) with D. Coy on their left.

All this time the enemy had been constantly shelling the area. C Coy suffering heavy casualties. Very little information could be obtained as to the progress of A. Coy. A patrol was sent forward from C Coy but became casualties almost immediately. Capt. PETERS 'MC' later went out with a small patrol and located A Coy H. Qrs. in a shell hole about a 100m East of DOG TRENCH, the remainder of the Coy were consolidating positions in shell holes within about 50ft. of the wire in front of SOUTH GUILLEFONT TRENCH. At 11.00 it was reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER had been badly wounded in the neck, and Lieut CALLAN had been killed. It was later reported that Capt FAIRWEATHER died about 10 minutes after he was hit. Lieut WHITEHEAD was now in charge of A Coy.

At 12.30 information was received that the Americans were everywhere on the GREEN LINE and that the H.Gs. holding us up were a few that they had failed to mop up. The battalion together with 39th & 40th. Bns. was therefore to push forward and get in touch with the Americans in front of us. At 15.00 the advance was continued, C. Coy moving out of DOG TRENCH and pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole under exceptionally heavy H.G. fire. Lieut HALLOCH was wounded. The Company moved forward to shell hole positions in the vicinity of the wire west of South Guillemont trench, where advance was definitely held up at 1600.

At 17.55 smoke barrage was put down and the wind drifted the smoke down CLAYMORE VALLEY, the brigade on our right were thus enabled to push forward and A & C Coys were also enabled to push forward to South Guillemont trench where posts were established. Right post C Coy was established at A.19.b.30.70 where they gained touch with 41st. Battn. Left post A Coy at A.15.d.38 (approx) This Coy failed to gain touch with 39th Bn. During the night patrols were sent out but could not get in touch with 39th Battn. Whilst holding this trench a party of 30 Americans under Lieut DONNACKER, 10th I.R.U.S.A. were incorporated in the posts held by our troops.

P 10

(2)

All this time heavy T.H. fire from direction of BONY AVENUE and shell fire were directed on DOG TRENCH in which battn. H.Qrs. had been established at F.18.c.4.5. Battalion H.Qrs later moved to F.24.a.2.8.

At 04.30, 30/9/48 orders were received that the 11th Bde with 2 Battalions of 9th Bde would attack at 06.00 approx squares A.26 & 27 on a battn frontage in a northerly direction and take up a line through A.8.cent. to the KNOB inclusive. 10th Bde was to clear up the grounds in A.14 and A.8.c.&d. As the attack progressed northwards. Barrage opened at 03.00 and B Coy pushed forward passing through A and C Coys and took up position in CLAYMORE TRENCH, Coy headquarters being at A.14.c.0.3. During this operation B Coy captured 5 heavy machine guns, 4 light H.Gs. and recaptured 4 Hotchkiss guns taken by the enemy from a disabled tank.

At 08.30 A Coy moved forward up BREAD LANE and established itself in CLAYMORE TRENCH on the left of B Coy, their frontage extending approximately from BREAD LANE to VICK LANE. Here liaison was established with 39th Battn on the left. C Coy likewise pushed forward to CLAYMORE TRENCH. The position is now as follows:- B.C.&A. Coys in CLAYMORE TRENCH, R.flank at A.14.c.10.15, and left flank at VICK LANE. D.Coy in support in DOG TRENCH. At 09.50 C Coy pushed forward one platoon up BONY AVENUE, and established post at A.14.c.5.7, from which BONY was under observation. A patrol was pushed along this trench to about A.14.d.4.4. where it came under H.G. fire from Village and had to withdraw. At 14.30 orders were received per phone from Bde that Coys were to push forward small patrols as far as possible. Posts have been established in CLAYMORE TRENCH and BONY AVENUE as above. D Coy have moved forward from DOG TRENCH to South Guillemont trench. D.Coy H.Qrs. established at A.19.c.70.30. At 18.00 it was reported from Bde H.Qrs. per phone that tomorrow morning this brigade in conjunction with 9th Bde on right would push forward possibly as far as the KNOB. Definite orders would follow later. Post in BONY AVENUE was to be withdrawn to CLAYMORE TRENCH. At 20.30 orders were received per phone, that proposed stunt for tomorrow mentioned above had been cancelled.

During the night 30th/1st. patrols were pushed forward but no definite information was obtained.

At dawn on 1st. Oct advanced post in BONY AVENUE was re-established at A.14.c.80.25.

At 08.35 C Coy commenced to push forward up BONY AVENUE towards the village of BONY, no resistance was met with and the Coy entered the village at 09.45. At 10.00 B Coy mapped up the village while C Coy continued to push on towards the CATALET TUNNEL. Posts established and touch gained with 39th at A.15.b.80.10

At about 14.30 orders received that the 37th Battn would push forward and occupy the KNOB with left flank on CANAL TUNNEL and in A.10.c.2.a. 40th Bn would push out and occupy BONY POINT in touch with 37th Bn on left, and right flank on brigade right boundary - 39th & 38 Bns would be disposed in main HINDENBURG system as support to 37th and 40th Bns. respectively. *38th Bn in 9.15.6*

At 14.00 positions as above were established with the exception that the 39th carried out the task of 40th Bn and vice versa. Disposition of Battn at this time was as follows:- B.&C. Coys in that portion of HINDENBURG LINE in A.15.b. D.Coy in support in that portion of HINDENBURG LINE in A.15.c. A.Coy in reserve in BONY AVENUE. Battn H.Qrs. moved to CLAYMORE TRENCH at A.17.c.05.35.

Whilst taking up new position as above Capt COLLINS, O.C.D.Coy was wounded.

During the remainder of the day with the exception of intermittent shelling nothing else of importance took place.

The above positions were maintained throughout the following day. Enemy artillery was moderately active, particularly in the vicinity of BONY.

At 12.15 warning orders were received that the Brigade would be relieved on night of 2nd/3rd instant by 151st. Brigade.

By accordance with orders from Brigade the battalion commenced to withdraw from position at 16.30 to bivouac area in rear of RONSSOY WOOD. Withdrawal was completed by 17.45 and battalions in position in bivouacs mentioned above by 19.55.

(Sgd) H. HURRY. Lt-Col.

O.C. 38th Bn. A.I.F.

APPENDICES

Signal Service - The co-operation of the Battalion Signal Service with the companies was perfect. Telephonic communication was throughout maintained with all Coys and Brigade. This line was also used by many other units in the vicinity and proved extremely valuable for intelligence purposes. The system employed was by reinforcing the directing Company with H.Qrs Sigs and supplying them with wire to reel out as they moved forward. Other Coys T'd in along the line.

Rations & Supplies - These were received with unfailing regularity. Meals were received warm in excellent quality and sufficient quantity. Sufficient supplies of bombs & S.A.A. were delivered to the most forward Coys and reserve dumps established.

Casualties - The casualties for the Operations were: Killed 2 Off, 11, B.R. - Died of wounds, 3, O.R. Wounded 3, Off, 87, O.R.

B31/1

Lt. SANDIFORD 'MC'

This is to authorise you to take charge of the Band Instruments Music & paraphernalia belonging to the 38th Bn. A.I.F. on the voyage to AUSTRALIA and hand same to the Major of BENDIGO or other suitable custodian until the Battalion as a whole has returned in trust for such purposes as the Battalion may ultimately decide, & I authorise Capt. A. FRASER 'MC' to hand same to your charge accordingly.

(Sgd) G. HURRY, Lt.Col.
38th Bn. A.I.F.
13/2/19

File

38TH. BATTALION A.I.F.

Battalion Headquarters,
18th February 1919

Lieut. N.W.W. SANDIFORD 'MC'

Capt. F.C. HEBBELL 'MC' (For information)

Lt. Col. White D.S.O.

Lt. Col. Murray D.S.O.

Major Hutton

*do
do
do*

Re 38th Battalion Band Instruments

*10th Brig
for information*

You will be held responsible for the care and safe custody of all the 38th Battalion Band Instruments in possession of the Band when the Embarkation Quota marches out. The following is a list of such Instruments and a Nominal Roll of the Bandsmen in possession of each

BAND INSTRUMENTS 38TH. BATTALION A. I. F.						
Instrument	No.	Reg.No.	Rank	Name	Address	
1 Bb Cornet E.P.	94587	7	Sgt	CODE J.J.	27 Mayfield St. COBURG. MELB.	
1 " Baritone	98508	50	L/G	SAVAGE R.	14 Stewart St. WINDSOR.	
1 Eb Soprano Cornet	81157	299	Pte	HILDEBRANDT L.W.	Burney St. BENDIGO.	
1 Bb Cornet (Basses)	100929	29955	Pte	HENSTRIDGE C.	292 Paddington St. GEELONG.	
1 Bb " "	106084	1234	Pte	GULL J.B.	4 Miller St. GEELONG WEST. VIC.	
1 Bb " "	95557	2904	Pte	WESTLAND G.L.	135 Beaconsfield Parade, ALBERT PARK. MELB.	
1 Bb " "	95558	-	-	-	-	
1 Bb " "	88859	860	Pte	DELANOX G.	Speed, Via WOONELANG, VIC.	
1 Bb " (Pally Cor)	97224	1693	Pte	SIMMS F.W.	Lake Charm, VIC.	
1 Eb Flugel Horn	80005	3161	Pte	WALLIS W.H.	COSTERFIELD, Via HEATHCOTE, VIC.	
1 Eb Tenor	96045	1901	Pte	READDIE E.A.	BALLENDELLA, ROCHSTER. VIC.	
1 Eb " "	94197	287	Pte	HOCKEY D.	Glenvia, 10 Backley St. BENDIGO.	
1 Eb " "	94196	711	Pte	St. LEON A.	WENTWORTH, N.S. Wales.	
1 Eb " E.P.	58907	395	Pte	SCOTT N.	Parker St. CASTLEMAINE	
1 Bb Euph.	82491	3286	Pte	BLAKE G.C.	375 Wellington St. COLLINGWOOD, Melb.	
1 Eb. Bass	96132	44	Pte	DERRICOTT G.A.	64 Hundy St. BENDIGO.	
1 Eb. " "	95822	526	Pte	CAMPBELL G.L.	PANNOVBANKIN P.O. Vic.	
1 Bb " "	82501	3445	Pte	KUTCHER A.R.	Miller St. DAYLESFORD.	
1 BbB " "	95859	929	Pte	LEAM A.S.	WOONELANG. VIC.	
1 Tenor Trombone E.P.	96131	43	Pte	MEAGHER N.B.	Myers St. BENDIGO.	
1 Bb Euph.	99407	6001	Pte	DAVIS E.W.	Vz teria St. WHILL. Vic.	
1 Clarinet (Roberts)	Paris	6143	Pte	READ J.R.	94 Bay St. BRIGHTON. MELB.	
Bass Drum, Sticks 2.		513	Pte	BRIDGEMAN S.	GUNBOWER, VIC.	
Drum Major Staff		244	Pte	CAMPBELL R.W.	High St. BENDIGO.	
1 Trombone	58918	3554	Pte	WESTWOOD R.	Bloomfield Rd. ASCOT VALE. MELB.	

S U M M A R Y


Cornets	9	Flugel Horns	1	Tenor Horns	4	Trombones	4	Euphoniums	2
Baritones	1	Basses	4	Drum (Sticks 2)	1	Side Drum	2	2 Pair Sticks	2
Drum Majors Staff	1	Band Stands	25						

(2)

As all the Instruments set out were a gift to the 58th Battalion prior to its departure from AUSTRALIA, you will make arrangements on arrival in Australia for the withdrawal and storage (privately) of all these instruments on charge to the Battalion.

On arrival at HAVRE you are to see Lt.Colonel HURRY, 'D.S.O' and obtain from him in writing any further instructions he may wish to give you and ascertain his desires as to the course of action you are to adopt in AUSTRALIA.

A copy of these instructions has been sent to Colonel HURRY with a request that he forward this Unit a copy of any instructions he may give you.



A/Adjutant 58th Battalion A. I. F. List

5th. October 1918.

- 1. The 38th. Battalion will move by Train and Road to HALLENCOURT Area on 5th, 6th, and 7th October 1918.
- 2. On arrival the Battalion will be disposed of in the HALLENCOURT Area, BAILLEUL Sud Area as under:-

C, D, Coys. and H'Qrs BAILLEUL
 A&B Coys BELLERFONTAINE

- 3. Two personnel and one omnibus Train will be available for the Brigade as per schedule attached. Such Transport as is not detailed to move in the omnibus train will move by Road passing the starting point at 1.5.a.2.7. at 12 noon on 5th inst. under the command of the O.C. 23rd. Coy A.S.C.

4. MOVE BY ROAD

Date	From	To	Route	Billets from Area Commandant at.
------	------	----	-------	----------------------------------

5th.	AIZECOURT Area	Vicinity of MORCOURT	ALLAINES CLERY HEN-FEUILLERES DOMPIERRE-CRIGNOLLES	MORCOURT
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6th.	Vicinity of MORCOURT	Vicinity of ARGOEUVES	HAMEL-FOUULLOY VEC QUIMONT-N switch road AMIENS-LONPRE	ST, SAUVEUR
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7th.	Vicinity of ARGOEUVES	HALLENCOURT Area	LA-CHAUSSEE PICQUIGNY-MANGEST	-
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- 5. The following light railway trains will be available for conveying personnel with packs, blankets and stores to PERONNE from D, 20.d.2.8.

Time 12-45 (38th. Battalion
 (100 Men from 10th. Field Amb.

Each Train will carry about 350 personnel.

- 6. Two Motor Lorries will report at D. 23.d.1.6 at 8 a.m. for the purpose of conveying stores to Light Railway and an Officer has been detailed by 39th. Battalion to direct these to Units.
- 7. Capt. C.H. PETERS M.C. will report for duty as entraining Officer to the Divisional Entraining Officer at R.T.O's Office at PLAMICOURT (PERONNE) at 9-45 a.m., and will act as detraining Officer when destination is reached. "C" Coy will detail a leading party of 25 other ranks together with at least 2 Sergeants to report at R.T.O's Office at PERONNE, to Divisional Entraining Officer at 12.30 to act as loaders for the Brigade Transport Train. The Complete leading party will work under Officer(S) detailed respectively by 37th. and 40th. Battalions who will also report as above

A. Robbins

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No	1	10th. Bde Staff	Adjutant	38th. Battalion	Lieut. A.I.F.
"	"	2	C.O.	Copy No 7	File
"	"	2	"A" Coy	" "	(8
"	"	4	"E" Coy	(to	War Diary
"	"	5	"C" Coy	(10	

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------	------	----	----------	----------------------------------

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------	----------------	----------------------	--	----------

6th.	Vicinity of MORCOURT	Vicinity of ARGOEVES	HAMEL-POUILLOY VEC QUEMONT-N switch road ANIENS-LONGPRE	ST, SAUVEU
------	----------------------	----------------------	---	------------

7th.	Vicinity of ARGOEVES	MALLENGOURT Area	LA-CHAUSSEE PICQUIGNY-RANGEST	-
------	----------------------	------------------	----------------------------------	---

5. The following light railway trains will be available for conveying personnel with packs, blankets and stores to PERONNE from D.30.d.2.8.

Time 12-45

{ 38th. Battalion
{ 100 Men from 10th. Field Amb.

Each Train will carry about 350 personnel.

6. Two Motor Lorries will report at D.27.d.1.6 at 8 a.m. for the purpose of conveying stores to Light Railway and an Officer has been detailed by 38th. Battalion to direct these to Units.

7. Capt. G.H. PETERS M.C. will report for duty as entraining Officer to the Divisional Entraining Officer at R.T.O's Office at FLAMICOURT (PERONNE) at 9-45 a.m. and will act as detraining Officer when destination is reached. "C" Coy will detail a loading party of 25 other ranks together with at least 2 Sergeants to report at R.T.O's Office at PERONNE, to Divisional Entraining Officer at 12-30 to act as loaders for the Brigade Transport Train. The Complete loading party will work under Officer (H) detailed respectively by 37th. and 40th. Battalions who will also report as above

H. Robbins

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No	1	10th. Bde H.Q.	Asst. Adjutant	38th. Battalion	Lieut. File
"	"	C.O.	"	"	"
"	"	"A" Coy	"	"	"
"	"	"B" Coy	"	"	"
"	"	"C" Coy	"	"	"

(8 to War Diary)
(10

SCHEDULE (1)

TRANSPORT TRAIN NO 1

Unit	Nature of Vehicles	No of Axles	No of Animals	Remarks
------	--------------------	-------------	---------------	---------

38th. Battn.	Riding Horses		8	
	3 Field Kitchens		8	
	1 Cart Off. Mess			Mess Gear
	1 Waggon G.S.			For supplies
	2 Carts Water			
	1 Cart Maltese			Medical Gear
	Pack Animals		7	

(a) One Field Kitchen to accompany Battalion Transport travelling by Road.

Train leaves PERONNE 15-30

Station: PERONNE
 Area: PERONNE
 Station: PERONNE
 Area: PERONNE
 Station: PERONNE
 Area: PERONNE

The following is the list of personnel with packs, blankets and stores to be transported from 15.30.22.

Each train will carry about 250 personnel.

The Motor Lorries will report at 15.30.22 at 8 a.m. for the purpose of conveying stores to light railway and an Officer has been detailed by 38th. Battalion to direct these to units.

7. Capt. G.H. REYNOLDS M.C. will report for duty as commanding Officer to the Divisional Training Officer at 15.30.22. Office at PERONNE (PERONNE) at 15.30.22 and will act as detaching Officer when destination is reached.

"C" Coy will detail a loading party of 28 other ranks together with at least 8 Sergeants to report at 15.30.22 Office at PERONNE to Divisional Training Officer at 15.30.22 to act as loaders for the British Transport Train.

The complete loading party will work under Officer (S) detailed respectively by 38th. and 40th. Battalions who will also report as above.

COY NO	NO	1	2	3	4	5
"A" Coy	1	1	1	1	1	1
"B" Coy	1	1	1	1	1	1
"C" Coy	1	1	1	1	1	1

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR HALLENCOURT AREA

Reference Map VIGNACOURT 1/100,000

1. LOCATIONS Units are located in the HALLENCOURT Area as follows:
(a) Units of the 10th Australian Infantry Brigade Group

10th Brigade Headquarters	-	Chateau BRONDELLE
37th Battalion	-	SOREL and WANEL
38th Battalion	-	BAILLEUL and BELLIFONTAINE
39th Battalion	-	HOCQUINCOURT
40th Battalion	-	BRONDELLE
10th A.L.T.M. Battery	-	BRAY BELLIFONTAINE
10th Field Ambulance	-	Bray
23rd Coy A.A.S.C.	-	WANEL

(b) Other Divisional Units

Divisional Paymaster	-	HALLENCOURT
C.R.E.	-	Do
Divisional Clothing Store	-	Do
.. Baths Officer	-	Do
.. Canteen Store	-	Do
Australian Comforts Fund	-	ALLERY
S.A.A. Section 3rd D.A.C.	-	AIRAINES
3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion	-	LIERCOURT
3rd Divisional Salvage Coy	-	HALLENCOURT
D.A.D.O.S.	-	ALLERY
3rd Australian Sanitary Section	-	AIRAINES

2. BOUNDS The Brigade Boundary is as follows :-

EPAGNETTE (exc) LIMOUX (inc) HOCQUINCOURT (inc) HALLENCOURT (inc)
BITTENCOURT (exc) LONGPRE (exc) FONTAINE (exc) PONT REMY (exc)
EDUCOURT-sur-SOMME (exc) EPAGNE (exc). This area has been sub-
divided into five sub-areas called "A" "B" "C" "D" "E" respectively
A senior officer has been placed in charge of each sub-area as
follows :-

"C" sub-area - Lieut-Colonel G. HURRY "D.S.O"
who will be responsible ~~to~~ to the Brigade Commander for the
discipline of all Units in their respective sub-areas.

3. DISCIPLINE The following instructions will be strictly adhered
to while the Division is in 'rest'.

(a) Regimental passes for leave within the Brigade area
must be issued to all men on leave outside their own Battalion ~~with~~
billeting area. These are available from 1500 to 2100. Passes to leave
Battalion areas at other times than above, or to leave Brigade area
must be issued by Brigade Headquarters.

(b) All men going on leave must wear stripped web belts
and must have colour patches. Box respirators need not be carried.

(c) Before going on leave all men must be paraded by the
Battalion Orderly Sergeant when they will be inspected and then
issued with passes.

(d) All troops must be in billets by 2130. A strict roll-
call will be held at this time.

4. Guards The Battalion will mount a guard daily at 0900. The
smartness and turnout of guards must be a matter of special attention

5. LEAVE Arrangements are being made for leave to be granted daily
to ABBEVILLE and allotment together with transport arrangements
will be notified later.

6. SANITATION Companies are responsible for the cleanliness and ~~the~~
sanitation of billets in occupation by them. No latrines other than
Military latrines will be used by troops.

7. FIRE PRECAUTIONS Striking matches, handling fires, smoking, or the
use of naked lights in or near buildings where straw, hay, etc., is
stored is strictly forbidden. Attention is drawn to General Routine
Orders and Fourth Army Routine Orders on the subject.

8. WATER Water will be drawn from wells in the various villages
and must be chlorinated at source of supply. Horses will not be
watered in streams or water holes, but by bucket pending erection of
horse troughs.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR HALLENGOURT AREAReference Map VIGNACOURT 1/100,000

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40th Battalion	--	BRONDELLE
10th A.L.T.M. Battery	--	BRAY BELLIFONTAINE
10th Field Ambulance	--	Bray
23rd Coy A.A.S.C.	--	WANEL

(b) Other Divisional Units

Divisional Paymaster	--	HALLENGOURT
C.R.E.	--	Do
Divisional Clothing Store	--	Do
.. Baths Officer	--	Do
.. Canteen Store	--	Do
Australian Comforts Fund	--	ALLERY
S.A.A. Section 3rd D.A.C.	--	AIRAINES
3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion	--	LIERCOURT
3rd Divisional Salvage Coy	--	HALLENGOURT
D.A.D.O.S.	--	ALLERY
3rd Australian Sanitary Section	--	AIRAINES

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BITTEHCOURT (exc) LONGPRE (exc) FONTAINE (exc) PORT RIBY (exc)
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sanitation of billets in occupation by them. No latrines other than
Military latrines will be used by troops.

7. FIRE PRECAUTIONS Striking matches, kindling fires, smoking, or the ~~use~~
use of naked lights in or near buildings where straw, hay, etc., is
stored is strictly forbidden. Attention is drawn to General Routine
Orders and Fourth Army Routine Orders on the subject.

8. WATER Water will be drawn from wells in the various villages
and ~~must~~ be chlorinated at source of supply. Horses will not be
watered in streams or water holes, but by bucket pending erection of
horse troughs.

9. GRAZING Grazing in the area must be arranged for through the senior supply officer.

10. SALVAGE Salvage will be forwarded to Q.M.Store by Coys and then returned to Refilling Point, thence to Railhead by supply waggons of Divisional Train. Salvage personnel have been placed at Railhead and Refilling Point.

11. REINFORCEMENTS Railhead - LONGPRE
One cyclist orderly from 40th Battalion has been detailed to report to O.C. 3rd Australian Divisional Wing, LONGPRE, to act as guide for all units in the Brigade area.

Owing to limited accommodation at the Wing, it will be necessary for drafts to move immediately on arrival to their Units until further accommodation is available.

12. BATHS Baths in the Brigade Area are allotted to Units as follows :-

BELLIFONTAINE	-	{ 'C' & 'D' Coys 38th Battalion
		{ 39th Battalion
		{ 10th A.L.F.M. Battery
LIERCOURT	-	{ 'A' & 'B' Coys 38th Battalion
		{ 3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion
		{ 23rd Coy A.A.S.C.

Approximately 50 men per hour can be bathed at LIERCOURT, and 50 per hour at BELLIFONTAINE.

13. Y.M.C.A. Divisional Y.M.C.A. Representative is located at Billet 400 HALLENCOURT. The Brigade Representative is located with 38th Battalion where he has erected at 30 & 30 marquee.

J.R. Robb

Lieut
A/Adjutant 38th Battalion A. I. F.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No 1	'A' Coy
.. 2	B Coy
.. 3	G ..
.. 4	D Coy
.. 5	T.O.
.. 6	Q.M.
.. 7	File
.. 8	War Diary
.. 9	..
.. 10	..
.. 11/12	Spare.

38th BATTALION A.I.F ORDER No.97.

17th October 1918

Reference Maps - Sheet 57E 1/40000
VIGNACOURT 1/100000

1. The 38th Battalion A.I.F. (less "A" and "B" Coys and Transport Section) will move to SOREL and WANEL as under. Hqrs (less Transport Section) on Friday 18th inst.- "C" and "D" Coys and A.M.C. Details on Saturday 19th inst. immediately after G.O.C's inspection.
2. All Headquarters details will parade at 09.45, 18th inst. in front of Orderly Room in full marching order (less blankets) ready to move to new billets. Blankets will be rolled in bundles of 10 and stacked at Bn. Hqrs, Officers Mess by 09.30. All Hqrs Officers valises etc will be ready stacked at the mess by 09.30.
3. 1 N.C.O. and 4 Signallers and a further party of 2 men who will act as guard over blankets will remain behind and will ration at "D" Coy for Mid-day meal. The men at present in detention will be sent direct to new Battalion Headquarters at SOREL under escort by O.C. "D" Coy on the morning of Saturday 19th inst.
4. After the Brigade inspection of Saturday "C" Coy will proceed direct to its new billets in WANEL and "D" Coy will proceed to billets in SOREL. Each Coy will detail an officer to proceed to WANEL and SOREL respectively tomorrow 18th inst and make all arrangements for its reception. "C" and "D" Coy will arrange for their blankets to be rolled in bundles of 10 and stacked ready for transport which will call for them and any other stores etc on Saturday afternoon before 15.00. A guard of 1 N.C.O. and 1 man per Coy will be left behind with the stores.
5. The a/R.M.O. and his details will remain with "C" and "D" Coys and will proceed with them to SOREL on 19th inst.
6. The Transport section will remain in present billets till further notice. Riding horses and grooms are to be accommodated in new area with Battalion.
7. While in present Billets "C" and "D" Coys will each maintain signal stations continuously from 07.00 to 22.30.
8. ACKNOWLEDGE

W.A. Bowden Lt.
@/Adj. 38th Bn. A.I.F.

D ISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1	Hqrs 10th A.I.Bde
2.	C.O.
3.	Major Robertson
4.	O.C. "A" Coy
5.	O.C. "B" Coy
6.	O.C. "C" Coy
7.	O.C. "D" Coy
8.	Q.M.
9.	T.O.
10/12.	War Diary
13.	File

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A.H. Bowden Lt.
S/Adj. 38th Bn. A.I.F.

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Copy No. 1	Hqrs 10th A.I. Bde
2.	C.O.
3.	Major Robertsen
4.	O.C. "A" Coy
5.	O.C. "B" Coy
6.	O.C. "C" Coy
7.	O.C. "D" Coy
8.	Q.M.
9.	T.O.
10/12.	War Diary
13.	File

(Copy)

MEDICAL DIARY 38th Battalion

The sick Parades for the month of March were light. There was no disease of an epidemic nature.

The men going away on the second quota to AUSTRALIA were medically boarded and taking all things into consideration they were remarkably fit, after coming through such strenuous times in France. Altogether about 250 were boarded.

(Sgd) J.L. ALLSOP Captain

R.M.O. 38th Battalion A.I.F.

March 1919

38TH. BATTALION A.I.F. ROUTINE ORDER NO. 968

By

4th April 1919

Captain A. FRASER "MC" Commanding

- ADMINISTRATION 1. This will be the last Routine Order issued by the 38th Battalion. In future the Administration of this Bn. will be carried out by the 39th Battalion with the assistance of 2/Lieut R.L. PARTRIDGE. In future all returns will be submitted to the 39th Battalion H.Qrs.
- ENGLISH LEAVE 2. The allotment of English Leave to the 10th Demob. Regt. is now 2 daily, and no special allotment will in future be given to the 38th Bn. Those desiring leave must now submit written Applications.
- STRENGTH 3. The following were detained in U.K. ex leave for N.M.E. and are S.O.S.
Lieut GOLLAN R.W. "B" Coy. 19/3/19
1639 L/c Fowler G.T. "B" Coy 24/3/19
Lieut TAYLOR C.J. "B" Coy. proceeded to U.K. for duty with Demobaust, 2/4/19 and is S.O.S.
6030 L/c Hume C.N. "B" Coy evacuated to Hospital 31/3/19 and is S.O.S.
The following proceeded to U.K. for N.M.E. 3/4/19 and are S.O.S.
Lieut DORRINGTON I.A. "B" Coy. ~~31~~
3290 Pte De Leon C.H. "B" Coy
3366 " Pointon G.F. "B" Coy
3355 " Marriott W. "B" Coy
214 Sgt Baird D.A. "B" Coy. marched out with No. 29 Quota (39th Bn.) and is S.O.S. ~~and~~ from 3/4/19.
The following were declared illegal absentees by Courts of Inquiry held on dates shown hereunder and are S.O.S.
482 Pte Goodwin A.L. "B" Coy 31/3/19
1823 Pte Dalli J. "B" Coy 2/4/19
- TRANSFERS 4. The following are transferred from "H.Qrs" to "B" Coy ~~3214x2x~~ as from 4/4/19.
Captain FRASER A "MC"
2/Lt. PARTRIDGE R.L.
" TULLY J.H.
1873 RSM LUCAS W.F.
- DETACHMENTS 5. The following Officers and other ranks who were attached to the 38th Bn. are detached to the 39th Bn. as from 4/4/19.
Captain Chaplain BROWN C.P. (10th Bde H.Qrs)
356 Sgt Palk A. (A.A.P.C)
3099 Pte Laby C.R.
17517 Pte Petrie A.L. (10th Field Amb.)
- PROMOTION 6. 2616 T/Cpl Poppins E.T. has been selected as an Instructor under A.I.F. Education Service with Embarkation Quota No. 29 and is to retain the rank of E.R.Cpl while so employed, as from 1/4/19.
- REVERSIONS 7. The following revert from Drivers to Privates as from 3/4/19 on proceeding with No. 29th Embarkation Quota and ceasing Transport Duties.
281 Dvr Gill H. 1674x Dvr Lofts A. 392. Dvr Swan F.W.
The following revert from Drivers to Privates on dates shown hereunder.-
586 Dvr Trenter A.T. 17/2/19 on proceeding with No. 12 Quota
3396 Dvr Stewart A.J. 19/3/19 on evacuation to Hospital.

The following Officers and other ranks marched out to GANACHES 3/4/19 to proceed with No. 29 Embarkation quota, due to entrain for A.G.B.D. LE HAVRE on the 9/4/19. No further A.F.B. 21's will be forwarded regarding those personnel, but any changes between now and date of entrainment will be notified by letter.

Lieut WHITEHEAD J.L. (O.C)	Lieut ROBBINS H. "MC"	Lieut ROWE W.L.
Lieut McNICOL N.G. "MC"	Lieut TELFER P.J. "MC"	Lieut BOYLAND W.J.
Lieut STOKES H.R.	Lieut MITCHELL L.W.	Lieut DAVIS J.C.
Lieut POTTER E.	Lieut BOWMAN G.G.	2/Lt DUGAN G.L.
2922a Cpl Woodhouse G.G.	159 Sgt Onley R.E.	1118 Sgt Glover R.L.
674 Sgt Robertson D.O.	814 CQMS Bear E.J.	536 CQMS Burns W.S.
917 Sgt Kelly R.B.	1645 Sgt Hogan W.J.	124 Sgt Shuttlewood J.A.
1194 Sgt Lockett J.H.	615 Sgt McNeil J.D.	1889 L/Sgt Rangescroft H.C.
2883 L/Sgt Parker G.C.	446 Cpl Waterson T.R.	63 Cpl Homden J.W.J.
811 Cpl Barkoll C.	1053 Cpl Stanley T.	951 Cpl Nowton C.E.
387 Cpl Quin C.A.W.	519 Cpl Gann F.C.	1563 Cpl Richards W.S.
621 " McLeod J.	1794 " Bartell R.E.	2290 L/c Bullen D.M.
2059 L/c Dixon F.A.	119 L/c Harlow P.P.	658 " Sutton H.
384 L/c Symonds E.C.	123 " Clancy D.	942 " McDonald E.H.
473 " Courtney P.	1617 Dvr Baldwin W.J.C.	3293 " Barnett E.W.
226 Dvr Birmingham F.J.	441 Pte Blakeloy W.T.	22 Dvr Brown H.
2293 Pte Campbell B.S.	2211 " Capner E.E.	2783 Pte Clayton W.J.
1821 " Corbett W.L.	2543 " Connelly A.H.	2785a " Constable W.H.
245 " Coram A.A.	1140 Dvr Currie J.	3056 " Dickinson T.W.
2305 " Dickinson H.J.	1179 Pte Duffy E.G.	268 Dvr Easton F.J.
2185 " Evans R.D.	739 Dvr Exon G.E.	877 " Fennessy J.
1853 " Fielding W.J.	2827 Pte Foggie F.J.	2803 Pte Frith A.J.
2804 L/c Garton F.W.	28 Dvr Gill H.	6988a " Gillies H.
2807 Pte Gregory A.J.	6014 Pte Grey A.T.	571 L/c Harris E.J.
2329 L/c Hartwig W.F.	2583 " Hayllar H.	1653 " Holmes P.J.
6032 " Hendy N.R.	77 " Hocking J.V.	286 " Hough A.E.L.
3363a Pte Houlder W.R.	1652 Dvr Hutchescn H.	2822 Pte Hills F.C.
2816 " Healey F.B.	2097 Pte Innes G.R.	2586 L/c Jenkins E.W.
2028 " Johnstone A.J.	11 " Jolme J.P.	2344 Pte Kirby J.
1943 " Krieg W.	923 Dvr Lacey T.A.	1222 Dvr Lawrie D.P.
2592 L/c Lees J.A.O.W.	6051 Pte Lester E.R.	2833 L/c Lever H.
1783 Pte Lewis R.C.	929 " Loan A.S.	2832 Pte Lawrie J.E.
1674 Dvr Lofts A.	2858 " Loudon D.K.	727 " Makopeace E.G.
2365 Pte Meyer J.E.	2111 L/c Millor E.	2115 " Mitchell F.E.
2420 " Morrell H.C.	16 Pte McCormack T.J.	461 Dvr McBean J.R.
19 Dvr McCorkell S.J.T.	3266 " McGuinness T.	3201 Pte McKenzie D.A.
2127 Pte Michanus T.W.	4866 " Nolan E.J.	635 " Osgood B.B.
634 " Osgood H.R.	352 " Owen J.	2376 " Palmer H.A.
2861 " Patterson G.	31 " Potter W.	2616 " Poppins E.T.
2890 " Porter W.G.	1053 " Poppleton A.	2807 " Quinlan T.J.
7037 " Rice C.W.S.	3487 " Robertson E.R.	652 " Roberts J.J.
1387 " Rumble H.S.	1274 L/c Rogers J.H.	7078 " Scannell A.G.
391 Dvr Shappand A.H.	1387 Pte Shaman J.	2142 " Sheringham C.
2642 Pte Silsby E.B.	3284 " Spence F.S.	1308 " Strachan D.R.
1914 " Strauss A.F.	392 Dvr Swan F.W.	2761 " Thompson P.H.
1006 Dvr Tierney F.K.	2920 Pte Tough J.N.	3253a " Turner W.C.
2159 Pte Unveas Y.	1923a " Westblade J.H.	1950 L/c Wight T.
2409 " Whistler A.E.	1707 " Whyte P.J.	2916 " Williams H.E.
30 Dvr Willetts E.C.	35 Dvr Wills T.P.	711 Pte Waters E.N.
3164 Pte Woods C.W.P.	2424 Pte Worthington J.	2902 " Wattz J.H.

The following form "B" Cadre, 38th Battalion and are included in above.

Lieut H. ROBBINS "MC"
 1645 Sgt W.J. HOGAN
 2883 L/Sgt G.C. PARKER
 2365 Pte J.E. MEYER
 11 Pte J.P. JOLME

The following Officers and Other Ranks are detached to the 39th Bn as from 4/4/19, for Demobilization and Administrative purposes. This is a complete list of the members of the 38th Bn. remaining behind after the departure of No. 29 Embarkation Quota.

OFFICERS

Capt. FRASER A. "HC"
 Lieut CHALMERS A.J. - Detached Aust Corps School, RUE, 10/1/19
 Lieut CROWE W.H. - English Leave 27.3.19
~~Lieut GILMAN R.~~
 2/Lt. HUTCHINS G.L.
 P.2/Lt. JAMIESON E.A.
 P.2/Lt. LOW J.S. EU Picquet BARBENCON
 P.2/Lt. OSMALLEY W.B. - Detached P.&.R.T. School, ~~CHATELAIN~~, 25/1/19
 P.2/Lt. PARTRIDGE R.L.
 P.2/Lt. PHILLIPS T.P. - School 43 Aust. Aux. Motor & Petrol Coy. Dieppe
 2/Lt. ROBERTS L.A.
 P.2/Lt. ROBINSON G.H. English Leave extended to 1.4.19
~~Lieut TAYLOR G.~~
 Lieut VERSO S.B. - Detached P.&.R.T. School, 25-1-19 BARBENCON.
 Lieut WATKINS G.H.
 P.2/Lt. TULLY J.H. - Detached 3rd Aust. Div Train 22/1/19.

OTHER RANKS

3020 Opd Aniet H. - Detached Postal Guard Le HAVRE. 14/2/19
 3262 Pte Anderson T.S.
 2279 Pte Backman F.G. - Detached Coaches 4/2/19
 530 Pte Bannister H.G.
 2043 L/c Barber R.
 4757 Pte Beasley A.
 3263 " Beebe G.E.
 3411 " Bell A.E.
 2774 " Belfield J.H.
 3268 " Benson A.D.
 32 " Bird A. EU Picquet
 2775 " Bodey I.V.H. Rome Leave 24. 3.19
 80 " Bridges A. EU Picquet
 1210 Dvr Brown J.E.
 1125 Cpl Bruce E.N. English Leave 4.4.19
 3036 Pte Bryer-Jones G.R. EU Picquet
 1066 CSM Buckland T.H. English Leave 4.4.19
 763 CSM Buckland R.J. do 2.3.19
 754a Pte Burleigh T.
 2785 " Cairns C.E.
 3393 " Carlson I.
 446 CSM Clarke A.
 7211 Pte Clarke W.A.
 3280 " Clifton L.B.W. 10th Demob. Reg. (not detached) 27.3.19
 444 Sgt Cole H.R.
 1129 Sgt Coffey J.
 3283 Pte Collins T.O.
 3171 " Colvin G.W. English Leave 18.3.19
 4788 " Cooke A.
 3045 " Cooper A.A.
 3039 " Cornell W.H. English Leave 25.3.19
 3278 " Cove E.H.
 2797 " Couch L.
 629 " Cowan A.T.
 3040 " Creed L.J.
 3119 " Crosby H. English Leave 20.3.19
 2779 L/c Curnow J.
 3043 L/c Cuttiford D.
 3048 Pte Dare G.
 3394 " Davenport C.G.
 3288 " Davidson N.G.
 1147 Cpl Deal F.S. - Detached Divisional Coaches 4/2/19
 2809 Pte Dean T.H.
 3291 " Dervan L.
 3290 " Duncan T.
 2306 L/c Duncan A.
 1150 Sgt Dunn G.

4

2554 L/c Durham G.H. Aust. Corps R/E W/Shops Jeumont
262 CSM Durward W.J.
4799 Pte Eddy R. English Leave 20.3.19
3148 " Elphick F.B.
4732 " Entwistle J.J.
3392 " Fairrey E.
3298 " Farrell T.A.
6987 L/cgt Fauz G.
3299 Pte Fauvel P.H. EU Picquet
3300 " Feldman F.A.
3303 " Ferguson G.E.
2801 L/c Fleigner H.A. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
881 CQMS Fowler W.L.
3058 Pte Fowler H. English Leave extended to 6.4.19
3301 " Fraser G.T. School 3rd Div. Train
3430 " Frost R.N.
2076 Cpl Gaulton J.E. - Detached Postal Guard, HAVRE, 24/3/19
3399 Pte Gent H.
3071 " Gillham R.W.
1043 Sgt Grinton J.W. Paris Leave 22.3.19
5024 Sgt Grinton A.V. Nice Leave (14 days) 28.3.19
3398 Pte Grigg H.J.
3437 " Gunn W.P. English Leave 10.3.19
3077 L/c Gunston J.F.
3450 Pte Hanrahan P.J. - Detached Postal Guard HAVRE, 26/3/19
4822 " Hardwick A.
3001 " Hart A.C. EU Picquet
3320 " Hayes R.K. - Detached Postal Guard, HAVRE, 26/3/19
1849 Sgt Hayman A. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
3313 Pte Henderson A.H. English Leave 20.3.19
3252 Sgt Heslin P. EU Picquet
3314 Pte Holmes C.B. EU do
3090 " Hutson F.J.
761a " Ireland L.M. EU Picquet
3320 " Jackson M.A.
4833 " Jeffery T.
3324 " Jephcott T.C.
3328 " Kasch T.J.
4845 " Keegan R.E. - Detached A.G.B.D. for duty 26/3/19
2850 " Kenny J.R.
3427 " Ledger J.H. English Leave 20.3.19
1048 Sgt Lehman F.H. - Detach A.G.B.D. for duty, 20/3/19
3443 Pte Lishman W.A. EU Picquet
3332 " Lonsdale F.L.
1873 RSM Lucas W.F.
7043 Pte Lucas J.N.
4647 " Luke J.H.
765a " Madden R.W.
3110 L/c Manning W.A. - Detached A.G.B.D for Duty 26/3/19
874 Pte May W.J.
43 " Meagher N.B. English Leave 19.3.19 - may report back to A.S.C.
766a " Millist O.P. EU Picquet
4850 " Moss E.N.
3344 " Munro E.I. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
3348 " McNulty W.R.
2124 " McVicar A.A. A.W.L. from Eng. Leave - believed N.M.E.
8061 " O'Donoghue A. - Detached Aust Corps School, RUE, for duty, 31/12/18
3117 " Pascoe O.H.W.
1255 CQMS Peate G. English Leave 10.3.19
2135 Cpl Plim J. EU Picquet
3354 Pte Powell W.E.G.
3209a " Preston H.
4870 " Pritchard L.W.
1900 CQMS Quinton B.J. - Detached 3rd Aust Div Wing, 3/12/18
3461 Pte Ranson J.G. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
3127a " Reeve A.S. English Leave 22.3.19
2712 " Riley S.H. Dental Sch. - 1st Aust. Gen Depot HAVRE
3532 " Roberts W.A.
3262 " Robertson D.K. EU Picquet
4881 " Ross R.G. ~~xxxx~~ English Leave 20.3.19
3424 " Rowe R.R.
3379 " Ryan F.J. Aust. Corps R.E.W/Shops JEUMONT
3008 L/c Sandow W.J. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
3133 Pte Sands W.J. Sch. 9th F. Engineers
2650 " Scott S.W.

P.T.O

(B)

4887 Pte Seider T.F.
 3186 " Shaw G.
 10 " Simmonds J. Aust. Corps R.E. W/Shops JEUMONT
 4888 " Slater W.
 3138 " Smith F.J. - Detached Postal Guard, HAVRE, 14/3/19
 380 Sgt Spencer H. 30 days Special Leave to U.K. - proceeded 6.3.19
 3452 Pte Strow R.H.C.
 3369 " Teichelmann R.C.
 3370 " Toohy E.L.
 520 Cpl Towl K.T. Aust. Corps Sch. RUE
 3256 Pte Taylor C.A.
 3150 " Thornber J. - Detached P.S.R.T. School, BARBENCON (batman) 25/3/19
 4907 " Thrum G.H. - Detached Postal Guard, HAVRE, 26/3/19
 3152 " Verso A.J.J. English Leave 21.3.19
 1318 " Wallace F.P. Paris Leave 1.4.19
 4904 " Ward T.J.
 2915 " White F.
 3137 " Williams H.T. English Leave 22.3.19
 3166 " Wright S.G.
 3170 " Wright O.D. Aust. Corps R.E. W/Shops JEUMONT
 2909 " Yole A.
 3384 " Young W.C.

R. BERRINS Lieut
 Adjutant 38th Bat talion A.I.F.

38TH. BATTALION A.I.F.

NOMINAL ROLL OF DECORATIONS AWARDED SINCE ARRIVAL IN FRANCE

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Lieut-Colonel G. H. DAVIS
Lieut-Colonel G. HURRY
Captain G. V. DAVIES

MILITARY CROSS

2/Lieut K.G. WILSON
(Capt) Lieut C.H. PETERS
Lieut W.H. McCULLOCH
2/Lieut T.H. KENNEDY
Capt R.E. TRIBILCOCK
Capt F.E. FAIRWEATHER
Capt W.H. ORCHARD
Lieut W.R.B. MARTIN
Capt E.W. LATCHFORD
Capt A. FRASER
2/Lieut E.J.H. SCHLITZ
Lieut J.A.B. CHURCHILL
Lieut F.J. BAXTER
Lieut N.W.W. SANDIFORD
Lieut J.F. EASON
Lieut A.W. SMITH
Lieut A.L. BOOL
Lieut P.J. TELFER
Lieut H. ROBBINS.

BAR TO MILITARY CROSS

Lieut F.J. BAXTER 'MC'
Capt C.H. PETERS 'MC'
Capt F.E. FAIRWEATHER 'MC'

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

1007 Sgt. A.J.C. TAYLOR 326 Pte F. LOCK
631 Sgt P.L. NIHILL 546 Cpl G.B. FULLERTON
996 Sgt (Lieut J.S. SHILLIDAY 2209 Pte A.A.G. BRIGHT
645 L/c F.J. PERRY 2090 Sgt J.P. HEANEY "MM"
5026 Cpl A.V. GRINTON

MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL

948 L/c J.A. McDONALD 599 T/Sgt E. MULQUINY
350 RQMS J.W.A. NICOLL

BELGIAN CROIX DE GUERRE

2634 L/c R.B. SINCLAIR 3972 Cpl R.B. BRANCH
38 L/c A.W. LANDILLS

FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE

1862 Pte A. HOLLINGWORTH 440 Cpl A.J.B. RAYBOULD
4847 Pte J.H. LUKE

MILITARY MEDAL

610 Pte MEYERINK J.J. 631 L/c NIHILL P.J. 749 Pte McVICAR P.
465 " TUTOR H.W.H. 124 Pte SHUTTLEWOOD J.A. 980 " RISBY G.S.
380 Sgt SPENCER G. 428 Sgt BERRY R.P. 434 Cpl PASCOE J.T.
337 Pte MOORE A.S. 6009 Pte EYERS A.L. 1729 Cpl COUTTS P.R.
763 CSM BUCKLAND R.J. 1845 " GREEN T.A. 6025 Pte HOLT G.
2090 Pte HEANEY J.R. 1959 Sgt ROBERTS L.A. (Now Lieut)
2134 Pte PYERS L. 2518 Cpl BROOK F. 2078 Pte GUTHERIDGE J.G.
2469 L/c PATHERICK A.V. 3233 Sgt SIDEN O.A. 1816 " CHALMERS T.M.
1818 Pte CHALMERS P. 861 Cpl CRAFTER F.S.H. 1886 " McMASTER E.

Copies of original
messages re

31st Aug 1918

W.R. Sturt
Cecily Copse - Somme

O.C. A B C D boys.

AA 121

31

Re RELIEF The instructions contained in my AA 119 regarding the sending back of 2 guides per company for the 11th Bge after you were established in your new positions is now cancelled by my last memo (AA 120).

The 11th Bge moves through you.

38th Bn

7.35 P.M.

Sgd. H. Robbins Lt.

Boys are to be ready tomorrow
to move back to GAVX 4000 JAP

O. S. boy. Urgent.

AAA 120 31

Relief will be carried out tonight
by 11th Bge AAA. The 11th Bge
under cover of a barrage will
move through our troops to
the approximate line of -
BOUCH AUFESNES - MT. ST. QUENTIN
road AAA. Troops of this Brigade
will be withdrawn as 11th Brigade
pass them AAA each company
commander will withdraw his
men separately and independently
as soon as the 11th Bge passes
through his company and proceed
with them to square H1

Sgt. H. Robbin, Lt

2.

AA 120 31st.

along main road to CURLU AAA.
 Lt Col CHURCHILL has gone forward
 with guides (one per company drawn
 from H. Qs) who will meet
 each company along main
 road leading to CURLU and
 direct it to its position in the
 square H1 AAA. A hot meal
 will be provided on arrival
 AAA Each company commander
 must report to Sgt SHUTTLEWOOD
 personally at old 37th Bn H.Q.
 (near forward Bge H.Q. Hs) that
 relief is complete AAA boys
 proceed direct to new location
 AAA I shall if possible be at
 37th HQ myself to receive reports

38th Bn
 Sgt. A. Pabbin

LATER. Exact time of relief not yet known
 and is quite possible the relief will take
 place WITHOUT BARRAGE AAA

O.C. ABC & D boys.

AA 119 31

A general advance by the
38th and 39th Battalions pivoting
on the cross roads C 20 d 30.10
will take place to gradually
swing line forward until
the right flank of the right
Battalion (38th) rests on the canal
and POINSOT TRENCH in I 3a
and to the Brigade frontage
extending along main road through
I 6 b and d. I 6 and 3c
consolidating if possible in
trenches on East side of road AAA.
The 38th Battalion will pivot on
the 39th Battalion on its left.

over

2

AA 119

31st.

The 37th and 40th Battal are co-operating under special instructions AAA. (Battal H.Q. will remain in present location (I 10.7.5) for time being AAA. Operations to be started forthwith AAA 40th Battal has 2 companies already in vicinity of sunken road junction in C 26 Rd 4.1 AAA The Battal will be relieved tonight and this movement to the road should facilitate relief AAA Relieving unit not yet known AAA As soon as you have made

3.

new position good send in two guides per company to guide in relieving companies AAA Ensure that a company runner who knows where

Headquarters is accompanied
guides H.H.H. Patrols will be
assigned after relief at our
new location H.H.H. Forward
progress reports frequently
and dispositions in new
positions when there

38th B-

5.25 P.M.

Sgt. H. Robbins Lt.

P. B. H. G. G. G.
H. H. 116 3/1/20

- Br. H. G. now located at
approx T 10.75 (VAN TRENCH)
H. H. H.
Ammunition is being brought
to Col. Brigade H. G. G.
as soon as possible.

38th Br

2.25 PM.

Sgt.

H. G. G.

Runner Very Urgent

Pl. A C & D Coy.

HA 104 31st

Take up position in GOND
TRENCH about 300 to 400
yards to your rear HAF
Barrage opens at 6 AM.

HAF In attack forward
under cover of barrage HAF.
Detailed orders have already
been forwarded to you HAF.
Companies have linkages as
detailed at conference HAF.
Objective is our RED LINE
I 2 a and c.

38th 93rd

H 6 a cent.

5 AM.

Sgt. H. Robbins

All companies

HH 103 31st

Instead of forming up as
instructed companies will
form up in GOND TRENCH
breaching through H66 and
d up as far as CODE ALLEY
AAA. Barrage will open at
6 AM and will follow on
the start line for 6 (six)
minutes AAA. They will
then advance by lifts of
one hundred yards every
six minutes AAA.
Artillery start line will be
north and south through
east corner of CLERY
COPSE AAA.

(over)

W. J. P. [Signature]

2

All companies
(continued)

AA 103 3rd

Order of companies in GOND
TRENCH will be A Coy right,
D Coy centre
C Coy left company AAH.
Companies frontages will be
as already detailed AAH.
B company will follow in
close support AAH.
Objective to capture the
RED LINE (INFERNAL
TRENCH — ZOMBO TRENCH)
as detailed at conference
this evening — under cover
of barrage AAH. At same
time or earlier Brigade on
north and south will

over
Sgt. P. P. P.

3

All companies
AA 103 31st

capture their objective AA.
ZERO 6 AM 31st August
AA. Half an hour before
zero troops must be in
GOND TRENCH AA.

Artillery barrage lasts till
ZERO, plan 90 minutes AA.

On account of differences in
the start lines the barrages
of Tank Brigades will not
start at the same time
as ours - Division on north
starts at 5.5 AM and Brigade
on south at 5 AM AA.

Other orders are as verbally
issued to you this evening
3rd P.

H 6 a cont Sgt J Pollock
4.30 AM.

O. O. Companies

A.H. 99 30'

Have your company standing
by ready to support forward
troops in case of colateral
attack from CLERY COPSE
AAA.

39th Bn are in support
vicinity of H Co central AAA.
Ammunition coming up
by carrying parties

38th Bn
4.40 P.M.

Sgt. R. R. R. R.

OB Simpson

AA. 100. 30

Back O.C. in to meet
Major MAUDSLEY A.J. at
Forward Brigade H.Q.
Immediately - map H5061
Get there as quickly as you
can to attend to
conference - urgent AAA.
Bring maps and note
books

380 Pm

6:10 P.M.

Sp. J. Roberts
JC

MILITARY MEDALS (Continued)

997 Pte STANBURY W.E.	715 Cpl WHITE H.B.	389 Pte SEYMOUR C.E.
1340 " TRANTER B.D.	2802a Sgt FRASER H.J.	5974 Sgt BURKE J.
645a Sgt KING J.H.S.	1832 Pte FEDDER F.	933 Cpl MEREDITH J.V.
1670 Pte MATHESON J.	629 L/c CAMPBELL G.	915 Cpl BELL I.L.
485 Pte NEWELL W.J.L.	1852 Pte HOLLINGWORTH A.	29 Sgt BEARD E.S.
12306 Pte SMITH L.C.	1925a Cpl WALLACE J.	2319 Pte GRANT J.
5020 " GILLY R.L.M.	3013 Pte UMBERS E.C.	3069 L/c DUNN J.H.W.E.
67 L/c McDONALD J.R.	61 " CHEEK C.H.	628 Pte NIHILL J.J.
6097 Pte ROWE P.B.	3136 " PRICE G.F.	1228 L/c LEWIS J.C.
2645 " SMITH A.E.G.	452 " ALLITT J.W.H.	7111 Pte WILLIAMS T.G.
1008 " TAYLOR F.H.	967 Cpl PEGLER A.E.	814 Sgt DAUM H.A.
398 " TODD A.J.	2640 Pte STEVENS H.J.	1246 Pte McCOY F.C.
3363 " SCOTT D.	951 Cpl NEWTON C.E.	2552 " DE LA REY F.J.
3020 " AMIET H.	3140 Pte PURCELL G.V.	440 Sgt RAYBOULD A.J.B.
2182 Cpl PATON E.W.	899 Pte HEDGECOCK E.E.	1639 L/c SHILLIDAY E.S.
240 L/c COOKSON W.W.	2337 Pte HAYTHORNE A.B.	7141 Pte McMASTER A.
1048 Sgt LEHMAN F.M.	2446 Pte McPHERSON A.	1251 Cpl NICHOLSON H.
4895 Pte TYLES J.		

BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL

29 Sgt. E.S. BEARD "MM"

933 Sgt J.V. MEREDITH "MM"

MENTION IN DESPATCHES

Lieut-Colonel C.H. DAVIS	Capt. A. FRASER	Capt R.M. MARKS
Lieut C.C. GALE	1721 Cpl T.L. MURPHY	Capt H. DENCH
Lieut F.B. LANGLEY	1251 Pte H. NICHOLSON	967 L/c A.E. PEGLER
Lt-Col C.H. DAVIS 'D.S.O'	Lieut-Col G. HURRY 'D.S.O'	
Major A.J.A. MAUDSLEY	Lieut J.B.O'DONNELL	1228 L/c J.C. LEWIS
350 RQMS. J.W.A. NICOLL	Capt H. DENCH	Lieut R.J.H. MAJOR
714 Sgt F.W.P. MARRETT		

EPITOME OF DECORATIONS AWARDED TO MEMBERS OF 10th Brigade

	37th Bn	38th Bn	39th Bn	40th Bn	Trench Mortars	Brigade	Machine Gunners
V.C.	2			2			
D.S.O.	2	3	1	3		2	
M.C.	16	19	15	21	1	2	2
BAR		3					
D.C.M.	8	9	13	9	2		
M.S.M.	6	3	5	5	2		1
BELGIAN CROIX DE GUERRE	4	3	5	4		1	1
FRENCH C.D.G.		3		1			
MED MILITAIRE				1			
BELGIAN CREVALIER.			1				
ROUMANIAN MIL. MEDAL	69	78	78	81	8	9	7
B A R	1	2	3	1	-	1	-
MENTIONS	12	18	12	15	1	7	4
	120	141	133	143	15	22	15

N O M I N A L R O L L
OF

39TH. BATTALION EMBARKATION QUOTA NO. 39

"A" COMPANY

No.	Rank	N A M E	R e m a r k s (Kit shortages)
	Lieut	WHITEHEAD J.L. (O.O)	
	Lieut	ROBBINS H. "MO"	
	Lieut	ROWE W.L.	
	Lieut	McNICOL N.G. "MO"	
	Lieut	TILFER P.J. "MO"	
	Lieut	BOYLAND W.J.	
	Lieut	STOKES M.R.	
	Lieut	MITCHELL L.W.	
	Lieut	DAVIS J.C.	
	Lieut	POTTER E.	
	Lieut	BOWMAN G.G.	
	s/Lt.	DUGAN G.L.	
2922a	CSM	WOODHOUSE G.G.	
159	Sgt	ONLEY R.E.	
1110	Sgt	GLOVER R.L.	
374	Sgt	ROBERTSON D.C. (D.C.M.)	
914	CQMS	BEAR F.J.	
536	CQMS	BURNS W.S.	<i>Tool - intrenching head.</i>
917	Sgt	KILLY R.B.	
1545	"	HOGAN W.J.	<i>Shorts F. 2</i>
124	Sgt	SHUTELEWOOD J.A. (M.M.)	
1194	Sgt	LOCKETT J.H.	
615	Sgt	McNEIL J.D.	
1209	L/Sgt	RANGECROFT H.C.	
2003	L/Sgt	PARKER G.C.	<i>Drawers 1 pair. Short 1. Caps 2. Comfy shoes 1 pair w. Knife. Clasp. Lanyard.</i>
446	Cpl	WATERSON T.R.	
63	Cpl	HOMDEN J.W.J.	<i>Jacket cardigan.</i>
811	Cpl	BARKELL C.	
1056	Cpl	STANLEY T.	
951	Cpl	NEWTON C.E. (M.M.)	
307	Cpl	QUIN G.A.W.	<i>Dressing field.</i>
819	Cpl	CANN F.C.	
1563	Cpl	RICHARDS W.S.	

No.	Rank	N A M E	R e m a r k s (Kit Shortages)
621	Cpl	McLEOD J.	
1794	Cpl	BARTILL R.E.	
2290	L/c	BULLEN D.M.	
2059	L/c	DIXON F.A.	<i>Dressing-field.</i>
119	L/c	MARLOW P.P.	
653	L/c	SUTTON H.	
334	L/c	SYMONDS E.O.	
123	L/c	CLANCY D.	
942	L/c	McDONALD E.H.	
473	L/c	COURTNEY P.	
1617	Dvr	BALDWIN W.J.C.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
3293	Pte	BARNETT D.W.	
226	Dvr	BIRMINGHAM F.J.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
441	Pte	BLAKELLY W.T. (M.M.)	
22	Dvr	BROWN H.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2293	Pte	CAMPBELL E.S.	
2211	"	CAPNER E.E.	<i>Tooth-brush & Mess tin & cover. Dives Identity 2. Clasp knife & lanyard</i>
2783	"	CLAYTON W.J.	
1821	"	CORBETT W.L.	
2543	"	CONNELLY A.H.	
2735a	"	CONSTABLE W.H.	
245	"	CORAH A.A.	
1140	Dvr	GURRIE J.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
3056	Pte	DICKINSON T.W.	<i>Leaces & Cap comforter.</i>
2305	"	DICKINSON H.J.	
1179	"	DUFFY E.G.	
263	Dvr	EASTON F.J.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2125	Pte	EVANS R.D.	
739	Dvr	ERON G.E.	
277	"	FENNESSY J.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
1853	Pte	FIELDING W.J.	<i>Clasp knife</i>
2027	"	FOGGIE F.J.	<i>Comb.</i>
2003	"	FRITH A.J.	
2004	"	GARTON F.W.	<i>Clasp knife & lanyard</i>
221	Dvr	GILL H.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>

No.	Rank	Name	Remarks (Kit Shortages)
6908a	Pte	GILLIES H.	
2307	"	GREGORY A.J.	
6014	"	GREY A.T.	
571	"	HARRIS E.J.	
2120	"	HARTWIG W.F.	
2503	"	HAYLLAR H.	
1653	"	HELMES P.J.	
6032	"	HENDY N.R.	
77	"	HOSKING J.V.	
336	"	HOUGH A.E.L.	<i>Jacket-cardigan</i>
3333a	"	HOULDER W.R.	
1652	Dvr	HUTCHESON J.(M.M.)	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2322	Pte	HILLS F.C.	
2313	"	HEALEY F.B.	<i>Disc Identity (green).</i>
2097	"	INNES C.R.	
2506	"	JENKINS E.W.	
2022	"	JOHNSTONE A.J.	
11	"	JOLNE J.P.	<i>Spurs for Chin Strap Cap Comforter Quinine Food</i>
3344	"	KIRBY J.	<i>Flour & Lanyard</i>
1946	"	KRIEG W.	<i>Braces trousers.</i>
925	Dvr	LACEY T.A.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
1322	"	LAWRIE D.P.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2592	Pte	LEES J.A.O.W.	<i>Singlet</i>
6051	"	LESTER E.R.	
3341	"	LEVER H.	<i>Cartridge carrier 1.</i>
1703	"	LEWIS R.G.	
929	"	LOAM A.S.	<i>Tool-intrenching head.</i>
2832	"	LAWRIE, J.E.	<i>Lanyard</i>
1674	Dvr	LOFTS A.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather</i>
2353	Pte	LOUDEN D.K.	
727	"	MAKEMPACE E.G.	
3165	"	MEYER J.E.	<i>Spurs for Lanyard</i>
2111	"	MILLER B.	
2115	"	MITCHELL F.M.	
2420	"	MORRILL H.C.	
16	"	MCCORMACK T.J.	<i>Jacket-cardigan</i>
461	Dvr	MCBEAN J.R.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>

No.	Rank	Name	Remarks (Kit Shortages)
19	Dvr	MCCORKILL S.J.T.	<i>Spurs jack with leather.</i>
3266	Pte	MCGUINNESS T.	
3201	"	MCKENZIE D.A.	
2127	"	McMANUS T.W.	
4366	"	NOLAN E.J.	
635	"	OSGOOD B.B.	
634	"	OSGOOD H.R.	
352	"	OWEN J.	<i>Jacket-cardigan.</i>
2376	"	PALMER H.A.	
2061	"	PATTERSON G.	
31	"	PETTER W.	
2616	"	POPPINS E.T.	
2390	"	PORTER W.G.	
1053	"	POPPLERON A.	
2367	"	QUINLAN T.J.	
7037	"	RICE C.W.S.	
3497	"	ROBERTSON E.R.	
2897	"	ROBINSON A.H.	
652	"	ROBERTS J.J.	<i>Drawers 1. Shirt 1.</i>
1607	"	RUMBLE H.S.	
1274	"	ROGERS J.M.	
7073	"	SCAMMELL A.G.	
391	Dvr	SHAPLAND A.H.	
1607	Pte	SHARMAN J.	
2142	"	SHERINGHAM C.	
2642	"	SILSBY E.B.	
3234	"	SPENCE F.S.	
1303	"	STRACHAN D.R.	<i>Jacket-cardigan. Cap comforter. Mess tin & cover. Dishes-identity 2. Clasp knife & lanyard. Dressing field. Tool-intrenching head. Tool-intrenching head carrier.</i>
1914	"	STRAUSS A.F.	<i>Left-cartridge carrier.</i>
392	Dvr	SWAN F.W.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2761	Pte	THOMPSON E.H.	
1006	Dvr	TIERNEY F.K.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
2920	Pte	TOUGH J.H.	
3253a	"	TURNER W.C.	
2159	"	UNVOAS Y.	

(5)

No.	Rank	N a m e	R e m a r k s (Kit Shortages)
1923a	Pte	WESTLADE J.H.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
1950	"	WIGHT T.	
2409	"	WHISTLER A.E.	
1707	"	WHYTE P.J.	
1915	"	WILLIAMS H.B.	
130	Dvr	WILLETTS E.C.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather</i>
135	"	WILLS T.P.	<i>Spurs-jack with leather.</i>
711	Pte	WATERS E.N.	
13164	"	WOODS C.W.P.	
2424	"	WORTHINGTON J.	<i>Dressing-field.</i>
2902	"	WATZ J.H.	

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the Kit Shortages set out above in the Remarks Column are the actual shortages of the man opposite whose name shortage appears.

Dated 2/4/1919

Whithead

O.C. "A" Company

N O M I N A L R O L L

of

38th. Battalion Embarkation Quota No. 45.

No	Rank	Name	Remarks. (Kit shortages)
	Capt.	FRASER, A. "MC"	
	Lieut.	VERSO, S.B.	
	Lieut.	HUTCHINS, G.L.	
	Lieut.	ROBERTS L.A.	
	Lieut.	JAMIESON, E.A.	
	Lieut.	LOW, J.S.	
	Lieut.	O'MALLEY W.B.	
	Lieut.	PHILLIPS, T.B.	
	Lieut.	BAUM H.A.	
	Lieut.	PARTRIDGE, R.L.	

<u>W.Os and Sergrts.</u>			
1873	RSM	LUCAS, W.F.	
262	CSM	DURWARD, W.T.	
446	CSM	CLARKE, A.	
881	CQMS	FOWLER, W.L.	
1900	CQMS	QUINTON, B.J.	
5024	Sgt.	GRINTON, A.V. "DCM"	
1043	Sgt.	GRINTON, J.W.	
1048	Sgt	LEHMAN, F.N.	
1129	Sgt	COFFEY, J.	
444	Sgt.	COLE, H. R.	
101	Sgt.	PERKINS, F.	

<u>Other Ranks.</u>			
6987	L/Sgt	FAUX, G.	
1125	Cpl.	BRUCE, E.N.	
2135	Cpl.	PLIM, J.	
2076	Cpl.	GAULTON, J.E.	
3020	Cpl.	AMIET, H.	
3262	Pte.	ANDERSON, T.S.	
3431	Pte	BELL, E.A.	
2774	"	BELFIELD, J.H.	
3263	"	BENSON, A.D.	
"&&2	"		
2775	"	BODEY, I.V.H.	
3036	"	BRYER-JONES, G. R.	
754a	"	BURLEIGH, T.	
181810	Dvr.	BROWN, J.E.	
///	"		
3393	Pte.	CARLSON, J.I.	
7211	"	CLARK, W.A.	
3280	"	CLIFTON, L.B.W.	
4778	"	COOKE, A.	
3045	"	COOPER A.A.	
3039	"	CORNELL, W.H.	
2797	"	COUCH, L.	
3040	"	C REED, L.J.	
3119	"	CROSBY, H.	
2799	L/Cpl.	CURNOW, J.	
3048	Pte	DARE, G.	
3394	"	DAVENPORT, C.G.	
3288	"	DAVISON, N.G.	
2809	"	DEAN, T?H?	
3291	"	DERVAN, W.L.	
3290	"	DUNCAN, T.	
2306	L/Cpl.	DUNCAN, A.	
3295			

(2)

No.	Rank	Name	Remarks. (kit shortages)
3295	Pte.	DUSSELL, G. H.	
2547	"	DODDS, F.	
4799	"	EDDY, R.	
3148	"	ELPHICK, F. B.	
4732	"	ENTWISTLE, J. J.	
3392	"	FAIRY E.	
3299	"	FAUVEL, P. H.	
3300	"	FELDMAN, F. A.	
3303	"	FERGUSON, G. E.	
3430	"	FROST, R. N.	
3301	"	FROST, R. N. 51 Quabts. Bant	
3071	"	GILHAM, R. W.	
3398	"	GREGG, H. J.	
3077	L/Opl.	GUNSTON, J. F.	
3450	Pte	HAN RAHAN, P. J.	
4822	"	HARDWICK, A.	
3081	"	HARR, A. C.	
3320	"	HAYES, R. K.	
3313	"	HENDERSON, A. H.	
3314	"	HOLMES, C. B.	
3090	"	HUTSON, B. J.	
761a	"	I RELAND, L. H.	
3320	"	JACKSON, M. A.	
4833	"	JEFFREY, T.	
3323	"	JEPHCOTT, P. G.	
3328	"	KASCH, J.	
2850	"	KENNY, J. R.	
3448	"	LISHMAN, W. A.	
7043	"	LUCAS, J. M.	
4847	"	LUKE, J. H.	
318b	"	LINES, H. H.	
765a	"	MADDEN, R. W. J.	
674	"	MAY, W. J.	
3348	"	McNULTY, W. R.	
3117	"	PASCOE, C. H. W.	
3209a	"	PRESTON, H.	
4870	"	PRITCHARD, L. W.	
3127a	"	REEVE, A. S.	
2712	"	RILEY, S. H.	
3532	"	ROBERTS, W. A.	
3262	"	ROBERTSON, D. K.	
4881	"	ROSS, R. G.	
3424	"	ROWE, R. R.	
3133	"	SANDS, W. J.	
2650	"	SCOTT, S. W.	
4887	"	SEIDER, T. F.	
3186	"	SHAW, G.	
2146	"	SHAW, A. E.	
3138	"	SMITH, F. J.	
3452	"	STEW, R. H. C.	
3370	"	TOOHEY, E. L.	
3256	"	TAYLOR, C. A.	
3150	"	THOMBER, J.	
4907	"	THUM, G. H.	
3152	"	VERSO, A. J. J.	
4904	"	WARD, T. J.	
1318	"	WALLACE, F. P.	
2915	"	WHITE, F.	
2909	"	YOLE, A.	
3384	"	YOUNG, W. C.	

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the kit shortages set out above in the remarks column, are the actual shortages of the man opposite whose names the shortage appears.


24-4-19.

O.C. 38th. Company.



Lieut Whitehead sings

Rio Pardo Clink




The Purser

Companions in Distress

Old 'Un: What did Shrewdie say?

The Monk: Stay there you old f—!!! (Steve)

CHAIN
- OF -
INTELLIGENCE



W.P.M.
1917.

Officers to meet Bear

38/4/1.

CONFIDENTIAL.

LECTURE ON INTELLIGENCE.

For Regimental Officers and Non-commissioned Officers.

- I. Introductory.
- II. Organization of the German Army.
- III. Uniform.
- IV. Necessity of Accuracy in Observation, and Speed in forwarding Intelligence.
- V. Necessity of continuous Observation in Trench Warfare.
- VI. Gaining of Information by Raids.
- VII. Contre-Espionage.

LECTURE ON INTELLIGENCE.

For Regimental Officers and Non-commissioned Officers.

I.

Intelligence is very frequently looked upon as an affair that has nothing to do with regimental officers and men. A very general opinion seems to be that information about the enemy is obtained in some mysterious way from spies or other persons of doubtful character, but of surprising intelligence.

This is not really the case at all. Spies are of course made use of, but the great trouble in this case is that one never knows whether a man is trying to do his best for us or is employed by the enemy to wilfully deceive us. In any case, particularly in warfare of the present stationary type, we have to depend almost entirely upon information furnished by troops in contact with the enemy. Frequent identifications of the enemy's units on the whole front are of great importance. It is only when touch is maintained with the enemy along the whole line that it is possible to follow his movements accurately and to anticipate his intentions.

Every man should, therefore, look upon himself as a collecting agent of information. All scraps of information, no matter how small provided they are reliable, are gratefully received, and it is the duty of the Intelligence Staffs in rear to collate all these scraps of information received and to do their best to draw some conclusion from them. The more accurate and full the information furnished by the troops the more accurate and full will be the information about the enemy that we shall be able to give them in return.

II.

If reliable information is to be afforded by troops in front line, it is essential that they should have some idea of the organization of the German army. The war organization of this army is based, like all others, on its peace organization; it is, therefore, necessary first of all to give some idea of the latter.

In peace time the whole of the German army is divided in 21 Corps areas, exclusive of the Bavarian Corps areas, of which there are three. Two of the above-mentioned 21 Corps areas, the 12th and 19th, are Saxon. In addition, the Guard Corps, whose headquarters are at Berlin, is recruited from all over the empire.

On attaining the age of 20, every German becomes liable for service in the army. Just before the war, the annual output of men, exclusive of those rejected for medical or other reasons, was approximately 560,000. Of these, somewhat less than half, or about 250,000, were actually taken for service with the colours.

The alternatives open to a German at the age of 20 are shown on the following table, which shows his history from the age of 20 to the age of 39:—

20	22 (Inf.)	27	32	39
Colours.	Reserve.	Landwehr (1st Ban).	Landwehr (2nd Ban).	
	Ersatz Reserve.			
Landsturm (1st Ban).				

Men selected for service with the colours did, in the infantry, two years with the colours, and then were passed in succession to the various classes of reserve. If a man was not taken for service with the colours he became at once an Ersatz reservist and did an annual training amounting to something like a fortnight a year. At the age of 32 he, together with the man who had done his service with the colours, was passed into the Landwehr (2nd Ban). The third alternative was to be posted to the (untrained) Landsturm. In this the man did no training at all, but his name had been registered and he was available to be called up in case of necessity at any moment. At the age of 39 all men were passed into the Landsturm (2nd Ban) where they remained until the age of 45, when, in peace time, a man's liability to service normally ended.

The annual recruits are "classed" according to the year in which they become available for service. Thus a man who is 20 years old in 1915 is known as belonging to the "1915 class." As stated above, over half a million men used to be available annually in each class; now, owing to the fact that a very large number of men have volunteered for service before they are due to be called up, the annual classes do not amount to more than 300,000 at the outside. Needless to say, all of these are taken.

A man was always able to volunteer for his army service at any time after he became 17. Men who wished to undertake a professional career were thus able to get their army service done with. There is, in addition, another class of volunteer, the Einjahrfreiwillige. This is a man who is able to pass a certain educational standard and is therefore allowed to do only one year instead of two with the colours. On the conclusion of his year's service he was normally posted to the Reserve as a non-commissioned officer, and it is this category that is now supplying practically all the officers required to replace casualties.

From the Corps areas mentioned above, a whole Corps, including its artillery, pioneers, etc., is recruited, and in war time the Corps is entirely based in its own area for obtaining supplies, etc. All classes of recruit undergo their training in their own Corps area at their regular regimental depots.

At the beginning of the war several new Reserve Corps, numbered 22 to 27 as well as some higher numbers, were formed. In addition a large number, but not all, of the original Corps were duplicated by Reserve Corps bearing the same number. In addition to this, various units were formed composed almost entirely of Ersatz Reservists, Landwehr men or Landsturm men; such units were known as Ersatz, Landwehr or Landsturm battalions. At this period in the war, however, there is very little difference to be found in the various classes of units; active units are full of Landwehr men, and vice versa. The only exception is a Landsturm unit, which is almost exclusively employed on Lines of Communication and still consists almost entirely of Landsturm men. Recently, however, all men previously rejected as medically unfit have been called up, up to the age of 45; these men have been sent to Landsturm units, from which the more active men have been withdrawn to take their places in the fighting units.

Infantry is organized in regiments, always of three battalions, though recently a few Landwehr regiments have had a fourth battalion added to them, the men for which have been obtained by reducing the establishment of the original three. Battalions and companies are of exactly the same strength as our own. The companies are numbered throughout the regiment (twelve companies in a normal regiment). In addition there is always one machine gun company, numbered 13, and nowadays, practically always a second, numbered 14. The second company has been formed by adding machine gun sections to the regiments and gradually forming them into companies.

In addition to the normal infantry regiments there are Jäger battalions, which have an organization independent of any regiment. Reserve Corps and some of the active Corps have one of these battalions per division. These Jägers wear a distinct uniform and are composed of specially selected men who are picked rifle shots.

In addition to the machine gun companies of regiments mentioned above, and which form an integral part of the regiment, wearing its uniform; a unit known as a machine gun battery exists. This unit was originally formed for service with a cavalry division, but now is found, at times, in the trenches.

Corps normally consist of two divisions, not three as is generally the case with us. Divisions are of almost exactly the same strength as our own; they consist of two brigades, each of two regiments of three battalions. Divisional troops consist of a Jäger battalion (sometimes), field artillery (originally six gun batteries, now reduced to four). A division normally has either twelve batteries of guns, or nine batteries of guns and three of howitzers. There is also a proportion of pioneers and train. No heavy artillery is attached to divisions, but at the beginning of the war each Corps, i.e., two divisions, had four 15 cm. howitzer batteries each of four guns. This proportion has now been largely increased.

III.

All units in the German army wear a field grey uniform, except Jäger battalions and machine guns batteries, which wear field green. Uhlans have lancer-cut tunics and hussars braided ones, otherwise the cut of the tunic is uniform. A new uniform is in process of introduction, the chief difference between the old and the new being that the new is uniform for all arms and is fastened up the front by hooks instead of buttons.

All units, infantry and other arms, wear the number of their regiment in figures on their shoulder straps. There are, however, certain exceptions to this in the case of regiments which have honorary distinctions; such regiments generally have a monogram on their shoulder straps in place of a number. An additional distinction is that artillery wear a grenade on the shoulder straps above the number. Saxon pioneers similarly wear a crossed mattock and shovel. Shoulder straps have coloured edgings which originally varied with the Corps to which they belonged; in the new uniform, however, the edging will probably indicate the arm and not the Corps to which they belong; in any case, the colouring is of minor importance. Trousers were originally made of the same material as the tunic, but recently, owing to shortage of material in Germany, a very large number of trousers are made of corduroy material, which is generally of a brownish colour.

Great coats are generally made of the same material as the tunic; field grey or field green. A certain number of dark blue great coats are, however, in existence. This may sometimes lead to confusion with Armierungs battalions (see below).

As regards head dress, helmets are now not generally worn in the trenches, being left behind in the rest billets. The old pattern helmet is of compressed leather and has a field grey cover with the regimental number marked on it in front. On the helmet itself are various badges which give an indication at least of the State from which the regiment comes, sometimes of the individual regiment. A new pattern of thin steel helmet has been introduced which gives a certain amount of protection from shrapnel, but this should not be confused with the new helmet to be worn with the new uniform, which has no spike. There are also special helmets for use in the trenches, made of bullet-proof steel in front; these seem to have very much the appearance of the helmet designed for the new uniform.

Jägers wear a shako in place of a helmet, and seem to wear this more frequently than infantry do their helmets.

As regards caps, Jägers and men of machine gun batteries wear a field green cap, other arms the ordinary field grey. The various arms may be distinguished by the colour of their cap bands, as follows:—Infantry, red; Jägers, light green; artillery and pioneers, black; machine gun batteries, scarlet; cavalry, various. On the front of the cap are two cockades which give some lead to the State to which the regiment belongs. Every unit wears the Imperial cockade of three concentric rings, red, white and black, working outwards. In addition to this, each State wears a badge consisting, like the Imperial, of three concentric rings, the colours of which, working outwards, are:—Prussia, black, white, black; Saxon, white, green, white; Bavaria, white, light blue, white; Württemberg, grey, red, grey. Other minor States have various coloured cockades.

Originally the peaked cap was the mark of an officer or senior non-commissioned officer; now the use of the peaked cap appears to be optional, and it is possible that in the new uniform a cap with a peak will be introduced for all ranks.

Armierungs battalions, which consist of officers and men too old or physically unfit for service in the trenches, are used to a large extent for work behind and close up to the trenches. They are clothed in dark blue uniform.

Landsturm units are clothed in field grey with dark blue shoulder straps.

The distinction between officers and N.C.O.s is that the officers wear their badges of rank on the shoulder, N.C.O.s on the collar. Officers have gold or silver lace shoulder straps of varying thicknesses; their rank is denoted by a combination of the thickness of the lace with a badge consisting of two, one or no stars. Non-commissioned officers wear the following badges on the collar:—Gefreiter (lance-corporal), a button on each side of the collar; Unteroffizier, gold or lace strips on each side of the collar; Feldwebel (Serjeant), lace strips as above **and** buttons. These badges of rank should not be confused with the litze which are the badge of a Grenadier regiment. Offizierstellvertreter (acting officers) wear serjeants' badges on their collar and the shoulder straps of a 2nd Lieutenant (thin lace with no star).

Clothing and equipment are marked with the number of the regiment, etc., e.g., J R, Infantry Regiment; Jäg Battln. Jäger Battalion; Esk, Squadron; the number of the regiment, etc., being given after the distinguishing letters.

Rifles are marked with the place of manufacture, which sometimes gives a lead to the district the unit comes from.

It may be stated that the most certain method of identifying the enemy's units is by obtaining prisoners or deserters. Next to this the best things are documents taken from dead or prisoners. Correspondence is extremely important because (a) the date and postmark usually afford valuable evidence as to the date on which the man's unit was on this front, and (b) should a man belong to one unit and be drafted to another, the unit with which the man is actually serving is shown by the address; identity discs and equipment marks may not always have been corrected in such cases. Identity discs and shoulder straps always form a good identification. A very important means of identification is the soldbuch (paybook); this gives the whole of the man's military history.

IV.

The two most essential things in forwarding intelligence are (a) Accuracy, and (b) Speed. First of all, Accuracy; this can only be attained if the observer has been to some extent trained and knows what to look for. Accuracy is of particular importance, because if reports have to be verified valuable time may be lost.

Observers in the trenches should be particularly careful. They must remember that cap bands which identify the different arms are liable to fade. A faded red cap band will frequently give the appearance of brown, which would indicate cavalry; also the grey cover strip which is very frequently worn is made of slightly different material to the cap and fades to a different colour and, therefore, it may frequently give the impression of a white band. One should remember that anything but red (infantry) or possibly black (artillery observer) is an unusual colour for a cap band in the trenches, and therefore one should be chary of reporting it unless one is absolutely certain. Also remember that uniforms fade. Muddy field grey is hard to distinguish from field green, and the latter, even when seen at close quarters, is hardly distinguishable from khaki; therefore, do not report the enemy as wearing khaki unless you are perfectly certain he is not wearing field green. Also avoid reporting men dressed in civilian clothes. After all, a man in a cap comforter does not have a very military appearance, and you may be certain that the enemy, as much as we do, likes to be comfortable in the trenches.

When sending back reports do not use fancy names, such as "whiz-bangs." The trouble is not that we do not know what a "whiz-bang" is, but that different fancy names are used to describe the same article in different parts of the line. There are several popular terms for various German shells—a "whiz-bang" in 999 cases out of 1,000 is a field gun shrapnel fired at close range. A "crumpet" generally indicates a field howitzer shell bursting on percussion. A "woolley bear" is the same shell bursting in mid-air with shrapnel effect. The "crump" is a larger shell, the 15 cm., bursting on percussion. There are numberless names for the larger shells. The only really accurate way of discovering what shell has been fired at you is not by estimating the noise it makes when it bursts, which depends very largely upon the personal factor of the observer or the distance he is away, but by getting a sufficiently large portion of the base to enable a circle to be drawn and thus actually to get the bore of the gun from which it was fired. Craters give a rough idea of the size of the shell which made them; 5 ft. by 2 ft. indicates a field howitzer; 10 ft. by 3 ft., a 15 cm.; 15 ft. by 5 ft., a 21 cm.; 30 ft. by 10 ft., a 42 cm.

Generally, be very careful to only report actually what you see and hear. The fatal course is to try and draw conclusions from what you see, then you will inevitably modify your facts to suit the conclusions you imagine you have drawn.

As regards Speed, it is of the greatest importance that information should be sent on at once. It is of little use to us knowing where every German was the day before yesterday if we have not the least idea where he is now. Do not sit on information in the hope that it will hatch out into something better; it won't. Above all, do not allow any man to sit on trophies, such as rifles, helmets, equipment. One has no desire to deprive men of such trophies, but they must be told perfectly straight that everything captured must be shown to someone qualified to judge of their importance. Occasions have occurred of documents which were of great importance being sent home as souvenirs in private letters; this conduct is absolutely criminal and it should be made clear to everyone that it is so. The purloining of documents of this sort may, by depriving us of information, be the indirect cause of numberless casualties, and a man who sends home such documents in complete ignorance of their value is no less a murderer than a man who shoots his own brother.

Similarly, it is very important that information should be sent back regarding the sizes of shells that are fired at us. Fuzes make very pleasant trophies and there is no harm in old pattern fuzes being so used, but it is of the greatest importance that we should have full information of all new fuzes that are fired at us, and therefore all fuzes that are not definitely known to be of old patterns must be sent back in order that the manufacturers at home may have the chance of improving upon them.

V.

It is not always recognised that the system of patrols and scouts by which information is obtained in open warfare, must be supplemented in warfare of the present type by continuous observation from fixed points. The only chance of getting the fleeting opportunities that the enemy affords us of observing his movements is by having fixed observation posts watching the same little piece of the enemy's line day by day. The same men should be continually employed on the same post, and the best organization seems to be to withdraw suitable men from battalions and concentrate them at brigade headquarters, keeping the organization of them under a Brigade Intelligence Officer. By having a series of such positions along the whole front of a division the enemy's line may be kept under continual observation day after day. Such observation posts may be in the trenches, close behind them, or, in exceptional cases, on commanding ground some distance in rear. Telescopes, periscopes and field glasses may be necessary for these posts, and it is often an advantage if they can have a panorama photograph in a waterproof case with degrees marked off on it so that a bearing with reference to some permanent point may be given for all observations.

Sentries, machine gunners, etc., are of little use as substitutes for such observation posts. They are not trained in what they should observe, and they have other and more important duties which would interfere with their intelligence duties.

VI.

Occasions for gaining information of the greatest importance are afforded by raids or attacks on the enemy's trenches. Prior to these raids careful instructions should be given by an Intelligence Staff Officer to all ranks who are taking part in the raids in order that they may be absolutely au fait with what they ought to look out for.

The great thing is to get everyone, as far as possible, to keep their eyes open and their minds off gas. Men are very apt to assume that any piece of mechanism they see in the trenches is some form of gas cylinder or flammenwerfer; they should get this idea out of their heads and be careful to report only what they see and to give an accurate description. From this we will try and puzzle out what the thing seen was.

Make a note of the construction of the trenches, how revetted, floor boards, the drainage, etc. Do not exaggerate the size of dug-outs; this is very apt to be done. On one occasion men who had been into a German dug-out in the dark were absolutely positive it measured 50 yds. by 30 yds. This happened to be an absolute impossibility in the position in which the dug-out was, as the space available was limited on one side by the trench into which it opened and on the other by a crater. Do not give feet and inches unless you are absolutely certain of the measurements; it is far better to say the trenches were up to your shoulder, a little above your head, etc.

Notice marks on equipment, helmets, caps, rifles; bring away what you can, especially shoulder straps and identity discs, it is most important that neither of these be retained by the men as souvenirs.

VII.

It is the duty of the Intelligence Branch not only to endeavour to find out all it can about the enemy, but also to endeavour to prevent him finding out anything about ourselves.

In this duty regimental officers and men can be of the very greatest assistance. Above everything do not talk, particularly in public places. The discussion of moves that you know or think you know are going to take place is absolutely criminal. Barbers, café proprietors, waiters and waitresses may all be looked upon as potential spies, and it is most important that they should have no opportunity of picking up odd scraps of information.

The censoring of letters by officers is a most important duty. Far too much is allowed to be written about movements that are going to take place, about what has happened, how many casualties units have had, and so forth. There seems to be an idea that, though there may be some danger in giving details of this sort in letters home, there is none whatever in giving them in a letter to a friend in some other unit of the Expeditionary Force. This is a great mistake, because the latter is by far the more dangerous of the two; the recipient of the letter probably puts it into his pocket, shortly afterwards he may be captured and thus put the enemy in possession of information he badly wants to know. The greatest care should be taken regarding the documents which are taken on patrol; the only course is to take none at all.

Do not allow shouting across between the trenches. The enemy has many soldiers who speak English perfectly, and they recognise by our accent what part of the country we come from. Another most important thing is care in sending telephone messages or buzzer messages back from the trenches. The enemy has a particularly effective instrument by which he can overhear all our conversations on the telephone up to a distance of four or five hundred yards, and those by the buzzer a great deal farther. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that as few messages as possible, and those of no tactical importance, should be sent back in clear. We know definitely that the enemy has been able in nearly every case to locate units in the trenches within quite a few hours of their arrival.

Patrols should look out for the antennæ of the enemy's listening apparatus. These consist generally of two divergent wires coming over his parapet and being earthed at two points close up under our parapet. Sometimes the earth is formed by attaching the telephone wire to our barbed wire. This should be seen to.

If you suspect light-signalling behind the lines act at once; go straight and see what it is. It is no good sending in a report and expecting somebody else to take action a couple of days later when the signalling has stopped and the signaller, if one ever existed, has disappeared.

The great point is to take "Contre-Espionage," as it is called, seriously. Even though results may be small, the fact that persons on whom the least suspicion falls are systematically harried will make the real spy's life a far from happy one and discourage him from visiting our area. Nevertheless, one must remember that one is in a friendly country. Though one has the right to detain anyone on suspicion, it is for the French authorities to investigate the case, and it is, therefore, essential that the suspect should be handed over to be dealt with by the Assistant Provost Marshal with as little delay as possible. Cases have occurred where absolutely innocent men, armed with all the necessary passes, have been detained for several days in places in the shelled area, merely owing to the fact that the officer who arrested them had no idea of what passes the man ought to have. Such cases are inexcusable and are bound to lead to friction with the local authorities.

Because a man is dressed in British, French or Belgian uniform, do not necessarily assume that he is what he appears to be. Such a disguise is by far the most effective and safe one for a German spy, and there is little doubt that it has been frequently made use of. No matter who the man is, if he acts suspiciously—wants to know too much about the troops—detain him; do not take his name and number and let him go; detain him and hand him over to the nearest Staff for investigation. Do not mind what he says to you; the more he protests the more likely it is that he is a spy.

Above all, if you have the misfortune to be taken prisoner, do not talk at all. All the enemy has the right to ask you for is your true name and rank; do not tell him anything more. It will be fatal if you start talking and begin to tell him lies, as then he will have a handle to threaten you with. The only thing to do is to refuse to say anything. Cases have occurred where prisoners have been taken and shortly afterwards batteries of ours which had never been shelled before have been fired on. There is no reason to think that any of the prisoners wittingly gave away the position of these batteries; no doubt they were all examined separately and each one, without knowing it, gave away a little bit about their positions, and all these little bits added together marked the batteries down on the map with the greatest accuracy.

In fact, the whole secret of successfully defeating the enemy's spy system is by not talking and by not allowing those for whom you are responsible to talk either.

(Sgd.) B. WALCOT, Lieut.-Colonel,

General Staff, Second Army,

for Major-General, General Staff.

July 24th, 1916.

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Part of [23/55/1, Part 2]

Maps for military history study of
Napoleonic wars.

These 3 maps are of the battles of Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo, June 1815.

All are published by 5th Fd Svy Bn RE in Jan-Feb 1919.

It is probable that these maps were printed to assist officers studying military history for promotion examinations or for Staff College entrance.

Bullen

16 May 1988

