


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Machine Guns

**Item number:** 24/4/6 Part 2

**Title:** 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion

October 1918 Includes appendix K



AWM4-24/4/6PART2



## FOURTH MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

-----  
 FIXTURES FOR FOOTBALL - Commencing Thursday 3rd October, 1918.

## -----AUSTRALIAN RULES COMPETITION.-----

October 3rd.	---	24th	v.	13th Coys.	--	12th Coy.	v.	4th Coy.
" 10th		4th	v.	13th Coys.	--	24th "	v.	12th "
" 17th		13th	v.	13th "	--	24th "	v.	4th "
" 24th		13th	v.	24th "	--	4th "	v.	12th "
" 31st		12th	v.	24th "	---	13th "	v.	4th "
Nov. 7th		4th	v.	24th "	--	13th "	v.	12th "
" 14th		Final Match.						

----- RUGBY FIXTURES -----  
 Commencing Saturday 5th October 1918.

Octbr. 5th.	13th	v.	12th Coys.	---	4th Coy.	v.	24th Co.
" 12th	24th	v.	12th "	--	13th Coy.	v.	4th "
" 19th	4th	v.	12th "	--	24th Coy.	v.	13th "
" 26th	12th	v.	13th "	---	24th Coy.	v.	4th "
Novr. 2nd.	4th	v.	13th "	--	12th Coy.	v.	24th "
" 9th	13th	v.	24th "	--	4th "	v.	12th "
" 13th	F I N A L S.						

----- SOCCER FIXTURES. -----  
 Commencing Tuesday 8th October 1918.  
 To be drawn at a later date.

## R U L E S.

- (1) 2 Points for a win and 1 point for a draw, the two leading teams at the end of the second round to play off for premiership - in the event of the leading team being beaten they have the right to challenge.
- (2) Two matches to be played for each fixture in the one day - First Match commencing 1.15 pm.
- (3) The first named team on each day will be responsible for fixing up and preparing ground.
- (4) Cups will be allotted from Canteen profits for each competition.
- (5) Footballs will be supplied for competition games from Canteen Funds.
- (6) Personnel on Headquarters may play with their original Units in the Australian and Rugby competition, but with Headquarters team only in the Soccer competition.  
Attached personnel for Rugby and Australian Rules to be ballotted for.

*Approved* Lieut.  
 Hon. Secty.  
 Battalion Sports.



## Report on Aust. Expedition

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

I was attached to the 106th Infantry Regiment (American) Machine Gun Company. I remained at the Coy HQ. This Coy's 12 Guns were attached to the 106 American Regiment when they attacked having got their objective the line which was to be the starting off line for the larger attack two days later.

While attached to this Coy I noticed that the communications were not all that could be desired, no reports being received at HQ from Gun positions until several Sergeants came in later in the afternoon. This was partly due to loss of the three Section officers becoming casualties & inexperience of Section Sgts. in this matter also owing to the same thing eleven of their twelve guns failed to reach their objective & in most cases the could not account for the way in which

they were lost.

With regard to the food sent to the men in the line preparatory to the attack very little had reached the men & the main fault seemed to be that they fed from the rear forward instead of vice versa. I pointed this out to the Coy Commander & Second in Command & they intended to rectify same.

One big item that appealed to me was the shortage of officers both in the Infantry Companies & Machine Gun Companies. There being only three Section officers in the Coy to which I was attached & when these became casualties there were not any to replace them.

L. H. B. / Sg.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

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Appendix K



H. O.,  
4th Aust. M. G. Bn.

4th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

24th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.

Ref. your F 24 of 5th inst. - Report from N.C.O's.  
detached with American Mission, herewith report from Sgt. LINDICOAT T.  
Sgt. MORRIS C.W.E. was also detached with American Mission, but as he is  
at present on U.K. Leave, no report is available from him.

6:10:18.

*B. Hatch* ..... Capt.  
O.C. 24th Aust. M.G. Coy.

Appendix H



4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

Report on operations  
attached to American  
reported to O.C. Capt. Eaglestone  
of 10th Machine Gun Coy (2nd Division)  
on the night of 28th Oct. & explained  
to him that I was to be attached to  
his Coy. That night I located all the  
ammunition dumps that we taken  
over from the English troops &  
found some satisfactory the next  
morning the O.C. & myself reconnoitered  
the gun positions all of which  
were satisfactory the moral of  
the gun teams was good they all  
appeared to know what their  
work was the guns of this company  
were doing barrage work & whilst  
firing I visited them all to see  
if they required any assistance  
but the each team were doing  
well. On the night of the 28th Oct  
the guns were moved & new  
positions were taken up on the  
left flank these positions were  
selected by O.C. & myself no  
firing was done in new location  
while I was with the Coy.  
Casualties were light & these  
were caused by enemy machine  
gun fire chiefly

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

Positions were good but badly  
handled & the system employed  
in getting hot meals to the  
men needs much improvement  
the meals were cooked some  
4 or 5 miles back from advanced  
Coy & B cooked meat & potatoes  
etc were put in sand bags &  
brought up to positions in big  
timber & of course were always  
cold on arrival the tea was  
the only item that was hot  
on arrival

Sgt J. Laddcock  
24th M. G. Coy



# Report on Operations of 105<sup>th</sup> United States Machine Gun Battalion

Appendix K

211

By

Attached Australian Officer.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

94

Date.....

I was attached to the 105<sup>th</sup> U.S. M. G. Bn. This Bn. took part in both the preliminary and the big operation, firing Barrage both times. The arrangements within the Battalion were good, although the time was short, reconnoitering parties were sent out and did their work well, and with the result that all the Guns got into position well on time, and the ammunition supply was well maintained. I would like to comment on the excellent work of a No 4 Gun Battery of C. Company in Holesall Post, when the enemy retook the Knoll on the left flank, and advanced behind the assaulting waves of the Americans, this Battery maintained direct fire on the enemy at short range, and sent back for more ammunition, 30,000 rounds were immediately sent up, and the Battery remained in action with no infantry near, this Battery undoubtedly saved this portion of the jumping off line. The ration arrangements were fair, water being the principle trouble, the Battalion only having 2 water carts but their ideas are sound, and a little experience is necessary to adjust these matters. The communications right through are bad. This Battalion has an unofficial but very good system of runners, by whom they succeeded in maintaining good communication, but the signal arrangements were impossible, and if heavy casualties had occurred amongst the runners there would have been no communication at all. All Coy Head Quarters had ringing phones, but the only Boards that they could connect with were Buzzer Boards, so the phones were useless, and during the whole operations no Coy HQ was on the phone. I would strongly recommend a change in this Department. The Orders from Division were not received till too late; for instance the Barrage Map showing the Battalion on which Targets to fire for the big operation.

(Over)



was received by us at 02-30 on the morning of the operation, and  
 zero was at 05-30 and the second lift on this map was impossible,  
 being out of range. The other Battalion on Banage on our right  
 did not receive the map at all. Besides this Battalion, in the  
 Brigade, there are two Regimental companies, and as far as I could see  
 there was nobody to look after them. They would get orders from  
 either the Regimental commander or the Machine Gun Battalion commander  
 and there seems to be a need for a distinct understanding of command  
 for these boys. There is one outstanding point, that is shortage  
 of Officers. To successfully run Guns, a strength of 1 Officer to two  
 Guns is necessary, this Battalion could not supply one Officer to  
 4 Guns. This leaves no allowance for casualties.

*Stephen B.*  
 4th Amb Coy.



**"A" Form**  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.**

Army Form C. 2121  
(In pads of 100.)

4th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

Prefix.....	Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of
Office of Origin and Service Instructions		Sent		Reed. at.....m.
		At .....m.		Service. Date.....
		To .....		No. From .....
		By .....		Date.....
				(Signature of "Franking Officer") By.....

TO {	Adj. 4 M G Bn.		
------	----------------	--	--

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

<p><i>General Report on Operations of American Division by personnel attached from this Bty. Sgt. Roda Kish is missing therefore no Report is attached.</i></p>			
---	--	--	--

From	Place	Time	
<p><i>H. M. G. Coy.</i></p>			

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

\* This line should be erased if not required.

Order No. 1625. Wt. W3253/ P 511 27/2 H. & K., Ltd. (E. 2634).



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Report on A'boy.  
105 M.G. Bn. American Forces

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

Date.....

This Company occupied positions on the night of Sept in 62<sup>C</sup> F. 16. and 62<sup>C</sup> F. 17 and fired a barrage for the preliminary operations the following morning. After the barrage was fired the guns stood by & later retired to selected direct fire positions in the trench 62<sup>C</sup> F. 16.

On the night of Sept the company again moved into <sup>the</sup> former positions & fired a barrage on the morning of Sept for the operations carried out on that day. The Company then moved back to the direct fire positions previously occupied.

During the barrage the platoon Officers & N.C.Os. conducted the gun work very satisfactorily & communications were good. The supply of ammunition was well kept up by Coy. hoppers, being brought to a central dump.



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2  
+ from there it was conveyed to the  
guns by their respective gun teams

The supply of water was fair.  
Instead of filled petrol cans being sent  
from Nucleus with rations, a water  
wagon was sent to the village of  
Ronsay from where the water fatigue  
filled the Company's cans.

More attention could have been  
paid by the B.C.M.S. to the ration  
stages & a fairer distribution of  
rations at Nucleus made.

Transport men were given too small  
a percentage of bread while all  
the margarine & Jam & bacon was  
sent forward. In the case of  
many casualties being sustained  
~~there~~ a certain amount of work  
was likely to occur.

The general occupation of the  
positions was speedily & well  
carried out by the company  
commander despite the difficulties  
entailed by reconnoitering under direct

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE  
BATTAL



<sup>3</sup>  
Observation from the enemy and  
the very short notice received.

G. B. Heney  
Sgt  
1st Coy.

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION
No. ....
Date. ....



134<sup>th</sup> a.m.g.

6.10

4<sup>TH</sup> AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

To

H Qrs.

4<sup>th</sup> Aust m.g. Bn

Ref F24

Attached please find reports  
from Sgts. Lewis & Bushell*Am*  
W. M. Bony Capt.  
O.C. 134<sup>th</sup> a.m.g. Coy.



Report on operations during period of duty  
with American Army.

On Sept 27<sup>th</sup> 1918 I reported to O.C. 105<sup>th</sup> American M.G. Coy. for special duty to act as adviser for the attack, which I did to the best of my ability. I was told that I had to stop with Coy. H.Q. and not to go in with the guns, but as Coy. H.Q. was up with the guns all the time, I had to be with them. Coy. H.Q. was situated at SAINT EMILE.

On day of 27.9.18. I went out with O.C. to find M.G. Batty. positions for barrage fire, and laid out our positions, about 400 yds in front of place called YAK POST.

On night of 28<sup>th</sup> Coy. moved guns up to positions and had to dig in. Coy H.Q.s. were established in trench near positions, which I advised was very wrong, but were not moved. At 5.15 A.M. of 29<sup>th</sup> Barrage was fired, and as Corp'l. and one gun team were put out of action, I was asked to take charge of two guns which I did. We were firing on four different targets. Infantry gained Objective at 10 A.M.

On same day Enemy counter attacked. We were firing on Enemy advancing for 15 minutes.

Coy. remained in these positions, and on morning of big advance 30.9.18. at 5.30 A.M. fired barrage.

Same day Coy. was ordered to a position at a place called EGG POST. but on reaching same found that position was occupied by an Aust. M.G. Coy. so O.C. and myself went forward to select a position. Went to front line where we remained for the night. On the following day 1.10.18 not being able to find suitable positions, moved guns about 500 yds in front of EGG POST. where we were being fired on



4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No	102
Date	

Continued

heavily by enemy machine guns, which had not been mopped up by Infantry.

Coy. stayed in this position until next day 2.10.18, when at 10 A.M. I was sent for, and was told to report back to my own unit. Stayed one night at Corps Rest Camp and reported back to 13<sup>th</sup> Aust. M. G. Coy on 3.10.18.

- Having no map I cannot report the exact positions we were firing on.

No 2135 W. E. Lewis Sergeant  
13. A. M. G. C.



Report on Operations during period of duty  
with American Army.

Reported at TINICOURT on Sept 26<sup>th</sup> 1918. and found that Coy. I was attached to were further on. On 27<sup>th</sup> I proceeded to 107<sup>th</sup> Coy. H.Q. and reported. Went around Coy's. N.C.O's and men, and gave any advice I thought would help them.

On 28<sup>th</sup> at midday proceeded towards the line. Coy. was halted and tea served to men about 4 P.M. Proceeded on again and halted about 2 miles from SAINT EMILE for a time, then went forward again stopping at Sunken Road behind YAK POST.

At 4.30 A.M. on morning of 29<sup>th</sup>, limbers were unloaded. Guns were mounted and sentries posted in trench 20 yds in front of Sunken Road.

At 10 P.M. on night of 29<sup>th</sup>, limbers were loaded and Coy. proceeded to the front line, as close as possible with limbers.

On morning of 30<sup>th</sup> at 5.30 A.M. Barrage opened and a short time after the Infantry started ahead with great confidence, but if anything a little too eager. Smoke barrage was rather dense, and seemed to confuse most of the men. Some thought it was gas. At this time I got cut off from my party by the infantry, and found myself in the new front line along with some of 105<sup>th</sup>, 104<sup>th</sup> and 107<sup>th</sup> Coys and also some



4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	.....
Date	.....

English Regs. who had got lost in the Smoke barrage.

I spoke to a Liut. of the 38<sup>th</sup> Aust Inf. Battr. who was observing there. Some of the men were rather new as a lot of foolish reports were about. One man came along and told the men in the trench that they would have to retire as the enemy were outflanking them on the right. I told the men it was all rot, and went along the trench and over on to some high ground and found everything normal, which I told to the men about. I stayed in the trench that night. Next morning 1.10.18. I inquired for 107<sup>th</sup> M.G.C. whereabouts, but nobody could tell me. After having a good look round for them and being unsuccessful, I decided to go to Regimental H.Q.s. for information. On my way there I found that the 107<sup>th</sup> Coy. was being relieved, so I started back and met the Coy who had been relieved and proceeded with same to Transport lines at SAINTÉMILE and remained there that night.

Next morning 2.10.18. I received notice to return to my unit, so reported to O.C. 107<sup>th</sup> Coy that I was going to leave them, and proceeded to PERONNE Rest Camp as ordered. arriving back to my unit on 3.10.18.

No 3242. Sgt L J Bushell  
13<sup>th</sup> A. M. G. Coy.



# Reports on Work of 105<sup>th</sup> Regiment N. G. Coy.

M. S. Army.

Appendix

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

I was attached to No 3 Section of this Coy. There was a Sergeant in charge of the Section, and we were ordered to report to the 2nd Battalion of 105<sup>th</sup> Inf Regiment. We did so, and marched off at the Rear of the Battalion when they moved up to the tape half an hour before Zero. The Battalion got lost, and we were 300 yards from the Starting Point when the Barrage opened. We were supposed to get 12 men from the Battalion to act as carriers, but as the Barrage started before we had our Limbers unloaded, and the Battalion did not stop, we did not get the men, and that was the beginning of a general mix up. There were men of all Ranks mixed up, carrying on independently. I could see that the N.C.O's of the Section did not have enough experience to carry us, so I took charge of it.

I unloaded the Limbers, took as much ammunition as we could carry, also told the Mule Drivers to follow me with the four Mules with the remaining Ammunition and Packs. We had no compass, so as we knew we had to go east from the Starting Point, we followed that Direction by the Sun. We passed a few yards on the right of the Knoll, and met about 300 Americans without Officers coming back. I asked almost all of them why they were coming back, and they stated they were doing so because the rest did, so I asked them to form a line until the fog lifted, and then as a Tank was going forward, I asked them to follow me, and the Tank and about 200 men did so, the rest stopped in Shell holes. We went forward until we came up against a line of Enemy Machine Guns; we got into the trenches, took positions and mounted our Guns 20 Yards at the Rear of the Infantry on higher ground. Our left Gun did good work by preventing the enemy from turning our flank until the 2nd Australian Division came up. There were no Communications or Organisation of Dumps for Rations or Ammunition. I left the Mules behind cover, and as I could see



that we could not go forward, I unloaded the Ammunition and sent the Mules back. The 3rd Australian Division pushed in on a line with us on our left, and we held that line until we were relieved next morning.

W. Rodakis Sgt.

4th Australian M. G. Coy.



# WAR DIARY

My dear mother,

I am writing you from the front, and I am very happy to hear from you.

I am well, and hope you are the same. I am very busy here.

I am writing you from the front, and I am very happy to hear from you.

I am well, and hope you are the same. I am very busy here.



WR  
All Coys.

4TH AUST. MACHINE GUN BATTALION.  
Headquarters,  
5th September, 1918

12TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.

No. ....

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FIRE.

The following precautions against fire will be adopted.

No other fires than those required for cooking purposes, as authorised by Company Commanders, will be allowed. Where required for cooking purposes they will only be in stoves and under strict supervision of Company Commanders.

No open fires in any billet will be permitted. Naked lights are not to be left unattended in any billet.

Buckets or tins containing water will be kept ready to hand in every billet and this will only be used in case of fire.

As the billets the Battalion now occupy will soon be tenanted by the French civilians, Company Commanders will take steps to ensure that every precaution is taken to safeguard these billets.



*C. Atwood* Lieut.

A/Adjt., 4th Aust.M.G.Bn.



# Appendix

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4TH AUSTRALIAN  
DIVISION.

Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
6th September, 1918.

4th Aust. Div. Arty.  
4th Aust. Div. Engrs.  
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
13th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
4th Aust. Pioneer Battalion.  
4th Aust. Machine Gun Battalion.  
4th Aust. Div. Train.  
A.D.I.S.  
Camp Commandant.



The 4th Australian Divisional Canteen has been established.

Canteen Officer. Lieut. L.I. GOLDSTEIN, 16th Battalion, A.I.F.

Location. With Div. Headquarters for the present. Future Locations will be shown on Distribution of Units List.

Capital. Units are requested to pay to the Canteen Officer the amount of capital arranged by representatives at the earliest moment after the 8th instant.

Recognised Unit Canteens. The following are the Canteens which will be supplied by the Divisional Canteen :-

4th Div. H.Q.	No. 1 Sec. D.A.C.
4th Div. Signals.	No. 2 Sec. D.A.C.
4th A.I.Bde.	S.A.A. Sec. D.A.C.
12th A.I.Bde.	4th Fld. Coy. A.E.
13th A.I.Bde.	12th Fld. Coy. A.E.
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	13th Fld. Coy. A.E.
4th Aust. M.G.Btn.	14th Coy. A.A.S.C.
4th Fld. Ambce.	7th Coy. A.A.S.C.
12th Fld. Ambce.	26th Coy. A.A.S.C.
13th Fld. Ambce.	27th Coy. A.A.S.C.
10th A.F.A.Bde.	
11th A.F.A.Bde.	

P.T.O.



Unit Canteens Representative Buyer. Each Canteen mentioned above will supply to the Canteen Officer by the 8th instant, the name of the Officer, N.C.O., or man who will buy for the Canteen and sign for stores, etc.

Whisky, Port Wine, Sherry. These will be distributed on the ration strength of officers, and each canteen weekly, on Tuesdays, will send in the number of officers it supplies.

BEER and Stout. Will be distributed on the full ration strength.

Rules of Canteen. The Divisional Canteen will not supply any Canteen on MONDAYS. This day is set aside for working out distributions, etc.  
TUESDAYS. Each Canteen will send its buyer to the Div. Canteen when the distribution list will be available.  
Canteens can draw their stores on any other day of the week. Stores not drawn within 7 days after distribution advised will be re-distributed pro rata.

Deposit Account. Canteens can deposit money with the Div. Canteen on current A/c if desired. This will save the necessity of the buyer carrying a large sum on his person.



*R. Brown*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
A.A. & Q.M.G.,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



*1. H. 64. 36.  
9 Oct 7 Creek.*  
**FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.**Headquarters,  
22nd September, 1918.**GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 88.****REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING.**

1. Attention is directed to G.S. Circular No. 85 of 24th ultimo, on the above subject. The instructions set forth therein will be complied with on arrival in CAVILLON Area.
2. Every man in the Platoon will be made available for the Platoon Commander at the same time for at least 1½ hours daily.
3. Programmes of proposed Training will be submitted weekly to reach D.H.Q. on Saturdays. They will show times, places and nature of work being carried out during following week.
4. All units will include at least two Route Marches weekly, in full marching order, in their Programmes of work. Distances will not be less than six miles or more than eight miles. Strictest march discipline will be maintained throughout. Regulation pace will be insisted upon, and halts of ten minutes will be made at 10 minutes before each clock hour. Hardening effect on shoulders and feet is what is to be aimed at. Special attention will be paid to Divisional Standing Orders regarding "March Discipline" and to pamphlet "Hints on Training" issued by XVIII Corps.

**DISTRIBUTION.**

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	(22).
12th " " "	(17).
13th " " "	(17).
4th Aust. Div. Arty.	(20).
4th " M. G. Bn.	(6).
C. R. E.	(4).
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	(5).
A. D. M. S.	(5).
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.	(4).
AUST. Corps.	(1).

*Beland* Major,  
General Staff.  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



R

WR

4th Aust M G Bn

26th Sept 1918

4th Aust Machine Gun Coy.

Leave to HQ

The following allotment of leave has been made for period ending 3rd October 1918:—

Date	H Q	4th Coy	12th Coy	13th Coy	24th Coy.
Sept 29	1 OR	1 OR	-	10 2 OR	10 4 OR
Oct 1	-	2 OR	2 OR	-	4 OR
3	2 OR	-	2 OR	2 OR	2 OR
Total	3 OR	3 OR	4 OR	10 4 OR	10 10 OR

Please forward serial particulars of destination, address while on leave, etc, if men recommended for above allotments.

Leave personnel report for papers at Bn HQ on 2nd day prior to commencement of leave and to RTO at AILLY-SUR-SOMME at 9.30 am on day prior to commencement of leave.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

C. A. Fowler Asst. Adj. 4th Aust M G Bn

No. 26/9/18



Appendix

K

WR

4th Aust M G Bn.  
26th Sept 1918.

17th Aust M G Coy.

Leave in France.You are allotted the following vacancies  
for 10 days leave to places in France: -

2. M.G.

The following particulars are required to  
reach this office not later than 6pm  
27th inst: Name, No. Destination and Address  
Leave commences 3rd October 1918.

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.
No. ....
Date 5/9/18

1st M.G. Coy. Capt. J. J. J.  
4th Aust M G Bn.

12TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY.
No. ....
Date .....



From 25-9-18 to 1-10-18

4th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

No

Date

I was detailed to join up with an American Mission on 25-9-18. joined up with C Coy 106th Machine Gun Battalion 24-9-18. Billeted one day with them in back area. noticed that the distribution of food to the troops who were in too large numbers, food liable to grow cold. Also it would be advisable to issue troops, with their 24 hours dry Rations in Gun Teams, and not piecemeal from the Kitchen. noticed they placed 2 Dixies of hot water outside of the cook-house after each meal for the men to wash their mess-kit. moved forward on the 26th 9-18. The pace was very irregular. moved very fast at the commencement of the march and slowed down considerably.



K.L.

4th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION


2

Towards the end. Tends to fire  
the Troops. moved into the  
forward area in large groups.  
Transport was out of all pro-  
portion to the number of Troops  
going forward. about half of the  
limbers could have carried all the  
guns & gear. The S.A.A. to form the  
forward dump should have come  
up after the Gun Teams. had moved  
off to their positions. The S.A.A. Dump  
was badly placed as there was a  
Sunken Road on the opposite side  
of the Ravine, which would have  
afforded good cover for 1 or 2  
limbers. also cover for men  
going between Guns & Dump.  
There was a good deal of  
confusion in unpacking the  
limbers. Squads should have been  
split up into Gun Teams. and  
each Team to place its own  
gun gear in its respective  
dump. so as to enable it to pick



3

it Gun and move off ~~quickly~~ and Silently. In moving up to the Gun positions. The approach was good, and the men should not have been hurried forward as they were heavily loaded and tired. There was no attempt to dig Gun position. The men did not know how to dig them or they were tired. The men should be further trained in the use of ground and cover. The gun were placed too close together, only a few yards between guns. The Task of the Company was to lay down a Barrage on the Hindenburg line. The Task of each gun should have been clearly understood by each Gun number and a Gun chart made out for each gun. The volume of fire was very satisfactory, and the advancing Infantry spoke very highly of it.





K. 1. 1. 1.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

H

Rations

24 hours dry Rations should have been issued to the men before going into the line, also Dry Rations. The cooker should have been brought up into forward area, after the Barrage had lifted, to enable a hot meal to be served as soon as possible. A personal Reconnaissance of the forward area, a day or two before taking over would go a long way to prevent confusion. The Trench Discipline was very good, especially the Gas discipline and the concealment of lights against aircraft.

The splendid fighting qualities of Officers, N.C.O. and men cannot be too greatly stressed. Keeness for the work, Promptness & willingness to execute all orders under the most adverse circumstances, must win for this unit, a high place amongst



5

the best of fighters. The improvement in the steadiness of this unit was most marked before the men were relieved a little more experience in the field and in my opinion will prove themselves second to none.

Sgt Almvick  
12<sup>th</sup> M. G. Coy

4<sup>th</sup> AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
B'TM



4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

*Report on Operations with Australian Mission  
to American Corp from 25<sup>th</sup> Sept to 1<sup>st</sup> Oct 1918*

I reported to the above mission at the Corp Reinforcement Camp near Peronne on 25 Sept. I was there notified that I was to report to B Coy 106 American M.G. Coy.

Duties were to assist the Coy generally during their period in the line. I proceeded by motor to Vincourt and there joined the Coy, on the afternoon of 25<sup>th</sup>.

On the evening of the 27<sup>th</sup> the Battalion moved forward, each Coy being followed by its fighting limbers.

On arriving at Coy H.Q. The limbers were unloaded. The Coy then moved forward in gun crews to their Battery positions, taking guns, tripods & as much belt ammunition as possible.

Two men per gun team carried on building their gun positions while the remainder returned for the rest of the gun gear. The Coys twelve guns were placed in position, occupying a battery frontage of approximately 150 yds.

All belt ammunition was in position & guns laid & ready to fire about one hour before zero.

A good deal of trouble was experienced in getting up a supply of reserve ammunition, owing to the distance of the dump from the gun positions & the bad state of the ground. The officers were not notified of the zero hour.

The Battery opened fire with the artillery.

The Barrage appeared to be very good, all guns working well.

More care could be taken of spare parts & belt ammunition.



Report on operations with Australian Mission  
to American Corp, between 25<sup>th</sup> Sept.

Appendix

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

1st Oct. 1918.

I reported to the 106<sup>th</sup> American Mch Gun Batt<sup>n</sup> on the 25<sup>th</sup> Sept. & on the 26<sup>th</sup> I was posted to D. Coy. of that Unit. During the day of the 26<sup>th</sup> I noticed how rations were distributed. A mess sergt. was in charge of this department & at meal times men & N.C.Os lined up at the cooker & received hot meals & also dry rations. No 24 hours dry rations were issued to each man, as is the case in the Australian Corps.

Coffee is the beverage & is taken three times per. day. Tea is not on issue to the American Army.

The American M. G. Batt<sup>n</sup>s are composed of 4 boys. & each boy has 3 platoons of 4 Guns per. platoon.

On the 26<sup>th</sup> I marched with the boy from Lincomb Wood to Ronsey a distance of approximately 10 miles. The pace during this march was unusually fast, No strict march discipline was observed. Smoking was indulged in all along.

At Templeham, about 3 miles from our destination, we rested for 30 minutes & a hot meal was dished out to us from the cooker. One limber was provided for each platoon & the men marched behind their respective limbers. When we reached Ronsey, the Capt. of the boy & 2 sergts. who had gone up earlier in the day to reconnoitre, guided us close to the positions we were to take up. The limbers were unloaded & there was a good deal of confusion but eventually every man got a good load of guns, ammunition ect. & we marched to a short line of trenches east of Bullicourt Rd. No. 1. Gun stopped at the first position, No. 2 at the second & so on until all the guns were in position in the trenches at intervals of 10 yards. The officers were not too plentiful, but they seemed to know their work thoroughly & were assisted greatly by the N.C.Os. & very soon all the guns were laid on



this targets, ready to fire barrage at zero. All through the night we were shelled intermittently with gas & I noticed that the gas discipline of the troops was splendid. At zero we opened fire on targets in the vicinity of the Hindenburg Line. We fired for 28 minutes, in 7 minute bursts & ~~learned~~ learned from the Infantry that the fire had been very effective. The men & officers did not seem to realize the importance of a clean gun & were slow in attending to points after firing. I pointed out this mistake & they will profit accordingly. On the 29<sup>th</sup> we laid down another 30 minute barrage on one target & again the fire seemed very good. All through both barrages we were shelled & M.C. gunned pretty heavily, but the men behaved very well. On the night of the 29<sup>th</sup> we shifted our positions to Benjamin Post, a mile to the south. In this position our guns were silent & we had orders to fire only in case of a breakthrough by the enemy. The guns were placed in this position (in my opinion) on too narrow a frontage & I pointed this out & the officers had the interval between guns considerably increased. Everybody seemed to realize the importance of keeping the supply of bulk ammunition up to the guns & there was no trouble in this respect. During the first day or two in this line, hot meals & dry rations arrived very sporadically, but towards the end the Mess Sgt. had things running very smoothly & hot porridge & coffee would arrive at daylight & hot stew & coffee at dusk. The discipline of the troops was excellent. They acted on the orders they received, cheerfully & at once. A perfect understanding seemed to exist between Officers, N.C.O's & men. All were keen & willing to learn. The personnel of the Unit to which I was attached, could not be surpassed. Practical experience is all that is wanted to make good soldiers out of raw material which is full of the spirit to win the war.

J. Pintard L/Adj.





The Battery carried out another Barrage on the 29th Sept. which went off very well.

Four guns were then sent forward & placed in position for defence purposes, in case of a counter attack.

The remainder of the guns being in reserve.

The casualties in the Coy were light.

The enemy used a considerable amount of Blue cross, & smothering gas shells, but owing to the splendid discipline of the men, no casualties from gas occurred.

They never failed to use their helmets on the gas alarm.

There seems to be a perfect understanding between officers & N.C.O.'s & men.

A very noticeable fact is the cheerful manner in which the men carry out their duties.

The weather was bad most of the time, making transport work very difficult owing to the state of the roads and the broken ground.

The rations were good, but not regular.

The system of rationing could be improved on.

I would suggest rations being forwarded from cooks by runners to each gun team by means of petrol tins and ration bags.

On the whole the Coy carried out the work well and with a little more practical experience will do excellent work.

C/O 4302 Sgt. Meller R.  
12th Aust M.G. Coy





# Report on Operations with Australian Mission

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Corps from 25<sup>th</sup> September to 1<sup>st</sup> October 1918

Appendix K

4 <sup>th</sup> AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION
Date .....

I was notified I was to be a member of the above mission and in accordance with orders received, reported to Aust Corps Reinforcement Camp, PERDUE, on the morning of the 24<sup>th</sup> September when the Mission personnel assembled. Here General BRAND, in a short address pointed out the object of the mission and laid stress its being Advisory. I, with 4<sup>th</sup> Sergeants of the 12<sup>th</sup> Aust. M. G. Coy - Sgts MILLER, SCHAPER, ALNWICK and PRIETHARD, was attached to the 27. Division 54 Brigade, 106 M. G. Battalion. On the morning the 25<sup>th</sup> September I reported to H.Q. of the 106<sup>th</sup> M. G. Battalion. The Battalion is composed of 4 x 12 gun companies. I allotted 1 Sergeant to each company, to work with company commanders. During the morning I looked through their transport and found it battalionsed under a Battalion Transport Officer, equipped with mules in very poor condition and very little system in regard to packing of limbers, etc. During the afternoon I attended a conference at the 27<sup>th</sup> Divisional H.Q. and Battalion commanders. Divisional Commander outlined task of 1<sup>st</sup> taking Hundenburg Outpost Line in Divisional Front on the 27<sup>th</sup> inst. to be followed by attack on Hundenburg line on 29<sup>th</sup> September. His remarks were supplemented by 4<sup>th</sup> Aust. Divisional Commander and 4<sup>th</sup> Aust. Brigade Commander. This conference was followed by one of B. M. G. O. and M. G. Battalion and Regimental Coy. Commanders. Their maps were issued & it was decided to supply lifting barrage on 54<sup>th</sup> Brigade Front. Details were to be forwarded later for front attack. Question of chinometres occurred, equipped with only one per 4 guns, also compasses, there being very few in Companies. T bases were also to be secured. By 6 am 26<sup>th</sup> September no further details regarding barrage to hand & having only 24 hours to prepare before Zero and situated 8 kilometres behind line TEMPAUX a FOSSE, I advised Battalion C.O. to proceed on scheme independantly making 4 one Coy batteries of 12 guns each for convenience of transport. Reconnoitring and time control; the Coy commanders had never fixed lifting barrage previously, and were not confident & relied largely on AUST. N.C.O.s attached. Accordingly Reconnoitring Parties Officers and digging parties were sent out to prepare battery position, marked on the map, sending back runners to Battalion H.Q. with positions of guns.



H.Q. prepared figures for the 4 batteries, & found the American Officers quite competent to do this. At 2.0 P.M. Boys moved out to battery positions with transport.

D.M.A.O. had notified us of having established an Ammunition Dump in a position central to batteries. We found it was not there and made enquiries & was then told it was still in lorries and had not moved up. At 9.0 P.M. this dump was established, which made hard and difficult work for the batteries to get bulk up in time. I had the Cookers sent forward and a hot meal prepared for the men before going in.

No instructions of Zero Time or S.O.S. signal was given by midnight. Major BRYANT moved from TEMPEUX LA FOSSE and established an advanced Battalion H.Q. in front of ROUSSAY, notifying Brigade personally at 2.0 A.M. and getting ZERO TIME, 5.30 A.M. I set out with runner to visit batteries to notify them of ZERO TIME. The runner got lost & we had stand by until day light. Arrived at first battery & found all batteries were aware of ZERO. I then visited 3 batteries during the barrage & found the teams very inexperienced in handling their guns & rectifying stoppages. Officers had very little idea of how to control guns firing. I had already advised them of these points and advised using Lucas lamp but they could not keep control of fire by any means and were "carrying on" in a very rough way. We did not visit fourth battery, as barrage had ceased, but later got in touch with the Coy. D.B. and found that he had not fired barrage. The only reason for this I could gather being lack of confidence in himself. The Batteries then stood on S.O.S. line. The Americans did not understand this part of work at all and again depended very largely on the N.C.Os attached. That evening the dry rations were sent up by limbers. The limbers were to get the hot rations from the cookers on the way up & take it



forward to the batteries. Two of the four coys. failed to get their positions that night, due to the guides not meeting the limbers. Runners and guides were not reliable.

At 12-0 midnight orders were received to prepare a barrage fire from present battery position. One barrage to fall in front of HINDENBURG outpost line, which was then our front line and another on the HINDENBURG LINE which 3400 yards off. In the attack on the HINDENBURG LINE we were unable to move 3 batteries forward on account of being unable to <sup>get</sup> clearance of a hill in front. The 4<sup>th</sup> battery had to be moved right off our sector to reach barrage position.

We prepared second barrage at 3000 yards to fall a little short of the HINDENBURG LINE. At 8-0 P.M. we received word to fire only the second barrage. We had all the ammunition we required at the dump, which was forward. The "T" bases arrived the morning after the first barrage was fired, but we used them in the second attack for the battery which had to get a fresh position. The standing barrage in front of the HINDENBURG LINE was fired with more confidence than the lifting barrage, the whole battalion having gained confidence after the first barrage. At 10-0 A.M. on 29<sup>th</sup> September the Battalion was to withdraw all its guns and stand by for orders. Here a certain amount of confusion occurred. After being withdrawn the whole Battalion looked to H.Q. for orders and orders from there were issued to section officers, and companies were not ~~left~~ <sup>dealt</sup> with through their O.C.s. — the result being that everything was at a stand still. I took the situation in hand & got companies away from B. H. Q. ~~seper~~ bivouaced separately. Then I took the Coy. Commanders and made them establish their own H.Q. and looked to the detail matter of their respective coys. I also saw that they took over their respective cookers and made their own arrangements re rations — hot meal, ration parties, runners etc.



Previous to this, Battalion H.Q. had arranged all these Company details with only partial success, no definite system being in use. After this I went back to rear H.Q. and straightened out things there.

The mule teams had been out for 24 hours without feed or water. Rations were coming up at no definite time and a great deal of matter which should have been attended to at Rear B.H.Q. was being sent to forward B.H.Q. When I returned to forward H.Q. I found orders had been received to send forward guns for defence in depth. The C.O. had sent forward one section per Coy to establish themselves anywhere along the Brigade Front & he was not aware of the position of the guns, and Coy. Commanders had gone forward instead of Section Officers.

I organised the Brigade sector into Coy. sectors and got Companies established in their sectors. Here again the attached H.C.O.s proved of great value to the Coy. Commanders in reconnaissance & they having very little idea of sighting guns for direct defense. I got the Coy. Commanders back from the gun positions, and directed them to establish a central C.H.Q. to control the guns in the line, and out of it. I also had to direct them as regards reports. No system of reports was in vogue and as a matter of fact very few were sent. Communications between sections to boys & boys to Battalion were very bad. I introduced the system of reports we have in use.

Rations again required attention. They were coming in sections to the Boys H.Q., but after being sent to Boys, no further distribution was made except to the men individually each meal. This was unsatisfactory & I insisted on rations being issued in bulk to gun teams and from there the 24 hours rations to each man.

The actual placing of the guns in position, the emplacements, care of gun gear, care of belts, ect. all needed explanation, in fact I found the Americans



very inexperienced in the usual trench routine generally and a great deal of instruction was necessary.

The Battalion was just beginning to work to a system, boy Officers controlling their Boys, communications established, rations under control, when the orders were received to withdraw to VILLIERS FAUCON on the 1st October.

I received Orders to report back to the Aust. Corps Reinforcement Camp PERONNE on morning of 2nd of October with the Sergeants attached to the 106th M.G. Bn, which I did accordingly.

I consider it would have been advisable for us to have remained a day or so longer and have gone over the whole of the operations in details with the Officers to explain our reasons for doing certain things and getting their views on the operations and to give them any further information they required. The American Officers expressed this wish.

Reviewing the operations, I found the Americans very green and inexperienced to the general conduction and organisation of an offensive operation, but very keen to learn and they helped me in every way, asked for a great deal of advice and acted on it, and were quite prepared to have mistakes pointed out & be corrected.

(Signed) E.M. CULLIMORE, 1  
Lieut



To adjt.  
H. M. G. B.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

Report on operations re American "Moro"  
Herewith reports from Lt Bullman & three A.C.O's  
of this Coy.  
Reports from following are at present unable  
to be obtained:—  
Sgt Dughi. W.I.A.  
Sgt Schaps. Leave to U.S.

11/10/18

Printed Lt  
H. M. G. B.



Australian Corps. ~~Sim~~

Since The Australian Corps joined the Fourth Army on the 8th April, 1918, they have passed through a period of hard and uniformly successful fighting of which all ranks have every right to feel proud.

Now that it has been possible to give the Australian Corps a well earned period of rest I wish to express to them my gratitude for all that they have done. I have watched with the greatest interest and admiration the various stages through which they have passed from the hard times of FLERS and POZIERES to their culminating victories of MONT ST. Quentin and the great Hindenburg System at BONY, BELLICOURT Tunnel and MONTERERAIN.

During the summer of 1918 the safety of AMIENS has been principally due to their determination, tenacity and valour.

The story of what they have accomplished as a fighting Army Corps, of the diligence, gallantry and skill which they have exhibited, and of the scientific methods which they have so thoroughly learned and successfully applied, has gained for all Australians a place of honour amongst nations and amongst the English speaking races in particular.

It has been my privilege to lead the Australian Corps in the Fourth Army during the decisive battles since August 8th which bid fair to bring the war to a successful conclusion at no distant date.

No one realises more than I do the very prominent part they have played, for I have watched from day to day every detail of their fighting, and learned to value beyond all measure the prowess and determination of all ranks.

In once more congratulating the Corps on a series of successes unsurpassed in this great war I feel that no more words of mine can adequately express the renown that they have won for themselves and the position they have established for the Australian nation not only in France but throughout the world.

I wish every Officer, N.C.O. and man all possible good fortune in the future and a speedy and safe return to their ~~Australia~~. beloved Australia.

H.Q., Fourth Army.  
14th October 1918

(Signed) H.S. RAWLINSON.  
General,  
Commanding Fourth Army.



France,  
24th September 1918.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION

EXTRACTS FROM A PRIVATE LETTER WRITTEN TO AN OFFICER OF 4th  
MACHINE GUN BATTALION BY A FRENCH CIVILIAN.

" I saw in yesterday's papers that the Anzacs, to whom you belong, will in the near future be given leave to Australia.

The French papers are full of the acts of bravery of the splendid Australian troops. Did not they capture the biggest gun ever taken by any Army? Is it not the Australian Army that kept the town of AMIENS virgin soil from the German feet. Is it not the same Army who stopped the quick advance in April? Perhaps we owe the salute of France and of the Allies to its bravery.

I have noticed many reports in the papers about the Australians, more than I ever saw since your splendid success of the 8th August - a new spirit has grown up in the Allied mind. They appreciate in a fuller sense the precious help you have given to the Allied cause.

A French Mission is in Australia now - It is a token of the debt we owe you.

You must be very busy now, as I see by the papers your Division has won great glory in the last Somme Offensive."

Appendix

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100



## FOURTH MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

## -----BOXING COMPETITION-----

To be held on 15th October 1918.DIVISIONS.

- (1) Feather Weight - 9 Stone 2 lbs. and under.
- (2) Light Weight - 10 Stone and under.
- (3) Welter Weight. - 10 stone 10 lbs. and under.
- (4) Middle Weight. - 11 stone 7 lbs, and under.
- (5) Heavy Weights. - 11 stone 8 lbs. and over.

R U L E S.

- (1) Marquis of Queensberry Rules.
- (2) Referees decision Final.
- (3) Competitors weigh in 10 am. morning of Contest.
- (4) Competitors exceeding weight will be placed in the next heavier division.
- (5) Rounds :- 3 two minutes with 1 minute interval .
- (6) Gloves - 8 ounces.
- (7) Entries close 6 pm. 12th October 1918.
- (8) Individual prizes in all events will be supplied from Canteen Funds.
- (9) Competitors to be medically examined on morning of contest.



*A. J. D.* Lieut.  
Battalion Sports Officer.  
Hon Secy.







## FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

1321

Headquarters,  
20th October 1918.TRAINING MEMO No. 2.

1. A General Divisional Recreational Committee will be formed forthwith for the purpose of taking in hand all arrangements for competitions, both within and without the division, organised in connection with the Division.
2. This Committee will deal with competitions under both the Recreational Training Scheme and generally.
3. Representatives will be appointed by the Brigades and Divisional Troops as follows:-

Infantry Brigades - 1 each  
 Div. H.Q. )  
 M.G.Bn. )  
 Divl. Engineers ) - 1 each.  
 Divl. Train )  
 Pioneer Bn. )  
 A.A.M.C. )  
 Divl. Sigs. )  
 Div. Artillery ( as soon as relieved from line) - 1.

Nominations as per above, (except in case of the Divl. Artillery) will be forwarded to this Office by Tuesday, 22nd inst.

4. All committees or representatives appointed to control the various branches of sport, (such as the Boxing Tournament, etc.) will automatically become responsible to the General Committee.
  5. The first meeting of the committee will be held at Divl. H.Q. on Wednesday the 22nd inst, at 3 p.m. Formations and Units sending representatives will forward a list of subjects for discussion at the conference to this Office by midday Tuesday 22nd. inst.
- Subsequent meetings will be arranged and list of agenda prepared by the committee itself, with the proviso that the committee must meet at least once a week.
6. The minutes of each meeting will be drawn up and submitted for the Divl. Commander's approval not more than 24 hours after the holding of each meeting.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

Signed. J.D.Lavarack Lieut. Col.  
G.S. 4th Australian Division.

All Companies.

No. *54/17*

Forwarded. Lieut. FAWCETT has been nominated and the following list of subjects for discussion is submitted:-

1. Divisional Football Tournaments.  
Rugby, Australian and Association.
2. Divisional Boxing Tournament.
3. Cross Country Run, 5 miles, 20 men from each Unit.
4. Divisional Sports Meeting.  
Pedestrian and Horse events.

*W. H. Houch* Capt.  
Adj. 4th Aust. M. G. Battalion.



4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

No. 71/20

Date

Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
20th October, 1918.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th " " "  
13th " " "  
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.  
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.

12TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.

No.

Date

### TRAINING.

1. It is proposed to hold a series of Conferences under the auspices of the Inspector-General of Training, G.H.Q., in the Australian Divisions. Brigadier-General GULGISBERG, O.M.G., D.S.O. of the Training Inspectorate will attend each Conference.

2. The object of the Conference is as follows :-

- (a) To enable the Training Inspectorate to discuss, fully and directly, with Commanders of all grades, the latest methods of training, which are being applied throughout the Army.
- (b) To enable Commanders of all grades to get into direct touch with the Training Inspectorate, to discuss fully our recent battle experiences, in order to arrive at what are likely to prove the most effective means of training for later phases in the operations.

3. The Conference will be held in the BOVELLES AERODROME (Sheet 62E) P.11.A.2.3. The vicinity of the landing ground will be used for the demonstration to be carried out.

4. The following officers will attend :-

Representatives from Divisional and Brigade H.Q., all Battalion and Company Commanders including Machine Gun and Pioneer Bn.

5. The programme of Conference will be as follows :-

- (a) 10 a.m. to 10.45 a.m. .. Training and Organization,
- 11 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. .. Battle Tactics of the Platoon and Company.
- 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m. .. Platoon Training.
- 11.45 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. .. Demonstration of Method of Training.

P.T.O



(2).

12.30 p.m.	to 2 p.m.	..	Lunch.
2 p.m.	to 3 p.m.	..	Demonstration of Method of Training.
3.15 p.m.		..	Discussion.

(b) As no facilities are available for messing, Officers attending this Conference will have to provide themselves with midday lunch.

In connection with the conference, 13th A.I.Bde. will detail an Illustration Platoon. This platoon will consist of four sections each of 7 men (including Section Commanders), two of the Sections will be Lewis Gun Sections. This platoon will be used to give a series of demonstrations under the direction of Lieut-Col. LEVEY, Gordon Highlanders, attached to the Training Inspectorate.

7. Brigadier-General GUGGISBERG and Lieut-Colonel LEVEY will arrive at Divisional H.Q. on the day before the Conference and hope to get personally in touch with Brigadiers and as many Commanders of units as circumstances permit. 13th A.I.Bde. will place at the disposal of Lieut-Col. LEVEY for 23rd and 24th inst. the Illustration Platoon detailed in para. 5.

Brigadier General GUGGISBERG will be accommodated at D.H.Q., 13th A.I.Bde. will make arrangements to billet Lieut.Col. LEVEY for the night 23/24th inst.

8. All officers attending the Conference should be prepared to put forward any points of view or difficulties that they may have in regard to training from the point of view of actual practice.

The Training Inspectorate desires that the result of the Conferences should be twofold - In the first place, that those attending the Conferences should be informed fully as to latest views of the Training Inspectorate in regard to training; and in the second place, to enable the officers of the Training Inspectorate to get in touch with the latest methods actually employed in battle so that they may be kept conversant with the latest developments of the requirements of units in regard to training.

10. Sufficient copies of this memo. are enclosed to issue down to Battalion and Company Commanders.

11. 'Q' of Division will arrange seating accommodation at BOVELLES AERODROME.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*L. Sprang. Mayst*

for Lieut-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Extra,

Copies to - A.Q.

Camp. Comm. Aust. Corps.

Capt. CLARK Brig.-Gen. GUGGISBERG, C.H.G., D.S.O. (2 Copies).



No. G. 1/550/P.

Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
21st October 1918.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th " " "  
13th " " "  
4th " Div. Engrs.  
4th " M.G. Bn.  
4th " Pioneer Bn.

TRAINING.



Continuation this Office G.1/550/1 of 20th instant.

1. The conference and demonstration will take place on October 24th.

2. C.R.E. and Field Coy. Commanders will also attend in addition to those detailed in para. 4.

3. Brigadier-General GUGGISBERG, C.M.G., D.S.O., will visit Brigades on the day preceding and the day after the demonstration, and would like to meet as many officers detailed in following table as are available. -

13th A.I. Bde. at Bde. H.Q. BOVELLES.	2.45 p.m. 23rd inst.	Brigadier, Battalion Commanders C. R. E.
13th A.I. Bde. at Bde. H.Q. PLISSY.	10.30 a.m. 25th inst.	Brigadier and Battalion Commanders.
4th A.I. Bde. at Bde. H.Q. PICQUIGNY.	2.45 p.m. 25th inst.	Brigadier, Battalion Commanders, C.O., M.G. Bn. C.O., Pioneer Bn.

*L. Gray Capt*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff.  
4th Australian Division.

Copies to all recipients of G.1/550/1 of 20th inst.



*Please post conspicuously*

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4th AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

CROSS COUNTRY CHAMPIONSHIP.

Distance 4 miles.

to be run on SUNDAY 10th November 1918.

1st Prize = Gold Medal.

2nd. " = Silver Medal.

3rd. " = Bronze Medal.

In addition to the three individual prizes a trophy will be given to the Company scoring the highest aggregate number of points.

Each Company and Battalion Headquarters will be limited to 20 entries.

Entries close noon 9th November 1918.



Lieut.  
Hon. Secretary.  
21/10/1918.

Appendix

136



WR

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	5112
Date	24/10/18

No. G. 1/561

Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
23rd October, 1918.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th " " "  
13th " " "  
4th " Div. Engrs.  
4th " M.G. Bn.  
4th " Pioneer Bn.

## LECTURES.

1. Lieut-Colonel. ALLARDYCE, D.S.O., of I.T. Training will lecture to the Officers and N.C.O.'s of Brigades on "Artillery Cooperation".

2. Lectures will be held as follows :-

Unit.	Date	Time & Place.	Remarks.
4th A.I. Bde.	26th inst.	3 p.m. Concert Hall PICQUIGNY.	3 Offs. and 3 N.C.O.s from M.G. Bn. and Pioneer Bns. will attend.
12th A.I. Bde.	29th inst.	3 p.m. Concert Hall PISSEY.	3 Offs. and 2 N.C.O.'s from Div. Engrs. will attend.
13th A.I. Bde.	30th inst.	3 p.m. Concert Hall GUIGNEMICOURT.	-

3. All Officers attending these Lectures should be prepared to put forward any suggestions they wish to make or difficulties experienced in recent operations.

4. Sufficient copies are enclosed for issue down to Battalion and Company Commanders.

L. Craig Capt

per. Lieut-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copies to -

Lieut-Col. ALLARDYCE, D.S.O.  
I.T. Training, B.E.F. France.  
C.O.C.





FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.Headquarters,  
24th October, 1918.Circular Memorandum - Re A.I.F. Imprest Accounts.

1. The attention of all concerned is drawn to the necessity of greater care in handling Public Monies, particularly in the manner of drawing pay and arrangements for its care before distribution.
2. Attention is drawn to the following extracts from King's Regulations and Field Service Regulations :-
  - (a) An N.C.O. is not to be subjected to the risk of loss by having Public Monies placed in his hands. (K.R. 114.)
  - (b) An Officer is personally responsible for all money he may trust to subordinates.
  - (c) Officers receiving Imprests are held responsible for all money so advanced to them until it has been satisfactorily accounted for. (F.S.Reg. 127-4 ).
  - (d) Imprest Holders who unavoidably hold considerable sums of money will apply to the General or other Officer Commanding for such Military Guard or Escort as may be required to ensure the safety of public money or valuables. (F.S.R. 124 - 1.).

Lieut-Colonel,  
A.A.&Q.M.G.,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



COPY.A.415.

It is notified for the information of all ranks that British Official photographs taken during the recent visit to France of H.M. The King, can now be purchased by men on active service.

The prices of unmounted copies are as follows  
(post free)

8" x 6"	fr. 1.00 each; fr. 10.00 per doz.
10" x 8"	fr. 1.50 each; fr. 15.00 per doz.
12" x 10"	fr. 2.00 each; fr. 20.00 per doz.
15" x 12"	fr. 2.50 each; fr. 25.00 per doz.

Official order forms and all further information can be obtained from:-

Ministry of Information,  
Photographic Bureau,  
10, 11, 12, Coventry Street,  
Piccadilly Circus,  
L O N D O N, W.1.

Signed. F. BRYANT. Major S.C.,  
for D.A. & Q.M.G.,  
FOURTH ARMY.

26/10/18.  
FJC.

To All Companies.  
4th Aust. M. G. Battalion.

12TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY.	
_____	
_____	



*RAW*

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th " " "  
13th " " "  
4th " Div. Arty.  
4th " Div. Engrs.  
4th " M. G. Bn.  
4th " Pioneer Bn.

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	12/17
Date	28/10/18

No. G. 8/510/1  
Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,  
27th October, 1918.

4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
4th Aust. Div. Train.  
A. D. M. S.

12TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.

The following from G.H.Q. is forwarded for necessary action :-

" Now that the fighting is assuming a character more approximate to open warfare, it is no longer desirable to continue the use of large scale maps which were essential in trench warfare.

The general use of comparatively small scale maps (1/100,000) will lead to a truer appreciation of essentials; in the present phase the situation is affected by the position of our troops in regard to tactical features, and not by the question as to whether they occupy the support or reserve trench of a certain system.

So long as it is necessary to support our advance by a close artillery barrage it will not be possible to dispense with large scale maps altogether. At the same time, the difficulties of supply and issue of large numbers of these maps during a war of movement will necessitate a more general use of the 1/100,000; and it is essential that all Commanders should accustom themselves to its use.

*L. Long Capt*  
for Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff.  
4th Australian Division.

Copies to :-  
Aq.  
DADOS.  
DADVS.  
DAPM.  
Div. Claims Officer.



4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion,  
Headquarters.  
27th October 1918.

All Companies.

U. K. LEAVE.

Following is the leave allotment, for other ranks,  
for period 1st to 4th November.

Usual particulars to reach this Office by 6 p.m.  
on third day previous to sailing.

Passes for Companies will be forwarded to  
respective Company Headquarters by the morning run on the  
second day previous to date of sailing.

<u>November.</u>	<u>1st.</u>	<u>2nd.</u>	<u>3rd.</u>	<u>4th.</u>	<u>Total.</u>
Bn. H.Q.	2	-	-	-	2
4th Coy.	-	-	-	-	-
12th Coy.	1	-	-	-	1
13th Coy.	2	-	-	-	2
24th Coy.	1	-	-	-	1
					<u>10</u>

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	A9/7011
Date	

*Arthur A. Bowden* Lieut.  
Asst. Adjt. 4th Aust. M.G. Battalion.





Appendix *K**WR*All Companies  
T.O.4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion,  
Headquarters.

29th October 1918

4th AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

No

Date

BOX RESPIRATORS.

The result of the inspection by the Divisional Gas Officer is as follows:-

Company.	On Parade	Serious Faults	Slight Faults	No. of men who failed to adjust Resp. in 5 Seconds.
4th	70	6	39	7
12th	55	5	17	3
13th	104	6	42	15
24th	50	6	27	15

More attention to gas instruction, gas drill, and inspection of respirators is necessary to obtain a good report from next inspection by Divisional Gas Officer.

Each Company will arrange to have the helmets of its Transport personnel inspected forthwith.

The 24th Company will arrange to inspect all Battalion H.Q. respirators, the M.C.O. inspecting to report to R.S.M., notifying date to Battalion H.Q. beforehand.

*H. Mouch*  
Adj. 4th Aust. M. G. Battalion.





4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

No. *96/16*  
*3/11/18*

Headquarters,  
8th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
30th October 1918.

The following extract from letter received through Australian Corps from Fourth Army is forwarded for future guidance:-

"Much information is now being received, derived from the  
"statements of prisoners and liberated civilians, with regard to  
"the enemy's intentions, movements and lines of defence.

"The value of this evidence, which may range from direct  
"observation to mere rumour, can, as ~~xxx~~ a rule, only be gauged on the  
"spot, by careful cross-examination and checking from maps,  
"photographs, and other local sources of knowledge.

"It would be of great assistance if, when such information is  
"forwarded, a point were made of always stating the nature of the  
"evidence, (first-hand, hearsay, or rumour), and an opinion given,  
"when possible, of its credibility."

Sufficient copies herewith for distribution to Battalions.

Signed. L. CRAIG. Captain.  
General Staff.  
4th Australian Division.



*Forwarded for information*  
*Anthony*  
*Capt*  
*Adj. 4th Div*

Appendix *K*



4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	QJ/16
Date	2/11/18

*W*  
FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

12TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY.	
No.	
Date	

Headquarters,  
1st November 1918.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS No 95

It has come under the notice of the Divisional Commander that horses on charge of the Division have been clipped - This is contrary to A.R.O. No. 2618.

No horse on charge of any unit in the Division is to be clipped, unless by the direct order of a Veterinary Officer and then only for Veterinary reasons. In all cases where a veterinary Officer orders a horse to be clipped he will inform Divisional Headquarters through the proper channel.

Units who have any horses on charge that have been clipped since 15th September 1918 will render a return stating No. of horse and date it was clipped to Divisional Headquarters by 4th November 1918.

This order does not interfere in any way with the hogging of manes, which must be kept short, or the banging of tails.

*R. G. Jones*

Lieut-Colonel.  
A.A. & Q.M.G.  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



G.13/448,  
First ANZAC Corps,  
18th December, 1917.

NOTIFICATION OF HOSTILE ARTILLERY FIRE.

1. It has come to notice that the immediate notification of the commencement, duration, nature and cessation of all hostile artillery fire to the Australian Corps Heavy Artillery is not being carried out as rapidly as is necessary to secure the best results possible.  
This notification is as necessary in back as in forward areas.
2. It cannot be too clearly laid down that the first and most important duty of the Heavy Artillery, under which term is comprised all artillery except divisional artillery and anti-aircraft guns, is neutralisation of hostile batteries.
3. (i) Whenever a round from a hostile gun reaches our side of the lines, the heavy artillery act; they do not retaliate, they get at once on to the battery which is firing in the attempt to stop it. There is a most elaborate system under which, if brought to perfection, the heavy artillery know at once the location of any hostile battery which opens fire, but these results are not arrived at without the strictest co-operation by everyone concerned - Flying Corps, Artillery, Observation and Sound Ranging Sections - and last, but not by any means least, by a system of reporting all hostile fire at the moment it takes place by anyone who is affected by it.  
(ii) The procedure of the Heavy Artillery, when shelling is reported to them is as follows, - they consult their records as to what the location of the battery probably is, and open a neutralising fire on it; if they do not stop it firing the probability is that they have got on to the wrong battery, and they try another known position, and if this has no effect yet another, and so on.  
(iii). It will at once be seen that, for the successful carrying out of this procedure, it is essential that Heavy Artillery should be informed not only immediately any hostile shelling commences, but also most particularly immediately it stops.
4. In order that regularity in this matter may be ensured, it is necessary to lay down certain rules as to the procedure to obtain.  
The question of shelling divides itself naturally under three heads -
  - (i) The shelling of the front zone.
  - (ii) The shelling of battery positions and O.P.'s; and
  - (iii) The shelling of back areas, such as camps and towns.
  - (i) In the first case, the report will be sent in at once by the responsible officer at the battalion headquarters in the trenches to brigade headquarters, who will call at once on the liaison officer of the Artillery. This officer will call up the Heavy Artillery H.Q. direct, and he will be held responsible that the Heavy Artillery are kept informed of the state of affairs - whether the shelling has ceased, whether it has slackened, or has got heavier.  
The liaison officer must remember above all that the Heavy Artillery want most particularly to know if their shelling of the battery positions has had the desired effect.  
(ii). If the shelling is taking place on battery positions or O.P.'s., the artillery officer on the spot will inform the Group Commander of his Group, and this officer similarly will be responsible that information is sent to the Heavy Artillery.  
(iii). If the shelling is on back areas or on towns, the responsibility will rest with the area commandant or the town major who will be

P.T.O.  
=====



(2).

similarly responsible. In all such areas arrangements should exist to ensure that information of enemy shelling is promptly communicated to the area commandant or town major.

5. The information furnished should contain reference to -

- (i) Time shelling begins :
- (ii) nature of projectile :
- (iii) locality shelled :
- (iv) direction from which shelling comes. This should be given as a grid bearing from an O.P. (if possible) or from a definite co-ordinated position.

6. The Heavy Artillery also have a duty towards the Infantry beyond the actual carrying out of their work.

Nothing is so trying as to be continually sending in reports and apparently obtaining no results; Heavy Artillery should, therefore, reply to all messages to the effect that, "We are opening fire with 60-pdrs", "We are still firing at the batteries".

(sgd) C.E.B. WHITE,  
Brigadier-General,  
General Staff,  
First ANZAC Corps.

(2).

No.G. 5/571/2

Headquarters,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
4th May, 1918.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	(6)
12th " " "	(5)
13th " " "	(5)
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.	(5)
4th Aust. Div. Artillery.	(7)

MG 7/68 Forwarded for information.

*L. J. J. J. J.*  
for  
Lieut-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



*all officers to read & initial.*

*Staylor*  
*Hatch*  
*Pontin*  
*Cullimore*

*St wood*  
*Free*  
*Reilly*

Appendix

*K*

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CIRCULAR MEMO NO. 13.

INTELLIGENCE DUTIES IN THE LINE.

211

1. Intelligence work in a field unit aims at the following objects:-

- (a) to have available in the handiest form all past information about our situation and that of the enemy.
- (b) to add daily to the information systematically.
- (c) to cooperate in turning information to practical value at the earliest opportunity.
- (d) to circulate information to all concerned, and
- (e) to train personnel.

It is pretty clear that an Intelligence Officer cannot be a specialist but that like an Adjutant he must be a good all round man with sound military judgment: a quick and accurate worker on strict business lines.

The tests of good Intelligence work are as follows :-

- (a) Do fair queries arise from the Reports and Summaries?
- (b) Is the information complete, timely, usable, and used?
- (c) Can the work be handed over in such a manner that the relieving Officer can carry on without loss of time?

2. The Log Book allots half a dozen pages to each 500 yards square of the No Man's Land Map which is pasted in at the first page of each Section, the co-ordinate lines being ruled through in pencil to facilitate quick reference.

In the Section should be entered all information gained about localities or movements in the square concerned whether such information is gained by patrols, O.P., photos, aeroplane reports, or prisoners examination. Entries must be made as to group together the reports on any one point e.g.

M.G. at 31.45 in action Feb. 14/15. 17/18. 18/19. (silenced by Trench Mortar at 28.36. etc., etc.,  
Pill Box at 73.94 occupied Feb. 14/15 - working party 15/16 - shelled 16 - vacated 16-17 17/18 occupied 16/17 etc., etc., at 45.29. etc., etc.,  
Enemy attitude. No patrols Feb. 14/15. M.G. fire general on our Posts 15/16, patrols active (probable relief) no flares 16/17. No patrols, many flares, 17/18 etc., etc.,  
Flares and Light Signals etc., etc.

The log book is so to speak a reference work, very necessary but inconvenient and slow to use.

3. The No Man's Land Chart 1 : 5,000 supplements the log book by showing all the ground from our front line inclusive to the enemy support line or posts. On it are shown by means of the authorised conventional signs all detail of military value e.g. wire, trenches, tracks, pillboxes, Machine Guns, Trench Mortars, banks, hedges, ditches, organised shell holes, landmarks, ponds, bridges, ruins, woods, etc., etc. Essential information which cannot be shown graphically (e.g. state of wire, attempted raid, patrol encounters, places from which flares are fired) is given by means of a 2 figure coordinate in a circle (C4) at the place of occurrence and a short note with date in the margin opposite a similar circle and figures i.e. (C4) belt of wire 50 yards long 20 feet wide, iron standards 4 feet high in good order 27/2.

It is best to make this chart on tracing linen and to draw it so that the detail and writing are used facing the enemy. (not N. & S.). It is of service to keep a fair copy certified up-to-date to hand over, the original being retained for the War Diary. Unless the chart is clear, intelligible, up-to-date and the difference between certainty and belief clearly shown (ink and pencil or colour) it will be a danger rather than a help.









( 3 )

9. The I.C. is concerned with the actual carrying out of patrol work only in so far as gaining a good general knowledge of the front is concerned or for special tasks. It is not desirable that he should do more than this as it would effect the value of his real work, the coordinating factor becoming a professional patrol leader to the exclusion of other Officers.

10. The transmission of information and the action required is like all work of a unit covered by the general responsibility of the C.O. but whether this is exercised through the I.O. or not, the latter must be fully acquainted with methods, arrangements, and action involved.

The daily Intelligence Summary requires careful scrutiny and drafting in order to give the clear, concise, account of the events etc., reported by patrols and O.P. In many cases it is desirable to add the deductions arrived at e.g., attempted raid, registration etc. It is obvious that certain information about the enemy or about our intended action must be notified to Companies in good time and that the issue of the summary in no way replaces the immediate report to subordinates, flank units, or higher authority.

11. Lastly there is the duty of training scouts observers whilst out of the line - generally with few facilities for this work. Recent experiences in the line must be discussed and criticised with a view to improved methods and results. Map Reading by day and reports by night, including judging distance (with and without flares) require constant practice.

No pains should be spared to secure good "teaming" of scouts by selecting men who are anxious to work together and to eliminate those who have overrated their ability or staying power.

Reliable observers are second in value to only to first class patrol leaders and as rare. Quickness and keenness of sight, unwearying patience, and a good memory are essential to a R.Q. observer.

The manner in which intelligence personnel carry out their duties affects the morale of the unit either for good or evil. A "windy" patrol is a misfortune - an apparently harmless exaggeration may entail unnecessary work and engender distrust - and slackness is bound in the long run to incur a just penalty.

24-2-18.

*A. J. Varley*  
 Captain.  
 A/Brigade Major.  
 12th Aust. Infantry Brigade.




4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONHeadquarters,  
7th March, 1918.G.S. CIRCULAR NO. 74.GAS TRAINING.

Owing to the great probability of an extensive use of gas by the enemy during his next offensive, advantage will be taken of the present opportunity to improve the gas training and efficiency of all units of the Division.

Particular attention will be paid to the following points :-

1. Regular drills with respirators uncluding rapid adjustment of masks, both at the halt and on the march, with and without equipment.
2. All ordinary movements such as <sup>and</sup> aiming, firing, bombing, and signalling will be practised while wearing masks.
3. Units will be exercised in night marching whilst wearing masks especially with regard to :-
  - (a) Wearing masks for several hours continuously.
  - (b) Maintaining direction and touch when advancing in extended order.
  - (c) Following tracks over heavy ground.
4. In addition to the regular inspections of respirators by unit gas M.C.O.'s, arrangements will be made by Divisional and Brigade Gas Officers and M.C.O.'s to inspect and fit in a lachrymatory chamber the respirators of all units of the Division.
5. At all schools and instructional courses for officers and O.R. a lecture on gas will be given at least once a week.
6. Lectures and demonstrations will be arranged particularly with regard to gas projector attacks and action during gas shell bombardments.



Lieut-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde	7
12th " " "	7
13th " " "	7
4th Aust. Div. Artillery	20.
C.R.E.	4
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	5
2nd Aust. G. Coy.	1
Div. Sig. Coy.	1
A.D.I.S.	5
4th Aust. Div. Train	5
4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy	1
Div. Gas Officer	5
G.O.C.	1
G.	1
A.Q.	1
C.A., Australian Corps	1
Australian Corps	1
Retained	10.



Copy of 4th Aust. Div. letter G28/428, dated 12th May, 1918

1. The following points have been noticed lately by the Divisional Commander, who directs that steps be taken immediately to attend to them. -
2. Trenches in defence systems are being undercut for living accommodation. This weakens the trench and must be discontinued. Living accommodation for garrisons will be provided immediately behind the fire trench. All fire trenches now undercut for accommodation will be repaired and put in proper state of defence as soon as possible.
3. Trees and brushwood within the woods are being cut down without discrimination, and without regard to tactical consideration. This is especially the case in the neighbourhood of defence lines cut through the wood. In such cases brushwood should be cut in front of the trenches to improve the field of fire, but not to any extent behind - in order to leave the background which helps to conceal the defences.  
  
Trees should not be entirely cleared ~~the~~ near the defence lines, as they serve to conceal them from aerial observation.  
In running wire entanglements through woods every advantage must be taken of the undergrowth, which must not be cut down, but must be used to form part of the obstacle.  
All falling of trees and removal of brushwood will be done in future under the control of the C.R.E., who will appoint an officer for forestry duties, with a few other ranks. He will also arrange direct with Brigades for a few men to act as forestry police and prevent unauthorised persons cutting down of trees and brushwood.
4. Great care must be taken to minimise tracks leading to H.Q's., etc. At present almost every important locality is the centre of a regular star-post of tracks which must inevitably give it away. Commanders of units must realise that not only their own safety but also the integrity of the chain of command is endangered by carelessness in this respect.
5. The orders with regard to the wearing of Box Respirators are frequently disregarded.
6. All ranks when absent for any appreciable distance and time from their unit or allotted position in the defensive system must be fully armed.

M.G.2/22.

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

Headquarters.  
13th May, 1918.

O.C.  
12th Aust. M.G. Coy.

Above copy of 4th Aust. Div. letter G28/428 of 12th May, 18 is forwarded for information and necessary action.

*C. V. Duchatel* Capt Adjt.  
4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion.



AUSTRALIAN CORPS.Headquarters,  
23rd May 1918.Headquarters,  
4th Australian Division.DISPOSAL OF SALVED SERVICEABLE STORES.

Reference G.R.O. 3630 para. 8.

Before Stores of any kind can be issued from  
Salvage Dumps to Units the following action is necessary:-

A written demand signed by an Officer authorised to make such demands must be submitted to the Officer responsible for the issue of the articles required (i.e., D.A.D.O.S., S.S.O., C.R.E., A.D.M.S. for Ordnance Stores, Supplies, Engineer and Medical Stores respectively). If the Demand is in order it will be endorsed by the Officer concerned and will then constitute the authority for the Salvage personnel to issue.

In cases of emergency articles can be issued on an un-endorsed demand provided a certificate is attached signed by O.C., Unit stating that it is not practicable to obtain the necessary endorsement. In such cases the O.C. Unit will be held responsible that the Demand is in Order. Receipts will be obtained for all issues in duplicate, one copy being retained and the other copy forwarded together with the authority for issue to the Branch concerned.

A Statement will accompany the weekly salvage return showing items issued on un-endorsed demands and the units to whom issued.

Reference Army Standing Order 121 para.d. iv.

Salved serviceable stores are only to be despatched to Base if they are declared to be not required by a representative of the Branch responsible for the supply of the store in question.

(sd) R.W.A.ANDERSON Capt.  
Staff Captain  
for D.A. & Q.M.G.  
AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

P. T. O.

12/1/18



2153

Appendix

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,  
25th May 1918.

Q.28/184.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
13th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
4th Aust. Div. Art.  
4th Aust. Div. Engrs.  
4th Aust. M.G. Battalion.  
4th Aust. Pnr. Battalion.  
A.D.M.S., D.A.D.O.S., D.A.D.V.S.  
4th Aust. Div. Train.  
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.  
4th Aust. San. Sec.  
Camp Commandant.

For your information and future guidance.

*R. G. Jones*

Lieut-Colonel.  
A.A. & Q.M.G.

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



*Ho 3 40*



*4th Aust. M.G. Bn*

*a102*



( COPY )

G. 164/129.  
Australian Corps,  
26th May, 1918.HOSTILE BOMBING & SHELLING.  
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1. In order to ensure the receipt of early information in the event of a hostile aircraft attack and to enable counter-measures to be taken, a telegraphic report will be wired "priority" direct to Headquarters R.A.F., G.H.Q., and Fourth Army Intelligence by divisions and area commandants.

2. This report will contain -

- (a) Indications of scope of attack:
- (b) general locality: (if described by map reference, sheet (number to be given)).
- (c) time of attack.

3. The following form will be used for the aircraft attack messages :-

(Address to) ..... AIR..ATTACK.....  
(Text) 5 (number of planes) moving N.E. over  
GLISY..... Bombs sheet 27a K.24.D.  
.....  
(Address from) 4th Aust. Div., etc.  
(Time) 7.30.p.m.

4.(i) Any message received by a signal office addressed "Air Attack" will be circulated ("Priority") to the following :-

R.A.F. Headquarters.  
G.H.Q.  
Fourth Army Intelligence.

(ii) A.D. Signals, Australian Corps will arrange for a copy of this message to be sent to General Staff, Aust. Corps.

5. In the case of more than one message reporting the same attack being received from several sources, the signal office concerned will ask its formation staff whether it is necessary to send more than one report.

6. Attention is directed to First ANZAC Corps G.13/448 of 18th December 1917.

These instructions lay down the system which is employed throughout the Corps for reporting hostile shelling. It is necessary that the methods laid down should be widely understood and constantly practised.

Copies of First ANZAC Corps G.13/448 are forwarded herewith to previous non-recipients.

(Sgd) A.M. ROSS, Lt.2Col.  
for Brigadier General,  
General Staff,  
Australian corps.

MG2/69



FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Headquarters,  
25th May 1918.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 12th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 13th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 4th Aust. Div. Art.  
 4th Aust. Div. Engrs.  
 4th Aust. M.G. Battalion.  
 4th Aust. Pnr. Battalion.  
 A.D.M.S., D.A.D.O.S., D.A.D.V.S.,  
 4th Aust. Div. Train.  
 4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
 4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.  
 4th Aust. San. Sec.  
 Camp Commandant., 4th Aust. M.V.S.

A. 4/174



Several instances have recently occurred of O.C. Units having dismissed charges preferred by the Provost Branch, without calling the Witnesses for the prosecution.

Para 468 of Fourth Army Standing Orders lays down that in dealing with charges by Provost Branch "If the accused denies a charge it will not be dismissed until the A.P.M. concerned has been communicated with in order that arrangements may be made for the Police to give evidence in person".

Attention is also called to a further direction in the same order viz., that if a C.Os. award in a charge laid by the Provost Branch is apparently lenient, an explanation of such leniency is to accompany the charge sheet to its office of origin.

These two points are to be again brought to the notice of all O.C. and must be strictly complied with in future.

*Major Brown*  
 Major.  
 D.A.A.G.  
 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copy to :- A.P.M.

MG 143



## FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,  
31st May, 1918.

G.S. CIRCULAR NO. 81.

Exposure to enemy Observation and Fire.

1. The Divisional Commander wishes once more to impress most strongly on Brigadiers and Commanding Officers the vital importance of the most rigorous measures to prevent unnecessary exposure to enemy observation and fire at all times.
2. It must be impressed on all ranks that their personal safety is not the only or even the main consideration, - that by taking care of themselves, in fact, when no fighting is going on, they are doing a service to their comrades and the Army at large. In the present situation, as regards man-power, we can afford to give nothing away. Every man "knocked" during stagnant periods is a potential double loss on exchange as the probable result is at least one casualty the less to the enemy when active operations recommence. As a matter of principle all ranks must ensure that the enemy pays as dearly as possible for every casualty.
3. The most effective means of avoiding both observation and fire is the reduction of movement by day to the minimum necessary. This reduces greatly the chances of drawing attention to Headquarters and localities occupied by troops. This is particularly the case with regard to enemy aeroplanes and balloons, for which a good lookout must always be kept. It is almost impossible for aircraft to distinguish occupied from unoccupied trenches if the men remain still.
4. Tracks afford another fruitful source of information to the enemy as regards the positions of headquarters and dispositions of garrisons, batteries, etc. One way of minimising tracks is to place a barbed wire fence round important localities with openings carefully selected. It is generally through the presence of a star-post of converging tracks that information is given away.
5. It must be remembered that the enemy now relies on a short intense bombardment to overwhelm our garrisons prior to his attacks, and for this to be effective his information must be accurate. The measure of success of this preliminary bombardment will largely depend on the amount of gratuitous information afforded him.
6. The Divisional Commander has noticed a particularly careless attitude towards matters of this nature which requires strong and determined action on the part of Officers and N.C.Os. if it is to be counteracted. If we are to be successful in this War every wile and artifice to hoodwink the enemy must be resorted to and all ranks must "play the game" to the uttermost.

*H. Lavarack*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde. (22)  
12th Aust. Inf. Bde. (17)  
13th Aust. Inf. Bde. (17)  
4th Aust. Div. Arty. (20)  
4th Aust. M.G. Bn. (6)  
C. R. E. (4)  
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. (5)

A.D.M.S. (5)  
4th Div. Sig. Coy. (4)  
Camp Commandant. (1)  
L.H. Detachment. (1)  
Cyclist Detachment. (1)  
A.P.M. (1)



*12th Coy*Appendix *K*

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AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.III Corps.  
Aust. "

Fourth Army No. "Q" 2283.

1. In the event of horse casualties occurring in the Fourth Army Area from hostile bombing, the following procedure will be followed:-

- (i). A report, by wire, will be forwarded to Fourth Army "Q".
- (ii). A Court of Enquiry will be assembled to inquire into the circumstances in which the casualties occurred.
- (iii). Full particulars are to be stated as to steps which were taken to carry out the provisions of A.R.O. 1944.

2. A Court of Inquiry will be held forthwith as to the circumstances which led to casualties in the Australian and III Corps areas on the night of the 23/24th May.

H.Q., Fourth Army.  
25.5.18.

(sd) MAX BOLLAM Major.  
for Lieut-Colonel.  
A.Q.M.G., Fourth Army.

- 2 -

H.Q., Aust. Corps No. 163/371.

Headquarters,  
4th Aust. Div.

Forwarded for information and future guidance. Also for immediate action with regard to para. 2 if applicable.

The instructions contained in para 1 will shortly be issued as a Corps Routine Order.

Headquarters,  
29th May 1918.

(sd) R.G.A. ANDERSON Capt.  
for Lieut-Colonel.  
A.Q.M.G.  
AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

-3-

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
13th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
4th Aust. Div. Art.  
4th Aust. Div. Engrs.  
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.  
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
A.D.M.S., D.A.D.O.S., D.A.D.V.S.  
4th Aust. Div. Train.  
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
4th Aust. Div. San. Sec.  
4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.  
A.P.M.  
Camp Commandant.



Headquarters,  
30th May 1918.

Q.30/49.

For your information and action when necessary. The report by wire referred to in sub para.(1) of para 1, will be sent to Division by units.

*R. G. Gorse*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
A.A. & Q.M.G.  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

*MG 764*



12 May

211



Appendix K

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FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Headquarters,  
3rd June, 1918.

G.S. CIRCULAR NO. 83.

1. In continuation of the instructions contained in 4th Aust. Divisional G.S. Circular No. 81 dated 31/5/18, the Divisional Commander directs that the following copy of a letter from the Corps Commander be promulgated in such a manner as to ensure that every individual is made thoroughly acquainted with its purport. -

" During the past few days several instances have come under my notice of the occurrence of multiple casualties under circumstances which can only be regarded as avoidable, and as having been the result of a certain degree of neglect or indifference on the part of the responsible officers immediately concerned.

Cases have, for example, occurred of single aeroplane bombs, during a relief, at night, having killed and wounded twenty to thirty men, of single B.V. shells in back areas having caused heavy casualties, and many gas casualties having been caused by men having been allowed to remove their respirators merely because they were afraid of being ridiculed by their comrades for being over-cautious. Similar instances can be multiplied, and in every case the majority of the casualties could have been avoided if the officers in immediate charge of the troops had insisted upon the taking of proper precautionary measures.

There is indeed a marked tendency for all troops moving about in or living in areas liable to be shelled, or bombed, or gassed, to take unnecessary risks such as by crowding together, or by moving in over-large bodies, on the principle, apparently, that it is easier to take their chances than to take the trouble to avoid danger.

While, at all times, unconcern as to safety of life and limb is to be deprecated, it is doubly so at the present juncture when the man-power question in the A.I.F. is so serious.

I therefore wish Divisional Generals to take up this question very seriously and to make every effort to inculcate a very much higher standard of responsibility on the part of all officers in immediate charge of troops, particularly in back areas, for their safety and immunity from unnecessary losses, and to hold officers strictly to account for any negligence in this regard."

2. The main point is the realization and exercise of their responsibility by officers in immediate charge of troops.

3. The lives of their men are in the hands of the officers equally as much in back as in forward areas, and experience shows that this kind of carelessness, whenever it occurs, will be punished eventually in such a way as to make up for all chances previously taken with apparent impunity.

*G. Lavarak*  
Lieut.-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	(22)	A.D.M.S.	(3)
12th " " "	(17)	4th Div. Sig. Coy.	(4)
13th " " "	(17)	Camp Comdt.	(1)
4th " Artillery.	(20)	L.R. Detachment	(1)
4th " M.G. Bn.	(6)	Cyclist "	(1)
C. R. E.	(4)	A.P.M.	(1)
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	(5)		

MG 2/70



Copy of G.H.Q. letter O.B./1872 dated 23rd June, 1918 addressed to Fourth Army.

1. It has been brought to notice that a great deal of preventible hardship to horses and consequent waste of horseflesh now takes place owing to lack of precision in orders and ignorance of officers inexperienced in moving warfare.

This hardship is chiefly due to harnessing up unnecessarily soon and keeping harness on unnecessarily long, and it is necessary for the General Staff of formations and for Artillery Staffs to pay attention to this subject.

2. A frequent cause of misunderstanding is the different interpretation that is placed in different formations on the meaning of the order "Stand to".

As units are constantly moving from Corps to Corps and Army to Army it is necessary that this order should be capable of only one interpretation in all cases, namely, that units are ready to move immediately on receiving the signal or order to move off.

3. It must therefore be understood that when the order "stand to" is received horses are harnessed up and hooked in but that poles are left down, pending receipt of further orders to move.

4. When it is desired to ensure that units shall be ready to move at very short notice but not necessarily immediately on receipt of the order, the words "stand to" used must be qualified by a time limit.

For instance :-

(a) The order "Stand to at half an hour" would not necessitate horses being hooked in but harness should be kept ready immediately behind the horses.

(b) "Stand to at one hour" would involve a state of preparation in which horses could be exercised only in the vicinity of the lines but otherwise the normal procedure in the wagon lines would be adhered to.

5. To obtain the standard desired in para. 4 with new and inexperienced drivers practice in quick turn out is required and each unit must know as a result of such practice what length of time is required by it in order to harness up and move off.

(2).

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	(6).
12th " " "	(5).
13th " " "	(5).
4th Aust. Div. Artillery	(20).
C.R.E.	(4).
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.	(5).
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	(1).
4th Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	(7).
A.D.M.S.	(4).
4th Mob. Vet. Sect.	(1).



No. G.

Forwarded for information and necessary action. Sufficient copies are enclosed for issue to Battalions, Batteries, Field Coys. and Field Ambulances.

Headquarters,  
30th June, 1918.

*L. Craig. Capt*  
Lieut.-Colonel,  
G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copies to A.Q. (2).

A.P.M.  
D.A.D.V.S.  
Camp Commandant.  
O.C. Troop 13th A.L.H.

4TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
BATTALION.

No.

Date



Copy of G.O. 1234, 1918, addressed to  
General Staff.

1. It has been brought to notice that a great deal of preventable  
loss of horses and consequent waste of horsepower has taken place  
owing to lack of attention in orders and instructions of officers in-  
charge of moving units.  
This is due to the fact that the instructions are not always  
clear and unambiguous, and it is necessary for the General  
Staff to issue orders and for officers to pay attention to them.  
2. It is proposed to issue instructions on the subject of the order  
"Stand to" in the following manner:  
The units are constantly moving from Corps to Corps and Army to Army.  
It is necessary that this order should be capable of only one inter-  
pretation in all cases, namely, that units are ready to move immediately on  
receiving the signal or order to move off.  
3. It is proposed that when the order "Stand to" is issued, the  
units should be harnessed up and hooked in but that poles are left  
down, pending receipt of further orders to move.  
4. When it is desired to ensure that units shall be ready to move  
at very short notice but not necessarily immediately on receipt of the  
order, the words "Stand to" need not be qualified by a time limit.  
For instance:  
(a) The order "Stand to at half an hour" would not necessitate horses  
being hooked in but harness should be kept ready immediately behind  
the horses.  
(b) "Stand to at one hour" would involve a state of preparation in which  
horses could be exercised only in the vicinity of the lines but  
otherwise the normal procedure in the wagon lines would be adhered to.  
5. To ensure the standard of harnessing in gear, a with new and improved  
drivers practice in which every unit is required and each unit must show as  
a result of such practice what length of time is required by it in  
order to harness up and move off.

W.O.G.



(2)

- 1. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 2. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 3. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 4. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 5. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 6. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 7. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 8. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 9. G.O. 1234, 1918.
- 10. G.O. 1234, 1918.

Referred for information and necessary action.  
Copies are enclosed for issue to Battalions, Batteries, Field Coy.,  
and other units concerned.

*Handwritten signature*  
G.O. 1234, 1918.

Copies to A.G. (2).  
G.O. 1234, 1918.



AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

175/464

G.  
Headquarters,  
25th July, 1918.

2nd Australian Division,  
3rd Australian Division,  
4th Australian Division,  
5th Australian Division.  
-----

RELATIONS WITH THE ENEMY.

Reports have been received lately as to the enemy's misuse of the white flag. The white flag shewn by the enemy is to be interpreted as a desire on his part to communicate only.

It involves no obligation on our part whatever and is liable to be fired on at the discretion of the commander on the spot, and this should normally be done.

In showing the white flag the enemy takes upon himself the onus of making clear his intentions. Until he does this no communication will take place. When it is desired to enter into communication with the enemy following upon the showing of a white flag by him a white flag is similarly shewn in reply. This means that the authority showing it is prepared to accept a communication. **THIS IS NOT TO BE DONE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS BY ANY AUTHORITY BELOW THAT OF A BRIGADIER-GENERAL.**

Any one entering into communication with the enemy under cover of a white flag must be prepared to justify his action and will be required to produce very good reasons.

The maximum number allowed in the party is four -

- (a) The message bearer;
- (b) Interpreter;
- (c) Bugler or drummer;
- (d) Flag carrier.

An enemy party bearing a white flag will not be permitted to approach near enough to our lines to permit of observation of our positions.

At any sign of treachery fire will be opened at once on the enemy. The white flag must always be treated with suspicion until the enemy party is in our hands as the enemy has frequently abused it.

Instructions for the action of outposts in regard to flags of truce are laid down in Field Service Regulations, Section 86.

Detailed Instructions have been published in General Routine Orders - See S.S.309 "Extracts from G.R.O." page 85.

*J. McColl*  
Brigadier-General,  
General Staff,  
Aus. Australian Corps.

(Sufficient copies are enclosed for distribution to Companies).



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Appendix

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*Noted. Law Bomb Case.*

SECRET.  
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Fourth Army.

AA. 25.

Orders have been issued to gradually re-equip all night flying squadrons with navigation lights in place of those already in existence. Conversion to be completed by 5th September 1918.

A.A. 25 dated 24.7.18 forwarding revised copy of A.A. 25 dated 13.4.18 "orders regarding firing at aircraft from the ground at night" will therefore be amended as under from night 5/6th September inclusive.

Cancel para 3 (a) (1) and substitute the following :-

3. (a) Rifle and Machine Gun Fire.

In "Intermediate and Back Area"

(1) Rifle and Machine Gun Fire will be opened on any aeroplane located in this area by night which does not show its navigation lights, or which is unmistakably identified as hostile in the beam of a searchlight.

N.B. The navigation lights are as follows :-

Handley Pages

- 1 white light under the nacelle shining downwards.
- 1 white light underneath and half way down the fuselage, shining downwards.
- 1 white light on the top and in the centre of the upper plane, shining upwards.
- 1 small white light on the tail fin, shining backwards.

F.E.s

- 1 white light under each wing tip, shining downwards.
- 1 white light under the tail, shining downwards.
- 1 white light on the top and in the centre of the upper plane, shining upwards.
- 1 small white light on the tail fin, shining backwards.

Camels

- 1 white light under the fuselage, shining downwards, just behind the pilots seat.

The orders regarding the showing of lights by Camels issued under A.A. 17 dated 12.6.18, and amendments dated 2.8.18. still hold good.

G.H.Q.  
25.8.1918.

Sgd.-----Col.  
for Lieutenant-General  
Chief of the General Staff.

4TH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.	
No.	947
Date	3/8/18



## FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,  
24th August, 1918.

## GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 85.

## REORGANIZATION &amp; TRAINING..

12TH AUSTRALIAN  
MACHINE GUN  
COMPANY.

No.

Date.

1. During the present period out of the line Formations and Units will take immediate steps to effect a thorough reorganization. The following is to be completed within three days after the relief :-
  - (a) Reorganization of personnel within their sub-units, (Sections, Platoons, etc.)
  - (b) Careful and complete overhaul of arms, equipment, clothing, boots, vehicles, etc.
  - (c) All possible action as regards repairs, and the replacement of deficiencies.
2. (a) Training will begin on the fourth day after coming out of the line.
  - (b) It is to be systematic and progressive and must be carried out in such a manner as to ensure the full and detailed training of the Infantry Platoon, the Artillery Section, and corresponding units in other arms and services, as the tactical unit.
  - (c) Actual unit Commanders, (e.g. in the Infantry the Platoon Commander and platoon sergeant), must train their respective units, the work being carefully supervised by Company and Battalion Commanders in the Infantry, and similarly in the other arms.
  - (d) Every man in the Platoon is to be made available for the Platoon Commander at the same time for at least  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours in the forenoon. Working parties, specialist training, pick parades, etc., must be arranged so as not to interfere with this. Necessary working parties are to be detailed by complete units, (Sections, Platoons, etc.), under their own commanders, and not by numbers of men.
  - (e)  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 hours actual work at training every day will be sufficient if full use is made of the time. The Divisional Commander wishes, however, to emphasise the fact that the Division has lacked time for training hitherto, and that the best possible use must now be made of such time as is available. This can only be done if programmes of work are carefully thought and worked out, and the work for successive days arranged in detail, by the officers concerned, a day in advance.
3. (a) A short period in each day must be devoted to steady drill, handling of arms, saluting, and guards and sentries, so as to inculcate and restore discipline and smartness.
  - (b) Training programmes will also include the following :-
    - (i) Physical Training and Bayonet Fighting.
    - (ii) Musketry, - including rapid loading (daily), range practice, fire control and discipline, fire direction and quick recognition of targets, covering fire, instruction of snipers, and care of arms.

P.T.O.

\*\*\*\*\*



( 2 )

(iii) Open warfare drill and training, including, -

- (a) attack with and without tanks.
- (b) advanced, flank and rear guard action.
- (c) outposts
- (d) defence

(iv) Hopping up tactics.

(v) March Discipline, (daily, and at all times when troops are on the move.)

(vi) Patrolling and Scouting, (every man to be instructed).

(vii) Working and entrenching.

(viii) Specialist Training in Lewis Gun, Bombing, Rifle Bombing, and Signalling.

(ix) Daily lecturettes will be given on the past actions of the Division and the lessons to be drawn therefrom. Lecturettes will also be given on saluting, and the payment of compliments generally, (including the attentions which should be paid to flagged cars, and the meaning of the various flags).

(o) Officers are to be instructed in the duties and responsibilities of platoon commanders and will be set small tactical schemes. Particular attention is to be paid to their training in the use of the compass by day and by night.

They must also be made fully acquainted with the rules and reasons for, and the paramount importance of, March Discipline

Definite steps must be taken to instil into all officers the realization of their responsibilities as officers. A special point is to be made of their behaviour on all occasions, more especially when detached from their units.

4. The Divisional Commander wishes the Field Artillery to carry out as much training as possible in manoeuvre and open warfare tactics, march discipline and steady drill, (including gun drill with open sights,) on the general lines laid down above.
5. The Divisional Engineers and the Pioneers are to carry out training on the general lines laid down in paras. 2 and 3, together with such technical training as can be arranged by the C.R.E. and C.O. Pioneer Battalion, respectively, as time may allow.
6. Mounted Units and transport personnel are to arrange for training in stable management and horsemastership. Watering and feeding, stable picquets, etc., are to be carried out under proper supervision.
7. Games and Recreational Training are to be freely indulged in, under proper organization and supervision.
8. All formations and units will submit programmes of work contemplated, giving details as to subject, time, and place, to higher formations sufficiently early to enable Commanders and Staffs to visit units when at work.



( 3 )

9. The Divisional Commander intends, so far as time allows, to carry out inspections of all Units in the Division at an early date.

*D. Lavarack.*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution:

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	( 22 )
12th " " "	( 17 )
15th " " "	( 17 )
4th " Div. Arty.	( 20 )
4th " M. G. Bn.	( 8 )
C. R. E.	( 4 )
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	( 5 )
A. D. H. S.	( 5 )
4th Div. Signal Coy.	( 4 )
AUST. Corps.	( 1 )





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K 165

# FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Administrative Instructions No. 86.

Subject:- DIVISIONAL PACK TRANSPORT TROOP.

1. The Divisional Pack Transport Troop will be reformed immediately.
2. The source from which animals will be drawn and the organisation and establishment are shown on tables hereunder.
3. Lieut. R. WITHERS, 4th Aust. Div. Train will Command the Pack Transport Troop.
4. Sections will as far as possible be used to supply their own units, but will at all times be available for general purposes at the discretion of the Pack Transport Troop Commander.
5. Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Sections will mobilize at I. 57.3. central, at 9 am., on 28th June 1918. No. 4 Section will for the present remain with units but be held available at short notice.
6. The O.C., Pack Transport Troop will arrange with Divisional Headquarters to complete Packs and Saddles required to one per animal.
7. Picqueting gear etc., will be furnished by units.
8. Trench Shelters, Cooking Utensils etc., will be provided by units.
9. All demands for transport will be made in writing on O.C., P.T.T. in advance daily. Standing orders will not be received. Clear information as to points of loading and delivery must be given in the demand, and destination will not be changed except with the authority of O.C., P.T.T.
10. Administrative Instructions No. 65 of 4th August 1917 are cancelled.

Headquarters,  
4th Aust. Div.  
27th June 1918.

Lieut-Colonel.  
A.A. & Q.M.G.

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL PACK TRANSPORT TROOP.

### Organisation and Establishment.

Organisation. The troop will be organised into 4 Sections, viz.,

No. 1 Section	4th Aust. Inf. Bde.
No. 2 "	12th " "
No. 3 "	13th " "
No. 4 "	Divisional Troops.

### Establishment.

Off.	O.R.		
1		Officer Commanding.	A Captain or Senior Subaltern. (Div. Train)
3		Section Commanders ) Nos. 1, 2 and 3.)	One Subaltern from each Unit.
1		Sec. Commander No. 4	One Subaltern from Div. Train.
	1	Troop Sgt. Major.	W.O. from Div. Train.
	1	Acting Q.M. Sgt.	from Div. Train.
	1	Corporal	"
	3	Corporals Sections ) Nos. 1, 2 and 3. )	1 from each unit.
	1	Corporal Section No. 4	from Div. Train.
	5	Batmen	1 per Officer.
	132	Drivers	1 per animal.
	2	Shoeing smiths	from Div. Train.

P.T.O.



Establishment (contd).

Off.	O.R.		
5	146	Brought forward.	
	1	Saddler	from Div. Train.
	8	Cooks and Assistants	2 per Section.
	4	Privates for Sanitary Duties	1 from each unit and 1 from Pnr. Bn. for No. 4 Section.

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FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL PACK TRANSPORT TROOP.

Source from which Animals are drawn.

Unit.	Pack Animals.	No. of Animals per Battalion.	Total Animals.
No. 1 Section	Per Battalion		
4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	2 spare L.D. Horses		
	1 Pack Animal.		
	6 Pack Animals (Ammunition.)	9	36
No. 2 Section.			
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.	ditto.	9	27
No. 3 Section.			
13th Aust. Inf. Bde.	ditto.	9	27
No. 4 Section.	Spare L.D. Horses	6	
4th Aust. Pnr. Bn.	Pack Animals	15	
4th Field Coy. A.E.	do	7	
12th " " "	do	7	
13th " " "	do	7	42

TOTAL. 132.

Horses and Saddlery for Officers and N.C.Os. will be supplied by units concerned.

Off.	O.R.	
1	1	Officer Commanding.
1	1	Section Commanders.
1	1	Sec. Commander No. 4.
1	1	Troop Sgt. Major.
1	1	Acting Q.M. Sgt.
1	1	Corporal.
1	1	Corporals (Sections).
1	1	Sec. 1, 2 and 3.
1	1	General Section No. 4 from Div. Train.
1	1	Boy Officer.
1	1	Boy Soldier.
1	1	Shooting Smith.



## 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## Administrative Instructions No. 88.

BACILLARY DYSENTERY has occurred among the French Troops in the new sector and is especially prevalent in BOVES. The strictest attention to sanitation becomes more than ever an urgent necessity. The principal agents in the spread of this disease are Food, Fingers, Flies and Water, all being equally dangerous.

Commanding Officers must realise that the occurrence of this disease among the troops under their command means negligence on their part and that of their subordinates in enforcing Sanitary and Water discipline. The closest co-operation between unit headquarters and Medical Officers is essential to prevent this dread disease gaining a foothold and becoming a menace to the lives of our men.

Necessary orders (and frequent inspections to be certain that these are obeyed) will be at once issued to ensure that the following preventative measures are carried out :-

- (1) No uncooked vegetables are to be eaten.
- (2) Scrupulous cleanliness must be the rule in all cookhouses, butchers' shops, messes and the personnel employed there. Provision for washing of hands must be made.
- (3) Food must not be left uncovered at any time.
- (4) All receptacles and utensils must be cleansed with boiling water.
- (5) Fly-proof meat safes must be constructed.
- (6) Strict water discipline must be enforced, all water being boiled before use for drinking purposes.
- (7) Every means must be used to destroy and prevent the breeding of Flies.
- (8) Latrines must be fly-proof.
- (9) Horse manure must be buried or burnt daily.

It must be remembered that Staging Troops are more liable to laxity in Sanitary and Water Discipline. All Officers must realise their responsibilities and do their utmost to prevent their men becoming infected through carelessness.

Headquarters,  
30th July, 1918.



*R. Brown*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
A.A. & Q.M.G.,  
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.



## AUSTRALIAN CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 800.

## C L A I M S.

The following instructions are issued for the guidance of Divisional Commanders in their handling of Claims. -

## A. Under normal conditions.

(a). The aim should be to ensure that the method adopted will enable the Claims to be expeditiously investigated, render the greatest justice to the Claimants, and at the same time limit to a minimum the travelling about, outside the Divisional Area of the respective Divisional Representatives.

(b). When Claims are found to be fair and reasonable they should be settled at once. Whether they are to be eventually met from the Funds of the Public or of the units concerned does not justify a postponement in the settlements. The Divisional Commander of the unit involved can subsequently decide whether the payment should be made under G.R.O. 763 or G.R.O. 1036. Only when it is necessary to enable a D.C.O. to arrive at a just decision or to prevent duplication of payments should the Claim be sent to the responsible units first for a report, where such action leads to delay in settlement.

(i). Every effort should be made to induce the French Inhabitants to submit claims immediately they arise, the local MAIRE and through him, not to the Claims Commission, but to representative of French Mission of the Division on the spot.

(ii) To prevent delay and accumulation of claims, arrangements should be made with the MAIRE of a return of Claims each week and where no Claims have arisen, a Nil return will be insisted upon.

(iii) In handing over a Divisional Area to an incoming Division, all Claims, if possible, should be settled by the outgoing D.C.O. before departure. Steps should be taken by the French Mission, prior to the move, to warn the Inhabitants, through the MAIRE, to send in at once, all Claims to the MAIRE. Units will endeavour to settle these claims direct.

(iv) When Claims are paid by units direct, MAIRES and D.C.Os. should always be notified, to prevent a further payment on the same score.

(v) When the units have been unable to arrive at a settlement, full reports should be attached to the Claims before forwarding them to the D.C.O.

(vi) Only Claims submitted within 12 hours of the departure of the unit concerned need as a rule be considered. Divisional Commanders must decide whether special circumstances justify the consideration of Claims submitted later than 12 hours.

(vii) Claims will be regarded as Area Responsibilities, that is claims independently of how or when they have arisen, will be investigated by the D.C.O. of the Division on the spot.

(viii) Where a Claim is being investigated by a local D.C.O., it should be carried through to completion and not referred to another D.C.O. for payment, because it appears that one of the units of the latter Division may be responsible, but only for prior or subsequent report, or refund from the unit concerned.

(ix) A D.C.O. should not be called upon to handle claims outside his own Divisional Area unless he has personally investigated them, except to obtain a refund or report from one of these - his own units.

(x) Where refunds have been received by a D.C.O. on Claims not settled by him, he will inform the Division that compensated the Claimant, that this refund has been received and credited to his Imprest Account.

## B. Under the abnormal conditions created by intense enemy pressure, a number of Claims are received in which Inhabitants property alleged to have been taken by troops.

(a). As a rule these are dealt with from a disciplinary point of view by the higher formations (Corps and Armies) and investigated by the Provost Branch and Gendarmerie. On no account should any action be taken by Divisional Claims Officers which might delay or prejudice this course, and these cases cannot be considered from the Claims point of view until the disciplinary aspect has been examined. Then, however, the damage can-

(D 70)



not be brought home to any particular formation, and when absolute proof of the loss is difficult or impossible, Divisional Claims Officers should adopt the following procedure:-

(b) A report should be made to the Claims Commission, giving all evidence procurable, and stating as far as possible :-

- (i) Date or period of damage.
- (ii). Whether the Claimant was absent or present at the time of the damage.
- (iii). Whether the Claimant has evidence that British Troops are responsible.
- (iv) Whether the Claimant brought the damage to notice.
- (v). What evidence the Claimant can produce of the existence of property and its value.
- (vi). Whether the Area in which the damage took place has been evacuated by Civilians.
- (vii). Whether troops other than British occupied the Commune.
- (viii) What salvage operations, if any, took place in the Commune. It is very important to ascertain this in view of extensive salvage operations that were carried on in various Communes by French and British Military Authorities, and also by French Civil Authorities.

(c). All these cases will eventually be dealt with by the Claims Commission on a general basis applicable to all claims of this class arising within certain dates and specified areas.

(d). Information may assist in establishing dates during which damage of this kind was frequent in certain localities or Communes, and state ments of the general conditions under which it took place, greatly assists the Commission.

(e). Some of these Claims may come within scope of G.R.O. 763 and although units cannot be identified, British responsibility may be clearly established. In this case they can be settled by the Divisional Claims Officer at the discretion of the Divisional Commander.

(f). Subject to the above, the investigation and adjustment of Claims should continue as heretofore, and G.R.O. 1036 should be strictly enforced as far as possible.

(g). In notifying the Claims Commission of payments made, Divisional Claims Officers should mark all adjustments under G.R.O. 1036 "Recovered from Unit".

(h). If Claimants are absent and payment is not possible their claims should be referred to the Claims Commission with Divisional Claims Officer's assessment for ultimate settlement. When such payments are to be made by the Claims Commission under G.R.O. 1036, a statement should accompany the vouchers that the money has been recovered and placed to the Public Credit.

(i). On no account should payment be withheld from persons entitled to be paid for damage evidently committed by British Troops on the ground that the Commune is under shell fire.

Claims from Areas now occupied by the enemy should be held up until some communication is received from the Claimant, when, if the Claim is admitted, it can be adjusted. In cases in which no evidence can now be obtained, the Claimant should be informed, that under the circumstances it is not possible to proceed. A similar procedure to that defined under B para (c) will eventually be applied to in such cases.

(signed) E.A. CARRUTHERS.  
Brigadier-General.  
D. A. & Q.M.G.  
AUSTRALIAN CORPS.



# MAP "C" (SECRET)

## 211 MACHINE GUNS, "A" DIV. SECTOR


Ref. Sheets G2 D.S.W. & S.E., Scale 1/20000.

British M.Gs. shown thus: ○

French M.Gs. shown thus: ○→

DATE: -24/7/18

Note: "A" Div. Guns colored Red.





Appendix

K

(T35032) "C" PLAN 211

371 ANCHORAGE  
AUTODIAL WITH H. CIVIL ENGINEERING  
ONCE ONLY ONCE, 22.5 MILES - 20000 YDS  
AND 1000 YDS - 2000 YDS  
ONCE ONLY ONCE, 22.5 MILES - 20000 YDS  
AND 1000 YDS - 2000 YDS  
ONCE ONLY ONCE, 22.5 MILES - 20000 YDS  
AND 1000 YDS - 2000 YDS

