

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/74/32 Part 2

**Title:** 57th Infantry Battalion

September 1918 Appendix 27



AWM4-23/74/32PART2

57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

HISTORY OF OPERATIONS

29th September to  
1st October 1918.

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57th BATTALION.

CONTENTS.

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BATTALION ORDER NO 9/101.

Ref. 62 B N.W. 1/20;000.

28. 9. 1918.

1. On Z Day at an hour to be notified the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade acting as part of the Australian Corps to which the II American Corps is affiliated, will attack the enemy's positions in the HINDENBURG line in the sector NAUROY - GOUY. The attack will be carried out in two phases?
  - (a) The 30th American Division on the right and the 27th American Division on the left are to attack at ZERO and capture the Green Line.
  - (b) The 5th Australian Division on the right and the 3rd Australian Division on the left are to pass through the AMERICAN Divisions in open warfare formation and proceed to the RED Line.
2. Objectives and boundaries are as shewn on the maps already issued.
3. Dispositions:
  - (a) 57th Battalion on the right, 59th Battalion on the left: 58th Battalion in close support in the centre.
  - (b) Attached to 57th Battalion:
    - 2 MARK V Tanks.
    - 2 Whippet Tanks.
    - 1/2 Section Light Horse.
    - 1 Section Field Artillery.
  - (c) The 8th Australian Infantry Brigade (29th Battalion) will be on the RIGHT of 15th Australian Infantry Brigade. The 11th Australian Infantry Brigade (44th Battalion) will be on the left of 15th Brigade.
4. 57th Battalion will arrive at the START line by 9 am. The Battalion will be disposed on a TWO Company front: "A" Company RIGHT: "B" Company LEFT in the front line: "C" Company RIGHT: "D" Company LEFT in the second line. The Battalion will occupy trenches in G 2 A and C. Battalion Headquarters will be about G 2 C 10.90.
5. The operations as far as they effect the 57th Battalion will be divided into stages:
  - STAGE 1. From the START line to the GREEN line - At 9 am the battalion will move within the boundaries indicated on map already issued in an EASTERLY direction. Movement will be by Platoon Columns. Battalion Headquarters will move with the second wave. The width of ground covered by the Battalion during this stage will be approximately 800 yards, approximate time table for various stages is issued separately.
  - STAGE 2. From the GREEN line to ESTREES - JONCOURT road. The battalion will cross the GREEN Line at 11am. Formation Two waves of TWO lines each either in platoon columns or extended according to the opposition being encountered. At this stage sections of the 58th Battalion will have been interpolated between 57th and 59th Battalions. Two MARK V tanks will have been guided to the head of the column and will thenceforth operate in the lead. 57th Battalion will swing SOUTH EAST skirting ESTREES. 58th Battalion with FOUR Tanks attached will attack and mop up ESTREES. The Southern edge of the village must be marked to permit of our passage round the southern end.

CONTD

SECRET.PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS NO 1  
accompanying  
BATTALION ORDER NO 9/101.26th September 1918.SIGNALS.

1. The only light signals to be employed will be:
  - (a) S.O.S.: No 32 Rifle Grenade: Three REDS.
  - (b) Success Signal: No 32 Rifle Grenade: Three WHITES.

SECURITY.

1. It is of the first importance that secrecy should be observed prior to all operations in order to effect surprise. The necessity for secrecy should be impressed on all ranks.
2. The leaflet "Keep your mouth shut" will be pasted in the paybooks of all Australian personnel and will be issued to each individual American soldier.
3. Any Officer, N.C.O. or man found discussing the operation in public or giving details to any person not immediately concerned will be severely dealt with.
4. No orders will be given and no reference will be made to the operation on any telephone line forward of Divisional Headquarters of line Divisions.
5. The greatest care will be taken by Officers whose duties require that they should make reconnaissances in forward areas that no map is produced except under cover.

CONTACT AEROPLANES.

1. It is essential that EVERY MAN should know when a contact aeroplane is desirous of ascertaining the position of our troops and how to communicate with it. Company Commanders will ensure that all ranks are informed (a) When the contact machine is likely to require signals.  
(b) The means by which our position is communicated to the machine.
2. All ranks will at once be provided with tin discs. These discs will be secured to the reverse side of the Small Box Respirator and will be flashed in the direction of the contact aeroplane when that machine calls for signals by a succession of "As" on its Klaxon horn.
3. Red ground flares will be issued and these will be lit by front line troops for the same purpose as the discs are flashed when the aeroplane calls.

COMMUNICATION.

1. Message rockets will be issued as soon as available. The signalling Officer will ensure that Company and Headquarters Signal personnel are acquainted with their use.
2. A series of code calls for employment between Infantry, using the Popham panel, and contact aeroplanes has been issued to the Signalling Officer. Those calls already in use will be retained.

Cont'd.

The following are being issued :

- (a) 1/20,000 special Operations sheet for distribution to all Officers.
- (b) 1/20,000 map message form for distribution down to N.C.O's
- (c) 1/20,000 barrage map for distribution to Company Commanders.
- (d) 1/40,000 organisation map.
- (e) A mosaic photograph of the Divisional Front, squared and freely annotated for distribution to Company Commanders.
- (f) Oblique photographs of the Divisional front for distribution to all Officers and senior N.C.O's.

Company Commanders must ensure that these maps and photographs are freely circulated to N.C.O's so that the achievement of their tasks may be facilitated.

BATTALION INTELLIGENCE POLICE.

1. One German speaker and two searchers will be allotted to the battalion for use as follows:
  - (a) GERMAN SPEAKER (1) To secure immediate identifications quickly so that Divisional Headquarters may be informed speedily of enemy units on the battle front.
    - (11) Secure immediate information for the battalion Commander as regards dispositions, assembly positions orders for counter attack, etc.
    - (111) To be in charge of the two searchers, to separate important documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and convey information of moment to the Battalion Commander.
  - (b) TWO SEARCHERS. The two searchers under the German speaker systematically search the battlefield, enemy positions, suspected Headquarters, dead, etc., for papers, documents, maps, etc., have them packed in sand bags and returned to rear through the Battalion Intelligence Officer. This personnel will carry torches and besides rifles or revolvers, some Mills bombs for use on enemy dugouts.

PRISONERS.

1. (a) Searching. Officers and N.C.O's will be searched as soon as possible after their capture, by an officer or N.C.O. and all documents taken from them sent back to Battalion Headquarters.
  - (b) Prisoners other than officers and N.C.O's will be searched on their arrival at the Corps Cage.
  - (c) All ranks must understand that a prisoners paybook, identity disc and personal belongings should not be taken from him. All escorts and guards must be warned to take special precautions to prevent prisoners from destroying papers.
2. Separation of Prisoners. Care will be taken that officers, N.C.O's and privates are separated from one another at once and are not allowed to communicate. Prisoners who have been

CONTD.

interrogated should not be allowed to mix with those who have not yet been examined.

2. It is important that when prisoners are sent back, information regarding the locality of capture should accompany them.
3. It is most important that no officer or N.C.O. except those only authorised be allowed to interrogate or converse with prisoners.
4. Prisoners should be sent to rear with as little delay as possible. Care must be taken that too many men are not employed on escort duty.

#### IDENTIFICATIONS.

The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily as possible cannot be too strongly impressed on all concerned. It is essential that the identifications and locality in which obtained should be sent to Battalion Headquarters as soon as secured.



LIEUT.  
ADJT. 57th BATTALION.A.I.F.

PRELIMINARY \* INSTRUCTIONS NO 2  
 accompanying  
BATTALION ORDER NO. 9/101.

26th September 1918.

INFORMATION REQUIRED.

The following information is required by Battalion Headquarters during the operation:

- (a) Position of our troops.
- (b) Position and strength of the enemy.
- (c) Nature and position of enemy defences.
- (d) Nature and direction of hostile shelling.
- (e) Identification of German units.

EXTRA WATER BOTTLES AND IRON RATIONS.

All ranks will carry two water bottles and two iron rations. The extra bottle and ration will be issued later.

It must be clearly impressed upon all ranks that both iron rations are emergency rations and will not on any account be consumed without the permission of an Officer.

CONCEALMENT OF MOVEMENT.

Movement in the forward area must be reduced to an absolute minimum. Officers will explain to their men the reasons for restricted movement. Great care must be exercised regarding lights etc. at night.

LOOTING.

Absolutely no looting of enemy dead is to be permitted. The only people authorised to search bodies are the Intelligence personnel.

DISPOSITIONS.

Exact Company dispositions should be sent in to Battalion Headquarters as soon as possible after the final objective has been reached so that an S.O.S. line may be given.

MINES AND TRAPS.

All ranks are to be warned of the need of caution in respect to mines and booby traps.

*J. B. [Signature]*

LIEUT.  
 ADJT. 57th BATTALION. A. I. F.

SECRET.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS NO 3  
 accompanying  
 BATTALION ORDER NO 9/101.

27th SEPTEMBER 1918

CORPS ARTILLERY AND TANKS.

Particulars regarding the co-operation of Artillery and Tanks on the Corps Front have already been communicated to Company Commanders. This information will be passed on to all ranks.

ANTI GAS.

The enemy may try to render all dugouts unusable as he retires by exploding Yellow Cross shell in them. During an advance it is impossible to bring up cylinders of Chlorine, the use of which is the best means of neutralizing Yellow Cross Gas. In the circumstances the best method will be to keep fires burning in the dugout for some hours and place the dugout out of bounds. The dugout should not be occupied until it has been declared fit for occupation by the Brigade Gas Officer.

LAND MINES

The following reports on mining in German back areas have been received:

- (a) LE CATALET: Mines have been placed in houses and "La Rue Nationale" is mined one Km. south of LE CATALET Church.
- (b) All the wells in the localities neighbouring on ST QUENTIN have also been mined.

TANKS.

4 Mark V and two Whippet tanks have been allotted to 57th Battalion.

ARTILLERY.

One section of Field Artillery has been allotted to 57th Battalion.

BARRAGE:HEAVY ARTILLERY.

From 11 am heavy artillery will not engage targets East of the north and south grid line separating B 19 and 20. From 12 Noon it will lift 1000 yards east: at 1 pm 1000 east again and so on. Great care must be exercised by Company Commanders in the regulation of their advance so that our own troops do not walk into this barrage.

CAVALRY.

Cavalry will cross the start line at 2 pm to be in close co-operation with the 8th Australian Infantry Brigade on our right.

ENEMY ARTILLERY.

Enemy guns are reported to be in GOUY HOUROY and ESTREES.

INFORMATION.

It is of the first importance that speedy information regarding enemy forces and dispositions be sent to Battalion Headquarters. Care should be taken that the time of any occurrence is mentioned in the text of messages.

*J. J. [Signature]*  
 LIEUT.  
 ADJT. 57TH BATTALION. A.I.F.



PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION NO 4.

accompanying  
BATTALION ORDER NO 9/101.

28. 9. 18.

1. Ammunition, Bombs, Signals, etc.

The following will be issued today:

- 1 extra Bandolier S.A.A. per man.
- 1 extra water bottle per man.
- 1 extra emergency Ration per man.
- 8 Wirecutters per Platoon.
- 7 S.O.S. Signals per Company.
- 6 Success Signals per Company.
- 60 Ground Flares per Company.
- 3 Message Rockets per Company.

In addition each Company will carry as many picks and shovels as possible.

2. LIAISON.

O.C. "B" Company will detail one Officer to report to Headquarters 119 American Regiment before 7 pm tonight for liaison duty. He will take with him two runners and will keep these Headquarters informed of the situation. He will rejoin his Company as the Battalion passes over the Green Line.

3. APPROACH MARCH TO START LINE.

Companies will pass the starting point ( the HIGSON QUARRIES in L 10A ) at 7 15 am on zero day and proceed on a two Company frontage as already allotted, by Platoon columns via routes already reconnoitred. Company Commanders must be responsible for judging of the necessity for ordering men to temporarily take cover if exposed to heavy shelling. In the event of casualties, wounded will be placed under the best cover available but the march of the column must not be delayed.

4. WOUNDED.

Special measures must be taken to prevent tanks from running over wounded. Places where wounded are lying should be indicated by a rifle with bayonet fixed thrust into the ground and with a piece of white rag attached.

5. MINES AND TRAPS.

Warn all ranks to beware of mined dugouts and to be careful of mined trenches. Minenwerfer are sometimes buried in trenches with a board resting on the instantaneous fuses.

6. TRENCH SHELTERS.

The trench shelters at present on issue to Companies must be carefully collected prior to moving out and placed with the Company blankets in the charge of CQMS's until collected by the Q.M. The Q.M. will arrange to collect all blankets, cookers, trench shelters, etc. as soon as possible after the Battalion moves out.

7. MEDICAL. The R.M.O. will remain at rear of the column throughout the advance.

*J. B. [Signature]*  
LIEUT.  
ADJT. 57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

28. 9. 1918.

The 58th Battalion will endeavour to supply troops for this purpose, but "B" Company will be responsible for rendering what assistance is necessary in this operation.

The 57th Battalion during this stage will be operating in portion of 8th Brigade area.

"A" Company and "D" Company will proceed to the Eastern ESTREES - JONCOURT road. "D" Company passing through "B" Company will occupy the Western road. Battalion Headquarters at this stage will be located about H 2 D 6.4.

STAGE.3 The attack on the BEUREVOIR - FONSSOMME LINE will be carried out by three Companies. "A" on the RIGHT: "C" in the CENTRE; "D" on the LEFT. For this purpose "D" Company will side slip to the NORTH until its LEFT flank rests about H 3 A Central. "C" Company will move from the Western road to the Eastern road. "B" Company will by this time have occupied the Western road. "A" Company will move outpreceded by a tank to the direction of SWISS COTTAGE. "C" Company will move out as soon as "A" Company is clear of the road. "D" Company will move as soon as "C" Coy. is clear. "B" Company will move to the Eastern road as soon as "A" Company has moved off. The RIGHT flank moving first. Battalion Headquarters will move with "B" Company to the bend in the sunken road H 3 C 6.1.

STAGE 4 Capture and consolidation of the RED line - including capture of WIANCOURT. The exploitation as far as the RED line must be undertaken without delay. The method of attack cannot be laid down with precision and will depend upon the situation at this moment. "A" Company will move forward and take up a position along the RED line facing RAMICOURT with left flank on sunken road leading to SWISS COTTAGE. "C" Company from that point 600 yards NORTH. One tank will work round SWISS COTTAGE Hill on the NORTH side of it; the other will work round the southern outskirts of WIANCOURT. "C" Company must provide flanking protection as the Company passes WIANCOURT whilst "D" Company advances on WIANCOURT passing through and mopping it up. "B" Company as soon as the attack on the RED Line has commenced will move forward and occupy that part of the BEUREVOIR - FONSSOMME road which runs through H 4 C. "B" Company will here await orders and be prepared either to support the attack on WIANCOURT or occupy any portion of the RED Line.

#### ACTION OF TANKS.

In crossing the BEUREVOIR - FONSSOMME Line, tanks will deposit 8 boxes of S.A.A.

Upon the arrival of the Battalion at the RED Line and capture of WIANCOURT tanks will rally. The four tanks allotted to the 58th Battalion for the capture of ESTREES will also be available to assist in the capture of the RED line should their duties permit.

4.30 pm.

*for*  
C.O. 57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

1:20,000

NOTE CHANGE OF COLOUR.  
Enemy Trenches in Blue.

TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION  
RECEIVED UP TO 19.9.18



Information from Captured  
German Maps printed in Red.  
(EXCEPT DETAIL NAMES)

- REFERENCE
- Proposed Trenches
  - Wire Entanglements or other Obstacle
  - Normal Gauge, Double Gauge
  - Railways Metro Gauge Proposed
  - Dumps, Stores or Depots - Supply Ammunition
  - Signal Posts
  - Gun Emplacements
  - Machine Gun and direction of fire
  - Tramway Mortar
  - A.A.
  - Headquarters
  - Division
  - Other Units
  - Railhead
  - Telephone and Telegraph Centres
  - Dem.
  - Gasworks
  - Signal Station
  - Divisional Boundary
  - Corps Boundary
  - Other Units

**LEGEND**

- CORPS BOUNDARIES
- DIVISIONAL BOUNDARIES
- ARTILLERY START LINE
- INFANTRY FORMING UP LINE
- FIRST OBJECTIVE
- FRANK EXPLOITATION OF 1<sup>ST</sup> OBJECTIVE
- SECOND OBJECTIVE
- EXPLOITATION OF 2<sup>ND</sup> OBJECTIVE

APPENDIX 27

~~Ady~~ Wiancourt



APPENDIX 27

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APPENDIX

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Part of sheet  
on B

4-OCT 18

57th. Battalion A.I.F.



BATTALION ORDER NO 9/108.

Ref. 62 B. NW. 1/20,000.

1st October 1918.

1. At zero hour on the morning of 1st October the 5th Australian Division will advance from its present line and seize and consolidate along the line from A 22 Central to H 15 Central.
2. The 15th Australian Infantry Brigade will be on the left, the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade operating on the right.
3. The 57th Battalion has been allotted frontage as follows:  
From A 29 C 2.4 on the left to G 5 D 5.8 on the right. The road to CABARET WOOD FARM is exclusive to 57th Battalion and INCLUSIVE to 58th Battalion. The CABARET WOOD FARM road is the left boundary. The right boundary is a line running from the intersection of the railway and trench G 5 D 5.8 to A 30 D 0.0.
4. At 5.30 am on the morning of Oct. 1st Companies will be in position in the LE CATALET - NAUROY line in the following order from RIGHT to LEFT:
 

"A" Company	"
"B" "	"
"C" "	"
"B" "	"

 within the limits set out in para 3.
5. Each Company will occupy 250 yards.
6. One Company of Tanks is attached to the Division for the purpose of dealing with the maze of trenches west of ESTREES. The tanks will approach round the Southern edge of BELLICOURT and proceed through G 5 and G 6.
7. The 59th Battalion will operate on the RIGHT flank of 57th Battalion and the 58th Battalion will operate on the LEFT flank.
8. (a) A barrage will be put down at 6 am 200 yards beyond the start line, - and will lift 100 yards every 3 (THREE) minutes.  
(b) When the troops have reached their objective a protective barrage 500 yards beyond will remain to cover consolidation.  
(c) The extent of the advance for 57th Battalion is approximately 900 yards.
9. At zero plus 3 minutes troops will commence the advance, each Company advancing in two waves. The second wave will not pass through the first wave but will remain behind at a distance of 100 to 200 yards unless the first wave require support to enable it to advance. "B" Company will detail a strong platoon to attack and capture CABARET WOOD FARM. This portion of the attack will be in conjunction with attack by similar party of 58th Battalion who will operate on the left.
10. Arrived at the line of objective the battalion will dig in in two lines about 400 yards apart. Advantage will be taken of the configuration of the ground so that the final line will be a series of posts along the general line of the objective given.
11. In the event of a counter attack driving us from our position before we are properly established the line of main resistance will be the LE CATALET - NAUROY Trench.
12. COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (1) Two relay runner posts will be established.
    - (a) At "C" Company's present Headquarters.
    - (b) At Lamp Signal Station G 4 B 45.50. The Signalling Officer will be established at "C" Company's present Headquarters. He will endeavour to run lines forward to Companies from this point. He will regulate all runner traffic forward


CONTD

266 and rearward. Companies will send their messages to the Signal Officer at "C" Company's present Headquarters.

(II) Each Company will detail one runner to report to the Signalling Officer at C Company's present Headquarters at 5.30 am today.

13. (a) The location of the objective can be gauged from the position of CABARET COPSE or from the fact that CABARET WOOD FARM is half way.
- (b) Troops must be impressed with the necessity for keeping close up to the barrage.
- (c) All Bombs, S.A.A. etc., will be carried. S.O.S. Signals also should be taken. Picks and shovels will be required.
14. Zero hour will be 6 AM today 1st October.

A C K N O W L E D G E.



LIEUT.  
ADJT 257th BATTALION. A.I.F.

1.43 am.

Issued to all Companies.

Ref. 62 B NW 1/20,000.

1. 10; 1918.

1. The Battalion will be relieved tonight by units of the 2nd Australian Division.
2. Prior to the relief the following adjustments will be made in the positions of Companies.
3. "B" Company will as soon as it is dusk move forward and establish a line of outposts on the GRANDCOURT + ESTREES Road (B 19 c and 25 B) "D" Company will establish a second line of posts from BANK COPSE to FOLEMPRISE FARM.  
"A" Company will remain in present location keeping in touch with "C" Company.  
"C" Company will take over such posts as are vacated by "B" Company on the left and will also keep in touch with "A" Company on the right.
4. These moves will be accomplished immediately on receipt of this order.
5. On relief Companies will proceed to G 3 and G 4 and occupy our positions to be allocated as follows:  
"B" Company and "D" Company will occupy the Canal Bank. "A" Company will occupy trench running N and S G 3 B and D. "C" Company will occupy trench in rear running N and S through G 3 A and C.
6. Companies will make their way as best they can to these positions as soon as relieved.
7. Battalion Headquarters will be situated in the same location as yesterday Report arrival when this vicinity is reached.
8. Rations will be available at the ration Dump same location as last night at 10 pm tonight. Each Company will arrange to collect its own quota.

*J. B. Lawrence*

LIEUT.


ADJT. 57th BATTALION. A. I. F.

6.45 pm.

57th. Battalion. A.I.F.  
DISPOSITIONS 10pm

1 OCT 18

PARTS OF 62°N.E., 62°S.E., 62°N.W., 62°S.W.



MESSAGES:

DESPATCHED AND RECEIVED

29 SEP 18

A B C D E

29 SEP 18

owing to fog we  
have been obliged to  
follow the line of  
telegraph posts running  
into BELLICOURT. I am  
going to advance to the  
line of the canal north  
of Bellicourt. Par 1000 at  
grid line between 3 & 4  
where trench & contour line  
cut the grid. (G 4 A 0-3)  
? 3000m

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29 SEP 18

Hqrs 15 Aust Inf Bde.

9.50 am. We are in  
heads moving N and S  
through G3 A 7.0.

58 Bn has just passed us  
on our left.

Fog has been very dense  
but lifted for about  
15 minutes at 9.25 am.

but is now extremely dense  
again. Our casualties include  
two officers & about 20  
other ranks.

9.50 am

57 Battalion

29 SEP 18

15 Aust Inf Bde

9.50 am 29.15 am

We are at present dug  
in on the WEST side

of the canal bank in  
G4 R. 58 Bn is on

our left. The Americans  
are held up in front

of us about 200 yards.  
and enemy is holding

out on our front at  
least in the LE CATNET

NAUROY line. The Americans

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APPENDIX

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29 SEP 18

Do not seem able to  
make any headway -

57 Battalion

J. P. Gammell  
Lieut

Ham

29-9-18

29 SEP 18

57 Battalion

Also 29th day

Ham: Tanks are in  
use of us. Both of  
ours have been knocked  
out. The two tanks of  
57 Bn are intact. ~~and~~  
~~are~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~moment~~  
the tanks are

J. P. Gammell  
Lieut

H. Gammell  
57 Bn

29 SEP 18

Hqrs  
15 Area Sup Bde

// - 1300

After our very light report  
no sign of 59 Bn -

The Bn are on left of  
5th and we have report  
no one on their left

J. B. ...  
A. P. ...

// - 1500

29-9-1918

29 SEP 18

Hqrs  
15 Area Sup Bde

A. S. O. 29th Bn

~~15~~ - 11-49 am. Liaison  
reports 29 Bn on  
our right with Hqrs  
at G10 B 2.4 -

pending further  
instructions we are  
putting Canal round  
in a state of  
defence: facturing up  
the americans many  
of whom had become  
separated from their



29 SEP 18

units in the fog and getting in touch with the situation forward. We are experiencing MG fire from high points to the North. MG fire is almost enfilading Canal embankment.

I am getting in touch with Col. Wilson personally to discuss situation. I cannot get any word of 59 Bn so far - Can you tell me if they have

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29 SEP 18

Get reached his line.

Co  
57 Battalion

G 4 A 5.7

J. P. G. [Signature]

17-15 pm

APPENDIX 27/100

Aggr  
58 bn

29 SEP 19

Colonel Daily would be  
good if Col. Watson  
could come over to  
his Hqs at G4A53.  
He wishes to discuss  
the situation.

J. B. Williams

to

12 noon 29 9-18

29 SEP 18

Hqs 15 at Bde

also 29th and

a 77 battery firing  
from CABARET WOOD  
FARM causing  
considerable damage  
reported to me by our  
right Coy at 12-5 pm

J. B. Williams  
Lieut

12 7 pm  
59 Battalion

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APPENDIX 27/181

29 SEP 18

A B D Coy.

Please send forward  
reconnaissance party -  
See that they have  
maps and draw all  
possible of the  
situation - endeavour  
locate the American  
front line

W. J. [Signature]

12:50 pm 29-9-18

266

29 SEP 18

~~W.~~

A. Company.

Get as far as G 4 d g. 5.

On left of NAUROV. (about 200 yds)  
5 Germans seen giving themselves up to  
Yambo We are unable to move at present  
as they have our position covered with  
machine gun fire, firing from the  
direction of CABARET FARM, which is  
occupied by machine gun posts.  
Enemy occupying trench running from  
N.E. from G 4 B. 5.3 to CABARET FARM.  
am trying to push on further  
We appear to be held up from the  
direction of the above FARM

J. Keene [Signature]

2 pm 29.9.18.

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Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of :	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Date.....
At .....m.			.....Service.	From .....
To .....m.				By.....
By .....			(Signature of "Franking Officer")	

TO { 3 57 Bu 58 Bu 59 Bu

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

Instructions recd from  
 Ant Corps and  
 you are to push on  
 at once using all  
 available tanks.  
 Carry on Americans  
 with you as you  
 get through the  
 am arranging for

From \_\_\_\_\_  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time \_\_\_\_\_  
 The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
 Censor. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of :	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Date.....
At .....m.			.....Service.	From .....
To .....m.				By.....
By .....			(Signature of "Franking Officer")	

TO {

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

phone to you and  
 Cable wagon for  
 reached Bellicourt.  
 please cooperate  
 mutually and  
 arrange zero time and  
 I will arrange  
 baggage when and  
 where you want

From \_\_\_\_\_  
 Place \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time \_\_\_\_\_  
 The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
 Censor. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name \_\_\_\_\_

266

APPENDIX

27 103

286

APPENDIX

27 104

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Date.....
.....	At .....	.....	.....	From .....
.....	To .....	.....	.....	By.....
.....	By .....	(Signature of "Franking Officer")	.....	

29 SEP 18

TO { 3

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

it. aaaa added all  
 Bns.

From hanna  
 Place 12.35pm  
 Time  
 The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

Note

29 SEP 18

Co 5-7 Bn had Conference  
 with Co 58 Bn - Coy Comds  
 of both Bns were present.  
 It was decided to push  
 on at 3pm using tanks  
 & assets of artillery.

*[Signature]*  
 to  
 Act

30-19-18 5-7 Bn

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.	Service	29 SEP 18	From.....
	To.....			By.....
	By.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO } *To Co. 57<sup>th</sup> Battalion*

Sender's Number: *	Day of Month. <i>29<sup>th</sup></i>	In reply to Number.	AAA
-----------------------	---	---------------------	-----

*We are held up in trench running through Gubbins. No sign of barrage. MG. fire very heavy.*

*L. W. S. 10<sup>th</sup> app*

From	<i>9 10 pm</i>
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

*57<sup>th</sup> Bn*      **29 SEP 18**

---

*We are held up at C 4. B 3, 4 - we are being heavily exploded from left flank AAA. MARK V tank out of action*

*3 40 PM.*

*CH B 5 3*      *H. Smeaton*

29 SEP 18

all Coy 58 Bn

The 57 & 58 Bns will meet  
as soon as the LECATALET  
- ~~NAUROY~~ NAUROY line has  
been taken

Col. WATSON will bring  
back the left flank  
as a protective measure.

Word has been received  
from Bugabi that 59 Bn  
is held up in A 27 A  
this endangering our  
rear.

Bn HQ (57 Bn) Site at  
out draft will  
arrive of 57 Bn

3-25

29-9-18

J. W. Whannel  
57 Bn  
Recd

266

29 SEP 18

~~57 Bn~~

A Coy occupying

Trench in C 5 central

about 250x from LECATALET

1x NAUROY line AAA this line

appears to be lightly held

and we expect to occupy

It <sup>LECAT - NAUROY</sup> with 20 minutes - C

Coy is with A.

4.5 for  
C 5 central

W. J. Mean

APPENDIX

27/106

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
At.....m.			Service.	From.....
To.....			29 SEP 18	By.....
By.....			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....

TO	CO. 57 <sup>th</sup>	Ballin
----	----------------------	--------

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
*	29 <sup>th</sup>		

along East bank dug out	and a line from established in	digging running 9.5a.0.5 to Company Sunkin Rd	in South 9.5a.2.0. 1/2 in at 9.4b.7.4
Lts Edward Capt of Company.			
4 8 pm			

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Op au Coy. 29 SEP 18  
 AS-23 29 aaa  
 A+B Coys will occupy  
 the trench running N+S  
 through G+B as present  
 occupied by them. It  
 will be necessary for  
 these Coys to extend as  
 far as possible.  
 Coys D Coys will withdraw  
 to the Canal embankment  
 as soon as circumstances  
 permit. S+B Coys will  
 conform on our left

266

APPENDIX 27/107



Balls.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

265

APPENDIX 27  
107

Positions were 29 SEP 18  
Consolidated - American  
troops will be distributed  
among Coys. A Coy  
will endeavour to  
fit in land with  
29 Bn on our right.

J. P. Whannell

Lieut

for Co.

4 pm

57 Bn

29-5-18

of Coy

29 SEP 18

My message sent at  
4.8 pm is conditional  
on your not being  
able to reach LECATALET  
- NAUROY line. If you  
can make the LECATALET  
- NAUROY line, so so.  
Pass on to A Coy  
Please

J. P. Whannell

Lt

4.27 pm

29-5-18

57th Bn 29 29 SEP 18

P Coy occupying LECATOCAT  
NAUROY TR. from G 5<sup>D</sup> 7 0  
to G 5 B 4.0. AAA Am  
in touch with 29th Bn  
in same trench C Coy  
are moving up 7/7 1

4 30 pm

R. Mean

29 SEP 18

D  
B Coy

A Coy is almost in  
the LECATALET - NAUROY  
line.

B Coy will endeavour  
to push forward to the  
same line.

D Coy will distribute  
in depth in the line  
vacated by B Coy and in  
the canal embankment

4 40 pm

J. Brown

lieut

29-9-18

APPENDIX 27/109

266

A27B

UNITED STATES - WARREN

469

1

Prefix.....	Code.....	m	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of: <b>29 SEP 18</b>	Recd. at.....
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Service.
						From.....
						By.....
					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO { **57th Bn**

Sender's Number. * <b>Hx/36</b>	Day of Month. <b>29th</b>	In reply to Number.	<b>AAA</b>
------------------------------------	------------------------------	---------------------	------------

Your message of 4.30 PM  
has advised of  
situation on my left  
near AAA. Will follow  
you as soon as possible  
past **BELUCOURT!**

From **GA 91**

Place **H-53**

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. **(Z)**

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

*W. J. ...*

\* This line should be erased if not required.  
(3796.) Wt. W 492/M1647. 650,000 Pads. 5/17. H.W. & V., Ltd. (E. 1187.)

**57th** **29 SEP 18**

I sent back by  
runner at 4.30 pm  
stating we had  
taken **LE CATLET. MADURAY**  
**TR.** - The Sunken Road  
running through **5 A** is  
held by Enemy who is  
showing considerable movement  
in small parties apparently  
not following **H. J. ...**  
**57th**

266

APPENDIX

21 110

266

57<sup>th</sup> Bn  
Wesley

APPENDIX

21

110

57 Bn

29 SEP 18

A Coy are occupying  
LE CATELET. NAUROY <sup>TR</sup> from  
NAUROY to 100 yds left  
of Railway line AAA

over 18 pms are shelling

US AAA We are in touch

with 29<sup>th</sup> Bn on Right  
but not in touch on left BAAA

We are working along  
trench to 29.C it appears  
to be unoccupied. <sup>W. measured</sup>  
5 pm

J. Ob a + C boys 29 SEP 18

A Coy on the right +  
C Coy on the left will  
occupy the Le Catelet line  
from G 5 D 70. to the East  
West grid line between  
G 5 + A 29  
58<sup>th</sup> Bn are already in  
the LE CATELET LINE  
and are swinging back  
along the CT just  
South of 28 CENTRAL  
back to the CANAL

B Coy is digging in, in  
support about 400  
to 500 yards in rear  
of A + C — D Coy is  
holding the CANAL  
along with the  
AMERICANS <sup>the 1st</sup>  
29-9-18 <sup>58<sup>th</sup> Bn</sup>

29 SEP 18

5 15 pm

C Coy have moved onto  
 LE CATALLET MAURONG TR on  
 my left AAA they have  
 met opposition in same  
trunk from approx 100 Enemy  
 in G. 5. B - they have made  
 a bombing block and both  
 Enemy & ourselves are bombing  
 MG fire from left is active  
 there is considerable movement  
 of small parties of enemy 200 to 300 yds

29 SEP 18

on our front AAA

5 15 pm

W. Brennan

Enemy now been cleared from  
 MAURONG - to - Collet line as far  
 north as G. 5 B.D.B.  
 Enemy is occupying the line  
 in G. 5. B. & is therefore behind  
 our flank.  
 A company has moved  
 to our left flank.

5. 20 pm  
29. 9. 18.

W. Brennan  
16. C. Coy

APPENDIX

27 1/2



[Faded handwritten text on the left side of the top note]  
 6. 0.  
 5-7 1/2  
 577101  
 Woodland

[Faded handwritten text on the left side of the bottom note]

AM

29 SEP 18

Mr Hays at G4 c 5.6.

We shall probably stay here for tonight.

Send up Saa and Bombs with the

rations please

J. P. O'Rourke  
Lieut

~~57~~

570pm 29-9-18

29 SEP 18

AM

Require Axes + Shovels

urgently and also

Candles very urgently

J. P. O'Rourke  
Lieut

54pm

29-9-18

29 SEP 18

Hqrs 15 and 29 Bde -

ASIS 29th aaaa

We hold posts in the

LE CATALET line from

GSD 7.0 to GSB 4.0

but NOT securely.

We are in touch with

29 Bde on the right

We are pushing another

Co forward on the

left of the Co in the

LE CATALET line.

Our casualties have

been heavy - I should

say, as far as can be

gathered at present, four  
officers and about 100  
others.

We are doing what we  
can to get the Americans  
lighter tent they are very  
tired and demoralised.

58 Bde are occupying a

small portion of the LE

CATALET line. North of

CABARET Wood FARM. We are

endeavouring to obtain

touch.

5.57 pm

J. J. [Signature]  
57 Battalion  
4th Div Co.

266

APPENDIX

27

114

29 SEP 18

Hq 1st Air Bde.

A 516 29th aar

There are a great number of wounded from 57th and American Battalions in the area between the Canal embankment and the LECATALET line.

J.P. [Signature]  
554 [Signature] 57th 29-9-18

29 SEP 18

Hq 15 Bde

A 517 29 aar

I have arranged with 53rd to place S.O.S. line 150 yards beyond the Junction road East of LECATALET line. Cutting through CABRET Wood FM. Hence running N.W. 50 yards beyond boundary line to a 28 A 7.6 thence North to our boundary.

Will you please arrange this with all field artillery covering it.

J.P. [Signature] Lt for Co  
559 [Signature] 57th  
29-9-18

APPENDIX 27

2-55pm  
 [Faint handwritten notes on graph paper, including the name "W.M." and other illegible text.]

2-55pm  
 [Faint handwritten notes on graph paper, including the name "Coe" and "Seaton".]

op A Co.

29 SEP 18

A518

29

can

B Coy will come  
in on your left.

St Bon is endeavouring  
to gain touch with  
you from the report  
along the LE CATALET  
line.

St Bon  
Management  
Line

6. 8. 18

29-9-1918.

266

~~57<sup>th</sup>~~

29 SEP 18

Everything OK.  
Nothing fresh to report -  
our left flank is not  
Sealow Seawie. A17 we  
do not know where  
B + D Coy are A17 we  
are doing best to protect  
flank A17 Had 25

Casualties including 1st Lt  
+ 2 platoon Sgt  
6 45 pm W. J. M. M.

APPENDIX

27

116

A521

29/9

29 SEP 18

aaa

Op C Coy

Reference your message  
times 5:20 pm.

We have arranged with 58  
Bn to bomb down the  
LECATALET line from the  
North.

We are running a line to  
a Coy as soon as possible.

If the situation demands the  
Co will send up another  
Coy on your left but Col.  
WATSON assumes as his  
his people are demoralising  
with you.

J. Spin  
J. Whannel  
Lieut.

7-5-18

57 Bn

Op A Coy

29 SEP 18

A522

29/9

aaa

We are running a  
line forward to you  
as soon as possible  
tonight. Your report re  
opposition in LECATALET line  
received. 58 Bn are  
arranging to bomb down  
from their end.

J. Whannel  
Lieut.

7 pm

57 Bn

7-5-18

29/9

22 117

29 SEP 18

op Coy  
A 523 25 aac

58 Bn report they have  
just taken 3 prisoners  
from the LECATALET  
line as a result of their  
bombing.

W. W. Williams  
Lieut

7 pm

57 Bn

29-9-18

D Coy

29 SEP 18

ASst. 29 a aca

C Coy reports bombing operations  
in LECATALET line on their  
left flank -

58 Bn are bombing down to meet  
them.

Should however C Coy require  
your services you must be  
prepared to go in on their  
left flank.

58 Bn have just secured 3  
prisoners during the bombing  
operations.

7 pm W. W. Williams  
Lieut

29-9-18 57 Bn

266

APPENDIX

27 118



op B Coy

29 SEP 18

A 576

dg

aaa

C Coy reports bombing operations in LE CATALET line on their left flank. 58 Bn are bombing down to meet them.

Should however C Coy require four services you must be prepared to go in on their left flank.

58 Bn have just secured 30 prisoners as result of bombing operations.

As in bond with Capt Kemp C Coy ps

J. B. Pitham  
Lt

7.8 pm

29-9-18

A Coy.

29 SEP 18

A 575

dg

aaa

We are watching left flank.

58 Bn are assisting by bombing down from their end.

B Coy is disposed in trenches about forked roads in G4 B.

D Coy is in reserve in the Canal Bank.

See this on to C Coy ps

7.10 pm

J. B. Pitham  
Lt

29-9-18

57 Bn

266

APPENDIX

27

119

SM

SI

29 SEP 18

NUWA

GAZA

B729

29

aaa

From Old 3<sup>rd</sup> light tank

By - Rally tonight in

Copse 1769.3 AAA

Inform whippet

NUWA

7.30 pm

20 57<sup>th</sup> Bn

29 SEP 18

Ammunition - we have expended

SAA 3000

Grenades mls 50

SAA is required urgently

Water we are in need  
of water.

W. Meardon

29/9/18

Adj. M. B.  
58<sup>th</sup> Bn.

29 SEP 18

Your A521 + A523 received.  
58<sup>th</sup> Bn are not yet in touch  
with me.

I require 3,000 rounds of  
S.A.A., 60 bombs, and  
a supply of water.

There is no shelter where  
I can burn a candle in  
my sector so please don't  
ask for many reports.

One of my platoons  
has just joined me up. I  
think they got mixed  
up with B. Coy.

Situation at present is  
quiet but I am not too  
happy about the enemy left  
flank.

9.15 p.m.  
29.9.18

A. K. Keys Capt  
A.C. Coy

O.C. A.C. Coy

29 SEP 18

A 528

54<sup>th</sup>

AAA

You will provide 2 parties  
carrying parties who will  
bring up rations to A + C  
Coys - Keep the guide  
who bears this to lead  
the party to BN HQRS.  
another guide will take  
them on from there.

9.30pm

30-9-18

A. K. Keys to  
for CO 54<sup>th</sup> Bn

It will be necessary also  
to forward 3,000 rounds of  
SAA and 50 bombs to  
each of A and C Coys.  
See that they are despatched

*[Faded handwritten notes on a grid of graph paper, likely a ledger or account book. The text is illegible due to fading.]*

*[Faded handwritten notes on a grid of graph paper, mostly illegible.]*

Adj.  
57<sup>th</sup> Bn

MESSAGES:

DESPATCHED AND RECEIVED

30 SEP 18

30 SEP 18

O/c B Coy

Please fix in London  
with a VC Coy in  
LE CATALET line at once.  
Distribute four men  
in that line wherever  
required. Advise action  
taken please.

J. P. [Signature]

12 30 am

30-9-18

266

APPENDIX

27/22

30 SEP 18

of A and C

A529 30th ada

please go in touch with  
B Coy who are holding  
a line G5 A 0-5 to G5 a 2.0  
with Coy Hqs in support in  
Luncheon road at G4 B 7.4 -  
Inform Capt Elliott that he  
is to distribute his Coy  
in the LECATALET line where  
required.

JBT P. Whannel  
Lieut

12.25 am 30-9-18

30 SEP 18

Capt Elliott

Your actions are here.

Get a party down for  
Hami & for Saa & Bouts  
please.

Get in touch with a  
Coy in LECATALET line  
and go forward between  
Hami Coy assist them  
hold what line.

JBT P. Whannel  
Lieut

1.25 pm

30-9-18

30 SEP 18

~~To 57 MBn~~

300

Phone - Can anything be done re this please?

The Situation here is quiet - no planes being sent up on our immediate front - there are a few Enemy planes in vicinity of NAUROY.

Shelling - 77 battery firing at very close range from direction L.C.D. Central mainly to our rear, but occasionally in front of our position.

M.C. fire - fairly quiet - occasional bursts from various positions.

30 SEP 18

We are holding the trench very lightly - we have lost one complete LC team & gun, and in addition 3 MOI of other sections. We are very short of SAA & LC Magazines.

We are in touch with 29 MBn on right - they are still in same position.

~~7 20 AM~~

H. J. McNeill

57 Mgn

APPENDIX

27

124



Secret

30 SEP 18 Copy 18

15th Aust. Inf. Bde Order No 203

Ref. Sheet 62 BNW  
1/20,000

30.9.18.

1. (a) The 3rd and 5th Aust. Divs are today to advance their line northwards to clear the KNOB and the RAILWAY RIDGE respectively with the object of clearing all enemy in the area WEST of LE CATELET
- (b) The boundary line between the Divisions will be OBAN VALLEY down to A 27 Central.
2. The 14 A.I. Bde is to advance NORTH on a one Bn. front (53 Bn) with a field arty barrage.
3. Forming up line will

2

- A 29 C 0.4 to A 28 C 0.9  
arty start line - 300 yds in front of forming up line
4. Objectives - RAILWAY RIDGE to A 17 Central.
  5. Zero hour - 6 AM.
  6. Rate of barrage 100 yds in 5 minutes.
  7. 15 A.I. Bde is ordered to move forward its left flank in conformity with the attack of 14 A.I. Bde and occupy the line of the CATELET TRENCH at the junction of the latter with the inter-divisional boundary.
  8. The 58 Bn. accordingly

286

APPENDIX

27

125

3

conform as directed in  
para 11, by swinging  
their left flank round  
NORTH EAST, after the  
53<sup>rd</sup> Bn have passed  
through, and will  
join with the troops  
of the 14 A.I. Bde at  
approx. A 2 D 5.5.

9. Owing to the increased  
Bde frontage consequent  
upon this movement Co.  
59 Bn. will detail one  
company to be at the  
disposal of Co. 58 Bn.  
to take up a position  
in the CATALET TRENCH  
between the 54 and 58  
Bns.

10. The 11<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde will  
attack on the left flank  
having for its objective  
the KNOB.

11. II Corps on the right

4

will attack and  
occupy JONCOURT.  
The 8<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde will  
conform to this attack  
and occupy ETRICOURT.

12. The Air Service will  
place Smoke Screens  
along the BEAUREVOIR  
Trench systems from  
PROSPECT HILL to  
ESTREES.

13. Report to Bde Forward  
Station at J 3 C 9.1

14. Acknowledge verbally.

*R. J. Pollard*

Captain  
Brigade Major  
15 A.I. Bde.

Issued at 2 Am by Special Runner  
to:-

57 Bn	Copy 1/1	Copies to =
58 Bn	" " 2	14 A.I. Bde
59 Bn	" " 3	5 <sup>th</sup> Aust Div.
File	" " 4	
W.D.	" " 5-7.	

ALL Coy 30 SEP 18

A 2/325 30 aaa

14 Aust Bde is carrying

out flanking movement

in Northerly direction starting

from line A 29 C 04 -

A 28 C 0.9 aaa zero

hour 6 am 30d.

R. P. Hannell

LR

2:10 AM

for Co.

2.9.18

O.C. Coy. 30 SEP 18

A 548 30th aaa

Reference the flanking movement of 14 Brigade advised in my message some little time ago.

When 58th Bn move North the gap between 57 and 58 battalions will be filled by one company of 59th Bn which will be placed under orders of C.O. 58th Bn.

This Coy will be at 57 Bn Hqs at 5:30 am - please send two guides to report to me at once to guide the Coy to the line LE CATALET line. You will please place the Coy in position on your left.

2:30 pm R. P. Hannell  
Lieut.

2.9.18

266

27/187

57<sup>th</sup> Bn

30 SEP 18

300

A 535 + A 529 Retained.

C Coy are sending a patrol to B Coy - they will be able to guide anyone from B Coy to D Coy sector - is it necessary that I should also send a patrol - Every man including Coy HQ detail is either down post or patrols and several men are

Sick from Gas + having been blown up etc - hence am hoping that C Coy patrol will suffice.

I have been expecting the Support Coy to get in touch with us.

Situation is comparatively quiet on 57<sup>th</sup> + 29<sup>th</sup> Bn sectors

3 AM

W. J. McNeill

266

APPENDIX 27

128

and was found that  
 several of the  
 other...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...



...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...

Sept 57<sup>th</sup> Bu.

30 SEP 18

Msgs A529 & A535 received.

I am sending two men back to saddle up to find Capt. Elliott & bring him forward but I am most very hopeful of them finding him in the dark.

It would have been much easier for him to have sent messages to us via Bu. Hedges.

Situation quiet.

Rations allowed all night. Everybody wet to the skin & fairly miserable.

58<sup>th</sup> Bu are NOT in touch with me.

I am sending patrol out at dawn to try & locate them.

3 a.m.

30.9.18

J. D. Reynolds  
O.C. C Coy.

30 SEP 18

O.C. D Coy

It will be necessary

to send another party

up to A Coy with

Seven - 5000 rounds

required. Please supply

party. Can you also

supply fuel?

3.15 a.m.

30.9.18

J. D. Reynolds  
Lieut

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.	Service.	From.....	
	To.....		By.....	
	By.....	30 SEP 18 (Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO

GAZA

Sender's Number. * LE 2	Day of Month. 30.	In reply to Number. —	AAA
----------------------------	----------------------	--------------------------	-----

I am	at	and	are
going	to	work	along
from	the	company	left
flank	to	the	1st
Bde.	who	are	along
there	at	present	This
will	be	cases	than
moving	the	whole	of
the	company	whose	new
have	all	dig	sheets.
when	will	notify	you
new	position	are	in

From	
Place	
Time	8.15 am

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

Secret

30 SEP 18 Copy No

57 Bn order No 9/104

Ref sheet 62 B NW

1/20.000

30.9.18

1. At 4 pm today the 8th Bde and the 300 (29 Bn) is to seize and occupy the high ground in G 6 D and establish themselves on the original green line. The 57 and 58 Bns are to swing forward their line pivoting on the left flank of 58 Bn to conform with this advance. Simultaneously the British 32nd Division is to attack JONCOURT.

2 The point of junction with the 8th Brigade will be G 6 D 0.7 and the line will run NORTH WEST from that point through CABARET WOOD FARM.

3 At the conclusion of the operation Coys will if possible be distributed in Coys.

3:30 pm

FRANK RUSSELL LIAISON TO C.O.

266

APPENDIX 2-7

130

30. 9. 18.  
9. 55 p.m.  
57th Bn 9 SEP 18

Mearns has just rung me up regarding proposed straightening of our line in conjunction with 57th Bn. Capt Elliott's patrol was unable to enter CARRIET WOOD FARM.

58th Bn. tried just previously & were caught by M-G fire when they were across & had great difficulty in getting back.

Mearns states that he does not think it possible for him to advance. Enemy is shelling his area heavily on the slightest sign of movement.

Telephone wires to your days are cut. All keys left C. C. Coy

4 p.m. 30. 9. 18.  
Three patrols endeavoring to reach Sinker Road through G. 5. B. Heavy M-G fire from both flanks experienced.

Right platoon patrol reached Sinker road & about 200 yds beyond. Enemy occupying about 300 yds in front of Sinker road. Returned 4. 45 p.m.

Centre platoon, reached Sinker road. Unable to advance owing to M. G. fire from front.

Heavy M. G. fire from flanks while going out to road. Returned 4. 50 p.m.

Left platoon, reached Sinker Road. Unable to proceed further owing to frontal M. G. fire.

Heavy M. G. fire from both



2  
flank during advance to  
Lunker Road especially from  
immediate vicinity of CABARET  
WOOD PARR.

Patrol returned 2.50 p.m.

All patrols could move  
only one man at a time.

Have been in touch with  
5<sup>th</sup> Bn. They are not  
moving.

Alaca reports has not  
moved. People on his right  
went forward but fell back  
to railway & Lunker road  
in G. B. C.

Two men of one patrol  
believed wounded & are not  
yet in. Have sent party  
out for them.

3  
Impossible to move any  
number of men forward.

Am awaiting further  
instructions.

A. R. Keystaff

30.9.18.  
5.5 p.m.

H. C. Coy.

Stop

*[Faint, illegible handwriting on a piece of graph paper]*

57<sup>th</sup> Br

286

APPENDIX 27  
132

30 SEP 18

~~57th~~

X I just learnt that they are all 29" NO 59"

Sections of our infantry (59"?) advanced in northerly direction to C6C Central but apparently met with solid opposition from Enemy & our Shelling AAA they have all withdrawn to ~~the~~ WEST of Rly Embankment & Sunken Rd in C C central AAA & Coy have not moved from LECHTELET TR

we attempted to get forward but I have decided to remain here at for the present as we can assist the people and own R front to better advantage AAA Enemy M.C fire from front and LEFT flank very heavy AAA he appears to be still firing from direction of CABARET WOOD FRY.

at 45 for h/mearne

APPENDIX 27

153

*[Faint, illegible handwriting on a grid-patterned paper insert]*

*[Faint, illegible handwriting on a grid-patterned paper insert]*

572

Worried

APPENDIX 27

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.		.....Service.	From.....
	To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....
	By.....			

TO } *GITLA* **30 SEP 18**

Sender's Number. * <i>LE. 4</i>	Day of Month. <i>30</i>	In reply to Number.	<b>AAA</b>
------------------------------------	----------------------------	---------------------	------------

*Blompong patrol endeavored to reconnoiter CABARET WOOD FARM but were unable to advance owing to M.G. fire and SMIPER fire from left flank also M.G. fire from front. Patrol went out 3.15 PM returned 4.10 PM.*

From	
Place	<i>S. Port</i>
Time	<i>5. PM</i>
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.		.....Service.	From.....
	To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....
	By.....			

TO } *GAZZA* **30 SEP 18**

Sender's Number. * <i>LE. 3</i>	Day of Month. <i>30</i>	In reply to Number.	<b>AAA</b>
------------------------------------	----------------------------	---------------------	------------

*I am in touch with 584 Bathy on my left they tell me that they cannot advance until their left flank people do so. Also they endeavored to establish a post about H2ga 2 but were driven out by M.G. fire from Cemetery Road at H2ga 52 and Buildings in CABARET WOOD FARM. 77 Bathy appears to be firing from post in rear of the FARM.*

From	
Place	<i>Lt E. E. E. E. E.</i>
Time	<i>5.5 PM</i>
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Prefix.....Code.....m.

Words

Charges

72

27

24 SEP 19

266

APPENDIX 27  
134

at Coy

30 SEP 18

A 560 30 a a a

submit proposals at once  
for a renewal of advance  
under cover of darkness

It is suggested that the Sq Bn  
should approach us and so  
the attack.

State whether you consider this  
would be more successful.  
In any case be prepared for  
an advance under cover of  
darkness.

548pm

J B M  
Lieut

30.9.18

for Co  
57 PM

at Coy

30 SEP 18

A 561 30 a a a

How many men  
will you have  
available for carrying  
operations forward to  
Cape Tongao please?

Every available man is  
required

J B M  
Lieut

630pm

57 PM

30.9.18

57<sup>th</sup> Bn.

30 SEP 18

No shrap - shrapnel by our  
artillery happened on this company's  
sector this afternoon

No casualties from fire of  
our own artillery.

6.45 p.m.

30.9.18.

E. H. Keys

O.C. C. Coy.

To CO 57<sup>th</sup> Bn 30 SEP 18

Casualties received today  
from Enemy Shelling during  
4 pm Operation.

4 men killed

1 " Shell Shock (Evacuated)

1 " Remaining on duty.

No Casualties were received  
from our own Shelling, but  
from 4 pm to 4.30 pm 60 lbs  
were falling between C 5<sup>th</sup> Central  
and C 6 C 4 2 - about 12 to 15  
60 lbs fell short some within  
50 x of A Coy HQ & some amongst  
advanced troops of 29<sup>th</sup> who  
were forced to withdraw to  
LE COTILET TR - 18 lbs  
repeatedly fell short on



[Faint handwritten notes on a grid, possibly a list or schedule, including names and dates.]

[Faint handwritten notes on a grid, mostly illegible.]

57<sup>th</sup> Br

Same area between 4 pme  
+ 5-10 pme

7. Pm

Re movements  
of Coy

20 C.O.

57<sup>th</sup> Pm

30 SEP 18

Re proposed operation -

The Enemy appears to be holding ridge in G 6 A + G 6 C fairly strongly - he also has 77s very close in rear of same ridge - In our present position we are being heavily enfiladed with M.G fire from vicinity of CABRET FM. + and A 29 D. As far as I can learn the 29<sup>th</sup> Pm are in the same position as before the operation. Excepting that their post at G 12 A 28 has been strengthened.

I consider any advance from the Coys position most inadvisable until the high

[Faint, illegible handwriting on a grid-patterned slip of paper]

CO  
 5/5

[Faint, illegible handwriting on a grid-patterned slip of paper]

Ground in A 29 Central  
has been made good.

The Coy would be in  
the Open with no command  
to the front and any attempt  
of ours (Even patrols of 3 men)  
to get forward has been met  
with heavy shelling & M.C. from  
front & very heavy M.C. from  
A 29 Central.

We have been shelled  
very heavily all the afternoon  
& a big percentage of men  
have been badly shaken &  
under ordinary circumstances  
would be sent to the rear also  
gas has been very bad & men  
are feeling the effects of it.

I would therefore suggest  
that further troops be used  
for the operation  
7 pm 1/10/18  
W. J. McNeill

286  
Adj. 57 Bn. 30 SEP 18  
Re your A.560.

I am in favour of the 59<sup>th</sup>  
Bn. stepping up its advance  
the advance.

My own men have had a  
very strenuous & tiring time  
since leaving the rest area.  
They have had practically no  
sleep since that time and  
are very distressed. They  
have been ankle-deep in slush  
since yesterday & were wet  
to the skin last night. They  
are all suffering more or less  
from sore feet & are  
incapable of long sustained  
exertion.

My opinion is that the  
men are not fit to undertake  
an operation. My platoons  
average a strength of

*[Faint handwritten notes on a separate piece of graph paper, mostly illegible.]*

*[Large handwritten signature or initials, possibly "C. J. 7".]*

Adj. Br. 57<sup>th</sup> Bn. 30 SEP 18  
Re your A.560.

I am in favour of the 59<sup>th</sup> Bn. Scaffolding etc do continue the advance.

My own men have had a very strenuous & tiring time since leaving the rest area.

They have had practically no sleep since that time and are very distressed. They have had ankle-deep in slush since yesterday & were wet to the skin last night. They are all suffering more or less from sore feet & are incapable of long sustained exertion.

My opinion is that the men are not fit to undertake an operation. My platoon average in strength of

of fracture.  
 I think the enemy  
 opposition both in Art. & Co  
 & artillery has increased  
 since yesterday & is stronger  
 than his yesterday thought.  
 Patrols sent out this  
 afternoon met with much  
 more opposition than yesterday.

7 P.M.                      Lt. Keyes Capt  
 30. 9. 18                      O.C. Coy.

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
			.....Service.	From.....
At.....m.			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....
To.....				
By.....				
TO } 7-60		30 SEP 18		
} Sgt. Bath.				
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.		AAA
* L.E.S.	30			
Out	Shellings	was	reported	
to be	short	on	500 yds	
and	on	best	plumage	
shots	there	was no	shot	
shelling	on	on	shots	
From Lt. Keyes Capt				
Place 7-60				
Time				
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)				
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.				

266

APPENDIX 27

139

27

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.

Capt.  
 57<sup>th</sup> Bn

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.	.....Service.	From.....	
	To.....		By.....	
	By.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO } Co. 57<sup>th</sup> Batty. 30 SEP 18

Sender's Number. \*L.E. 6 Day of Month. 30 In reply to Number. AAA

I think the proposal that the 50<sup>th</sup> Coy. go on is an excellent one for the following reasons:-

- (1) Our men are very tired having had practically no sleep since leaving BACHES. They have been subjected to heavy bombardment all day today and quivers have had an extremely rough handling.
- (2) We are so short of officers that our operation is now extremely difficult.
- (3) In their present state I don't think the men are capable of to do a stand.

J. H. [Signature]

From \_\_\_\_\_  
 Place 7-20 pm  
 Time \_\_\_\_\_

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGES:

DESPATCHED AND RECEIVED

1-OCT 18

266

APPENDIX

27/140



Secret

1-OCT 18

Copy No 1

15<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde. Order No. 204

Ref. Sheet 62 B.N.W.  
1/40,000

1.10.18

1. At 6 a.m. on Oct 10<sup>th</sup>, the Aust. Corps is to push forward to the General line A 22 Central + H 15 Central.
2. The 15<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde. in accordance with the above will advance to and clear the area from A 22 D 5.5 on the NORTH to H 1 A 0.0 on the South pivoting on the present left flank of the 58 Bn at A 22 D 5.5.
3. Boundaries are allotted as follows:
  - (a) 58 Bn. pivoting on the present left flank at A 22 D 5.5 will swing forward to the front

2  
of the General line as given in para 2. The right boundary for 58 Bn will be the RED ROAD inclusive. Cos. 57 and 58 Bns. will arrange mutually for the capture and mopping up of CABARET WOOD FARM.

- (b) 59 Bn. will advance and clear the area between LE CATALET TRENCH as at present held and the general line as given in para 2. Northern Boundary will be the RED ROAD exclusive; Southern Boundary will be a line from G 5 D 4.8 to A 30 D 0.0 exclusive
- (c) 59 Bn. will advance and clear the area between LE CATALET TRENCH as at present held and the general line as given in para 2.

266

APPENDIX 27

141

3

The northern Boundary will be a line from 95 D 4.8 to A 30 D 0.0 inclusive; the southern Boundary will be the line of trench running from G 12 A 1.5 to G 6 C 8.1 thence to the point H 1 A 0.0. (trench exclusive).

4. Zero hour will be 6 A.M. on 1<sup>st</sup> Oct.

5. The attack will be supported by a field arty barrage which will open at zero on the general line G 12 A 5.6 to A 22 D 9.4 and will remain there for three minutes to allow our troops to get up close. The barrage will then advance at the rate of 100 yds in every three minutes. Rate of fire - 5 rds p.g. p.m. All patrols must be withdrawn before 6 A.M.

4

The barrage will go to a position 700 yds beyond the 2<sup>nd</sup> final objective where it will remain as a protective barrage.

6. One Company of tanks will cooperate. Their objective is to deal with the trenches in G 6 A - H 1 B and vicinity.

These tanks will approach through BELLICOURT and along the REQUIVAL RAVINE in order to avoid passing over the crest.

7. The 56 Bn (14 M. Bde) will be operating on the right of 59 Bn and these Bns will establish a joint H.Q.

8. In the event of a hostile counter attack CATALET TRENCH will

5  
be the main line of  
resistance. The objective  
once gained, however,  
will be stoutly defended.

9. Reports to Bde Hd. at  
93 D 5.2.

10. Acknowledge verbally.

30  
9  
18.

W. J. Galloway

Captain  
Brigade Major  
15th Arty. Inf. Bde.

Issued at 1.45 A.M. to

57 Bn Copy No 1  
58 Bn " " 2  
59 Bn " " 3  
File 4  
W.D. 5-7.

NUWA 1-OCT. 18

A587 18 a a a

The line to Bugasi has  
been discontinued since  
10 p.m. yesterday. I endeavored  
to ring you up at 12:30  
A.M. to notify you that our  
18 pro were falling very  
short on our trench about  
G 5 D 6.4. This is second  
occasion tonight on which  
18 pro have fallen short in  
same vicinity. About 15 or  
20 shells fell on the trench &  
within 25 yards of it. I  
trust our barrage tomorrow  
will be more exact.

Thos. Buckley  
Lieut Colonel

2-2 AM 57 Battalion  
1-10-18

Be Hedges

1-OCT 18

60 lbs. working  
short along gulls  
on right of  
Cabrera Wood Green  
Consistent

6<sup>30</sup> am E R Hedges  
& Con

1-OCT 18

To Ad

Everything going well

PP Beach Camp  
6:30 PM 10 Oct 18

APPENDIX

27

144

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of: <b>1-OCT</b>	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Sent			Date.....
	At.....m.	.....Service.		From.....
	To.....			By.....
	By.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO } *2nd Bn*

Sender's Number. * <i>LE-8</i>	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	<b>AAA</b>
-----------------------------------	---------------	---------------------	------------

*The are in position  
my line must A29  
to CABARET COPSE Exclusion  
I am in touch with 58<sup>th</sup> on  
my left and C Company  
on right  
no casualties.  
  
In all  
at 12  
by 2pm*

From  
Place  
Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. **(Z)**  
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

*NUWA* **1-OCT 18**

*A589- 18 aaw*

*My Coy jumped off all  
correct*

*Some 18 pro were falling  
short on the front line.*

*at 6.38pm on my right  
Centre Coy reports 60 men  
falling short in A29 D  
Central*

*C. GAZA  
6.38pm*

*1-10-18 J.B. Furmanee  
Lieut*

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APPENDIX 27

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57<sup>th</sup> Bn.

1 - OCT 18

Have mine on to 300 yds  
in front of CABARET CORSE.

Heavy gun still standing  
short in CABARET CORSE.

Men apparently in full  
retreat. No opposition.

6.45 a.m.

1.10.18.

OK Key Capt

H.C. C. Gray

57<sup>th</sup> Bn.

1 - OCT 18

Am digging in on line  
CABARET CORSE. including

In approx. A.30. E. 3.3.

Two platoons in front  
on support. Coy Hedges  
at A. 29. 5.3<sup>3</sup> (per phone from Capt Ellitt)

Estimated casualties - 500.

All caused by own  
artillery.

1.10.18.

6.50 a.m.

OK Key Capt

*[Faint handwritten notes on a piece of graph paper, mostly illegible due to fading.]*

*[Faint handwritten notes on a piece of graph paper, mostly illegible.]*

57th Bz

NO. OF MESSAGE

Prefix	Code	Words	Charge	1-OCT 18 This message is on a/c of.	Recd. at
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.					
DEG		Sent		Service	Date
At		To		From DEG	
		By 590		By	
(Signature of "Franking Officer.")					

TO	TO Adjt		
----	---------	--	--

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	
*	1/10/18		AAA

I have reached my objective and am digging in my company HQ is situated at A29D92 I am organized in depth four feet in front and four in rear

From	OCD Coy		
Place	7 AM		
Time			

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) *W. K. ...*

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

57th Br. 1-OCT 18

Advance is held up by short shooting of our own heavy artillery.

There is no enemy opposition this artillery + transport carrying over high ground to north-east.

our shells still falling just in front of CABARET COUSE

7 a.m. 1.10.18. E. H. ...

266

APPENDIX

27

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APPENDIX 27

57 Rm  
 Urgent  
 1-OCT 18  
 copy to Mr.

[Faint, illegible handwriting on a rectangular piece of lined paper]

266

1-OCT 18

57<sup>th</sup> Bn

A Coy in position  
 in trenches in G.6 B 3 3 on  
 right to ~~Sea~~ Road  
 G 6 B 18, - we are in  
 touch with D Coy 57<sup>th</sup> <sup>on left</sup> and  
 59<sup>th</sup> on Right AAA Enemy  
 did not fight but fled in  
 disorder Several guns were  
 taken at gallop through  
 ESTREES AAA Enemy is in  
 disorder & should be followed

without delay 1-OCT 18

my Hqs at G 6 B  
 B 18.  
 no casualties.

7.5 PM.

*[Signature]*

we are saluting some  
 to Cannon phone

8.15  
*[Signature]*

APPENDIX

27

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NURVA

A614 1st aad  
 very little opposition  
 encountered aad enemy  
 transport of arms seen in  
 flight crossing bedi found  
 to N.E.

GAZA

10/10/18  
 1 - OCT 18

1 - OCT 18

NURVA

A 2/608 1st aad  
 all objectives gained Jam  
 14 prisoners 46 RIR aad  
 about 40 other prisoners unknown  
 left sent back from Coy  
 without escort

GAZA

10/10/18  
 Jam

1 - OCT 18

57 Bn  
58 Bn  
59 Bn

1. Orders received to swing NORTH. The frontage of the Bde will then be along the general line of the TORRENS CANAL but we are not to confine ourselves to this. The object is to get a good jumping off line for 2nd Div. along this line. The objective is the high ground about Beardwood.

2. The night of the 15 A.I. Bde is to be at B20 B9.5 (road exclusive). The left will be at A23 Central.

NVA

A 2/602

1st

AAA

Bn Hqrs moving forward

at such a rate as we advance

to catch on around

GAZD

1.55 am

1 - OCT 18

1st Div. Hqrs

3. The 54 and 56 Bns are  
being withdrawn &  
being relieved by  
8 Bde and will  
become Div Reserve  
in 96 B. 8 Bde  
will then be on  
our right.

4. Inter Bn boundaries  
will be B 19 B 7.8  
(just NORTH of JACK  
scopse) and A 24 B 4.6  
(road inclusive &  
58 Bn.

5. 53rd Bn will be  
on left of 58 Bn.

6. Bde H.Q. is still at  
93 D 5.2. Intermediate  
Div. Str. at A 29 C 1.1 -  
and Bde F. Str. is being  
established at  
FOLEMPRISSE FM. (B 25 C)

10.15 AM  
1/10/18

Goller  
Capt Bn.

15<sup>th</sup> Bn and Bungalow.

18<sup>th</sup> Nov

1 - OCT 18

near

Lt Colonel MARS HALL'S

Lt Colonel SCANLON

at 9.6 ~~0.2~~  
or 9.6  
(54 Bn) signals are in vicinity. Situation  
is becoming less serious & returning  
to former position and is becoming  
parisiently

C.O. 57 Battalion

8181 1910 1918

10:55 am  
1-10-18

Prefix .....	Code .....	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at .....
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Sent			Service
At .....		To .....		From .....	
By .....		(Signature of "Franchising Officer.")		By .....	

1-OCT 18

TO { *Adyt*

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. **AAA**

I have advanced to ridge in front of my old position and am digging in on right of *B Coy* enemy shelling heavily *TTTT* There is no one on my right flank

From *O. B. B. Coy*  
 Place  
 Time *10:55 am*

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) *[Signature]*  
 Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

1-OCT 18

Capt Keys reports 10.50am as follows:-  
 We are digging in on line of sunken road from *BANK COPSE* to *FOLEMP-RISE FARM*, and enemy shelling very heavy and position not good and can we get counter battery.

From *Sent. Elliott*:- Please arrange counter battery at once and insist on mobile battery *14th* bde moving up at once into close supports.

*[Signature]* Pte *14th*  
 HQ Sig *59th* *14th*  
 11.50am

APPENDIX

27

182

O.C.  
 10/12  
 57

*[Faint handwritten text, possibly a list or notes, mostly illegible due to fading.]*

*[Faint handwritten text, possibly a list or notes, mostly illegible due to fading.]*

Prefix.....	Code.....m	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....
Office of Origin and Service Instructions					
		Sent		Service.	Date.....
		At.....m			
		To.....		By.....	From.....
		By.....			

1 - OCT 18

TO { 57<sup>th</sup> Bn.

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

We are digging in along the line of the road from Bank Top to Tolompron Farm. Enemy has direct observation from crest ridge & is shelling position heavily. I think it would be better to hold the ridge with a

From  
Place  
Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Prefix.....	Code.....m	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....
Office of Origin and Service Instructions					
		Sent		Service.	Date.....
		At.....m			
		To.....		By.....	From.....
		By.....			

1 - OCT 18

TO {

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

couple of Lewis Guns & withdrew remainder of company. Enemy can make position untenable as there is no shelter or cover. Blast is on my left, D on right. 5<sup>th</sup> Bn not up on left.

From C. P. G.  
Place  
Time 11.30pm

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)  
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

266

APPENDIX 29

153



All Coys.

A 2/6 17

1-OCT 18

aaa

It has been decided by Co Sgt B  
 & myself that we shall  
 withdraw to the line captured  
 this morning where you will  
 dig in & hold out a second div.  
 is one to more this as  
 either tonight or first thing  
 tomorrow morning aad. Kap  
 is at Ben Hqs.

*[Signature]*  
 Whannel Lt.

GAZA

12.45 pm

1- OCT 18

To Co  
 Sgt Balm.

We are in position  
 along top of Ridge. in 9.30.  
 I have one platoon on left  
 of Bank Topes and 2 platoons on  
 right. We are being heavily shelled  
 by artillery at almost point blank  
 range. I have addressed Company on  
 my right along about same line

*[Signature]*

11-30 am

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of :	Reed. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Date.....
<i>469</i>			<i>1-OCT 18</i>	From .....
	At .....		(Signature of "Franking Officer")	By.....
	To .....			
	By .....			
TO <i>Gaza</i>				
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
<i>B1</i>	<i>1st</i>			
<p><i>I am now withdrawing in conjunction with Capt Keys to the position I held this morning. I advanced but cannot live up there. The enemy are reinforced and are holding out &amp; are firing point blank on any movement.</i></p>				
From				
Place				
Time				
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)				
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name			

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of :	Reed. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Date.....
			<i>1-OCT 18</i>	From .....
	At .....		(Signature of "Franking Officer")	By.....
	To .....			
	By .....			
TO				
Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
<p><i>They can observe the least move</i></p>				
From	<i>Capt Peacock</i>			
Place	<i>OC 12-70pm</i>			
Time				
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)				
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name			

Secret.

Copy No 1

15<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde Order No 204

Refs Sheet 62 B.N.W.

1/20,000

1-OCT 18

1.10.18

1. After tonight (night 1<sup>st</sup>/2<sup>nd</sup> Oct) ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ the Southern Div. boundary will be a line drawn through A29 D9.7 to Big C2.5 (inclusive to Southern unit).

2. The 15<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde will tonight be relieved as follows:

(a) North of the new Div. boundary by the 54<sup>th</sup> Bn.

(b) South of the new Div. Boundary by the 5<sup>th</sup> Aust Inf Bde.

3. <sup>2</sup> Opposite numbers will be notified as soon as received.

4. The 15<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde will on relief will retire to positions in the HINDENBURG LINE as follows:

59 Bn. to G10.

58 Bn. to A27 + 28.

57 Bn. to G4 + G3

No troops to be in the LECTALET LINE. all areas will be reconnoitred and exploited before the troops move out.

5. Prior to relief Bns. will push forward and occupy the line of the road leading from ESTREES to GRANDCOURT. This will be the line to be handed over.

<sup>3</sup>  
6. Details of boundaries, garrisons, and other details affecting the relief will be arranged between Br. Comdros. concerned.

7. Back Bn. will send five guides to ~~new~~ old Bde H.Q. at 93 DS. 2 at 8 p.m. Guides will meet incoming units and direct them to unit sectors.

~~Back Bn. will send~~  
M.G. Co. will send two guides at the same time & place.

8. Rations will reach Bde H.Q. 93 DS. 2 at 10 p.m. Arrange guides.

9. Bde H.Q. on completion of relief will be established at 93 DS. 2

<sup>4</sup>  
10. Completion of relief will be reported to Bde H.Q. when at 94 BS. 6 location of new H.Q. will be forwarded to Bde H.Q. as soon as decided.

11. Acknowledge.

$\frac{1}{10}$   
 $\frac{18}{18}$

G. J. Galloway  
Captain,  
15th Brigade Major  
A.I. Bde.

266  
200

APPENDIX  
27 157

57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

Material captured by 57th Battalion during the  
period 29th September/1st October  
1918.

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Heavy Machine Guns.	17
Light Machine Guns.	7
77 m.m. Gun (No 29717)	1
Light Minenwerfer	3
Rangefinder.	1
Heavy Machine Gun Mountings.	7

Lieutenant and Adjutant

57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

## Personal Narrative of O. C. "D" Company.

On the 27th Sept. orders were received that we were to move to position near TEMPLEUX. At 2.2 pm the head of the column was to pass a given point with 100 yards between companies, my Company moving in rear of column. Observing the usual halts we marched as far as TINCOURT where we halted for the evening meal. Continuing the march from here we passed around ROISEL where we picked up guides who were to guide us to our destination. At this place we stayed until the morning of the 29th when we were to move in rear of the Americans and finally to pass through them to our objective which was the red line east of WIANCOURT. At 7.15 am my company moved along the left of the railway in rear of B Company, my company being in the second wave. Moving across the trenches in front of HARGICOURT in L 6 the battalion was forced to merge into file in order to keep touch, the fog and smoke making it impossible to see more than a few yards ahead. Moving due east we took up our position on the western side of the canal in G 4 a. We did not continue our advance from this point until 3 pm owing to the lack of information from forward. At 3 pm the battalion hopped over, my Company moving in the second wave. That night our line was established in the LE CATELET - NAUROY line my Company withdrawing to support in rear of the canal in G 4 a. In this position we remained until the morning of the 1st when we moved forward to the attack. Prior to the barrage I had established myself in the LE CATELET - NAUROY line on the left of "A" Company. At 6 am the barrage fell. It lifted 100 yards every three minutes and at 6.30 am we hopped over and took our objective, no opposition being offered.

From there I pushed forward a patrol to B 25 a. At 10.30 am I advanced to road running from BANK COPSE to FOLERTPRIZE FARM, and established a line on the right of C Company. At this time the enemy heavily shelled my position and at 11.30 am I retired to my former position. Orders were received for me at 6.30 pm to push forward and occupy that ridge from which I retired. This I did at 7 pm and established a line of posts between BANK COPSE and FOLERTPRIZE FARM. I received orders that the forward company had been relieved and that I was to proceed to the canal bank in G 4 A. We remained there until 11.30 am on the same day when we moved to our present location.

*J.B. Peacock*

CAPT.

3. 10. 18.

O.C. D. Company.

*(Signed for Captain  
B PEACOCK on  
behalf)*

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57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

Personal Narrative of O.C. "A" Company  
re operations Sept. 27th / Oct. 2nd 1918.

Ref. Sheet. 62 C NE. 1/20,000. Sheet WIANCOURT 1/20,000.

Sept. 27th. Battalion moved from Rest Area to Embankments South of TEMPLEUX in Square L 8 and 9.

Sept. 28th. Rested in same area. forward routes reconnoitred.

Sept. 29th. Company moved to "START LINE" passing starting point HIGSON QUARRIES at 7 15 am - from there on we came under shell fire and on nearing the START LINE we came into a dense fog which hampered our advance considerably - orders were received that we were to move forward to the TUNNEL (on our sector) SOUTH of BELLICOURT. We moved to this position pausing for a few minutes in the HINDENBURG LINE in G 3 D. On reaching the TUNNEL, the position forward was not clear and the Company took up a temporary defensive position there. About 12.30 pm a patrol went forward about 400 to 500 yards and could not locate troops except the enemy on EAST side of tunnel. Orders were received that we were to attack LE CATALET - NAUROY line of trenches and exploit as far as possible. Zero 3 pm. At 3 pm "A" and "B" Companies advanced, each Company having one Mark V Tank and several "Whippets" were to operate. The 58th Battalion appeared to be late in starting their advance. "A" and "B" Companies were supported by "C" and "D" companies respectively.

On reaching the sunken road in G.4.B. the enemy put down a machine gun barrage and from a close range field guns opened a deadly fire on to the tanks. At this time there were 2 Mark V and 4 Whippets on the Company Sector. We advanced in rushes to approximately G 4.D 9.9. We appeared to be getting very heavy casualties in the Company and most of the tanks were put out of action. The strongest opposition appeared to be coming from our left front and I therefore decided to cross the railway line which would protect our left flank and attack from the south of the Railway. We accomplished the movement to the right in rushes from and to shell holes and were able to reorganise in a trench running parallel with our objective. We then resumed the attack and enemy were seen evacuating to the ridge in rear of trenches. We captured our objective about 4 pm and O.C. "C" Company came forward and together we reconnoitred the trench 200 yards to the left of where we had entered it. He immediately brought "C" Company into the trench on my left. I also sent a patrol to the right and it got in touch with the 29th Battalion who had also reached the LACATALET LINE. Patrols were sent forward to railway line about 300 yards in front, it was not occupied by the enemy, who was then occupying the ridge about 400 yards East of it. We were receiving a considerable amount of M.G. fire from CABARAT FARM and the slightest forward movement on our part was resented from that quarter.

Sept. 30th. We remained in LE CATALET TRENCH - there was considerable movement of enemy in small parties on ridge to our front and every target was actively engaged. About 6 am 14th Brigade carried out an operation, moving NORTH along LE CATALET TR. but we were still subject to M.G. fire from our left flank.

Oct. 1st. The Brigade carried out an operation - A Company operated on right flank of 57th BN. - the objective was reached behind a creeping barrage and A Company occupied trenches in G 6 B - connecting with 59th BN on right and D Company 57th BN on left. Our barrage was good. Enemy shewed no opposition and fled in disorder. We captured 14 prisoners of 46th Regiment.

Cont'd

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Immediately our barrage lifted a platoon was sent forward to FOLEMPRISE FARM and to reconnoitre ground EAST of ESTREES and WEST of BANK COPSE. Enemy appeared to have retired beyond BEAUREVOIR LINE but could be seen returning in small parties and digging in there. ESTREES appeared to have been evacuated. Our patrol after being out for about an hour were heavily fired on by M.G. and 2 field guns were brought into action on forward slope west of BEAUREVOIR TR. and fired over open sights at them. The patrol returned to line occupied by the Company. About 11 am I received orders to conform to forward movement of C and D Companies - these companies were then advancing towards sunken road between FOLEMPRISE FM. and BANK COPSE. I gave orders to the Company to move forward and immediately went ahead myself to the right of D. Company. As soon as these Companies appeared over the crest the enemy shelled them heavily and the position appeared almost untenable. Before I had got A Company into position on the alignment it was decided to withdraw to the original objective until darkness set in.

OCT. 2nd.

On morning of 2nd we were relieved and returned to HINDENBURG LINE.

The work of all Platoon Commanders, N.C.Os and men throughout the operations was splendid.

M. J. MEARA

Lieut.

O.C. "A" Company.

3/10/18.



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57th BATTALION. A.I.F.

Personal Narrative. of  
O.C. "B" Company.

- FRIDAY. 57th Battalion moved forward from position near PERONNE and travelled by Route march to a point near TEMPLEUX where we arrived late at night and remained until about 7 am on the morning of the 29th inst.
- 27.9.18.
- SUNDAY B Company moved forward via HIGSON QUARRIES along railway to SLAG QUARRIES and thence roughly along the EAST and WEST GRID between G 1 and G 7 to a point along G 2 d 3.2 and thence in a N.E. direction towards G 3 Central. Crossing the trench systems in G 3 a and b we came to and dug in along Canal Tunnel at G 4 a. At this point we were unable to get in touch with American troops in front and at 3 pm the battalion advanced towards the LA CATALET - NAUROY LINE. Battalion disposition Artillery formation of sections. A Company right, B Company left, C Company Right support, D Company left support. One tank was allotted to each of the front Companies. Immediately the advance commenced the enemy opened up with 77s', 4.2, and 5.9s at point blank range. The two tanks attached to the battalion were out of action from direct hits within 10 minutes. No 8 platoon on the left front was reduced by 50 percent casualties including platoon Commander Lieut. Fleming and Platoon Sergeant Walker, DCM. No 7 Platoon on the right was reduced to 5 men. The casualties of this platoon included Platoon Commander Lt. Duncan, 2 Section Commanders and the whole of the Lewis Gun section with their gun. It was impossible to advance under the fire so I ordered the Company to reorganise in trench running from G 4 A 9.9 to sunken road in G 4 B, whilst I informed the Battalion Commander of the state of affairs. Meantime A Company on right had succeeded in getting a footing in the LEXCATALET - NAUROY LINE by way of the railway line through G 5 C and D and C Company moved to position in trench on A Company left. B Company then advanced to and dug in Support along a line extending from G 5 a 0.5 to G 5 a 2.0.
- MONDAY At 4.30 am B Company moved forward and entered the LE CATELET - NAUROY LINE between "A" and "C" Companies. At 6 am the 14th Brigade (53rd Battalion) cleared the LE CATALET - NAUROY TRENCH between C Company left flank at G 5 b 0.3 and the 58th Battalion Right at A 28 b 95.00 and B Company passing in behind 53rd Battalion occupied the trench between the points mentioned. At 7 am I got in touch with Lt. Dalgleish, 58th Battalion, to find what he knew of the CABARET WOOD FARM. He told me that he had endeavoured to get there about half an hour earlier but had been driven back to this trench by M.G. fire from FARM and small Sunken road in G 29 a. About 10 am it was reported that enemy had been seen going out of the FARM so I ordered Sgt FORRESTER, No 6 Platoon to send out a patrol to investigate, this patrol however met with no better success than that of 58th Battalion. The enemy shelled trench heavily several times and killed Sgt. Collins, No 5 Platoon Commander. Nothing else unusual happened for the day.
- 30.9.18.
- TUESDAY At 6 am barrage fell 200 yards in front of our trench LE CATERET NAUROY LINE and at zero plus 3 57th Battalion advanced and dug in along N & S grid line between A 29 and 30. B Company left flank was thrown back to rear to keep in touch with 58th Battalion whose Right flank was dug in at A 29 Central. At a time later the Brigadier coming forward ordered the Battalion forward. Our scouts having already reported the ridge in front clear we advanced covered by screen of scouts and reached a position on top of ridge in A 24 d A 32 b? At this point we suffered very heavy casualties from enemy direct shell fire. B Company were disposed as follows, No 5 Platoon dug in on sunken road APEX A 30 b 7.8, No 6 Platoon at A 30 b 5.8, No 8 Platoon (made up of remnants of 7 and 8 Platoons) in part of gun pit at A 24 c 2.3. At this time matters were becoming so serious from a casualty point of view that we were forced to return to our positions on grid line
- 1st Oct. 1918

CONTD.

between A 29 and 30. The 58th Battalion conformed to our movements and their right post was in touch with my left at Cross Roads in A 24 C. At 7 pm B Company under cover of darkness moved forward and occupied the GRANDCOURT - ESTREES ROAD from left at Cross roads B 19 C to bend in road B 25 b where we were in touch with 59th Battalion. We were unable to get in touch with 58th Battalion on left although we patrolled 400 yards along road towards GRANDCOURT and captured 3 prisoners in doing so. The only post of the 58th Battalion we were able to find was established at about A 27 D 5.0. they were then being relieved by men of 54th Battalion. B Company was relieved about 12.30 am by 20th Battalion and returned to Canal Tunnel G 4 a.

*L. H. Bennett*

3/10/18.

O.C. "B" Company.

CAPT.

Personal Narrative of Capt. E.K. Keys  
"C" Coy. 57th Battalion, covering recent  
operations.

I moved forward with my Company from the bivouac area at 6.50 am on the morning of the 29th inst. joining the remainder of the Battalion near the HIGSON QUARRIES. The route followed was along the railway line as far as COLOGNE FARM thence due east along line of telegraph poles. Shortly after passing COLOGNE FARM a heavy fog came on and touch between units was maintained with difficulty. At about 10.45 am the canal tunnel on the left of BELLICOURT was reached and a few stragglers from various American Units were met with. They could give no accurate information as to the progress of the attack. Patrols were therefore pushed out and these immediately came under hostile machine gun fire. The enemy was also infiltrating the canal bank from the North and it was apparent that the attack of the Americans had come to a standstill.

At 3 pm I moved out with my Company to attack the LE CATELET - NUUROY Line, following in rear of "A" Company who formed the right half of the first wave the other two Companies being on my left. Immediately we started we came under heavy machine gun and artillery fire. The tanks accompanying the attack were put out of action immediately. After considerable difficulty I reached the railway line at approximately G 4 D 7.4. There I came upon Lieut. Meara, O.C. "A" Company and after consultation we decided to push on and attempt to reach the LE CATELET - NUUROY line although touch had been lost with the left Companies and we could see that they were not advancing.

We entered this line at about G 5 D 6.3 and worked along to the left. Lt. Meara's Company extending to about G 5 D 4.8, there my right flank rested and the Company worked along the trench to the left. A party of the enemy were in the trench at about G 5 B 3.1. After a short exchange of bombs these were driven out and a party of enemy advancing towards the trench from the east were dispersed by Lewis Gun fire, casualties being inflicted on them. We established a bombing block in the trench at about G 5 A 9.5 and consolidated our position. At this time I had only two very weak platoons with me, the remaining two having become disorganised and mixed with B Company shortly after leaving the canal tunnel when the enemy's fire held up the left half of the advance.

My left flank was well in the air, the enemy holding CABARET FARM WOOD and that portion of the LE CATERET - NUUROY LINE to the south west of the farm. Later on during the night another of my platoons came up and gave some much needed strength to our line. The position remained unchanged until 6 am next morning (30th Sept.) when the 53rd Battalion advanced astride our line and mopped up the LE CATALET - NUUROY Line to the North. Our Lewis Guns got in some good work on the Huns as they retired from the trench to CABARET WOOD FARM. B Company now moved up and occupied the trench from my left flank to the road at A 29 C 2.4.

During the day I sent out patrols to ascertain if enemy were holding country in front but they were unable to get far owing to heavy machine gun fire coming from the front and from both flanks, particularly from CABARET WOOD FARM and its vicinity.

Enemy artillery and machine guns were very active all day. At 6 am on the 1st inst. I moved forward with my Company under cover of an artillery barrage. This barrage was fairly good on my sector with the exception of one 6 inch gun which was shooting short consistently and caused us some casualties. I dug in on a line about four hundred yards in front of CABARET COPSE and immediately pushed out a strong patrol to reconnoitre ground in front.

Later on in the morning I moved forward again and dug in on the line of the road from BANK COPSE and FOLEMPRISE FARM. Here the enemy had direct observation on us from the next ridge and shelled us out of this position. We withdrew to the position taken up during the morning.

At about 1 pm on the 2nd inst. the Battalion was relieved by the 20th Battalion and we moved back to the HINDENBURG Line near BELLICOURT.

3. 10. 18.

*E.K. Keys*  
CAPT.  
O.C. "C" Company.

5. 10. 18.

## PERSONAL NARRATIVE

of events in connection with the  
Operations of 29th Sept.  
to 2nd Oct. 1918.

THE ADVANCE TO  
START LINE.

From the vicinity of TEMPLEUX, 4500 yards behind the Start Line of the 30th American Division, we started at 7 am. We were not due there till 9 am, but the going would be bad for a column and it would be advantageous to have time to get set and view the unknown country before starting. We moved in two main columns with Battalion Headquarters between and slightly in advance to give direction. The route had previously been reconnoitred but it was not an easy one. Since 5.50 the artillery had been roaring but it was mainly our guns we could hear. Avoiding the village of HARGICOURT on the north and VILLERET on the south we steered a middle course past the AIGSON QUARRY. As we passed through the line of our heavy artillery we encountered a considerable amount of hostile shelling, sustaining some casualties. As we neared the crest of the ridge East of HARGICOURT I called a halt in a suitable spot. About 30 German prisoners with an unnecessarily large guard of Americans passed us here.

The ridge was being heavily shelled at the very spot where we wished to cross so I decided to utilize a trench running forward to enable us to get over the crest. Two Companies "B" and "D" were instructed to follow. We were disappointed on reaching the forward slope to find that the villages to the east were entirely obscured by smoke and fog which was rolling towards us in a dense cloud. Quite suddenly we became enveloped in it and so thick was it that we could not even see the sun. Things began to look serious and keeping touch became of paramount importance. I decided not to wait on the start line as the progress must necessarily be very slow and I could not risk being late on the Green Line where we had to pass through the Americans. It was impossible to see a man 3 paces away, and no land mark was visible. We could not even get direction from the sun. In the preliminary reconnaissance a line of telegraph poles had been noted leading to BELLICOURT. The fact that they were badly smashed and the wires trailing on the ground proved a boon to us now. I passed the word along the column to feel along this line of poles. It was impossible to see from pole to pole but the broken wire helped us. We moved very slowly along this line managing to keep the column of Headquarters and "B" and "D" Companies intact. By the slope of the ground and from compass bearings I knew we were in BUCKSHOT RAVINE which was about 500 yards south of our allotted area. This did not matter until we approached BELLICOURT when it involved the risk of crossing an 8th Brigade column, and in any case we had to pass round the North of BELLICOURT. Having advanced as far as I judged advisable I sent a reconnoitring party due north to locate the road known as the Red Road and halted the column. As we sat there in shell holes, waiting, three figures suddenly loomed out of the fog. When they stumbled across our line they halted and flung up their arms calling out "Pardon, Messieurs". Everyone laughed at the three Germans who were glad enough to be directed towards the rear.

ENTERING THE  
HINDENBURG LINE.

The party returned having located the road a few hundred yards away. A line of men was formed reaching from our halting place to the road and the column wheeled north with this line as a guide. We reached the road exactly where we had planned to, at the "Bridge over the Crater." At this moment the enemy poured in a hot fire of shells and fortunately the fog partially lifted for a few minutes enabling us to break into artillery formation and reach the north side of the road without getting scattered. The break in the

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fog enabled us also to see the 58th Battalion crossing on our left flank. We had proceeded about 500 yards, found the main HINDENBURG LINE and the fog closed round again. It was 9.10 am and we had gained our allotted area but I was in touch with two companies only. These I extended along the trench and hoped by this means to intercept the other two companies. Shortly afterwards both "A" and "C" Companies arrived. Here also I got touch with the 58th, half of which was on my left and half on my right. I directed those on my right to their proper area which they gained immediately after.

The trench bore evidence of recent evacuation. German equipments lay about here and there and presently an American mopping up party moved down the trench past us. They could not give us much information of the situation ahead. One of our men found a full box of cigars and as his comrades filed past he extended the box which was speedily emptied and presently the smoke from 100 cigars mingled with the fog.

ADVANCE TO THE  
BELLICOURT TUNNEL.

By 9.40 am all Companies were reorganized and ready to advance. The fog was now lifting and we were able to resume our advance in parallel columns. I calculated on reaching the Green Line, which was then 3000 yards off, easily on time, viz: 11 am. Enemy shelling was desultory and uncertain but we got through without mishap and as the visibility became suddenly quite good the high mound of the BELLICOURT TUNNEL suddenly appeared ahead. I noticed groups of Americans in the vicinity. These shouted to us to halt and waved us back. I could not understand their reason so continued to advance till I reached the tunnel embankment and there extended my line.

The Americans were much bewildered and could give no idea of the situation except that there were Americans about 300 yards ahead who apparently formed the firing line. Two things soon were made manifest. First; a reconnaissance forward revealed no American line but the enemy facing us. Second, machine gun bullets were zipping along our line in rear of the tunnel and proving that our left flank was exposed. The 58th were on my left but we could find no trace of the 59th who should have been on the left of the 58th.

BELLICOURT AND  
THE LE CATELET  
NAUROY LINE.

The men at once dug in to shield themselves from the enfilade fire and from shells which now commenced to fall in BELLICOURT and round the tunnel. I endeavoured to rally the Americans but they did not seem equal to the task of sorting themselves out or amalgamating. I therefore attached them to my various Companies as I located scattered groups. I then pushed forward posts to establish a line. Pigeons would have been invaluable at this juncture for it was impossible to get touch with Brigade, but no pigeons had been available. The two Light Horsemen who had been attached to us came up at this juncture and the report of the situation was taken by one of them to Brigade report centre. The C.O. 58th Battalion came across at my invitation and we discussed the situation. The Americans had not finished their task, and, as far as could be ascertained, their attack had fizzled out and would not be renewed. At 13.30 the Brigade signallers having discovered our location had got a telephone line run out to us. Brigade directed us to continue the advance as best we could, sweeping the American troops on with us as we went towards the Green Line. Some of the tanks <sup>that</sup> had been allotted to us had arrived, the rest having been put out of action as they advanced. It was decided to launch an attack on the LE CATELET - NAUROY Line at 15.00 using the 4 Mark V Tanks and the whippets and arranging for a creeping barrage.

Exactly at 15.00 the attack was launched, but the barrage for some unexplained reason fell wide of the mark and was useless. The large tanks were put out of action one by one as they climbed the slight ridge forward of our position and the whippets were soon either ditched or out of action from shell fire. The enemy was strong in machine guns on the left and had at least one field gun well forward, firing at point blank range. Heavy fire from the north hampered the 58th advance and made it necessary to swing back a defensive flank. My right flank got into the trench successfully after some trouble and shortly after another company on its flank also secured a footing.

Cont'd.

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On their left flank the enemy still held the trench and a bomb fight commenced. The 58th had got a footing also in the trench further north opposite CABARET WOOD FARM, and had its right flank swung back down a sunken road where they were in touch with "B" Company of this battalion whom I had directed to hold a support position. The situation on the left was very obscure. C.O. 58th maintained that he occupied his frontage in LE CATELET trench with his right flank in touch with 57th whereas I knew that on my left flank was a bomb block we had made and beyond that the enemy. It became clear that we were not strong enough to carry out our intention of advancing to the Green Line and beyond, and the absence of the 59th Battalion from the northern flank and the presence of the enemy there made it too risky to do more than hold our gains for the time.

EVENTS OF NIGHT  
29th/30th SEPT.

The situation on the right of southern flank, where the 57th was in touch with the 29th in the LE CATELET line, was satisfactory but there seemed every danger of a flank attack from the north. About 6 pm C.O. 59th arrived at my Headquarters and reported having met with much opposition further north, his advance having in consequence been checked. His battalion was then coming up to support the attack by 57th and 58th. As this attack had come to an end, the 59th was placed in rear to support 57th and 58th in event of flank attack.

During the night an American Lt. Col. a regimental commander, arrived at BELLICOURT with a Battalion. He explained that the Battalion commander had apparently got lost and he was himself taking charge of the battalion. He did not seem to have any clear idea of what he was expected to do beyond the fact that the 28th Division of Americans further north had not cleared the enemy out of the HUNDENBURG System, though they had apparently passed through. He had to defend the flank against attack but did not know where to place his men. I gave him the exact position on the flank and arranged to have him guided to the locality where our left flank was most exposed, so that the defensive flank of the 58th Battalion was strengthened and extended. The American troops were eager to do well but at every turn betrayed lack of experience. The Regimental Commander, for instance, had made no provision for lights and wished to "buy" from me a couple of candles. Very few of the officers and N.C.Os know how to locate themselves on, or to read a map. Lieut. COZENS of the 5th Battalion A.I.F. was attached to this American Battalion. The C.O. apparently found him very useful.

THE ATTACK BY 14TH  
BRIGADE 6 am  
30th SEPT.

To clear up the situation to the north, and to safeguard the flank, an attack by 14th Brigade was launched at 6 am. The 53rd Battalion passed through my area at 6.20 am. My left flank Company co-operated and the pocket of the enemy between us and the 58th Battalion in the LE CATELET line was bombed out and the enemy caught by our Lewis gun fire as he retreated towards CABARET WOOD FARM. The advance of the 53rd Battalion cleared the LE CATELET LINE on the 58th Battalion frontage and beyond, and that unit was able to swing forward and occupy the trench.

At 8 am General ELLIOTT visited my Headquarters and remained discussing the situation, till 8.45. Lt. Col. CHEESEMAN of the 53rd BN. was with me also. He had used my Headquarters and telephone line to carry out his northerly attack, until 8.30 am when he left to follow his unit. Before leaving he expressed his appreciation of the facilities I had placed at his disposal.

At 8.55 am the C.O. 58th BN. rang up and notified me that a patrol of his had established themselves in CABARET WOOD FARM. This was good news to us for we had been much troubled by machine gun fire from that place from which they could get the greater part of my line in enfilade. I notified my left Company Commander about it and was surprised he had not first notified BN. H.Q. He stated that he was in touch continuously with the 58th Company on his flank but nothing had been told to him of the fact. Moreover the enemy could still be seen walking about the farm. A patrol was sent out to investigate but was driven back by heavy machine gun fire and our left flank was shelled from close range. It was evident that we did not hold the place and indeed it was not captured till the advance of the next day.

Cont'd

During the rest of the day the enemy shelled our position constantly. We had suffered up to this time over 100 casualties. The men were wet through on account of the rain which had fallen during the night and there had been practically no sleep for any one. A hot meal had been served to them during the night and two hot meals had been arranged for the next night. No complaining was heard, however, and the men could be relied upon for further effort. The call for further effort came next morning at 6 am.

Meanwhile the artillery had got a line direct to us and was thus able to engage successfully many targets that presented themselves. An officer of the 53rd Battery did particularly good work in this respect. During the night two hot meals were sent forward to the men. At 10 pm I went to Brigade H.Q. where plans were made for an advance to take place the following morning.

THE ADVANCE OF  
OCT. 1st.

In accordance with plans the Brigade launched an attack at 6 am. The objective was a line from A 22 Central to G 15 Central, an average distance of 1000 yards from our position. The object was to secure a good definite start line for the 2nd Australian Division who were to continue the advance next day. A good barrage fell and the attackers advanced without trouble, except in the case of portion of my line where one at least of our guns persistently fired short, and inflicted half a dozen casualties, the only ones we sustained. We captured a number of prisoners and the enemy fled in disorder. His guns also were seen galloping away. We therefore passed the objective line and commenced to exploit. Patrols entered ESTREES, FOLEMPRISE FARM and BANK COPSE. The battalion then moved forward and H.Q. advanced with them halting in square G 6 A. Had such an easy success been anticipated and provision been made for a more extensive advance we could have taken the BEAUREVOIR line. The delay on our objective line, and the period occupied by patrolling however, gave the enemy time to realize that we were not contemplating and extensive advance, and both infantry and guns returned to a position in front of the BEAUREVOIR line. As we mounted the crest of the high ground North west of ESTREES we came under direct observation of his artillery and a heavy barrage was put down on our advancing troops. They dug in along the line MINT COPSE - FOLEMPRISE FARM, but it was impossible to maintain themselves there. Our field artillery were not yet in a position to help as it was mainly a question of our infantry against BOCHE heavy artillery. Having pigeons with me this time I sent a message by that means to ask for vigorous counter battery work and to have the mobile section of P.A. sent up. Response was soon forthcoming to these requests but not much diminution of the hostile shelling was noticeable.

I was faced with deciding between relinquishing ground won and seeing my battalion systematically blown to bits by artillery. I chose the former and ordered a withdrawal to the rear of the crest line, the objective line of the morning not to be passed. This order was carried out, 58th on the left, and 59th on the right conforming. I left posts on the ridge for some hours but eventually withdrew them also as there seemed every possibility of their suffering from the fire of our own guns as well as those of the enemy. At dusk I sent two companies forward again to seize and hold the ridge, 58th and 59th BNS. conformed and a line was established and consolidated from MINT COPSE to ESTREES.

The men were very much exhausted by this time from want of sleep, gas, and the strain of the constant shelling. That night units of the 2nd Aust. Division relieved us in the forward positions and we withdrew at 2 am. to the positions previously occupied along the BELLICOURT TUNNEL, where a hot meal was waiting for the men. Unfortunately the stew in the hotboxes had turned sour owing to the jolting it had been subjected to on the pack animals and the length of time it had been kept closed up as a result of the late relief. Authority was therefore given to consume the meat in the battle rations where necessary.

The section of Light Horsemen attached to the battalion during the operations of 1st Oct. did excellent service carrying despatches under heavy shell fire. Fortunately both Brigade and Battalion signallers soon had communication by 'phone established thus saving the Light Horsemen.

*Hasd. D. D. D.* LT. COL.  
C.O. 57TH BATTALION. A.I.F.

8th Bde.	5th M.G.Bn.	A.D.M.S.
14th Bde.	5th Pnr.Bn.	5th D.Train.
15th Bde.	5th D.Engrs.	D.A.P.M.
5th D.Arty.	5th D.Sigs.	"A.Q".

Ig	2nd	A A A
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Following wire from Aust Corps aaa begins  
 aaa please convey to all Commanders, Staffs  
 and troops of 3 and 5 Aus. Divs. my sincere  
 appreciation of and thanks for their fine work  
 of the past three days aaa confronted at  
 the outset of the operations with a critical  
 situation of great difficulty and hampered  
 by inability to make full use of our artillery  
 resources these divs. succeeded in completely  
 overwhelming a stubborn defence in the most  
 strongly fortified sector of the Western Front  
 aaa This was due to the determination and  
 resource of the leaders and the grit endurance  
 and fighting spirit of the troops aaa nothing  
 more praiseworthy has been done by Australian  
 troops in this war aaa General MONASH aaa ends.

From.

5th AUST. DIV.

(Z)

*John A. Chapman*  
*Capt.*



8th Bde.	5th M.G. Bn.	A.D.M.S.
14th Bde.	5th Fnr. Bn.	5th D.Train.
15th Bde.	5th D. Engrs.	D.A.P.M.
5th D. Arty.	5th D. Sigs.	"A.Q."
Ig. 223	3rd	AAA

Following from Gen. RAWLINSOON begins the task carried out by the 3 and 5 Aus. Divns. in clearing the main WINDENBURG system in the neighbourhood of BONY has greatly assured the operation and wish to thank both these gallant divisions for their endurance and tenacity in carrying out a most difficult and intricate operation as Ends.

From 5th AUST DIV.

(Z) *Jim M. Chapman*  
Capt.

Headquarters, 5th Australian Division,  
4th October, 1918.

I desire most heartily to thank and congratulate the Division on the splendid results of their efforts during the recent operations, in connection with the capture of the SIEGFRIED System of the HINDENBURG LINE, from the 29th September to 2nd October inclusive, which compare most favorably with anything that has been achieved by British troops during the war, and the great value of which has been acknowledged in terms of the highest praise by the Fourth Army and the Australian Corps Commanders.

The operations were conducted under most difficult and trying conditions and reflect very great credit on all ranks. The courage and determination of the infantry was only equalled by the gallantry, efficiency and close support of the Field Artillery, afforded, at times, under extraordinarily difficult conditions and at very short notice.

The perfect and whole-hearted co-ordination and co-operation of the Staffs and all arms and branches of the Division were again largely responsible for our success, and the very fine work by the Machine Gun Battalion, Engineers, Signal, Medical and Transport services, and especially the Pioneers on the 29th September deserve special recognition and praise.

On behalf of the Division I wish also to most heartily thank and place on record our appreciation of the great assistance and most valuable support rendered during the operations to the Division by the Heavy Artillery, 5th Tank Brigade, 5th Brigade, R.A.F., 3rd Squadron A.F.C., and 13th Light Horse Regiment, which contributed in very large measure to the successful attainment of all our objectives.

*J. Dalrymple Hobbs.*  
Major-General,  
Commanding 5th Australian Division.