

**AWM4**


**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Tunnelling & Survey

**Item number:** 16/4/9

**Title:** 3rd Australian Tunnelling Company

November 1916



AWM4-16/4/9



WAR DIARY  
OR  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.  
(Brass binding not required.)

3rd  
AUSTRALIAN  
TUNNELING COY.

No. 356  
Date. 11/1/16  
will be printed in manuscript.

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and  
references to  
Appendices

Confidential

War Diary  
of  
3rd Aust. Tully Coy.  
for  
November 1916.

J.B.S.



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 AUSTRALIAN WAR  
 MEMORIAL  
 TUNNERS COY.

**WAR DIARY**  
 or  
**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.**

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
 Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.  
 and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
 will be prepared in manuscript.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
			<p style="text-align: center;"> <u>War Diary</u>  <u>of</u>  <u>3rd Aust. Inf. Coy.</u>  <u>for</u>  <u>November 1916.</u> </p> <p style="text-align: right;"> <u>Confidential</u> </p>	



3RD AUSTRALIAN TUNNELLING COY.  
 No. ....  
 Date 35/11

WAR DIARY

3rd Tunnelling Coy.

Army Form C. 2118.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

19.

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date 1916	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Nov. 1.		<p>Company strength A.I.F. Officers 20 O.R. 679 Attached A.I.F. 2 Officers + 4 O.R.</p> <p>At the beginning of Nov. 1916, the Company received orders to relieve the 258<sup>th</sup> Coy. R.E. in the Hill 70 Sector, Loos, 1<sup>st</sup> Corps 1<sup>st</sup> Army Area (Sheet 36C N. W. 3 + S. W. 1 from H 19a. 30. 30. to M 68. 30. 70.)</p> <p>The 257<sup>th</sup> Coy. R.E. took over the sector vacated by 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Tnlq. Coy.</p> <p>The condition of the work on this Laventie front at the time of Relief is shown in a report by Major Coulter add pages 11 + 12</p> <p>Correspondence R + I: O.S. 56/2 from D.D.O.S. Ref: Issue of Donkeys</p>	<p>Appendix 4.</p> <p>Appendix I.</p>
	Nov. 7.		By this date the 257 <sup>th</sup> Coy. R.E. had completed the Relief at Laventie.	
	Nov. 9.		The 3 <sup>rd</sup> Aust. Tnlq. Coy. marched into billets at Bracquemont (Noeux-les-Mines) (Sheet 36B. 25d. 80. 40)	
			<p>Correspondence R + I: - S.G. 324 from 56<sup>th</sup> Div. Ref: Copy of Instructions from XI Corps app. 3 + instructions from I. of M. 1289 Ref: Gumboots.</p>	5.
	Nov. 12.		<p>On this date the Relief of the 258<sup>th</sup> Coy. R.E. at Hill 70 by 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Tnlq. Coy. was completed</p> <p>Company Order 181: - 2407 Sapper J. T. Silcock was wounded on 11/11/16.          1044 " J. H. Jones accidentally injured on 11/11/16.</p> <p>" 187: - Lieut R. Y. Langdon + Lieut A. C. Morris were granted temporary rank of Captains while commanding sections from 24/7/16 (Extract A.I.F. order No 111)</p> <p>Correspondence R + I: - From Coy M. C.M. 547 Ref: Warning of Miners Underground.          Letter from Major Coulter re above.</p>	<p>Appendix 6</p> <p>" 6a</p>

3<sup>rd</sup> type page 13



WAR DIARY

3rd Tunnelling Coy.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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(Erase heading not required.)

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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date 1916	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Nov.	13	The mining work on the Hill 70 sector in progress by the 258 <sup>th</sup> Coy. R.E., was continued. During the week a total footage of 280 feet in all working faces was obtained (Ref: 10)	
		16	4 D.D.L. & 4 D.D.L. R.I. <sup>off the front line</sup> were driven in hard chalk with flints. 21 D.D.L. <sup>in front line</sup> driven on a grade of 1 in 3 was started on the horizontal, still in hard chalk. 22 D.D.R.I. from the front line had its shaft destroyed by T.M. fire. Rescue work & repairs delayed progress of work. No. 1. L. 1. off the front line trench was connected by a rise to Cameron shaft. Water rose 3' in Black Watch <sup>shaft</sup> and 2' 6" in Gordon shaft. Pumping in progress. This delayed the work as pump was out and pumps installed. Enemy T.M. fire destroyed front line trench & N-23 shaft-top on 15/11/16. A large number of filled sand bags had to be moved. Windlasses were installed for haulage. Complete surveys were in course of progress during this period to correct levels etc. Correspondence R & I: - Extract from A.I.F. Orders of 16/11/16 Re. Promotion of <sup>St.</sup> Capt. Laydon } Appendix 7. from 1 <sup>st</sup> Army 21/752/AMS. of 18/11/16. Ref. the Award of M.C. to D. Grainger } + Capt. Morris. " 8 Correspondence from 3 <sup>rd</sup> Aust. Tnl. Coy. & 51 Caps. Amm. Park } Ref: - attachment to Supply Column. " 9 Report by Sgt. R. L. Ward R.E. of 258 <sup>th</sup> Company, on action of 4207 } Sgt. Berry J. N. & 4400 Lt. Col. Monaghan J. A. at Loos on 19/11/16. " 10 C.M. 752 from Controller of Mines Ref: Musketry Training " 11 A.M. 706 Report by Major Coultter on front line trench at H190 9/2 " 12 A.M. 710 from Major Coultter Ref: J. of M. 1482. " 13 J of M. 1482 from Inspector of Mines. Ref: Mine Trucks " 13a	



3rd Tunnelling Coy.  
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WAR DIARY  
 or  
 INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	1916			
	Jan	17	During this period all the mining was done in hard chalk, a total footage of 375 ft. in all faces <sup>(11 faces)</sup> was driven. All galleries worked, were entered from the front line trench except Skaforth Main which is entered from Pioneer Trench.	
	Nov.		4 DDLIRI was stopped on account of shortage of men.	
			21 DDL. nearing completion. 22 DDRI nearing connection with N°2 Shaft DDRI.	
		23.	N°1 DDRIRI is a new listening gallery. N°2 DDLI was connected with Gordon Main. type page 26	
			<u>COMPANY ORDERS. N°190:</u> - Lieut W. W. Cranmer awarded Military Cross. } 21/11/16. 1300 Spr. W. F. Cassin " Military Medal. }	
			" 191: - 4207 Sgt. Berry J. W. awarded Military Medal } 22/11/16. 4400 L/Cpl. Monaghan J. A. " " }	
			" 192: - St. G. T. Crawshaw & St. O. R. reported for duty & were taken on strength as from 23/11/16.	
			<u>Correspondence R+I:</u> - Reports by Capt. A. Sanderson to O.C. re Inclini Gallery at Shaft 21	Appendix 17
			Behal from Report on Officers & N.R. attending Course at Mine School 21/11/16.	" 15
			Report on St. O. R. Howies work on Post Pipe Work at Red Lamp & at Hill 40 on 27/11/16.	" 16
			Report on Sapper E. Birds splendid work on 28/11/16.	" 17
			From St. Behalon angae Section. Ref: - 244 Spr. R.M.G. Batcher.	" 18
			A sample of Report that used by 3rd Aust. Tully Coy.	" 19
			Added Appendix 20	



3rd Tunnelling Coy.  
22.

WAR DIARY  
or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

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Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and references to Appendices

Place Date Hour

Nov.

24

30

The work in progress during the previous week was continued for the remainder of the month. All the mining was done in hard chalk. The total footage at all faces was 214 feet. Work was considerably retarded by the charging of 2 mines, the blowing of one mine by us + two mines by the enemy. Rescue work + the recovery of bodies followed on the two enemy "blows".

Enemy work with the push-pick or bayonet was heard close to N°22 Shaft R/L, (70' level), being identified by 4 officers on different occasions. It was decided to blow 6000 lbs of ammonal.

+ At about 112' in N°21 DDL, the ground was very broken with deep cracks. Strong flow of water from face, which was plugged.

An enemy camouflaged opposite this gallery was blown at 12.40 a.m. on 27/11/16, destroying our gallery and killing 20 men. Charging had been completed by us + tamping about 10 minutes.

Opposite N°1 DDRILL Chamber, an enemy blow took place at 8 a.m. on 28/11/16, killing 2 men. (Sgt Allen + Sapper Cockton)

COMPANY ORDERS. 197: - 4 Sappers killed in action  
1030 Spr. Horton W. F., 1414 Spr. Edwards L. B. 4468 Spr. Russell of J.  
1122 S/Cpl. Pember J. killed in action 27/11/16.  
970 Spr. Cockton H. " " 28/11/16. + Sgt. J. Allen killed in action 28/11/16  
17 O.R.'s reported missing + Lt. H. Russell + 8 O.R. "gassed"

198: - 2370 Spr. Brockley J. R. 4309 Spr. Daniels R. E. 4431 Spr. Nightingale W.  
4304 Spr. Coulton D. 2893 Spr. Francis H. F. 5258 Spr. Barker C. V.  
killed in action, 27/11/16.  
4364 Spr. James H. L. wounded 28/11/16.

also killed in action 27/11/16  
1364 Sgt. Kerby M. J. M.  
4456 Spr. Reid J.  
4402 " Moore W. J.  
943 " Batson W. H.  
1313 " Christiansen P. M.  
4451 " Praed W. J.  
5014 " Prosser T. G.  
4431 " McLean Hester.  
1273 " Lyons M.  
1071 " Ladd A. E.



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War Diary  
of  
3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Infg. Coy.  
for  
November 1916.

Appendices.

*W.S.*



56  
 Controller of Mines,  
 First Army.  
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O.S. 56/2. 1st November, 1916.

With reference to your C.M.160 dated 21.10.16, the General Officer Commanding approves the issue, under General Routine Order 1133, of an additional 210 "Donkeys" to the 3rd Australian Tunnelling Company R.E. (Higher Establishment).

An indent should be submitted accordingly to the Ordnance officer concerned, which should bear your counter - signature as to necessity for supply.

Should any further Companies on the Higher Establishment join, or be made within the Army, the question of additional supply of "Donkeys" will be taken up as you consider necessary.

Headquarters,  
 First Army.

(sgd) W.H.U.SMITH, Colonel,  
 D.D.O.S., First Army.

O. C.,  
 No. 3 Aust. Tun. Coy.  
 -----



For your information, and necessary action, please.

2/11/16.

*H.H. Gill*  
 Captain R.E.,

for Controller of Mines,  
 First Army.



SECRET.

WAR DIARY

*Appen*

Army Fo

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
3rd Australian Tunnelling Coy.

54th Divn.  
324.

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Remarks & references Appendix

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information

APPENDIX

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D. D. & L., London, E.C.  
(20340) Wt W5300/P713 750.000 3 E 2688 Forms/C2118/16.



SECRET.

56th Divn  
S.G. 324.

XI Corps RHS 837/12.

## NOTES ON CORPS COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE.

XI CORPS H.Q. - 1st November, '16.

PRESENT.- CORPS COMMANDER.  
G.S.O.2., A.Q.M.G., B.G.R.A., C.E., XI Corps.  
G.O.C. & G.S.O.1 5th Division.  
G.O.C. & G.S.O.1 56th Division.

REMARKS BY THE CORPS COMMANDER.

The policy of the Corps is to maintain the defence of the very wide front we are now holding without unduly straining the energies of the men and to give them as much training as possible; and above all to foster the offensive spirit by enterprises against the enemy.

I have been very carefully into the defence of the line, and there is no doubt that we are faced with considerable difficulties, perhaps more than any other Corps in the Army. We are holding a line of over 17,000 yards with about 17,000 Infantry of all ranks. This means that the individual soldier has very little opportunity of rest, recreation or training, and that if the same conditions were to continue for several weeks there is no doubt that the fighting efficiency of the Divisions would suffer.

I have represented this to the Army Commander, and he is going to ask G.H.Q. for another Division for the Corps, and if we get that, matters will become quite easy. I have pointed out that it is not the defence of the line so much as the maintenance of the line which causes us the greatest trouble. You may be sure that I shall do my utmost to improve matters in this respect as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I want you to bring home to the officers and men that they are still taking part in the SOMME Battle, and it is only by weakening our line and throwing extra work on all ranks in one locality, that we can collect sufficient troops for great offensive operations in another.

As regards the strength along the various parts of our line, there are two important localities which we must pay special attention to. The QUINCHY-GIVENCHY Front by the 5th Division which is the most important; and the NEUVE CHAPELLE and LA BASSEE Road front by the 56th Division. The QUINCHY-GIVENCHY ridge gives us the only direct observation obtainable in this part of the country. Were it occupied by the enemy, he would be much more advantageously placed than he is now, and it would constitute a grave menace to BETHUNE. NEUVE CHAPELLE he might attack for sentimental reasons. He would not, however, materially improve his position here.

Our reserves are well placed for the latter, but not so well placed for the former which is the more important of the two. To overcome this difficulty, I have arranged to obtain a call upon a Brigade of the I Corps, which will be resting in BETHUNE in a few days time. I will give you details of that soon as the matter is definitely settled and the troops arrive. Meanwhile, I am arranging for buses to be placed at LA GORGUE to transfer a battalion or perhaps two battalions from the 56th Division to the 5th Division in case of trouble at GIVENCHY. (Information has since been received that there are now two Brigades in Army Reserve - one at BETHUNE and the other about FOUQUEREUIL, which will obviate the necessity for keeping buses ready.)

We must do all we can do increase the strength of companies in the trenches. Suggested means are the reduction of guards and unnecessary specialists; and above all, good organization - where we fail more than in any other respect.

The line, though you may not think it, has had a vast amount of work put into it during the last year and it is in a fairly good state as regards parapets, though in a few places, especially on the QUINCHY Front, it has been badly knocked about by hostile trench mortars. Where we fail, as usual, is in our wire entanglements, and we must use every effort to put them right.

Make them really as strong as those of the enemy. This is doubly



important now that we are holding the line so thinly. Where the front line is under heavy and continual trench mortar fire, it can be held as an out post line and should be organised in a succession of strong points, capable of all round defence and with obstacles in the intervals. In this case, however the support line should be heavily wired; this applies particularly to the QUINCHY - GIVENCHY Sections. In sections where no close support line exists, the wiring of the reserve line should be thoroughly overhauled.

As regards offensive action. There are two methods we can adopt:-

- (a). The action of what may be called fighting patrols who go out with the one object of rounding up hostile patrols in NO MANS LAND, or snatching sentries out of the enemy's lines, sap heads or craters.
- (b). The definite attack on a small portion of the enemy's line with the object of killing the defenders, damaging his mine shafts, machine gun emplacements etc. and driving him back.

I hope you will do all you can to stop the use of specialists on these occasions. We do not want special patrol officers N.C.O's and men, or special raiding parties. Let the company and battalion take it on with such material as there is at hand.

The next important detail is that the initiative for these enterprises should come from the company and battalion and not from the Division and Brigade. We will all do everything we possibly can to encourage companies and battalions to undertake these operations and we will give them immediate rewards as rapidly as possible. Let them know that they are helping our comrades on the SOMME.

As regards fighting patrols, we ought to be able to organise 2 or 3 every night along the Corps front. Everything depends upon observation beforehand, and here the gunners in the O.P.'s can help us. Get to know the habits of the enemy and then the fighting patrols can get a small success here and there and bring us prisoners if possible.

Remember that the rifle and bayonet should be the soldiers weapon on these patrols, and not the bomb.

As regards raids; artillery preparation, except to cut wire is generally not effective. That is the German system. He knocks out our parapets, compels the garrison to move to a flank, and then sends a small party over, which generally gets practically wiped out, and the net result at the end is not very great.

Compare this with our system which is to surprise the enemy actually in his trenches, kill and capture as many men as possible, and compel the rest to run away. Artillery action is very useful to cover the withdrawal but not to prepare the attack.

Points to be remembered in regard to raids are as follows:-

Thorough preparation: reconnaissance by officers of infantry, trench mortars and artillery, and machine guns; some times R.E. and miners.

Selection of locality with several alternatives prepared and the wire cut and kept open.

How to keep the wire open: Patrols, M.G.'s. and T.M.'s. Training of the company for a raid.

A thorough knowledge of the locality of NO MANS LAND, and of the approach, so that everyone can find their way if they get lost.

During one tour in the trenches the company is busy the whole time arranging for the attack. When it comes out for a rest it trains on the model and generally actually on the ground, by means of existing trenches or trenches taped out.



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On the model - The exact task of each party.  
What each party is to carry.  
Where it is to go.  
How long it is to stay there. etc.

Special instructions to all men, if they are taken prisoners not to talk.

In my opinion, a raid - as distinct from a fighting patrol - should rarely be less than one Company; then the whole company with all its Staff and with no specialists can take it on. Two hours is a good time to stay in, as it allows for properly clearing up the place and getting prisoners back, etc. The enemy cannot deliver a powerful counter attack in that time. His artillery barrage has usually ceased and the casualties when withdrawing are usually very slight, especially if our own T.M. and Artillery barrage is properly directed on to hostile Machine Guns.

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*



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11.

Copy G.M. J.C. 11/6/1917 Appendix 4.

REPORT ON FUTURE MINE DEVELOPEMENT ALONG THIS COMPANY'S FRONT.

RED LAMP.

-----

No. 25 Shaft. The right lateral should be driven continuously to connect with No. 2 Shaft workings (L.H. 2) (400') This being done No. 2 Shaft could be dispensed with as a main hauling shaft and kept open sufficiently to serve as an air-way and water shaft also as an exit.

No. 2 Shaft. If the right lateral from No. 25 is not pushed on continuously steps must very soon be taken to retimber the whole of No. 2 Shaft and drives leading from it, as the ground in this part of the mine is very bad on account of the proximity of old workings.

No. 1 and 1A Shafts. The only work desirable here is an underground dugout between the two laterals with a chimney into No. 1 Shaft.

It has been found that cookhouses are destroyed frequently in this locality and a dugout for the men would mean that a large quantity of material would be required to make it strong enough to withstand anything less effective than minenwerfer.

It is always difficult to take heavy material to this part of the line and the underground dugout would require only 2 or 3 men per shift for 10 days. It was intended to use ordinary R.E. sets except that 3' caps and sills would be used instead of 2'6". This takes a low seat along one side and allows a man to pass those sitting down.. If a large stope be taken out near these shafts it would weaken them considerably and no timber would stand for long. If this scheme is adopted No. 1 Main should be repaired. This has not been used for at least 9 months. There should be no difficulty in repairing as the weight on the timber is not excessive.

No. 3 Shaft. Two faces should be carried on in this part of the mine as shewn, the right hand lateral is the most important and must go on continuously to connect with No. 26 Shaft.

No. 26 Shaft. Two faces should be carried here; the left hand lateral is the most important until connection is made with No. 3. The right hand face is to protect new Bodmin Trench.

To recapitulate the important faces are

- No. 25 R.H.l.
- No. 3 Right Main R.H.l.
- No. 26 L.H.l.

The existing faces in Red Lamp should be patrolled by a listening patrol until the scheme of central listening is installed. The wiring of this is being put in and it was intended to carry on with Western Electric apparatus until the seismophones were available when they would be substituted. This is important in view of the scarcity of men.

FAUQUISSART  
& TILLELOY.

-----

No. 24 Shaft. The left lateral should be carried on when possible to protect the new Bodmin Trench, and the connection should be made at once with No. 23. There is a distance of 240 feet to connect. It is advisable to work from 24 end so as to group the



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right and left faces.

No. 23, 22, 21 Shafts. Work should be carried out when men are available. No. 22 Main is the most important and should be pushed out another 60 feet. Patrol listening only is necessary in this section.

CHAPIGNY.  
-----

No. 20 Shaft. Head cover completed the shaft should be sunk as soon as No. 19 is down required depth and the plat cut.

No. 19 Shaft (Incline) should be completed without delay. The shaft is now well in the blue clay, and no difficulty should be experienced, but shaft must not be allowed to stand or it will be lost. As the plat will be about 70 feet out beyond the parapet this will serve as a listening post, allowing the men to sink No. 20. They should be available for No. 20 in 10 days.

No. 18 and 17 Shafts. Listening and pumping only.

WINCHESTER.  
-----

No. 15 Shaft. R.l to be driven on a bearing of 210 deg. for 40 feet.

No. 7 Shaft. Pumping.

No. 6 Shaft. Pumping; When possible the connection around the camouflet to reopen the charge and support galleries should be driven.

No. 8 Shaft. Excavation for head connection is about completed. This shaft must be sunk without delay to protect the new Cord trench.

The most important points in the above to be observed are the sinking or completion of Shafts Nos. 20, 19, and 8, and the driving of connections in and near the Red Lamp Section.

*L. J. Coulter*

z COMMANDING 3rd. AUSTRALIAN TUNNELLING COMPANY.  
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356 Copy To Col in 6000

(1) The Controller of Mines,  
1st A.F.M.Y.

REPORT ON PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WORKING THIS  
COMPANY ON PRESENT FRONT.

TABLE SHEWING PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF MEN ON COMPANY FRONT.

PLACE	DRIVING	LISTENING & PUMPING	N.C.O.'s	TOTAL	REMARKS
Red Lamp	17	5	2	24	
Fauquissart	3	3	1	7	
Chapigny.	4	3	1	8	
Winchester.	8	12	1	21	

TABLE SHEWING DETAIL OF DRIVING & SINKING PERSONNEL.

SECTION	SHAFT NO	MEN	FACES	REMARKS
Red Lamp	25	4	1	
	26	6	2	
	3	7	2	
Fauquissart.	24	3	1	
Chapigny.	20	4	1	
Winchester.	8	4	1	
	15	4	1	

The 257 Company has 206 men on detachment present Winchester fatigue from 56th. Division, 25, totaling 231.

As the men required to work the Company front on new basis amounts to 240, we therefore require another nine (9) men; this of course makes no allowance at all for sick, casualties &c., therefore if the Division allots another 50 or totaling 75 this should cope with sickness, casualties &c. This is a minimum, and I should recommend that a total of 100 (i.e. an additional 75) be obtained if possible.

This 50 men  
from 45 weeks  
that goes 257 Coy.

Major.  
3/11/1916. Commanding 3rd. AUSTRALIAN TUNNELLING COMPANY.



APPENDIX

Q.O.S./4/6/135/A.

E-in-C./R.E.3262.

I-of-M.1289.

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Second Army.  
Third Army.  
Fourth Army.  
Fifth Army.  
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With reference to G. R. O. 1668 dated 7.7.16.

The necessity of increasing the number of thigh  
gun boots to Tunnelling Companies has been represented, but  
as the conditions under which these Companies work are so  
Variable, to increase the number of boots on the establishment  
of all Companies would not be satisfactory.

Authority is therefore given for the scale of issue  
to be increased to 200 pairs per Tunnelling Company, whether  
on the higher or lower establishment, in those cases only  
where it is considered essential and is supported by a Certificate  
from the Controller of Mines in your Army.

G. R. O.,

2.11.16.

(sgd) A. FORBES, Colonel,  
D.D.O.S.,  
for Quartermaster General.

-----

O.C., *N<sup>o</sup>3 Aust. Coy., R.E.*

For your information.



7/11/16.

*[Signature]*  
for Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,  
Controller of Mines,  
First Army.



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O.C., No 3 Aus Coy., R.E.



1. Now that most mine systems have back line entrances, and the forward faces are a considerable distance from the entrance, the existing methods of warning miners underground in case of enemy raid or attack, are insufficient.
2. Mechanical or electrical means of alarm should therefore be installed in all systems.
3. Will you please let me have your proposals, with plan, not later than 14th inst, for installing such methods of warning miners underground ; also estimate of stores required.
4. In the event of your adopting an electric system, the circuits should be limited to separate groups of bells to convenient surface sentry posts. Elaborate schemes of wiring to try and ring all bells in mine system from any single sentry post have not proved successful.

7/11/16. ✓

*G. Williams*

Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,  
Controller of Mines,  
First Army.



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16.  
APPENDIX

Appendix #  
6a

(COPY).

The Controller of Mines,  
First Army/

At the present stage I consider mechanical rather than electrical signals better.

I therefore, propose installing knocker lines & knockers in the Gordon & Black Watch ~~Yves~~ inclines. The former will serve Gordon No. 7 & No. 22 bottom levels and latter will serve Black Watch & 21 bottom levels. This leaves only the listeners patrolling the upper levels and I think that they can be warned by the men on the brace.

19/11/1916.

(Sgd) L.J. Couiter,  
Major,  
3rd Australian Tunnelling Company. ✓



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Appendix 7.17  
APPENDIX

Extract from A.I.F. Orders dated 16/11/16.

x x x x x x x x x x x

3rd Australian Tunnelling Coy.

The undermentioned are granted the temp. rank of Captain while commanding a section - dated 24th July 1916.

Lieut. R.E. LANGDON.

Lieut. A.C. MORRIS.

x x x x x x x x x x x

O.C. 3rd Aust. Tun. Coy.  
-----

For your information.



*A. E. Williams*

17/11/16.

Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,  
Controller of Mines,  
First Army.



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Month	Complete sick	Percentage sick	No. evac sick	Per cent to evac
August	527	4.68	6	.03
Sept.	654	3.83	9	.04
Oct.	698	3.96	9	.04
Nov 1-15	301	3.52	9	.19



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C O P Y

Appendix 7.a  
19.  
APPENDIXThe Controller of Mines  
First ArmyVALUE OF CAMP HOSPITALS IN PREVENTING WASTAGE  
-----

The results obtained by the erection of small camp hospitals in two Companies, which are given below, are very similar to those obtained by other Companies: Where records have been examined, it has been found that men treated in the camp Hospital were able to return to duty after being in Hospital for 4-5 days on an average, whereas similar cases sent to Field Ambulances were lost to the Company for 4-6 weeks. In some of the Companies this has resulted in very serious weakening of strength. The average age of Miners as compared with the Infantry, is high, and there is a tendency for Medical Officers of Field Ambulances to give the older men a longer spell off duty than is necessary: This is undoubtedly a source of wastage, which should be prevented by the erection in every camp of a suitable hut for the treatment of minor cases of sickness:

171 Company R E  
-----

Table shewing daily sick parade and evacuations to Field Ambulances from June 6th- September 30th 1916 -

Month:	Number Reported Sick:	Percentage Daily Sick:	Number Evacuated to F: Amb	Daily Percentage Evacuated:
June 6-30th	270	2-8%	15	:16%
July	439	2-0%	34	:15%
August	278	1-7%	19	:11%
September	312	1-8%	6	:036%

June returns only apply to Headquarters and one advanced billet - in the others the whole Company is included: Camp Hospital was opened on August 12th: The result was an immediate decrease in the number of evacuations and a slight increase in the number of sick, owing to patients in Camp Hospital being returned daily on sick report:

1st Australian Company  
-----

Month:	Number Reported Sick	Percentage Daily Sick	Number Evacuated to F: Amb	Daily Percentage Evacuated
June 6-30th	395	3-0%	46	:3%
July	461	2-7%	30	-17%
August	378	2-2%	12	-07%
Sept	211	1-3%	9	-05%

In this Company the patients in Camp Hospital are not returned on daily sick report: Hospital was opened end of July with the result that there was at once a marked reduction in the number of men sent to Field Ambulance: 68 patients have been treated in the hospital since it was opened: The average stay in Hospital has been 4 days, and in all cases men were discharged to duty: Cases of the same character sent to the Field Ambulance were, on an average, lost to the Company for about six weeks: When it is remembered that the incidence of disease is greater in August than in June or July, the actual saving to the Companies is greater than the above figures show: ✓



APPENDIX

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Headquarters,  
XI Corps.

First Army No. 21/752/AMS. 18/11/16.

With reference to the recommendation forwarded under your No. C.27/168 of the 7th inst. , the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has, under authority granted by His Majesty the King, awarded the decoration stated to the undernamed. (MS H/4116 dated 17/11/16).

The recipient should be informed if possible, and his name will be published in the London Gazette in due course.

THE MILITARY CROSS.

Lieut. W.W. GRAINGER,  
3rd Tunnelling Coy. Australian Engineers.

Headquarters,  
First Army.

*L. McArthur Capt*

ASSISTANT MILITARY SECRETARY  
TO G. O. C. 1ST ARMY



21.

356 APPENDIX

(2)



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O.C. 3rd Australian Sq. Coy R.C.

For information and necessary  
 action. Please convey the Corps  
 Commanders congratulations to  
 Lieut Grainger.

18/4/16.

*[Signature]* Captain  
 for D.A.A.M.C.  
 XI Corps

*[Faint handwritten text]*



APPENDIX

356.

*Appendix 9.*

A.M. 684.

Officer

Commanding 1st. Corps,  
Ammunition Park.

Reference to attached please could arrangements  
be made for us to be attached to a Supply Column in the 1st.  
Corps for M.T. repairs. Our Map Reference is Sheet 36B, L 25  
D 8.4.

*Detmold*

Captain, Adjutant.

18/11/16.

3rd. Australian Tunnelling Coy.

*Command 3<sup>rd</sup> Australian Tunnelling Coy*  
*Your vehicles will be attached for*  
*maintenance to No 40 Divl Supply Coy. whose main*  
*position is E.30.C (MAIN ROAD BETHUNE/NOEUX)*

19.11.16

*C. M. Ritchie* *Lieut Col*  
*Ldg Coy*



## APPENDIX

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Xlth Corps Ammunition Park P1/520.

O.C.,

3rd Australian Tunnelling Coy.

It is regretted that there is no Supply Col attached to Xlth Corps, nearer to you than the 4th Aust D.S.C.

As however you are now in the 1st Corps Area it is suggested that you apply to 1st Corps to be attached to a Supply Column of that ~~Corps~~ Corps.

*B.S. Johnson*

Lt-Col

Commanding, Xlth Corps Ammunition Park

17-11-16.



Copy 256  
 REPORT ON THE ACTION OF NO. 427 SERGEANT BERRY, and  
 NO 4400 LANCE CORPORAL MONAGHAN OF THE

3rd. AUSTRALIAN TUNNELLING COMPANY AT LOOS.

ON 19 / 11 / 16.

.....

At about 8/45a.m. on 9/11/16, No. 105630. Sapper Meikle, 258 Company R.E. was buried by a mininwerfer obtaining a hit on Shaft 22.

Rescue work at once started by four men, two R.E's and two Australians, the R.E's working from No. 2 Shaft, while the two Australians worked from the top. These two almost succeeded in freeing the buried man when another mininwerfer again buried him to the head, also burying the two rescuers. Notwithstanding the heavy and incessant T.M. fire these two men on being freed kept on working until 5/30p.m. when the buried man was got out alive. The trenches in the vicinity were destroyed, and access was only obtained from the open behind the parados. These men kept the head and shoulders of the buried man clear as the sap was continually being shaken in, and stayed with him while the trench was closing in on them. The T.M. fire was most intense for 1 1/2 hours, the spot in which they stayed consisted of about 6 feet of trench, being the only part in the vicinity not levelled.

Signed R.L.Ward. 9/Lieut. R.E.  
 258 Company.

.....



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Appendix 11.

25.

O.C., No 3 Aus Coy., R.E.



Reference Musketry training.

1. There are a certain number of men in each Tunnelling Company, who have never received any training in musketry, and a large proportion of those who have passed musketry course, now require some re-training.
2. It is considered necessary that instruction in musketry be included in the parades the men attend during the period away from the trenches.
3. Short ranges should be constructed, if it is found that the use of an existing range (conveniently situated) cannot be arranged for with the Division.
4. Please advise me by the 26th inst what your arrangements are, for musketry training, and also what you propose in regard to the use of short ranges.

*G. Williams*

20/11/16.

Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,  
Controller of Mines,  
First Army.



AM 706

General Staff.

24th Division :

I have to report having made an examination of the old front line trench at H 19 C 9 $\frac{1}{2}$  1 with the object of inspecting LG 30.

The old front line trench is now blocked and partly filled with wire.

In it evidences of a recent enemy raid were seen namely two bags of bombs (handle type) 5 mobile charges three of which were piled in the entrance of LG 30. The fuse lighter had been pulled but failed to ignite the charges. Bombs and two mobile charges were brought back.

In addition immediately to the left of LG 30 were fresh footprints and newly turned earth going from the trench over the parapet.

I consider that the trench was visited last night during or immediately following the heavy T.M. bombardment which I understand took place around Trench 65 and to the right of that trench.

I reported the matter to the Commanding Officer of the Battalion in the line.

*L. J. Coulter.*

MAJOR

22/11/1916.

COMMANDING 3rd AUSTRALIAN TUNNELLING COMPANY .



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Appendix 13

A.M. 710.

27

The Controller of Mines,  
First Army/

Reference I. of M. 1482, our experience has been in clay, and the short time that this Company has been in chalk does not give us enough experience to more than comment on the questions in I. of M. 1482 as follows:-

1. The repair & upkeep of wooden rails should not be a heavy factor, though it was <sup>so</sup> in the clay mines.
2. Some saving of labour with steel track and flanged wheels should be obtained, as it is certainly easier for the men and a greater amount of spoil could be moved as greater speed would be obtained.
3. 3,000 feet of track, approximately, would be required, i.e. 6,000' of rails for main inclines & main laterals, and 16 pairs of flanged wheels.
- v 4. 4 geared winches would be sufficient for all requirements.

*L. J. Coulter*

Major,

O.C. 3rd Australian Tunnelling Coy.

23/11/1916.

✓



I.-of-M.1488.356  
Controller of Mines,First Army.  
-----

Reference your C.M.675, I recognize that steel track and flanged wheel trucks have definite advantages, in certain cases, over wooden track and rubber tyred wheels and axles, especially where very heavy duty and long life of track are required.

At the same time, the advantage of standardising types is so great that it demands very considerable improvements to justify introducing 2 different types of plant to achieve the same end.

Before taking any action I would like to have further information on the following points raised in your minute :-

- (1) Is the repair and upkeep of wooden rails a heavy factor?
- (2) Is there any saving of labour with either system?
- (3) If rails and flanged-wheels are obtained on a standard basis, roughly what quantities would be required?  
Do you propose a wide application or only in a few long inclines, which you can specify ? (I agree that 40 cm. would be a good gauge).
- (4) If these wheels and axles, and tracks, are made a regular mining store, will you need geared winches placed on the same basis of supply ?

It is absolutely necessary to prove that an appreciable saving in labour will be effected and that the proposal is not one for convenience only, before sanction for purchase of another type of rails and wheels & axles can be agreed to.

G. H. Q.,  
20.11.16.

(sgd) R.N.HARVEY, Brig.-General,  
Inspector of Mines.

O.C., No 3 Aus. Coy., R.E.



Will you please give me your remarks as to (1), (2), (3), and (4), of above letter, as far as it affects your company.

21/11/16.

*G. Williams*  
Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.,  
Controller of Mines,  
First Army.



thing is doing when he loses  
the water from his side - (14)

If the water ceases up we  
may be able to get a chamber  
in on the right hand side  
near the face and I  
think it would perhaps be  
advisable to put an  
anger hole, ~~through~~ that  
we can plug through on  
the left hand side of the  
face in case there may  
be a chamber there  
which we could charge.

The listeners reported hearing  
a trolley just ahead of  
this face a few minutes  
before the relief came on  
at 2 p.m. today.

I am stopping here tonight  
in case of further develop-  
ments if we can get the  
water out.

A. Sanderson  
Capt ✓

24/11/16

Major O.C. 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Tunn Coy. Appendix 14.

The gallery running S.E. from  
the bottom of Shaft 20 struck  
the edge of broken ground at  
about 112 feet. The ground is  
very much fractured on the  
left side going in. At 120 feet  
just as the chambering was  
about to be commenced a heavy  
flow of water started to come  
in at the face. This was about  
half an hour before I arrived,  
approx 2/30 p.m. I sounded  
the ground on the left side  
of the face and it is very  
drummy, almost too much so  
for broken ground. It sounds  
as if there may be a chamber  
or cavity filled with water  
there. Probably the camouflet  
budded down to form a  
chamber and it has since  
filled with water. Lt. Russell has  
plugged the crevices as much  
as possible and is installing  
a pump to force the water  
into Black Watch. The Boss  
will probably judge that some



1100

As the space between the water and the back was full of foul gas I could not get in to make a detailed examination. The water being too deep to allow the proto apparatus to be worn. I estimate that there is from 15,000 to 20,000 gallons of water in the bulled gallery. This could not be got rid of in less than about ten days ~~working~~ pumping in the same way and with the same apparatus as previously <sup>used</sup> in Black Watch. If the power pump can be obtained right away we could quickly get to the end of the gallery. The line through Black Watch is being lifted and two men will be stripping the back today, more if possible. About 20 feet is being left open under the rails in the deepest part for a pump as was done at Gordon Slant. The proto men will make an examination of the 60 ft level at 21 Shaft this morning and I will probably examine them myself.

A. Sanderson  
Cap.



Appendix 14a

5/12/16

The 30.

3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Imm. Coy

The incline gallery from the bottom of Shaft 21 is quite sound to the ~~foot~~ of the slope (about 50 feet from the top of slope). I could not get in any further as the level portion of the gallery is nearly full of water. Looking along the surface of the water the gallery appears to widen out as it goes in and also the back gets higher. In plan it would show as follows:-



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APPENDIX

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XI

Appendix 14a

5/12/16

The Co. 3rd Aust. Inn. Coy

The incline gallery from the  
A. 0. 11. 21 is about 50m

*[Faint handwritten notes, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]*

No. 1

Rect cor to 31 17



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On a recent occasion Lieutenant O.R. Howie when firing a push-pipe of which the leads had been cut by intense shell fire, went over the parapet under very heavy fire and placed 50lbs of ammonal on the pipe and successfully exploded it. The previous night he had worked under machine gun fire for 2½ hours adjusting the pipe.

On 27/11/1916 after an Enemy "Blow" causing casualties he organised the rescue parties and led them into the mine, thereby saving lives and performed valuable exploration work underground. He carried out this arduous and dangerous work for 34 hours until relieved.



~~Copy~~ Confidential

On 28/11/1916 when ~~an~~ Enemy <sup>exploded a mine No. ---</sup> "~~blow~~" occurred, Sapper Bird was in a gallery with 3 other men, one of whom was killed outright, the remaining three men were knocked over and affected with gas. <sup>Two of them</sup> ~~but~~ reached the shaft ~~except one man~~. Sapper Bird on finding that <sup>he was</sup> ~~the sapper~~ had been left in the drive at once went back and brought him out, and half carried and half dragged the almost insensible man up a 100' shaft, though suffering from the shock of the explosion <sup>and knowing well the dangers from gas, which was</sup> ~~and the effects of gas.~~ <sup>already affecting him.</sup> He collapsed on reaching the top.

Recommend for Mil Medal (Immediate Reward)





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32.

APPENDIX

*Appendix 18.*

Mr

In reply please quote

No. 22127

ANZAC SECTION, 3rd ECHELON. G.H.Q.  
British Expeditionary Force  
28th November 1916.

COMMANDING OFFICER  
3rd Australian Tunnelling Company.  
B. E. F.



Re No. 2440 Sapr Butcher R.M.G.  
-----

Your A.F. B.2069 received in this office on 14-11-16 shows the above named soldier awarded punishment of 2 days No.1 F.P. and 14 days F.P. No.1 for Drunkenness and Disobedience of Orders respectively on 6-11-16.

It is pointed out that, as both awards were made on the same date, Sapper Butcher only forfeits pay for 14 days, as forfeiture of pay commences on day of award, these awards running concurrently.

In this connection, your attention is directed to K.R. 494 and footnote thereto, relative to joint awards.

Forwarded for your information, please.

*W. Rawford* Lieut.  
Officer i/c Records.



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Coy. No Section. WORKING REPORT for 24 hours ending 6 A.M. / /19

Army Form C. 2118.

WAR DIARY

Description of Work	Shift	Measurement			Name of Faceman	Number of Spoilmen		REMARKS
		On	Off.	Adv.		A. I. F.	B. E. F.	
	Day							
	Afternoon							
	Night							
	D							
	A							
	N							
	D							
	A							
	N							
	D							
	A							
	N							
	D							
	A							
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	N							
	D							
	A							
	N							
	D							
	A							
	N							
	D							
	A							
	N							

Shift	No of Relief	On Duty	NUMBER of		NAMES of N. C. Os A. I. F.	NAMES of N.C.Os. and Unit. B. E. F.	Remarks.	
			A. I. F.	B. E. F.			Officer in charge.	
Day		Facemen					ABSENT	A. I. F.
		Spoilmen					Leave	
		Carrying					Hospital	
		Listeners					Headqtrs	
		Sentries					Otherwise	
		Others					Absent	
Afternoon		Facemen					Leave	
		Spoilmen					Hospital	
		Carrying					Headqtrs	
		Listeners					Otherwise	
		Sentries					Absent	
		Others						
Night		Facemen					Leave	
		Spoilmen					Hospital	
		Carrying					Headqtrs	
		Listeners					Otherwise	
		Sentries					Absent	
		Others						



Appendix 19.

D. D. & L., London, E. C.  
42340 Wt W3300/P713 750,000 3/18 E 2688 Forms/C218/10.



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MINING NOTES No. 75.

MAINTENANCE OF EFFICIENCY IN MINE RESCUE WORK.

replaced  
by later  
circular  
C.M.1263

In order to test the working efficiency of the organization for Mine Rescue Work, periodical Mine Rescue Practices should be conducted under conditions approximating as closely as possible the conditions en service, on the following lines :-

1. The practice should be held once a week under the Officer detailed as O. i/c Mine Rescue Work of the Unit, assisted by the N.C.C. Instructor of the Company.
2. The practice will commence with an actual emergency call and will be controlled from the Mine Rescue Stations, which should be taken in rotation.
3. The work should include -
  - (a). Exploration of galleries.
  - (b). Driving, repairing and clearing of galleries.
  - (c). Sandbag carrying and tamping.
  - (d). Rescue work underground and use of Mine Stretcher.
  - (e). Code signalling.
4. Proto and Salvus Sets which have been longest in the trenches will be used. The apparatus used for the practice will be returned afterwards to the Mine Rescue School for exchange, thus ensuring a regular turn over of the stock held at the Mine Rescue Stations.
5. A report of the practice should be rendered on the attached form. This form should also be used when reporting Mine Rescue Work done in connection with our own or enemy blows.

In addition to the above practical tests, the following steps should be taken to prevent men forgetting what they have learnt :-

The Officer in charge of the Rescue Organization

of the

Should be sent to  
Who will note  
Return

APPENDIX 20<sup>34</sup>

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of the Company should at regular intervals give lectures on -

- (a). Mine Gases and Gas Poisoning.
- (b). Rescue Work and Apparatus;

and the Medical Officer of Company should give practical demonstrations on the treatment of Gas Poisoning, administration of oxygen, artificial respiration and First Aid. The Novita Set used for demonstration purposes, should be returned to School for recharging every week.

All available N.C.Os and all trained men should attend these lectures, and have actual practice in giving oxygen and doing artificial respiration.

A complete inventory of apparatus and rescue material should be hung up in each Station and copies kept at Company Headquarters. The amount stocked should be in accordance with the scale advised in the Revised Memorandum of Gas Poisoning in Mines. (S.S.308).

A bi-weekly inspection of all Stations should be made by the Company Instructor and all apparatus etc, overhauled and checked with the inventory, and deficiencies reported. A record of this visit should be entered in a book kept by the Instructor and signed by the Officer in charge of Company Rescue organization.

G.H.C.

2-11-16.

*R. H. H. H.*

Brigadier General.

Inspector of Mines.



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RETURN OF MINE RESCUE WORK.

carried out under working conditions by

the..... Section ..... Company during week ending.....

Date on which practice was carried out.

Station or Sub-Station used.

Mine in which work was done.

Approximate distance between Station and Mine Shaft.

Time at which call was given.

Time at which squad landed at Mine Shaft with apparatus ready to descend.

Period of time taken by practice.

Name of Officer in charge of operations.

Men employed in practice.	Regimental Number.	Rank,	Name.	Pulse.	
				Before	After.

Type and number of apparatus used.

Work done and Remarks.

(Signed).....