

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/2/3

Title: 2nd Infantry Brigade

May 1915



AWM4-23/2/3

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages
will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

H.Q. 2nd Australian Infantry Bde.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	1915. May 1st	4/45am.	<p>Heavy shelling, commenced at 4.45 am. continued till 7 am. Shell fire continued intermittently during the morning.</p> <p>Shelled by H.E. shells from South East. These shells did very little damage, although they fell in the Section allotted to the Brigade without effect.</p> <p>(The original of above appears on the same sheet as entries for previous month and will be found with the volume for that month).</p>	

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

FROM May 18th 1915.

TO May 31st 1915

& one entry June 2nd 1915

Vol

DATE TIME PLACE	EVENT	Ref to attached. Appdx or Source of Information
ANZAC COVE May 18 th	<p>During action of May 8th/9th The whole of the Bde. Staff became casualties & all documents appear to have gone astray.</p> <p>Lt. Col D. S. WANLISS. 5th Battalion assumed command of the Bde vice Lt. Col. W. K. Bolton 8th Battalion invalided</p> <p>The Brigade was in reserve in SHRAPNEL GULLY. Bivouaced near the junction of MONASH and WALKER ROAD</p> <p>Night 19th/19th Enemy delivered attack all along line. The Bde were not called out.</p>	<p>ROR</p> <p>ROR</p>

Time. Place. Date	Event	References.
ANZAC COVE. May 19 th	Bde remained in Support. furnishing road making parties by day & supporting 1 st Bde with 4 Coys & 2 M.G. sections by night. The Bde also furnish 1 Battalion per night as reserves. Including Picquet 4 Coys as above supported 1 st Bde	RVP.
Night 20/21	The remainder of Bde were called out & occupied supporting points covering MONASH RD & WALKER RD. in case the enemy's attack on front line was successful. The Bde returned to bivouac at daybreak.	RVP.
May 22 nd	Capt R. V. Pollack 15 th Hussars Staff Capt. 2 nd Light Horse Bde appointed Temp. y Brigade Major Aust. Div. Order 137. Brigade employed as on 19 th	RVP.
May 23 rd	Capt. C. H. Jess. Staff Capt. 4 th Inf. Bde appointed ^{by} Brigade Major vice Major W. E. Carr. Severely wounded vide Aust. Div. order Pt II 55.	D.O Part II No 55 para 182

Time. Place. Date	Event	References															
ANZAC Cove May 23 rd	Capt. Yess did not take up duty on this day. Bde employed as on 19 th and in general reorganisation.	RUP															
May 24 th	Armistice from 7.30 am till 4.30 pm granted to enemy to bury their dead.																
May 25 th	H.M.S. TRIUMPH supporting our R Flank in ANZAC Bay was torpedoed by submarine.	RUP															
May 26 th	The Bde was reinforced by arrival of 450 (about) reinforcements on night of 26/27. Strength of Bde on morning 26 th <table> <tr> <td>H.Q. & Signals.</td><td>6 Officers</td><td>30 others</td></tr> <tr> <td>5th Bn.</td><td>14 "</td><td>411 "</td></tr> <tr> <td>6th Bn.</td><td>11 "</td><td>383 "</td></tr> <tr> <td>7th Bn.</td><td>17 "</td><td>386 "</td></tr> <tr> <td>8th Bn.</td><td>13 "</td><td>685 "</td></tr> </table> <p>Capt. C.H. Yess arrived & took over duties from Capt R.V. Pollock. 1.35 PM</p> <p>Officers Commanding Units. (Temporarily) 5th Major F. de Maistre. 7th Capt. T.H. Weddell CHJ 6th Major H.G. Bennett. 8th Lt Col C.H. Brand</p>	H.Q. & Signals.	6 Officers	30 others	5 th Bn.	14 "	411 "	6 th Bn.	11 "	383 "	7 th Bn.	17 "	386 "	8 th Bn.	13 "	685 "	RUP Report of Operations May 8 th 9 th Compiled by Order of Div. HQ from available Signal Messages etc. Copy attached Appdx "A" RUP. RUP.
H.Q. & Signals.	6 Officers	30 others															
5 th Bn.	14 "	411 "															
6 th Bn.	11 "	383 "															
7 th Bn.	17 "	386 "															
8 th Bn.	13 "	685 "															

Time Place & Date.	Event.	References.																								
ANZAC COVE May 27 th	Bde remained in reserve, & continued reorganization & divisional duties	CHJ																								
May 28 th	As for 27 th inst. Captain R. V. Pollock simply attached for duty as Staff Captain Captain G. Ebeling 8 th Bn, who had been temporarily performing duty since 9/5/15, returned to unit.	CHJ DO Part II para 186																								
May 29 th	Heavy firing commenced along front at 3.20 AM, & continued till about 6.30 AM. Bde remained in reserve. Shrapnel bursting over 7 th & 8 th bns in forenoon. At 7.57 AM. G 78 received fr-BRAUND'S HILL garrison to be returned in position. Recommened & try by maxim fire from there to give assistance to QUINN'S Port which is being heavily attacked. Captain Ebeling & Lt Findlay instructed to report to 1st Brigade, & carry out necessary duty 8 AM.	CHJ - STATE. Unit Offrs Others <table> <tr> <td>B H Qrs</td><td>5</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr> <td>Bde Sect Signrs</td><td>1</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr> <td>5th Bn</td><td>15</td><td>516</td></tr> <tr> <td>6 "</td><td>12</td><td>522</td></tr> <tr> <td>7 "</td><td>15</td><td>540</td></tr> <tr> <td>8 "</td><td>13</td><td>826</td></tr> <tr> <td></td><td>61</td><td>2434</td></tr> <tr> <td>Total</td><td></td><td>2495</td></tr> </table>	B H Qrs	5	12	Bde Sect Signrs	1	18	5 th Bn	15	516	6 "	12	522	7 "	15	540	8 "	13	826		61	2434	Total		2495
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Total		2495																								

Time Place Date	Event	References.
ANZAC COVE May 29 th (cont)	8 th Machine Gun section ordered into position at 9.30 AM. - 2 Officers 111 men (miners) attached to No 3 Duties as shown fully on 19 th ^{Defence Section}	CH. J.
May 30 th	Captain G. Kirby 8 th Batta severely wounded by Shrapnel while in bivouac. In reserve. 8 th Inf M. Gun section relieved from BRAUND'S HILL 5.30 PM. returned 7.30 PM. At 9.42 PM. Warned to be in readiness to occupy SUPPORTING POINTS. 8 th Batta detailed 9.45 PM but were not called on.	CH. J. Major Glasford G.S.D.
May 31 st	In reserve.	

5.17

Appendix A

1

Report of Operations of 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde
at Cape Hellas from May 6th 1915 to

May 6th Embarked at ANZAC Cove at 4am in Fleet Sweepers.
disembarked at Cape Hellas at about 9am on
same day. Went in to bivouac at 168 Y3
(3rd PYLONG) and came under orders of
G.O.C. Composite Divn (Gen Paris)

May 7th Remained in reserve as above.

May 8th Brigadier issued orders to Battalions to be ready
to move forward at 9am.

At 11.15am the following message was received
from G.O.C. Composite Divn

"Brigade will proceed to Square 169A and act
in support of 29th Divn for N.Z. Brigade as
necessary. A.A.A. Establish communication by
wire to your present H.Q. from Square 169A and
inform me when you are through. acknowledge"

From H.Q. Composite Divn. File 138. 11.10am.
The Brigade remained in reserve ~~at~~ in readiness
to move. Bivouac sites were selected & men
had commenced to dig in & cook their evening
meal at ~~4.25pm~~ 4.55pm the following
message was received.

"You will be required to attack at 5.30pm
precisely between the valley you are now
in and the valley just S.E. of KRITHIA
— SEDD EL BAHR road AAA Move forward

5.18

2

at once until you are in line with N.Z. Bde on your left and your right on the valley S.E. of KRITHIA RD. This will be in advance of Composite Bde Trenches A.A.A. The Composite Bde ~~will be~~ under Col: Carson will support you A.A.A. Your objective is the ridge beyond S^W KRITHIA with your Right somewhat thrown back to join hands with the French or 2nd Naval Bde, who are at present on the French left." From G.O.C. H.Q. Composite Divn Hill 138. 4.20 pm

At 4.57 pm Battalions were warned to be ready to move at a moments notice.

At 5.5 pm The following Operation Order was issued by Col J.W. Mc Kay Commandg: 2nd Aust Inf Brigade.

1. The Brigade will attack at 5.30 pm between the valley we are in running through 176 W and the valley East of KRITHIA RD. running through S.E. Corner of 176 X

2 The 6th & 17th will be firing line & supports 6th on our left, 17th on our Right.

The firing line of 6th & 17th will at 5.30 pm be in line on the left with New Zealand Bde and the right on the valley on our Right. This will bring the firing line in front of the present fire trenches of the Composite Bde

5.19

3

The objective is the ridge beyond KRITHIA with our left further forward than our Right which latter will link up with the French or the 2nd Naval Bde at present on the French left. Every opportunity is to be taken to use the bayonet.

3. 8th Bn & 5th Bn general reserve moving forward direct to their front.

The above order was received by C.O. 5th Bn at 5.20pm.

The following extracts from signal messages available.

All the Brigade Staff are casualties and there is no War Diary or any other documents available.

6.50pm from Composite Divn.

Push on till dark direct attacks on all points which will secure you a good line for the night. At night hold & entrench all ground gained

7.35 To Comp: Divn

Bde 350 yds in front of firing trenches & had started to dig in. They were unsupported on both flanks.

7.40.1 To Comp Divn

Asking for reinforcements to meet possible counter attack

5-20

5

7.43 pm. Reinforced by 100 1st Bn Lancashire Fusiliers.

7.55 pm. I shall be badly impeded on my left by day light unless reinforced.

8.10 pm. Satisfactory fire line established. Bde is being heavily attacked & is still unbroken.

8.20 pm. Dwn asked to send Staff Officer to Bde HQ as there was no Officer there except Capt Gould. Dwn: Signal Coy who was doing well.

Communication urgently needed & reinforcements asked for.

8.33 pm. Still being heavily attacked.

8.53 pm. Asking for troops to come up on flank.

9.15 pm. A 2. Bde came up on left of Bde.

9.31 pm. Heavily attacked, reinforcements again asked for.

9.58 pm. Battalion Commanders were sent following order.

"During night get your trenches in order, in a good continuous line with traverse to protect you against flanking fire. Also if possible reorganise Coy & form support to firing line with some of your men."

10.51. To Comp Dwn:

I think I can hold now if my Right is safe.

11.30. Food & water urgently needed.

May 9th

6

12.20 am. Drake Battalion came up on Right of Bde.

2.5 am. Col J. W. McKay commanding 2nd Inf Brigade wounded.

3 am. Lt. Col Bolton assumed command.

5.22. Asking for artillery support by day, as Bde had been severely cut up & was rather disorganised.

8.30. G.O.C. congratulates troops on their fine effort and orders all positions to be strengthened & units reorganised and careful reconnaissance to be made to assist in next advance.

9 am. Major Sketchley Staff Officer reported to G.O.C. that position was satisfactory.

10.2 am. Trenches in firing line extend from 176.55 to Y.5.

1 pm. Lt. Commander Lewis Naval Bde reported that his men were dead beat & his right exposed as the French had not come up.

Bde held its position for remainder of day.

May 10th Bde held to position.

May 11th Bde held to position during night of May 11th / 12th. The Bde was relieved by ~~the~~ Lancashire Fusilier Bde.

May 12th The Bde bivouaced in trenches in Sq 176 A9.

~~May 12th The Bde bivouaced in trenches in Sq 176 A9.~~
They then withdrew to bivouac in Sq 168 X 9.

5.22

May 13th. 14th 15th Rested in bivouac

May 16th Embarked for ANZAC at 11am + 4pm.

May 17th Disembarked ANZAC about 8am.

Attached copy of Lt Col Bottoms despatch to
G.O.C. Composite Dwn:

type

25/5/15.

R. L. Pollok. Capt 15th Hussars.
Tempy B. In.
2nd Aust Bde.

Copy

8

From Lt Col Bolton.

Commandg 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde

To G.O.C. Composite Divn 13. V. 15.

Sq 168 x 9.

Sir

I have the honour to make the following report concerning the operations in which this Bde was involved since the night of 8th 9th May 1915. The Brigade had received orders from the Brigadier (Col J. W. McKay) to attack. Our objective being the ridge in rear of KRITHIA village and our advance being bounded by the gullies Sq 176 S. & Sq 176 V.

The Brigade commenced the attack at 5.30 pm.

The 6th 17th Battalions formed the firing line.

The 5th & 8th The Supports.

During the advance the ^{Bn}~~Bde~~ became very mixed, owing 1st to the rapid nature of the advance, which was carried out under heavy fire from Artillery and to the fact that the supporting Battalions were not clear as to the Battalions they were to support.

After the leading Battalions reached the line

Sq 176 R.S.W.X - 3 in 300

Major Bennett (6th Bn) who was the Senior Officer present gave the order to dig in, and sent back word to say that he was in.

5.24

9

advance of the Troops on his Right & Left. and that further advance was not possible. This was at dusk.

Under very heavy rifle & Machine Gun fire, for both attacking lines were in the open, the Brigade continued to dig themselves in with entrenching tools and the picks & shovels they had brought with them.

At 3 am the men had dug themselves in.

I returned from the support line in order to get touch with Bde H.Q.

I discovered that the entire staff were casualties & I assumed command.

I made my H.Q. and ordered Capt. Gould Divn. Sig. Coy. to establish communications between myself & both the firing & support line.

The Brigade was now established in 2 lines the 1st at Sq 176 R.S.W.X. - 3 in 300 the 2nd approx 75 yards in rear.

Communications trenches were commenced between the lines and from the fire trench to the spot in the nullah on the left which ammunition & supplies could be brought with a certain amount of safety.

A very heavy fire was kept up on Sat night May 8th & 9th. Until the night of 11th/12th when we were relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Bde.

10

525
The men were in the trenches they had dug without overcoats blankets or ground sheets. The Battalions were mixed up in both trenches and the casualties amounted to something under 50%. The casualties among Officers & N.C.O.s being particularly heavy and I was obliged to ask the G.O.C Composite Divn to relieve me.

The supply of ammunition was undertaken by 2nd Lt James (8th Bn) and by making an opportunity of every lull in the enemy's fire he managed to keep the Brigade supplied regularly from the Advance Depots he had formed.

The supply of Rations was carried out by Capt Milner (A.A.S.C.) and Capt Comins (6th Bn) and Lt Hopkinson on the same lines. From Bde H.Q. I placed Major Bennett in command of the firing line & Lt Col Wainwright in command of the Support lines. The greatest difficulty was experienced in collecting the the wounded & burying the dead.

The former was rendered difficult on ~~the~~ account of enemy's rifle fire and during the night of 8th 9th from ~~the~~ rifle fire from the troops in rear, some 700 yds of our lines.

5.96

11

After the first batch of wounded had been despatched, stretchers became very scarce as many were taken as far as the beach and were not available for several hours, while others were actually left on the hospital ships.

The burial of the dead could only be carried out at certain periods of the night and at great risk.

Capt. Jackson A.A.M.S. (attached 8th Bn) worked and the Battalion stretcher bearers worked night & day under these trying circumstances several stretcher bearers were hit.]

The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 officers & 1134 other ranks, nearly all of which were sustained during the advance.

On the night of the 11th 12th I was relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade and withdrew the Brigade to the trenches in Sq 176 A - G, where we remained in reserve. On the following morning I withdrew to 168 x 9.

In conclusion I have the honour to bring to your notice the names of the following Officers NCOs & men, whose work came under my own observation.

Major Bennett (6th Bn)

5.27

Exceptionally good work in organising the 2nd firing line. The Commanding Officers of the leading battalions were wounded early in the action & Major Bennett took charge ordered the men to dig in and by his example enabled the men to establish themselves securely in the position they had reached.

(Capt Jackson A.D.M.S. (alt 8th Bn)

Exceptionally good work in collecting wounded under fire. Scarcity of stretchers made it necessary to make many journeys to the zone where the wounded were lying in the zone of fire.

Many stretcher bearers were hit & Capt Jackson collected volunteers & on several occasions led them out himself & assisted in the work.

2nd Lt James 8th Bn:

Exceptionally good work in organising the supply of ammunition to the firing line & supports. He led the parties carrying ammunition himself under fire & showed great skill in judiciously selecting suitable spots for advance depots.]

Capt Ebeling 8th Bn.

Rendered very great assistance in reorganising the Bde: & gallant conduct in frequently carrying orders to the firing line under fire

13

(Sergt. Kuring Police Sergt. of Brigade.
 Exceptional gallantry under fire, was
 practically the only means of communication
 between the flanks during the digging in
 under heavy fire.
 I enclose a list from Battalions which I
 have revised (Not available believed to have been
 sent to H.Q. Composite Divn. with
 I have the honour to be original despatch
 Sir. RDB.

Your obedient servant
 (sd) W. Wilberforce B.M. for C.C. 2nd
 Aust. Inf. Bde.

Note

Whereas The list of recommendations from P.O.
 Battalions were forwarded with original
 despatch. No copies are available in this
 Office.

J. D. Dole ^{Rep.}
 15.2.

26.5/15

2

To G.O.C. Divn: H.Q.

As supplementary to my report of 13th inst. re action
 at ATCHI BABA. I beg to bring under your
 notice the excellent service rendered by
 Capt. Cooper 8th Bn & Lt. Gules 7th Bn. Capt.
 Cooper with 20 men & a sergeant did
 excellent work in securing our left flank
 on the night of 8th 7th inst. Lt. Gules prepared
 excellent sketches of the fire trenches constructed
 by this Bde. so W. H. B. 15.2.15

5.29

16

Supplementary account of operations
of 2nd Inf Brigade on May 8th 1915.

Describing action of 5th 6th 7th & 8th Bns. after the receipt of the C.C. 2nd Inf Bdes operation order, issued at about 5pm on May 8th & already appearing in previous despatch.

The above order was received by Batta Commanders about 5.20pm and the attack was commenced almost at once, very little time being available for the explanation of detail to ~~Supp~~ subordinate leaders. The 6th Bn were on the left of the line, the 7th Bn on the right. The firing line was composed of 6th Bn D & C Coy. 7th Bn A & B Coy. Companies advanced in shallow columns on a frontage of about 250 yds per Coy, until they got close up to the Composite Bde trench where they extended. The supports to firing line consisted of 6th Bn A & B Coy, commanded by Major Bennett & C & D Coys 7th Bn.

The 6th Bn firing line advanced as far as the trench held by the Composite Bde & there stopped for a breather. They were here joined by the supports under Major Bennett 6th Bn, who had been given a

5:30

17

verbal message by de Mast, Staff Capt to push on. The Brigadier then personally ordered Major Bennett to push on, which he did with all the men he could collect. They advanced by rushes for about 350 to 400 yds where they checked & commenced to dig in, as the N.2 Bde had not come up on the left & the French Shrapnel aimed at the Turkish trench about 250 yds to the front were only just bursting clear of them. Time about 6.30 pm.

The 2 Coys of the 7th Bn in the firing line advanced in shallow columns from position A in a NE direction & then changed direction left & extended just before the trenches occupied by the Drake Bn, where they halted & then advanced by rushes for about 350 to 400 yds, where they commenced to dig in about 6.30 pm for reasons above stated & in the fact that the Naval Bde & the French had not come up on their Right. The firing line of the 7th Bn was directed by Major Cass Brigade Major until wounded & then by Capt Weddell 7th Bn. It was some little time ~~the~~ before the supporting Coys came up, they were directed to protect the Right of the line & dig in.

531

18

The 5th & 8th Bn were in reserve. The 5th Bn advanced in double line of fighting columns about 400 yds in rear of Supports to firing line. A, B & C Coys rapidly became merged in the firing line owing to receipt of verbal messages to ~~that~~ push on. D Coy were the first to form the Supporting line.

The 8th Bn crossed the Nullah to the East in order of A, B, C & D. A & B Coys joined on the left of the 5th Bn & became merged in the firing line. C & D Coys were somewhat in rear & most of the men seemed to have reached the firing line, which however was not supported by complete units. The same thing occurred in the Support trench which was composed of bits of all Battalions & other units.

(sd) D. L. Wainwright

Lt Col

Anzac.

29/5/15. Commandg. 2nd Bde.

Each Battalion Commander furnished a report & it was attached to this report & forwarded to 1st Aust. Divn.

D.L.W.

5.39

Account of the action of 5th Battalion after receipt of Brigadier's order on May 8th about 5.20 pm. 14

At 5.20 pm the 5 Bn who were then preparing to go into battle at position A received the operation order.

The Bn was ordered to move in two lines of fighting columns. B & A in first line, A Coy being on the right. C & D Coys about 200 yds in rear of B & A. The leading Coys to maintain a distance of about 400 yds from the supports to the firing line.

The whole to advance with their left resting on the East bank of the nullah.

The leading Coys immediately came under shrapnel fire & had to extend. Reforming on reaching the trench occupied by the "Indian Troops"

from where a further advance was made until the Composite Bde trench was reached about 5.35 pm. The Brigadier was at the trenches & personally instructed me to continue my advance & keep more to the right. This was done. The Brigadier then personally gave an order to one of my Coy Commanders (A Coy) which was on my right. This Coy was ordered to move to its left front and so came on the left of my line. A ~~A~~^B Coy then advanced & became merged in the firing line & commenced to dig in. I established my H.Q. on W side of the KRITHIA RD

5.33

15

about 100 yds in rear of the firing line
 H C Coy on the East of the machine then
 reinforced the firing line. D Coy advanced
 to a point just E of the KRITHIA RD +
 about 150 yds in rear of the firing line. &
 covered the position. At short intervals
 from 7pm small parties from different units
 came up & reinforced different parts of
 the firing line & when the firing line became
 strong enough, the troops on the E & W of
 my H Q commenced to dig in & form a line
 of supports

At about 12 min 8/9 May Lt Col Bolton
 came to my H Q with portion of the 8th Bn.
 He established his H Q about 50 yds to ~~my~~
 the W of my H Q. About 1pm Col Bolton
 ordered me to take command of firing line
 & supports, while he went back to Brigade H Q.
 Shortly afterwards Col Bolton sent me a
 message to say The Brigadier was wounded
 & he had assumed command of the Bde.
 I may add that the ~~line~~ ^{Bn} was under heavy
 Shiapnee fire until it reached the Composite
~~Bn~~ ^{de} Trench & from then on under heavy
 machine gun & rifle fire from the front &
 left front & later from the Right front.

Original reports from C.O. Battalions were forwarded to
 Div H Q attached to this
 Cuzac report ^{ROD}
 May 27th 1915. D Swanlin to Lt
 Commanding 5th Bn.

Confidential
8th May 1915.

Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade, (Australian)
~~Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade, (Australian)~~ *Cape Hill*

9 a.m. Brigadier issued orders to Battalion to be ready to move.
11.15. The following message received from G.O.C.;

"Brigade will proceed to Sq 169A and act in support of 29th Divn. or N.Z. Bde. as necessary. AAA Establish communication by wire to your present Headquarters from Sq. 169 A and inform me when you are through. Acknowledge.

Brigade remain in reserve ready to move. Sites were selected, and men had commenced to dig in, and to

4.55 Cook evening meal. Following message received :-

"You will be required to attack at 5.30 p.m. precisely, between the valley you are now in, and valley just S.E. of Krithia - Seddelbahr Road. Move forward at once, until you are in line with N.Z. Bde on your left and your right on the valley S.E. of Krithia Road. This will be in advance of the Composite Brigade trenches. The Composite Brigade under Col. CASSON will support you. Your objective is the ridge beyond Krithia with your right somewhat thrown back to join hands with the French or second Naval Brigade, who are at present on the French left" -

From G.O.C. Composite Division. 4.20 p.m.

4.57 The Battalions were warned. The following operation -
5.5. Order was issued by Co. J.W. Mc Kay :-

1. Brigade will attack at 5.30 p.m. between the valley we are in running through 176 W and the valley East of Krithia Road running through S.E. corner of 176

2. The 6th and 7th will be firing line and supports - 6th on our left, 7th on our right.

The firing line of 6th and 7th will at 5.30 p.m. be in line on the left with N.Z. Bde. and the right on the valley on our right. This will bring the firing line in front of the present fire trenches of the Composite Brigade. The objective is the ridge beyond Krithia with our left further forward than our right which later will link up with the French, or the 2nd Naval Brigade at present on the French left.

3. 8th Battalion and 5th Battalion general reserve moving forward direct to their front.

5.20. The above order was received by C.O. 1st Battalion at 5.20. The following extracts from Signal Messages available

The objective is the ridge beyond Krithia with our left further forward than our right, which latter will link up with the French or the 2nd Naval Brigade at present on the French left. Every opportunity it to be taken to use the bayonet.

3. 8th Battalion and 5th Battalion general reserve moving forward direct to their front.

The above order was received by C.O. 5th Battalion at 5.20 the following extracts from Signal Messages available.

All the Brigade Staff are casualties, and there is no War Diary or any other document available.

6.50 From Composite Division: push on till dark direct attacks on all points which will secure you a good line for the night. At night hold and entrench all ground gained.

7.35 To Camp Division

Brigade 350 yards in front of firing trenches

and had started to dig in. They were unsupported on both flanks.

7.40 To Camp Division.

Asking for Reinforcements to meet possible counter-attack.

7.43 p.m. Reinforced by 1000 1st. Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers

7.55 p.m. I shall be badly infaladed on my left by daylight unless reinforced.

8.10 p.m. Satisfactory fire line established Brigade being heavily attacked is still unsupported.

8.20 p.m. Division asked to send Staff Officers to Brigade Headquarters as there was no Officer there except Capt. Goold, Divisional Signal Coy. who was doing well.

Ammunition urgently needed, and Reinforcements asked for.

8.33 p.m. Still being heavily attacked.

8.53 p.m. Asking for troops to come up on flank

9.15 p.m. N.Z. Brigade came up on left of Brigade

9.31 p.m. Heavily attacked Reinforcements again asked for.

9.56 p.m. Battalion Commanders were sent following order

"During night get your trenches in order in a good continuous line with traverse to protect you against Flanking Fire. Also if possible reorganise Companies and form supports to firing line with some of your men".

10.51 To Camp Division.

I think I can hold now if my right is safe.

11.30 Food and water urgently needed.

2nd Anst Inf Bde

Attached copy of Lieut. Col. Bolton's despatch to G.O.C.
Composite Division.

25/5/15.

Sgd. R.V. Pollock Capt.
Tem y B.M.
2nd Aust. Brigade.

} This signature attached
to Diary Notes May 6-17
Supplied on 25.5.15

From Lieut. Col. Bolton,
Commanding 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade.

To. G.O.C., Composite Division, 13 v 15.

Sq. 168 X 9.

Sir,

I have the honour to make the following report concerning the operations in which this Brigade was involved since the 8th-9th May 1915. The Brigade has received orders from the Brigadier (Col. J.W. Mc Kay) to attack. Our objective being the ridge in rear of Krithia Village and our advance being bounded by Gullies Sq. 176 S and Sq. 176 Y.

The Brigade commenced the attack at 5.30 p.m. The 6th and 7th Battalions formed the firing line. The 5th and 8th the supports. During the advance the Battalions became very mixed, owing first to the rapid nature of the advance which was carried out under heavy fire from A. Artillery and to the fact that the supporting Battalions were not clear as to the Battalions they were to support.

After the leading Battalions reached the line Sq. 176 R.S.W.X - 3 in 300.

Major Bennett (6th Battalion) who was the Senior Officer present gave the order to dig in, and sent back word to Say that he was in advance of the Troops on his right and left and that further advance is not possible. This was at dusk.

Under very heavy rifle and Machine Gun fire, for both attacking lines were in the open, the Brigade continued to dig themselves in with entrenching tools and the picks and shovels they had brought with them. At 3.0 a.m. the men had dug themselves in. I returned from the support line in order to get touch with Brigade H.Q. I discovered that the entire Staff were casualties and I assumed command. I made my H.Q. and ordered Capt. Gould Divn. Sign. Coy. to establish communications between myself and both the firing and support lines.

The Brigade was now established on two lines, the first at Sq. 176 R.S.W.X. - 3 in 300, the second approximately 75 yards in rear.

Communications trenches were commenced between the lines, and from the fire trench to the spot in the nullah on the left which ammunition and supplies could be brought with a certain amount of safety. A very heavy fire was kept up on Saturday night, May 8th and 9th. Until the night of 11th/12th when we were relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade.

The men were in the trenches, they had dug, without overcoats, blankets, or ground sheets. The Battalions were mixed up in both trenches and the casualties amounted to something under 50 %. The Casualties among Officers and N.C.O's being particularly heavy and I was obliged to ask the G.O.C. Composite Division to relieve me. The supply of ammunition was undertaken by 2nd Lieut. James (8th Battalion) and by making an opportunity of every lull in the enemy's fire, he managed to keep the Brigade supplied regularly from the advance depots he had formed. The supply of rations was carried out by Capt. Milner (A.A.S.C.) and Capt. Comins (6th Battalion) and Lieut. Hopkins on the same line. From Brigade H.Q. I placed Major Bennett in command of the firing line and Lieut. Col. Wanliss in command of the support lines. The greatest difficulty was experienced in collecting the wounded and burying the dead.

The former was rendered difficult on account of enemy's rifle fire, and during the night of 8th/9th from rifle fire from the troops in rear, some 750 yards off our Lines. After the first batch of wounded had been despatched, stretchers became very scarce as many were taken as far as the beach, and were not available for several hours, whilst others were actually left on the Hospital Ships.

The burial of the dead could only be carried out at certain periods of the night and at great risk.

Capt. Jackson A.A.M.C. (attached 8th Battalion) and the Battalion stretcher bearers worked night and day under these tragic circumstances, several stretcher bearers were hit. The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 Officers and 1,134 other ranks, nearly all of which were sustained during the advance.

On the night of the 11th/12th, I was relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade and withdrew the Brigade to the trenches in Sq 176 A - G, where we remained in reserve. On the following morning I withdrew to 168 X 9.

In conclusion I have the honour to bring to your notice the names of the following Officers, N.C.O's, and Men, whose work came under my own observation.

Major Bennett (6th Battalion)

Exceptionally good work in organising the firing line. The Commanding Officers of the leading Battalions were wounded early in the action and Major Bennett took charge, ordered the men to dig in, and by his example enabled the men to establish themselves securely on the position they had reached. Capt. Jackson A.A.M.C. (attached 8th Battalion) exceptionally good work in collecting wounded under fire. Scarcity of stretchers made it necessary to make many journeys to the zone where the wounded were lying in the zone of fire. Many stretcher bearers were hit, and Capt. Jackson collected volunteers and on several occasions led them out himself and assisted in the work. 2nd Lieut. James, 8th Battalion, exceptionally good work in organising the supply of ammunition to the firing line and support. He led the parties carrying ammunition himself under fire and showed great skill in selecting suitable spots for advance depots.

Capt. Ebeling 8th Battalion, rendered very great assistance in re-organising the Brigade and gallant conduct in frequently carrying orders to the firing line under fire.

Sgt. Keating, Police Sergeant of Brigade.

Exceptional gallantry under fire, was practically the only means of communication between the flanks during the digging in under heavy fire.

I enclose a list from Battalions which I have revised (Not available, believed to have been sent to H.Q. Division with original despatch, R.V.P.)

I have the honour to be,
Sir

Your obedient Servant,
W. Wilberforce, B.M., for O.C. 2nd
Australian Infantry Brigade.

Note. The List of recommendations from C.O. Battalions were forwarded with the general despatch. No copies are available in this office.

R V. Pollock Capt.

25/5/15.

5/5/15

To. G.O.C. Divisional Headquarters.

As supplementary to my report of 13th inst. on action at ANCHI BABA I beg to bring under your notice the excellent services rendered by Capt. Cowper, 8th Battalion and Lieut. ~~Cass~~ ^{Gaills}, 7th Battalion, Capt. Cowper with 20 men and a sergeant did excellent work in securing our left flank on the night of 8th/9th May. Lieut. Gaills prepared excellent sketches of the fire trenches constructed by this Brigade.

Sgd. W.K. Bolton. Lieut. Col.
O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Supplementary account of operations of

2nd Infantry Brigade on May 5th 1915.

? May 8

Describing action of 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions.

After the receipt of the O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade's operation order issued at about 5 p.m. on May 8th and already appearing in previous despatches. The above order was received by Battalion Commanders about 5.20 p.m. and the attack was commenced almost at once, very little time being available for the explanation of details to subordinate leaders.

6th Battalion were on the left of the line, the 7th Battalion on the right. The Firing line was composed of the 6th Battalion, D. and C. Coy., 7th Battalion, A. & B. Coy., Companies advanced in shallow columns on a frontage of about 250 yards per Coy, until they got close up to the composite Brigade trench where they extended.

The supports to firing line consisted of 6th Battalion, A & B. Coys., Commanded by Major Bennett and C. & D. Coy, 7th Battalion. 6th Battalion Firing Line advanced as far as the trench held by the Composite Brigade and there stopped for a breather. They were here joined by the supports under Major Bennett, 6th Battalion, who had been given a verbal message by Lieut. Hasty Staff Captain to push on.

The Brigadier then personally ordered Major Bennett to push on, which he did with all the men he could collect. They advanced by rushes for about 350 to 400 yards, where they checked and commenced to dig in, as the N.Z. Bde., had not come upon the left and the French Shrapnel aimed at the Turkish Trench about 250 yards to the front were only just bursting clear of them. Time about 6.30 p.m. The two Coys of the 7th Battalion in the firing line advanced in shallow columns from position A in O.N.E. direction and then changed direction left and extended just before the trenches accepted by the Drake Battalion, where they halted and then advanced by rushes, for about 350 to 400 yards, where they commenced to dig in about 6.30 p.m. for reasons above stated, and for the fact that the Naval Brigade and the French had not come up on their right. The Firing Line of the 7th Battalion was directed by Major Cass, Brigade Major until wounded, and then by Capt. Weddel 7th Battalion. It was some little time before the supporting Coys came up, they were directed to prolong the right of the line and dig in.

The 5th and 8th Battalions were in reserve. The 5th Battalion advanced in double line of fighting columns about 400 yards in rear of supports to firing line. A.B. & C. Coys rapidly became merged in the firing line owing to receipt of verbal message to push on. D. Coy were the first to form the supporting line.

~~crossed~~
The 8th Battalion ~~assisted~~ the Nullah to the East, in order, A.B.C. & D. A. & B. Coys formed on the left of the 5th Battalion and became merged in the firing line. C. & D. Coys were somewhat in rear and most of the men seemed to have reached the firing line, which however was not supported by complete units. The same thing occurred in the support trench which was composed of bits of all Battalions and other Units.

Anzac.
27.5.15.

Sgd. D.L. Wanliss. Lt. Col.
Commanding 2nd Inf. Bde.

9/6/15

Each Battalion Commander furnished a report and it was attached to this report and forwarded to the 1st Aust. Divn.

R.V.P.

Account of an action of 5th Battalion after receipt of orders May 8th about 5.20 p.m. The Battalion was ordered to move into ^{two} lines of column B. & A. Coys. in ~~the~~ first line A Coy being on the right, C. & D. Coys about 200 yards in rear, B. & A. the leading Coys to go the distance of about 400 yards from the supports of the firing line. ^{of the nullah. The leading companies immediately came under shrapnel fire} The whole to advance with their left resting on the East flank and had to extend. Reforming on reaching the trench occupied by the Indian Troops.

From where a further advance was made until the Composite Brigade trench was reached about 5.50 p.m. The Brigadier was at the trenches and personally instructed me to continue my advance and keep more to the right. This was done. The Brigadier then personally gave an order to one of my Company Commanders (A. Coy). which was on my right. The Coy was ordered to move its left front and so came on the left of my line. A. & B. Coy then advanced and became merged in the firing line and commenced to dig in. ^{established} ~~yesterday~~ my H.Q. on West side of the Krithia Road about 100 yards in rear of the firing line. A. & C. Coy on the East of the nullah then reinforced the firing line. D Coy. advanced to a point just East of the Krithia Road and about 150 yards in rear of the firing line. At short intervals from 7 p.m. small parties from different units came up and reinforced different parts of the firing line, and when the firing line became strong enough, the Troops in the East and West of my Headquarters commenced to dig in and form a line of supports. At about 12 m.n. 8th/9th May Lt. Col. Bolton came to my Headquarters with portion of the 8th Battalion.

He established his Headquarters 50 yards to the West of my Headquarters. About 1 p.m. Col. Bolton ordered me to take command of firing line and supports, while he went to Brigade Headquarters.

Shortly afterwards Col. Bolton sent me a message to say, the Brigadier was wounded and he had assumed command of the Brigade. I may add that the Battalion was under heavy shrapnel fire until it reached the Composite Brigade Trench and from then on under heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the front ~~line of and~~ Left Front and later from the Right part.

Original report from C.O. Battalions, were forwarded to Divisional Headquarters attached to this.

Sgd. D.S. Wanli~~as~~

Lt. Col.

May 27th 1915.

Commanding 5th Battalion.

new position, the brigade remained in readiness to move; the troops began to dig in and cook their evening meal.

(B). THE ATTACK ON EVENING OF 8TH. MAY

2. - At 4.55 p.m. on 8th. May the following messages was received at Brigade Headquarters.

"You will be required to attack at 5.30 p.m. precisely between the valley you are now in and the valley just South East of KRITHIA-SHEDD EL BAHIR road. Move forward at once until you are in line with NEW ZEALAND brigade on your left and your right on the valley South East of KRITHIA road, this will be in advance of Composite Brigade trenches. The Composite Brigade under COLONEL CASSON will support you. Your objective is the ridge beyond KRITHIA with your right somewhat thrown back to join hands with the French or 2nd. Naval Brigade who are present on the French left.

From G.O.C. Composite Div. Hill 136 4.20 p.m.

3. - At 4.57 p.m. battalions were warned to be ready to move at a moment's notice and at 5.5 p.m. the following operation order was issued by G.O.C. 2nd. Infantry Brigade :-

- (I) The Brigade will attack at 5.30 p.m. between the valley we are in running through 176 W and the valley east of KRITHIA road running through South East corner 176 x.
- (II) The 6th. and 7th. will be firing line and support 6th. on our left 7th. on our right.

The firing line of 6th. and 7th. will at 5.30 p.m. be in line on the left with NEW ZEALAND brigade and the right on the valley on our right. This will bring the firing line in front of the present fire trenches of the composite brigade. The objective is the ridge beyond KRITHIA with our left further forward than our right which latter will link up with the French or 2nd. Naval Brigade at present on the French left. Every opportunity is to be taken to use the bayonet.

- (III) 8th. and 5th. Battalions general reserve moving forward direct to their front.

4. - The above order was received by battalion commanders about 5.20 p.m. and the attack began as ordered punctually at the hour named - 5.30 p.m.; consequently there was no time to explain the orders and plan to subordinate leaders.

The 6th. and 7th. battalions came under shrapnel fire as soon as they advanced; they extended and pushed on to the trenches held by the composite brigade where a brief halt of 2 or 3 minutes allowed the men to regain their breath. The brigadier who was in the Composite brigade trenches personally urged the men to push on, and the advance was continued for some

another three or four hundred yards in face of shrapnel, rifle, and machine gun fire until checked at a distance of about 400 yards from the Turkish trenches. As the troops on the left had not come into line and the French artillery shrapnel aimed at the Turkish trenches was bursting just clear of the firing line, the order was given about 6.30 p.m. to entrench and hold on to the ground won.

The 5th. Battalion advanced about 400 yards behind the supports and the 8th. battalion rather further in the rear. Bits of both these battalions got into the firing line, behind which were constructed support trenches - held by bits of all battalions of the brigade, as well as by men of other units.

(C) SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

5. 9 Between 7.0 and 10.0 p.m. several messages were despatched asking for reinforcements to meet Turkish attacks. Col. McCoy, the Brigade Commander was wounded about 2 a.m. on 9th. May; Major Cass, brigade Major and Lt. Hastie acting Staff Captain, had been wounded previously. Lt. Col. Bolton, 8th. Battalion, assumed command of the brigade.

6.- During the night 8th/9th. May, the ground won was entrenched and the brigade held this position until relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade during the night 11/12th. May

After relief, the force rested in bivouac on 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th. May; it embarked at 16th. and landed at ANZAC COVE on 17th. May, about 8.0 a.m.

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2

To:- Headquarters,
1st. Australian Division.

From:- O.C. 2nd. Inf. Bde.

Your G.890 D/25/5/15.

Report called for herewith.

All the Brigade Staff who took part in this action are casualties. Consequently the account is only a précis of the available signal messages. There is no War Diary available and no other documents except Lt. Col. Bolton's despatch can be traced.

Anzac Cove.
May 26th. 1915.

Commanding 2nd. Inf. Bde.

Report of Operations of 2nd. Australian Infantry
Brigade at Cape Helles from May 6th. 1915 to

May 6th. Embarked at Anzac Cove at 4 a.m. in Fleet Sweepers disembarked at Cape Helles at about 9 a.m. on same day. Went in to bivouac at 168 Y 3 (S. F.L.M.10) and came under orders of G.O.C. Composite Division (General Paris)

May 7th. Remained in reserve as above.

May 8th. Brigadier issued orders to Battalion at 9 a.m. to be ready to move forward.

At 11.15 a.m. The following message was received from G.O.C. Composite Division.

"Brigade will proceed to Square 169 A and act in support of 29th. Division for H.Q. Brigade as necessary. Establish communication by wire to your present H.Q. Square 169 A and inform me when you are through. Acknowledge"

From H.Q. Composite Division Hill 138 11.10 a.m. The Brigade remained in reserve in readiness to move. Bivouac sites were selected and men had commenced to dig in and cook their evening meal. At 4.55 p.m. the following message was received.

"You will be required to attack at 5.30 p.m. precisely between the valley you are now in and the valley just S.E. of KRITHIA - SHED EL BARR Road. Move Forward at once until you are in line with H.Q. Bde. on your left and your right on the valley S.E. of KRITHIA RD. This will be in advance of Composite Bde. Trenches. The Composite Bde. under Col. Casson will support you. Your objective is the ridge beyond KRITHIA with your right somewhat thrown back to join hands with the French or 2nd. Naval Bde. who are at present on the French left".

From G.O.C. H.Q. Composite Divn.
Hill 138 4.30 p.m.

At 4.57 p.m. Battalion were warned to be ready to move at a moments notice.

✓

At 5.5 p.m. The following operation order was issued by Col. J.W. McKay Commanding 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

1. The Brigade will attack at 5.30 p.m. between the Valley we are in running through 176 W and the Valley East of RITHIA RD. running through S.E. corner of 176.

2. The 6th. and 7th. will be firing line and supports 6th. on our left 7th. on our right.

The firing line of 6th. and 7th. will be at 5.30 p.m. be in line on the left with New Zealand Bde. and the right on the valley of our right. This will bring the firing line in front of the present fire trenches of the Composite Bde.

The Objective is the ridge beyond RITHIA with our left further forward than our right which latter will link up with the French or the 2nd. Naval Bde. at present on the French left. Every opportunity is to be taken to use the bayonet.

3. 8th. Bn. and 5th. Bn. General reserve moving forward direct to their front.

The above was received by G.O. 5th. Bn. at 5.20 p.m.

The following extract from signal messages available.

All the Brigade staff are casualties and there is no War Diary or any other documents available.

6.30 p.m. From Composite Division.

Rush on till dark direct attacks on all points which will secure you a good line for the night. At night hold and entrench all ground gained.

7.35 To Comp. Divn.

Bde. 350 yds. in front of firing trenches and had started to dig in. They were unsupported on both flanks.

7.40 To Comp Divn.

Asking for reinforcements to meet possible counter attacks.

7.43 p.m. Reinforced by 100 1st. Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers.

7.55 p.m. I shall be badly infiltrated on my left by day light unless reinforced.

8.10 p.m. Satisfactory Fire line established Bde. is being heavily attacked and is still unsupported.

8.20 p.m. Divn. asked to send Staff Officer to Brigadier H.Q. as there was no officer there except Capt. Gould Divn; Signal Coy. who was doing well.

Ammunition urgently needed.

Reinforcements asked for.

8.35 p.m. Still being heavily attacked.

8.35 p.m. Asking for troops to come up on flanks

9.15 p.m. H.Z. Bde. came up on left of Bde.

9.31 p.m. Heavily attacked, reinforcements again asked for.

9.50 p.m. Battalion Commanders were sent following orders.

"During night get your trenches in order, in a good continuous line with traverses to protect you against flanking fire. Also if possible re-organise Coy's and form support to firing line with some of your men.

10.51 p.m. To Comp. Divn.
I think I can hold now if my right is safe.

11.30 p.m. Food and Water urgently needed.

12.20 a.m. Drake Bn. came up on right of Bde.

2.5 a.m. Col. J.W. McKay commanding 2nd. Inf. Bde. wounded.

3 a.m. Lt. Col. Bolton assumed command.

5.20 a.m. Asking for artillery support by day, as Bde. had been severely cut up and was rather disorganised.

6.30 a.m. G.O.C. Congratulates troops on their fine effort and orders all positions to be strengthened and units re-organised and careful reconnaissance to be made to assist in next advance.

9 a.m. Major Sketchley Staff Officer reported to G.O.C. that position was satisfactory.

10.2 a.m. Trenches in firing line extend from 176 S 5 to Y 5

1 p.m. Lt. Commander Wells Naval Bde. reported that his men were dead beat and his right exposed as the French had not come up. Bde. held its position for remainder of day.

May 10th. Bde. held to position.

May 11th. Bde. held to position during night of May 11th./12th. The Bde. was relieved by Lancashire Fusiliers Bde.

May 12th. The Bde. bivouaced in trenches in Sq 176 A 9 till about 9 a.m. and then withdrew to bivouac in Sq. 168 X 9.

May 13th. Rested in bivouac.

14th. 15th.

May 16th. Embarked for ANZAC at 11 a.m. & 4 p.m.

May 17th. Disembarked Anzac about 8 a.m.

Attached copy of Lt. Col. Boltens despatch to G.O.C. Composite Division.

Copy

From:- Lt. Col. Bolton
Commanding 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.,

To:- G.O.C. Composite Division, 13.v.15

Sq. 178 X 2

Sir,

I have the honour to make the following report concerning the operations in which this Bde. was involved since the night of 8th. and 9th. May 1915.

The Brigade had received orders from the Brigadier (Col. J. H. Mc. Kay) to attack. Our objective being the ridge in rear of KRININ village and our advance being bounded by the gullies Sq. 178 S and 178 Y.

The Brigade commenced the attack at 5.30 p.m.

The 6th. and 9th. Battalions joined the Firing Line.
The 5th. and 8th. The supports.

During the advance the Bns. became very mixed owing first to the rapid nature of the advance, which was carried out under heavy fire from Artillery and to the fact that the supporting Battalions were no clear as to the Battalions they were to support. After the leading Battalions reached the line Sq. 178 R.S.W.A. - 3 in 300

Major Bennett (6th. Bn) who was the senior Officer present gave the order to dig in, and sent back word to say that he was in advance of the troops on his Right and Left and that further advance was not possible. This was at dusk.

Under very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, for both attacking lines were in the open, the Brigade continued to dig themselves in with entrenching tools and the picks and shovels they had brought with them.

At 3 a.m. the men had dug themselves in I returned from the support line in order to get touch with the Bde. Headq. quarters, I discovered that the entire staff were casualties and I assumed command.

I made my H.Q. and ordered Capt. Gould Divn. Sig. Coy; to establish communications between myself and both the firing and support line.

The Brigade was now established in 2 lines the 1st. at Sq. 178 R.S.W.A. - 3 in 300 the 2nd. approx. 75 yards in rear.

Communications trenches were commenced between the lines and from the fire trench to the spot in the mullah on the left which ammunition and supplies could be brought with a certain amount of safety.

A very heavy fire was kept up on Saturday night May 8th. and 9th. until the night of 11th/12th. when we were relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade.

The men were in the trenches they had dug without overcoats blankets or ground sheets. The Battalions were mixed up in both trenches and the casualties amounted to something under 50%. The casualties among Officers and N.C.O.'s being particularly heavy and I was obliged to ask the G.O.C. Composite Division to relieve me.

The supply of ammunition was undertaken by 2nd. Lt. James (8th. Bn) and by making an opportunity of every lull in the enemy's fire he managed to keep the Brigade supplied regularly from the advance Depots he had formed.

The supply of rations was carried out by Capt. Milnes (A.A.S.C.) and Capt. Collins (8th. Bn) and Lt. Hopkinson on the same lines. From Bde. H.Q. I placed Major Bennett in command of the firing line and Lt. Col. Canlies in command of the support lines. The greatest difficulty was experienced in collecting the wounded and burying the dead.

The former was rendered difficult on account of enemy's rifle fire and during night of 8th. 9th. from rifle fire from the troops in rear, some 700 yards of our lines.

After the first batch of wounded had been despatched, stretchers became very scarce as many were taken as far as the beach and were not available for several hours, while others were actually left on the hospital ships.

The burial of the dead could only be carried out at certain periods of the night and at great risk.

Captain Jackson A.A.M.S. (attached 8th. Bn) and the battalion stretcher bearers worked night and day under these tragic circumstances.

The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 officers and 1134 other ranks, nearly all of which were sustained during the advance.

On the night of 11th. 12th. I was relieved by the Lancashire Fusilier Bde. and withdrew the Brigade to the trenches in Sq. 176 A-4, where we remained in reserve. On the following morning I withdrew to 108 X 9.

In conclusion I have the honour to bring to your notice the names of the following Officers, N.C.O.'s and men whose work came under my own observation.

Major Bennett (8th. Bn.) Exceptionally good work in organizing the firing line. The Commanding Officers of the leading battalions were wounded early in the action and Major Bennett took charge ordered the men to dig in and by his example enabled the men to establish themselves securely in the position they had reached.

Captain Jackson A.A.M.S. (attached 8th. Bn) exceptionally good work in collecting wounded under fire. Scarcity of stretchers made it necessary to make many journeys to the zone where the

wounded were lying, in the zone of fire.

Many of the stretcher bearers were hit and Captain Jackson collected volunteers and on several occasions led them out himself and assisted in the work.

2nd Lt. James (8th Bn) Exceptionally good work in organising the supply of ammunition to the firing line and supports. He led the parties carrying ammunition himself under fire and showed great skill in selecting suitable spots for advance depots.

Captain Whaling (8th Bn.) rendered very great assistance in reorganising the line, and gallant conduct in frequently carrying orders to the firing line under fire.

Serjt. Ayring, Police Serjt. of Brigade Exceptional gallantry under fire, was practically the only means of communication between the flanks during the digging in under heavy fire.

I have to honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) W. Wilberforce B.M. for O.C. 2nd.
Aust. Inf. Bde.

Note

The list of recommendations from C.O. Battalions were forwarded with original despatch. No copies are available at this office.

23.5.15

To: G.O.C. Division Headquarters.

As supplementary to my report of 13th. instant re action at ARUNI BARR I beg to bring under your notice the excellent service rendered by Capt. Cosper 8th. Bn. and Lt. Grills 7th. Bn. Capt. Cosper with 20 men and a sergeant did excellent work in securing our left flank on the night of 8th. 9th. inst. Lt. Grills prepared excellent sketches of the fire trenches constructed by this Brigade.

(Sgd) W.K. Bolton, Lt. Col.
O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade

Supplementary account of operations of 2nd Infantry Brigade on May 8th 1915.

Describing action of 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions after the receipt of the O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade operation order, issued at about 5 p.m. on May 8th and already appearing in previous despatch.

The above order was received by Battalion Commanders about 5.20 p.m. and the attack was commenced almost at once, very little time being available for the explanation of detail to subordinate leaders. The 5th Battalion were on the left of the line, the 7th on the right. The firing line was composed of 6th Bn. A. & C. Coy 7th Bn. A. & B. Coy. Companies advanced in shallow columns on a frontage of about 250 yards per Coy. Until they got close up to the

11.

the Composite Bde. trench where they extended. The supports to firing line consisted of 6th. Bn. A. & B. Coys. commanded by Major Bennett and C. & D. Coys. 9th. Bn.

The 6th. Bn. firing line advanced as far as the Trench held by the Composite Bde. and there stopped for a breather. They were here joined by the supports under Major Bennett 6th Bn. who had been given a verbal message by Lt. Hasty Staff Captain to push on. The Brigadier then personally ordered Major Bennett to push on, which he did with all the men he could collect.

They advanced by rushes for about 350 to 400 yards where they checked and commenced to dig in, as the N.Z. Bde had not come upon the left and the French shrapnel aimed at the Turkish Trench about 250 yards to the front were only just bursting clear of them. Time about 6.30 p.m.

The 2 Coys. of 7th. Bn. in firing line advanced in shallow columns from position A in a N.E. direction and then changed direction left and extended just before the trenches occupied by the Draka Bn. where they halted and then advanced by rushes for about 350 to 400 yds, where they commenced to dig in about 6.30 p.m. for reasons above stated and for the fact that the Naval Bde. and the French had not come up on their right. The firing line of the 7th. Bn. was directed by Major Cass Brigade Major until wounded and then by Capt. Weddell 7th. Bn. It was some little time before the supporting Coys. came up, they were directed to prolong the right of the line and dig in.

The 5th. and 8th. Bn. were in reserve. The 5th. Bn. advanced in double line of fighting columns about 400 yards in rear of Supports to firing line A.B. & C. Coys. rapidly became merged in the firing line owing to receipt of verbal message to push on. D. Coy. were the first to form the supporting line.

The 8th. Bn. crossed the Hullah to the East in order A.B.C & D. Coys. A & B Coys. formed on the left of the 5th. Bn. and became merged in the firing line C. & D. Coys. were somewhat in rear and most of the men seemed to have reached the firing line, which however was not supported by complete units. The same thing occurred in the support trench which was composed of bits of all Battalions and other units.

Commanding Bn. Inf. Bde.

27.5.15

Folio 402

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Appendix No.4

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Report of:- Exactly what took place in 6th. Bn. from receipt of Operation order No.13 by Col. J.W. McKay about 5.15 p.m. on May 8th. until the Bn. eventually reached the line where Bn. interchanged in the night about 7 p.m. on May 8/9th.

At about 5 p.m. on 8th. May the men started their tea.

At 5.10 p.m.

At 5.10 p.m. a written order came to be ready to move at a moments notice. The men were ordered to equip themselves and stand to. The Brigade order for this was in possession of Lt. Col. W.R. Mc. Nicoll. At 5.20 p.m. the Bde. order was received I thought, in message form which instructed as follows:-

"The Brigade will attack at 5.30 p.m. with frontage extending from the Creek on left to the Creek just to our right of the KRITHIA ROAD. Firing line and supports 5th. Bn. (on the left) and 7th. Bn. (on the right). Reserve 5th. & 6th. Bn. Objective - Hill behind KRITHIA. Our line on the left will be extended by New Zealand Brigade and on the right by either the French or the Naval Division.

This message was in possession of Lt. Col. Medlicott (wounded) Our C.O. told me to immediately inform Coy. Commanders of the order of attack detailing "B" (on left) and "C" (on right) Coys. as firing line and "A" (left) and "B" (right) Coys. as support.

I told them that each Coy. would occupy about 50 yards our left resting on the creek - to be in trench with on right - 7th. Bn. - and on left NEW ZEALANDERS.

The Coy. Commander could only give brief indefinite details to their subordinates which they did. Then C. & B. Coys. moved up the creek for about 30 yards and then up the bank into position ready to advance. It was then 5.30.

Shrapnel started pouring into our position in the creek - wounding very few. Also stray bullets were thick and were pouring just over our heads.

I was detailed to command the supporting Coys. The C.O. Adj. and signallers occupied a dug out on the Creek.

When the firing line Coys were clear of the creek, I sent up the supporting Coys. to their positions, ready for the advance - going with the 1st. company.

They got into position and immediately moved forward.

As these Coys. were leaving the Creek, Lt. Hastie the Bde. Staff Captain came there and said "Get on as quickly as you can. The Brigadier has personally led the firing line right up to the trench" The men thinking that the trench referred to was the enemy's got very ~~near~~ *near* *been*

The supporting Coys. after moving forward about 200 yards came to a trench occupied by British Troops. They dropped into this for a breather & a rest. Almost immediately the Brigadier came into my view of the parapet and said "Don't stop here. The 5th. Bn. will get there before you". I said, "We are only stopping for a breather Sir" He said "Go on Push on" You need not run, Walk I got out of the trench and passed on at a walk taking as many men with me as I could grab hold of. I found a very thin line in front of my left about 50 yards in front of our trenches and none on my immediate front. I filled this gap and seeing it was useless to push on further ordered the men to hang on and not go forward. To go forward from this position meant unnecessary loss and it also meant we might have lost the ground we had already won. I sent word along our line both ways to find out if we had touch with any other troops on our flanks.

13.

From the left I learned "No touch with anyone of the left" This I reported. Then I ordered to men to dig themselves in where they were - every second man firing while the other dug. Reinforcements continually arrived but always in the centre. The consequence was the centre was crowded.

Then I received word along the line that we had touch with New Zealanders on the left but that the part of our line nearest the creek was very thin and that we had touch with no troops on the right.

All this I reported asking that supports should be sent to the left of our line. This was done. The entrenching proceeded during the night.

(Sgd) H.G. BENNET Major.
Commanding 8th. Bn.

Folio 403
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27.5.15

Appendix No.4
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From:- C.O. 7th. Bn. A.I.F.,

To:- 2nd. Inf. Bde.

On May 8th. 1925 at 5.15 p.m. Lieut. Col. Gertside, sent for me and told me I had two minutes to fall in my Company (A.Coy) After having formed up the Company, I was told to get a move on, and when I asked what was expected of me, was informed that we were about to attack the enemy, that I was to take charge of the firing line A. & B. Coys. to occupy 500 yards of frontage and get into touch with the 8th. Bn. on my left. This was the first intimation Company Officer received.

As I did not know the direction in which attack had to be made I asked and was told to go in a N.E. direction until I came to a road where I must change direction left. This I did and was assisted by Major Cass.

The firing line, in narrow shallow, formations advanced, and came under heavy shrapnel fire, which was ineffective, not a man of "A" Coy. 7th. Bn. to my knowledge being hit. As we were approaching the line of trenches occupied by the Drake Regiment of the Naval Brigade, I gave the order to extend and the successive lines immediately came under heavy machine gun and rifle fire.

Major Cass gave the order for the men to take a breath while in the trenches of the Drakes. After a rest of 2 or 3 minutes Major Cass ordered the line to advance, when we had doubled about 50 yards we again lay down and from this spot made successive rushes, covering fire being used, to great advantage. Major Cass was wounded and his last message was for Captain Meddell to take charge of the right of the firing line.

I continued to make advances even though our losses were heavy in the valley especially. At one time I noticed the 7th. about 300 yards ahead of the 8th. Bn. and I saw the 7th. give the

6th. covering fire until they were in line with us.

When within 400 yds. of the Turkish Trenches, I observed the left digging in, and as our own artillery, which materially assisted the advance, were landing there shells at our feet and further noticing that the French and the Naval Bde. had not come up on my right. I gave the order to "dig in" and immediately sent for supports to reinforce. All the officers of "A" Coy. excepting myself had been wounded, and only Mr. West was the only officer of "B" Coy.

Every second man dug in, the other men keeping on firing and although we dug in under heavy fire from the Turks our casualties were light from this *out*. At last the supports came up, Lt. Grills with C. Coy. on my right and they dug in. D. Coy. came on but immediately sent them to the right to build up the firing line there. The firing line which carried these packs made good use of these packs to build up the parapet, and as they had neither picks or shovels, they used their entrenching tools to great advantage. No orders were received by me from the time the advance was made, and, although I tried often to get into touch with Mr. Headquarters I could not, and it was not until the morning of Sunday 9th. May that I found out I was the senior officer remaining.

I might state that I was not allowed time to explain the situation to Platoon *Commanders* or Sergeants, and consequently I had to do most of the explaining during the advance under shrapnel. The advance was too hurried at the start, the men being taken away from their evening meal with the greatest haste.

When we began to dig in, a message explaining the reason and the position was sent to and received by Bde. H.Q. I omitted to state that when we got out of the Drake Trenches our men had to advance over barbed wire, thrown out indiscriminately in front of the same trenches.

As my watch was struck by a bullet and smashed during the advance no time of events were recorded. The conduct of the men was excellent and they did all that was required of them.

(Sgd) H.W. Weddell Capt.
C.O. 7th. Bn.

Folio 405

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Appendix Bq.4

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Headquarters
8th. Battalion,
27.5.15

Headquarters. 2nd. Inf. Bde.

In compliance with signal message K.B.218 I obtained the following account of part taken by 8th. Bn. in the attack by 2nd. Inf. Bde. on 8th. May.

The battalion was in bivouac 176 V 5 on 8th. May and at 5.20 p.m. an operation order issued by O.C. 2nd. Bde. was received. 8th. Bn. was to be reserve to 5th. Bn. Prior to this the firing line 6th. and 7th. Bn. had moved off. A. & B. Coys. 8th. Bn. had also moved. Verbal message to O.C. Bns. O.C. A. Coy. states all the orders he received was to follow on after 6th. Bns. A. Coy. followed the creek up to 176 H 5 and crossed eastward in single file. Shell fire was heavy. When half his men were over the 7th. ~~Coy~~ *Bn* received a verbal message from Bde. H.Q. to line the trench (an old one) on left bank of creek or mullah, that the message would be confirmed later. Shortly after another verbal message was received to push on and reinforce the 6th. Bn. Before the moving on the O.C. found that his right near the left of 5th. Bn. at 176-S-3 A. Coy. reached some trenches which were occupied by Lancashire Fusiliers and 7th. Bn. As we had orders to support 6th. Bn. the Coy. pressed on.

The Brigade had by this time reached the aforesaid trenches and gave O.C. A. a verbal order to get on. Eventually the foremost firing line was reached and at that point about 100 of the 6th. Bn. were there. We dug in.

O.C. B. Coy. corroborated the statement made by A. Coy. The men of these two Coys. were unavoidably mixed up. At 7 p.m. a written order by the Brigadier was passed along the line urging all to dig in and hold *ground* at all costs. This was the only written message or order received.

O.C. C. Coy. was a reserve Coy. He received a verbal message from the orderly officer to Brigadier to come out of the creek or mullah at 176-S-4 and push on to the right i.e. to the direction of L. CULTIVATION. He did so but shortly afterwards saw D. Coy. getting into an old trench on his left front. Col. Bolton (O.C. 6th. Bn) who was with D. Coy. mentioned to C. Coy. to *come* towards D. He was then ordered verbally to reinforce 6th. Bn. on the right of road which leads towards ~~WIND-EL-BANK~~. Arrived there about 7 p.m. with only about 1/2 Coy.

D. Coy. States he confirmed to C. Coy. and fired on and occupied a position astride the road. One platoon was sent to the left flank.

No firing was opened until the final firing line was reached. No covering fire was provided.

The M.G. Section followed D. Coy. and finally took up a position in the firing line at about point marked.

(Sgd) C.H. Brand Lt. Col.
O.C. 8th. Bn.

Appendix No.5

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2ND BDE. AT CAPE HELLES 6TH TO 7TH MAY 1915.

Headquarters 1st Aust. H.Q.
Anzac Cove.
30th May 1915.

General Officer Commanding,
Aust. & New Zealand Army Corps.

Reference Map of GALLIPOLI PENINSULA 1/40,000 and attached
sketch 1/20,000.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations of the 2nd Bde. of this Div. at CAPE HELLES between 6th & 7th May 1915.

In view of the fact that all the brigade staff are casualties, this necessarily meagre report is based upon the available signal messages and records in possession of the off. temporarily commanding the Bde.

(A) PRELIMINARY STEPS. 1. The 2nd Inf. Bde., brigade section Divisional Sig. Coy. and Bearer Sub-Division, 2nd Fd. Amb. embarked in Fleet Sweepers at ANZAC COVE about 4 am. on 6th May. The Force disembarked at CAPE HELLES about 9.0 a.m. the same day, went into bivouacs near sq. 168 Y-3 and came under the orders of Maj. Gen. Paris, Commanding the Composite Div. The Force remained in reserve in the above position until the morning of the 8th May. At 11.15 a.m. on this day, a message was received from G.O.C. Composite Division directing the 2nd Bde. to proceed to square 169.A and act in support to 28th Division or New Zealand Infantry Bde. as necessary, At this.

RESULT OF INQUIRIES RE LIST OF DEFAULTERS FROM COMPULSORY DRILLS FOR THE MONTH
OF 192

Brigade Division.

[illegible]

Place

Provost Staff.

D.1986/7.21.—C.10509.—12M.

(1390) W. W 9044-1194. 12/14. 40,000 Pads. S. B. Ltd.

"B" Form.

Army Form C 2122

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix <u>9B</u>	Code <u>DD</u> m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions. Words.		At <u>4-55</u> m.	At _____ m.	<u>8/5/15</u>
<u>Priority</u>		From _____	To _____	
		By _____	By _____	

TO	<u>SEC</u>	<u>HUST</u>	<u>BDE</u>
	_____	_____	_____

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	
<u>CD 37</u>	<u>8TH</u>		<u>AAA</u>

You will be required to
attack at 5-30 PM precisely
between the valleys you are
now in and the valley
just S-E of Iritihia
Ledd El Bahi Road AAA
Move forward at once until
you are in line with
New Zealand Bde on your
left and your right on
the valley S-E of Iritihia
Road this will be in advance
of composite Bde.

From			
Place			
Time			

* This line should be erased if not required.

(1390) W. W 9044-1194. 12/14. 40,000 Pads. S. B. Ltd.

"B" form.

Army Form C 2122

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Words.	At	At	
			m.	m.	
			From	To	
			By	By	

TO				

* Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
-------------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

under Colonel Casson will
support you AAA Your
objective is the ridge beyond
Strithid with your right some
what thrown back to join
hands with the French or
2nd Naval Bde who are
at present on the French
left

From	G. O. C
Place	H Q Composite Div
Time	Hill 132 4-20 PM

* This line should be erased if not required.

Army Form C 2122

No. of Message

* This line should be erased if not required.