AWM4

Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries, 1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/3/9

Title: 3rd Infantry Brigade

July 1916

AWM4-23/3/9

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WAR DIARY
or
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3rd Aus Inf Bde

Army Form C. 2118.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
SAILLY	1.7.16		Brigade in billets in Reserve 1st Australian Division Sector. Training continued. Night 1/2 9th Battalion Raiding Party under Captain WILDER NELIGAN carry out raid against enemy's trenches. Raid very successful. See appendix attached (A) Casualties to 12 noon Nil.	Appendix "A" Report on Raid by 9th Bn L.S.
SAILLY & OUTTERSTEENE	2.7.16		Brigade receives orders to move to billets in OUTTERSTEENE Area. Move in following order commencing at 1900: 10th Bn, 9th Bn, 12th Bn, & 11th Bn at 1/2 hour intervals. See Operation Order Appendix "B". On the night of 2nd/3rd July 11th Bn Raiding party under Captain MEDCALF carry out a successful raid. See appendix "C" attached. Casualties to 12 noon this day 9th Bn killed Capt. C. BENSON and 5 O/R; wounded Captain M. WILDER-NELIGAN, Lieut H.T. YOUNG, and Lieut RAMKEMA and 26 O/R (includes 1 officer & 3 O/R slightly at duty); missing 3 O/R.	Appendix "B" (Bde Operation Order No 14) ~~Appendix "B"~~ Report on raid 11th Bn. L.S. L.S.
	3.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon — nil — Casualties from 11th Bn raid not received. Training continued. 3rd M.G. Coy complete and T.M. Battery (personnel only) returns to Brigade & Billet in OUTTERSTEENE.	L.S. L.S.

1577 Wt. W10791/1773 500,000 1/15 D. D. & L. A.D.S.S./Forms/C.2118.

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3rd Australian Infantry Brigade.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
OUTTERSTEENE	4.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon: 9th Bn wounded 7/25 7 O/R (not previously reported) 11th Bn Nil. T.M Battery not yet reported. Training continued. Route-marching, Close Order Drill, Attack formations, Training of Specialists, Gas helmet drill, Special Training of re-inforcements etc. Two additional Lewis Guns to each Battalion. Question of extra personnel & Transport not decided.	Lt.
"	5.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon:- 3rd Aus Light. T.M. Battery wounded Lieut G.R. PAGE killed 3 O/R, wounded 3 O/R; 9th Bn wounded 4 O/R, wounded (reported at duty) 1 O/R, died of wounds 1 O/R. Training continued. Bombing ground placed at disposal of Battalions. One physical training Instructor placed at disposal of Brigade: 10 all ranks per Bn detailed for course of 4 days Training.	Lt.
" "	6.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon:- Nil — Training continued as above.	Lt.
" "	7.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon: Nil — Training continued as above.	Lt.

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Place	Date	Hour	Ref Maps Sheets 5A & 11 1/100000 — Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
OUTTERSTEENE	8.7.16		Casualties to 12 noon :- Nil. Training continued. Orders received to get everything ready for an immediate move if necessary. 1st Div Order No 25 orders for move to new area prior to entrainment at GODE WAERSWELDE	Bde Order No 15 Lt. appendix D
"	9.7.16		G.O.C A N Z A C (1st) visits Brigade — 9th & 11th Bns on parade. Orders issued to Units of Brigade area for move in accordance with Div Order No 26. Brigade move to new area commencing at 1400. Hd qrs established near (sheet 27) GODESWAERVELDE " Trappist Convent R19 d 7.6. Brigade group billetted by 2000. 1st Aus Div Order No 26 for entrainment issued. Casualties to 12 noon: Nil.	Lt
"	10/7/16		Brigade Order No 16 for entrainment issued. Brigade commence entrainment at GODESWAERVELDE at ~~8~~ 1953 (9th Bn). Brigade Hd qrs move at 2255.	Order No 16 Appendix ~~D~~ E 2/5
DOULLENS & HALLOY	11/7/16	5.20	Brigade Hd qrs arrive at DOULLENS and march to billets at HALLOY LES PERNOIS All Bns & M.G Coy & T.M. Battery arrive in billets during the day. Message from 1st Aus Div received for move to NAOURS.	Lt.
HALLOY	12/7/16		Remaining units of Brigade Group arrive viz 3rd Field Ambce, 3rd Fd Coy, & 4th Coy A.A.S.C	Bde Order No 17 appendix A.F
		1000	Brigade and 3rd Field Coy march to NAOURS. Brigade Order No 17 issued for march.	Lt.
		~~D~~ 1300	Brigade in billets at NAOURS. 9th Bn 4 Officers & 112 O/R at DOULLENS on fatigue. Guns & accessories of 3rd A.L.T.M.B still at DOULLENS.	
		1700	Conference of C.O's.	

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3rd Australian Infantry Brigade

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Ref Sheet 11 LENS $\frac{1}{100000}$

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
NAOURS	13.7.16		All Battalions Route March 2 Battalions morning & 2 Afternoons.	List
		2000	Conference of C.O's Senior Majors and Coy Comdrs	
"	14.7.16		Bns route marching in area allotted. Order to move at six hours notice received 1050 (1st Aus Div A606) G.O.C visits front line.	List.
"	15.7.16		Brigade under orders to march at six hours notice. Short marches & Training continued. 1st Div H296 Units to hold themselves in readiness to move in the morning. Representative from each Bn & M.G Coy with Bde Major visit front area	List.
" RUBEMPRE	16.7.16	1200	Brigade marches to billets in RUBEMPRE — HERISSART area as ordered by 1st Aus Div AQ 264. Group for move: Brigade Hd Qrs, 4 Battalions, M.G. Coy, L.T.M.B, 3rd Field Coy, 4th Coy A.A.S.C, 3rd Fd Ambce. Brigade Hd Qrs opposite RUBEMPRE Church; 9th & 10th Bns and 3rd Fd Ambce at HERISSART; remainder at RUBEMPRE.	Appendix G Bde order No 8 List.
"	17.7.16		Battalions and other units route marching and Training. Party of 9 officers visit front Line. Conference of C.O's at 1730	List.

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3rd Australian Inf Bde

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Place	Date	Hour	Reference Map 11 LENS 1/100000 & 57D 1/40000 — Summary of Events and Information & Appendix "Z" I & II	Remarks and references to Appendices
RUBEMPRE	18.7.16		Order received to move to Area FORCEVILLE — HEDAUVILLE 1st Aus Div G 877.	Appendix H. Bde Order No 19 LST
		0930	Brigade Pass starting point East of HERISSART at 0930. Great improvement noticed in marching & march discipline generally.	
FORCEVILLE VARENNES HEDAUVILLE			Troops arrive at about 1430. Brigade in close Billets. Hq qrs at FORCEVILLE with 9th, 10th, 11th Bns and 3rd Fd Coy. 12th Bn, M G Coy, LTMB and 3rd Fd Ambce at HEDAUVILLE and A.A.S.C (4th Coy) at VARENNES. Pack and blankets dumped at FORCEVILLE and ~~RUBEMPRE~~ HEDAUVILLE. Brigade under orders to move at short notice.	LST
FORCEVILLE & ALBERT	19.7.16		Brigade move to ALBERT under 1st Div Order No 30 to take over the line from 34th Division. Arrive ALBERT and bivouac in square W 29 d. 9th and 11th Battalions and one section M.G Coy move up and take over in the line. Remainder of Brigade in Billets in ALBERT and bivouacked in W 29 d (night 19/20). Field Coy & A.A.S.C bivouac in Square W 27 A	Appendix "1" Bde Order No 20
POZIERES SECTOR	20.7.16	0300	Brigade Hq qrs at X 15 C 5.6 in SAUSAGE Valley. 68th Bde relieved. During the day 10th & 12th Bns and M.G Coy were moved up into SAUSAGE VALLEY. Throughout the day the area occupied by the Brigade was continuously shelled. Positions improved and communications dug. Conference at Divisional Hqrs. Decided to postpone new attack on POZIERES but carry out a minor enterprise against position in old German Trenches in square X 5 a in connection with relief of 1st Div	LST ~~Appendix K Brigade Order No 13~~ Also Report on operations Appendix Z LST

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Place	Date	Hour	Reference Map Sheet 57D 1/40000 — Summary of Events and Information & Sketches Appendix Z I & II	Remarks and references to Appendices
POZIERES SECTOR	21.7.16	0230	~~Minor enterprise by 9th Bde against points X15 b 2 & X15 b 3 failed~~. ~~Strategic supply of~~ 1st Divn relieved by 9th Bde from X5 d 6.0 to X5 d 3.8, but the points X5 d 3.8 and X5 d 4.1 were not occupied. Work continued throughout the day on ~~jumping off~~ trenches and communications under heavy artillery fire. Orders issued for attack on POZIERES under 1st Aus Divn Order No 31 but attack postponed to enable jumping off trenches to be constructed. Orders issued for minor enterprise by 9th Bde	Appendix Z Appendix K Bde Memo No 13
"	22.7.16		Orders issued for attack of enemys positions under Bde Order No 21 and instructions attached. Report from 9th Bde that minor offensive against O.G 1 and O.G 2 failed. Work continued in organising supplies and preparing ground for attack under Bde Order No 21.	Appendix L per Order No 21 & Appendix Z.
		2300	Brigade ~~Orders~~ " arrived at advanced position at X16 b 2.3 (CONTALMAISON)	
"	23.7.16	0030	Attack on POZIERES commences. 1st objective taken by 0032 except certain positions in Old German Trenches.	
		0115	2nd objective taken — 5 howitzers taken also 1 machine gun & a few prisoners including officers.	over

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Place	Date	Hour	Reference Sheet 57 D — Summary of Events and Information — Appendix Z Sketches I & II	Remarks and references to Appendices
POZIERES	23.7.16	0400	Position shown in Green in Sketch I	Appendix Z
		1210	Orders received to seize remainder of village of POZIERES	
			Heavy shelling throughout the day. Position was consolidated and communication and supply arrangements organised and improved. Enemy's attempts to counter-attack failed.	Lt.
		1330	Div Order No 35 for seizing N.W wing of village received.	
"	24.7.16	0312	Orders issued to make good O.G.1 and the whole village.	Appendix Z
		~~1805~~ 18	Orders issued for extension of right flank of the Division (1st Aus Div Order No 36)	Appendix "M"
			2 Bns less 2 Coys of 2nd Bde at disposal of G.O.C 3rd Aus Bde.	Bde Order No 22
		1805	Bde Order No 22 issued for attack.	
"			Orders issued for occupation of the whole of POZIERES (1st Aus Div Order No 37) & Bde Memo No 14	Appendix "N" Operation Memo 14
		0830	Enemy counter attack beaten off.	
			Heavy enemy shelling throughout the Day — positions further consolidated — supply arrangements reorganised and ~~imp~~ improved in preparation for ~~a~~ further offensive.	Lt.
"		2330	All arrangements for attack completed	Lt.

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3rd Australian Infantry Brigade

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Army Form C. 2118.

Reference Sheet 57D 1/40000 " 11 LENS 1/100000

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information & Skeletons I & II Appendix Z	Remarks and references to Appendices
POZIERES	25.7.16	0200	attack commenced against enemys trenches in O.G 1 & 2	Appendix "Z"
		0330	attack to occupy Northern portion of village of POZIERES commences.	
		0850	Counter attack from N & NE.	
		1000	" " " " Repulsed.	
			Bombing fights especially in O.G 1 & O.G. 2 throughout the day.	H.S.
			Artillery fire continuous throughout the day.	
		1845	Orders issued for relief of 3rd Aus Inf Bde by 5th Aus Inf Bde under 1st Aus Div Order No 38	Appendix "O" H.S.
"	26.7.16	0600	Relief of Bde by 5th Aus Inf Bde completed and 3rd Bde bivouac in square W21a	
ALBERT	"	1815	Brigade leave ALBERT for VADENCOURT eventually billeted at WARLOY	
WARLOY	"		In Billets at WARLOY	Appendix "P" & "Z" H.S.
			Total casualties during operations 65 officers 1639 other ranks Detail shewn in appendix ~~"R"~~ "Z" III	
WARLOY	27.7.16	1330	Brigade marches to Billets in LAVICOGNE Area.	Appendix "Q" & "R"
LAVICOGNE			" billeted for night 27/28 " "	
			Special order (congratulatory) issued by G.O.C 1st Aus Div attached (Appendix Q)	H.S.

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Place	Date	Hour	Reference Sheet 11 LENS 1/100000 Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
LAVICOGNE	28.7.16	1130	Brigade march to Billets in BERTEAUCOURT. The sister Brigade 13th billeted at HALLOY LES PERNOIS turn out "en masse" to receive the Brigade.	Appendix "S"
BERTEAUCOURT	"		Brigade in Billets.	
"	29.7.16		Re-inforcements arrive. Reorganization and Training commence	
"	30.7.16	1030	Brigade parade for Brigadier's congratulations and advice. Training & re-organisation continued.	
"	31.7.16		Training " "	

War Diary, July '16

(1)

Appendix No. A

1st Australian Division.

I beg to forward herewith report of O.C.9th Battalion on the enterprise against hostile trenches carried out on the night of 1st/2nd July, 1916.

2. Owing to all the Officers, and several of the Sergeants having been killed or wounded and the strenuous opposition met with by all the parties when in the trenches, no information of the hostile works is available, except that the breastworks are higher than most of ours, the parados appear to be better, and some of the dug-outs under the front breastwork have their entrances under the fire step and are difficult to get at in a hurry.

3. I beg to bring to notice the keen and zealous work put in for 3 weeks previous to the raid by all ranks of the raiding parties and the excellent arrangements made by Lieut-Colonel J.C.ROBERTSON, Commanding 9th Battalion, and Capt.M.WILDER-NELIGAN, O.C.Raiding Parties. This latter Officer also, although severely wounded in the head, continued to direct operations until return to our trenches, I ~~enclose~~ endorse the O.C.9th Battalion's remarks about him.
I purpose forwarding names of other Officers and "Other ranks" for mention and reward as soon as their deeds can be vouched for.

4. I also wish to place on record the excellent solid support rendered by our Artillery and Medium T.M.Batteries both prior to, and during the raid; the arrangements made by Lieut-Colonel Burgess and those under his Command, largely contributed to the success of the raid.

5. I much regret the loss of Capt.BENSON, a most gallant leader, and the N.C.O's and men who were killed or died of wounds.

E G Sinclair Macfagan
.....Brig-General.
Commanding 3rd Aust.Inf.Brigade.

4/7/16.

581

Appendix No. A. 11

Headquarters,
9th Battalion, A.I.F.

Report of an enterprise carried out by three parties of 9th Battalion (Queensland) on portion of the enemy's trenches in PETIL-LION Sector on the night 1/2nd July, 1916.
Reference Brigade Trench Map L 1/10,000.

.....

After careful reconnaissance and sifting of information it was decided to make an attempt about the point N.9.d.0.1. A Machine Gun was known to be about this spot which had caused much loss and annoyance. To effectively attack at this point it was necessary to also attack on the right and left flank in order to minimise the losses from enfilade fire on the return journey. The conditions seemed favorable here for the carrying out of a silent operation and this method was accordingly decided upon.

On June 9th a selection was made from a large party of volunteers and one hundred and sixty were chosen. This party were detached from the Battalion and billeted in the Divisional Reserve Area adjacent to the Divisional Bomb School. A heavy course of training was instituted and steps taken to get together the requisite material and equipment. During the period of training patrols frequently covered No Mans Land, and all Officers, N.C.O's and a number of men became familiar with the country in front of our objective, right up to the enemy's entanglements. It was finally decided to attack at the following points:-

N.9.c.75.10.
N.9.d.02.15.
N.9.d.25.10.

and during the period of training the enemy's entanglements in front of these points was methodically cut by the Medium Trench Mortars, care being taken to mislead the enemy by cutting the wire in other sectors as well.

The co-operation of the Artillery was arranged and the plans adopted for the raid were as follows.

A heavy bombardment on our right flank between the points N.8.d.8.2. and N.9.c.4.1. with a barrage placed from N.9.c.57.10. to N.15.a.6.7. thence to N.15.b.7.8. thence to N.9.d.7.2. Owing to the fact that all previous raid had been carried out under the cover of a direct bombardment it was considered that the enemy would retaliate on this sector and enable our raiders to return in safety. Events afterwards proved that the enemy was entirely deceived and what we had anticipated actually took place. It was considered that our new trenches being dug in No Mans Land in front of the enemy trench would tend to make him consider this sector as likely, and to further confirm this, on the afternoon of the raid, the wire was cut by T.M's in front of the sector to be bombarded.

The co-operation of Machine Guns was also arranged for. The Artillery bombardment was supplemented by two Vickers Guns traversing the parapets and support lines of the sector bombarded together with two V.M.Guns strengthening the barrage. These four Guns used indirect fire entirely and were worked from positions 2000 yards in rear. A further two V.M.Guns using direct fire from emplacements specially constructed protected the right and left flanks of the raided sector.

The constitution of the party was as follows-

O.C.Raid.
Captain M.WILDER-NELIGAN.
2 telephonists and 2 messengers.

Right Flank Party	Centre Party	Left Flank Party
Capt.Benson, C.E.	Lieut.Ramkema, J.P.	Lieut.Young, H.T.
2 Ladder men.	2 Ladder men	2 Ladder men
8 Bombers	14 Bombers	8 Bombers
7 Bayonet men	11 Bayonet men	7 Bayonet men
5 Blocking men	4 Blocking men	6 Blocking men.
2 Telephonists	2 Messengers	2 Telephonists
2 Messengers	4 Telephonists	2 Messengers
4 Wire cu tters	4 Wire cutters	4 Wire cutters
4 Mat men	4 Mat men	4 Mat men
1 Tape man	1 Tape man	1 Tape man
1 M.G.Expert	1 M.G.Expert	1 M.G.Expert.

Appendix No. A.

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Right Flank Party. (contd)	Centre Party. (contd)	Left Flank Party (contd)
1 Engineer	1 Engineer	1 Engineer
2 Reserve Wire Cutters	10 Salvage men	8 Salvage men
7 Salvage men.		

The weapons and ammunition carried were as follows:-

Ladder men 6 bombs.

Bombers Double bomb waistcoat, Revolver in entrenching tool carrier loaded, and 6 round in pocket. 20 Bombs and knobkerrie.

Bayonet men. Rifle, bayonet painted black, 4 Bombs, 50 rds S.A.A.

Blocking men. Rifle, 50 rounds S.A.A., 6 Bombs.

Messengers, Wire cutters, Mat men, Tape men, and telephonists - 6 bombs each.

Salvage men. Revolver, 6 rounds in revolver and 6 in pocket. 6 bombs and knobkerrie.

Officers Revolvers and 4 Bombs.

Twenty torches among salvage men, 1 with each Officer.

Each party and O.C.Raid was connected by phone with O.C. Battalion who with his staff of telephonists was located in a dugout at the entrance to Sally Port. The O.C.Battalion was in phone communication with Brigade Headquarters and Artillery. A representative of the Artillery Commander was also with Battalion Commander. In all sixty messages passed through the Battalion Hdqrs from the time the first party debouched. A special code previously arranged was used. A slight westerly breeze was blowing and the night dark.

At 2350 the Right Party commenced to debouch from the Sally Port followed by the Centre and Left Parties. At 0043½ all parties reported that they were in position opposite their objectives and 200 yards from the enemy's trenches. Two M.G's commenced with indirect fire to sweep the support trenches in rear of the objectives in order to cover any noise of the advance. At 0130 all parties were in position 100 yards from their objective. At this point the Left Flank was held up by enemy's wire and it took some considerable time to forge a way through. The order had been given to advance to the 50 yards position. The centre party was also in trouble. The Right Flank was all ready at the 50 yards point. The phone of the centre party lost touch at this point and after waiting for half an hour the O.C.Raid was informed and the bombardment was asked for. Up to this point all parties had arrived unnoticed.

At 0203 the code word "Gallop" was sent to the Artillery and Machine Guns. At 0203½ the Machine Guns opened up followed by the Artillery at 0205. At 0212 all parties had reported entry into trenches. At 0217 the recall signal (rockets) was sent up and at 0230½ all parties had returned to our trenches and word was sent to the Artillery and Machine Guns to cease fire.

The bombardment had the effect of driving the enemy to the flanks with the result that in those portions raided there was a greater number than there would have been normally in occupation. In many cases hand to hand fighting took place. Lieut.Ramkema with two others in a masterful way bluffed a dugout full of the enemy. Six of these were killed and the remainder ordered to throw their arms and proceed to our trenches. On the way across three began to get troublesome and were quickly dispatched. The remainder (eleven) reached our lines safely.

The Left Party under Lieut. Young had some hot fighting. The Bombers leading cleared the trenches, bombed a Machine Gun Party and the salvage party following secured a Machine Gun which was brought into our lines.

The party on the Right flank got into the trench unnoticed and then concentrated their efforts in hard hitting. Only four prisoners were taken but a large number of the enemy were killed. In this sector the entry was a complete surprise which gave our men a wonderful advantage.

Our casualties were 1 Officer killed (Capt.Benson) 1 Officer seriously wounded (Capt.Neligan), one Officer wounded (Lieut. Young), 5 O.R.killed, 1 O.R. wounded and missing, 2 O.R.missing and 21 other ranks wounded. The Medical Officer (Capt.Gibson) reports that the whole of the casualties were caused by either Bombs or H.E. with the exception of Capt.Benson who received a bullet wound. As no H.E. was used in the retaliation on No Mans Land, the wounds must have been inflicted by bombs showing clearly the nature of the opposition. After careful interrogation the number of enemy killed has been definitely ascertained to be fifty three. (Forty nine in enemy trenches, three in No Mans Land, and one Officer in our Trenches by enemy shell). A very large number were wounded. Twenty one prisoners were taken, one Machine Gun and a quantity of equipment and Trench Material. Until the signal for the retirement was given, the discipline of all parties was excellent. Each man carried out his own job and everything worked smoothly. After the retirement was commenced the parties became somewhat disorganised.

Too much credit cannot be given to Captain Wilder-Neligan who was O.C.Raid. This Officer submitted the original scheme, organised the parties, attended to the training, and introduced numerous ingenious ideas. He worked night and day to achieve success. When advancing over the wire in the final stage he was struck by a bomb on the head and shoulder and although severely wounded he proceeded into the enemy's trench and superintended the completion of the operation. Captain Benson and Lieutenants Young and Ramkema all did excellent work,and I propose making separate recommendations with regard to these and a certain number of other ranks for their efforts.

The following points may be of interest to succeeding raids :

Knobkerries were of little use. The men were enabled with Bombs and Revolvers to cover a greater space and deal effectively with less exertion with the enemy.

Mats no use in the advance but useful in the retirement. Having the mats laid enabled the party to bring the Machine Gun back.

White bands are made too noticeable if luminous paint is added. White calico is sufficient.

Useless taking Engineers. Time available in the trench is not sufficiently long to allow of anything being done.

Careful preparation is absolutely necessary and fullest consideration of all details. Parties should be separated and given special training for at least a fortnight.

I desire to bring to your notice the excellent work done by the Artillery and the keen interest displayed by Lieut-Col.Burgess for the well directed artillery co-operation. I am very grateful also to the O.C.Machine Gun Coy. who assisted materially and all arrangements were carried out as desired.

Our thanks are due to 1st Division for the assistance rendered in the matter of securing equipment and for kindly help in overcoming difficulties.

3rd July, 1916.

(Sgd) J.C.Robertson, Lieut-Col.
Commanding 9th Battalion.

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(2) SECRET.

War Diary

Appendix No. B.

July 1916

1st Australian Division.

I beg to forward herewith the Report by O.C. 11th Battalion on the enterprise against the hostile trenches on the night of 2nd/3rd July, 1916.

With Appendix I. Report of O.C. Raiding Party
" II. Copy of 3rd Inf.Brigade Operation Memorandum.
" III. Copy of 11th Battalion Operation Order.
" IV. Copy of 1st Divisional Artillery Order 24. and table of tasks.
" V. Copy of Operation Order 3rd Bde Machine Gun Company.

2. The operation was a complete success and identifications were obtained, although no live enemy was met with except one and he was at once bayonetted being met on entry of the party into the hostile trenches.

It is regrettable that no active opposition was met with by the raiding party to more thoroughly test their organization, which appears to have been excellent.

3. I beg to bring to notice Lieut-Colonel S.R.ROBERTS, Commanding 11th Battalion for the great care in preparation and thorough organization of the enterprise. Nothing was left to chance and every care was taken to cover all possible eventualities; also Captain F.G.MEDCALFE for the cool and collected way in which he led his men and controlled the whole operation.

All concerned worked hard and with great zeal and keenness during the two weeks training previous to the enterprise.

4. The co-operation by Artillery and Trench Mortar, both by Medium and Light Batteries, was more than excellent. The shooting was so good that considerable damage was done to hostile personnel and works, and its accuracy was such that our party were able to lie within 60 yards of hostile parapet whilst bombardment was in progress, with complete confidence.

5. I also wish to place on record our sincere thanks to our Sister Brigade (the 13th) for their co-operation and assistance.

6. I much regret the casualties resulting in four of the T.M. Battery being killed.

5/7/16.

E.G. Sinclair MacLagan
.....Brig-General.
Commanding 3rd Inf.Brigade, A.I.F.

Appendix No. B

11th. Battalion. 15

To/ 581

July 4th 1916.

3rd Infantry Brigade.

Report on a Minor Offensive carried out by a party of the 11th Battalion, A.I.F. against a section of the enemy's forward works opposite the Left SubSection of the Brigade Frontage of the 1st Divisional Sector PETILLON Section.

I have the honor to submit the following report on the minor offensive which was made on the night of the 2/3rd July 1916 by a party of the 11th Battalion, 3rd Infantry Brigade, A.I.F. against a section of the enemy's forward works.

During the early part of last month orders were issued to the Battalion to prepare a scheme for a raid on the enemy's trenches to be delivered from the Left SubSector of the Brigade Frontage of the 1st Divisional Sector of the PETILLON Section.

As the line comprising the abovementioned frontage is a salient offering favorable ground for effective retaliation by the enemy on our parapet and forward works, much anxious thought was given to the risks that would be incurred on making such a raid, and it was considered essential to prepare a scheme which would draw the enemy's fire from the weakest points in our lines.

It was felt also, in view of the risks involved, that the raid should be made against a strong point in the enemy's lines so that the damage inflicted to his works would be in keeping to any he might inflict on ours.

What appeared to be a particularly strong point was the TADPOLE, (N.10.B.8.4. to N.10.B.94.45); this was protected on the enemy's right by a forward line of trenches (N.11.A.1.6. to N.11.A.55.76) - a favorable position for his machine guns - on his Left by a Salient N.10.B.85.4.

The enemy had also shown considerable activity at this particular point during the time the Battalion was in the trenches.

Careful reconnaisance was made of the works and the position of his machine guns was noted down.

The question of carrying out a silent raid without a preliminary bombardment was fully considered and dismissed as impracticable as the enemy had established a system of listening posts in advance of his parapet.

It was considered that a long bombardment on the night of the raid would probably result in our line of retreat being revealed to hostile Artillery before the Party could return, and ~~though~~ so it was decided to reduce the bombardment to thirteen minutes, three minutes of which to be devoted to known machinegun positions and the remainder on the objective and on other portions of the line ~~and~~ on both flanks, and on important positions in the rear. The Artillery scheme also included a Right and Left diversion during operation. The Right Diversion had a twofold object namely (a) to mislead the enemy as to the point to be raided and (b) to cause casualties amongst his working parties which would, no doubt, be employed on a section of his line (N.8.D.8.8. - N.9.C.4.1.) to be bombarded during the raid to be carried out by the 9th Battalion on the night of 1/2nd July 1916. The Left diversion had also two clear objects (a) to mislead the enemy as to the point to be raided and (b) to prevent his bringing an enfilade fire on the Raiding Party.

By distributing Artillery fire along the enemy's frontage, his retaliation would scarcely be effective on any point in our line. Moreover, it was hoped that considerable damage would thus be inflicted upon him.

In viewing of the forward positions on both flanks of the TADPOLE it was decided to hem the Raiding Party in with machine gun fire, thus preventing the enemy from attempting and turning movement, namely, counter attacking from the flanks.

Provision was also made prevent him occupying or advancing to a forward position in advance of the objective. Provision was further made for Lewis Machine Guns to be available for counter Machine Gun work.

The scheme also included a machine gun diversion well to the Left of THE TADPOLE and for heavy and indirect machine gun fire on vulnerable points and communication trenches in rear. Roles were allotted the Medium T.M.Batteries and the Light Trench Mortar Batteries.

In addition to the aforegoing, it was arranged that the enemy's line should be bombarded and his entanglements cut at several points prior to the date of the enterprise.

The scheme was embodied in the Artillery, Brigade, Battalion and 3rd Field ~~Company~~ Machine Gun Company Orders, Copies of which are attached.

The Party was detached for a fortnights special training.

A large map was made for the section to be raided, enlargements were obtained of aerial photographs of the place and the whole fully explained to all concerned.

The course of training included the reconnaisance of NO MAN'S LAND by Officers and Scouts, study of enlarged map of position to be raided, physical drill, running, marching, jumping, crawling long distances, rescue races carrying a man, crossing cut and uncut barbed wire entanglements by night, cutting through entanglements, crossing ditches by night, raiding party drill formation, trench practices, bombing, bayonet fighting, revolver practices, advancing stealthily under flare lights, and several full rehearsals including the laying of tapes and telephone wire.

The equipment of the party was varied according to the duties allotted; some carried revolvers, bombs, and knobkerries; others carried rifles, darkened bayonets and bombs. Each man had a knife to cut himself free should his clothing become caught in barbedwire. Mats for crossing wire, and sledges (the enemy's own) for crossing ditches were taken. Each member carried Mill's bombs, the advance party carried moral effect bombs to be thrown in the trench from enemy's entanglements, and the parapet or covering party had also some lachramatory and smoke bombs to effectively cover their retirement by preventing the enemy from successfully manning the parapet.

I attach full report from Captain MEDCALF who was in charge of the Raiding Party. He has practically given the narrative of the operation and has supplied information concerning the enemy's trenches

I should add that the Raiding Party noticed that where shells and bombs had made craters in the trenches, the ground was very wet whilst the unbroken portions were dry. This shews that the trenches had been particularly well constructed, provision having been made to keep the water out though the trenches were cut below the present water level.

In addition to bombing dug-outs they actually searched them and though naturally they were disappointed at not finding papers they noted how very tidily each one was kept, the one in which the candle was burning was particularly neat and the blankets were folded in the manner adopted on board ships. The old mine referred to in Captain MEDCALF'S report had water in it but a few bombs were thrown therein.

All speak in glowing terms of the work of our Artillery and Trench Mortars. Lieutenant CLARKE, who was in charge of the Right Bombing Party, states that there were no less than seven heaps of debris to scramble over in a length not more than 25 yards. They saw no traces of Gas cylinders; they were disappointed at finding no Machine Guns in the emplacements.

It was particularly satisfactory to all concerned to see that we had effectively subdued a comparitively long frontage of the enemy's line; by the number of red lights he sent up along other parts of his line he obviously was at a loss to know where the attack was to be made.

For some time his artillery fire was rendered abortive but I observed that shortly after the return of the Party to our lines the enemy directed his shrapnel on NO MAN'S LAND in front about the point at which the party returned to our trenches. I assume from this that his telephone wire were not cut and that once the enemy had recovered from the initial shock proper direction was given to his guns. Smart work by the party saved any casualties but had Captain MEDCALF delayed his return we may not have escaped so fortunately.

Whilst I remained in constant communication with the Raiding Party our special lines to the Artillery Group Commander and to the Brigade were destroyed early in the operation and some little delay therefore occurred in getting messages through to them from other positions. This resulted in the guns being kept off the parapet of THE TADPOLE longer than necessary but caused me no anxiety as we had the enemy's flanks still under control and I knew the Lachramatory Bombs would prevent him from manning the debris of the TADPOLE. As a matter of fact I did not hear a single shot from there up to the time I left the Line. We had some casualties amongst the Trench Mortar personnel but these, I believe, were not due to the enemy's fire. I did not have time to go into the matter before leaving

SALLY. The damage to our line was negligible.

Lessons Learned from the Raid.

(1) That by the good use of Artillery, Trench Mortars and Machine Guns a comparitively long frontage of the enemy's forward line can be completely subdued, rendering it possible to cross NO MAN'S LAND in safety.

(2) Taht by making a diversion it is possible to draw off attention from the actual point at which the raid is being made.

(3) That once the enemy is aware where the raid is being made you cannot afford to stay too long in his trenches, otherwise his shrapnel will become effective on the return trip.(I assume his telephone wires are deeply laid).

(4) That it is possible when Artillery fire is so ably controlled as that ofour Division, a party can crawl up to within sixty yards of the objective before the guns are lifted.

(5) That Machine Guns can be effectively used for counter-Machine Gun work.

(6) That by using smoke anf lachramatory bombs you can prevent the enemy from manning his parapet.

(7) That by studying aerial photographs, particularly when they are enlarged, you can familiarise yourself beforehand of the trenches to be raided.

(8) That by careful training troops can perform what amounts to drill movements, with shells crashing just over their heads.

(9) That to maintain communicating with your supporting Artillery the lines must be well buried for some distance in the rear.

(10) That when guiding tapes are used they should be partially colored (this was done on this occasion) otherwise they shew up to clearly when flare lights are sent up.

(11) That if troops will only keep their dug-outs free from papers,(taking the lesson from our opponents) a raiding party can secure no documentary identifications.

(12) That Machine Guns cannot be captured unless all the personnel are killed if every body knows theyare to be withdrawn when their use is no longer possible.

(13) That the surmounting of barbed wire entanglements is not impracticable.

Apart from the killed actually seen, I trust the enemy's casualties were heavy elsewhere. In this connection I may state that the party did not enter the portion of the line where the fire of Light Trench Mortars was directed or where our Machine Guns were playing and no doubt he sufferred losses elsewhere from artillery fire.

In conclusion I respectfully venture the opinion that the enterprise was sucessfully carried out on the lines laid down by the G.O.C. Brigade. It is certainly had the effect of considerably increasing the morale of the Battalion and particularly that of the party engaged.

The whole party carried out their duties with coolness and precision and was particularly well led by Captain F.G.MEDCALF. All the other Officers engaged namely Lieut. W. KRUGER, Lieut. W.R.HANLAHAN, and Lieut. R. CLARKE, 2/Lieuts.H. DAVISON and W.G.HASTINGS handled their respective parties in a very capable manner. The conduct of the N.C.Os and men were particularly good. and once again I find it difficult to single out anyone for special recommendation. Major J.S.DENTON D.S.O. rendered valuable assistance in training the party and Major J.S. MILNER ably assisted me on the night of the operation. Lieut. L.L.LENAY handled his Lewis Guns with marked ability.

Our thanks are due to the Officers Commanding the Artillery, the Medium Trench Mortar Battery, the O.C.Light Trench Mortar Battery, the O.C.3rd Machine Gun Company and C.O's of Units in the firing line for their valuable and effective co-operation.

S R Robb

Lieut-Colonel,
C. O. 11th Battalion.

Appendix I

Appendix No. B.

The Adjutant
XI th Bn

In accordance with Bn. O.O. dated 22/6/16, the Raiding Party consisting of 6 officers and 63 other ranks proceeded from the left Sally port in the left Coy of the Bde Sector, at 00.00 3/7/16, our objective being the "Tadpole".

The party was organised as follows —

Lt W. Krüger with 4 scouts and 4 wire cutters formed the first line.

Lt. W. Hallahan with 18 other ranks ~~as~~ comprised the left bombing party.

Lt R. Clarke with 18 other ranks comprised the right bombing party.

2nd Lt A. Dairson had charge of 6 other ranks as parapet party, & 3 O.R. as prisoners' guard.

2nd Lt W. Hastings had charge of the Bombing Search parties.

There were in addition, two messengers, two engineers, two machine gunners, two stretcher bearers, & two telephonists.

All officers and scouts and selected N.C.O's had previously reconnoitred the ground for 100 yards in front of our trenches, and a bearing had been taken in daylight from our sally port to the point we considered the centre of the ~~Td~~ Tadpole parapet.

At. 00.00 on 3/7/16 the first line of our party proceeded out to take up its formation in a dip 70 yards forward from our sally port, a luminous tape being run out on a bearing of 168° from the gap in our wire at N.10.B.55.85.

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Appendix No. B.

The whole party was in position in the dip by 00.25, the formation being



As soon as the first line was in position, two scouts were sent forward for 60 yards to reconnoitre that distance and report.

At 00.30 our artillery opened with sudden concentration on the Tadpole parapet and other points laid down in the scheme.

The scouts having reported good cover ahead, the Raiding party crawled slowly forward in the above formation.

Noting the accuracy of our artillery fire on the enemy's parapet, the party was enabled to push on more boldly; and at 00.43 when the artillery lifted, we were in formation within 30 yards of the enemy's wire, or 60 yards of the parapet.

As the artillery lifted, so we wheeled inwards into our respective parties four abreast, and made for the wire at the double.

We discovered that the main portion of the wire had been destroyed, but that many loose tripwires were in evidence. The enemy had, too, apparently laid a number of loose coils since the last firing of the trench mortars.

The men carrying slats for crossing wire placed

3.

placed them at hand for the wire cutters, and two sledges which the enemy had previously used in a similar expedition against us were thrown across a ditch in the midst of the wire.

One machine gun opened fire on us from the left as we crossed the wire, and flares were thrown from the flanks, but no one was hit.

Engaged by at least one machine from our left.

The right and left bombing parties entered the trench simultaneously at 00.46 and bombed ~~the~~ towards either flank. The searching parties followed, and the parapet party and other details got into position a moment later.

I placed myself with the parapet party, where the position could best be controlled.

Meanwhile the various parties proceeded with their respective works, as laid down.

Seven minutes after our entry into the trench I received word from the right bombing party to the effect that counter bombing was being done against them. I considered that sufficient time had elapsed for obtaining identifications and all prisoners in the portion of trench assigned to our search; so, strengthening the parapet party on the right, at 00.54, eight minutes after entry into the trench, I withdrew right and left bombing and searching parties by means of the previously agreed upon signal — A cheer from the parapet party, passed on in turn as each other party heard it.

By 00.56, all parties having reported correct to me,

4.

as they crossed by the parapet party, had cleared the wire.

In order to prevent the Tadpole parapet being manned after we had vacated it, the parapet party hurled 5 lachrymatory and 5 smoke bombs into suitable portions of the trench & parados, after which they retired along the carpet of mats laid down by the wire cutters.

Word was sent through the wire to Hd Qrs. and the last party left the Tadpole.

The luminous tapes marked the way across No Man's Land back to our trenches, & no difficulty was experienced in following it.

Machine gun fire and light artillery fire was encountered in No Man's Land, but all members of the party reported safely in our trenches. There were no casualties in our party.

The advance & retirement across No Man's Land was particularly well done, and the work of the wire cutters was especially good in cutting the loose trip wires & laying a smooth track with slats to ensure rapid egress for all parties from the enemy's trench.

The point at which we entered the Tadpole was the identical spot to which the bearing had previously been taken.

The right and left bombing parties advanced from the centre along the Tadpole front, and penetrated the flanks for forty yards, hurling bombs from there into the rear of the Tadpole.

Appendix No. B

5.

The front of the Tadpole was a veritable shambles, our artillery fire having smashed in the greater part of the parapet, and wrecked many dugouts.

Dugouts were both under the parapet and in the parados. They varied in size from about 8' x 4' x 4' to about 30' x 6' x 6', a step leading down into them from the trench. They were floored, and had spaces for men to sleep in. What appeared to be an officer's dug out was visited.

There were three bunks built in ship fashion to the wall, two tables in the dugout, and a candle burning. The dugout was estimated to be 30' x 6' x 6' + was in the parados of the comm^n trench which joined up the left bombing pit to our left flank of the Tadpole.

Two searchers spent three minutes in this dugout, but could find no official papers.

The front trench where it was untouched, was 7' deep, the parapet being 5' above the surface, and the trench bottom 2' below.

Duckboards were well laid, as with flooring boards lengthwise.

Boxes of bombs were let into the parapet in a way similar to our own.

The two points shown on ~~the~~ our trench map as ~~supposed~~ supposed dugouts were visited. They turned out to be bomb pits, the one on our left being joined up by comm^n trench with the left of the Tadpole.

The right pit was completely smashed in & filled with debris; but the left contained boxes of bombs, from which samples were taken and the remainder scattered, so that they would not be at hand, should the enemy return.

Appendix No. B.

6.

A machine gun emplacement was found ten yards ten yards to the left of our left Tadpole flank. It contained fittings for a machine gun stand, but no gun was in evidence.

Two other emplacements were noted, each a few yards on either side of our right Tadpole flank, but they were smashed in and filled with debris.

An old mine shaft was found under the parapet, at the point where the comm^n trench to the left bomb pit led out from the Tadpole front.

Many dead were found buried in the debris of smashed dugouts and breached parapet.

The dead were estimated to be at least 50.

Although we traversed 150 yards of the trench + searched systematically, only one live German was seen, and he was bayonetted by the first bayonet man who entered the trench.

Officers and men all worked together with fine esprit, the work of the scouts and wire cutters being especially good, the former in directing the way from our sally port to the centre of the Tadpole parapet and back to our sally port, + the wire cutters in cutting an avenue in the wire + laying the mats which gave all parties free egress from the German work.

Identifications (20th Bavarians), respirators, bombs, rifles + papers were handed in on our return.

The aeroplane maps and sunprints taken from them proved of the greatest possible value to us. On entering the Tadpole, everyone at once recognised the particular spot they were at and worked accordingly.

The slats which the wire cutters laid through the wire were useless after the party had finally cleared the wire, so they were left in that position.

It was impossible to free the tape at the enemy's wire because such procedure would render possible the tape being pulled in all directions as the party crossed No Man's Land.

The excellent & accurate work done by our artillery, mortars, and machine guns rendered the morale of the raiding party of the highest possible order. The whole scheme of work in its sequence as practised before the action was carried out systematically. There was not the slightest hitch anywhere, except that there were no Germans left alive in the portion of trench assigned to our search; & accordingly that was ~~the~~ a source of much regret, particularly as the party was so well organised to cope with resistance.

H Metcalf Capt
of Raiding Party

4/7/16

581

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Appendix No. C.

Copy No.....

3rd AUST.INF.BRIGADE ORDER NO.14.

Headquarters,
2/7/16.

Reference Map 36 and 36a.

RELIEFS. 1. The 12th Inf.Brigade will relieve 3rd Aust.Inf.Bde. in accordance with 1st Aust.Div.Order No.24. The 3rd Inf.Brigade will march and take over Billets in the OUTTERSTEENE Area as under today:

1900	10th Battalion
1930	9th Battalion
2000	12th Battalion
2030	11th Battalion

The time will be that at which each Battalion leaves starting point ordered by Battalion Commander.
Brigade Headquarters will move as convenient.
3rd Machine Gun Company and Trench Mortar Batteries will move tomorrow on completion of enterprise.

PARTIES EMPLOYED ON SPECIAL DUTIES 2. Parties detailed for enterprise, also personnel for duties in the SAILLY Area who have not yet been relieved will assemble at SAILLY Brickyards ready to move to their new area tomorrow 3rd instant. These parties will be marched to the new area at 2 p.m. tomorrow 3rd instant, under orders of Lieut-Col.S.R. ROBERTS, 11th Battalion. Unit Commanders will ensure that rations for 3rd instant, are provided for all details left behind.

REPORTS. 3. Reports on completion of move and each evening showing location of units will be sent to Brigade Headquarters together with Marching in States.

GENERAL 4. Units will take with them their Iron rations, but will hand over on relief the reserve rations to units in the front line.

DISTRIBUTING PARTIES 5. Advance parties have been detailed to proceed to OUTTERSTEENE. Similar parties will remain to hand over Billets to 12th Brigade.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS 6. Brigade Headquarters will close at SAILLY at 9-30 pm on 2nd instant, and open at OUTTERSTEENE at the same hour.

Acknowledge.

.....Captain
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Bde.A.I.F.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.	
1 & 2	File
3	9th Battn.
4	10th Battn.
5	11th Battn.
6	12th Battn.
7	3rd M.G.Coy.
8	T.M.Battery
9	1st Aust.Division
10	War Diary,

Appendix No. D.

SECRET

3rd Aus Inf Bde Order No 15

D

Bde Hdqrs
10/7/16

Ref Sheet 27 $\frac{1}{40000}$

1. Ref attached 1st Aus Div A & Q 303. The Brigade will move to-day to billets in GODEWAERSVELDE area as detailed.

2. Starting point 27 X 22 a 2.2

3. Times to pass starting point: 11th Bn 1400, 10th Bn 1415, 9th Bn 1430, 12th Bn & T.M.B 1445, 3rd M.G Coy 1500, Bde Hdqrs 1515, 3rd Fd Coy 1530, 3rd Fd Ambulance 1545, 4th Coy AASC 1600

4. Billeting parties will meet Staff at starting point at 1300.

5. Train Transport required with units at ~~1400~~ 1100.

6. Refate to Bde Hdqrs next location on arrival.

Detailed details of Bde representatives at 0850. Messages to Fd Ambulance, Fd Coy & AASC. Copy of Div Order 25 issued to units

William Schofield
B/M 3rd Aus Inf Bde

Appendix D

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Appendix No. E. 16

27

SECRET

Copy No.....

3RD AUSTRALIAN INF.BRIGADE ORDER NO.16.

Brigade Headquarters,
10/7/18.

MOVE. 1. The 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade will move to the new area by rail in accordance with 1st Aus.Div.Order No.26 and Schedules attached issued to all concerned.

BRIGADE GROUP 2. The Brigade Group for the move will be as follows:-
Headquarters and 3rd Inf.Brigade.
3rd Inf.Brigade Signal Section
3rd Field Coy.Engrs.
3rd Field Ambulance.
Bde.Coy.Divisional Train (4th Coy.A.A.S.C.)
Supply Section will move with the 1st Battalion of the Brigade.

BRIGADE STAFF. 3. The Staff Captain will proceed with 1st Train, and Lieut.R.J.WALLACE, 8th Battalion attached to Brigade Staff will proceed by last train and remainder of Staff with Brigade Headquarters.

BRIGADE HEAD-QUARTERS TRAIN 4. Brigade Headquarters, Signal Section, 3rd M.G.Coy. and 3rd Aust.L.T.M.Battery under the Command of Capt. A.STEELE, 3rd M.G.Company will pass starting point at R.19.d.7.6. at 1920 today.

ADVANCE PARTY 5. Officers Commanding Units will send a representative ahead to entraining station to reconnoitre route and forming up places etc.

STATES AND REPORTS. 6. Marching in States and Reports showing new locations must be rendered to Brigade Headquarters without delay on arrival at a new location. A complete marching out State showing number of men,horses, four and two wheeled Wagons, and bicycles will be sent down with the first portion of every Unit so that accommodation in the train can be checked by the R.T.O. at the beginning of the entrainment. Copy to be rendered to Brigade Headquarters by 1800 today.

TRAIN PICQUETS 7. Picquets will be detailed for the journey for each end of the train to prevent troops leaving the train at all stops. These will travel at each end of the train and will be provided with definite written orders.

RATIONS 8. Units will draw and entrain with one day's ration in addition to the unexpended portion of the current day's ration.

ACCOMMODATION ON TRAIN. 9. Accommodation on train is laid down in 1st Aust.Div. Order No.26. para 10. This must be strictly complied with.

.....Captain.
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Bde.A.I.F.

Issued at .....

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.	to.
1 & 2	File
3	1st Aust.Div.
4	9th Battn.
5	10th "
6	11th "
7	12th "
8	3rd M.G.Coy.
9	3rd Aus.L.T.M.B
10	3rd F.Ambulance
11	3rd F.Company
12	4th Coy.A.S.C.
13	Staff Capt.
14	Bde.Sig.Officer
15	Spare.
16	"

Order of March
Bde Hdqrs
Signal Section
M G Coy
T.M.B

Appendix No. F.

Copy No. 2

3RD AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO.17.

Appendix F

Brigade Headquarters,
12/7/16.

1. The Brigade will march to Billets to-day in NAOURS Area.

2. Starting Point about 1000 yards East of HALLOY LES PERNOIS Church, where the CANAPLES - VIGNACOURT Road passes under railway arch.

3. Route via HAVERNAS and WARGNIES thence (a) 11th Battn, M.G. Coy, and 9th Battalion by Northern road. (b) 12th Battalion, Brigade Headquarters, 10th Battalion and Field Coy by Southern Road.

4. Time to pass starting point:

11th Battn.	1000	T.M.Batty	1035
12th "	1010	9th Battn	1040
M.G.Coy	1020	10th Battn	1050
Bde.Hdqrs.	1030	Field Coy	1100

5. Billeting Parties will be detailed as laid down in message B.M.488 dated 11th instant.

6. 1st Line and Train Transport will accompany Units.

7. Brigade Headquarters will close at HALLOY at 1000 and re-open at NAOURS at same hour.

.....Captain.
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Brigade.

Issued at 0711.....

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Appendix No. G.

SECRET

Copy No. 15

3RD AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO.18.

Brigade Headquarters.
16/7/16.

Reference Map 11. 1/100,000.

1. The 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade group will move to billets in area MERESSART - RUMEMPRE to-day.

2. Starting Point - road Junction 1½ miles West of TALMAS.

3. Route to TALMAS thence:
9th and 10th Battalion via road junction 300 yards South of VAL DE MAISON to MERESSART, remainder to RUMEMPRE direct.

amended all to Rubenfil
B0145

4. Time to pass starting point as follows:

Brigade Headquarters	1200	10th Battalion	1300
M.G.Company	1205	11th Battalion	1315
A.L.T.M.B.	1210	3rd F.Company	1330
12th Battalion	1230	4th Coy.A.A.S.C.	1345
9th Battalion	1245	3rd F.Ambulance	1400

5. Billeting parties have been ordered to meet Staff Captain at Brigade Headquarters at 0900.

6. 1st Line and Train Transport to accompany Units.

7. Transport for Light Trench Mortars will be arranged by Division. The guns and accessories will be left under a small escort until transport arrives.

8. Brigade Headquarters will close at NAOURS at 1100 and open at RUMEMPRE same hour.

Issued at.....

.....Captain
Brigade Major, 3rd Aust.Inf.Brigade.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.	
1 & 2	File.
3	9th Battalion
4	10th Battalion
5	11th Battalion
6	12th Battalion
7	3rd M.G.Company.
8	3rd A.L.T.M.B.
9	3rd Field Coy.Engrs.
10	3rd Field Ambulance.
11	4th Coy.A.A.S.C.
12	Staff Captain.
13	1st Aust.Division.

Appendix No. H.

Appendix H

SECRET.

Copy No. 2.

3RD AUST.INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO.19.

Brigade Headquarters,
18/7/16.

1. The 3rd Infantry Brigade Group will march this day to new area as follows: Bde Hdqrs, 9th, 10th, 11th Bns and 3rd F.Coy for FORCEVILLE. 12th Bn.M.G.Coy, A.L.T.M.B. 3rd F.Amb. to HEDAUVILLE; 4th Coy A.A.S.C. to VARENNES .

2. Route TOUTENCOURT - HARPONVILLE - VARENNES.

3. Starting point road junction 200^{x} North of H. in HERISSART.

4. Time to pass starting point:

9th Battalion	- 0930	11th Battalion	- 1000
10th "	- 0940	12th "	- 1010
3rd M.G.Coy	- 0950	4th Coy.A.A.S.C.	- 1020
3rd A.L.T.M.B.	- 0955	3rd F.Coy.Engrs.	- 1025
Bde.Hdqrs	- 0956	3rd F.Ambulance	- 1035

5. Billeting parties will meet Staff Captain at starting point at 0830.
6. 1st Line and Train Transport will accompany Units.
7. Brigade Headquarters will close at RUBEMPRE at 1000 and open at FORCEVILLE same hour.
Acknowledge.
Issued at 0650.

(Sd) L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Capt.
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Brigade.

Appendix No. I

Appendix "I"

3RD AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO.20.

Copy no 2

Brigade Headquarters,
19/7/16.

Ref.Map 57d.

1. Reference 1st Aust.Divisional Order No.30 dated 19th instant. The Brigade Group will march to ALBERT as under:

2. Starting point Cross Roads S.E. of HEDAUVILLE, thence via BOUZENCOURT.

3. Time of head to pass starting point 1600

4. Order of march:

9th Battalion	3rd A.L.T.M.B.
11th "	Brigade Headquarters
10th "	3rd F.Coy
12th "	4th Coy A.A.S.C.
3rd M.G.Coy	1st Line Transport.

5. Destination of 3rd F.Coy is W.27.a.8.3.
" " 4th Coy.A.A.S.C. W.20.d.5.5.
" " 1st Line Transport W.27.a.5.6.

6. Lieut.HEMING from Brigade Headquarters has been detailed to guide the Brigade through ALBERT.

Issued at 1320

(Sd) L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Capt.
Brigade Major, 3rd Infantry Brigade.

581 appendix K Appendix No. K 32

Copy No. 1.

3RD AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO.13.

Reference 57 D. S.E.4.

Brigade Headquarters,
21st July,1916.

1. O.C.9th Battalion will arrange to undertake offensive action from the two strong points at Sq.X.5.d.4.5. and Sq.X.5.d.7.8.

2. Object - to make good the Western trench as far as X.5.b.1½.½ and the eastern trench as far as its junction with MUNSTER ALLEY at X.5.b.4.1.

3. The attack to take place at 2-30 a.m. to-night 21st/22nd inst

4. Ground gained is to be consolidated and strong points formed where suitable.

5. A Section of Engineer Field Coy., will be placed at the disposal of O.C.9. Battalion by C.R.E., the O.C. to report ~~to~~ at 9th Battalion Headquarters as soon after 2100 as possible.

6. Reports to Brigade Headquarters at X.15.c.5.6. using same code as used in PETILLON Sector where necessary.

Full report as early as possible a.m. 22nd instant.

(Sd) L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Captain
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Brigade, A.I.F.

Issued at 2100 ~~1900~~

Copy No.1.	Filed		
2	9th Battalion	By despatch rider	
3	11th Battalion	do	
4	2nd Brigade	do	

SECRET. Copy No.1.

3RD AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

OPERATION ORDER NO.21.

Brigade Headquarters,
22/7/16.

Reference Trench Map 1/20,000 Sheets 57d.S.E., and 57c.S.W.

1. INTENTION. The Brigade will attack the enemy at 22nd/23rd July,1916.

Information 2. The French Army and 4th Army on our right attack the enemy at 9-30 p.m. (2130). The First Australian Infantry Brigade co-operate and attack on our left.
(i) Heavy Artillery and Artillery of 10th Corps are assisting in the attack.
(ii)For information re enemy see para 2 (ii) Divisional Order No.31 dated 21/7/16.

3. FRONTAGE. The Brigade will attack on the front Sq. X.5.d.7.8. to X.5.c.½.3.
The 9th Battalion will attack on the right, the 11th Bn. on the left.
The Dividing line between Battalions N to S will be as follows X.5.a.4.4. - X.5.c.8.6. - X.5.c.9.2. - X.11.b.3.5.
The left of the 9th Battalion will direct and follow this line which is a true bearing of 347°.

4. Objectives:-
1st objective - Enemy trench from Sq.X.5.d.7.8. to X.5.c.½.3.
2nd Objective - The trench line along the enclosures S.E. of POZIERES and including the copse Sq.X.4.d. and X.5.c. and the German 2nd position line to the Railway at Sq. X.5.b.2.6.
3rd Objective - The South Eastern side of the BAPAUME - ALBERT ROAD from the Sq.R.35.c.8.1. to Sq.X.4.b.7.2.

5. Order of Battle:
(i) First 4 lines each of two waves:
9th Battalion on right
11th Battalion on left
3 Sections 3rd M.G.Coy, 2 with 9th Bn. one with 11th Battalion.
1 Batty L.T.Mortars with 9th Bn. on the right.

(ii) Brigade Reserves
(a) 10th Battalion on right disposed as follows:-
2 Coys in BLACK WATCH ALLEY with head near Point 11.d.8

2 Lewis Guns with the rear Coy.
The leading Coy will be at the disposal of O.C.9th Bn. if required and will eventually support the right attack of that Bn.
The rear Coy. will form the first 2 waves of Reserves closing up to point 11.d.8.9. directly there is room.
2 Coys and H.Q. in rear of the 2 leading Coys of 12th Bn. in BLACK WATCH ALLEY.

(b)

(b) 12th Battalion:
2 Coys in BLACK WATCH ALLEY in rear of leading 2 Coys 10th Battalion.
2 Lewis Guns with the leading Company
2 " " " " rear Company
2 Coys. and H.Q. at Sunken road immediately N. of BAILIFF WOOD.

(c) ½ Batty.L.T.M. at Sunken Road immediately North of BAILIFF WOOD.

(d) One section 3rd M.G.Company in positions selected in BLACK WATCH VALLEY.

6. Method of Attack.
(i) The advance to each objective will be timed in accordance with the barrage map (attached Div.Order).
(ii) The 9th and 11th Bns. will attack in 4 waves on a two Company frontage each in accordance with separate instructions issued.
(iii) The 9th Bn. will detail one Company to deal with the two hostile trenches on the right running N.N.W. and S.S.E.
(iv) The O.C.3rd M.G.Coy will detail one section (4 guns) to report to O.C.9th Bn. as arranged between O.C's concerned for use in direct attack and one section 4 guns for use with right company.
One section (4 guns) to report to O.C. 11th Battn. at time and place arranged between O.s.C. for use in direct attack.
All to be used in accordance with special instructions issued herewith.
(v) Light T.Mortars will support right of 9th Bn. with 4 guns

7. Consolidation and strong points:-
Each hostile position is to be consolidated immediately taken, and every step possible taken to make it secure against counter attack.
The following strong points will be constructed.
(a) In first objective:
(i) X.5.b.2.0½
(ii) X.5.b.4.1.
(b) In second objective:
(i) Sq.X.5.a.9.5.
(ii) Sq.X.5.a.8.2.
(iii) At head of copse Sq.X.d.9.9.
(c) In Third Objective
(i) An enclose work at Square X.5.a.7.9. - Sq.X.5.a. 9.9½. - Sq.X.5.b.0.8. - Sq.X.5.a.7.7.
(ii) Sq.X.5.a.3.6½.
(iii) Sq.X.4.b.7½.2.
(d) Two Companies 1st Aust.Pioneer Bn. and one Field Coy Engineers for right and left subdivisions of Brigade front will be available to construct these points.

8. Communications
For work with contact aeroplanes GREEN flares only will be used. They will be lit when each objective is captured, but will only be used after day break: They will be lit by all Infantry units in the front line at 8 a.m., 12 noon, 4 p.m., and 8 p.m.
Ground sheets and ground signalling sheets are to be used with contact aeroplanes. - Mirrors flashed by day.

9. Ammunition, bomb, and water Dumps:
(a) Will be established at the following points:
(i) In hollow road N.of BAILIFF WOOD.
(ii) Near Point Sq.11.b.8.9.
(iii) Near Point Sq.11.b.4.6.
(iv) Near Point Sq.11.a.2.2.
(b) 9th and 11th Bns. to provide 50 men under an Officer to above to firing line from (ii), (iii) and (iv) dumps.
10th Battalion will supply 1 Officer and 50 other ranks to carry from (i) to (iii) and(iv) dumps.
12th Bn. 1 Officer and 50 men to carry to (ii) and (iii) dumps.
These 10th and 12th Bn. parties will report to Lieut. HEMING, Brigade Bombing Officer at 8 p.m. (2000) at Brigade Headquarters Sq.21.b.5.6.

10. Tools, ammunition, bombs and rations
Each man of second wave (or half of each line) will carry a pick or shovel.
Every man will carry 2 bombs for use of bombers only, except in emergency.
Every man will carry 220 rounds S.A.A..
Every man will have his water bottle full and will carry 2 small tins bully Beef, 8 ration biscuits, and piece of cheese and one iron ration.

11. Each Battalion will arrange for a party to collect all stragglers and form them into a formed body to be brought up in rear of the Battalion.

12. Men are forbidden to take wounded to the rear unless with written order from an officer.

13. 20 Officers per Battalion only will go forward to the assault, the ~~remai~~ remainder, to include 2nd in command, and 2nd in Command of Companies to report as ordered to Divisional Headquarters ALBERT at 12 midnight. The senio of each Battalion will take a list of such officers (in duplicate) with him.

14. Reports to advanced Brigade H.Q. after 12 midnight 22nd/23rd July,1916 at X.16.b.2.2. (ruins of first house N.W.corner of CONTALMAISON VILLAGE).
All reports should be sent in duplicate by 2 separate runners.
(b) Battalions will inform all units of Brigade of position of their battle H.Q. as early as possible

15. Synchronization of Watches:
1 representative from each Unit will report at Brigade H.Q. at 1200, 1600, 2000 today.

16. Signals etc.
Brigade Signal Office will arrange for communication between units of Brigade to Brigade H.Q. and Div.Report centre, and units on either flank.
O.C.Units will be responsible that all possible steps are taken to keep up communication.

17. Identifications
Both sleeves to be rolled up above the elbow during our first barrage and immediate prior to the 1st assault being launched, kept rolled up hereafter until daylight.

Dictated to representatives of Units at 1120
Brigade Bomb Officer
" Signal "

Copy 1 and 2 files
3 1st Inf.Bde.A.I.F.
4 1st Aust Div.

581

Appendix No. L.

Copy No.1.

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE A.I.F.

MEMO of Instructions with Brigade Operation Order No.21 of 22/7/16.

1. Watches synchronized at Brigade H.Q. at 12 noon - 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 22nd July, 1916.
Representatives of units to attend quarter of an hour prior to above times, reporting to Brigade Major.

2. Zero time has been communicated by word of mouth to all units, on no account is it to be telephoned, written or signalled.

3. Method of attack:
(i) 9th and 11th Bns in 4 lines (6 waves) thus:

11th Battn. 9th Battn.

½ Coy

F.L. (- - - - 1st Wave)
(- - - - 2nd Wave) 1st Line.

Supports (- - - - 2nd Wave)
(1 Coy "A" 1 Coy "A" ~~3rd~~) 2nd Line.
(- - - - 3rd Wave)
"A" "A" = 2 Vickers guns each

Reserve) 5 Wave - - - - ~~3rd~~ 3rd Line
) 1 Coy 1 Coy. 1 Coy ½ Coy ½ Coy
) 6 Wave - - - - 4th Line

~~A~~ A = 2 Vickers guns each 4 Vickers Guns.

12th Battn. 10th Battn.

Above to be in position by 12 m.n. 22/23rd July,1916

(ii) First Objective

1st Wave lying out 150x from enemy trench
2nd Wave in our leading trench
3rd Wave)
4th Wave) in our 2nd trench

3rd Line (5th Wave) in our 3rd trench
4th Line (6th Wave) in BLACK WATCH ALLEY, or in front of it as decided by O.C. Battalions concerned.

As each wave goes forward the next takes its place.

Brigade Reserves 10th Bn. and 2 Coys 12th Bn. with the Lewis Guns allotted,moving across till in rear of their proper positions when they will go forward in 2 waves.

12th Battn. 2 Coys 10th Bn. 2 Coys.

- - - - - - - - 7th Wave
- - - - - - - - 8th Wave

keeping about 200x in rear of preceding moving unit.

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Appendix No. L.

Not to move forward from our present front trench unless called for when Bde.H.Q. is to be informed.

1st objective to be taken and consolidated by first 2 waves.

(iii) 2nd Objective by 3rd and 4th waves closely supported by 5th wave, the 6th wave being used if necessary to push home the attack.
This objective when gained will be consolidated by 3rd, 4th and 5th waves.

The 6th wave pushing forward towards 3rd objective and covering the consolidation of 2nd objective.

(iv) 3rd Objective.
The 7th and 8th waves will attack the 3rd objective and will hold and consolidate it when taken.

Should the 3rd objective be taken, the 9th and 11th Battalions as re-organised will remain in their consolidate positions and become Brigade Reserves

The Vickers Guns with the first objective will move forward with the 8th wave.

9th and 10th Waves will be formed by 2 rear Companies 10th Battalion and 2 Companies 12th Bn., the latter moving to BLACK WATCH ALLEY on receipt of instructions from Bde.H.Q.
They will be used if necessary to support the attack on 3rd objective.

4. STRONG POINTS:
Engineers will undertake construction of strong points in left sub-section - Pioneers those in right sub-section.

5. Consolidation of positions taken must include the construction of communication trenches as outlined to C.O's verbally.

6. Units must arrange for traffic control.

7. Dresssing stations at BAILIFF WOOD and GORDON DUMP.

8. Lieut.HEMING, Brigade Bombing Officer will organize supplies of ammunition, water, bombs, and supplies from GORDON DUMP, and Brigade DUMP at BAILIFF WOOD in Sunken road.

581

Appendix "M"

Copy No.1.

3RD AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 22.

Brigade Headquarters,
24th July, 1916.

Reference Sheet No.57d. S.E. 1/20,000 Trench Map.

1. (i) The Right Flank of the Division will be extended to include the enemy's position in trenches O.G.1. and O.G.2. between the line X.5.b.2.0. - X.5.b.4.0½. and the line X.5.a.7.7. - X.5.b.0.8. both lines inclusive.

(ii) The line will be continued to the North East corner of POZIERES at about Sq.X.5.a.3.7.

2. The attack will be made at 2 a.m. on 25th instant.

3. The 5th Aust.Inf.Bn. and 2 Companies 7th Aust.Inf.Bn. under Orders of Lieut-Col.LE MAISTRE,D.S.O., 5th Aust.Inf.~~XXX~~.Bn. will make the direct attack from the South Westerly direction. The 10th, 9th, and 12th Aust.Infantry Battalions will co-operate by fire until the assaulting first line of the main attack passes through their line.
The 10th Battalion will also co-operate by attacking the hostile post at about 5.b.2.½. along the trench from the S. an and S.E. with bombers.
The L.T.M.B. will enfilade O.G.1 during the barrage, but will cease fire immediately the barrage stops.

The troops of 3rd Inf.Bde at present holding the line from ~~X~~ X.5.a.1.5. to X.5.a.6.4. will co-operate by swinging up their right which will rest on 5.a.7.7. (point of junction with 5 and 7th Bns.

4. Attention is directed to D.O.36 of 24/7/16 re instructions for the attack. Also para 5 Artillery Barrages.

5. Reports to 3rd Inf.Bde H.Q.. These must be frequent and must give position of troops as far as known, and times of occurrences.

6. All changes of location must be sent to Bde.H.Q. if possible accompanied by a sketch showing distribution.

7. Identification. Sleeves will be rolled up above the elbow.

Acknowledge.
Issued at 1805.

(Sd) L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Capt.
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Bde.

Copy No. 1. File
2 7th Bn.
3 9th Bn.
4 10th Bn
5 11th Bn
6 12th Bn
7 3rd Bde.
8 1st Aust.Div.

581

Appendix "N"

Copy No.9.

3rd AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM NO. 14.

Brigade Headquarters,
24/7/16.

X. In continuation of Brigade Operation Order No.22 of 24th July, the following additional operation will take place.

1. The Division will take up a line from the Cemetery at 34.d.6.0. through X.4.b.6.7. to X.5.a.7.7. to X.5.b.0,8.

2. The junction between the 1st Aust.Inf.Bde and 3rd Aust Inf.Bde will be a line from Sq.R.34.d.3.0. Southwards through X.4.b.3.2.

3. Brigade Operation Memorandum No.16 will hold good with the following modifications.
12th Bn. will move one Company up from Bde.Reserve to support the forward move of the two front line 12th Bn. companies and prolong their line to point 5.a.7.9.
The Company 10th Bn. now at about X.5.a.6.3. will form a support to the assault of the 12th Bn. forward companies and will follow them in a central position at about 200x distance moving back to about point 5.a.6.3. when the operation is completed.

4. At 3-30 a.m. the 12th Battn. and any other unit men with it and left (West) of point X.5.a.~~x~~ 3.7. will pivot on that point and swing up till in line with the point of garden enclosure about 5.a.1.7½. and 5.a.0.7½.

The 11th Bn. will take up the line 5.a.0.7½. westwards throug point 4.b.6.7. to junction with 1st Aust.Inf.Bde at about point X.4.b.3.9.
O.C.11th Bn. will move up all of his Battn now in German first objective line to co-operate.

5. 1st British Bde co-operate on our right and the 48th Division on the left of the 1st Aust.Inf.Bde.
Artillery co-operate throughout.

6. 10th Battn. will hold one company intact in its present position to act as ~~position~~ portion Brigade Reserve.
7th Battn. (less 2 Coys) will be Brigade Reserve and will be placed at about trench running through 5.c.8.1.

7. M.Gun Company - Will move 2 guns of the four now with 9th Battn to move with support Coy of 12th Battn. to be placed in strong point at 5.a.3.7.
O.C.12th Battn. will also place:
(b) 2 Lewis guns in strong points at 5.a.7.~~x~~.7.
(c) T.M.Batty at tail of 7th Battn.

8. Two sections of 5th F.Coy will assist in placing 5.a.3.7. in a state of defence as a strong point.

9. Positions taken to be at once consolidated and communication established.

10. Reports to Advanced Bde.H.Q.
Acknowledge.
Issued at. 11.30pm

(Sd) L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Capt.
Brigade Major, 3rd Inf.Brigade.

581

Appendix No. O.

appendix "O"

MESSAGE Order No.23.

All Battns. 3rd M.G.Coy. T.M.B.

A.Z.S. 231 25th July.

3rd Infantry Bde will be relieved by 5th Inf.Bde tonight 25th/26th inst. ~~by 5th Inf. Brigade~~ aaa The method of relief will be as follows The 17th Battn. will relieve that portion of the line from 5.d.4.5. to 5.a.9½.3½. including the trench to 5.d.2.9½. from 5.d.7.8. Only those troops actually in that portion of the line are to be relieved then aaa This Battalion will commence relief at about 9-30 p.m. aaa Great care is to be taken over the relief to prevent any gap or careless taking over aaa.
(2) The 19th Battalion will relieve the left of the line next commencing about 10-30 p.m. at where the left of the 11th Battalion rests about Point 4.b.3½.2½. to Point 4.b.7.5. in the same manner only those troops within these limits are to be relieved commencing at that hour aaa (3) The 18th Bn. will relieve that portion of the line between points 5.a.9½.3½ and 4.b.7.5. aaa (4) M.G.Coy Commanders will mutually arrange reliefs also the Light T.M.Batteries aaa (5) Men will leave the trenches a platoon at a time and on arriving on the road will move with at least 3 minute intervals between platoons aaa
(6) Tools will be collected and carried away as far as is possible aaa
(7) Ammunition (except pouch ammunition) will be left in the trenches for relieving units aaa (8) We must evacuate as many wounded as possible aaa (9) O's.C. Bns. will arrange and see that the front line is not over crowded during relief and also that no stretch of it is left unoccupied for more than a few minutes.
(10) After relief Units will march to bivouac ground in W.21.a. on N.E. side of road.
(11) Reports will be sent to Bde.Hdqrs (on Bivouac ground) when relief is completed.
Acknowledge.

1845

L.S.TOLLEMACHE, Capt.
Bde.Major, 3rd Inf.Brigade, A.I.F.

581

Appendix No. P.

Appendix "P"

MESSAGE

A.Z.C. 505 26th July. All Battns. 3rd M.G.Coy.T.M.B.

Reference Map 57d aaa Brigade will move to-day to Huts in VADENCOURT WOOD Square U.21.b. and U.22.a. aaa Starting point road junction W.27 Central V.21 central - WARLOY U.23.Central aaa Order of march - Bde.Hdqrs, M.G.Coy., T.M.B., 10th, 11th, 12th, 9th Bns aaa Time for head to pass starting point 1815 aaa The Staff Capt. has proceeded to new area.Advance parties will be sent ahead to reach cross roads in Sq.U.22.a. at 1830 aaa. Kits aaa Packs, blankets, and greatcoats will be stacked by Units ready for transport to be provided by Q.Branch aaa The kits of casualties will be separated from those marching with units aaa A sufficient guard and loading party will be left with each separate dump aaa. Acknowledge.

1727

3rd Aust.Inf.Brigade.

.581

Appendix "Q"

SPECIAL ROUTINE ORDER
by
MAJOR GENERAL H. B. WALKER C.B.,D.S.O.
COMMANDING 1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
July 27th 1916.

The Divisional Commander desires that the following congratulatory essages and the replies thereto, regarding our recent operations, be be communicated to all ranks of the 1st. Australian Division.

1.

Frem Reserve Army to 1st. Australian Division, dated 23/7/16.

Following message received from Commander-in-Chief begins- AAAPlease communicate my warmest congratulations to the Australians and the 48th. Division for their fine work this morning.

11.

To 1st. ANZACfrom 1st. Australian Division, dated 23/7/16- :-

On behalf of 1st Australian Division I beg to thank ~~you~~-the Commander-in-Chief for his kind congratulations on last night's operations, the success of which was decided by the gallantry of the fighting troops.

111

From Reserve Army to 1st. Australian Division, dated 23/7/16.:-

The Army Commander wishes to congratulate the 1st Australian Division on their splendid performance last night. He instructs that the pre ent line must be consolidated and the flanks made secure before any further advance is attempted.

1V.

TO Reserve Army from 1st. Australian Division, dated 23/7/16.:-

On behalf of the 1st. Australian Division I beg to thank the Army Commander for his kind congratulations on last night's operation the success of which was decided by the gallantry of the fighting troops.

V.

From 1st. ANZAC to 1st. Australian Division, dated 25/7/16. :-

Following from Reserve Army begins AAA The Army Commander desires his congratulations conveyed to General Walker and 1st Australian Division on good work done last night.

V1.

To 1st. ANZAC from 1st Australian Division, dated 25/7/16.:-

General WALKER wishes to thank the army Commander for his congratulations on the good work done by the 1st Australians Division last night, the success of which was due to the gallantry displayed by the fighting troops.

V11.

From G.O.C. 1st ~~Australian~~ Division to 1st Aus. Division, dated 26/7/

On temporarily leaving the line on relief all ranks of the 1st. Division desire to ezpress to the 1st Australian Divn.alongside of w whom they have now been fighting for the last few days, their profour admiration of the magnificient feat of arms which has culminated in the capture of POZIERES

The First Division feels proud to have had the privilege of meeting and serving alongside of the First Australian Divn. and look forward to the time in the near future when they may have again the good fortune to be closely associated with the First Australian Division in the common task.

(2)

&Vlll.

To 1st. Division from G.O.C.1st Australian Division, dated 26/7/16.

All ranks of the 1st. Australian Division thank the First Division for their kind letter and beg to assure them that their sentiments are heartily reciprocated.

It is to be hoped that we may soon find ourselves serving side by side again, and we only regret that we were so soon separated.

(SD) G. C. SOMERVILLE, Major.
D.A.A.&Q.M.G.
1st Australian Division,

581.

Appendix No. Q.

1st Anzac Corps, 27th July, 1916.

My dear Walker,-

Now that you and your Division are going back for a rest - which I wish I thought would be a fairly long one, but which I fear may be comparatively short, I feel I must send you a line just to thank you, your brigadiers, and indeed the whole of the 1st Division most sincerely for the really magnificent bit of work you have all put in in taking and holding Pozieres. I well know what a great strain it has been for all concerned, and the worst of it is that I am afraid we must all of us look forward to continuous series of such strains during this stage of the fighting. I feel that no troops could have done better, or have been better handled, and I well know how grateful the Chief and everyone else are at the work done by the Division. Will you please let all concerned know how much I do think of the good work which has been done by every single individual, and of the amount of self-sacrifice, which it is extremely difficult to realise.

I only wish that I could thank everyone individually, and wish, too, that there was a sufficient number of V.C's to go round for the very large numbers of Officers and men, who I am sure have deserved them.

Mind you and all of you, take as much rest as you can possibly manage now, though I know you will be busy re-organizing, &c.

As always, the best of good wishes to you, my dear Walker, and again my grateful thanks.

Yours ever,

(Sd) W.R.BIRDWOOD.

P.S. Godley sent a wire conveying his congratulations to you and your Division, to which I sent a suitable answer on your behalf.

Sm

War Diary Appendix Appendix No: Q

3rd Australian Bde
July 1916

SPECIAL ROUTINE ORDER
By
MAJOR GENERAL H.B.WALKER, C.B., D.S.O.
COMMANDING 1st.AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
July 31st. 1916.

Now that the Division has left, for a while, the scene of active operations, the Divisional Commander, in addition to his messages of congratulation conveyed to all concerned on the battlefield, desires to express his high appreciation of the brilliant services rendered by the Division during the recent operations at POZIERES. The gallantry of the fighting troops has acquired one of the most important positions on the front, for which British and French Armies are now fighting, and has earned for the Australian Forces a record which will go down to posterity.

The reputation of the 1st.Australian Division has been worthily upheld and the Divisional Commander now desires by means of this order to express his gratitude to all ranks and all arms and staffs for the way in which they have responded to the demands made on their Military virtues.

C.H. FOOTT, Lt.Colonel,
A.A. & Q.M.G.
1st.Aust. Division.

Appendix No. R.

Appendix "R"

MESSAGE

All Battalions M.G.Coy. 3rd A.L.T.M.B.

B.M. 6. 27/7/16.

Brigade will move to LA VICOGNE today. Route VADENCOURT, TOUTENCOURT HERISSART, LEVAL DE MAISON, Fme DUROSEL aaa.

Starting point X roads 100x West of V in VADENCOURT aaa

Time for head to pass starting point 1330 aaa Order of march

11th Battn. 12th Battn. Bde.Headquarters, M.G.Coy. T.M.B. 9th Battn. 10th Battn aaa

Advance parties under Staff Captain have been ordered to parade Brigade Headquarters 1200 aaa

Issued at 1200

3rd Inf.Brigade.

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Appendix No. S.

appendix "S"

MESSAGE

All Battalion, 3rd M.G.Coy. T.M.B. 4th Coy.A.A.S.C.

A.Z.C. 533 28th

Reference Map LENS 11 1/100,000 aaa Brigade will move today to billets in BERTEAUCOURT area today aaa Starting point road junction 200x North of N. in VICOGNE aaa Order or March aaa Brigade Hdqrs 12th Battalion, 9th Battalion, 10th Battalion, 11th Battalion, 3rd M.G.Company, T.M.B. 4th Coy A.A.S.C. aaa Time to pass starting point 1130 aaa Brigade will move closed to proper distance and according to standing orders laid down for marches aaa Billeting parties will report at MAIRIE at BERTEAUCOURT at 1300.

Issued at 0900

3rd Inf.Brigade.

3RD AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Report on Operations about POZIERES 19th - 26th July, 1916.

Reference Map 1 - 10,000 attached hereto Appendix I. & II

Relief. 1. The 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade relieved the 68th Inf. Brigade on the night of 19th/20th July, 1916, except in O.G.1. and O.G.2. relieved on night of 20th/21st July.

LOCATION AND DISPOSITION 2. Front Line - 9th and 11th Bns. and 4 Vickers Guns.

9th Battalion - One Company. BLACK WATCH AVENUE with posts in advance - X.11.b.8.9. to X.11.b.0.5.

2 Vickers Guns 3rd M.G.Company.

3 Companies Battalion Reserve near BAILIFF WOOD (X.16.a.5.0.) Battn.Headquarters.

11th Battalion - One Company X.11.a.8.7. to X.10.b.9.7. via X.11.a.1.3½.

One Company BLACK WATCH AVENUE X.11.b.0.5. to X.11.a.4.0.

2 Vickers guns in latter.

Headquarters and 2 Companies X.16.a.6.

10th & 12th Bns., remainder M.G.Coy., and T.M.B. in Sq.East of ALBERT W.29.d., and in billets in ALBERT.

Brigade Reserve.

Brigade Headquarters X.15.c.5.6.

WORKS. 3. On 20th July all ground was continuously shelled by enemy but with Engineer and Pioneer Battalion working parties, BLACK WATCH AVENUE (a bad wet trench very shallow and full of dead) was improved and new trenches commenced in Sq.X.5.c. and X.11.a.

LOCATION 4. On 20th/21st

9th Battalion: 9th Bn. 2 Coys holding line X.5.d.7.8., X.5.d.4.5. to X.11.a.8.8. an attempt to take points X.5.d.2.9. and X.5.b.4.1. with

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2 Officers and 100 men failed with casualties - 10 O.R.killed, 1 Officer and 31 O.R. wounded 3 O.R. missing

Supports in BLACK WATCH AVENUE Sq.11.b.

9th Battalion Reserves: 2 Companies & H.Q. Sq.21.a.

11th Battn. 2 Companies X.11.a.8.7., X.11.a.1.3½.,X.10.b.9.7.

1 Company BLACK WATCH AVENUE Sq. 11.c. and 10.b.

1 Company and Hdqrs BAILIFF WOOD Sq.X.16.a.

Brigade Reserve:-

10th Battalion in old British trenches Sq.X.20

12th Battalion in Sq.X.15. and X.20.

Brigade M.G.Company less 4 Guns and T.M.B. in Sq.X.20.

WORKS. 5. Work continued up to early morning of 23rd without intermission:

Trenches X.11.b.8.9. to X.16.b.1.5. deepened widened and cleared of dead. - X.5.d.4.5. to X.11.a.2.3. by road made 3'6" deep. - X.5.b.9.2. to X.11.a.5.9. to 3'6" or 4feet deep and joined to rear trench by 2 communication trenches and trench X.11.a.5.7. to X.11.a.1½.4. made 3'6" deep. Communication trenches X.5.d.0.2. to X.11.b.4.5. dug 4' deep, and X.11.a.2.3. to X.11.c.4.7. dug 5' deep.

MAIN ATTACK. 6. On 22/7/16. Orders were received to attack enemy's positions:-

Frontage. (a) Brigade frontage X.5.b.4.1. to X.5.c.0.3.

Hour. (b) Hour of attack 12-30 a.m. 23rd July.

(c) Brigade was ordered to attack as under:

9th Battn. (on right) } each finding 2 lines (4 waves)
11th Battn. (on left) } F.L.&.S. & 2 lines Local Reserves

9th Battn. to find one Company of first lines to attack

O.G.1. and O.G.2. supported by one Company Brigade Reserve 10th Battalion

1st Line was to take 1st objective and hold and consolidate it - 2nd line to assist.

3rd and 4th lines to take and hold 2nd objective.

M.G.Company 4 Guns to hold 1st objective - 4 guns to assist 9th Battalion. 4 Guns in BLACK WATCH AVENUE.

T.M.B. - 4 Guns to assist 9th Battalion against strong points in O.G.1. and O.G.2.

Brigade Reserves. 10th Battn.) were to follow 9th and 11th Battns on a
12th Battn.) 2 Company frontage of 4 lines.
and were allotted the 3rd and 4th objectives.

M.G.Company less 4 guns. T.M.B. less 4 guns.

Objectives. 1st hostile trench X.5.b.4.1. to X.5.c.0.3.

2nd X.5.b.2.6. to X.4.b.7.0.

3rd R.35.c.9.0. to X.4.b.7.2.

4th not determined, but West of Village and N.E. corner of same, also the 2 trenches O.G.1. and O.G.2. to N.E. of Village as far as Sq.R.35.

Difficulties. (d) Great difficulty was experienced by 10th and 12th Battalions who had to make their way up BLACK WATCH AVENUE (all ground to the S.E. of same being 1st Div'n British, and we were unable to use it), which formed the neck of a bottle - then change direction left; and again after passing through 1st objective, change direction again ½ left. Much hampered also by having to wear Gas helmets on account many phosgene gas shells

(e) NARRATIVE: 23rd.

12-32 a.m. 1st objective taken (and one M.G. by M.G.Company) with moderate opposition except that the right failed to make good the enemy strong points in O.G.2. and O.G.1. at 5.b.4.1. and 5.d.3.8.for a considerable time in the latter case and not for some

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(4)

days in the former.

The strong point at 5.b.2.0½. was strongly held and precluded occupation of trench to S.E. of it for 200x, however in about ½ hour 5.b.3.8. was taken and a "mask" formed by 9th Battalion round 5.b.2.0½ to the S.W. The 9th Battalion therefore was held up by M.G. and rifle fire from O.G.1., and only one platoon advanced on right of 11th Battalion, who made for 2nd objective, the first being consolidated by the line which took it.

(f) At about 1-15 a.m. 2nd objective was taken by 11th Battalion and one platoon 9th Battalion and in copse Sqq: 5.c. and 4.d. 5 howitzers taken.
There was no regular trench line and sometime was wasted in making a line to entrench, Officers had great difficulty in re-organizing as men pursued parties of enemy right through the village in which houses or streets were so broken up as to be unrecognisable.

(g) Hearing of delay of 12th and 10th Battalions and of heavy fire hostile from O.G.1. on rear and left flank of 11th Battalion, I ordered 2 leading Companies 12th Battalion to push on and prolong 11th line to the right (N.N.E.)
These started from BLACK WATCH AVENUE about 1-40 a.m. and did not reach the front line until about 3-30 a.m, when they at once began to dig in.

Locations. (h) Position at ~~4 a.m.~~ 12 noon as in sketch ~~in green~~ Mauve.

Hostile Artillery (i) Hostile Artillery were active throughout and heavily shelled the captured positions all day, also all communications, valleys etc.

Post 5.b.2.0½

(j) 8-55 a.m. O.C.9th Battalion reported that about 8 a.m. he had gained a footing near strong point 5.b. 2.0½. but could not gain the post notwithstanding the launching of 5 or 6 attacks.

Reinforcement.

(k) Reinforcement 2 Companies 7th Battalion received.

Patrols.

(l) By 9 a.m. all positions taken had been consolidated and patrols constantly pushed forward to reconnoitre. All advances were preceded by patrols.

Supplies.

(m) Supply arrangements worked well and by noon all front line troops were well supplied with ammunition, bombs, water etc; and dumps established in the 1st objective taken and in communication trenches in rear.

(n) Communication trench X.5.c.5.3. to X.5.c.2.7. well down, and in use by 11-15 a.m.

(o) At 12-10 orders received to seize remainder of village -

9th Battalion ordered to make good O.G.1. as far N. as railway. 1st Division attack on MUNSTER ALLEY had failed and this left the flank on the right exposed.

(p) 12 noon to 8-55 p.m. Heavy hostile shelling - Advance of a few hundred yards to West and N. of village.

9th Battalion form a line opposite O.G.1. to keep down the fire and establish themselves near X.5.b.2.0½. Line thoroughly consolidated and counter attack from N.E. stopped by our Artillery. Shelling of trenches and communications with tear shells

(q) 8-45 to 9-30 p.m. Situation

Hostile shelling less violent.

The 10th Battalion now on right flank with 9th Battn. on their left - 12th Battalion 2 Coys - 11th Battn.

(r) 11th Battalion report 10 p.m. their patrols heavily fired on from W.& N.W. (This turned out to be our 8th Battalion).

We co-operated with 1st Imperial Division on our right and again attempted to make good strong points in O.G.1. and O.G.2. both attacks failed with considerable number of casualties.

(s) 24th

3-12 a.m. Orders issued for general attack to make good O.G.1. and whole village. Attack on O.G.1. failed - 12th Battalion established themselves in N.E. corner of the village - 11th Battalion heavily fired on, could only hold their ground N.West of ALBERT.- BAPAUME ROAD.

5 a.m. 12th Battalion had to fall back on line of railway owing to trenches being obliterated with hostile shell fire.

(t) From 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. heavy hostile shelling all our trenches and communications with heavy guns and shrapnel.

Hostile counter-attack.

(u) 8-30. heavy hostile counter attack from N.W. to N.E. both sides ALBERT - BAPAUME Road repulsed by our Artillery and Machine Gun fire killing many of enemy. - 12th Battalion again occupy ground in advance of N.E. corner POZIERES and patrol to front.

(v) 10-30 hostile shelling much less.

(w) 12-05 to 2 p.m. - heavy shelling also many tear shells.

(x) 10th Battalion directed to dig trench 5.d.7.8. to 5.d.2.9., this was completed during night of 24th/25th to 7' deep.

(y) 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. - heavy hostile shelling of front trenches, the village, communications, etc.

(z) Orders for attack by 5th Battalion and 2 Coys and co-operation by 10th and 9th Battalions issued attack 2 ~~p~~.m. on 25th July. All arrangements completed by 11-20 p.m.

attack O.G. 1

7. Prior to attack on O.G.1. and O.G.2. Bombs, ammunition, water etc., had been sent up in large quantities and wounded evacuated to a great extent. Most of dead were still unburied and all ranks very exhausted having had (9th and 11th Bns) little sleep since 18th instant, except under heavy fire, and no sleep since 19th instant.

25th

(a) At 1-50 a.m. 5th Battalion in position for attack. 7th Battalion (2 Companies) had lost their way and took no part in the fight.

At 2 a.m. 5th Battalion took O.G.1. - 10th Battalion 1 Company taking strong point 5.b.2.0½. and consolidated it. O.G.2. was taken at about 3 a.m. Owing to the 7th Battalion Coys not co-operating, the left of 5th Battalion was "in in air" and they were at once heavily bombed from points 5.a.8.7. and 5.b.0.8. also from MUNSTER ALLEY - 5.b.4.1. and ground to the N.E.

O.G.2. was a poor trench much knocked about, and afforded

Evacuation O.G.2.

little cover - from N. and N.E; after heavy losses 5th Battalion had to evacuate it at about 4-30 a.m.

(b) Meanwhile a terrific bomb fight was conducted by 10th Battalion and some bombing squads 9th Battalion for possession of strong points 5.b.4.1. and 5.b.3.0½. (between O.G.1. and O.G.2.) resulting in alternate occupation of these points and many casualties both sides.

1st (Bde) Division failed to take MUNSTER ALLEY.

(c) 11th Battalion had advanced and been heavily fired on from about 4.b.5.6. to 4.b.8.5. (8th Battalion) 5-25 a.m. - 12th Battalion meanwhile holding their ground well despite heavy shell and M.G.fire from O.G.1. and the N. - but had again to fall back on tramway line of trenches after front trenches were completely obliterated.

(d) About 5 a.m. 5th Battalion reinforced with bombs and 1 company 10th Battalion, in addition 9th Battalion had 2 Companies in support of them 300x in rear. Continual applications from O.C. 5th Battalion for reinforcements and bombs.

L.T.M.Battery.

(e) Light T.M.B. about 5.d.3.8. to 5.d.4.7. rendered valuable assistance against hostile strong points firing over 1400 shells.

Counter attack.

(f) 8-50 a.m. reported to Division (reports from several points of line) large bodies enemy advancing from N. & N.E. 2 Companies 7th Battalion moved to central position to deal with counter attack and 4 guns Vickers in position in O.G.1., and trench 5.d.3.8. - 9.6. also ready making 1st objective line

(9) Appendix No. Z.

very strong for advanced troops to fall back on.

10 a.m. This counter attack was pushed strongly, but repulsed by Artillery and M.G.fire, the M.Guns in BLACK WATCH ALLEY doing great execution in the close ranks of the enemy at 2000 yards and upwards ranges.

Hostile shelling

(g) Meanwhile very heavy hostile shelling over whole area, gas shells freely used and causing a few casualties.

(h) At 11-10 - 9th Battalion report holding O.G.1. to X.5.a.9.4.

(i) Bombing and enemy shelling continued all day and casualties were continuous.

Relief.

(j) Arrangements made for relief of 3rd Inf.Brigade and relief successfully completed by 6 a.m. 26th inst. by 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

CONDUCT.

8. The behaviour of all ranks under a tremendous strain was magnificent, some men including Brigade Staff were 6 days and nights with little or no sleep.
When not fighting men dug hard.

WOUNDED

9. Evacuation of wounded was very difficult and arrangements were unequal to the strain especially from aid posts to dressing stations.
The behaviour of the stretcher bearers was heroic and their endurance marvellous.
Aid posts were again and again blown to pieces and wounded killed, the medical officers worked day and night, and I regret to report several casualties amongst them.

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ARTILLERY. 10. Our Artillery shooting appeared to be most accurate and men crept close up to the Barrages with the greatest confidence.

Hostile Artillery caused many casualties and they shelled stretcher parties consistently, and I am sorry to say, accurately.

COMMUNICATIONS. 11. Communications - Good - I was in touch with Battalions, ~~with~~ by runners, and visual; the lines broke down completely after many attempts to repair them. The Brigade Signal Section and the runners and Battalion signallers did yeoman service and not one message out of hundreds was unduly delayed or failed to arrive.

I regret there were many casualties amongst the runners. Lieut.FERGUSON and the visual stations provided by the Signal Section were exposed to severe shell fire, but carried out their duties with great devotion to duty.

SUPPLIES. 13. Supplies were kept up and there was no shortage of ammunition (S.A.A.) but there was difficulty in keeping up supply of Mills grenades, and Light Trench Mortar shells but on no occasion did they actually fall short completely. Water and rations turned up regularly and the carrier parties were brave and did their work excellently.

The supply of ammunition etc., from the Division to the Brigade was excellent, and we owe our grateful thanks to Q branch for their first class arrangements.

ASSISTANCE. 14. We owe a debt of gratitude to the 2nd and 5th Brigades for their assistance and working parties and carriers, and and to the Engineers and Pioneer Battalion for their excellent work done under heavy shell fire.

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(11)

HONOURS AND REWARDS

15. I am forwarding later, names of individuals for recognition and reward.

16. I attach maps Appendices I and II showing the position of the Brigade at various times. & summary of casualties during operations Appendix III

E G Sinclair MacLagan
.....Brig-General.
Commanding 3rd Aust. Infantry Brigade.

30/7/16

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3rd Australian Inf Bde Appendix 2 I

57D S.E. 4.



3rd Australian Infantry Brigade

Appendix Z II

57D S. E. 4.



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CASUALTIES.

3rd Aust. Inf. Brigade.

19th July to 26th July

Unit.	Officers			Other Ranks			Total	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed	Wounded	Missing.	Off.	O.R.
3rd A.L.T.M.B.		1		4	15		1	19
3rd M.G.Coy.		4		9	27	3	4	39
9th Battalion	3	10	2	51	186	111	15	348
10th Battalion	2	11		49	218	48	13	325
11th Battalion	6	11	1	62	358	91	18	511
12th Battalion	3	10	1	68	242	97	14	407
Total.	14	47	4	243	1046	350	65	1639.

For detail of officers see attached.

Lt Col

OFFICERS CASUALTY RETURN.

3rd. A.L.T.M.B.

Lieut. G. H, HART Wounded.

3rd. M. G. Coy.

Capt.	B.H. WALTHER.	Wounded 23/7/16.
2/Lieut.	W. A. McPHEE	" "
2/ "	F. ARCHER	" "
Lieut.	G. L. CAVANAGH	" "

9th Battalion

Lieut. **Killed**

Lieut,	N. L. WEYNAND	23/7/16.
"	C. H. RUDDLE	"
2/Lieut.	A. P. BLAIR	"

Wounded

Major	W. M. YOUNG	23/7/16
2/Lieut.	C. O. THOMPSON	23/7/16
"	J. P. RAMKEMA	(slightly at duty) 23/7/16.
Captain	S. N. LAWRENCE	23/7/16.
2/Lieut.	J. H. LUKIN	23/7/16.
2/Lieut.	W. AGGETT	"
Captain	A. R. KNIGHTLY	25/7/16 (slightly at duty).
2/Lieut,	J. E. McNAUGHT	"
"	R. M. WHITE	"
"	F. J. BIGGS	22/7/16

Missing

2/Lieut.	C. A. WITTKOPP	23/7/16
"	S. K. FORD	"

10th BATTALION

Killed

Captain	C. W. HOOPER	25/7/16.
Lieut.	B. R. J. HILLIER	"

Wounded.

Major	F. G. GILES	23/7/16.
Captain	W. F. J. McCANN	"
Lieut.	H. W. THOMAS	"
"	A. C. SANDLAND	"
2/Lieut.	A. E. WILMER	"
"	A. W. COLLINS	"
"	H, L, Boyce	25/7/16-
Captain	W. A. WHITBOURN	"
Lieut.	E. M. INGLIS	"
"	W, H, G, STEWART	"
"	P. G. MELVILLE	"

12th BATTALION

Killed.

Captain	I. S. MARGETTS	24/7/16
"	P. D. NICHOLAS	25/7/16
Lieut.	C. D. LUCAS	"

Wounded

Lieut.	A. GREEN	24/7/16	
Captain	J. A. W. KAYSER	24/7/16	
"	J. A. FOSTER	"	
"	C. J. TOZER	"	
Lieut.	R. M. W. THIRKELL	"	
"	S. H. HUGHES	25/7/16	
"	T. C. B. MOORE	"	
"	C. N. RICHARDSON	"	(slightly at duty)
"	J. N. HOLYMAN	"	" "
"	G. GANDY	"	" "

11th BATTALION

Killed

Captain	A. H. MACFARLANE	27/7/16
Lieut.	G. R. S. WALTERS	"
"	J. G. NICHOL	"
Captain	H. A. MANSFIELD	"
Lieut.	S. T. FORBES	"
2/Lieut.	W. G. HASTINGS	"

Wounded

Major	J. T. MILNER	27/7/16	
Captain	F. J. GRIFFIN	"	
2/Lieut.	A. C. ELLIOTT	"	
"	L. J. BICKFORD	"	
Captain	J. NEWMAN	"	
"	G. G. CAMPBELL	"	
2/Lieut.	H. DAVIDSON	"	
Lieut.	W. C. BELFORD	"	(Wounded but remaining on duty)
"	J. M. AITKEN	"	" " "
"	E. ROGERSON	"	
"	F. J. MACKEAN	"	

Missing.

2/Lieut	P. E. M. VOWLES	27/7/16.