


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/42/4 Part 3

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 1st
Australian Division

May 1915



AWM4-1/42/4PART3

Appendix No. 1

1/5/15

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

The enemy's action now appears to have resolved itself into continual attacks with the evident object of inducing our men to use up quantities of ammunition.

They have apparently realised our difficulties in sending ammunition up to the firing line. It is all the more necessary therefore to continue the strict control on expenditure of ammunition which has already been so well taken in hand.

All troops not actually employed in the firing line must be used in digging in, firing trenches, support trenches and communication trenches, until every C. O. is thoroughly assured that he has made his position impregnable and that his men are absolutely secure against fire, whether of rifle or of shell.

SECRET-

Postponed and subsequently cancelled

Copy No. 16

72

OPERATION ORDER No. 4

by
MAJOR-GENERAL W.T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.,
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Beach 224 G.
1st May 1915.

Reference- Map of GALLIPOLI PENINSULA 1/40,000

Informa-
tion.

1. The Army Corps will to-day occupy a general line in advance of its present position to include the knoll 224 d 5 and thence south by west along the western bank of the gully 224 O.S.W.

The New Zealand and Australian division with one battalion Naval Brigade attached will advance to the knoll 224 d 5 joining up on the right with 1st Australian Division and on the left occupying the space 237 x i R 9-8-7.

The 2nd Naval Squadron will co-operate with fire:-

- (i) From the south west up the gully 224 O S W.
- (ii) On knolls 224 D 5 237 Z 238 q-v and the area to the west thereof.
- (iii) On BIYUKANAFARTA and KOJADERE.

Inten-
on.

2. The 1st Australian Division will advance to the west edge of the gully 224 O.S.W. with its left directed on 224 i 6 due east of the right of the position now occupied by the 4th Australian Infantry Bde. and in touch with the right of that brigade.

The new line will be entrenched when occupied.

Instruc-
tions.

3. (i) The advance to the new line will be made by the 1st infantry brigade and will begin at 5 p.m. at which time the brigade will be deployed in rear of the existing line. The right of the brigade will be directed on 224 n 8.

(ii) The 3rd infantry brigade will remain in its present position in support of the advancing troops.

(iii) The battalion of the R.N. brigade will advance its trenches to the crest of the ridge it now occupies.

(iv) The 2nd infantry brigade will remain in reserve in its present position.

(v)(a) The 3rd F.A. bde. will from its present position engage any target in 224 n 9 and 224 O; it will also engage any enemy artillery opposing the advance.

(b) The 7th Indian Mountain Brigade (less 1 battery) will under the orders of the O.C. 1st infantry brigade assist the advance.

(vi) The O.C. D.E. will detail one company of engineers to accompany the 1st infantry brigade, and under the orders of the Brigadier-General commanding to assist in entrenching and entangling the new position.

(vii) The A.D.M.S. will detail bearers to accompany the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Reports.



4. Reports to Headquarters 2nd Infantry Brigade.

C.B.B. WHITE Lieut.-Colonel,
General Staff.

Copy No.	To	By	At
1	MAJOR	Hand	9.45 a.m.
2 to 5	1st Inf. Bde	D.S. Coy.	"
6	2nd Inf. Bde.	"	"
7	3rd "	"	"
8	Deal Battn.	"	"
9 to 10	R.M. Bde.	"	"
11 to 12	Div. Art.	"	"
13	No. 7 I.M.A. Bde.	"	10.40 "
14 to 18	D.H.Q. (G. Branch 2, A Branch 2)	Hand	"
19	H.Q. Engrs.	D.S. Coy.	"
20	D.S. Co. (by hand); 21 Dwt. train (by D.S. Co.); 22 A.D.M.S. (by hand)		"

Appendix No. 2
1/5/15

SKETCH OF RIGHT FLANK
Scale 12" to 1 Mile V.L. 50 Feet




Scale.

App. 2
1/5/15

574

Appendix No 2
1/5/18
H.Q.




575

75

Appendix No 2
1/5/15

Scale 20" = 1 Mile



Appendix No. 2
1/5/15

1/5/15

2/5/15

2/5/15


SKETCH
from Cap^t McGee's Position.
Left of 4th Bn

Col Monash
Bde Digging



Tablamey Major
2/5/15 90

SKETCH
of ENEMY'S TRENCHES
from Right of 4th Bn



2/6/15 - Tablamey Major
90

Appendix No. 2

2/5/15

Sch. 4a.

"A" Form.

C.M. Form A. 39.
Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message.....

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Prefix.....	Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of: <i>2nd May</i> <i>from Message file 648</i> Service.	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Sent			Date.....
		At.....m.			From.....
		To.....			By.....
		By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO	G.O.C.	Royal	Marine	Bde
	OC.	Second	inf	bde

* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number	AAA
5 648	second		

G.O.C. wishes all ammunition, tools, equipment, water tins and other gear now lying about behind the firing line to be collected ~~AAA~~ and sent down under proper charge to the Ordnance depot on the beach ~~AAA~~. Please detail parties, each under an officer, from the battalions of the naval division under your command to carry out this duty, in addition to the entrenching work ~~AAA~~ work to begin today and continue until finished ~~AAA~~. These parties are to burn or bury dead animals and rubbish and generally clear up the areas allotted as under - Royal Marine Bde area between ^{N.W. watershed} of big valley in squares 224 i, h, m, r and crest of spur which runs from 224 m 6 to q 2 ~~AAA~~. Second bde remainder of the area between the firing line & the sea in squares 224 m, r and q.

From	<i>Amv</i>	<i>Dir</i>	
Place	<i>Amv</i>		
Time		<i>11.20</i>	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

D.210/9.13. - C.9258.

* This line should be erased if not required.

579

2nd May 79

from message file

ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDICATING ROADS IN SQUARE 224 S and

224 P 8 discovered by H. M. S. TRIUMPH.

5650
Appendix No 3

2/5/15

1. A signal will be made and timed.
2. Half an hour from that time, one or two shots will be fired to burst as nearly as possible on the left end of the road visible to Triumph in 224 S.
3. Then an interval of 10 minutes, and one or two shots to burst on the right of road in 224 S.
4. Then an interval of 10 minutes and one or two to burst on road in 224 P 8.
5. In each series the last shot may be taken to be correct from point of view of Triumph.
6. Preparatory signal to be made. Time - am going to fire as arranged on road $\frac{1}{2}$ hour from time of origin of this signal.
To be made direct to Right flanking station by lamp.

Received at
12 noon on 2/5/15

pa (WR)
CW
2/5

"A" FORM. Army Form C. 2121
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of :	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions						Date	
Sent					At	m.	Service.
To					From	5663	
By					(Signature of "Franking Officer")	By	2515

TO { NZ + A DIV^N
Operation Order N°5 by
Major Gen Sir A J Godley KCMG CB Comd^o NZ + A Div^N

Sender's Number. Day of Month In reply to Number A A A

* N°1. BEACH 2-5-15

Intention The operations ordered in DIV operation Order N°7 of 30 April will be carried out this evening, and the instructions therein contained

N°2 will hold good with the following exceptions:
Distribution (a) The 1st Australian Div will NOT move
(b) According to the RIGHT of the 7th (Australian) Bde will NOT move as it must maintain connection with the LEFT of the 1st Australian Div

(c) Brig. 7 (Australian) Inf Bde will make arrangements to ensure that his LEFT will rest on the RIGHT of the NZ Inf Bde on completion of the attack.

N°3
HOUR The exact time for the advance to commence will be notified by telephone later.
At the hour named for the advance to commence the fire from the ships will commence but will be directed on the

"A" FORM. Army Form C. 2121
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of :	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions						Date	
Sent					At	m.	Service.
To					From	5663	
By					(Signature of "Franking Officer")	By	2515

TO {

Sender's Number. Day of Month In reply to Number A A A

* line 224 F3 - 237 Z 9 - 237 U 9.
Prior to the hour of commencing the advance the fire of the ships will be directed on the line 224 D 2 to B and the parallelogram to East of it

ISSUED at 2.30 pm to :-

CRA ✓
NAVAL Bde
NZ Inf Bde ✓
7th Aust^N Inf Bde ✓
O C signals.
1st Aust DIV
CRE
ADMS.

W 8 Branthwaite M
R 2

Appendix N° 4
of 7/1/16 Bde took
log + Bde Ants
informed + checked
for 2000 hours
2/5 4/5/5

From
Place
Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (2)

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message in on a/c of: 1 Aust Div 4679 Service. 2.5.15 (Signature of "Franking Officer")	Recd. at	m.	
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.						Sent.	Date	
						At	m.	
						To		
						By		

TO	1 st Aust Div
----	--------------------------

* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
NZG96	2		

With reference to the orders for ~~longer~~
operations all guns both naval &
military will fire on the line 224
D 2 to 8, and the parallel range
immediately to the East of it from 7 p.m.
to 7.15 p.m.
At 7.15 p.m. the Infantry advance
will commence & guns will then fire
on the line 224 F3 - 23729
- 237 U9

From	NZ & A Div
Place	Beach
Time	4.15 p.m.

2nd May
Appendix file
5679



1st Aust Div

To see.

WLB

2/5/15

Seen & loc.
pa

Appendix No. 4
2/5/15

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of: Service. (Signature of "Franking Officer")	Recd. at	m.	
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.						Sent.	Date	
						At	m.	
						To		
					By			

TO { R M Bde

* Sender's Number	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
-------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

Reaxe disposal right 13 will walkers the guide down he	place of Section line he head CHATHAM as he Dorsetmouth	two Colonel g AAA sent quarters battm also bally Bde	battalions Monarch the A to to AAA being to	at Commanding N guide General Guide a sent lead
---	--	---	---	---

From	Place	Time
------	-------	------

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

5-67

Appendix No. 1.
2/5/15

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. Army Form C. 212.
No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message in on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.					Sent. At _____ m. To _____ By _____ (Signature of "Franking Officer")	Date	
						From	
						By	

TO { First Inf Bde.

* Sender's Number 9999	Day of Month. Third	In reply to Number.	AAA
---------------------------	------------------------	---------------------	-----

Colonel Guide AAA Report to Trotman	Monash for Please that Colonel has	with the district battalion Monash been	Send CHATHAM to AAA informed	a Bn. to report General
for CW 3/5				

From Aust	Place 1-4-15	Time 2:20 a.m.	Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name. P. H. White
--------------	-----------------	-------------------	--

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

*This line should be erased if not required.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	Words	Received	Sent, or sent out	Office Stamp.
			From R.W.	At _____ m.	3/5/15
			By J.R.	To _____	
			By _____		

Charges to collect

Service Instructions.

Handed in at _____ Office _____ m. Received _____ m.

TO Aust Div

*Sender's Number K a 138	Day of Month 3rd	In reply to Number 9999	AAA
-----------------------------	---------------------	----------------------------	-----

Acknowledged informed	aaa	Chatham Bn	
for CW 3/5			

FROM	PLACE & TIME	1st Inf Bde	2:20 a.m.
------	--------------	-------------	-----------

*This line should be erased if not required.

W.2384-583. 80,000 Pads 8/14. S.B. Ltd. Forms C.2123.

2.26

Appendix No. 1
3/5/15

83

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message

Prefix _____ Code _____ m. Words _____ Charge _____
Office of Origin & Service Instructions. _____
This message in on a/c of: _____
Sent. _____
At _____ m. _____ Service. _____
To _____
By _____ (Signature of "Franking Officer") _____
Recd. at _____ m. _____
Date _____
From _____
By _____

TO { N. 2 4 A Div 3 5 15 5692

* Sender's Number 999 Day of Month. Third In reply to Number. AAA

Instructions have been issued for
the CHATHAM and PORTSMOUTH Bns
to be placed at Colonel
Monarchs disposal AAA The CHATHAM
Bn is in support of
the first hacker has been asked
to hand it over and
told a guide sent from Colonel
lead it up to Monarch to
PORTSMOUTH Bn is some 600
yards down the valley AAA
Instructions have been issued to
General Fortman that both bns

From _____
Place _____
Time _____

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message

Prefix _____ Code _____ m. Words _____ Charge _____
Office of Origin & Service Instructions. _____
This message in on a/c of: _____
Sent. _____
At _____ m. _____ Service. _____
To _____
By _____ (Signature of "Franking Officer") _____
Recd. at _____ m. _____
Date _____
From _____
By _____

TO { 5692

* Sender's Number _____ Day of Month. _____ In reply to Number. _____ AAA

are to be placed at
Colonel Monarchs disposal and that
guide down the PORTSMOUTH Bn
lead to General helms headquarters to
Guide the CHATHAM Bn

pa (W)
3/5

From Port Div
Place _____
Time 2 am

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)
Censor. _____ Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name. _____

Appendix No. 1

“A” Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.
Army Form C. 2
No. of Message

Prefix _____ Code _____ m. _____ Words _____ Charge _____
Office of Origin & Service Instructions. _____
This message in on a/c of: _____
Sent. _____
At _____ m. _____ Service. _____
To _____
By _____ (Signature of “Franking Officer”) _____

TO { NZ Infantry Bde
1st Aust Division

* Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA
NZG 110 Thud

Following is copy of message sent to
Brigadier General Trotman at 8.15. am.
Today begins you will take over
command of the Section of the defence
from the right of the N.Z. Inf Bde
commanded by Colonel Johnston to the
left of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade
commanded by General Walker and
the original line held by Colonel
Monash's 4th Australian Brigade must
be at once reestablished and
consolidated and any localities
won during the night should be
included and strengthened and
268000 rounds S.A.A. have been
despatched and are now nearing

From _____
Place _____
Time _____

Prefix _____ Code _____ m. _____ Words _____ Charge _____
Office of Origin & Service Instructions. _____
This message in on a/c of: _____
Sent. _____
At _____ m. _____ Service. _____
To _____
By _____ (Signature of “Franking Officer”) _____

TO { 2

* Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA
Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

Monash's Headquarters are ample
supplies of food and water will be
sent up throughout the day and
the flanks of your Section are secure
with Otago Battalion supported by
Cameron's Bn of N.Z. Inf Bde on your
left and Gen Walker's Bde on your
right and support will be given you
by artillery both naval and military
and our guns have just knocked
out one of the enemy machine guns
and have now the range and done
good execution among Turks massing
on 224 D.S. but have now been
dispersed. message ends

From NZ + A.B.W.
Place Bead
Time 9.15 am

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) [Signature]
Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.

May 4th 1916

Commanding - Capt. R.L. Leane 11th Bn
Landing Party { 2 officers 100 men & medical officer
 & details 11th Bn
 1 officer 10 men 3rd Field Coy Engineers
 with explosives

Instructions were given to all concerned both verbally & by Pde Operation Order No. 5 of which you have a copy.

Capt Lane in command of the landing party reports that the party embarked in the destroyer COONE at 3:30 am & disembarked on the beach at 4:35 am. The enemy held his fire until the men commenced to get out of the boats, about 30 yds from water's edge. Fire opened from several trenches in front of the landing place & from flanks, followed by fire from three

Note 1. the shops.

Enemy was so close & relative positions
so uneven that he could bring but little
fire to bear. ~~over~~ enemy.

At about 5:30 am he decided to retire by the beach & sent 15 men back. These came under a heavy fire from KABA TEPE & a trench to the East, so he (Capt Leane) decided to attempt to get off by boats. He signalled to the destroyers, who sent in the tugs covered by gun fire from the destroyers & a gun of the 9th Battalion AFA. The boats were gallantly brought in & the force, except the 15 men sent along the beach & the killed, embarked and got back to the destroyer with a loss of 3 men wounded during this movement.

Appendix No. 1

(3)

Losses	Officers	Others	
Hit in boats	1	10	apport
landing		4	Killed
landing		5	wounded
Party sent along beach		2	Killed
Re-embarking		3	wounded.

Totals.	Officers	Others
Killed	-	6
wounded	1	18
	<u>1</u>	<u>24</u>

Capt Leane reports as regards the defences of KABA TEPE, that there are several (3) maxims & 1 QF 1" gun & he saw some 50 men - in addition to which fire was coming - from other crests which would bring his estimate up to 150 men.

The barbed wire entanglements are very wide, cover most of the cliff-face & crests & is high wire about 3' 6" posts heavily barbed.

There appear to be tunnelled ways to the defences and many places from which observation of our movements can be carried out.

Lt Rumball of the shore (10th Bn) or wire-cutting party reports as follows:-

Left the lines at 3.30 am with 1 NCO &

4

12 men -

Proceeded along the beach

Reached the first creek - no opposition - at 4.30 am. Cleared a belt of about 30' of wire on Southern bank. This took about 10-15 minutes.

Then advanced to gully near KABA TEPE & cut the wire for a width of about 20' at the mouth of the gully.

The wire is very thick & mixed plain & barbed. The barbs are about 1 inch apart & the wire about twice as heavy as ours -

This party had 1 man wounded & was very well landed. Lt Rumball signalled back useful information as regards position of enemy trenches on KABA TEPE which enabled the enemy fire to be kept down whilst the boats got away with the landing party.

The Engineers report that they had to abandon the gun cotton on the beach - This was reported to Capt Leane on return to the destroyer & on his enquiry as to whether it had been brought away.

All wounded were brought away.

The Total losses therefore were.

Killed	Officers	0	Others	6
wounded		1		19
		<u>1</u>		<u>25</u>

Appendix No. 1

4/5/15

87

(5)


I beg to bring to notice the support afforded by the fire of the destroyers & the gallant manner in which the Captain of HMAS COLNE stood close inshore & the way in which the boats were handled & saved by the picket boats - enabling the detachment, including the wounded to be brought away - The behaviour of the men of the 11th Bn was likewise excellent - there was no sign of a rush for the boats & everything was done in a cool & orderly manner which reflects great credit on the officer in command & all ranks.

St. Simdair MacLagan Col
Comd. 3rd Inf. Bde.

May 4th 1915.

Note 1. about 5.30 am. Destroyers were signalled to send a boat for wounded, this boat was towed to shore by a pinnace, enemy fired at this tow both coming to shore & when leaving with 8 wounded men, but did not fire ^{at it} whilst the wounded were being placed in the boat. ^{8th}

845m



Appendix No 1

1 5/5/15

OPERATION ORDER No 5.

by
Major-General W.T.Bridges, C.M.G.
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Appendix No 1
5/5/15

Divisional Headquarters,
BEACH 224 C
5th May, 1915.

Reference map of GALLIPOLI PENINSULA 1/40,000.

1. Under orders from G.H.Q., the following units of the Army Corps are to be transferred to CAPE HELLER on the night of the 5th May.
One infantry brigade) From each the 1st Australian
Brigade section D.S.Coy.) Division and N.Z.&A.Division.
Bearer Sub. of 1st Pd. Amb.)
 - 2 The following units of the 1st Australian Division will accordingly be transferred :-
2nd Infantry Brigade
Brigade Section D.S.Coy.
Bearer Sub division of the 2nd Pd.Amb.
 3. The 2nd Infantry Brigade will be withdrawn from the section of defence it now holds at 5 p.m. to-day. It will be relieved by units of the 1st & 3rd Infantry Brigades between whom the line will be divided as arranged between the brigade commanders.
Thereafter that portion of the defensive line held by the Australian Division will be organized in 2 sections - No. 1 being allotted to the 3rd Infantry Brigade and No. 2 to the 1st Infantry Brigade.
 4. The following will be the arrangements for the embarkation of the 2nd Infantry Brigade :-
(i) The brigade commander embarked at 6 a.m. this morning.
(ii) The brigade under the command of Lt.-Col. Bolton will rendezvous at the BRIGHTON PIER rendezvous at 9 p.m. and embark at 9.15 p.m.
It will assemble East of the rendezvous at 7.30 p.m. where issues of rations and tools will be made.
(iii) Troops will be marched on to the Embarking points in 8 detachments proportioned to the capacity of the boats and lighters serving each embarking point and will close up in fours left on the pier (or on the cutter) on to which they are to go, and sit down.
The embarking points, boats and number of men to be accommodated are shown below :-
- | | | |
|-----------------|--|--|
| Embarking Point | No. 5 Pier RED LIGHT | 2 Lighters, capacity 250 men |
| " | 2: Sunk Horseboat 30x 8)
of No. 5 Pier) | 2 Horseboats " 200 " |
| " | 3: No. 4 Pier GREEN light | 2 " " 200 " |
| " | 4: No. 3 Pier GREEN & WHITE Light. | 2 Lighters) " 450 "
2 Horseboats) |
| " | 5: Beach between Nos. 3 & 2 Piers. | 12 cutters) " 450 "
2 pinnaces) |
| " | 6: No. 2 (A.S.C.) Pier)
White Light.) | 2 lighters) " 450 "
2 horseboats) |
| " | 7: No. 1 Pier RED Light | 2 horseboats " 200 " |
| " | 8: BRIGHTON Pier No light | 4 Lighters " 600 " |
| | TOTAL Capacity | 2800 " |
| 1 & 2 | go on to 1 T.B.D. or Fleet Sweepers | |
| 3 & 4 | " 2 T.B.D's | " |
| 5 | " 1 T.B.D. | " |
| 6 | " 1 T.B.D. | " |
| 7 & 8 | " 2 T.B.D. | " |
- A plan of the beach is also attached.
Troops will embark on the orders of the Beach Master.
There is to be no noise; nor is any fire or light to be allowed at rendezvous or at BRIGHTON Pier. The Australian Troops will embark in a fleet of mine sweepers.

9 407575
24 09
18 407575

- 2 -

Appendix No. 1
5/5/15

- (iv) All work and traffic will cease on the sea front at 8 p.m.
Animals picketted on the beach between Pier No. 1 & N.E. 1
Divisional Headquarters will be removed from their
lines at 7.45 p.m. and will go :-

Those N of No. 3 Pier to the reentrant in 224 B3
" S of No. 3 Pier " East side of BRIGHTON Pier
Rendezvous.

They will return to the beach after troops have cleared
at about 10.30 p.m.

- (v) Equipment and supplies will be taken as follows :-

S.A.A. 200 rounds per man on person
100 " " in boxes
3500 " per M.G. in belt boxes.

Tools. As ordered for landing on 25th April

Supplies 2 iron rations on person & sufficient for one
meal on board ship.

Water bottles filled.

- (a) The 200 rounds per man will be issued from Brigade
reserve.
(b) The boxed 100 rounds per man will be issued by D.A.D.O.S.
at the Rendezvous.
(c) The iron rations and one meal will be issued East of the
rendezvous at 7.30 p.m.
(d) Tools required to complete equipment will be issued
East of rendezvous at 7.30 p.m.
(vi) A return of troops to be embarked will be prepared before
troops leave the beach and forwarded at once to A.C.H.Q.
(vii) Major D.Glasford and Major J.Gellibrand will assist the
P.M. L.O. in the embarkation.

C.B.B.WHITE, Lt.-Col.
General Staff,
1st Australian Division.


Copy No.	To	By	At
1 - 5	Div. H.Q. (G.O.C. 1, G Branch 2, A branch 2)	Hand	11.45 a.m.
6 - 8	Div. Art. (H.Q. 1, 3, F.A.Bies 3)	Hand	"
10	Div. Eng.	D.S.Coy.	"
11	D.S.Coy.	Hand	"
12	H.Q. 1st Inf. Bde.	D.S.Coy.	"
13	H.Q. 2nd "	"	"
14	5th Bn.	"	"
15	6th Bn.	"	"
16	7th Bn.	"	"
17	8th Bn.	"	"
18	3rd Inf. Bde.	"	"
19	Div. Train	"	"
20	A.D.H.S.	Hand	"
21	No. 7 I.M.A. Bde.	D.S.Coy.	"
22	A.N.Z.A.C. for information	"	"
23	N.Z. & A. Div. "	"	"

Appendix No. 1

5/5/15

Boutz + Piers

Anzac Cove



May 5th 1915
from message file

Third 1st

To 3 Inf Bdes Div. Art, 7th Indian Bde
Art. Bde copy to N.Z. & Dion

The following arrangements have been made for the direction of artillery fire:

(1) No guns of the Division will fire northwards of a line joining the gun and Headquarters No 2 section of defence (Bt. Sgt. H. B. Walker) unless specially directed to do so by the Officer commanding that section at their Headquarters.

(2) The fire of guns of the 2nd Bde on the extreme right of No 1 section will be directed by the Officer commanding that section.

(3) The fire of the remainder of the guns will be directed by the Officer No 2 section.

(4) The Officer commanding the 7th Indian Bde will detail observing officers and make arrangements for communication accordingly.

Alert Des
2.30 pm

C. B. White

2.40 pm

5/4 1915

Appendix No. 2
5/5/15

594
Gau 328
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

5847
Appendix No. 315
5/5/15

3/5
Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 5th. May, 1915.

From: Brig.-General,
General Staff,
A. & N. Z. A. C.

To: Headquarters,
Australian Division.
N. Z. & A. Division.

MEMORANDUM

The following are some remarks by a Staff Officer on the Army Corps Headquarters Staff, on trench work being carried out

1. Some trenches, intended for fire trenches, have been deepened so much that fire from them is impossible, even if the earth parapet were shovelled away.
2. In nearly all cases the front face of the trench has been burrowed into, to give cover from shrapnel. This interferes considerable with the possibility of getting out of the trenches to meet a bayonet attack or to counter attack, unless special boxes, etc. are provided to step on to.
3. Trenches on the forward slopes must be constructed so that fire can be brought on to the slope itself. The majority only allow for fire at the opposite crest. If trenches are really commanded at close range, substantial overhead cover must be made, covering the whole trench if possible.
4. In occupying the trenches men must dispose of their gear inside the trench in recesses, etc. Rifles, accoutrements, and ammunition must be similarly disposed, as some are being damaged by rifle and shell fire.

There are also a large number of spare rifles, accoutrements, ~~and~~ ammunition, water tins, biscuit boxes, etc., etc. lying near around trenches. These should be collected and buried or burnt or sent into store at once.

The situation of the trenches is hopelessly given away by this debris.

Adkin
Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig-General, Gen. Staff,
A. & N. Z. A. C.

595

Ca 328

May 5th

95

5847
5/5/15
AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 6th. May, 1915.

3/5

Appendix No. 3
5/5/15

From: Brig.-General,
General Staff,
A. & N. Z. A. C.

To: Headquarters,
Australian Division,
N. Z. & A. Division.

2 Copies

MEMORANDUM

The following are some remarks by a Staff Officer on the Army Corps Headquarters Staff, on trench work being carried out

1. Some trenches, intended for fire trenches, have been deepened so much that fire from them is impossible, even if the earth parapet were shovelled away.
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There are also a large number of spare rifles, accoutrements, and ammunition, water tins, biscuit boxes, etc., etc. lying near around trenches. These should be collected and buried or burnt or sent into store at once.

The situation of the trenches is hopelessly given away by this debris.

Similar details
Reported by
S.S.O. II 29 April

Circular memo
accordingly
5/5/15

Adkins

Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig.-General, Gen. Staff,
A. & N. Z. A. C.

596

Appendix No. 6/5/15
6th May

C.M. Form A 39 (b).
Army Form C 2123.

C Form. (Duplicate.)

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Office Stamp.

Inquiries respecting this Message, or application for repetition of the same, may be made at the Delivering Office; but any complaint as to its delay, &c., should be made in writing and addressed to the officer in charge. In either case this form must accompany such inquiries or complaint.

Service Instructions.

Charges to pay £ s. d.

Handed in at the

Office at 7:32 M.

Received here at 7:40 M.

TO

Uncle Ben



* Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

KC 157

15th

A A A

Last night's reports	9 Bn patrol
states enemy occupies trench running	
from XX 224 to 224 K. 7. XX	there
are four trenches which would	
hold with supports 400 men on the	
ridge no barbed wire met with a a a	
on ridge running from 212 H in	
NE direction enemy well entrenched	
a a a not much movement of	
enemy seen a a a our engineers improved	
entanglements round the guns to about	
eleven yards wide a a a	

Night in trenches a a a	10th Bn patrol
moved out 500 to 600 yards to immediate	
front no enemy seen other readings	
nothing to report 12th Bn patrol found	
enemy trench running our lines in	
valley east of 403 (18 Bn) trench 40	
yards long ending about 30 yards from	
our trenches trench four feet deep & five	
feet wide a a a Close to trench three tents	
where Turkish packs and papers were	
found later will be forwarded you by	
hand a a a otherwise quiet	

FROM
PLACE
TIME

Appendix No. 1

6/5/15

C.M. Form A 39 (b).
Army Form Q 2123.

C Form. (Duplicate.)

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Office Stamp.

Inquiries respecting this Message, or application for repetition of the same, may be made at the Delivering Office; but any complaint as to its delay, &c., should be made in writing and addressed to the officer in charge. In either case this form must accompany such inquiries or complaint.

Service Instructions.

Charges
to pay)

Handed in at the

Office at

M

Received here at

M.

TO

* *Sender's Number.*

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

A A A

**FROM
PLACE
TIME**

3rd Exp Bnd

5915- 8.30pm. 6/5/15 To 1st, 2nd Inf. Bdes, Div. Art. & Div. Engrs
 Attention is drawn to the necessity for improving our position in the vicinity of the 400 contour in 224-N. Until we are firmly established on the plateau we cannot fairly attempt to capture & hold Haba Tepe. Field guns to be brought in a more forward position. The salient in the line held by the 1st Inf. Bde. appears to be a suitable position & the southern slope affords positions for firing both N.E. & South. A Turkish trench is being prepared within 400 yards of this salient & it is imperative that this should be stopped. A machine gun could be advantageously used. In cases such as the above section commanders should point out to their Arty. commands the positions on which they want gun fire. It will then be for the Arty. command in conjunction with the Engineer officer allotted to the section to arrange for the movement & emplacement of the gun, the necessary working party being detailed by the Ob. the section of defence. The co-ordination of the work of Arty. Engrs. is the ~~duty~~ ^{duty} of the section command. The present salient in the position on the right of No. 1 section might gradually be eliminated by the following measures (a) An evacuated Turkish trench lies in about 224-R between 2 & 3. This it appears could easily be taken by night & connected on the south to the present trench. By doing this the tedious sapping with the same object would be obviated. The locality would supply a good observation post. If its rate of progress cannot be hastened then a sap now being advanced from the head of the salient should be used to blunt the northern re-entrant angle thus preventing fire from salient on our own trenches to the North. It is very desirable that we should advance our line on to the eastern edge of plateau 400 & thus gain further gun positions. It may be that this could be done by advancing the present salient. This makes more desirable still the measures suggested above. To each section command. The Ob. Div. Art will detail one or more Observing officers who will not be relieved or changed without the knowledge & concurrence of section commanders.

Divisional Headquarters,
Anzac Cove, 6.5.1915.

6th May 1915

Appendix 2

With reference to Divisional Order dated 28th April, 1915, Para 4, no Indian troops except those belonging to the mountain batteries are to present with the Army Corps. Due notice will be given of the coming of any Indian Troops before they arrive.

With reference to 1000. The following additional information has come to hand. 5th Div. 13th & 14th Regts. are here, but the 13th Regt. does not appear to be exposed to us, although at least one battery is in the peninsula.

A Yuzbashi (Captain) who deserted to-day says that owing to the present lack of officers there is very little fire control amongst the troops, many of whom are only recently brought in. They suffered very heavy casualties on Tuesday night great numbers of officers have been killed. The battalions of the 5th Div. went into action 1200 strong. They now muster from 300 to 500 men. This is confirmed by an entry in an officer's diary which says that the battalion has been reduced from 1200 to 450. Many are suffering severely from diarrhoea through drinking local water.

All accounts show that the rank and file are unwilling to fight and some state that they go forward at the point of the revolver. When once launched to the attack their enforced discipline is sufficient to keep them going on.

C.B.B. HITE, Lt.-Col.
General Staff.

Appendix No. 1

7/5/15

copy.7th May
Appendix 1

S 922.

N.Z. S 224 - 7th May.

With reference to your order to the Artillery of the 1st Aust. Div. that they are not to open fire in support of No. 3 section (Br. Genl Trotman) unless a Staff Officer of this section is present. Will you please consider the question of rescinding the order as the range & direction of probable targets in this section are now well known to your Artillery and the S.O.B. No. 3 section cannot well spare a Staff Officer for this duty. He himself asks that it may be rescinded.

(Sgd.) A. Godley. Maj Genl
S.O.B., N.Z. Aust. Divn.

5101

Appendix No. 1A


7/5/15

1A/7

"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent		Service.	Date	
			At				
			To			From	
			By			By	
					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO	Aust. NZ - A	Division Division	
----	-----------------	----------------------	---

Sender's Number * Ga 32	Day of Month 7	In reply to Number —	AAA
----------------------------	-------------------	-------------------------	-----

Last	night	a	deserted	surrendered
himself	by	entering	one	of
our	hutches	and	waking	the
defence	AAA	What	might	have
happened	had	though	attack	been
Contemplated	can	be	imagined	Please
send	instructions	to	subordinate	commanders
that	while	there	is	no
need	for	all	the	occupants
of	hutches	to	be	awake,
those	who	are	detained	in
watch	should	be	on	the
about	and should be visited	visits	frequently	during
the	night	to	ensure	this

Received 1.45pm

Included in 5946
Circular 577/5

From ANZAC		
Place		
Time 1.35pm		

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) Acknowledged

Signature of Addressee or person authorised to telegraph in his name

* This line should be erased if not required.

158 S. B. Ltd. Wt. W5673/619—50,000. 10/14. Forms C2121/10.

5-102

Report on the Operations of Australian Divisional Artillery from 10 AM Sunday 25th April until 8 p.m. Monday May 3rd 1915.

Map. referred to GALLIPOLI Sheet 2.

1915.
April
Sunday 25.

About 7.30 AM the Artillery Officers detailed to observe the Naval gun fire were landed to perform the tasks allotted to them.

At 10.15 AM the Divisional Artillery Headquarters Staff accompanied by Adjutant 3rd F.A. Brigade and Orderly officer 2nd F.A. Brigade also landed, and at once proceeded to make a reconnaissance for gun positions to support the attacking Infantry.

At 11.30 AM. Divisional Artillery commander reported that there was ~~little~~ possibility of employing guns from the extreme left to the centre of attack. The right Centre and right of the position were then reconnoitred and it was found possible to emplace 2 guns on square 224.L.B. One gun, however, was only available. It was brought into action at the point named at 6 p.m. and fired 62 rounds that evening, and assisted the Bacchanti to silence the enemy battery at KABA, TEPE, which had been causing serious trouble during the day.

Late in the afternoon a

hpl
Received
10.30 am
7/5/15

8927

Appendix No. 2

further reconnaissance on the 7/5/15 extreme right revealed suitable positions for emplacing 4 guns. An urgent request was made during Sunday night for more guns which were promised before dawn. The first of these did not arrive until noon on Monday 26th.

Monday 26th April 1915.

At noon 3 guns of 2nd F.A. Bde were got into position on 224 L.6 and at 3 p.m. the same day O.C. 3rd F.A. Bde got one gun emplaced and in action at 224 R.4. The fire of these guns gave immediate relief in their respective zones.

About 5 p.m. 2 more guns were got into position under O.C. 2nd F.A. Bde near hill 224 L.6

Tuesday 27th April 1915.

By 11 AM O.C. 3rd F.A. Bde had 3 more guns in action on the extreme right and was actively engaged the whole day and contributed in no small measure to defeat the attacks of the Turks on the right position that day.

During this day the scheme for observation and co-operation with the Navy became effective, although observation was made under extreme difficulties owing to Observation Officers not being able to get sufficiently far forward to observe.

3Appendix No 2
7/5/15Wednesday
28th Apr. 1915.

During the night of the 27/28 the guns on the right of the position under O/c. 3rd F.A. Bde were able very effectively to co-operate with the Infantry in repelling the Turkish attack on our right. During the afternoon of this day 3 more guns with their wagons were landed and held as reserve, to be placed as soon as positions could be found for them with. During the day, in compliance with request from the Chief Adviser of Artillery, the number of Artillery observers was increased to 7, 5 of these being from the Australian Divisional Artillery and 2 from New Zealand Artillery Brigade. The scheme for observation was reorganised

Thursday
Apr 29th 1915.

Guns maintained existing positions. The 3rd F.A. Brigade assisted to repel a night attack on the right.

New scheme for observation for Naval fire found to be efficient and results far more satisfactory than hitherto.

This day the 9th Battery relieved the 7th Battery which had been constantly engaged night and day up to this time.

During the day several reports were received that our Infantry trenches were being shelled by our own guns. Searching

5 105

4

Appendix No. 2
7/5/15

investigation showed this to be untrue.

Friday

30th April 1915.

Very few targets presented themselves to Artillery fire during the day. Frequent requests were made from Infantry Brigadiers for Artillery assistance and although the fire was given its effect was doubtful owing to the difficulties of observation, notwithstanding the fact that Artillery Observers were in the Infantry firing line. The 3rd Artillery Brigade most effectively shelled the Turkish attack on the right centre at 4 p.m. This day.

Saturday

May 1st 1915.

During the day 1 gun of the 2nd Artillery Brigade was shifted to a hill about 250 ft high 400 yards to the right of existing position, which gave a more extended field of fire.

Sunday

May 2nd 1915.

A section of 8th Battery, ordered to occupy a position 224.I.7 which necessitated man handling the gun into a position up a hillside with a slope (at some parts over 60° to an elevation of 400 ft); this was successfully accomplished and one gun taking part in the Artillery

Appendix No. 2
7/5/15

Support to the Infantry attack on
the enemy's right the same evening

Monday
May 3rd 1915.

A complaint received from
the N. Z. & Aust. Div. stating that
Col. Monash's troops had been
shelled in their trenches by the
Australian Artillery. Ascertained
beyond all shadow of doubt that
no guns of the Australian Division
were fired in their direction or at
all at that time; that the shell
fire they mention either came
from the enemy or their own guns.

Generally.

It is to be regretted that the
Artillery up to this time have not
been able to give more assistance
to the Infantry owing to the following
circumstances:-

1 The unsuitability of field
guns for the very hilly and broken
up country over which the operations
have taken place and the scarcity
of gun positions. In some cases
guns have been taken up to a
height of 400 ft and got into
positions up slopes 60 degrees from
the perpendicular.

2 The great difficulty in
observing the result of fire. In
nearly all cases fire had to be
observed with forward observing
officers who did their work

7/5/15

6
from the Infantry fire trenches or even more exposed positions, generally under constant shell and rifle fire.

3 Difficulty of communication between observer and guns. This all had to be done by telephone lines which are frequently interrupted and broken.

4 The difficulty of distinguishing the enemy's trenches from our own. Both are in places very close together and in confused country.

5 The shortness of range and the flatness of trajectory make it impossible (or impossible) in many instances to search the gulches & nullas in which the enemy's machine guns and Artillery are concealed.

6 The intensity of fire from the enemy Batteries, which are thoroughly well established and concealed all round our positions and rifle fire from his fire trenches and numerous snipers

Since the commencement of operations the Divisional Artillery Staff have been constantly employed in reconnoitring the ground to find more suitable gun positions

I

Appendix No. 2
7/5/15

and observing stations for the better employment of both field gun & ship gun fire in support of the Infantry. This work has been carried out under extreme difficulties and under constant shell and rifle fire. At the same time the Staff has been employed as a means of communication between the various Infantry and Artillery Commanders and ships in direction and control of fire.

J. D. Hobbs. Col
Col. Br. Ar.
6-5-15

Appendix A gives amount of 18 pr Ammunition expended daily to date.

Appendix B Chart showing positions of guns during operations to date.

Appendix C Casualties to date.

Appendix D Chart showing positions of various Targets engaged

appendix E List of Targets engaged.

Appendix No. 2
7/5/15Daily number of rounds fired by
Australian Divisional Artillery

apl 25 1915.	62 rounds
26	702
27	1907
28	1896
29	461
30	255
May 1	820
2	691
3	553
Total	<u>7347</u>


5283
2064
73

Appendix No. 2

7/5/15

Diagram showing Positions of
18 p-guns and dates and times of
First getting into action and
subsequent moves

APPX B



GALLIPOLI SHEET 2
SQUARE 224.

5 III

Appx

C 111

2/7

Appendix No. 2

7/5/15

Casualties Divisional Artillery
Apr 25th 1915 to May 3rd 1915 incl.

27. 4. 15.	Lt Col G. J. Johnston	Slight wound left leg
27. 4. 15.	Capt R S Whitford	Slight wound left thigh
28. 4. 15.	Lieut Hodgson W.H.	dangerously wounded

other ranks

1 Killed

24 Wounded.

5.117

INFORMATION

2/7

APPX D

Appendix No. 2

2nd FA F.O.

in course 1st Inf Bde
Major B. Brown in tank
with 1st Inf Bde.
and 3rd Air Bde

237

Inf

Inf

Inf

Inf

Inf

Inf

Inf

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Inf

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Inf

Inf

Support for NZ

Support for NZ
27A
Search
on line P

En. HQ
3.5.15

3 FA 1 gun

2 FA 5 guns

Mtn guns

27 heavy 2nd
massing

3 FA 4 guns

Mtn guns

by 11th Bde

OS
2.5.15

3/5/15

Information of positions of enemy received
from all sources and transmitted to Batteries
and ships

Str 2/5/15

5113

E

Appendix No. 2

113

2/7

7/5/15

Targets engaged by 2nd Art. Bde 1st Aust Div

Date	Target		Date	Target		Date	Target	
26/4/15	225 a g 2	Inf	30/4/15	224 P 5	Inf: concentrating	4/5/15	23728	Inf
	Kaba Tepe	Art		224 K 5	Inf: Art:		224 P	Inf search
				224 P 8	Inf		2272	
26/4/15	224 K 6	Art		225 g 6	Art		224 F 8	MG
	224						224 F	MG
	KABA TEPE	Art	1/5/15	2372			225 B1	Art
	224 K 5			224 f	Inf		224 H 3	Art
	224 K 8 also g 8 f	art		225				
				224 f 8	MG			
27/4/15	225 f 2-3			225 a 1 2 5 6 7 8	Inf			
	225 a 5	Inf		224 P 1	MG: Inf:			
	225 a 2	Inf		225 L 1	Art			
	225 L 5	Art		224 K 2 5 8	search			
	224 K 5	MG	2/5/15					
				224 f 8 K	search			
28/4/15	225 a 8	Inf MG		237 2 8	Inf			
	224 J 8	MG		225 a 7	Inf			
	225 a 9	Inf		224 J 3+6	MG			
	224 f 5	Inf		237 Y	Inf			
	224 i 9	Inf concentrating		224 f 7.3.	Inf			
				237 U 9	Inf			
29/4/15	224 f 5	Inf	3/5/15					
	225 a 8	Inf		224 P	Inf			
	224 J 9	MG: Art:		225 B 1-4	Art			
	224 J 5	MG		art: impositions				
	224 J 3	MG		224 K	art			
	23725			2372	Inf			
	225 A 5	Inf		224 F	MG			
	224 f 5	Inf: Art:		238 Y	Inf			
	224 J 2	MG						

7/5/15

Targets engaged by 5th Art Bde: 1st Aust Div

Date	Target	Date	Target
1/5/15	Enemy's supply train	4/5/15	211 K 7 KABA TEPE LOOK OUT
	" Observation party		224 N 8 MG
	" Gun		212 N 5.8 search
	224 I 8 MG		224 N 7 MG
	224 N 2 MG		211 K 7.1.2 KABA TEPE sweep
	Supporting Inf. attack		224 C 6 stopped
	Enemy's machine guns		212 R 7 art
	224-R-2.3 Inf		212 H 1.5 art
	Enemy's trenches (crossed)		212 G. 9 art
	Supporting Inf. attack (night)		212 W. 1 art
2/5/15	Supply train in same position as on 1st May		224 N 6.7 Inf
	KABA TEPE		224 X 9 Inf
	224 N 5 MG		
	Enemy's art.		
	224 S 2		
	Searching & sweeping		
	Enemy on crest - at Contour 400		
	Entrenchments E of position		
	Supporting Inf. attack		
3/5/15	224 N 5. 2.3.5.6.9.1. search		
	Hill 971		
	224 S 8 Inf		
	224-O-6.9.1.2.4.5 Inf		
	224 M. 5. 2.3.7		
	212-D-2.5 art		
	224-U-1 art		
	213-V-9		
	Lost second O in 400		

Morning Report

1st Inf. Bde.

Asst Dir.



1. Disposition of Troops.

Same as yesterday. Except that a machine gun of the 3rd Brigade was placed at the disposal of the 2nd Batt.

This gun fired on enemy trenches to his left front at 900 yds range & on trench in his front in immediate front but it did not stop digging.

2nd Batt a fatigue party of 96 men was detailed for work with Engineers & artillery.

4th Batt Troops in reserve about 90

Composed of Re-inforcements

1st Batt Trenches have not been altered but only improved.

2. Patrols. 2nd Batt patrolled their front to about 500 yds & buried 6 Dead. No papers found on them, as pockets were inside and no other patrols were sent out.

3. Enemy's movement Heavy shell fire on trenches during the day. Those occupied by Captains Jacobs & Clayton being blown in.

Enemy continued digging in front of

2nd Batt. In front of 3rd Batt's sniping continued. All very quiet during night.

Made up from reports from Battalion

7.5.15

11-0 a.m.

Maneuvered maps for
g.c. 1st Inf. Bde.

Seen by
7/5

Appendix No. 2A
7/5/15

Appendix No. 2 A
7/5/15ToAust Divⁿ

Regret have been unable to
 send report before, but if I have
 to compile report from O.C.'s Battos
 it takes a little time, and there
 are many messages coming there
 after 8 a.m. that takes up all my
 time, trying to get fire of guns on to targets.
 Would suggest that I send the
 report, received from O.C. Battos to
 you direct, with any remarks I
 have to make with them.

7.5.15

11-30 A.M.

H. Hancock Major

In charge of Inf Bde.

Received
 Div. Headquarters
 12.30 p.m.
 7/5/15

Appendix No. 2B
7/5/15

5935- 7th May.

7th May 1915
(from message file)From Capt. Rawson R.A.

Enemy's Battery firing at the beach from the south in enfilade. Naval shrapnel are going a bit too much to the North + a little too much over the Battery. Battery's dust can be seen very distinctly from square 224 - M-8-9, my present position. 18 pdrs. on the right of our position are about to engage it. Observing officer is here

1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
*****DIVISIONAL HEAD-QUARTERS,
ANZAC COVE, 7th May, 1915.
*****B946
O.C. 1st, 2nd Bdes + 1, 2, 3 & 4 9, 10, 11 & 12th Bns

The O.C.C. is pleased to note an improvement in the construction of fire and communication trenches. Some defects are still evident and steps should be taken immediately to remedy them. The principal defect at present is that while some trenches are still too shallow, many are so deep that the parapets are so arranged that it is difficult for more than a few men to fire without incurring considerable loss. This gives to the Turk a fire superiority, advantage of which he will take by advancing. He readily lies in making sandbag or other head cover and providing steps for men to stand on.

2. In every trench (i) Head cover or loop holes must be provided so that a maximum number of rifles may be employed.
- (ii) Communication trenches must be so arranged that the firing line can be rapidly reinforced.
- (iii) There must be steps or other arrangements enabling men to make or meet a charge.


3. On the evening of the 6th instant, a deserter surrendered by entering a trench and waking up the defenders. The O.C.C. has frequently drawn attention to the necessity for posting proper look outs at regular intervals. Subordinate commanders will be instructed forthwith to post lookouts by night and day, and to see that they are frequently visited.

4. There are still rifles, biscuit boxes, tins, equipment etc. lying in the trenches and adjacent ground. Now that each section of defence is organized and has its definite allotment to sub units the O.C.C. desires that all subordinate commanders shall see that rifles and ammunition, tins, etc., are collected and returned to store, and that all refuse is buried or burnt.

C.B. White Lt.-Col.
General Sta

COMMUNICATION DIAGRAM. A.I.N.Z. A.C. MAY 7th 1915.

Appendix 4
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Forwarded to H Q ANZ Army Corps on 13th May 1915
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Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
 Anzac Cove,
 7th May, 1915.

General Officer Commanding
 Australian & New Zealand Army Corps.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Reference map of GALLIPOLI PENINSULA, 1/40,000.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report
 on the landing effected on Sunday, 25th April, near KABA TEPE
 by the 1st Australian Division :-

(A) PRELIMINARY STEPS.

1. - Copies of Operation Order No.1 and a disembarkation order have already been handed to you.

On Saturday, 24th April, the day prior to the landing, 1,500 men were transferred at MUDROS BAY from the transports "MALDA", "IONIAN", "SUFFOLK", and "BEVANHA" conveying the covering force (detailed in the margin) to

Covering Force.
 Colonel E.G. SINCLAIR
 AGLAGAN, D.S.O.,
 Commanding.
 3rd Infantry Brigade
 fighting troops
 less all animals
 and vehicles.
 1st Field Company
 less mounted branch
 and all horses and
 vehicles.
 Bearer subdivisions
 of 3rd Field
 Ambulance less all
 horses and vehicles.

His Majesty's Ships :-

"QUEEN"	9th Bn. (less 2 cos. and m.g. section) Detachment 1st Field Coy. Engineers.
"PRINCE OF WALES"	10th Bn. (less 2 cos. and m.g. section) Detachment 1st Fd. Coy. Engrs.
"LONDON"	11th Bn. (less 2 cos. and m.g. section) Detachment 1st Fd. Coy. Engrs.

The remainder of the covering force in the four transports named proceeded to IMBROS on the 24th April, where they were transferred to seven destroyers.

Divisional Headquarters were, on the evening of the 23rd instant, transferred to H.M.S. "PRINCE OF WALES".

2. - The battleships named left MUDROS at noon on the 24th April. At 1.35 a.m. on the 25th April, at a rendez-

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vous east of IMBROS, the troops were transferred in good order and absolute silence to the tows. At about 3.30 a.m. when some four miles from the coast the battleships stopped and orders were given for the tows to proceed inshore and the men to land. At 4.10 a.m. the destroyers carrying the remainder of the covering force were ordered to follow.

(B) THE LANDING.

3. - The tows from the battleships landed at 4.15 a.m. in the following order :-

<u>Left</u>	<u>Centre</u>	<u>Right</u>
11th Battalion	10th Battalion	9th Battalion

About ten minutes later tows from destroyers, having rowed a distance of 150 yards, began to land. At 4.45 a.m. the whole of the covering force was on shore, three battalions being in the front line and one, the 12th Battalion, in close support.

4. - The position at which the landing was effected lies in Square 224 (G) and (L), and was about $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles north of the intended landing place. While in the tows and during the landing the troops were under machine gun and musketry fire and enfilade shrapnel fire from KABA TEPE. An accurate statement of the losses incurred during disembarkation cannot be obtained; it is feared there were many casualties.

5. - The covering force was followed by the remainder of the infantry of the Division. Three battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and one of the 1st Brigade began landing at 5.50 and 6.15 a.m. respectively; both Brigades had disembarked by 12.50 p.m..

The following units were on shore at the disposal of the Division at the times shown beneath :-

26th Indian Mountain Battery	..	9. 0 a.m.
One battalion N.Z. & A. Division	..	11. 0 a.m.
21st Indian Mountain Battery	..	6.45 p.m.

Divisional Headquarters went on shore at 7.30 a.m. and took over control of the operations.

(C) ACTION ON LANDING.

6. - (i) The landing place was on a narrow beach from which sandy bluffs rise abruptly to a height of several hundred feet. Behind these lies a deep valley intersected by sharp spurs covered with low scrub. In general these spurs run north-east and south-west, as do the ridges to the east. For military operations the country is difficult in the extreme. The map issued gives a general idea of the topography but is inaccurate in detail.

(ii) With great dash and regardless of opposition the 9th and 10th Battalions rushed the line 224 (r) (4) to 224 (i). The bulk of the 10th Battalion reached a position about 224 (i) (5). Detached parties of both battalions pressed forward and gained the line 224 (t) - (p) - (k), but were unable to maintain their position. This was part of the covering ridge which was the objective of the covering force. Three Krupp guns were put out of action by parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions in Square 224 (r) (5). At the same time the 11th Battalion charged a position about 224 (h) (1), and then made for 224 (c). The above operations all occurred before 6 a.m., at which time the general line held was 224 (m) - (h) - (b).

(iii) Between 6 and 7 a.m. the advanced portions of the line held by the 3rd Infantry Brigade were counter-attacked and driven in gradually on to spur 400 (Square 224 (n)) where the brigade was reorganizing and digging in.

(iv) It was intended that the 2nd Infantry Brigade should, upon landing, move on the left of the 3rd Infantry Brigade. Owing to the counter-attack on the 3rd Infantry Brigade Colonel MACLAGAN asked Colon

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McCAY to move up on his right in the direction of hill 400 in Square 224 (n). This request was promptly met by the Officer Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade. Further support was rendered by the despatch at 7.55 a.m. of two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Brigade, to the left of the 3rd Brigade. By these means between 7 and 8.15 a.m. the enemy's first counter-attack was repulsed.

(v) At 9 a.m. the right of the 2nd Infantry Brigade was advancing towards 212 (g) and (b) and meeting with little opposition. The left of the brigade was on a line running through 224 (q) to the right of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was being heavily shelled and was gradually giving way from the forward slope to the centre of the plateau in 224 (n) - (i). By this time the 3rd Infantry Brigade had been reinforced by the 1st Battalion and the remaining two companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade.

(vi) At 10.35 a.m. the 3rd Infantry Brigade reported that the hill in 224 (c) was seriously threatened and asked for support on the left. Two companies of the 2nd Battalion were despatched accordingly at 10.45 a.m. to 224 (c) (6); at the same time two platoons of this battalion moved towards the beach on the left as an outpost. At 1.10 p.m. these two platoons were withdrawn and the remaining two companies of the 2nd Battalion under Lieut.-Colonel BRAUND were directed by the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade to the ridge in 237 (w) (5).

(vii) At 11.30 a.m. the Army Corps signalled that the New Zealand Infantry Brigade was on its way to shore and would come under the orders of the General Officer Commanding 1st Australian Division. At the direction of the Corps commander Brigadier-General H.B. Walker, who was on shore, was placed in command of this brigade, which was put in at once on the left.

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At 1.15 p.m. the whole of the infantry of the 1st Australian Division had gone forward except the 4th Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade, which remained in reserve.

About this time portions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade went forward on the left to the spur in 224 (c).

(viii) Between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. the left of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the whole front of the 3rd Infantry Brigade was steadily attacked, the enemy endeavouring to move round on to the high ground in 224 (d).

(ix) At 2.35 p.m. the 2nd Infantry Brigade was ordered to establish itself firmly on the line of the ridge in 224 (r) - (n) - (i), and to entrench.

(x) Between 3 and 4 p.m. the enemy made a second counter-attack against the 3rd Infantry Brigade and left of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. This counter-attack was repulsed with the assistance of gun fire from His Majesty's Ships and the 26th Mountain Battery.

The 4th Battalion at 5.30 p.m. was sent to the support of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

(xi) Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. the enemy made a third and determined counter-attack against the 3rd Infantry Brigade. No ground was lost by us on any part of our line.

At 6 p.m. the one field gun which had been landed during the day was brought into action in 224 (L) (6). This gun assisted in silencing the enemy's gun on KABA TEPE. Throughout the day and despite the assistance of naval guns, the absence of field guns capable of replying to the enemy's shrapnel fire had placed us at considerable disadvantage.

(xii) During the night the enemy made continual attacks; at 10.20 p.m. the 8th Battalion repulsed a bayonet charge.

Units of the 4th Infantry Brigade (New Zealand &

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Australian Division) disembarked after dark and were sent up in support of the 3rd Infantry Brigade. By this means certain units of the last-named brigade were relieved from the trenches.

7. - The operations consequent upon an opposed landing naturally led to continuous calls for reinforcements and it became necessary to throw in units as they became available. This led to a great admixture of units which was added to by the broken nature of the country. In the circumstances it must, I think, be regarded as satisfactory that a continuous line was established and touch maintained between the various units.

8. - I desire to place on record the assistance afforded and the gallantry shown by the officers and men of the Royal Navy. In the disembarkation of the covering force the gallantry displayed by the officers and crews of destroyers, steamboats, and cutters, was beyond all praise.

I would at the same time express my thanks for the assistance given by the naval guns during the day. Their effective co-operation aided in no small measure the repulse of the counter-attacks made by the Turks.

(ii) The task of the Divisional Signal Company in establishing and maintaining communication throughout the operations was one full of difficulty and was excellently carried out.

(iii) The removal of the wounded from the firing line to the casualty clearing station on the beach was effected by the stretcher-bearers under heavy shrapnel and rifle fire in a most gallant manner. This station was located in a confined space on the beach not wholly protected from shrapnel fire, and here during the day and night some 1500 cases were treated and transferred from the shore to ships. The exertion of the Army Medical Services and the cooperation of the Royal Navy to this end were most praiseworthy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Major-General
Commanding 1st Australian Division.