

**AWM4**


**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number: 23/1/13**

**Title: 1st Infantry Brigade**

August 1916



AWM4-23/1/13

HALLOY

1st Bde

1916  
Aug 1<sup>st</sup>.

Brigadier & Bde Major attended conference at Div. H.Q. Chateau CANAPLES at 0930 to discuss lessons learnt during recent operations. Appendix 916/1 gives draft of main points.

1600. Parade of reinforcements joined since POZIERES fight 42 off + 167 others were inspected by G.O.C. Div. More recommendations for awards have been submitted.

Aug 2<sup>nd</sup>. Training, reorganisation, repeating all preceding. 40 names of candidates for commissions have been submitted to H.Q.

Aug 3. 10 off + 126 others arrived as reinforcements the off in hand H.F. WATSON. 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde Bombing Officer who has been away sick since the 26<sup>th</sup> July. He will perform the duties of Staff Capt. vice Forbes wounded on 24<sup>th</sup> July.

A large proportion of the others were old 1<sup>st</sup> Bde men rejoining.

Aug 4. It is understood here that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde will carry out an attack tonight.

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HALLOY. Reference map Lens.  
Sheet 11. 1:100 000.

1916.

Aug 5<sup>th</sup>

Aug 6<sup>th</sup>

40 new officers have been promoted from the ranks to fill vacancies caused by casualties. The standard has been steadily lowered & though the new men are good men few are of what used to be known as the officer type.

Training still in progress  
Church parades all denominations held today.

Brigadier & Bde Major ~~visited~~ reconnoitred roads to La Vicogne to where we shall probably move.

Aug 7<sup>th</sup>

Orders were received to move to La Vicogne on 9<sup>th</sup> & Rubempré, Herissart - Fontenoy on 10<sup>th</sup>. An impossible route N. of River Nierre was prescribed, visited D.H.Q. & had that altered.

Aug 8<sup>th</sup>

Trial of Corpl. G. Ravander 4<sup>th</sup> Bn on desertion charge completed. Sentence to suffer death - papers will be forwarded to higher authority tonight.

Bde Order 25. re moves issued at 10.30.

## LA VICOIGNE

1916

Aug 9 The Brigade Group, less 1<sup>st</sup> Field Ambulance, moved to La Vicoigne by the route ordered, meeting on the way the on a narrow 3<sup>rd</sup> Class road, the 5<sup>th</sup> Aust Inf Bde (B. General HOLMES) and a Bde of Artillery (Lt Col Stevenson).

Considerable inconvenience was caused through the clash. Three roads were available + it is considered that the Corps might have made other arrangements.

La Vicoigne has accommodation for 20 officers + 300 men. We had to billet there 116 officers + 2680 men.

## HERISSART

Aug 10 Bde Group moved to RUBEMPRE - HERISSART - TOUTENCOURT in accordance with Bde Order No 25.

Bde HQ are at HERISSART with 3<sup>rd</sup> + 4<sup>th</sup> Bns, M.G. Coy, 1<sup>st</sup> Field Coy, 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. at RUBEMPRE. 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. at TOUTENCOURT.

Aug 11<sup>th</sup> At 1100 most of the officers of the Bde, attended demonstration of use of smoke as a cover for attacking infantry. Gen GOUGH the army commander was present.

at 1430 some officers attended demonstration on communication between infantry and

## HERISSART.

Aug 12. Brigadier & Bde Major rode to 1<sup>st</sup> Bn at RUBEMPRE, then to Corps H.Q. at COURTAY to inspect corrected map of front line. Contours on existing maps are inaccurate. Brig. & Bde. returned to Courtay at 2000 & dined with Corps Commander.

Aug 13. Church parade for Bde less 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. Corps Commander attended & presented ribbons for medals as follows

A.S.O.	Capt. P.L. HOWELL-PRICE	1 <sup>st</sup> Bn
M.C.	Chaplain W. Mackenzie	4 <sup>th</sup> Bn
do.	Lieut. H.A. MOFFATT	1 <sup>st</sup> Bn
M. Medal.	Pte F.W. MACE	1 <sup>st</sup> Bde HQ
	Lieut. E WILSMITH	1 <sup>st</sup> Bn
	Pte T.G. HYDE	do
	R. Patterson	3 <sup>rd</sup> Bn
	Cpl. P. Kinsington	do.
	Serjt (now 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieut) E.B. Costin	4 <sup>th</sup> Bn.
	Pte W.R. Cohen	do.

Gen Birdwood addressed the Bde.

Aug 14. At 1145 orders were received to move Bde Group to Brickfields area, Albert. Bde Order 26 issued accordingly - warning message being sent at once to all units. 1430. Destination altered to HARPOYVILLE & VADENCOURT. Bde Major, in car lent by Division

ALBERT. Ref. map 1:10000  
Composite Trench map.

Aug 14.

intercepted 1<sup>st</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> Bns. on road as they had moved off & redirected their messages sent to all units at 1430 giving new destinations.

B.M. visited Corps H.Q. & obtained authority to billet men in Vaducourt Wood.

Aug 15.

March continued to BRICKFIELDS. Brig. & B.M. visited H.Q. 4<sup>th</sup> Aust. Div. at TARA HILL and 13<sup>th</sup> Bde H.Q. Gordon dump. Arranged for 2 Coys. 4<sup>th</sup> Bn to relieve 50<sup>th</sup> Bn. in trenches N.W. of POZIERES this afternoon.

Orders recd to send 1 Bn. to TARA HILL and 1 Bn. less 2 Coys. to LA BOISSELLE this was done.

1900. Orders were issued to 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. to relieve 49<sup>th</sup> Bn. & part of 51<sup>st</sup> Bn. in front line from R 34 D 69 to R 34 A 38 before 0800 tomorrow.

Similar orders issued to remainder of 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. to relieve remainder of 51<sup>st</sup> Bn.

These orders were sent by runner at ~~07~~ 1920.

2100 Orders were issued from this office for 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> Bns. to move into support tomorrow morning. Engineer officers were sent to reconnoitre positions for forward saps.

## SAUSAGE VALLEY.

Ref. Map. 1:10000 trench map.

Aug. 16 Relief carried out in accordance with orders issued yesterday.

1<sup>st</sup> Bn were in position in support trenches at 1205 + 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. at 1215.

Bn. H.Q. established as follows.

1<sup>st</sup> Bn X9C82

2<sup>nd</sup> Bn X9C42

3<sup>rd</sup> Bn R34A91

4<sup>th</sup> Bn R34C30.

Brig. Gen. GLASGOW commanding 13<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde. handed over the command to Brig. Gen. commanding 1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde. at 1430.

1430. Orders were received from 4<sup>th</sup> Aust. Div. to push forward saps etc.

Bde orders 27 + 28 (appendices 8/16/4 + 5) were issued accordingly.

1<sup>st</sup> M.G. Coy. completed relief of 13<sup>th</sup> M.G. Coy at 0940. They are now preparing further positions as the 13<sup>th</sup> Coy. had only eight guns in action.

Trenches generally on the left sub-section particularly are very bad. communications on the left practically non-existent.

There are some gaps in the line.

Patrols were sent out last night + report enemy in trenches about 100 to 150 yards

## SAUSAGE VALLEY.

Aug. 16<sup>th</sup> Strength of the Bde. on entering the line

	On Establishment			Attached			Total	
	Off	O.R.	Total	Off	O.R.	Total	Off	O.R.
Bde H.Q.	2	16	18.	4	21	25	6	37
1 <sup>st</sup> Bn	18	522	540.	1	3	4		
2 <sup>nd</sup> "	26	647	673					
3 <sup>rd</sup> "	25	642	667	1		1		
4 <sup>th</sup> "	27	697	724	1		1		
M.G. Coy	8	126	144		13	13.		
T.M.B.	3	36	39		12	12.		
Sig. Sect.	1	31	32		18	18		
	110.	2727	2837.	7.	67	74.		
Grand Totals.	117 off.	2794	O.R.	Total	2911.			

Aug 17. Had night from 2045 till 0300 this morning enemy attacked left of 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. The attacks were persistent but not strong, and were beaten off enemy leaving their dead - Heavy barrage prevented our sapping parties working and Engineers finally sent the parties home. Yesterday Capt W.T. McDONALD, 4<sup>th</sup> Bn, & Lieut BULKLEY 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. were killed. & four 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. officers wounded.

1030 Enemy aeroplane was brought down in flames in our lines by one of our planes after duel lasting half an hour.

0315. Brig & Bde. went forward to



## POZIERES SECTION

Aug 17.

4<sup>th</sup> Bn. N of POZIERES, & returned at 0630 to see Div. Commander.

Last night 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. on right pushed forward three saps, captured one prisoner and found two enemy machine guns & a telephone in NO MANS LAND.

Casualties for 24 hours ending noon today

	Officers	O. Rank
1 <sup>st</sup> Bn		0. K. 3 W. 0 M.
2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn		0 - 1 - 0
3 <sup>rd</sup> Bn	1 K. 3 W	3 - 37 - 0
4 <sup>th</sup> Bn	1 K. 5 W.	5 - 45 - 5
Total	2 K 8 W	8 K. 86 W. 5 M

at 1500 a company of 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. were ordered to move forward to support 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. & to come under command of CO 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. 1600 message rec<sup>d</sup> that at 1450 large numbers of enemy were advancing in open order from N. of MARTINPUICH towards our right. Art. Liaison officers & 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> Bn were at once advised. The attack did not develop. Two men were sent to remain with the right post of Bde. on left. ~~They~~ That Bde. will not come forward in spite of repeated requests.

1032 report received that Bde on left was being attacked at 6<sup>th</sup> Avenue. Report proved to be unfounded at 2355

## POZIERES Section

Ref map MOUQUET 1:5000

Aug 18. At 0515. One company 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn ordered up into close support of 4<sup>th</sup> Bn.

At 0912 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. ordered into line on right, taking over part of 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn's line.

Our heavy artillery shells our own trenches periodically. At 1320 they shelled our trench with 6" at R34A27 and at 1330 with 9.2 at R28C18.

The matter is invariably reported to Art. Liaison officers & to D.H.Q. It would be helpful to have Heavy Art. Liaison officers with infantry units.

Dist. Order. re tonight's operation received at 1545. Bde Order 29 issued in accordance therewith. at 1700.

1730 Div. suggested altering objectives etc. but it was considered too late to alter Art. arrangements.

1900 Bde H.Q. moved to advanced Report Centre at X10A53.

2050 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. reported increase in numbers & improvement in method of enemy on their front.

48<sup>th</sup> Division on left appear to have done well & have captured about 200 prisoners.

2050 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. report that they are still being shelled by our own guns.

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## POZIERES

Aug. 18. 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. could not advance as our  
 com<sup>d</sup> barrage was falling short. 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. report  
 18 pps. as well as heavies falling short  
 at midnight.

2245 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. reported that they had  
 gained S.P. 55. & were being counter attacked  
 1 M. Coy. & 1 Coy. 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. were ordered to  
 support the 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. reported that  
~~they~~ their whole Bn. had been absorbed for  
 working parties.

Word was therefore sent to D.H.Q.  
 Attached Appendix 8/16/7 shows orders of  
 art. & neighbouring Bdes.

Liaison officers attached to Bde-

LAHORE Div. art.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieut.	TRACY	5 <sup>th</sup> Bde
2 <sup>nd</sup> and Div. art.	Lieut.	GIBBONS	5 <sup>th</sup> P.F.A.
1 <sup>st</sup> Field Coy Engineers	Lieut.	STEVENSON	
145 <sup>th</sup> Inf Bde	Lieut.	BAKER	

and sundry minor reports etc.

Reference maps attached Appendix 8/16/9  
 1:20000 composite trench map and  
 1:5000 Monquet Farms.

Orders reference preparatory work are  
 attached Appendix 8/16/10

Bde Order 29 attached Appendix 8/16/11  
 dealing with tonight's operation

## POZIERES

Aug 19.

4<sup>th</sup> Bn report at 0221. received at 0315. A Coy. advanced their line to R33 B 55 where they established strong point C Coy. advanced their line & linked up with A on left & D on right.

D Coy. bombers advanced & drove out enemy from R34 A D 8 but owing to 5<sup>th</sup> Bn on right not being able to advance & leaving their flank in the air & also to lack of infantry support from remainder of company, almost entirely last joined, untried reinforcements, were forced back. Lts BOILEAU and ISAACS were on the spot & both did excellent work.

3<sup>rd</sup> Bn report third 0340 received 0500. again emphasises loss and damage caused by our own shell fire.

3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. claim to hold gun pit at R28 C 93. but elsewhere could not advance.

Rainy weather prevents contact aeroplane observation so machines will not go up as stated in para 6. Bde order 29

1300 Relief order received from D HQ. & A3a 152 was issued shortly after. Appendix 8/16/18. Brig Gen. MACLAGAN commanding 3<sup>rd</sup> Aust. Inf. Bde was here

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## POZIERES.

Aug 19 When orders arrived. One Bn. (1<sup>st</sup> Bn) has to be left in line and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. will be left at TARA HILL and will do most of the carrying.  
 2240 The command was handed over to Gen MACLAGAN and the P. Side Staff left for ALBERT.

## ALBERT.

Aug 20. 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. had to remain in TARA HILL area as Div Reserve and to perform fatigues etc  
 1800 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. was relieved. All units less 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. now in ALBERT  
 1930. Orders were received to move to WARLOY before noon tomorrow.

Aug 21. Both less 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. marched to WARLOY. Move complete 1145.  
 Fine bright but cool day.  
 Reference late action. Two reference maps attached, marked appendix 8/16/9  
 Brigadier & B.M. visited Corps H.Q. + the Corps Commander returned with the Brigadier & saw Bns. at WARLOY  
 Orders issued to move to LA VICOIGNE tomorrow

## LA VICOIGNE

1916

Aug 22. Bde Group less 1<sup>st</sup> Bn, 1<sup>st</sup> F. Coy +  
1<sup>st</sup> F. Amb. marched to La Vicogne.  
3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. were side tracked, on the way,  
at Val de Maisson. Camp as cover  
could not be found at La Vicogne.  
Orders for this last were received  
en route.

Entertainment orders received ~~for~~  
~~Order 30~~ for 25/26<sup>th</sup> inst.

Aug 23. Bde Order 30 appendix 8/16/12  
was issued.

The Corps Commander visited  
La Vicogne & presented medal ribbons  
to Officers & men lately awarded medals.  
The Bde paraded (less 1<sup>st</sup> Bn.) under  
2000 strong.

Casualties for period 15<sup>th</sup> - 20<sup>th</sup> Aug

	Officers			Other ranks			Total
	K.	W.	M.	K.	W.	M.	
1 <sup>st</sup> Bn.	-	3	-	28	66	6	103
2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn.	-	-	-	12	29	1	42
3 <sup>rd</sup> Bn.	1	8	-	29	124	5	167
4 <sup>th</sup> Bn.	1	8	-	55	229	9	302
M.G. Coy.	1	-	-	4	5		10
T.M.B.					6		6
	3	19	0	128	459	21	640

as per attached appendix 8/16/13

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## LA VICOIGNE Sheet 11 Lens

Aug 23 2040 1<sup>st</sup> Langae Order 3<sup>rd</sup>  
received, altering routes & times  
for march tomorrow. Amended  
March Table was issued in  
accordance therewith at 2130.

Aug 24. Bde Group marched to GEZAINCOURT-  
LONGUEVILLE (4<sup>th</sup> Bn) and BEAUVAL  
(1<sup>st</sup> Bn). The 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. has now rejoined  
the group after having been attached to  
the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde since Aug. 20<sup>th</sup>.

Aug 25. Bde Groups entrained in accordance  
with Bde Order 30. Train journey

Aug 26 took from 6 to 7 1/2 hours.  
Detraining Station HAPOUTRE in  
BELGIUM. Bns moved to huts  
as follows

Ref. map	1 <sup>st</sup> Bn, M G Coy, The Battery - ERIE huts
Belgium	2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn - St. Lawrence
N 28	3 <sup>rd</sup> Bn - Toronts
1:00000	4 <sup>th</sup> Bn. & 1 <sup>st</sup> Ad Coy - Scottish.

Bde HQ G 22 B 4.3

The fact that we follow the  
Canadian accounts for the names  
Before leaving Gezaincourt. The  
Brigade forwarded to B.H.O. an

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BUSSEBOOM, BELGIUM. Sheet 28

1140000

Aug 26 account of the operations near  
MOUQUET FARM Aug 15<sup>th</sup> - 19<sup>th</sup> 1916 Copy  
attached Appendix 8/16/14.

Aug 27. Orders were received from D.H.Q. outlining  
general scheme of relief - details will  
follow. This Bde will relieve the  
Centre Brigade of the 4<sup>th</sup> Div. Div.  
has now completed move from  
Southern zone of operations.

Aug 28 Brigadier, Col Neame, 1<sup>st</sup> Bn, and  
Brigade Major visited 10<sup>th</sup> Div Brigade  
East of YPRES. Saw part of the  
area but did not reach front line.  
On return to H.Q. Bde order No 31  
Appendix 8/16/15 was issued  
1700 Meeting of Bn Commanders &  
adjutants. Col FOOT from D.H.Q.  
Spoke on subjects of Salubring, dress  
etc. Brigadier gave information  
re area we are going to  
Capt COLVIN A.A.M.C. Div Gas Officer  
also attended & supplied certain  
information re former gas attacks in this  
area.



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## BUSSEBOOM

1916

Aug 28 News received that RUMANIA had  
(cont'd) declared war on AUSTRIA and that  
ITALY had declared war on GERMANY.

Aug 29. Capt H.V. FORBES Staff Capt. of this Bde,  
returned to duty after an absence wounded  
since July 24.

\* 2305 Gas alarm. followed later by  
news of gas attack on 4<sup>th</sup> Div front.  
All units warned though we are about 12000  
yards from front line.

C.O.s visited front line today.

Aug 30. Brigadier again went to forward area.  
4<sup>th</sup> Bn cannot find accommodation in  
Support & reserve lines & will be billeted  
in cellars etc in YPRES.

Aug 31. Bde Order 32 issued, <sup>copy</sup> attached to  
appendix 8/16/15.

Total casualties for the month are  
shown on appendix 8/16/16.

2<sup>nd</sup> + 3<sup>rd</sup> Bns. entrained at BRANDHOEK  
with details of 7<sup>th</sup> M.G. Coy. in  
accordance with Bde Orders 31 & 32.

Schools of instruction in Signalling,  
visual, observation duties etc, hours

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## BUSSEBOOM

Aug 31 guns, bombing, gas duties etc have been made available, & officers & others have been sent to attend. This further weakens battalions but we will benefit when the trains return.

Strength of units at noon today

	On Establishment			Attached		
	Off	OK	Total	Off	OK	Total
Batt. Q.	3	17	20	3	19	22
1 <sup>st</sup> Bn	22	454	476	1	-	1
2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn	26	564	590	1	-	1
3 <sup>rd</sup> Bn	19	617	636	1	-	1
4 <sup>th</sup> Bn	18	447	465	1	-	1
1 <sup>st</sup> Regt Coy	7	124	131		13	13
1 <sup>st</sup> T.M.B.	3	46	49		13	13
N <sup>o</sup> 2 Sig Sect.	1	30	31		17	17
	99	2299	2398	7	62	69

J. H. Milligan Major  
Bde Major 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Bns

31-8-16

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506 1st Inf Bde

1. In offensive operations against prepared positions thorough preparation for each successive advance is essential. Bodies of troops must be detailed to each special objective and should not advance beyond this.

Troops who have won any position must at once consolidate it, leaving it to other troops who have been detailed, to press on to the next.

2. The advance of each successive line within the limits of the final objective must be pressed with rapidity and the only limitation to the rate of movement towards the objective at this stage is the artillery barrage. The barrage gives time for the troops to close up under its protection as near as possible to their objective so that the moment it lifts they can rush the position before the enemy can run his parapet effectively. Infantry should be instructed that when an advance is covered by an artillery barrage, they must time their final rush by the lift of the artillery fire. Numerous casualties occurred because this was not clear to many of the men. Some of the wounded stated that the artillery did not lift quickly enough for them to get on. This indicates a want of knowledge that should be remedied.

3. In offensive operations of the present nature it is essential that the higher command should lay down the limits to which the attack is to be pushed, and when this line is attained it is the duty of the troops to consolidate it in order that they may be secure against any counter-attack which the enemy may make to recover lost ground. But the fact that a limit has been ~~marked~~ so placed must not be considered as restricting initiative on the part of lower commanders. Once contact with the enemy is joined, it is a principle that it is to be maintained. Beyond the objective laid down this contact must be maintained by means of patrols. Every commander should arrange to push forward strong patrols as soon as the line is firmly established, e.g. a case occurred recently of a certain line in a wood being reached in accordance with orders; the commander on the spot discovered by patrols which he had pushed forward promptly that the enemy had evacuated the whole of the

the wood in front. (On this occasion it was essential that the opportunity of continuing the advance should be taken and the position gained)

Any action taken beyond that laid down by the authority who commits the troops to action must be reported at once, and neighbouring units must be informed in order that their co-operation may be assured.

The principle to be kept in view is that the object aimed at must be obtained and must be strongly against counter-attacks while no opportunity must be lost for want of initiative. It is to be noted that the initiative if uncontrolled and if based on hope as to what the enemy may be doing may easily become dangerous. A subordinate commander who pushes forward without having thoroughly examined the situation by means of patrols incurs a grave risk.

4. Consolidation must not be considered as merely the preparation of strong points, and of digging in by the infantry after having attained its objective. It involves the task of sorting and reorganising troops. In doing this commanding officers should keep in mind the possibility of a further advance being ordered while the enemy is in a disorganised condition. The weight of numbers which it is necessary to throw into the line in order to overwhelm the enemy's resistance becomes a source of loss when <sup>the</sup> objective has been attained.

When a position is won and is consolidated a few men only with an ample number of machine guns can hold it. As soon as a position is consolidated and troops reorganised, if no further advance appears probable, commanders should give their attention to thinning the line and withdrawing troops to safer localities.

The task of reorganising in the face of the enemy is extremely difficult but if the men of different sections can be more or less got together it will facilitate the thinning of the line to a considerable extent, and the process will resemble an ordinary relief so far as the withdrawal is concerned. If men of various units or companies are intermingled it may be found possible when reorganising to withdraw the troops of one or more units or companies leaving the others to hold the line. Sentries will be needed at the exits to communication trenches. Consolidation also involves the selection of and preparation of strong points ahead, where they are likely to be of value. Parties should follow the patrols to construct these.

5. Reports must be steadily and continually sent back to higher authority. This must be done in the interest of the troops as it is the only means by which the Divisional Commander can judge the need of the situation and the condition of the troops and so enable him to deal with any conditions which may arise.

6. The organisation of runners proved most valuable. Now that the Division has had experience of their value, it is necessary that they should be systematically trained for their duties. An effective organisation will be worked out in each brigade to ensure this. Their close association with the signal service must be maintained.

In action it was found that they sometimes get up with the infantry in the firing line and were not available when required.

They must be given an organisation separate from the infantry and must be carefully looked after. While it is sure that there will be no difficulty in obtaining volunteers, everything must be done to give them the highest sense of their duty and of the necessity for self sacrifice. A separate organisation will help to do this.

7. A thoroughly satisfactory means of defining the foremost line has not yet been arrived at. It is of importance that aeroplanes should be able to locate our most forward positions promptly so that the information can be transmitted to Divisional Headquarters rapidly and the artillery informed promptly. Liaison officers of the artillery assist a great deal but if during the assault they go too far forward with the advanced lines they are useless as they cannot get the information back quickly enough. If they do not go forward they do not see and depend on the units for their information.

So far flares appear to be the best means of showing the position of the infantry. They must be shown by men in the front line only. This is largely a matter of education. It appears desirable to have special men detailed for flare lighting. The airmen prefer to see numerous flares sent up at fixed times.

8. Artillery Liaison Officers attached to infantry battalions are sometimes confounded with F.O.O.'s. The liaison officer keeps with the unit, generally head-quarters, and keeps the artillery informed of the situation. The F.O.O. goes where he can best see in order to direct the fire of the guns.

The functions of these officers are not thoroughly known in many of the infantry units.

9. It was found that Lewis-guns were most effective in assisting the bombing attack on the trench west of FOXBERG. It made the enemy drop down by <sup>traversing</sup> sweeping the parapet ahead of our bombers.

10. The question of reliefs for Commanding Officers and Company Commanders has been brought forward by Army Corps Headquarters. These can be arranged if reserves in command of battalions and companies are kept back when the first assault is launched.

11. Enemy machine guns are frequently placed in rear of his front line trenches in shell holes or in special emplacements connected by a tunnel with front line dug-outs.

All ranks will be carefully instructed in this matter as it may happen that the enemy infantry may make use of the machine-gun tunnel to come out on to the open behind his line. Shell holes in rear are frequently occupied when the trenches are shelled. Shrapnel is very effective against this.

## 1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO. 25.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
8th. August 1916.

Reference Map: LENS 11. - 1:100,000

- 436
- Move. 1. The 1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade Group will proceed by march route to LA VICOGNE tomorrow 9th. inst., and to RUBEMPRE-HERISSART-TOUTENCOURT on the 10th. instant. Units will move in accordance with attached March Table Appendix I.
- Starting Points. 2. The starting points will be as under :-  
On 9th. instant. Subway under railway, between HALLOY and CANAPLES.  
On 10th. instant. Road junction  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile N.E. of LA VICOGNE Church.
- Billeting Parties. 3. Billeting parties as under will report to Lieut. MACALPINE at HERISSART Church at 1200 tomorrow 9th. and will rejoin their units at LA VICOGNE the same night.  
Per Battalion - 1 Officer, 4 N.C.O's & Interpreter.  
M.G. Coy )  
1st. Field Coy ) 1 Officer, 1 N.C.O. and  
1st. Field Ambce. ) Interpreter if available.  
No. 2 Coy A.A.S.C. )  
At LA VICOGNE units will occupy the billets they were in on the night of July 28/29th.
- Bde. Hd. Qrs. 4. Bde. Hd. Qrs. office will close at PERNOIS at 1000 on 9th. and reopen at the same hour at LA VICOGNE, closing again at 1000 on 10th. and reopening at the same hour at HERISSART.
- Transport. 5. All Transport will march with the unit to which it is attached.

Acknowledge

*A. J. Milligan* Major,  
Brigade Major, 1st. Inf. Brigade.

Distribution of Copies.

Copy No.	To whom.	Time	Method.
No. 1	File	-	"
2.	War Diary	-	"
3.	1st. Bn.	1030	Orderly
4.	2nd. Bn.	"	"
5.	3rd. Bn.	"	"
6.	4th. Bn.	"	"
7.	1st. M.G. Coy	"	"
8.	1st. A.L.T.M.B	"	"
9.	1st. Field Coy Engineers	"	"
10.	1st. Field Ambce.	"	"
11.	No. 2 Coy A.A.S.C.	"	"
12.	1st. Aust. Division	"	D.R.
13.	5th. Aust. Inf. Bde. (For information)	"	"
14.	Staff Captain	"	Orderly
15.	Bde. Signal Officer	"	"

APPENDIX I. - MARCH TABLE

(Issued with 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Order No.25.)

436

Date.	Unit.	From.	To.	Time to pass Starting Point.	Route	Remarks.		
Aug.9th.	No.2 Co.A.S.C	HALLOY	LA VICOIGNE	0830	HALLOY-CANAPLES " read immediately South of Bde. SALOMEL -B DE BELLEVAL-BOIS DE LA MAOURS.	Under O.C. 1st. M. Coy		
	1st. Bn.	do	do	0900				
	4th. Bn.	do	do	0920				
	1st. M.G. Coy ) T.M. Battery ) Bde. Hd. Qrs. ) Sig. Section )	PERNOIS	do	0940				
	2nd. Bn	do	do	1000				
	3rd. Bn	do	do	1020				
	1st. Field Coy	do	do	1040				
	1st. Field Ambce.	HALLOY	do	1100				
Aug.10th.	No.2 Coy A.S.C	LA VICOIGNE		0830			via FME DE ROSEL LE VAL DE MAISON.	Under O.C. 1st. M.G Coy.
	1st. Bn	do		0900				
	4th. Bn	do		0920				
	1st. M.G. Coy ) T.M. Battery ) Bde. Hd. Qrs. ) Sig. Section )	do		0940				
	2nd. Bn.	do		1000				
	3rd. Bn	do		1020				
	1st. Field Coy	do		1040				
	1st. Field Ambce.	do		1100				

Appendix No. 1 8/16/2. 23



SECRET.

*Appendix 9/16/3*

Copy No.....

436

1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO.26.

Brigade Headquarters,

14/8/16.

Reference Map : Sheet 57 D. 1;40,000

Move.

1. The 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Group will proceed to the BRICKFIELDS AREA W.21. by route march today. Units will move in accordance with attached March Table Appendix I.

Starting Point.

2. The starting point will be the road junction at U.21.C.8.3. Sheet 57 D. Units billeted in HERISSART will pass the road junction at T.10.D.4.2 75 minutes before the time allotted them for passing starting point.

Advance Parties.

3. Advance parties of 1 Officer and 1 N.C.O per unit will report to Lieut. MACALPINE at W.27.D.0.5 at 1800 and will be allotted bivouac areas.

Transport.

4. All Transport will march with the unit to which it is attached.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

*A.L. Milligan* Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Infantry Brigade

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No.1	File	-	-
2.	War Diary	-	-
3.	1st. Bn.	1300	Orderly
4.	2nd. Bn.	"	"
5.	3rd. Bn.	"	"
6.	4th. Bn	"	"
7.	1st. M.G.Coy	"	"
8.	1st. A.L.T.M.B	"	"
9.	1st. Field Coy Engrs.	"	"
10.	1st. Field Ambco (for information)	"	"
11.	No.2 Coy A.A.S.C.	"	"
12.	1st. Aust. Division	"	D.R.
13.	Staff Captain	"	Orderly
14.	Bde. Signal Officer	"	"

APPENDIX I. MARCH TABLE

(Issued with 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. Order No. 26 )

436

Unit.	From.	To.	Time to pass Starting point.	Route	Remarks.
1st. Bn.	TOUTENCOURT	BRICKFIELDS CAMPING AREA,	1500	CONTA Y.-WARLOY.- MIDDLE ROAD via V.19.C.C.O.-V.20.D. - V.22.C V.24.C. - V.30.B. - W.25 - W.26 W.27.D.O.5.	
4th. Bn.	HERISSART	do	1530		
1st. M.G. Coy ) T.M. Battery ) Sig. Section ) Bde. Hd. Qrs )	do	do	1600		In one body under command of O.C. 1st. M.G. Coy.
3rd. Bn.	do	do	1630		
2nd. Bn.	RUBEMPRE	do	1700		
1st. Field Coy	HERISSART	do	1730		
No.2 Coy A.A.S.C.	TOUTENCOURT	do	As convenient.		

Appendix No. 8/16/3.1 25

## 1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO. 27.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

16/8/16.

Reference Map: Trench Map POZIERES 1:10,000

1. With a view to future operations against MOQUET FARM and the trenches to the East of it, the following will be carried out :-
2. The present front line from our extreme right to 33.A.8.1 will be pushed forward as follows :-
- (a) On the right beginning at 2200 saps will be pushed out and T. heads established tonight by working parties of 1st. Battalion and 1st Field Company who will come under the command of O's C. Battalions in firing line. At 1900 bombing parties will work up along trenches towards 28.C.0.1 and 27.D.9.1 and form blocks beyond bombing range of our sapping parties.
- (b) In the centre a line will be established so as to link up R.34.A.3.8. with R.33.B.5.5. Work will be begun at 2200 by working parties of 1st. Battalion and 1st. Field Company.
- (c) On the left the line will be advanced so as to include point R.33.B.5.5. It will probably be possible to reach point 5.5. by bombing along from 34.A.3.4.
3. Divisional Artillery will today bombard the trench from R.33.B.5.5. to 2.7. and from 5.5. to 4.8. They will also bombard the Northern end of the trenches towards 27.D.0.1 and 27.D.9.1. and the sunken road just South of R.28.C.2.1.
4. Times laid down in Para. 2 must be punctually observed so that the artillery may be notified and the bombardment lifted. Prompt reports as to the points reached will be sent in so that the artillery may take the necessary action.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

*S. L. Milligan* Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Distribution of Copies.

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4.	2nd. Bn.	"	"
5.	3rd. Bn.	"	"
6.	4th. Bn.	"	"
7.	1st. M.G. Coy	"	"
8.	1st. A.L.T.M. Battery	"	"
9.	1st. Aust. Division	"	D.R.
10.	4th. Aust. Division	"	"
11.	2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade	"	"
12.	145th. Inf. Brigade	"	"
13th.	1st. Field Coy	"	Orderly

Appendix 9/16/5

Copy No. 2

436

1st. AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 28.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

16/8/16.

1. Working party of 2 Officers and 150 other ranks from 1st. Battalion will report to Lieut. REAST 1st. Field Company at CHALK PIT at 2015 tonight to be met by 3 guides from 4th. Bn. Covering parties will be furnished by 4th. Battalion.
2. Working party of 2 Officers and 150 other ranks <sup>from 1st Bn</sup> will report to Lieut. McBride 1st. Field Company at Chalk Pit at 2045 tonight to be met by 3 guides from 3rd. Battalion. Covering parties will be furnished by 3rd. Bn.
3. Each man will carry 1 pick and 1 shovel. The work is to cut saps and T. Heads from front line forward.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

*Stirling* Major,  
Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Distribution of Copies.

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1.	File	-	-
2.	War Diary	-	-
3.	1st. Bn.	1615	Orderly
4.	3rd. Bn.	"	"
5.	4th. Bn.	"	"
6.	1st. Field Coy	"	"
7.	Spare	-	-

*Appendix*

*9/14/16*

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

18/8/16.

1st. Australian Division.

Reference your G.766, and in continuation of my B.G.10 of the 17th., I have to report that on the 16th. instant the enemy bombarded our Left Battalion front line and support trenches continuously from 1650. At about 1930 the bombardment intensified and small parties of the enemy with fixed bayonets were seen pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole.

At about 2000 enemy rifle fire opened, the bombardment being continued, and at 2045 the infantry attacked. They were met by Machine Gun and rifle fire and by bombs, and after a few minutes turned and ran. Simultaneously with the Infantry attack H.E.Shells were directed on the right of the line and POZIERES was heavily barraged on South and West.

The infantry attacks were renewed throughout the night but all were repulsed with loss to the enemy only two coming within bombing range. Our right Battalion was able to bring enfilade Lewis Gun fire on the enemy. *rising from headquarters*  
*The last attempt of the enemy to mass for attack was about 0230.*

The attacks were carried out on a narrow front about R.33.A.8.1. and one attack was made in six waves. In order to allow our patrols and bombing parties, which were timed to go out before the enemy's attack took place, to go out our artillery barrage had been lifted to the MOUQUET-COURCELETTE Road; the enemy thus gained immunity from shell fire South of that line.

*W.D. Smyth* Brig. General,

Commanding 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

## Appendix 8/16/7

Operation Orders

Angac Art. Order. 7

Lahore Div. Art Order 89

1<sup>st</sup> Aust Div Art Orders 43 + 44

2<sup>nd</sup> Aust Inf Bde Order 39

145<sup>th</sup> Inf Bde Order 121

and Sundry other reports in  
connection with the operations

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Appendix No. 8/16/17

SECRET.

Copy No. 3

ARTILLERY ORDER No.7  
by  
G.O.C.R.A. 1st ANZAC.

18th August 1916.

R28c.90.25 to  
R28c.2.2 to  
R27d.9.1 to  
R33b.4.8 to

- The 1st Australian Division is carrying out two operations on the evening of the 18th instant.  
(1) Operation "A" which will have as its objective the line R.28.c.95 to 36 to 03 to R.33.b.59 to 48 to R.33.a.81 and the establishment of a defensive flank in R.28.d. and R.34.b.  
(2) Operation "B" the objective of which will be the capture of the trench from the junction of MUNSTER ALLEY and the SWITCH LINE at X.6.a.5.7 to R.35.d.35 and on to R.35.d.46 from which point posts will be established joining up with the O.G.2 line at R.35.c.48.
- The trenches from R.28.c.95 to R.27.d.12 to R.33.b.27 to R.33.a.47 and the trench from X.6.a.57 to R.35.d.46 are being steadily bombarded during the day.
- Tables of bombardments and barragos are attached.
- During the bombardment from -1 hour to 0, II Corps is co-operating by bombarding from R.33.a.47 to R.33.b.27 to R.27.d.12 with heavy howitzers, and from 0 to 1 hour they will continue, but will lift off the portion from R.33.b.29 to 27 to 07.
- During the bombardment from -1 hour to 0, III Corps is bombarding the portion of the trench from junction with MUNSTER ALLEY to R.36.b.00, and from 0 to 1 hour will lift on to the factory and the BAPAUME Road in R.36.a. Central.
- The hour of assault will be zero hour which is ~~8.0 p.m.~~ 9.0 p.m.
- Flares are being shown by the Infantry in both new lines at 7.30 a.m. and at 10.30 a.m. on the 19th.
- Acknowledge by wire please.

*Reley*  
Captain R.A.  
Staff Officer R.A. 1st Anzac.

Issued as under :-

Copy No.1	File.	Copy No.15	
2	1st Anzac.	16	1st Aust.D.A.
3		17	
4		18	
		19	
5	B.G.H.A.	20	II Corps R.A.
6		21	III Corps R.A.
7		22	R.A. Reservo Army.
8		23	No.7 Sqdn.R.F.C.
		24	13th K.B. Section.
9	Lahore D.A.		
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

1st Inf Bde

Forwarded for your information

Please acknowledge by wire

*R.A. Smythe Major*  
1st Aust Div

Received 8.45pm 18/8/16

TIME TABLE FOR ATTACK ON NIGHT OF 18th AUGUST.

	Time.	Objective.	Rate of fire.	Remarks.
"A" Operation (a) 18-prs.	0. to 0.1	Intense fire on the line R.28.d.03 to R.28.c.22 to R.34.a.09 to R.33.a.7.3	Quickest rate possible.	RED Line.
	0.1 to 0.2	Intense fire on the line R.28.d.03 to R.28.c.22 to R.27.d.91 to R.33.a.73.	do.	BLUE Line.
	0.2 to 0.10	Intense fire on the line R.28.c.95 to 36 to 03 to R.27.d.73 to 31 to R.33.a.73.	do.	YELLOW Line.
	0.10 to 0.30	Same line.	2 rounds per gun per min.	do.
	0.30 to 1 hour. hour.	Same line.	1 round per gun per min.	do.
	1 hour on	As required.	Usual nightly rate.	
(b) 18-prs.	0 to 0.10	Intense fire R.28.d.03 to R.34.b.63.	Quickest rate possible.	
	0.10 to 1 hour.	Same line.	1 round per gun per min.	
	1 hour on	Same line.	Usual nightly rate.	
(c) 4.5" Hows.	0. to 1 hour.	R.28.c.95 to R.28.d.40.75 and down the new trench to R.34.b.68 and on R.27.d.42 to R.27.d.12		
(d) Heavy and Medium Hows.	-1 hour to 0.	On the line R.28.c.95 to 36 to 03 to R.27.d.73 to 42 to 31.	Heavy Hows. 40 rds. a gun. Medium do. 60 do.	
	0 to 1 hour.	On the points R.27.d.05.50 R.27.d.69 R.27.d.79 R.28.c.39.	1 round per point per min.	
(e) 60-prs.	0. to 1 hour.	On the approaches from COURCELETTE and from the North.	100 rounds.	

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cut our trenches.

Appendix No. 8/16/17



TIME TABLE FOR ATTACK ON NIGHT OF 18th AUGUST 1918.

	TIME	OBJECTIVE.	RATE OF FIRE	REMARKS.
"B" Operation. (a) 18-prs.	0. to 0.1	Intense fire on the line X.3.a.05.75 to R.35.d.25.45 to R.35.c.75.85.	Quickest rate possible.	RED Line.
	0.1 to 0.2	Intense fire on the line of the new trench from X.3.a.15.85 to R.35.d.35.55 and on to R.35.c.75.85.	do.	BLUE Line.
	0.2 to 0.3	Intense fire on the line R.36.c.3.0 to R.35.d.35.70 to R.35.c.89	do.	YELLOW Line.
	0.3 to 0.10	Intense fire on the line R.36.c.6.0 to R.35.b.35.00	do.	GREEN Line.
	0.10 to 0.30	Same line.	2 rounds per gun per min.	do.
	0.30 to 1 hr.	Same line.	1 round per gun per min.	do.
	1 hour on	Same line.	As required.	
(b) 18-prs.	0. to 0.2	R.35.c.75.85 to R.34.b.6.4	1 round per gun per min.	
	0.2 to 0.3	R.35.c.8.9 to R.34.b.6.4	do.	
	0.3 to 1 hr.	R.35.b.35.00 to R.34.b.6.4	do.	
	1 hour on	Same line.	As required.	
(c) 4.5" Hows.	0. to 1 hour.	On the road R.35.b.35.00 to 35.50 and on the trench R.35.a.36 to R.35.b.75.00	1 round per gun per min.	
(d) Heavy and Medium Hows.	-1 hour to 0.	On the trench from R.35.d.75.20 to R.35.d.35.55 and on to 35.70.	Heavy Hows. 40 rounds per gun per hour. Medium Hows. 60 rounds per gun per hour.	
	0. to 1 hour.	On points in COURCELETTE.	40 rounds.	
(e) 60-prs.	0. to 1 hour.	On approaches from COURCELETTE.	50 rounds.	

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Appendix No. 8/16/17





S E C R E T.LAHORE ARTILLERY.OPERATION ORDER NO. 89.

18th August, 1918.

1. The 1st Australian Inf. Bde. will advance its line to-night to R.28.c.8 $\frac{1}{2}$ .3.-5 $\frac{1}{2}$ .3 $\frac{1}{2}$ .-2.2.-0.1.-R.27.d.9.1.-R.33.b.5.7.-R.33.b.5.5. and will consolidate this line under cover of the artillery barrage. Strong points will be established at R.28.c.8 $\frac{1}{2}$ .3., R.28.c.2.2., R.28.c.0.1., R.27.d.9.1. and R.33.b.5.7.
- wrong* || A strong defensive flank will be constructed from R.34.a.9.9 $\frac{1}{2}$ . to about R.28.d.1.3.
2. The 2nd Australian Inf. Bde. will attack the enemy from the left of the 15th Divn. at X.6.a.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .3 $\frac{1}{2}$ . to R.35.d.4.3. and will join this point to the present line at/ about R.35.c.4.8. Strong points will be established
- (i) Near the tramway X.6.a.  
(ii) R.35.d.4.7.
3. The action of the Lahore Artillery and attached Bdes. will be as detailed in attached task tables and barrage maps.
4. Zero hour will be 9.00 p.m.
5. Flares will be shewn by the infantry in both new lines at 7.30 a.m. and at 10.30 a.m. on the 19th inst.
6. Time will be checked at 7 p.m.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued at 3.15 p.m.

*G. P. St Clair*  
Captain, R.A.,  
Brigade Major, Lahore Artillery

- |       |    |                    |
|-------|----|--------------------|
| 1     | to | R.A. 1st Anzac.    |
| 2     |    | 1st Aus. Div.      |
| 3     |    | 1st Aus. Div. Art. |
| 4     |    | 25th Div. Art.     |
| 5     |    | 48th Div. Art.     |
| 6     |    | Anzac H.A.         |
| 7-11  |    | 5th Bde. R.F.A.    |
| 12-13 |    | 11th Bde. R.F.A.   |
| 17-20 |    | 18th Bde. R.F.A.   |
| 21-25 |    | 5th Bde. A.F.A.    |
| 26-30 |    | 6th Bde. A.F.A.    |
| 31    |    | L.D.A.C.           |

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*1st Am 2nd Bde*Received 8.30 pm 18 $\frac{8}{16}$

TASK TABLE FOR ATTACK ON NIGHT 18th AUGUST, 1913.

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Nature of gun.	Time.	Unit.	Objective.	Remarks.	Rate of fire.
18-prs.	0 - 0.1.	18th Bde.R.F.A. (Lahore).	R.35.b.3.3. to R.35.a.7.3.	Red Line.	Quickest rate possible.
"	0.1 to 0.2.	"	R.33.b.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .7. to R.35.a.7.3.	Blue Line.	-Do.-
"	0.2 to 0.10.	"	R.33.b.2.9. to R.35.a.7.3.	Yellow Line.	-Do.-
"	0.10-0.30.	"	-Do.-	-Do.-	2 rds. a gun a minute.
"	0.30-1 hour.	"	-Do.-	-Do.-	1 rd. a gun a minute.
"	1 hour on-wards.	"	As required.		Usual nightly rates.
4.5" Hows.	0 to 1 hour.	"	R.27.d.1.2. to 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .2.		0 - 0.5, two rounds a gun a minute. 0.5 - 0.10, one rd. a gun a minute. 0.10 - 1 hour. 1 rd. a gun every 2 minutes.

P. T. O.

Appendix No. 8/16/7

436

## TASK TABLE FOR ATTACK ON NIGHT 18th AUGUST, 1916.

Gun.	Time.	Unit.	Objective.	Remarks.	Rate of fire.
18-pr.	0 to 0.2.	3th Bde. A.F.A.	R.28.d.0.5.-R.34.b.4.9.	Flank barrage.	Quickest rate possible
"	0.2 to 0.10.	"	R.28.c.9.5.-R.34.b.4.9.	"	-Do.-
"	0.10-1 hour.	"	-Do.-	"	1 round per gun per minute.
"	1 hour on.	"	-Do.-	"	Usual nightly rate.
4.5" Howb.	0 to 1 hour.	"	New trench from R.28.d.4.5. to 5.1.		0 to 0.5, 2 rds. a gun a minute. 0.5 to 1 hour, one rd. a gun a minute.
18-prs.	0 to 0.10.	5th Bde. A.F.A.	R.34.b.4.9.-R.34.b.6.3.	Flank barrage.	Quickest rate possible.
"	0.10-1 hour.	"	-Do.-	"	1 rd. per gun per minute.
"	1 hour on.	"	-Do.-	"	Usual nightly rate.
4.5" Howb.	0 to 1 hour.	"	New trench from R.28.d.5.1. to R.34.b.3.8.		0 to 0.5, 2 rds. a gun a minute. 0.5 to 1 hour, 1 rd. a gun a minute.

Appendix No.

Appendix No. 8/16/7

TASK TABLE FOR ATTACK ON NIGHT 18th AUGUST, 1916.

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Nature of gun.	Time.	Unit.	Objective.	Remarks.	Rate of fire.
18-prs.	0 - 0.1.	11th Bde.R.F.A. (Lahore).	R.34.A.09. to		
"	0.1 - 0.2.		R.28.c.1. $\frac{1}{2}$ . to R.33. b.4.7.-R.33.b.3.3.	Red Line.	Quickest rate possible.
"	0.2 - 0.10.		R.28.c.0.1. to R.27. d.9.1. to R.33.b.4.8. to R.33.b.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .7.	Blue Line.	-Do.-
"	0.10-0.30.		R.28.c.0.3. to R.27. d.7.3. to 3.1. to R.33.b.2.9.	Yellow Line.	-Do.-
"	0.30-1 hour.		-Do.-	-Do.-	3 rounds a gun a minute.
"	1 hour on.		-Do.-	-Do.-	1 round a gun a minute. ly Usual night/rate.
"	1 hour on.		As required.		
4.5" Howa.	0 to 1 hour.	"	R.27.d.4.2. to 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .2.		0 - 0.5, two rounds a gun a minute. 0.5 to 0.10, 1 round a gun a minute. 0.10 to 1 hour, 1 round a gun every two minutes.

P.T.O.

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## TASK TABLE FOR OPERATIONS, NIGHT OF 18th AUGUST, 1916.

<u>Time.</u>	<u>Unit.-</u>	<u>Objective.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>	<u>Rate of fire.</u>
18-prs. 0 to 0.1	5th Bde.R.F.A. (Lahore).	R.28.d.0.3.-R.28.c.2.2. - 1.½.	Red Line.	Quickest rate possible.
" 0.1-0.2.	"	R.28.d.0.3.-R.28.c.2.2. - 0.1.	Blue Line.	-Do.-
" 0.2-0.10	"	R.28.c.9.5.-6.6.-3.6. - 0.5.	Yellow Line.	-Do.-
" 0.10-0.30	"	-Do.-	Yellow Line.	2 rounds per gun per minute.
" 0.30 to 1 hour.	"	-Do.-	Yellow Line.	1 round per gun per minute.
" 1 hour on- wards.	"	As required.		Usual nightly rates.
4.5" Hows. 0 to 1 hour.	"	R.28.c.9.5. to R.28.d.40.75. thence along new trench to road at R.28.d.4.5.		0 - 0.5, two rounds a gun a minute. 0.5 - 1 hour, one round a gun a minute.

Appendix No.

Appendix No. 8/16/7


39



436

Appendix No. 8/16/7

40



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Secret.

Copy No 9

436

Divisional Artillery Order No 43.

VIC. JANA 201 August 16th 1916.

- The following will be the grouping of the 1st Aust. Div. Artillery.
  - Right Group. 2nd F.A. Brigade under Lt. Colonel A.J. Bessell - Brown C.M.G., D.S.O.
  - Centre Group. 3rd F.A. Brigade plus two batteries 21st F.A. Brigade under Lt. Colonel W.L.H. Burgess D.S.O.
  - Left Group. 1st F.A. Brigade plus one battery 21st F.A. Brigade under Lt. Colonel S.W. Anderson.

2. To enable this grouping to be carried out the 23rd Battery will be placed under the tactical control of the 1st F.A. Brigade and the 22nd and 24th Batteries will be under the tactical control of the 3rd F.A. Brigade

- The following will be the zones covered by the groups
  - Right Group - front held by Right Battalion of Right Brigade (2nd Inf. Bde) from HUNTER ALLEY, X 5 B 5.0 to BAPAUNE ROAD R 55 C 9.1 both inclusive.
  - Centre Group front held by Left Battalion of Right Brigade (2nd Inf. Bde) from BAPAUNE Road R 55 C 9.1 to R 54 B 6.0
  - Left Group. Portion of front held by Right Battalion of Left Brigade (1st Inf. Bde) R 54 b 6.0 to R 280 8.1

- (a) Liaison

  - (a) Each group will provide a liaison officer to be with the Battalion whose front it is covering.
  - (b) The Right Group will provide a liaison officer to be with the Right Brigade (2nd Aust. Inf. Bde). This liaison officer will be in direct telephonic communication with the C.R.A. and will send all reports direct to C.R.A.
  - (c) The Left Group will provide a liaison officer to be with the Left Brigade (1st Aust. Inf. Bde).

5. A continuous barrage will be maintained by all brigades. This barrage should usually not be closer than 250 yards in front of our own line.

- To maintain this barrage the following allotment of ammunition will be expended
 

	During daylight.	During darkness.
Right Group	35 rds per group per hour	70 rds per group per hour
Centre Group	60 rds per group per hour	120 rds per group per hour
Left Group	62 rds per group per hour	124 rds per group per hour

7. Brigade Commanders may engage other targets as they think necessary or at the request of the Infantry Brigadiers, but the daily allotment must not be exceeded except in cases of necessity. In such cases the C.R.A. will be immediately informed.

8  
W.L.H.

acknowledged

C.S.M. HILES Major.  
Bde Major 1st Aust. Div. Art.

Appendix No. 8/16/7  
Appendix No. 8/16/7

38A

Copy No		
1.	1st Aust. Div.	
2	1st Aust.Div.Art.	
3	Lahore Div Art.	
4	R.A., 1st ANZAC	
5	1st F.A.Brigade	
6	2nd F.A.Brigade	
7	3rd F.A.Brigade	
8	21st F.A.Brigade	
9	1st Inf.Bde	
10	2nd Inf.Bde	
11/2	War Diary.	

1. The following will be the names covered by the groups:  
 Left Group - 1st F.A. Brigade plus one battery 1st F.A. Brigade  
 Centre Group - 2nd F.A. Brigade plus one battery 2nd F.A. Brigade  
 Right Group - 3rd F.A. Brigade plus one battery 3rd F.A. Brigade

2. A continuous barrage will be maintained by all brigades.  
 This barrage should normally not be closer than 250 yards in front of our own line.

3. To maintain the barrage the following arrangements will be made:  
 (a) Each group will provide a liaison officer to be with the other groups.  
 (b) The Right Group will provide a liaison officer to be with the Left Group (and vice versa). This liaison officer will be in direct telephonic communication with the C.I.C. and will send all reports direct to C.I.C.  
 (c) The Left Group will provide a liaison officer to be with the Centre Group (and vice versa).

Left Group  
 Centre Group  
 Right Group

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

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First Australian Divisional Artillery Order No 44.

August 18th 1916

1. The grouping of the artillery and boundaries of groups as laid down in Div. Art. Order No 43 are cancelled as from 4 pm 18.8.16.
2. The 1st Australian Divisional Artillery (Right Group Artillery) will be responsible for covering the front held by the Right Brigade (2nd Inf. Bde) from X 6 A 1.4½ to R 34 B 6.0  
The Boundaries will be as follows.  
(a) On Left between 1st Aust Div. Art and Lahore ~~Artillery~~ Div. Art Line from R 34 B 6.0 to R 35 A 2.9 thence along road to COURCELET.  
(b) On the Right between 1st Aust. Div. Art and 34th Div. Art line from X 6 A 1.4½ to R 31 A 0.0
3. The following will be the zones covered by the Brigades  
2nd F.A. Brigade X 6 A 1.4½ to ~~X 6 A 6.9~~ X 5 B 6.9  
3rd F.A. Brigade X 5 B 6.9 to R 35 D 1.3½  
21st F.A. Brigade R 35 D 1.3½ to R 35 C 4.8  
1st F.A. Brigade R 35 C 4.8 to R ~~35~~ B 6.0  
34
4. The D.C., 21st F.A. Brigade will resume control of the batteries of the 21st F.A. Brigade from 4 pm 18.8.16
5. (a) Liaison The Liaison Officer at present with the Right Brigade Headquarters will remain there.  
(b) Each Brigade will send a Liaison officer to the Battalion it is covering, i.e. 2nd and 3rd F.A. Bdes to Right Battalion, 21st and 1st Bdes to Left Battalion.
6. Acknowledge.

C.G.N. MILES Major.  
Bde Major 1st Aust. Div. Art.

- Copy No
- 1 1st Aust. Div.
  - 2 R.A., 1st ANZAC
  - 3 1st Aust. Div. Art.
  - 4 Lahore Div. Art.
  - 5 34th Div. Art.
  - 6 1st F.A. Bde
  - 7 2nd F.A. Bde
  - 8 3rd F.A. Bde
  - 9 21st F.A. Bde
  - 10 1st Aust. Inf. Bde
  - 11 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde
  - 12/3 War Diary

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2nd AUST. INF. BDE. ORDER NO 39.

Headquarters,  
2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.  
18th August 1916.

1. 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde, will attack the enemy from the left of the 16th Division X.G.A. 2 1/2 . 6 1/2 . to R.35.D.4.6. and will join this point to the present line at about R.35.C.4.8.

Strong points will be established -

- (1) Near the tramway X.G.A.
- (11) R.35.D.47.

2. Artillery. The operations will be immediately preceded by a bombardment of heavy guns.

Programme of bombardment and time table of Artillery barrages will be issued separately. Barrage will begin 50 yards forward of our newly constructed starting line running from X.G.A. 34 to R.35.C.48.

No troops will be in advance of this line at the time of attack. Assaulting troops will follow barrages closely.

3. Engineers. Engineers will be detailed by G.R.E. for work on the strong points. They will be sent forward under the orders of the Inf. Bde. Commanders.

4. Dispositions. (a) The 6th and 7th Bns, will attack the enemy line between MUNSTER ALLEY (X.G.A. 2 1/2 6 1/2 .) to and inclusive of BAPAUME ROAD the 6th Bn on the right and the 7th Bn on the left.

Dividing line between Bns, will be Communication Trench "G" from O.G.S. to new forward line. This Trench is the one nearest the Tramway on Northern side of Tramway it will be solely at the disposal of 7th Bn, for feeding up into position prior to the attack.

7th Bn, will be responsible for seizing enemy strong point at R.35.D.46. and establishing strong point as per para 1 (11).

6th Bn, will be responsible for strong point near Tramway X.G.A. Battalions will form for attack each with 3 Coys in line in the front on half Coy frontage with I Coy in Support and I Coy in Reserve.

(b) 6th Bn, will move forward and complete the line <sup>left side</sup> from the 7th Bn, to point about R.35.C.48. connecting the right of their present newly made forward line with the left of the 7th Bn at R.35.D.46.

(c) Medium Trench Mortars. 2 Guns will co-operate from left flank of 44th Inf. Bde., 15th Division operating on enemy strong point on left of enemy line to be attacked.

(d) L.T. Mortars will also operate from same point on same objective as medium .T. Mortars.

(e) 2nd M.G. Coy, (6 Guns) will co-operate from North of CHALK PIT with indirect fire on to all roads in rear of enemy position. M.Guns of 44th Bde, will co-operate from same vicinity as Trench Mortars firing along the rear of enemy trench and on to BAPAUME ROAD,

5. Aircraft. Contact aeroplane will fly over the line at 7.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. on 18th inst when flares will be lit.

6. Time. Zero hour will be 9 p.m. Watches will be synchronised with the Bde. Sig. Coy, at 12 noon and 5 p.m.

7. Consolidation. Patrols and posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out in advance of the line when established.

When captured ground is entered by enemy trenches strong blocks will be constructed. For this work special parties will be told off beforehand and provided with the necessary stores.

Bombers will be specially told off for the protection of all such blocks. Bombing parties will be detailed to push along the enemy trenches leading forward from the captured line.

8. Two days rations and full waterbottles to be carried by all ranks.

9. Acknowledge.

*W. H. H. H.*  
Major.  
Bde Major, 2nd Aust Inf. Bde.

P.T.O.



SECRET.

Copy No. 11

145th INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER, NO. 121.

Ref Trench Map.  
 OVILLERS 1/10,000.  
 and Sun Print 1/5,000.

18.8.16.

1. An attack will be carried out today by 143rd Inf. Bde. at 5 p.m.
  - 1st objective - X.2.b.5.2. --- 20 --- 03 ---  
 X.2.a.9.1. --- 91 --- X.2.c.3.9.
  - 2nd objective - PTS. X.2.b.5.5. --- 44 --- 06  
 X.2.a.9.6. --- 76 --- 56 --- 43 --- 22
  - 3rd objective - in which 145th Inf. Bde. will co-operate by bombing from POINT 99; Pt. X.2.b.5.9. --- 48 and exploiting any success on remainder of front.
  
2. Corps Heavy Artillery and other Artillery continue constant bombardment to:-
  - (a) Obliterate QUADRILATERAL X.2.b.03 - X.2.a.96 - 65 - 81, paying special attention to Strong Point X.2.a.76 - 65 - 64.
  - (b) To prepare for first Infantry assault by obliterating line of 1st objective.
  - (c) At Zero Hour Heavy Artillery will lift to line 59 - 48 - 06 - 56 - 25.
  - (d) Field Artillery will work by Time Table given below:-
    - Zero to + 5 on first objective.
    - Lift at + 5 about 100 yds. except guns on front North of 20, through 03, to 91, which will not lift till + 7.
    - Lift at + 10 to 2nd Objective, viz, line 74 - 55 - 44 - 06 - 96 - 22, and slow down to 1 round per minute.
    - Lift at + 15 off 2nd Objective to line 12 - 79 - 46 - 25, 100 yds. North of 2nd objective, and slow down to 1 1/2 rounds per minute.
    - Lift at + 20 to Line 68 - 59 - 45 - 46 -

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After + 20 work back 100 yds. per 2 minutes to the bottom of the NAB - MOUQUET Farm Valley, stopping on line 03 - 56 - 33 - 31 - 19, and continuing at slow rate of this line.  
At + 5 heavy Artillery lift back to outside squares X.2.a. & b.  
At + 5, two batteries will come under the direct orders of the G.O.C. 143rd Inf. Bde.

3. R.BERKS will co-operate with 143rd Infantry Bde. in capturing by bombing attack PT. 59 and toward PT.48 in 3rd objective and will also establish a post in trench 78 - 74 near PT. 78. Trench here is in good order but only 3 ft deep. This must therefore be deepened and consolidated. A sandbag will be waved on bayonet to show 143 Inf. Bde. where our bombers are.
4. Forward dump of grenades will be made about Pt. 99.
5. All Machine Guns possible will bring covering fire to bear on the line 29 -- 79 -- 12, paying special attention to taking trench 03 -- 12 -- (in 32.d.) in enfilade.  
O.C.M.G.Coy. will arrange thro' Brigade Liaison Officer with 143 Inf. Bde. for control of M.G. fire from THIEPVAL SALIENT and those guns flanking the attack.
6. 1 Trench Mortar is placed at disposal of O.C, R.BERKS with one in reserve.
7. Reserves. O.C. 1/5th GLOSTERS will keep 2 Coys. in reserve ready to move at short notice to exploit any marked success and sweep enemy off S.W. slopes of spur in X.2.a.  
O.C. GLOSTERS will keep in close touch with R.BERKS by keeping an officer at their H.Q.



8. Aeroplane flares and every <sup>thing</sup> required for posts to maintain themselves for 24 hours, if necessary, will be carried. White Divl. Patches will be worn and screens to mark position for Artillery will be carried.

9. Liaison. R. BERKS will keep an officer with H.Q. of Right Bn. 145th Inf. Bde.

9a. R. BERKS will arrange for Officers and Regtl. Police to be on duty to enforce Trench discipline and control of traffic.

10. Bde. H.Q. will be at DONNETS POST with advanced H.Q. at an O.P. to be notified later.

11. Acknowledge by wire.

M. J. LEAHY, Captain,  
Brigade Major,  
145th Infantry Brigade

Issued at 10 a.m.

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SECRET.

Reference 145th Inf. Bde. Order, No.  
121 of today's date.  
Division wires:-

Ref. para. 2 (d) delete "Line 12 - 79 - 46 - 25"  
to read "Lift at 15 off 2nd Objective to line  
100 yards North of 2nd objective, and slow down  
to 1½ round per minute."

18.8.16.

T. J. LEAHY, Captain,  
Brigade Major,  
145th Infantry Brigade.

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Headquarters,  
4th. Australian Division.  
16th. August, 1916.

1st. Inf Bde order no \_\_\_\_\_

Headquarters,

1st. Aus. Infantry Brigade.  
13th. Aus. Infantry Brigade.  
-----

1. With a view to future operations against MOUQUET FARM and the trenches to the East of it, the following will be carried out commencing this afternoon or during night 16/17th. or very early morning 17th.

2. The present front line from our extreme right to 33.A.81 will be pushed forward as follows :-

(a) On the right saps will be pushed out and T. heads established. <sup>beginning at 2200</sup> ~~at night~~ by working parties of 1st. Bn. Bombing parties will work up along trenches towards 28.C.01 and 27.D.91 and blocks formed <sup>beyond</sup> blocks beyond <sup>of our sapping parties.</sup>

(b) In the centre a line will be established so as to link up R.34.A.38 with R.33.B.55. <sup>work will be begun at 10 PM</sup>

(c) On the left the line will be advanced so as to include point R.33.B.55. It will probably be possible to reach point 55 by bombing along from

34 A 34.

3. Divisional Artillery will to-day bombard the trench from R.33.B.55 to 27, and from 55 to 48. They will also bombard the Northern end of the trenches towards 01. and 91, and the Sunken Road just S. of R.28.c.21.

4. <sup>Times laid down in Para 2 must be punctually observed</sup> You will notify Divisional Headquarters exactly when you will begin this work, so that the Artillery may be notified and the bombardment "lifted".

Prompt reports as to the points reached will be sent in so that the Artillery may take the necessary action.

*D. K. Howard*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
G.S. 4th. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copies to :-

C.R.A.  
1st. Australian Division.

Dist.

1335  
1500 pm.

Headquarters.  
18th. August 1916.

436

— 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
1st. Aust. Divn. Artillery. (For information)  
Lahore Artillery. " "



It has been reported that Liaison with artillery on our front has not been working quite satisfactorily, either when 4th. Division was in the line nor now that 1st. Division is in line.

It is important that there should be an Artillery officer with Headquarters of every Battalion and Brigade in the line. These officers have been detailed by the Artillery but it appears that for lack of accommodation or other reason they have not been allowed to remain with Battalion Headquarters in all cases, but have been sent back to the 'Concrete house' in POZIERES.

To accomplish the duty for which they are detailed it is necessary that the Artillery Liaison officers should be with Battalion Headquarters and unless this can be arranged their services to some extent are being wasted.

Please say whether you desire a continuation of the present system of one Artillery Liaison officer with each Battalion Headquarters and one with each Brigade Headquarters or whether a reduction in the numbers is desirable.

Unless full use can be made of their services it seems to be rather a pity to waste valuable fighting officers.

Would you please submit your opinion as early as possible in order that adjustments may be made at once.

*R. M. M. M. M. M.*

1<sup>st</sup> Lieut-Colonel. General Staff.

1st. Australian Division.

Reply

BA. 31

436

1<sup>st</sup> Bde (Inf)

Report on work and operations in 1<sup>st</sup>  
B2 Sector. Since taking over till 0800.

① Communicating trench very much deepened R34 D 4.7 to  
R34 D 5 1/2 9 and R34 B 2.2 to R34 B 3.3 to R34 A 9 1/2 7  
This latter has been deepened some 5 ft as it  
ran down the slope of the hill facing the ridge  
held by the Germans.

② Fire trenches improved all along.

+ ③ Saps continued out from R34 D 8.9 1/2 to 9 1/2 9 1/2

(b) " " " " R34 D 7.7 to 7-9 1/2

(c) " " " " R34 D 6.0 to R34 B 6.1

(d) " " " approx R34 B 4 1/2 1/2 to R34 B 5 1/2 1/2

(e) " " " R34 B 2 1/2 1/2 to R34 B 2.4 in a  
curve

(f) " " " " R34 A 9 1/2 7 to R34 B 2.8 in a  
curve. This goes past present 3<sup>rd</sup> B 14 1/2  
and then is very shallow.

④ A new trench from 2 to 3 ft <sup>deep</sup> from R34 B 2.5  
was made from R34 B 2.8 to R28 D 2.1/2

2. all the Saps had been worked on before but  
were considerably improved and - lengthened  
by in some cases 70 yards - both (a) & (b)  
now run into OB 2 behind German wire

3. This OB 2 is almost knocked out of existence.  
Col. Weir and walked across the Sap heads in it  
this morning

5. The line was held by two patrols  
3 of which had Lewis MGs with them

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- in front of all working parties.
6. All men were employed most of the night
  7. <sup>0300</sup>26 - 18 p.m. Shells fell approx. R34 D 5'8 systems were duds. There were fired close together some other shots as far as I know dropped shot. Artillery Officer sent back word direct to Artillery Bde.
  8. Most of casualties occurred in fatigue parties D by bringing sections - and in shells which got some SB's and MG's
  9. A.B.C Coy occupy the line with 1 platoon in support in a new trench. - the length of line - the amount of work and the work Coy required this.  
D in Reserve. LA A+B.

19/8/17

John Strang  
C.O. 1st Bn.


Coy 1st Bn  
to 1st Bn

1st Inf. Bde

(1st Bn)  
Attached rough sketch showing present  
line and forward saps, as reported  
by us this morning.

P.S. Woodforde Maj  
for Co. MB

19/8/06



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Appendix No. 8/16/7 54

1st Bn, Confidential

Headquarters  
First Inf Bde  
I have to report that  
the artillery barrage at  
2000 last night was very  
inaccurate and completely  
breached my ~~position~~ in  
several places. I have  
suffered many casualties  
during the last two days  
from our own artillery  
and would again ask  
that the range of the  
heavies firing last night be  
increased 200 yards. This  
fire disarranged my  
parties and consequently  
my patrols were unable to  
follow up the barrage quickly.  
The Germans were in  
strength in their trench  
when my patrols were  
pushed out and I did

2

not consider it advisable  
to press the attack  
especially as the 4<sup>th</sup> Div.  
party working up to  
R28/C01. had to fall back.  
I have pushed out a  
post to a gun pit at R28  
C91.3. where I have 8 men  
and a Lewis gun. Will  
you please inform the  
artillery. Otherwise my  
line remains the same.  
A large engineer party  
reported and remade my  
front line.  
From my patrol reports I  
do not think a barrage  
of H.E. necessary on the  
line from R28/C5.4. to  
R28/C9.4.  
One wounded prisoner has  
been sent back.  
0340. O. Howell  
Commandy

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Appendix No. 8/16/7 55.



Head Quarters  
First Inf. Bde

Throughout the night the enemy maintained a heavy barrage fire on and in advance of our front line and on all communication trenches.

The party of 150 men of 1<sup>st</sup> Bn did not report here. Guides were sent by me as instructed and I again sent back later to try and gain touch with the party but unsuccessfully. Three saps were pushed forward on my right for about 30 yds to my front but work had to be suspended owing to the enemy artillery fire. During the night and

<sup>2</sup>  
under cover of their barrage the enemy has dug a new line closer to ours. It runs from R. 28.C. 94 to ~~29~~ 34 B 8.7. The 1<sup>st</sup> F.A. Bde have been asked to range on this at 1100 today when I will furnish a further report. This line at present is shallow & I think artillery fire will clear it of the enemy.

The enemy counter attacked the 4<sup>th</sup> Bn last night and my left company was able to take the attackers in the flank and inflicted very considerable casualties then and again this morning. My own casualties are 1 Officer 13 other ranks killed

<sup>3</sup>  
3 Officers 38 other ranks wounded (Total since coming into line). One prisoner of the 193 Regt. was captured this morning and states he comes from the front near ARMENTIERES. Forwarded herewith an enemy telephone taken from a German artillery dug out in no mans land. Two enemy machine guns are also being sent back by me. One was found buried in my line and the other in a dug out in no mans land.

17/8/16  
1007.

J. Howell  
Commandy 3<sup>rd</sup> Dist

Appendix No. 8/16/17

Handwritten notes on the left page of a lined notebook, including the date '20' and various illegible entries.

Handwritten notes on the middle page of a lined notebook, containing several lines of illegible text.

Handwritten notes on the right page of a lined notebook, featuring the words 'K', 'Buckley', 'was', and 'support', along with a circled 'D' and other illegible text.

436

CR. 109.

Headquarters  
3d Bn. Report  
Supt Inf Bde.

In connection with the operation assigned my Battalion on the night 18/19<sup>th</sup> inst I have to report as follows.

Throughout the day our own heavies shelled my line intermittently.

This shelling grew heavier towards 1600 when it eased off again.

At 1900 it again commenced and grew in intensity till the barrage lifted for 20.00 to 21.00 began.

This barrage was on my line and not the enemy's. In three places my front line was breached for lengths of 20 yards and I suffered casualties. This shelling continued till 22.20 when it lifted on the right and I was able to push out my patrols soon afterwards at this point.

This patrol found the enemy in strength about 200 yards from our line and after engaging them was forced back as the enemy pushed out a strong flanking party of about 30 men.

2.

A centre patrol pushed out to R34 A 54 and met no opposition but came back at dawn having been unable to establish itself sufficiently to stay out during daylight. There was no enemy trench at this point.

The left patrol were pushed out but could not go far as they came into our own barrage which was not more than 100 yards from my line at this point. Intermittent fire from our heavy artillery continued on my left till early morning just clearing my line.

23/8/16

O. Howell Price Lt. Col.  
Commandant 4th Div A.I.F.

To H.Q. 1<sup>st</sup> INF. BDE.

18/6/1916

In connection with the POZIERES position as it affects 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. I beg respectfully to report as follows:-

1. Work on assembly trenches in vicinity of X4C40 & X10A77 would provide good place for reserves for this Bn
2. Work on communication trenches especially crossing sky line of ridges should be kept up almost continuously e.g. R33C96 & R33D08
3. Engineers & Pioneers should send forward their own guides during day to ascertain the route & should arrive so that a fair proportion should all task in daylight. Very many men are lost from parties & much time is wasted; in fact some parties wander round & do no work at all. The provision of guides by Pns. makes the life of the runners etc. harder even than usual & is a great drain on men
4. Perhaps some time might be saved by using main ALBERT - BAPAUME Rd. as well as CHALK PIT Rd. for troops

J. G. Mackay Lt. Col.  
Commanding 4<sup>th</sup> Bn.

urgent

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1<sup>st</sup> INF. BDE

CO 15

19<sup>th</sup>

AAA

An arrow showing direction of officer our new line. Enemy trench on being taken would be stopped as men are very tired & 1916

Following is now 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. line  
Square R 33



R33C69 - A82  
R33B1520 - 55 - 85 - R34A39

Not known direction of trench Engineers dug last night. They stopped work & were past Bn. H.Q. before 0400. Trench Engineers dug thought to be rather shallow & not continuous but no particulars. Major Brown has carrying post bombing post in front of post 33A55. Enemy bombers very active & making efforts to cut off bombing post by creeping round flanks into shell holes. Very large supplies sent forward but firing line still asks for more. All available men are being used to carry forward bombs, water & rations before daylight as it is anticipated that enemy snipers & M. Guns may be active in trying to prevent communication AAA. Enemy artillery appears now to endeavour to put barrage between front line & rear in daylight & he watches carrying parties closely.

4<sup>th</sup> Bn.  
0545

J. G. Mackay Lt. Col.

Appendix No. 8/16/7 59

No 25

19. 8. 16

1st INF. BDE

A. Coy advanced their line and established strong point at R. 33. B. 55 which he now holds with Lewis Guns & Enquiries are now working on the post while the rest of working party is proceeding with communication trench.

(left flank)

C. Coys advanced at the same time and took up position in a shallow trench which they have deepened and are now linked up with A. Coy on left and D. Coy on right.

One team of Bombing Platoon supported by some of D. Coy. made an attack on the

25 Coys

I

Bombing Post at R. 34. A. 08; they reached the barricade and apparently were dealing off the enemy bombers. However the infantry - consisting of the latest recruits - failed to support them with rifle fire and withdrew to their trenches. A supply of bombs was thus not kept up and the enemy returned to the barricade, wounding several of our bombers. Although both Lt ISAACS and Lt BOILEAU were on the spot and endeavoured by personal effort to rally the men the infantry could not be got up to support the bombers again and there was nothing for the bombing team - who had behaved most gallantly - to do but withdraw.

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Appendix No 8/6/7

60

25 Contd

(3)

The C. R. on our right did not advance and the whole attention of the enemy bombers was concentrated against our attack.

D. Coy. lost heavily in the first POZIERES action - it has lost its O. C. and the majority of the men are untried reinforcements and apparently cannot be called upon for strong attack. Further, the quality of the enemy troops seems to be much better than it has been and he fights with great determination.

With further reference to the failure of this attack, owing to the very heavy enemy bombardment the commencement of the attack was delayed

no 25

(4)

and the bombers were compelled to go to their place by a devious route. On their arrival C. R. was not prepared to move and the Coy. Commander reported that he had not gone <sup>on</sup> with the attack for these various reasons. He was ordered to proceed with the attack immediately. C. R. was informed and they were asked to assist us by moving forward at the same time.

Vickers Gun & team have been sent forward to strong post also L.M.G. of 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. & one may be moved there from Post 81. It is expected sniping & bombardment will be had today - daylight & post & <sup>under</sup> are to be pushed up at once. Mackay

02-21

19/8/14

436

Appendix No. 8/147

61

436

19-8-16

No. 27 1<sup>st</sup> Inf Bde

Reference my No. 25 of last night, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn was informed of our advance and asked to co-operate. The messenger returned two hours later with the letter undelivered, he having failed to find 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn advanced H.Q.

Notification of our intention to advance was however given by Lt. ISAACS to 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn Coy Commanders

J. Mackay Lt Col  
Comd 4<sup>th</sup> Bn  
Pres Munn Capt (M)

~~Time~~  
0800

Appendix No. 8/16/7 62



**"C" Form (Original).**  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.** No. of Message.....

Army Form C. 2123.  
 (In books of 50's in duplicate.)

Prefix <i>Am</i>	Code	Words	Received	Sent, or sent out	Office Stamp.
		£ s. d.	From <i>Am</i>	At	
Charges to collect			By <i>Am</i>		
Service Instructions.			To		



Handed in at..... Office..... Received *13 18* m.

TO *1st Aust Inf Bde*

*Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
<i>9805</i>	<i>19</i>		

Reference divisional order  
 HQ para 3 right Bn  
 of 1st Bde will not  
 be relieved at present  
 On relief one Bn  
 will occupy TARA HILL  
 trenches remainder of Bde  
 to BRICKFIELDS On billets  
 can be arranged in ALBERT  
 for one Battalion at

FROM *927*

**"C" Form (Original).**  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.** No. of Message.....

Army Form C. 2123.  
 (In books of 50's in duplicate.)

Prefix.....	Code.....	Words.....	Received	Sent, or sent out	Office Stamp.
		£ s. d.	From.....	At..... m.	
Charges to collect			By.....	To.....	
Service Instructions.				By.....	

Handed in at..... Office..... Received..... m.

TO

*Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
------------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

*full strength in RUE D AVELUY  
 aaa this is placed at  
 your disposal aaa addressed  
 1st Bde repeated 3rd  
 Bde*

FROM *1st Aust Div*  
 PLACE & TIME *1310*

438

Appendix No. 8/16/8. 63

436

Appendix No. 8/16/8

64

"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.

**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.** No. of Message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix _____	Code _____	m.	Words	Charge	<i>This message is on a/c of:</i>	Reed. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			<i>Service.</i>
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO	APPENDIX	8/16/8
----	----------	--------

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	<b>A A A</b>
* A.S.A. 182	18x 19		

The following reliefs are to take place today and the 10th. Battalion will relieve the 3rd. Battalion, the 9th. and 12th. Battalions will relieve the 4th. Battalion and the 11th. Battalion will relieve the 2nd. Battalion in WIRE TRENCH and will take over all carrying duties and the 3rd. Machine Gun Coy will relieve the 1st. Machine Gun Coy and the 3rd. A.L.F. Battery will relieve the 1st. A.L.F. Battery and 3rd. Brigade Headquarters will relieve the 1st. Brigade Headquarters and the 1st. Battalion will remain in its present position and will come under the command of G.O.C. 3rd. Inf. Brigade and all details will be arranged between C.O.'s concerned and will be carried out by daylight if possible and on relief units will move as follows and 3rd. and 4th. Battalions, M.G. Coy T.M. Battery to BRICKFIELDS, 2nd. Battalion to TARA HILL and completion of relief will be reported by all units to Brigade Headquarters and on completion of these reliefs the G.O.C. 3rd. Inf. Brigade will assume command of the forward area and

A C K N O W L E D G E.

From	
Place	1st. Infantry Brigade <span style="float: right; font-size: 1.5em;">Major,</span>
Time	1500 <span style="float: right;">Major, 1st. Inf. Bde.</span>

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

(4198) Wt. W14042-M44. 3.0300 Pads. 12/15. Sir J. C. & S.

436

Appendix

8/16/9

Appendix No 8/16/9 65

Reference maps.

1: 5000 Ferme-du-Mouquet


1: 20000 Composite trench map



67  
Appendix No. 8/16/14

436

Identification Trace for use with Artillery Maps.



Tracing taken from Sheet.....  
of the 1.....map of.....  
Signature.....  
Date.....

G.S.G.S. 3023



436

Appendix No. 8/16/10 69

APPENDIX 8/16/10

1ST. BDE. FILE

PREPARATORY SAPS.

nights of ~~16th~~ & 17th. inst

436

Divisional Headquarters.  
15th. August. 1916.

G.O.C. 1st. Inf. Bde.  
G.O.C. 2nd. Inf. Bde.  
C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div. (for information)

Received 3.45 pm. inst.



1. The Divisional Commander has requested the G.O.C. 4th. Division to so arrange the reliefs that the point of junction between the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. and 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. will be at R.34.D.6.9. He has also asked that the Lewis guns of 1st. Pioneer Battalion should be allotted to the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

2. The Divisional Commander desires that full use should be made of the Lewis guns in the front line in order to economise men.

3. The attached sketch shows our present line in blue and that of the enemy in red pencil. It is most probable that the division will be called upon to extend its front to the line shewn as a continuous green line in the attached sketch. The date will probably be the 18th. inst.

4. Only three nights are available for preparation. The Divisional Commander desires that all necessary reconnaissances for preparatory work should be made tonight, and requests that you will ask the engineer company commanders of your group company direct for any reconnoitring and pegging out parties of the engineers that you may require.

5. The Divisional Commander desires that you should prepare an intermediate line approximately as shewn by the broken green line on the sketch to be finished on the night of 17th. inst. In the case of the 1st. Inf. Bde., the flanking trench 'A' should also be prepared in order to cover the right flank of the brigade.

6. Should the 48th. Division on our left be prepared to undertake the capture of the line marked by blue crosses simultaneously with our operation, the 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. may be required to capture the line marked by green crosses.

7. Arrangements should be made to organise bombing attacks to push forward along all communication trenches, occupied or otherwise, in order to seize and consolidate posts as far forward as possible.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Lieut Colonel, General Staff.  
1st. Australian Division.

does not  
apply as  
we are on that  
line

2/




1<sup>ST</sup> BDE

436

MORNING OF AUGUST 14<sup>TH</sup> 1916.

SITUATION MAP



1<sup>ST</sup> PRINTING COY, R.E. 5<sup>TH</sup> SECTION, (138)

13882 genl GLASSGOW HQ X15 C 5.5

Appendix No. 8/16/10

71

Headquarters.

16th. August 1916.

436



1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

1. Reference your Order No.27 of today's date. No arrangement appears to have been made for the construction of the flanking trench as directed in para. 5 D.H.Q. No.S/16/791. Please arrange for this to be done in addition to the work described in your order. It should run from about R.34.B.0.8. to about R.28.D.1.2. and should be 'T' headed.
2. The saps described in para 2.a. should be pushed forward as far as the road R.28.C.2.1.- R.28.D.0.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ . and 'T' headed.
3. The Divisional Commander desires that after the capture of R.33.B.5.5. bombing parties should be pushed ahead towards R.33.B.4.8. and R.33.B.2.7. The line which the division will be required to establish on 18th. inst. in this vicinity will run from R.33.B.4.8. to R.33.A.8.1.
4. Portion of the line R.34.A.3.8.- R.33.B.5.5. required to be joined up in your order appears to be within our line.  
This trench should be constructed from about R.34.A.1.8 to R.33.B.5.5.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "W. Blamey".

Lieut-Colonel. General Staff.

1st. Australian Division.

Received at 10 PM 16 $\frac{8}{16}$ 

Noted J.E. [unclear]  
1st. Inf. Coy.  
2330  
16/8/16.

1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO. 29

436

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

18/8/16.

Reference Map: FERME DE MCUQUET 1:5000.

1. INFORMATION AS REGARDS OUR OWN FORCES. On the 18th. August the 4th. Army is attacking the German Intermediate Line South of MARTINPUICH at 1445. The 15th. Division on our right is co-operating with this attack by discharging smoke. The 48th. Division on our left is attacking the enemy positions in Square X.2 at 1600.
2. ACTION BY THE BRIGADE. 3rd. Battalion will seize and occupy dug-outs at R.28.C.9.1, the strong point at R.28.C.9.3. and the trench to the West of the strong point and the points R.28.C.2.1 and R.28.C.2.2.  
4th. Battalion will seize and occupy the points R.28.C.0.1 and the new trench junction at R.34.A.0.8 $\frac{1}{2}$ . and R.33.B.5.5. and will continue to hold line from there to QUARRY at R.33.A.8.1.
3. STRONG POINTS. will be established at  
(I) R.28.C.8.1.  
(II) At sunken road in R.28.C.  
(III) R.33.B.5.5.
4. ARTILLERY. The trench at R.28.C.9.5. to 3.6. to 0.3. to R.27.D.7.3. to 4.2. to 1.2. will be kept under steady fire during the day with observation if possible. There will be an intense bombardment for 1 hour before Zero time.
5. ENGINEERS. 1 section of Engineers has been detailed for each strong point and each section will be assisted by a carrying and working party of 1 Officer and 40 other ranks from the 2nd. Battalion. These parties will report at CHALK PIT at 1800. Each man to carry a pick and a shovel, a rifle and 100 S.A.A.
6. AIRCRAFT. Contact aeroplanes will fly over the line at 0730 and 1000 on 19th. instant when flares will be lit.
7. TIME. Zero hour will be 2100. Watches will be synchronised with Brigade Advanced Report Centre C.E.R. at 1000 and 1800.
8. DUMPS Forward dumps for Engineer and other stores will be established as far forward as possible.
9. BOMBING PARTIES. will be detailed to push along the enemy trenches leading forward from the captured line.
10. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS. will open at Advanced Report Centre (station call C.E.R.) at 1000. 1900.
11. Patrols and posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out in advance of the line when established.  
When captured ground is entered by enemy trenches, strong blocks will be constructed. For this work special parties will be told off beforehand and provided with the necessary stores. Bombers will be specially told off for the protection of all such blocks.  
Machine Gun Company will act in accordance with instructions already issued.

-----  
A C K N O W L E D G E.  
-----

*S. L. Milligan* Major,  
Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Distribution of Copies.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To whom.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Method.</u>
No. 1	File	-	-
2.	War Diary	-	-
3.	1st. Bn	1700	Orderly
4.	2nd. Bn	"	"
5.	3rd. Bn	"	"
6.	4th. Bn	"	"
7.	1st. Aust. M.G. Coy	"	"
8.	1st. A.L.T.M. Battery	"	"
9.	1st. Aust. Division.	"	D.R.
10.	2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	"	Orderly
11.	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	"	D.R.
12.	145th. Inf. Brigade	"	"
13.	1st. Aust. Divl. Artillery	"	"
14.	1st. Aust. F. Arty. Bde.	"	Orderly
15.	Lahore divl. Artillery	"	D.R.
16.	1st. Aust. Field Coy Engrs.	"	Orderly
17.	Staff Captain	"	"
18.	Bde. Signal Officer	"	"
19-24	Spare	-	-

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

18/8/16.

PROVISIONAL ORDERS FOR OPERATION TO  
TAKE PLACE THIS EVENING 18th. Aug. 1916.Reference Map: FERME DE MOUQUET 1:5000

1. The position of the 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade is as follows:-  
1st. Battalion. 34 D.6.9. along firing line to 28.C.9.0 facing North East and forming a defensive flank with Machine Gun fire bearing on enemy trenches about R.28.D.3.7. to 5.6. to 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ .5 and about 3.1. Two companies 1st Battalion in reserve at area X.4.A. and R.34.C.  
3rd. Battalion. R.28.D.1.2 to C.7.1. to road at 34.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .9  
4th. Battalion. Thence to R.33.B.8.5. to 5.5. to the South of quarry to R.33.A.8.1. joining up with 145th. Inf. Brigade on its left.
2. Enemy trenches which are recently made extend from R.34.B.8.7. to R.28.C.9.3. where there is a strong point thence Westwards in the direction of 28.C.2.1. and 2.2.  
A new trench runs from 28.C.0.1. Southwards to the trench from 34.A.3.5. to 27.D.9.1. The High trench 28.C.9.5 to 6.6. to 3.6. is the enemy's main line of defence. FERME DE MOUQUET and trenches South West and North East of it are occupied by the enemy.
3. An artillery barrage is to be placed on the enemy's trenches at Zero time before dark.  
3rd. Battalion - As the barrage lifts strong patrols with bombers will push up and occupy the following points :- R.28.C.9.2, R.28.C.9.3., (strong point), R.28.D.0.2., R.28.C.2.1., and 2.2. As soon as the patrols have occupied these points they will be followed by parties to clear intermediate trenches to occupy them and to consolidate.  
4th. Battalion.- Will seize and consolidate the following points :- R.28.C.0.1., R.27.D.9.1., trench from 28.C.0.1., to 34.A.0.9. to present line of trenches to QUARRY.
4. 2nd. Battalion will continue the service of supply, one company in support of 4th. Battalion R.34.C. One company near CHALK PIT, two companies and Headquarters WIRE TRENCH.
5. Brigade Headquarters will open at Advanced Report Centre C.E.R. at 1800.



Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

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1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO. 30

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

23/2/16.

Reference Maps : Sh. 57 D. 1:40,000  
 Sh. 11 LENS. 1:10,000

1. MOVE. The 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Group will march to "K" area tomorrow 24th. in accordance with attached march table Appendix I. "A" and will go into billets there.
2. STARTING POINT. The starting point will be the road junction at M.21.A.6.5. The 3rd. Battalion may join the column at M.9.A.8.3. if desired.
3. BILLETING PARTIES. Billeting parties as under will proceed today 23rd. to reconnoitre the new area those going to GEZAINCOURT will report to Lieut. N.M. CUTHBERT, attached to 1st. Inf. Bde. H.Q., at GEZAINCOURT Church at 1730.

Per Bn. - 1 Officer, 4 N.C.O's, interpreter.  
Other units 1 Officer, 1 N.C.O.

4. ENTRAINMENT The Brigade Group will entrain at DOULLENS NORTH in accordance with attached Train Schedule, Appendix I. "B". Strict punctuality is to be observed. C.C. each train will take steps to ensure that strict train discipline is enforced throughout the journey.
5. RATIONS. Rations will be carried as follows :-  
 1 day's Iron rations on man.  
 1 day's rations on man or in cookers.  
 1 day's rations in supply section of Train.  
 All ranks will entrain with full water bottles.  
 One day's forage (oats) will be carried in Supply Section of Train.
6. TRANSPORT. All 1st. Line Transport will travel filled. Baggage wagons of Train will entrain with units to which they are attached, rejoining Train as soon as possible after detrainment.

Supply sections of Train (filled) will entrain with their Coy. Headquarters.

7. DUTIES. The following duties will be found :-

- 1st. Bn. - Unloading party of 2 officers and 100 other ranks. They will travel on 1st. train and will detrain and report to the Div. or Brigade representative immediately on arrival at destination.
- 2nd. Bn. - Mining party of 1 officer and 65 other ranks. They will entrain before the Brigade; train arrangements will be communicated later.
- 3rd. Bn. - Working party of 2 officers and 100 other ranks to report to Div. Staff Officer at DOULLENS NORTH Station at 1800 on 25th. They must have 48 hours rations and will proceed by late train as directed.
- 4th. Bn. - Two representative officers for entrainment and detrainment duties to report to Div. H.Q. on at 1000 on 24th. They should have had previous experience if possible.

9. RETURN. A return showing the number and nature of guns and ammunition taken into the 2nd. Army Area will be furnished to Brigade Headquarters immediately after detrainment.
9. BDE. HD. QRS. The Brigade Office will close at LA VI COGNE at 1000 and reopen at the same hour at GEZAINCOURT.

-----  
 A C K N O W L E D G E .  
 -----

*S. Milligan*

Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

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2.	War Diary	--	--
3.	1st. Bn.	1420	Orderly
4.	2nd. Bn.	"	"
5.	3rd. Bn.	"	"
6.	4th. Bn	"	"
7.	1st. M.G. Coy	"	"
8.	1st. A.L.T.M. Battery	"	"
9.	No.2 Sig. Section	"	"
10.	No.2 Coy A.A.S.C.	"	"
11.	1st. Field Ambco.	"	D.R.
12.	3rd. Field Ambce.	"	Orderly
13.	1st. Field Coy	"	D.R.
14.	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	"	D.R.
1st	1st. Aust. Division	"	"
16.	Staff Captain	"	Orderly
.			

MARCH TABLE APPENDIX I. "A". *Appendix No. 8/16/12.78*

436 (Issued with 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Order No. 30)

Unit.	From.	To.	Time to pass startg. point.	Route.
1st. Bn.	-	BEAUVAL		under instructions from G.O.C.
2nd. Bn.	LA VICOONE	GEZAINCOURT	0900	3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade VERT GALAND FME- BEAUVAL-G.21.A.4.5 GEZAINCOURT.
Bde. Hd. Qrs.) M.G.Coy T.M.Batty No.2 Sig.Sec.)	do	do	1000	do
4th. Bn.	do	LONGUEVILLETTE	0930	BEAUVAL-G.21.A.4.5- A.27.C.3.9.- LONGUEVILLETTE.
3rd. Bn.	VAL DE MAISON	do	1030	BEAUVAL-G.21.A.4.5 GEZAINCOURT.
No.2 Cy.A.A.S.C.	LA VICOONE	GEZAINCOURT	1100	VERT GALAND FME- BEAUVAL-G.21.A.4.5- GEZAINCOURT.
3rd. F.Ambce.	do	BEAUVAL	1130	VERT GALAND FME- BEAUVAL.

*vide attached*

TRAIN SCHEDULE APPENDIX I. "B".

Date	Train No.	Time Unit to arrive at DOULLENS N.	Train Dept.	Unit.
Aug. 25	1.	1820	2119	1st. Inf. Bde. H.Q. " " " Sig.Sect. No.2 Coy Div. Train.
26.	4.	2120	0019	1st.Bn., 1st.M.G.Coy 1 Sect 1st. T.M.Battery (1/2)
	7.	0020	0319	2nd.Bn., 1st.M.G.Coy 1 Sect. 1st. T.M.Battery (1/2)
	10.	0320	0619	3rd.Bn., 1st.M.G.Coy 1 Sect.
	13.	0605	0904	4th.Bn., 1st. M.G.Coy 1 Sect
	16.	0920	1219	H.Q.Div.Engincers 1st. Field Coy.
	19.	1230	1534	D.H.Q., H.Q. Div.Artillery, H.Q.Div.Sig.Coy. Cable Section.
	22.	1520	1819	1st. Field Ambulance.



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MARCH TABLE.Appendix No. 8/16/12<sup>79</sup>

Amended in accordance with 1st. ANZAC Order No. 34.

Unit.	From	To.	Time to pass startg.point	Route.
2nd. Bn.	LA VICOONE	GEZAINCOURT	1015	Road through second "A" in BEAUVAL Sheet 11. LENS.
Bde. Hd. Qrs.) No.2 Sig.Sect.) M.G.Coy ) T.M.B. )	do	do	1030	do
3rd. Bn.	VAL DE MAISON	do	1045	do
No.2 Coy A.A.S.C.	LA VICOONE	do	1100	do
3rd. F.Ambce.	do	BEAUVAL	1115	
4th. Bn.	do	LONGUEVILLE	1130	via M.9.A.8.3. and CANDAS.
1st. Bn.		BEAUVAL	To follow Div. Train Coy of 3rd. Bde. Group leaving VAL DE MAISON at 1200	FME DU ROSEL.

This cancels APPENDIX I. "A" issued with Brigade Order No.30.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

23/8/16

*J. Sullivan* Major,  
Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Appendix 8/16/13

Total Casualties from noon on 15/8/16 to noon on 22/8/16.

K 11 OR  
W 3 LL  
M 6 OR  
SM 7 OR

436

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS.

Nil.

1st. Battalion.

Casualties not yet known. Complete list will be forwarded when this unit rejoins Brigade.

2nd. Battalion.

Killed. 12 other ranks.  
Wounded. 29 ,, ,, (including No.3705 Pte. W.BOWSHER self inflicted)  
Missing. 1 other rank.

3rd. Battalion

Killed. Lieut. R.F.BULKELEY on 17/8/16 and 29 other ranks.  
Wounded. Major D.T.MOORE on 18/8/16  
Lieut. C.H.D.CHAMPION on 16/8/16  
2/Lt. R.B.ALLPORT on 17/8/16  
2/Lt. H.H.FERGUSON on 18/8/16  
2/Lt. E.R.SHELLEY on 17/8/16  
2/Lt. F.T.MAISEY on 18/8/16  
2/Lt. C.O.CLARKE on 19/8/16  
2/Lt. B.C.BERRY on 18/8/16 (slightly at duty)  
and 124 other ranks.  
Missing. 5 other ranks.

4th. Battalion.

Killed. Capt. W.T.MCDONALD on 16/8/16 and 55 Other ranks.  
Wounded. Capt. R.M.T.MATTHEWS on 17/8/16  
Capt. J.B.OSBORNE on 18/8/16  
Lieut. L.M.LANE on 18/8/16  
2/Lt. R.L.TURNBULL on 18/8/16  
2/Lt. R.G.F.McMAHON on 16/8/16  
2/Lt. R.B.BENNETT on 16/8/16  
2/Lt. A.L.D.HART on 17/8/16  
2/Lt. G.H.HILL on 17/8/16  
and 229 other ranks (including 6 slightly at duty)  
Missing. 9 other ranks.

1st. M.G.Coy.

Killed. Lieut. J.G.McKAY on 19/8/16 and 4 other ranks.  
Wounded. 5 other ranks.

436

- 2 -

1st. Aust. L.T.M. BatteryWounded.

6 other ranks (including 1 slightly at duty)

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

Unit.	Officers			Other Ranks			Total.
	K.	W.	M.	K.	W.	M.	
2nd. Bn.	-	-	-	12	29	1	42
3rd. Bn	1	8	-	29	124	5	167
4th. Bn	1	8	-	55	229	9	302
1st. M.G. Coy	1	-	-	4	5	-	10
1st. A.L.T.M. Battery.	-	-	-	-	6	-	6
TOTAL	3	16	-	100	393	15	527
<i>1<sup>st</sup> Bn.</i>		3		28	66	6	103

3 - 19 -

128.459.21

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436 1st Aus. Inf. Bde. Report on operations near 82  
 Mouquet Farm, August 15th to 19th, 1916.

Aug 15th. 2 Cos. 4th. Bn. relieve 50th. Bn. in firing line S. of FERME DU MOUQUET, the right at R33B84 the left at R33A81. Very few trenches exist but shell holes are occupied and the Point 81 improved. Many of the 50th. Bn killed and wounded encumber such trenches as remain. The wounded are evacuated by the 1st. Bde. As touch is not obtained with 48th Division on the left our flank is extended 200 yds. further in that direction and refused in order to secure our communications.

Aug 16. During the night the remainder of the 13th Aus. Inf Bde. was relieved and the firing line from R 34 D79 to 34A38 occupied by the 3rd. Bn. The 1st Bn remained in Reserve N. of Sausage Valley and the 2d. Bn. undertook the service of man handling supplies for troops in the line, from CHALK PIT Damp. At 1430 the 14th Aus. Div. issued orders to 1st Bde to push forward saps to certain points in front of firing line. The 13th M.G. Co. had only 8 M.G.s in action and the 1st M.G. Coy. which completed relief at 0900 prepares positions for all M.G.s with a view to working in firing line by night. The 1st. Bn. and 75 men of the 2nd. Bn. are told off for entrenching work under the 1st. Fld. Co. Engineers. The 1st Pioneer Bn. commences work on the making of Communication trenches. The Artillery of 1st Aus Div. is responsible for barrage on the right of our position; 5th Lahore for centre and 11th Lahore and 18th Lahore for the left around MOUQUET FARM. Our artillery bombards enemy trenches in front of our position throughout the day. The fire does not appear to be concentrated on special trenches but to scatter all round the points designated which are R33B55 to 27, 55 648, 27D01 & 91, and just S. of R28C21. Our F.O.Os. were unable to communicate with their artillery except by pigeon or the slow system of runners. By previous arrangement our barrage was lifted to beyond the MOUQUET - COURCELETTE ROAD at 1900 to allow of the advance of our bombers and

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covering parties for the entrenching parties. This gave immunity from our shell fire to the enemy's infantry who were preparing as it transpired for a general attack on our N.W. front from R 28 C through the Quarry to 6th Avenue (SKY-LINE TRENCH) which was in the area covered by machine gun fire of the 48th Division though not continually occupied by them.

The enemy had commenced a persistent bombardment of our front line and support trenches from 1630 and at 1930 the bombardment intensified and small parties of the enemy with fixed bayonets were seen pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole. At 2000 enemy rifle and MG fire opened, the bombardment being continued and at 2045 the infantry attacked they were met by rifle and MG fire and our bombing platoons which were assembled ready to push forward repulsed them by a violent counterattack. In a few minutes the Germans were seen running back in different directions.

Simultaneously with the first Infantry attack H.E. shells were directed on the extreme right of our line and POZIERES was barraged on South & West. Enemy's infantry attacks were renewed throughout the night but only one other came within bombing range. The right battalion was able to bring very effective enfilade fire to bear to its left from Lewis MGs on the enemy, issuing from MOUQUET FARM Trenches.

The attacks were carried out on a narrow front against R 33 A 81, our left strong point. Great attempts to advance were made during the night in 6 waves. The last attempt of the enemy to mass for attack was at about 0230.

Owing to the enemy's shell fire our working parties were unable to reach the front trenches on the face that was attacked but the trenches facing E for 500 yds on our right were improved during the night. It was found that digging during daylight generally drew heavy enemy shell fire.

17th August.

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At 10.30 an enemy aeroplane fell in flames in our lines after half an hour's duel with one of our aeroplanes.

During last night the 3rd Bn. on extreme right pushed forward 3 saps and captured a prisoner 2 enemy machine guns and a telephone in NOMANS LAND

at 1500 large numbers of enemy were reported advancing towards our right from North of MARTINPUICH. Our artillery checked them.

Two men were sent to remain with right post of Bde. on our left which will not come forward and occupy 6th AVENUE in spite of our repeated requests. They claim to occupy shells holes near it at night.

During the night the whole firing line had to be remade particularly NW and SE of the Northern salient in which parts it had been obliterated by enemy's shell fire. The 1st Pioneer Battalion continued to improve the communication trenches.

Enemy barrage fire continued on our front system of trenches throughout the night.

18th August.

3 Battalions disposed in firing line and support trenches as follows:

1st Bn. 750 yds facing NE.

3d Bn. 500 " " N.

4th Bn 1000 " " NNW. with 1 Co. 2d Bn. in support

1st M.C. Coy. 6 V.M.Gs in rear of front line for direct fire, remainder indirect fire.

1st L T M Batty's mortars disposed for defence, 4 in reserve.

Bde. HQ to advanced report centre of X 10 A 53 own trenches

Our own Howitzers shelling

during the day. At 1320 they appeared to shell R 34 A 27

with 6 in. shells at 1330 R 28 C 18 was reported as

shelled by 9.2 in. at 2050 3d Bn reported shelled again

by our guns. There are no <sup>heavy</sup> artillery liaison officers in the Bde.

At 1600 our heavies shelled the 3rd Bn.

particularly heavily then it eased off. at

1900 it again commenced and grew in

density till the barrage timed for 2000 to

2100 began.

This barrage was on our front line

R 28 C 90 to 71 to 20. In three places our front

line was breached for 20 yards and some

casualties occurred. at 2220 this shelling

lifted on the right and in accordance with

orders to seize the enemy's trench at

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R 28 C 93 to 24 a strong patrol was pushed out to 93 and found the enemy holding the HIGH TRENCH at 95 to 36 with machine guns. The ground was very broken and the enemy pushed out a strong flanking party of about 30 men to the East of 93. Our patrol engaged the enemy and we occupied the point 93 subsequently connecting it to 81 by a dig.

A centre patrol pushed out to R 28 E 54 but came back at daylight having been unable to establish itself securely. No enemy trench existed at this point, which was under shell fire.

A left patrol of the 3rd Battalion to point 22 could not establish themselves there owing to our own barrage fire which continued on that point during the night and which was not more than 100 yds. from our firing line at this point.

Intermittent fire from our heavy artillery continued on the firing line on this front till early morning, most of it just clearing our line.

The 4th Bn on the left advanced to O1 and 91 and found the trenches wired and occupied by enemy bombers and M.Gs against which we could make no head-way until the arrival of M T Mortars which were being sent forward by the Division.

R. 33 B 56 was occupied and a strong point made there defended by 1 VMG,

3 LMGs and a bombers detachment.

The enemy continued to counterattack this point till 0900 on 19th inst. A trench was dug from point 55 past the Quarry to 82 on the left thus advancing the line 100 yds.

The 1st Bn. on the right advanced its line 150 yards at the valley road (34 B 24) and 120 yds on the left. This new line was continually improved until the Bn. was relieved on 23rd August.

The 1st Bn. reported our 18 pounder as well as Heavy Shells falling short throughout the night. owing to the breaking of telephone lines close touch could not be maintained with our artillery. The Quarry might be suitable for a wireless installation.

now that communication to it is improved

صاحب البعثة اللواتي سميتم باشا  
 بجل اسرور والاحترام بطر هذا لسنو  
 عنى بالمسؤول امام تعادتم دليلا على ما عملتم  
 به من انصاف وكرم تعادتم به نحو من البعثة  
 التي لا اقدر على احصائها . ولتني اذكر هنا البعثة  
 لبيير من فاقول :-

تناولت بيد اسرور والحمونية مبلغ الاربعة جنيه  
 التي ترممتم تعادتم وارتتموها مصاريف لولدي وفلدي  
 كسدي لينفق على ما يلزمه من الحاجيات التي يحتاجها  
 نظيره في مدرسة واقترعوه في وقت لولنت انا وال  
 حصل لي ما ظهر بيالي انه كتب اليه بالسلام وذا  
 بالنسبة لاشهد تعادتم الكثير في ظروف مثل  
 الظروف وفي ذلك برهانا قويا على عطفكم وشفتكم  
 التي لا يفتني ولحالة هذه الا انه طلب من الله جل  
 قدرته انه يديمكم في صحة جيدة ويرفع قدركم لتأدوا  
 واجباتكم الشريفة بقدرته وانه يكل كل عاقلكم بالحق  
 والظفر لان من لدن تعادتم كل عطف وشفقة  
 نحوي وولدي في استقبيل هذا واني لواحيب انه  
 احصي كل ما لكم من الايام البيضاء على وعلى اصالي  
 الكثير وانه لنفذ كل ما في دونه انه تنفذ فضايلكم  
 غير اني بكل اسف اخبر تعادتم اني اعتر  
 خدمة الحكومة بدون ادنى ذنب ليسوجب عذابي  
 ذلك الشهادة المظاهرة لي بذلك ولا في نظرا للرضى الا  
 الذي قضيه في الخدمة فاني لا اجدر امامي الا الله  
 عمل اقوم به ليصل لي من ورائه ما استطيع به  
 ما شئني وقد اعرضت الا انه نفسي للخدمة  
 اخرى ومنظر لنتي . وفي الختام تفضلوا  
 بقبول فائق الاحترام

محمد محمد الخواص



His Excellency El Gawa Smith Pasha  
 Sir

With most respectful  
 I bring the following to your  
 Excellency remembering your  
 greatest favour and kind  
 assistance you have done to  
 me.

With many thanks  
 I have received the £E 4  
 the expenditures you have  
 sent to my son, which  
 proves your kind pity  
 and almost.

I feel unable to do  
 any thing but ask God  
 the Great to prolong your  
 life and promote you to  
 higher ranks and enable  
 you to have the full  
 success in your honorable  
 deeds.

I regret to bring to your  
 kindness that I have been  
 discharged from the Govt. Service  
 without being guilty as directed in the  
 discharge Certificate in my possession &  
 owing to the long period I have served,  
 I am unable to find out some works  
 to perform so as to support my  
 life, I have applied for service  
 and waiting the result.

Your most obedient  
 Servant

Muhammad El Khawad

24.7.1916



Messages asking for our artillery to lift appeared to have no result hence the advance of 3<sup>d</sup> Bn. was held up. <sup>86</sup>

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Artillery order no 7 by G.O.C. P.A. 1st Army of 18.8.16 was received too late to acquaint battalions with its contents giving details of our barrage fire. The Brigade thus occupied points assigned to it for the night of 18<sup>th</sup>. August except R 28 C 22.01 and R 34 A 09 and the ground joining them to 93 the point occupied on the N.E. The 1st Bn remained in the line till 23<sup>d</sup>. inst. and the remainder of the Brigade was relieved by the 3<sup>d</sup> Bde. on 19<sup>th</sup>. inst.

N. M. Smythe  
Br General

Cmdy 1st Aus Inf Bde.

25.8.16

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1<sup>st</sup> Bde. (Inf)

## 1st Bn Report -

Report on operation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn in  
the time 16/8/16 to 29/8/16. -

1. On 16<sup>th</sup> of Aug the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn occupied  
two trenches and supplied  
working parties for Saps in the  
line. These parties were  
handed over to officers of the  
Field Engineers as Chalk Pit was  
instructed.

1<sup>st</sup> night no work was done  
as the Engineer officers considered  
the shelling too bad.

2<sup>nd</sup> night. One party did no work  
and the other party did a little  
but were shifted about by the  
officers in charge.

From reports by Co. Firing Line Bn  
and my officers I consider that  
the parties should have been at  
work. With in connection therewith  
suggest that all parties Engineers  
or otherwise should have  
instructions to report to and  
work under the orders of the  
Co. Firing Line. - This has  
been my experience and

The Co. Firing Line knows more about what is required than the Engineers. providing the work is set down for anything special. Co. Firing Line is responsible for his front and work is very often set down and supposed to be carried out by the Engineers without his knowledge. In consequence is not completed.

17/8/16. - Coy E was sent up to act as close support Coy to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. and occupied Drawway or Copse Avenue.

18/8/16. The Bn. moved up to the front line taking over the portion of trenches R 34 0 5 7 - to R 34 A 9 1/2 9 1/2 from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn.

19<sup>th</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn was relieved by the 10<sup>th</sup> Bn.

21/8/16. Operation by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde took place on the evening Monday at 1800. My dispositions were made so as to safeguard the flank of the attack. Nothing happened on our front.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Bn attacked on our left and were reported to have taken portion of the German 2<sup>nd</sup> line but in any case had to

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retire to their jumping off line  
 which was a new line dug the  
 previous night 30 to 40 yds in front.  
 Large numbers of men of all  
 units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde were all  
 over our trenches having lost  
 their way, and this was  
 due in my opinion to lack  
 of examination of the ground by  
 sufficient officers and guides.

20/8/16. The Bn was relieved by the  
 23<sup>rd</sup> Bn. The relief being completed  
 by 2030. Three Coy go away  
 early but B Coy was stopped  
 by very heavy shelling -  
 The last of the Bn arrived Buixpelle  
 at 2015.

No fighting took place by this unit  
 but we were very heavily shelled  
 at different periods each day  
 particularly after any special  
 shelling by our own artillery,  
 and our relief was seen by  
 enemy aeroplanes.

~~Patrol~~ The whole line was  
 protected at night by patrols  
 of Machine Guns and ordinary  
 patrols in front of new line

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That was being dug.  
 New Trenches) all the Bn with the exception  
 of men on patrol were digging  
 on the new saps and trenches.  
 Every night.  
 The greater portion of the new line  
 would be ready to use after  
 one night's extra digging. It will  
 be along way better than the  
 old one.

Casualties Killed 21 OR. wounded  
 3 officers + 80 OR. -

We were very lucky in only losing  
 very few in our relief. but that  
 included the LMG officer.

Copies of reports to 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde are  
 attached here with

Map showing new jumping off line  
 for the 10<sup>th</sup> Bn in black <sup>product</sup> and also  
 the new saps and trenches dug  
 mostly by the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. - Old lines  
 in blue and enemy lines red.

J. Krause  
 Col  
 Co 1 Bn.

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copy

3rd Inf Bde

Report on work done  
+ disposition during the time 0800 on  
21/8/16 to 0800 - 22/8/16 along front  
R 34 D 9 1/2 - 7 to R 34 A 9 1/2 - 9 - 1 1/2  
Bn Sector

Saps - Main work cleaning out, as  
saps were blown in. Considerably.  
Trench - Portion of new trench (d) to  
(f) damaged (d) deepened but had  
to be stopped here as it was very  
heavily shelled. Blown in.

Disposition - Same disposition as in report  
yesterday  
D Coy was withdrawn from the  
digging new trench at 2430 on  
account of shelling and were  
then held in readiness to support  
the 10th Bn but were not  
required.

Patrols Report nothing seen of Enemy  
along the whole front particularly  
where there were some snipers  
on left front.

Connection with } Patrol gained connection with  
R Bn } 20th Bn along g.b. 1  
straight line from our.

flank in forward trench  
60 yards straight but in trench

Operation } No. Divisional Order was received  
last night } as to artillery Barrage on time of  
starting the operation.

Enemy } No movement on our left front  
I observed yesterday at 1300 a

small sap running from the Enemy  
trench approximately from

R. 28 c 8 3 running S.E. in which  
were several Germans. - Sap 100 close  
for artillery - advised O.C. 15<sup>th</sup> Bn  
to get rifle grenades on to them.

Casualties 4 Killed 8 wounded all O.R.

Burials 13 yesterday 17 this morning

23/8/16. 1100

sgd

Jaskeane  
C.O. 15<sup>th</sup> Bn.

Report on work done along front R34 D. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 7. 10.  
R 34A 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 9 1<sup>st</sup> Br. Section from 0800 to 10<sup>th</sup> Inst.  
to 0800 on 21<sup>st</sup> Inst.

SAPS. 1. Work was carried out on all saps.  
(a) to (f) deepening + lengthening  
(a) is connected with (b) & continues about  
40 yards (c) has a T piece running  
toward (b) about 60 yards (a) has been  
considerably lengthened + carried N.W.  
+ joined to a new trench from (f) in  
front of a line of German Artillery  
dugouts in the valley. (c) has been  
lengthened but does not quite connect  
up with the line (d) to (f).  
(f) has been considerably deepened.

TRENCH (2) Trench running from (f) N.W. has  
also been deepened + lengthened reaching  
with 30 yards of a sap from R28 C. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 7  
made by 10<sup>th</sup> Br. - the latter part of the  
trench is very shallow.

NEW FRONT  
LINE - URGENT

(3) I consider the work of the above  
saps + trenches should be pushed  
forward as quick as possible for the  
following reasons -  
(a) It will connect up with the Bde. on  
our right if continued in that direction  
(b) a fair part of the line (a) to (c) comes  
onto the forward slope of the ridge +  
commands a good deal of ground toward  
the Chumney + toward the N.W. - the trenches  
(c) in front of sap (f) are just below the  
crest on the reverse slope + short  
forward saps onto the forward crests  
will command all the valley in front.  
also a large area toward the Chumney N.E.  
(c) It will leave the present fire trench  
for use as a communication trench  
as these present fire trenches are  
unused or such with the result



436 exceptionally very heavy congestion + consequent casualties.

(a) This new line will practically be free of dead bodies which is the reverse of the present trenches.

(e) It straightens up the line.

(f) It includes several German gun pits + dugouts which can be used as shelters for the men.

(4) The line was held last night with 3 standing patrols of L.M.G.'s + 3 ordinary patrols were out in front of new line.

5) DISPOSITION 3 Coys. in the line with two platoons in support.

1 Coy. in reserve in Copse Avenue all men of all Coys. at work on the front (new) line + saps during the night.

Casualties. 4 men killed + 16 wounded.

SALVAGE (9) All rifles, equipments, etc. collected + put in dumps along the trenches.

WORK (8) The work was not started till late on atc of heavy shelling by the enemy which also interrupted the work. The shelling also filled up saps in places.

work for tonight (9) Deepening + lengthening the trenches if the operation tonight does not interrupt.

operation (10) During the operation tonight the whole of tonight. If the new line will be held + in addition the patrols as usual in front.

Shelling (11) Heavy shelling by the enemy, took place at 19.50 - 21.20 + 05.30 in retaliation for our shelling + was on on our front line saps + around Br: 14.40. - one hit registering in Aid Post.

Stitcher }  
Parties } 12

Stitcher Parties should not be allowed to follow the trenches carrying wounded as during the heavy firing today. The Enemy had the whole of the front line well registered and I attribute this to the Bearers..

Fatigue }  
Parties } 13

Guides should be specially trained as the Fatigue parties are continually going astray. waiting in the trenches while enquiries are being made causing congestion for a considerable time - all fatigue parties being very large. This causing extra casualties.

Killed

14

It is suggested that all units be warned to make a big effort to bury all dead as soon as they are killed.

15

This report would have been earlier but a special personal inspection was made of all saps and trenches mentioned.

21/8/1916

Sgt Jas Keane Lt Col 1st Bn

21/1/1918

Ad. Coy 1st Bn

W. B. reports

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Appendix no.

21/1/18

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H.Q. 1<sup>st</sup> Inf. Bde.

Reports of 4<sup>th</sup> Bns actions on  
16<sup>th</sup> & 18<sup>th</sup> August asked for  
by Brigadier are attached  
hereto.

25/8/1916

J. H. Mackay Lt. Col.  
Commanding 4<sup>th</sup> Bn.

1. On the night 16<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> August a bombing attack by 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. was ordered to take place at 1900. In preparation for this attack 3 teams of Bombing Platoon were placed in D Co lines & extra supplies of bombs were placed there. Near the bombers a Lewis gun & team were also posted. Shortly before 1900 the enemy bombarded heavily our front line trenches & put a barrage in rear while at same time small parties of his infantry were seen advancing against our trenches; <sup>& some enemy snipers commenced firing.</sup> Rifle fire was opened against these parties & the bombing attack was postponed. The <sup>enemy</sup> bombardment continued & at times increased in intensity & losses & casualties were considerable. On each company front patrols were thrown out & about 2130 it was reported that a body of about 100 men were located on D Cos front. At first there was doubt as to whether this was a party of our own Engineers who were alleged to have gone out from 3<sup>rd</sup> Bn. front to dig a trench but as they got closer it was evident to C. S. M. Howarth that they were hostile & he seems to have taken the first action against them. The enemy advanced on about a 50 yds. front right against No 13 Platoon where the bombing teams were ready awaiting orders. The enemy were extended to about 4 or 5 paces & approached in definite lines with about 12 in each line & apparently 6 paces between lines. They came within 20 yds. of our line at a steady pace & then ran forward. At this moment the bombers opened on them also a Lewis Gun & rifleman while 14<sup>th</sup> & 15<sup>th</sup> platoons assisted with cross fire. The first 2 lines seemed to disappear & the rest turned & fled followed by our fire. At intervals throughout the night the enemy could be seen moving in front of our trenches but he made no further attack & by daylight all was quiet on the front. On the morning of 17<sup>th</sup> August 2/lt. A. J. Allen counted 14 dead Germans in front of 13<sup>th</sup> Platoon & it is likely others were killed & fell in shell holes which were extremely numerous & ~~obscured~~ <sup>impeded</sup> the view. Two wounded prisoners were brought into the lines but one subsequently died. Another man was advancing to our lines to give himself up when he was shot in the head & killed by a German from behind. This prisoner later stated that he belonged to 133<sup>rd</sup> Saxon Regt. & had been in the fourth line of the attack in being his duty to dig in. He stated that he left Armentières for the front on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1916.

2. An advance of 4<sup>th</sup> Bn. left was ordered to take place at 2100 on 18<sup>th</sup> August & new trenches to be dug during night 18/19<sup>th</sup> Aug.

Plan: - C Co to swing its left forward & entrench on line R 33B 8.5 - 5.5. A Co to seize position R 33B 5.5 & swing line forward to this point pivoting on Quarry at R 33B 23. Engineers to make strong point at R 33B 55 & dig communication trenches to rear.

C Co accomplished its advance with little opposition.

At about 2030 enemy shelled A Co's trenches heavily, burying a number & causing about 12 casualties. This reduced the total number in the company to 60 men. <sup>Large numbers of bombs & S.A.A. were also buried.</sup>

At about 2050 Major D. R. Brown considered it advisable to move forward into craters 20 yards ahead in order to collect & steady his men and to avoid the enemy's shells.

At 2055 two Company bombing teams rushed forward & occupied posts in the two trenches leading forward from point 55 & about 20 yds. from that point. (Trenches run from R 33B 55 to points 2/2.7 & 4.6 respectively). 2/Lieut. Turnbull & Cpl. Kirby who had previously reconnoitred well forward acted as guides.

The company moved forward & were on the desired line by 2115 but the party of Engineers had not arrived at that hour. The two bombing posts immediately came into contact with enemy bombers & were kept fighting throughout the night.

A Lewis Machine Gun was placed near each post & these kept back parties of the enemy who showed great determination in endeavouring to work to the rear & cut off the bombing posts. (Major Brown is of the opinion that the Lewis guns saved the situation). Two or three snipers were posted a

little in advance of point 5.5 & the remainder of the Company covered by a few scouts proceeded to dig in moving towards the left. Bombs were badly needed & were very scarce owing to stores having been buried by enemy shells.

At 22.30 the party of Engineers arrived bringing 4 bombs each. They worked on front line & communications till about 0300 on 19<sup>th</sup>. About 12 men of 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. dug in & helped to man the front line. Bombs were collected from all sources in the line & it was only by the energy of the Adjutant (Capt. H. A. Mann) & R.S.M. Stewart that a barely adequate supply could be got forward.

At about 0200 on 19<sup>th</sup> all the men in the left post including 2/Lt. Turnbull were made casualties by a shower of bombs, but the enemy did not take advantage of this & the post was remained without loss of ground. Enemy snipers were very busy & effective throughout the night & early morning & shot dead Cpl. Kirby & 5 men of 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn. Their bombers were very persistent & daring even in daylight. Two more Lewis guns & a Vickers gun had been sent forward during the night & about 0530 the enemy attacks desisted & from 0600 onwards all was quiet.

J. G. Mackay Lt. Col.

*Appendix 9/16/15*

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1st. AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER NO. 32.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

28th. August 1916.

Reference Maps : Sheet 28 YPRES 1:40,000  
ZILLEBEKE 1:10,000

1. RELIEF. The 1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade will relieve the 10th. Infantry Brigade in the centre section of the 4th. Division Sector, which section will become the left Section of the 1st. Aust. Division Sector.

The relief will be carried out in accordance with attached table, Appendix I., and will be completed by the night of the 1st./2nd. September.

Details of relief will be arranged direct between Commanding Officers concerned tomorrow 29th. instant.

Completion of relief will be at once reported to Brigade Headquarters.

2. MOVE. The move forward of troops by rail as far as YPRES Asylum will be arranged by Divisional Headquarters. Train arrangements will be communicated later.

3. SPECIALISTS. Under arrangements to be made by Commanding Officers, parties of Lewis gun, bombing, sniping and intelligence personnel, and officers and other ranks of the M.G. Coy, will be sent into the line on the 30th. instant.

el On the 29th. instant the Brigade Intelligence personnel will move into the line and rejoin the Brigade on relief; they will be rationed by the 10th. Infantry Brigade from the 30th. inclusive.

4. SIGNALLERS. Under arrangements to be made by the Brigade Signal Officer the following details will move into the line on the 30th. instant:-

- One complete relief for the Brigade Signal Office.
- 1 Sergeant and 2 men from each Battalion Signal Office.
- 1 Signaller per Company from the 2nd. and 3rd. Battalions.

5. TRENCH STORES. Trench, post, and billet stores, Secret Maps, defence schemes, and aerial photographs, will be taken over and receipt given.

6. TRANSPORT. Transport lines are situated at VLAMERTINGHE. Units will take over the transport lines of the units they relieve.

7. BDE. HD. QRS. Bde. H.Q. office will close at BUSSEBOOM at 2000 on 1st. Sept., and will reopen at RAINWAY DUGOUTS, I.21.C.5.8., at the same hour.

-----  
A C K N O W L E D G E.  
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*J. Minigam* Major,  
Brigade Major, 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Distribution of Copies.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To whom</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Method.</u>
1.	File	-	-
2.	War Diary	-	-
3.	1st. Aust. Bn.	1530	Orderly
4.	2nd. Aust. Bn.	"	"
5.	3rd. Aust. Bn.	"	"
6.	4th. Aust. Bn.	"	"
7.	1st. Aust. M.G. Coy	"	"
8.	1st. Aust. L.T.M.B.	"	"
9.	1st. Aust. Division.	"	D.R.
10.	4th. Imp. Division.	"	"
11.	10th. " Inf. Bde.	"	"
12.	11th. " Inf. Bde.	"	"
13.	12th. " Inf. Bde.	"	"
14.	2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	"	"
15.	Staff Captain	"	Orderly
16.	Bde. Signal Officer	"	"
17-20	Spare	-	-



RELIEF TABLE -- APPENDIX I.

Issued with 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Order No. <sup>31</sup>~~38~~.

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Date.	Unit.	From.	To.	To relieve	Guides to meet unit at	New H. Q.
Aug. 31/Sept 1st.	2nd. Bn.	ERIE HUTMENTS	Left sub-section trenches.	2nd. Seaforth Highlanders	YPRES Asylum Station at 2030	I.23.C.8.6.
do	3rd. Bn.	TORONTO "	Bde. Reserve	1st. R. Warwickshire Regiment	do	I.21.C.5.8
do	1st M.G. Coy	ERIE "		10th. M.G. Coy	do	I.22.C.2.7
do	1st. A.L.T.M.B	" "		10th. L.T.M.B	do	do
Sept. 1st/2nd	3rd. Bn.	Bde. Support	Right subsection trenches.	2nd. Royal Dublins	do	I.29.C.4.3
do	1st. Bn.	ERIE HUTMENTS	Right Reserve	3rd. Aust. Bn.	do	I.21.C.5.8
do	4th. Bn.	SCOTTISH "	Left Reserve	do	do	I.21.B.1.2
do	1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	BUSSEBOOM	RAILWAY DUGOUTS	10th. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	-	I,21.C.5.8.

Appendix No. 8/16/15

SECRET

Appendix No. 8/16/15. Copy No. 2102

436 1st AUST. INF. BRIGADE ORDER No. 32.

Brigade Headquarters,  
31st August 1916.

Reference Map: BELGIUM Sheet 28 N.W. 1: 20,000.

1. INFORMATION. The 11th Imperial Infantry Brigade will be on the left of the 1st Aust. Infantry Brigade Section and the 2nd Aust Infantry Brigade on the right. The 2nd. Aust. Infantry Brigade is disposed as follows; 7th Bn. in the right sub-section, 8th. Bn. in the left sub-section, 6th. Bn. in Brigade support.
2. MOVE. Train leaves BRANDHOEK Station, G12, at 2000 tonight. Troops to be ready to entrain at 1930. Each unit entraining tonight will send an Officer to report at 1900 to Lieut. H.F. WATSON who will act as entraining Officer. Transport will move by road.
3. MACHINE GUNS. The Lewis Gun Section of the 1st. Pioneer Bn. is attached to this Brigade and will be under the Tactical command of the O.C. 1st Machine Gun Company. The portion of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade which is in this Brigade Section will be relieved by the 1st Machine Gun Company before Sept. 3rd.
4. TRENCH STORES. On taking over Trench Stores, maps, photographs, documents, etc., a receipt will be handed over and a copy furnished to this Office for transmission to Divisional Headquarters.
5. COMMAND. On moving into the forward area units will come under the command of the G.O.C. 10th. Infantry Brigade. When the relief of the whole section is complete the command will be assumed by the G.O.C. 1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*S.H. Milligan* Major  
Brigade Major 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Time Issued: 1100.

Copy No.	To Whom
1	File
2	War Diary
3	1st Aust Bn
4	2nd "
5	3rd "
6	4th "
7	1st Aust MGCoy
8	1st Aust L.I. M. B.
9	1st Aust Div.

Copy No.	To Whom
10	4th. Imp. Div.
11	10th Inf. Bde.
12	11 "
13	12 "
14	2nd Aust Inf. Bde.
15	Staff Captain
16	Bde Signal Officer
17-20	Spare. Lt N.M. CUTHBERT
18	Spare
19	No 2 Coy. ARSC.
20	1st Aust Pioneer Bn.

for month of August 1916

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Bde. Hd. Qrs.

Appendix 8/16/16

1 OR previously reported missing now reported sick in hospital

1<sup>st</sup> Battalion

30 OR	reported last month missing - reported this month	
1 "	" " " " killed	" " " " wounded
1 "	" " " " missing	" " " " killed
1 "	" " " " wounded	" " " " killed

21 OR Killed

Lieut. C. B. WITBY wounded

" P. W. MCINTYRE do

2/Lt. R. A. MILLER do

72 OR Wounded

5 OR Missing

2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion

2/Lt. W. J. BALDOCK reported missing last month, reported this month Wounded

13 OR reported last month missing, reported this month Wounded

12 OR Killed

33 " Wounded

1 " Missing

3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion

13 OR reported last month missing, reported this month Wounded

Lieut. R. F. BULKELEY Killed

2/Lt. J. V. PESTELL do

30 OR Killed

Major D. T. MOORE Wounded

2/Lt. R. B. ALLPORT do

2/Lt. H. H. FERGUSON do

2/Lt. E. R. SHELLEY do

2/Lt. F. T. MAISEY do

2/Lt. C. O. CLARKE do

2/Lt. B. C. BERRY do

130 ~~OR~~ OR Wounded

Missing 5 OR. Lieut. C. H. D. CHAMPION (accident)

